John Simkin

Curtis LeMay and John F. Kennedy

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Curtis LeMay and JFK had utter contempt for each other. LeMay developed his reputation during the Second World War. When the United States entered the Second World War after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, LeMay was a lieutenant colonel and commander of the 305th Bomb Group. Five months later he was given the responsibility of taking the B-17 Flying Fortress unit to England. While based in England he pioneered daylight bombing, which the RAF had abandoned as being too costly in the deaths of its airmen.

Curtis LeMay was promoted to brigadier general on 28th September 1943. The following year he took over the 20th Bomb Group. Starting in August 1944, Lemay organized the bombing of targets in China, Manchuria and Japan. LeMay played an important role in devising the strategy of firestorms. This was achieved by dropping incendiary bombs, filled with highly combustible chemicals such as magnesium, phosphorus or petroleum jelly (napalm), in clusters over a specific target. After the area caught fire, the air above the bombed area, become extremely hot and rose rapidly. Cold air then rushed in at ground level from the outside and people were sucked into the fire.

This strategy was used successfully by LeMay in Japan. During 1945 some 100,000 tons of incendiaries were dropped on 66 cities killing over 260,000 people and destroying an estimated 2,210,000 buildings. The large number of Japanese buildings made of wood made it easy for the bombers to create firestorms. On the 9th and 10th March 1945, a raid on Tokyo devastated the city. Robert McNamara, who served with LeMay during the war, later claimed that they would have been prosecuted as war criminals if the United States had lost the war.

Curtis LeMay was involved in the discussions concerning the use of the B-29 Stratafortress bomber to drop the atom bomb on Japan. He helped select the targets of Hiroshima (6th August) and Nagasaki (9th August).

LeMay was appointed Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force in July 1957, serving until 1961 when he was made the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. In this post he clashed repeatedly with President John F. Kennedy and his Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara.

LeMay believed that nuclear war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. According to the Washington Post (19th July, 1961) he told people at a Georgetown dinner party that a nuclear war would break-out later that year and that major cities such as Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Chicago and Detroit would be destroyed.

On 20th July, 1961, at a National Security Council meeting, General Lyman Lemnitzer presented Kennedy with an official plan for a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. LeMay was known to be a strong supporter of this strategy. Kennedy was disgusted and walked out of the meeting and later remarked to Secretary of State Dean Rusk "and we call ourselves the human race."

Robert McNamara told David Talbot in an interview for the book Brothers: The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years about Curtis LeMay's views on nuclear war. "LeMay's view was very simple. He thought the West, and the U.S. in particular, was going to have to fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, and he was absolutely certain of that. Therefore, he believed that we should fight it sooner rather than later, when we had a greater advantage in nuclear power, and it would result in fewer casualties in the United States."

LeMay argued that the United States should launch 5,000 missiles on the Soviet Union. He was convinced this would destroy their 350 nuclear missiles and therefore prevent an attack on the United States. JFK and McNamara rejected this strategy as immoral.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, LeMay wanted to bomb Cuba. When JFK asked LeMay how the Soviet Union would respond if the United States bombed their missiles in Cuba. He replied that they would "do nothing". Kennedy argued for a blockade of Cuba. LeMay responded by accusing the president of acting like Neville Chamberlain during the Munich Crisis and that the blockade scheme was "almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich".

Ted Sorenson, who was at the meeting later commented: "Telling Kennedy this is like Munich, is too soft, and the American people will think so too! That's what outraged me - a general telling the president of the United States what the people think."

Thirteen days after the crisis began, Khrushchev announced that he would withdraw the missiles from Cuba. LeMay was not happy with this outcome and told a friend: "We had a chance to throw the Communists out of Cuba. But the (Kennedy) administration was scared to death (the Soviet Union) might shoot a missile at us." He opposed the naval blockade, and after the end of the crisis, argued that Cuba be invaded anyway, even after the Russians agreed to withdraw.

On 13th March, 1962, General Lemnitzer, with the support of LeMay, presented McNamara with a top-secret memo, urging JFK to order a variety of shocking incidents to create a rationale for invading Cuba. Code named Operation Northwoods, the memo suggested that the administration should arrange a terror campaign in Miami and Washington that would create international revulsion against the government of Fidel Castro.

After the assassination of JFK, Curtis LeMay enjoyed a better relationship with President Lyndon B. Johnson. LeMay argued that by using the latest technology, North Vietnam could be blasted "back to the Stone Age." Others pointed out that "terror" raids on civilian populations during the Second World War had not proved successful and claimed that a better strategy would be to bomb selected targets such as military bases and fuel depots.

Lyndon B. Johnson preferred the latter proposal but was aware he would have difficulty convincing the American public and the rest of the world that such action was justified. He therefore gave permission for a plan to be put into operation that he surmised would eventually enable him to carry out the bombing raids on North Vietnam.

Operation Plan 34A involved the sending of Asian mercenaries into North Vietnam to carry out acts of sabotage and the kidnapping or killing of communist officials. As part of this plan, it was decided to send US destroyers into North Vietnamese waters to obtain information on their naval defences. On August 2, 1964, the US destroyer, "Maddox" was fired upon by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. In retaliation, "Maddox" fired back and hit all three, one of which sank. The "Maddox" then retreated into international waters but the next day it was ordered to return to the Gulf of Tonkin.

Soon after entering North Vietnamese waters, Captain Herrick reported that he was under attack. However, later he sent a message that raised doubts about this: "Review of action makes reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather reports and over-eager sonar men may have accounted for many reports. No actual sightings by "Maddox". Suggest complete evaluation before further action."

Johnson now had the excuse he had been waiting for and ignored Captain Herrick's second message. He ordered the bombing of four North Vietnamese torpedo-boat bases and an oil-storage depot that had been planned three months previously.

President Johnson then went on television and told the American people that: "Repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defence, but with a positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak tonight."

The Congress approved Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam and passed what has become known as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution by the Senate by 88 votes to 2 and in the House of Representatives by 416 to 0. This resolution authorised the President to take all necessary measures against Vietnam and the NLF.

On 2nd March, 1964, LBJ telephoned McNamara, to prepare a statement on Vietnam. Two days later, McNamara issued a statement rejecting withdrawal, neutralization, or American ground troops. This was discussed with the five Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell Taylor argued for “the progressive and selective attack against targets in North Vietnam”. General LeMay advocated an immediate “hard blow”. Johnson replied he did “not want to start a war before November” (the date of the 1964 presidential election).

The Republican Party surprisingly nominated the extreme conservative, Barry Goldwater. During the election campaign Goldwater called for an escalation of the war against the North Vietnamese. In comparison to Goldwater, LBJ was seen as the 'peace' candidate. People feared that Goldwater would send troops to fight in Vietnam. Johnson, on the other hand, argued that he was not willing: "to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."

In the 1964 presidential election. Johnson easily defeated Goldwater by 42,328,350 votes to 26,640,178. Johnson gained 61 per cent of the popular vote, giving him the largest majority ever achieved by an American president.

After the election LeMay was disappointed that Lyndon B. Johnson did not order a sustained bombing campaign like the one he organized against Germany and Japan during the Second World War. Once again LeMay clashed with McNamara. According to Daniel Ellsberg if it had not been for McNamara, no one would have stopped LeMay "from firebombing or nuking Vietnam".

In February, 1965, LeMay retired from the army. Patrick J. Frawley of the right-wing pressure group, the American Security Council (ASC), approached LeMay about standing against liberal Senator Thomas Kuchel. However, the candidacy went to Max Rafferty, who unseated Kuchel in the primary but lost to Democrat Alan Cranston in the election.

George Wallace, the racial segregationist, persuaded LeMay to become his running-mate in the newly formed American Independent Party. Wallace had a 21% approval rating until LeMay gave a nationally televised press conference where he argued that the government should consider using nuclear weapons to bring an end to the Vietnam War. This shocked the American public and LeMay's comments helped Richard Nixon win an easy victory in 1968.

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John,

Reading about LeMay's reaction to any foreign problem - bomb them, reminded me of one Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundy's deputy who wrote postition papers supporting the carpet bombing of North Vietnam.

Rostow was also one of the first to suggest LBJ form a blue ribbon commission to report on the assassination, and I now suspect, the leak to the anti-Castro Cubans that JFK was engaged in backchannel negotiations with Castro.

According to Dick Russell's report at his web site, Rostow told the Cubans that he learned the secret of the backchannel talks from Henry Cabot Lodge. (See Report on talks with Cubans). More likely it was Bundy, who was in on the talks and in fact suggested they be pursued. Attributing it to Lodge (not in the loop) or UN ambassador Stevenson (in the know) only deflects from Bundy.

Rostow's leak to the Cubans, I believe, had a trigger effect among the Cubans who were told this.

Rostow's support of LeMay's bombing policy is only the tip of the iceberg.

BK

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John,

Reading about LeMay's reaction to any foreign problem - bomb them, reminded me of one Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundy's deputy who wrote postition papers supporting the carpet bombing of North Vietnam.

Rostow was also one of the first to suggest LBJ form a blue ribbon commission to report on the assassination, and I now suspect, the leak to the anti-Castro Cubans that JFK was engaged in backchannel negotiations with Castro.

According to Dick Russell's report at his web site, Rostow told the Cubans that he learned the secret of the backchannel talks from Henry Cabot Lodge. (See Report on talks with Cubans). More likely it was Bundy, who was in on the talks and in fact suggested they be pursued. Attributing it to Lodge (not in the loop) or UN ambassador Stevenson (in the know) only deflects from Bundy.

Rostow's leak to the Cubans, I believe, had a trigger effect among the Cubans who were told this.

Rostow's support of LeMay's bombing policy is only the tip of the iceberg.

BK

I imagine he also told his brother, Eugene V. Rostow, about this. He was a member of the American Security Council (ASC). As was Ray S. Cline, Thomas J. Dodd, Lyman Lemnitzer, John K. Singlaub and Patrick J. Frawley.

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John,

Reading about LeMay's reaction to any foreign problem - bomb them, reminded me of one Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundy's deputy who wrote postition papers supporting the carpet bombing of North Vietnam.

Rostow was also one of the first to suggest LBJ form a blue ribbon commission to report on the assassination, and I now suspect, the leak to the anti-Castro Cubans that JFK was engaged in backchannel negotiations with Castro.

According to Dick Russell's report at his web site, Rostow told the Cubans that he learned the secret of the backchannel talks from Henry Cabot Lodge. (See Report on talks with Cubans). More likely it was Bundy, who was in on the talks and in fact suggested they be pursued. Attributing it to Lodge (not in the loop) or UN ambassador Stevenson (in the know) only deflects from Bundy.

Rostow's leak to the Cubans, I believe, had a trigger effect among the Cubans who were told this.

Rostow's support of LeMay's bombing policy is only the tip of the iceberg.

BK

Bill,

Correct me if I am wrong, but wasn't the leak to the Cubans via Felipe Vidal Santiago?

James

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John,

Reading about LeMay's reaction to any foreign problem - bomb them, reminded me of one Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundy's deputy who wrote postition papers supporting the carpet bombing of North Vietnam.

Rostow was also one of the first to suggest LBJ form a blue ribbon commission to report on the assassination, and I now suspect, the leak to the anti-Castro Cubans that JFK was engaged in backchannel negotiations with Castro.

According to Dick Russell's report at his web site, Rostow told the Cubans that he learned the secret of the backchannel talks from Henry Cabot Lodge. (See Report on talks with Cubans). More likely it was Bundy, who was in on the talks and in fact suggested they be pursued. Attributing it to Lodge (not in the loop) or UN ambassador Stevenson (in the know) only deflects from Bundy.

Rostow's leak to the Cubans, I believe, had a trigger effect among the Cubans who were told this.

Rostow's support of LeMay's bombing policy is only the tip of the iceberg.

BK

Bill,

Correct me if I am wrong, but wasn't the leak to the Cubans via Felipe Vidal Santiago?

James

http://www.dickrussell.org/articles/jfkcuban.htm

Dick Russell (Whose probably off fishing somewhere right now):

Exile militant Felipe Vidal Santiago, arrested on a 1964 sabotage mission into Cuba, told his captors that in Washington, DC in December 1962 he met with a lawyer/lobbyist connected to a "Citizen's Committee to Free Cuba." This lawyer informed Vidal Santiago of a conversation he'd had with Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, soon to be US ambassador to South Vietnam, who said he'd heard from Kennedy aide Walt Rostow of "a plan to open a dialogue with Cuba."

"Vidal told us he was very surprised," says Escalante. In fact Vidal, infuriated and betrayed, had alerted his exile cohorts, as well as a CIA contact, Colonel William Bishop. "It was almost like a bomb, an intentional message against Kennedy." Vidal was also an information conduit for General Edwin Walker, the ultra-right Texan paramilitary leader at whom Oswald had allegedly taken a shot in April 1963. And FBI files call Vidal a "very close friend" of Miami mobster John Martino, who intimated to family and associates that he had foreknowledge of the JFK assassination.

James, is this your source or do you have another line?

December 1962 seems to early for betrayal of Lisa Howard/Atwood/Lachuga connection, but I may be wrong.

Will bring this thread back to General LeMay, who may have been my father's commander in the 8th Army Air Force in England in 1943, though I don't think they crossed paths.

BK

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The Air Force connections to the assassination of President Kennedy are significant.

- One of the brothers of the accused assassin had served in the Coast Guard when LHO and his mother visited them in NYC, then enlisted in the Air Force, and was stationed at San Antonio at the time of the assassination. The post - assassination USMC investigation of LHO, the military say, was actually an investigation of his brother.

- Ed Lansdale was Air Force.

- Col. Lawrence Orlov, who accompanied George DeMohrenschildt in his first, unannounced visit to the Oswald appartment, was an Air Force Colonel.

- The Air Force was part of the leafleting projects.

- The Air Force runs the Executive Air Fleet - AF1, the VP and Cabinet planes, all of which use Collins Radio communicaitons equipment, as do all SAC bombers and NASA, which must utilize the LIBERTY (relay) STATION, at the Collins Radio HQ in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

-Art Collins, founder of Collins Radio, was good, personal friends with Gen. LeMay (See photo of them together), as well as Admiral Byrd, supplying them both with radio equipment for special missions.

-At the time of the assassination, according to the Andrews AFB Logs, LeMay was in Canada (probably at a SAC base), and immediately flew back to Washington D.C., where Paul O'Conner says LeMay was, at least for awhile, the senior officer in the autopsy room.

- Today, the 8th US Air Force has been assigned an additional new mission - conducting U.S. Military activities and waging war in Cyberspace.

-BK

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James, is this your source or do you have another line? (Bill Kelly)

Bill,

Yes, I do remember reading that now. I also heard a similar thing from one of the Dallas Alpha 66 guys who claimed that Vidal had alleged contacts into the White House. I assume this is what he meant.

Also in addition to your Air Force connections, we can add John Adrian O'Hare (William Bishop), who amongst other things was supposedly a Master Sergeant in the Air Force Reserves.

James

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James, is this your source or do you have another line? (Bill Kelly)

Bill,

Yes, I do remember reading that now. I also heard a similar thing from one of the Dallas Alpha 66 guys who claimed that Vidal had alleged contacts into the White House. I assume this is what he meant.

Also in addition to your Air Force connections, we can add John Adrian O'Hare (William Bishop), who amongst other things was supposedly a Master Sergeant in the Air Force Reserves.

James

Yes, James, Forgot JAO aka WB.

And then there's the USAF sidearm holster strap that was attached to the rifle found at the TSBD. Where'd that come from?

As for the Dec. 62 "leak" of JFK backchannel negotiations with Castro, it can't be the Lisa Howard/Wm. Attwood - Lachuga talks because Howard didn't meet Castro until April 63 and Atwood and Lachuga didn't get involved until August.

So the Dec. 62 "leak" appears to be more of wishfull thinking or a Northwoods type provocation, before the real thing started happening.

Unless there was another, earlier approach.

BK

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LeMay, Air Force General Curtis

From: The Kennedy Tapes :

"The Pacific War that had commenced at Pearl Harbor ended with Japan's surrender in August 1945….Curtis LeMay, who would be the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in October 1962, and Kennedy's most hawkish advisor, had been transferred from the European theater to take over the 20th Air Force, based on Guam. Slightly older than Rusk, he had joined the Army Air Corps in 1928, leaving Ohio State University without a degree. The mission of LeMay's command was strategic bombing of the Japanese home islands. After analyzing the command's operations, LeMay ordered a complete change in tactics. The B-29s had been flying at high altitude in order to be safe from antiaircraft fire. LeMay calculated that at much lower altitudes there might be a somewhat greater loss of aircraft, but that this disadvantage would be more than offset by increases in bomb loads and in bombing accuracy. Experience seemed to prove him right…."

"An admiring observer of LeMay's management of the 20th Air Force was Army Air Force Lt. Colonel Robert S. McNamara, who would later be Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, and LeMay's civilian boss. McNamara was less than a year older than Kennedy. He, too, came from Irish immigrants, but his forebears had taken the Panama route to California…McNamara and LeMay didn't see eye to eye during the missile crisis. Indeed, they may not have seen eye to eye in 1945, when LeMay was clearly gratified not only the cost-effectiveness of his operations but by their consequences. Of the March 1945 raid, LeMay boasted later, 'We burned up nearly sixteen square miles of Tokyo,' then quoted the official report…'There were more casualties than in any other military action in the history of the world.' LeMay also had command responsibility for the special bomber group that attacked Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and his attitude toward the first atomic bombs was dismissive. He rejected the notion that they were somehow special, morally or otherwise. 'The assumption seems to be,' he wrote, 'that it is much more wicked to kill people with a nuclear bomb, than to kill people by busting their heads with rocks.' At least in later years, McNamara would come to argue vehemently that nuclear weapons were special and ought never to be used."

"McNamara, [Robert] Lovett's nominee for Defense, was president of the Ford Motor Company, where he had gone after World War II…

"On October 14 a high flying U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the American Strategic Air Command flew a limited photographic mission over Cuba…During October 15, experts at the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), in a nondescript building at 5th and K in Washington, pored over photos from the October 14 U-2 flight…"

October 19th Cabinet Room.

Taylor: Well, I would just say one thing and then turn it over to General LeMay. We recognize all these things, Mr. President. But I think we'd all be unanimous in saying that really our strength in Berlin, our strength anyplace in the world, is the credibility of our response under certain conditions. And if we don't respond in here in Cuba, we think the credibility is sacrificed.

President Kennedy: That's right. That's right. So that's why we've got to respond. Now the question is: What is our response?

LeMay: Well, I certainly agree with everything General Taylor has said. I'd emphasize, a little strongly perhaps, that we don't have any choice except direct military action. If we do this blockade that's proposed, a political action, the first thing that's going to happen is your missiles are going to disappear into the woods, particularly your mobile ones. Now, we can't find them, regardless of what we do, and then we're going to take some damage if we try to do anything later on.

President Kennedy: Well, can't they put some of these undercover,….now that they've been alerted?

LeMay: there is a possibility of that. But the way they line these others up – I'll have to say it's a small possibility…I don't think there are any hid….Now as for the Berlin situation, I don't share your view that if we knock off Cuba, they're going to knock off Berlin. If we don't do anything in Cuba, then they're going to push on Berlin and push real hard because they've got us on the run….

President Kennedy: What do you think their reply would be?

LeMay: I don't think they're going to make any reply if we tell them that the Berlin situation is just like it's always been. If they make a move, we're going to fight. I don't think it changes the Berlin situation at all, except you've got to make one more statement on it. So I see not other solution. This blockade and political action, I see leading into war. I don't see any other solution. It will lead right into war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.

[Pause]

LeMay: Because if this whole blockade comes along, MiGs are going to fly….and we're just going to gradually slip into a war under conditions that are at great disadvantage to us, with missiles staring us in the face, that can knock out our airfields in the southeastern portion of the United States. And if they use nuclear weapons, it's the population down there. We just slipped into a war under conditions that we don't like. I just don't see any other solution except direct military intervention RIGHT now.

Anderson [Adml. George] : Well, Mr. President, I feel that the course of action recommended to you by the Chiefs from the military point of view is the right one. I think it's the best one from the political point of view….

LeMay: ….There's one other factor that I didn't mention that's not quite our field, which is the political factor…I think that a blockade, and political talk, would be considered by a lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this. And I'm sure a lot of our own citizens would feel that way, too. You're in a pretty bad fix, Mr. President.

President Kennedy: What did you say?

LeMay: You're in a pretty bad fix.

[Transcript note: Kennedy makes an unclear, joking reply.]

Actually, the response is pretty clear: President Kennedy: "...You're in it with me."

[in the film "13 Days" Kennedy's reply is: "If I'm not mistaken you're in the fix with me." ]

The failure of the Miller Center's Presidential Recordings Project (See: Zelikow/Holland) to properly transcribe these tapes, specifically this important exchange, led to servere criticism of their methods and policies.

Zelikow then took a break from the Miller Center to run the 9/11 Commission and work with Condi Rice.

BK

Edited by William Kelly

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Good to see prime suspect LeMay get the attention he richly deserves. Very good summary.

On 20th July, 1961, at a National Security Council meeting, General Lyman Lemnitzer presented Kennedy with an official plan for a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. LeMay was known to be a strong supporter of this strategy.

Chillingly, all the joint chiefs approved the plan.

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/northwoods.html

...

In February, 1965, LeMay retired from the army.

...

Correction: retired from the Air Force.

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Just saw "Thirteen Days" on TNT. A great movie. It certainly showed the clash between the Kennedys and the military and showed JFK in what many considered his noblest hour.

But for Myra to call Gen. LeMay a "prime suspect" in the assassination is pure hogwash. There is not one scintilla of evidence linking LeMay to the assassination. This reminds me of Robert Welch calling President Eisenhower a Communist. And another example of why VB can riducule the assassination research community.

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The prime suspect in the JFK assassination is Gen. Curtis LeMay.

After all, he detested both JFK and RFK.

In fact, the Kennedys were trying to put him in jail and/or deport him on the very date that JFK was assassinated.

He had made threats against the life of JFK.

Jack Ruby had ties to the organization he headed.

While hospitalized and sedated in the 1980s, he made statements about killing kennedy when Kennedy got to Dallas.

At the time of the assassination, David Ferrie was working for him.

Oops, sorry, that description fits Carlos Marcello, not Curtis LeMay! As far as I know, LeMay had a distinguished and unblemished military record and no history of ever participating in any criminal enterprise. And unless I missed something he never expressed to anyone taking any violent action against the Kennedys. Nor did he have any connection with Jack Ruby.

Edited by Tim Gratz

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The prime suspect in the JFK assassination is Gen. Curtis LeMay.

After all, he detested both JFK and RFK.

In fact, the Kennedys were trying to put him in jail and/or deport him on the very date that JFK was assassinated.

He had made threats against the life of JFK.

Jack Ruby had ties to the organization he headed.

While hospitalized and sedated in the 1980s, he made statements about killing kennedy when Kennedy got to Dallas.

At the time of the assassination, David Ferrie was working for him.

Oops, sorry, that description fits Carlos Marcello, not Curtis LeMay! As far as I know, LeMay had a distinguished and unblemished military record and no history of ever participating in any criminal enterprise. And unless I missed something he never expressed to anyone taking any violent action against the Kennedys. Nor did he have any connection with Jack Ruby.

Me thinkust the Tim doth protest to much.

LeMay was a cold war lunatic, during his time in the JCS, defcom was CONSTANTLY on red alert, he advocated dropping America's entire nuclear stockpile on the Soviet Union, and doing the same thing to Cuba, he was also one of the main supports/advocates of operation Nortwoods. He christened Kennedy a "no win chief" and an appeaser of Communism.

Does this mean he was instumental in the assassination, no, but neither does it earn him a get out of jail free card. I find it entirely reasonable that LeMays troubled relationship with his Chief is examined in light of his well documented enmity towards all things Kennedy.

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Stephen, granted Gen. LeMay had rather significant policy differences with JFK but that hardly makes him an assassin.

Now if Dallas would have been destroyed by an errrant American nuclear weapon on November 22, 1963, then I guess my position on the culpability of Gen. LeMay might be a bit different!

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