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Art Lundahl – The Briefer

Dino Brugioni dedicates his book "Eyeball to Eyeball" (Random House, 1991) "to Arthur C. Lundahl. His vision and leadership made photo interpretation the guardian of the national security."

Brugioni wrote: …Concomitant with Johnson's development of [special Kodak film, Land cameras &] the U2, Lundahl began to structure the intelligence organization within the CIA required to exploit the imagery acquired by the U2. Lundahl was given a free hand in recruiting and selecting personnel. Early in 1955, Hans "Dutch" Scheufele, William F. Banfield, and I were told by Dr. James M. Andrews, the director of the Office of Central Reference, and Dr. Joseph Becker, his executive officer, that we had new jobs and that we were not to discuss our new assignments with anyone.

I had been recruited by the CIA in March 1948 and was a member of a unit responsible for creating the Agency's industrial register of detailed information on foreign-production facilities worldwide…..

…Lundahl, aware of the difficulties encountered by the photo interpreters during World War II, conceived of his organization as a wagon wheel. The photo interpreters would be the hub of that wheel and the radiating spokes of specialists would make the wheel turn….in Q Building and, later, Quarters I – an abandoned barracks that housed a WAVE contingent during World War II…Photo-interpretation had traditionally been the private preserve of the military, especially the Air Force, which was extremely sensitive to the Agency's encroachment on its territory.

…During this period, Lundahl and his executive officer, Chick Camp were also involved in negotiating a permanent home for the center. The nondescript Steuart Motor Car Co. Building was selected in a crime-ridden area of the Washington ghetto at 5thand K Streets, NW. the four upper floors of the building would become the division's home, while the three lower floors would still be occupied by the motor car company, along with the Steuart Real Estate Office. The building was not air conditioned, and there were heating problems in winter….

Lundahl met with the Agency's deputy director for intelligence, Robert Amory, about reorganizing the organization to accommodate the service elements. Amory agreed and Lundahl chose the title National Photographic Interpretation Center for his new organization.

Air Force Colonel Osmond "Ozzie" J. Ritland had been working with Bissel, and he and lower-ranking Air Force officers were doing everything possible to aid the CIA in its photo-collection and interpretation efforts.

Meanwhile, at the Pentagon, there was an angry undercurrent as to how the Air Force could allow a task properly assigned to them slip away to the CIA. Air Force photo-interpretation units were directed not to cooperate with Agency personnel in their attempt to establish a photo-interpretation center. At Omaha, General Curtis LeMay regarded SAC as the free world's primary deterrent to the Soviet Union and assumed that it should have the dominant role I acquiring strategic intelligence. While General LeMay cooperated with the Agency in providing logistical support, he too, to paraphrase one of his senior officers, was 'bent out of shape' because the Agency was becoming involved with photo-interpretation. In one of his staff meetings, LeMay said about the U2, "We'll let them develop it and then we'll take it away from them."

The first U2 mission over the Soviet Union took place on July 4, 1956…Photo interpreters at the center looked at the photographs with abject fascination. A number of briefing boards were produced….Lundahl showed the intelligence significance of each board as the president listened intently. Lundahl remembered that the president "asked questions about very specific targets that were of great national interest. He was impressed with the quality of the photography and asked questions about the resolution and the altitude the pictures were made from. He also asked questions about intercept attempts and questions about any Soviet reaction." Lundahl described the president as being "warm with satisfaction" after seeing the results from the first mission. A warm and friendly relationship developed. Eisenhower admiring Lundahl for his articulate presentations and Lundahl enjoying the president's support for the reconnaissance programs.

It was an exciting era – a new age of discovery, and, for the first time, we had the capability to derive precise, irrefutable data on the vast land mass and physical installations of our principal adversary – and the data was only a few days old. It was also a learning and collaborative experience between the policymakers, intelligence analysts and photo interpreters. The analyst literally stood at the photo interpreter's shoulder and was made acutely aware of the exploitation process and of the photo interpreter's nuances and jargon. The policymakers began comparing the information derived from the U2 with other sources of information. Often when presented with information from other sources, the president would ask, "How does this compare with the U2 information?"

These missions were generating accurate, current information in greater quantities than had ever been contemplated. Much to our surprise, the Russians had not employed any camouflage and concealment efforts. Time and again, we knew we were reporting information that was dispelling existing notions and intelligence estimates, and we took a certain vicarious pleasure in proving the value of aerial photography over other intelligence sources. Analysts began reevaluating assumptions regarding Soviet strategic capabilities. Within a few weeks, analysis of the U2 photography had dispelled the bomber-gap myth.

Lundahl's combination of energy, memory, intelligence, knowledge, and articulateness was making quite a name for him and the art of photo interpretation. After the president was briefed on the takes from each mission, Lundahl would proceed to the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, congressional leaders, and the chiefs of the various intelligence directorates. Lundahl quickly became the most respected and honored intelligence officer in the intelligence community. He was a superb photo interpreter and photogrammetrist and could articulate the characteristics and technical specifications of the new collection system. This ability, combined with a warm enthusiasm and a strong empathy with his audiences, was daily proving the value of photo intelligence in the estimate process. After each mission, Kelly Johnson would come to the Center and we would brief him on the results of the mission. Such other distinguished visitors as General Jimmy Doolittle, Dr. Edwin Land, and Dr. George Kistiakowsky also came to our nondescript but vital facility in the Steuart Building.

On May 1, 1960, just fifteen days before a scheduled four-power summit conference was to convene in Paris, Gary Power's U2 air-plane was brought down by an indirect hit from a near-miss SA-2 missile near Sverdlovsk, in the USSR….

…A furious debate ensued in the Senate, …To quell the debate, Allen Dulles decided to brief the entire Senate on the benefits that were derived from the U2 program.

Mr. Lundahl was told that he would be allowed precisely thirty minutes and that this should be the briefing of his lifetime. Lundahl gave us the task of organizing the effort, and I carefully reviewed all the contributions that the U2 missions had made to the national estimate process, along with the many crises wherein the intelligence derived had been employed to resolve policy issues worldwide. A number of spectacular briefing boards were created, and Lundahl rehearsed himself intently on the substantive content of the boards, to assure that he could effectively deliver the information within the prescribed thirty minutes.

Lundahl remembers the chamber he and Dulles entered as being "filled with senators, many in angry or combative moods." Mr. Dulles, wearing one of his usual English tweed suits, introduced Lundahl. He then lit his curved tobacco pipe and settled back to enjoy Lundahl's startling presentation, which upon completion provoked a standing ovation from the senators present. Mr. Dulles was so surprised by the reaction that when he rose to his feet, his lit pipe tumbled onto his lap, setting his tweed coat afire. Lundahl, taken aback, did not know whether to simply stand there and accept the senators' acclaim or to seek a glass of water to throw on his inflamed director.

In Paris,…Lundahl, Cunningham, and a translater were driven to the Elysee Palace and escorted to de Gaull's office. De Gaulle was alone. Lundahl opened the package of briefing materials and moved toward de Gaulle in order to brief him at his desk. De Gaulle rose, walked toward Lundahl, and asked him to place the graphics on a large conference table, where he stood looking down at them....Lundahl handed him a lage magnifying glass. De Gaulle asked a number of questions…His initial response to what he saw was expressed, cryptically, in French, "Formidable! Formidable!"

When the briefing was completed, de Gaulle thanked Lundahl, paused, reflected for a moment, and then said, "This is one of the most important programs the West is currently involved in and it is something that must continue." ….

….Upon his return from the aborted conference, Eisenhower decided to speak to the nation and to reassure the public that he knew what was going on in his government…

James C. Hagerty, the president's press secretary, selected a number of the boards and left to show them to the president. He returned after a few minutes, saying Eisenhower had rejected the idea of showing all the briefing boards…Rather than releasing photography of Soviet installations for public display, the president had selected the single briefing board I had prepared of the San Diego Naval Air Station, showing the airfield, aircraft, hangers, and runway markers….

In his televised address, Eisenhower,….added, "Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. The usefulness of this work has been well established through four years of effort…"

There are a number of references in books on Powers U2 flight and the Kennedy assassination to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald provided the Russians with data on the U2 that was subsequently used by the Soviets in downing Gary Power's U2. Most of these accounts focus on the fact that in 1957, Oswald, then a seventeen year old US Marine Corps private, was assigned to the 1 Marine Aiercraft Wing, based at Atsugi Naval Air Station, about twenty miles west of Tokyo, as a trained radar operator. During the period Oswald was assigned at Atsugi, U2s used the naval air station as a staging base for missions over the Soviet Union. Oswald returned to the US, and on October 31, 1959, renounced his US citizenship. At the US embassy in Moscow, he indicated that he would tell the Russians everything he knew about US radar operations and something else that he termed "of special interest." 19 The knowledge derived from radar intercepts – i.e., course, altitude, and speed – is the same whether learned from US or Russian radar operations. The Soviets had an accurate record of U2 performance beginning with the first mission over the USSR on July 4, 1956. On subsequent missions the data was refined so that in a relatively short period the Soviets had an accurate record of U2 characteristics. The Russians had publicly confirmed the fact that they had been tracking and were knowledgeable about U2 operations….so the Russians were well aware of the U2s altitude, course, and speed….

On August 18, at 12:57 P.M., the US Discoverer XIV space satellite was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California….The reentry vehicle was ejected over Alaska on its seventeenth pass. In the recovery area, which encompassed a 200 by 60 mile rectangle, six C-119s and one C-130 flew within the area called the ball park. Three other C-119s patrolled an "outfield" area, embracing an additional 400 miles. All aircraft flew an assigned search pattern. At 3:46 PM on August 19, one of the C-119 Flying Boxcars, piloted by Captain Harrold E. Mitchell and his nine man crew, searching in the "outfield" area, hooked the parachute and the 84 pound capsule in midair at an altitude of 8,500 feet and hauled them aboard. 21 A new era of reconnaissance had begun. On this first successful photographic satellite mission, carrying a twenty-pound roll of film, we gained more than 1 million square miles of coverage of the Soviet Union – more coverage in one capsule than the combined four years of U2 coverage….

The front page of the New York Times on August 20, 1960 headlined the first successful midair recovery of the reentry capsule and on the opposite side of the front page announced the end of the U2 trial and conviction and sentencing of Gary Powers. One photographic-collection period of the Soviet Union was ending while another was just beginning….

The task of educating President Kennedy on photo interpretation devolved upon Arthur Lundahl. Lundahl was a key official who established a close working relationship with both President Kennedy and the assistant to the president for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy. Lundahl's articulate, erudite, and succinct explanations of what was seen on aerial photography were always welcome at the White House. The president wanted technical information presented in a straightforward manner, free of military jargon, so it would be comprehensible not only to him but also the average person. In one of his early briefings of the president, Lundahl explained that the U2 camera could photograph a swath about 125 nautical miles wide and about 3,000 nautical miles long on over 10,000 feet of film. Lundahl drew the analogy that each foot of film was scanned under magnification in much the same manner that Sherlock Holmes would scan evidence or look for clues with a large magnifying glass. "Imagine," Lundahl would suggest, "a group of photo interpreters on their hands and knees scanning a roll of film that extended from the White House to the Capitol and back." Kennedy never forgot that analogy. When other high officials were briefed on the U2 at the White House, the president would call on Lundahl to repeat the story.

Lundahl and President Kennedy hit it off famously. Periodically, Lundahl would update the president in private briefings on the latest finds from both the U2 and satellite photography. The president's discomfort from a chronic back ailment, the usual cluttered condition of the presidential desk, with its many mementos and reams of reading material, and the very nature of the photographic briefing materials to be presented required that a certain special physical arrangement be made. Lundahl would enter the Oval Office and the president would leave his cluttered desk and be seated in the famous rocking chair that had been custom designed to alleviate his back problem. The rocking chair was positioned in front of a round coffee table. Lundahl would be seated on the sofa to the right of the president, and the director of the CIA would frequently be seated on the president's left. Removing the silver cigar humidor and ashtray that were usually on the table, Lundahl would arrange his briefing materials and provide the president with a large magnifying glass. The president then drew up his rocking chair close to the table and, using the magnifying glass, began to study the latest photography as Lundahl briefed.

According to Lundahl, the president was a good listener. He liked good lead-in statements. Lundahl knew this and carefully selected and arranged his words so he could gauge the president's reaction as he spoke. Once he asked Lundahl to remain after a briefing. He was eager to know more about the photo-interpretation process. "Where do you get photo interpreters? How much do you pay them? How do you train them? Are they satisfied with their work? He indicted that he would like to visit the center and observe the high technology of interpretation at work. Lundahl was afforded a unique opportunity because of his position. He admired the president's intellect and courage, and in turn, the president came to admire Lundahl for his intelligence and grace in making a difficult task look exceptionally easy. He came to know the president as a friend and was privy to share the laughter, heartaches, secrets, moods, defeats and triumphs that occurred during the Kennedy years.

…Colonel – later General Andrew Goodpasture became powerful during the Eisenhower administration performing important national-security-affairs function. McGeorge Bundy – who had been appointed assistant to the president for national security affairs after the Bay of Pigs invasion and also had an instinct for power – assumed the intelligence watchdog role in President Kennedy's administration. Intense, articulate, and intelligence, Bundy kept close track of the satellite, U2 and other aircraft missions being flown – and their results. Any photography shown to the president had to be passed through Bundy's office in the White House basement….

….Suspecting that General Cabell had leaked the information, he asked for his resignation….On January 31, 1962 he resigned…from the Air Force…He was replaced by Major General Marshall "Pat" Carter…(Murphy) revealed that Admiral Arleigh Burke had been the source of his Bay of Pigs information…and his "bagman" at the Department of Defense, McNamara…

End Part I

Edited by William Kelly
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Art Lundahl - The Briefer – Part II

Excperts from Dino Brugioni's "Eyeball to Eyeball" -

The Cuban Missile Crisis (Random House, 1991)

On August 29, 1962, a U2 was dispatched to photograph the entire island of Cuba….As one analyst stated after viewing the results of the mission, "The sirens were on and the red lights were flashing."

Within minutes after the film was placed on the light table, a Center photo interpreter assigned to the mission scan team shouted, "I've got a SAM site." Excitement spread, and other photo interpreters gathered around him to look at his find…

When Mr. McCone was briefed on the finds of the mission, he admonished contemptuously, "They're not putting them [the SA-2 sites] in to protect the cane cutters. They're putting them in to blind our reconnaissance eye."

When Cline was briefed on the mission finds, he asked that Bill Harvey, chief of Task Force W, also be informed so that covert personnel would be aware of and could concentrate on collecting confirmation on the newly found sites. Harvey was briefed by Lundahl and William Tidwell, an assistant to Cline. He responded quickly that McGeorge Bundy and the president should also be briefed as soon as possible.

Bundy said the president would not be available that afternoon because he was preparing to fly to the Quonset Naval Air Station to meet his wife and children, who had returned from a month-long vacation in Italy. Recuperating from the death of their newborn son, Patrick, Jackie had visited her sister, Lee, and Lee's husband Stanislas Radziwill, at Villa Episcopin in Ravello.

Bundy told Cline that Attorney General Bobby Kennedy was available, however, and might like to hear the briefing, since he would be seeing the president later that evening in Rhode Island.

On August 31, at 4 PM, Lundahl, Tidwell, and Harvey waited outside the attorney general's office. After the group was ushered into Kennedy's office, Harvey made a brief introductory statement and turned the briefing over to Lundahl. Lundahl laid out the photographs and maps on Kennedy's desk and summarized the developments in Cuba. He pointed to the deployment patterns of the SA-2 sites and indicated that we would probably be seeing more. He then showed Kennedy the photo of the port of Mariel with seven KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats, explaining their function and mission in a sketch included on the briefing board.

Photography was an ideal medium for conveying information to someone with Bobby's forceful views and convictions. He was extremely interested, asked many questions, said he wanted to be kept up-to-date, and promised that the intelligence would be conveyed to the president that evening…..The briefing had lasted about an hour, and Lundahl noticed that there was a chill between Kennedy and Harvey – that Kennedy avoided speaking to Harvey directly and that Harvey avoided eye contact with Kennedy.

This was Lundahl's first briefing of the attorney general, and he remembered him as being "a very sharp fellow, very perceptive, full of good questions. He didn't like long, involved answers. He cut through any wandering conversations and got right up to the things he wanted to know….

Then on August 31, 1962, the day Bobby Kennedy was briefed on the SA-2 sites in Cuba, Senator Kenneth Keating of New York made the following startling announcement from the floor of the Senate: "I am reliably informed that…Soviet ships unloaded 1,200 troops, I call these men troops, not technicians. They were wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms."

A meeting with the president was set for September 7 at 3:30 PM. Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, General Carter, Cline, Lundahl, and John McLauchlin, representing the Defense Intelligence Agency, were ushered into the Oval Office. The secretary of defense had asked John Hughes, a special assistant to the director of DIA, to attend, but Hughes was unavailable. John McLauchlin, Hughes's deputy, laughs when he recalls how a GS-12 represented the DOD at such a critical White House meeting. He felt ill at ease when he saw the nation's leaders' inquiring glances directed at him. He is sure they were wondering, Who in the hell is he. But no one asked.

The president was seated in his famous rocking chair, with McGeorge Bundy standing immediately to his left. General Carter told the president that detailed analysis of the August 29 U2 photography over Cuba – in addition to providing data on the SA-2 sites and the KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats – had revealed a surface-to-surface missile site. He said that Cline and Lundahl would provide the details. Cline read a short prepared statement…He then asked Lundahl to describe the site. Lundahl removed the briefing board from a leather carrying case and handed it to the president. Lundahl looked over the top of the briefing board wile explaining it to the president….

The president obviously was concerned primarily with whether the newly identified site was defensive or offensive in nature.... "How far will this thing shoot?" the president asked….The president was not satisfied with technical explanations….The president paused for a moment and reflected,…He asked, "Do we have something like that?"

McNamara replied, "No, we don't."

The president snapped, "Why in the hell don't we? How long have we know about this weapon?"

…The president's face froze. He began to drum his fingers nervously and impatiently on the arms of the rocker. Lundahl knew that the quick, annoyed tapping betrayed his impatience and anxiety. "Damnit," the president said, "If that damn thing is in Cuba, we should know something about it."

General Carter, sensing that the president's questions and concerns about the missile system would not be satisfied that day, stated that he hoped the president understood that he was only following the president's orders to report any new developments in Cuba to him personally…

The president stood up and glared fiercely at General Carter and then muttered, almost to himself, "I do, but I don't want half-assed information….Go back and do your homework….I want no further reporting until the missile site has been completely evaluated and you can report back to me."

…The president asked how widely the information would be disseminated… "We have to be very careful about any evidence of offensive weapons in Cuba. If such evidence is found, It must be kept very restricted and I want to be the first to know about it."

…The president began a chopping motion with his right arm,… "If this information is in the Washington Post tomorrow, I'll fire both of you."

…Carter tarried and said, "…you do want us to know exactly what these things are so that we can report to you accurately?"

The president considerably toned down, said, "By all means."

Carter continued, "Then in order to arrive at these conclusions, it wouldn't be contrary to your wishes, or your order, that we, the analysts, talk back and forth with each other to compare our knowledge and winnow out our conclusions and to reject that which is inconsistent.

The president replied, "Most certainly not: that's exactly what I want to happen."

"I thought that's what you wanted," Carter said, "but others might have felt that each of us was to stay in isolation and try independently to arrive at a collectively agreed upon conclusion, which would have been hard to do."

The president then said, "No. Those people who need to know – those specialists, those experts who can talk to the photo interpreters and with whom those photo interpreters can talk – can collective arrive at a decision. That's what I want to happen>"

…Everyone had gotten the president's message.

When Carter returned to his Langley office, he was asked by an aide how the presidential briefing had gone. He answered, "The president was pissed!"

Carter called Huntington Sheldon, the CIA assistant deputy director for intelligence into his office. Carter told him that as a result of a presidential directive, a security system had to be established that would absolutely safeguard the dissemination of highly sensitive information derived from the Cuban overflights should offensive missiles be found…Sheldon summoned security specialist Henry Thomas to his office and asked him to bring with him a list of available code names.. Sheldon chose the code word PSALM.

At the Center, Lundahl appointed Jack Gardner and me to work with Office of Scientific Intelligence offensive missile specialist Sidney Graybeal and defensive missile specialist Norman Smith on the Barnes site….

General Carter called Lundahl early on September 10 and said that the president would like a current briefing on aerial photographic systems for himself and General Eisenhower…

…Carter was informed that the president would be lunching with General Eisenhower and that Carter, Lundahl, and his deputy, Col. David S. Parker, should have lunch at the White House dining room. Afterward, Lundahl set up his briefing materials on an easel in the Oval Office. Just before 2 P.M. President Kennedy and General Eisenhower came in. The president said to General Eisenhower, "You must certainly know these gentlemen?" General Eisenhower said that he did, shook hands with the briefers, and sat down at the president's right.

Carter made a few introductory remarks and then turned to Lundahl, who presented fifteen briefing boards on Soviet strategic industries and test centers. Lundahl had briefed President Kennedy numerous times and knew he liked opening remarks that gave him an immediate option on the presentation. The president reached into the humidor and took out a big black cigar and lit it. Senator Smathers had given him several boxes of Havanas and the president promptly had the bands removed and the cigars placed in the handsome silver humidor. Although he appeared to enjoy a good cigar, the president was not an adept smoker, often toying with and chewing on the cigar. He tried, however, not to be photographed with a cigar.

Part of Lindahl's presentation showed the improvements that had been made in the various photographic systems. General Eisenhower listened intently ad asked questions about the systems in the research and development stages….President Kennedy, too, asked numerous questions. During the briefing, Lundahl was pleased to see the president smiling, delighted with the general's questions and the answers given by the participants. The briefing lasted approximately forty minutes and all agreed that the briefing was a success. General Carter, especially, felt relieved and jokingly remarked, "At last, I can report some good news from the White House to Mr. McCone." But Carter's elation would not last long.

A Special Group meeting had been scheduled for September 10 in Bundy's office regarding aerial reconnaissance over Cuba….

James Reber, the chairman of COMOR (Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance), unfolded a large map of Cuba on the conference table with various flight plans on it. Bobby strongly advocated the overflights….

The president was confronted with a nagging dilemma – caught between Soviet and Cuban charges that the U.S. was planning to invade the island and mounting congressional demands from both the Republicans and Democrats that he had to do precisely that….

Direct military intervention against Cuba, of course, had to be considered. On October 1, McNamara had met with the Joint Chiefs of staff. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss circumstances in which military action against Cuba might be necessary and toward which planning should be actively pursued….These were operational plans: 312, 314, and 316.

Meanwhile Senator Kenneth Keating of New York…On October 10, on the floor of the Senate, the senator made the most serious charge to date….Keating then attacked the president and Undersecretary Ball for not telling the whole truth….Keating's speech hit like a bombshell at the White House. Keating's implication that the U.S. government possessed information on offensive missiles in Cuba and was doing nothing about it infuriated President Kennedy. Kennedy initially suspected that information had been withheld from him and angrily called McCone, demanding to know if such information existed. McCone responded in the negative and then called Lundahl to see if anything had been discovered in the aerial photos. Lundahl said he had no such information….

It was considered possible that Keating's information had been a deliberate attempt by a dissident refugee source to embarrass ad discredit the Kennedy administration before the November elections or to push the United States into taking action against the Castro government. In the past the Agency had received a number of such outright false reports, and all of them had been discredited….

McCone did not like the criticism that President Kennedy was receiving from Congress. He was a Republican…and he felt he was the logical man to approach Senator Keating….But Keating did not appear at the appointed time. The NPIC couriers exchanged banter with McCone's secretaries….Then the senator was ushered into McCone's office. Presumably, McCone showed the senator all of the briefing materials and then probably asked Keating for the source of his information. Keating refused. 46

The couriers reported that voices began to rise, McCone said that he had his cards on the table and had been honest but that the senator was doing his country incalculable damage….McCone retorted, "Tell me where they are and I'll prove to you they are not there." …

McCone did not give up. On another occasion, he asked Lundahl to report to the Senate Office Building and wait for him. The purpose he said, was to brief Senator Keating....Senator Keating's secretary (said) that he was busy and did not have time for McCone….Although a concerted effort was undertaken by the Kennedy administration to determine Senator Keating's source of information, all their efforts failed…In later years, Clare Booth Luce would state that some of her sources had furnished information on missiles being in Cuba and that the information had found its way to Senator Keating. 48

…On October 12, General Thomas S. Power, commander of the Strategic Air Command, was called to Washington. Ushered into the office of the secretary of the Air Force, he was asked if the Strategic Air Command was prepared to take over all the duties of flying the U2 reconnaissance of Cuba…General Power replied in the affirmative….

The motto of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing of the Strategic Air Command was Videmus –Omnia – "We see all." …The wing was based at Forbes Air Force Base, outside Topeka, Kansas, but had detachments…at Yokota, Japan, Incirlik, Turkey,…

October 15 would be a routine day for the heads of state of two of the most powerful nations in the world. President Kennedy had been campaigning in upstate New York and had appeared in the Pulaski Day parade at Buffalo on October 14….He stopped off in New York City and had a late night dinner with Adlai E. Stevenson…the president arrived late at the White House at 1:40 A.M. on the fifteenth. He slept late that morning and went to his office at 11:00 A.M., just in time to greet Ahmed Ben Bella, the prime minister of Algeria….Two days later Ben Bella arrived in Havana…

At the new CIA headquarters building in Langley, Virginia, the day also began with meetings for some of the principles who would later be involved in the crisis….At 9:10 Ray Cline opened the Second Conference on Intelligence Methods. Participants were foreign-intelligence chiefs, along with senior officers from the CIA, DOD and State.

Paul J. Pigot, Mrs. McCone's son, who had been injured in an auto race…had died at the March Air Force Base hospital. McCone had left Washington to accompany the body to Seattle….McCone had planned to open the conference…The first speaker was McGeorge Bundy,….the second Roger Hilsman….As the week's program continued, the Commonwealth intelligence chiefs were to become more and more suspicious that a crisis was brewing as their U.S. hosts mysteriously excused themselves from the business and the social functions of the conference.

End Part II - Art Lundahl - The Briefer

Edited by William Kelly
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This is just speculation. It may be a play on words peach > persika (swedish (the names indicate scandinavian origins). persica, damascus > syria. The peach was thought to originate from this area.

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Hey Bill,

It's interesting to note that there is still no mention of the true facts surrounding Gary Powers U2 flight's demise. No mention that his U2 was NOT equipped with a Lundahl camera, but was equipped with only a regular bombadier's camera. Providing such an inferior camera when operating at an elevation in excess of 50,000 feet was counter-intuitive to the purpose of a U2's mission. The Lundahl camera was the only camera capable of high resolution at such altitudes, yet Power's U2 was not so equipped. Why? Perhaps it is because the secrets of THAT technology needed to be preserved even more than those of the U2 itself. But, "who knew" that his U2 would be going down--and gave the order to replace the Lundahl with the useless bombadier's camera for that flight? Someone did...to be sure.

Oh, and by the way, Powers' U2 could not have been brought down by an "indirect hit" (or a direct hit) from Surface to Air missiles in that era because the U2 was flying at approximately 60,000 to 70,000 feet altitude. There were literally no SA missiles capable of reaching those altitudes--none. Moreover, even Soviet Migs couldn't reach those altitudes. That's what made the U2 so special...it was invulnerable to attack as long as it maintained altitude. This made it a great intelligence gathering resource (provided it was equipped with the Lundahl) but a very poor "weapon" in combat.

If an aircraft is hit with a "pebble" at that altitude it will EXPLODE. That isn't code either, I mean, a pebble--a little, tiny rock. That U2 would have been obliterated if it had been hit with anything--spit in the wind, let alone a SA missile--but it wasn't. Gary walked away from the wreckage and there are photographs taken of the aircraft after the crash landing. BTW: Those photos show NO presence of the Lundahl camera that should have been there.

Powers' U2 was not "shot down" -- even Allen Dulles testified to that after the incident. It was forced down and crash landed on a farm because its fuel supply mixture (specifically hydrogen) had been tampered causing it to lose altitude. The U2 can't restart its engines (if they die) until it descends to an altitude that allows it to become vulnerable to the enemy.

Edited by Greg Burnham
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This is just speculation. It may be a play on words peach > persika (swedish (the names indicate scandinavian origins). persica, damascus > syria. The peach was thought to originate from this area.

John,

The Rockford, Ill. Peaches were a semi-pro women's baseball team in 1945

Lundahl was the treasurer.

I was only kidding. I had already checked them out.

http://www.flickr.com/photos/thepollyannas...ockfordpeaches/

Nothing sinster about them as far as I can tell.

BK

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Hey Bill,

It's interesting to note that there is still no mention of the true facts surrounding Gary Powers U2 flight's demise. No mention that his U2 was NOT equipped with a Lundahl camera, but was equipped with only a regular bombadier's camera. Providing such an inferior camera when operating at an elevation in excess of 50,000 feet was counter-intuitive to the purpose of a U2's mission. The Lundahl camera was the only camera capable of high resolution at such altitudes, yet Power's U2 was not so equipped. Why? Perhaps it is because the secrets of THAT technology needed to be preserved even more than those of the U2 itself. But, "who knew" that his U2 would be going down--and gave the order to replace the Lundahl with the useless bombadier's camera for that flight? Someone did...to be sure.

Oh, and by the way, Powers' U2 could not have been brought down by an "indirect hit" (or a direct hit) from Surface to Air missiles in that era because the U2 was flying at approximately 60,000 to 70,000 feet altitude. There were literally no SA missiles capable of reaching those altitudes--none. Moreover, even Soviet Migs couldn't reach those altitudes. That's what made the U2 so special...it was invulnerable to attack as long as it maintained altitude. This made it a great intelligence gathering resource (provided it was equipped with the Lundahl) but a very poor "weapon" in combat.

If an aircraft is hit with a "pebble" at that altitude it will EXPLODE. That isn't code either, I mean, a pebble--a little, tiny rock. That U2 would have been obliterated if it had been hit with anything--spit in the wind, let alone a SA missile--but it wasn't. Gary walked away from the wreckage and there are photographs taken of the aircraft after the crash landing. BTW: Those photos show NO presence of the Lundahl camera that should have been there.

Powers' U2 was not "shot down" -- even Allen Dulles testified to that after the incident. It was forced down and crash landed on a farm because its fuel supply mixture (specifically hydrogen) had been tampered causing it to lose altitude. The U2 can't restart its engines (if they die) until it descends to an altitude that allows it to become vulnerable to the enemy.

Hey Monk,

Good to see you here. We're carrying on the traditions started by Rich Delarosa and friends at JFKresearch, and your contrabutions will be welcome.

I agree with your analysis, and remember reading about it in an article by Fletcher Prouty in Gallery - the girlie magazine in the 70s. It was kind of a radical idea then, but generally accepted now.

I'm reading Brugioni's "Eyeball to Eyeball" now, to get a better handle on Lundahl and the NPIC, and he mentions that the three things necessary for the success of the NPIC were the development of the new film by Kodak, the design of the U2 by Kelly Johnson at Lockhead, and the camera, the origin of which is not mentioned.

At first I thought it was a Land camera, but apparently it was designed by James G. Baker, about whom there is little to go on.

BK

James Gilbert Baker (November 11, 1914 – June 29, 2005) was an American astronomer and optician

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Gilbert_Baker

Prior to the launch of the Sputnik I spacecraft, Baker collaborated with Joseph Nunn to build a series of 12 satellite tracking cameras that would be called the Baker-Nunn camera. Dr. Baker designed the optical system for the cameras, which were fabricated by Perkin-Elmer Corporation.

He and Edwin Land were instrumental in persuading President Dwight Eisenhower to have the U-2 spy plane built. Baker also designed the lenses and most of the cameras used on the U-2 spy plane and later the SR-71 Blackbird. In addition, he designed the lenses and cameras used in the Samos satellite program, and a modified version of these optics were later used in the lunar mapping programs.

During the 1960s he designed the folding optics for the Polaroid SX-70 Land Camera. He also designed the Baker Super-Schmidt camera which was used to track meteors. In 1960 he became president of the Optical Society of America.

Baker was the author of many technical papers and he held more than 50 U.S. patents. He was the first person to use a computer for the design of optics[citation needed].

He died in Bedford, New Hampshire at the age of 90, and was survived by his wife Elizabeth, and his three sons, a daughter, and five grandchildren. (His children have also pursued technical careers.) He still had numerous telescope glass grinding and polishing projects at work up until his passing.

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NO, nothing sinister B) . Sounds peachy to me.

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Lundahl III - Brugioni on The Center

Excerpt from "Eyeball to Eyeball"

Monday, October 15, began as a beautiful fall day in Washington. Because of the poor parking facilities around the Steuart Building at 5th and K streets in northwest Washington, car pools were encouraged .... Broken bottles, abandoned autos, and trash littered the area…

The Steuart Building was a nondescript seven-story structure built during World War II. The Center occupied a total of fifty thousand square feet on the fourth through seventh floors. There were no restaurants or cafeteria facilities in the building and the food service was a particular problem, especially for persons working at night. When there was time, sandwiches and coffee could be bought at a nearby all-night diner. Most employees brought bag lunches and diners from home. Before entering the Steuart Building each morning, others stopped at the Center City Market. The market was a conglamoration of small shops selling everything from the cheapest cuts of meats to imported delicacies, from patent medicines to freshly cut flowers. But every morning, freshly baked breakfast rolls and freshly brewed coffee and tea were available. Properly fortified, employees passed through the security turnstiles of the Steuart Building en route to their offices. They were always greeted cordially by guard George Bailey, who knew everyone by their first name. Eunice Stallings, the elevator operator, a cigar-smoking women who did the New York Times crossword puzzle in record time, took the employees to their appointed floor.

A mere physical description of the squalid building amid its squalid surroundings in Washington's 2nd Police Precinct reveals little as to what NPIC was all about. It was a unique multidepartmental national-level organization. The formal structure was controlled, staffed, and funded by the CIA, but the informal organizational structure also comprised special detachments from the Army, Air Force and Navy. They were under the administrative control of "service chiefs," who contributed personnel for photo-interpretation projects of national interest such as the exploitation of photography acquired over Cuba.

The National Photographic Interpretation Center, however, was synonymous with its director, Arthur C. Lundahl. Lundahl was responsible for the conception and evolution of photographic interpretation as it was performed at the Center. His ingenuity was reflected not only in Center activity, but also at all the military intelligence agencies involved in photo-interpretation activities. From the inception of NPIC and its predecessor organizations, beginning in 1955, Lundahl's visionary approach and methods of deriving intelligence from photography and collateral sources were dismissed by many as too revolutionary to last. Basically, he aimed at fusing ideas and experience that previously had been considered unrelated or incompatible.

Drawing on World War II experiences, he juxtaposed and fused the skills of seven different disciplines: photo interpretation, collateral information and data processing, photogrammetry, graphics and publication support, technical analysis, and distribution and courier support. The result was a team of experienced personnel that inspired great confidence from other intelligence and government officials. The Center's organization and skill represented the first modern technological approach to intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination. NPIC supervisory personnel recognized their unique opportunity and worked hard at making the Center a model of organization and production.

Lundahl's leadership was reinforced by an unusual level of talent throughout the organization. Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, and his deputy, Lieutenant General Charles F. Cabell, extended Lundahl a free-hand in selecting personnel to staff the Center. Although the Steuart Building left much to be desired in physical amenities, Lundahl would frequently remark: "Where a choice be necessary, give me good men in poor ships than the converse." A particularly distinguishing feature of Lundahl's managerial genius was his ability to find gifted people and to establish the atmosphere of creativity in which they could work…

Edited by William Kelly
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Is anybody following me here, into what they called "the Center," - in a bad hood? I want to see how Lindahl set up NPIC and how it operated during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and compare that with what we know happened when the Zapruder film visited NPIC on two occassions. - BK

Lundahl III - Brugioni on The Center

Excerpt from "Eyeball to Eyeball"

Monday, October 15, began as a beautiful fall day in Washington. Because of the poor parking facilities around the Steuart Building at 5th and K streets in northwest Washington, car pools were encouraged....Broken bottles, abandoned autos, and trash littered the area…

The Steuart Building was a nondescript seven-story structure built during World War II. The Center occupied a total of fifty thousand square feet on the fourth through seventh floors. There were no restaurants or cafeteria facilities in the building and the food service was a particular problem, especially for persons working at night. When there was time, sandwiches and coffee could be bought at a nearby all-night diner. Most employees brought bag lunches and diners from home. Before entering the Steuart Building each morning, others stopped at the Center City Market. The market was a conglamoration of small shops selling everything from the cheapest cuts of meats to imported delicacies, from patent medicines to freshly cut flowers. But every morning, freshly baked breakfast rolls and freshly brewed coffee and tea were available. Properly fortified, employees passed through the security turnstiles of the Steuart Building en route to their offices. They were always greeted cordially by guard George Bailey, who knew everyone by their first name. Eunice Stallings, the elevator operator, a cigar-smoking women who did the New York Times crossword puzzle in record time, took the employees to their appointed floor.

A mere physical description of the squalid building amid its squalid surroundings in Washington's 2nd Police Precinct reveals little as to what NPIC was all about. It was a unique multidepartmental national-level organization. The formal structure was controlled, staffed, and funded by the CIA, but the informal organizational structure also comprised special detachments from the Army, Air Force and Navy. They were under the administrative control of "service chiefs," who contributed personnel for photo-interpretation projects of national interest such as the exploitation of photography acquired over Cuba.

The National Photographic Interpretation Center, however, was synonymous with its director, Arthur C. Lundahl. Lundahl was responsible for the conception and evolution of photographic interpretation as it was performed at the Center. His ingenuity was reflected not only in Center activity, but also at all the military intelligence agencies involved in photo-interpretation activities. From the inception of NPIC and its predecessor organizations, beginning in 1955, Lundahl's visionary approach and methods of deriving intelligence from photography and collateral sources were dismissed by many as too revolutionary to last. Basically, he aimed at fusing ideas and experience that previously had been considered unrelated or incompatible.

Drawing on World War II experiences, he juxtaposed and fused the skills of seven different disciplines: photo interpretation, collateral information and data processing, photogrammetry, graphics and publication support, technical analysis, and distribution and courier support. The result was a team of experienced personnel that inspired great confidence from other intelligence and government officials. The Center's organization and skill represented the first modern technological approach to intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination. NPIC supervisory personnel recognized their unique opportunity and worked hard at making the Center a model of organization and production.

Lundahl's leadership was reinforced by an unusual level of talent throughout the organization. Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, and his deputy, Lieutenant General Charles F. Cabell, extended Lundahl a free-hand in selecting personnel to staff the Center. Although the Steuart Building left much to be desired in physical amenities, Lundahl would frequently remark: "Where a choice be necessary, give me good men in poor ships than the converse." A particularly distinguishing feature of Lundahl's managerial genius was his ability to find gifted people and to establish the atmosphere of creativity in which they could work. Many new organizations are burdened with a percentage of castoffs. But Lundahl's most unique and significant contribution was his ability to lead and inspire others. He was unparalleled in winning he complete respect, admiration, and devotion of all those with whom he came into contact – presidents, the Congress, the military services, the intelligence community, the scientists, contractor and, of course, the personnel of the Center. The imagination and dedication of the people selected by Lundahl for managerial responsibilities can never be overestimated. These managers, in turn, supervised young, talented, and dedicated personnel. Although Lundahl set high standards for his employees, he permitted his staff an extraordinary degree of independence. He laid down few guidelines or specific rules. He believed that his staff would function better if given wide latitude. In return, he received an exceptional sense of commitment from his employees and a great response of new ideas. The employees of the Center had in Art Lundahl an ardent believer in, and a prophet of, photographic interpretation. He could articulate with great feeling the meaning of the photo-interpretation methods and the value of information obtained from the photography. Lundahl, in his words, didn't believe in a droning presentation but rather in an exploding one. Aerial photography was his ammunition.

Even the security system at the Center reflected the singularity and uniqueness of the organization. The security accorded the U2 program and the photo intelligence derived from it was never breached. Great effort had been expended to place the program in a separate security system and give it a set of special code words. Some maintain this system gave Lundahl extraordinary freedom to move information directly from the Center to the president. Others maintained that the novelty of aerial photography made it a new toy for the intelligence service chiefs and other government leaders.

It was also the knot that tied together the many bits and pieces of information gathered from other collection sources. Analysts now had the means to confirm or deny their suspicions or hypotheses. NPIC was uniquely qualified, staffed, and ready on October 15.

At the Naval Photographic Intelligence Center, the film from mission 3101 was processed under stringent quality and security controls. The film was carefully edited and titled, and the duplicate positives from the processors were spooled and packaged in film cans.

NPIC's operations officer, Hans F. Scheufele, maintained constant contact with the collection and processing sites so that scheduling information would be available to Center components and the exploitation teams could be appraised of the delivery time of the film. He kept this information posted on a large blackboard on his office wall. He also issued daily bulletins on "Proposed Staffing and Time Completion Estimates," which listed specific personnel assigned to exploit a given mission and the arrival time of the film.

This particular day had all the appearances of being routine. Lundahl had scheduled a 9:30 A.M. meeting with his division chiefs to discuss training….As he prepared for the meeting Lundahl glanced out his office window overlooking 5Street. With some annoyance, he noted that a U.S. Navy truck parked in front of the building entrance was blocking traffic. Two armed Marines had dismounted and taken positions immediately behind the truck. An armed Navy officer and an enlisted man entered the truck from the rear, lifted a box off the truck, and carried it into the Steuart Building.

Lundahl smiled, shook his head, and noted how good intentions often become counter-productive. Every effort had been made to keep the Steuart Building looking as innocuous as possible. Yet the regulations for transporting U2 film by the military services specified that movement of the film be made under armed guard. But in doing so, it was revealing that personnel in the Steuart Building were undoubtedly engaged in some extremely classified and sensitive work.

Robert Kithcart of the NPIC registry, a businesslike reserve paratroop captain who was in charge of all the film and files retained in the Steuart Building, received the box….He then placed the film in a wire basket to be delivered to Earl Shoemaker, the exploitation coordinator for this mission.

After being notified that mission 3101 had been successfully flown over Cuba, personnel at the Steuart Building prepared to exploit the photography and, when the exploitation was completed, to report their findings in a SITSUM (situation summary) for the mission. The usual procedure was to cable the SITSUM immediately to watch officers throughout the intelligence community. Some days later, it would be disseminated by courier in hard-copy form to a broader distribution of intelligence analysts in the Washington area and throughout the JCS unified and specified commands.

Marvin Michell, the collateral-support information specialist for the mission had performed preparatory tasks for many of the U2 missions over Cuba. He had plotted the mission flight track…Marvin wheeled a library cart full of the target packets and reference materials to the area where the photo interpreters were waiting.

Earl Shoemaker had his photo-interpretation teams ready….The interpreters began cranking the reels of duplicate positives onto the light tables.

Normally, six photo-interpretation stations were employed in scanning…there stations were manned by six photo interpreters – three teams of two interpreters each – representing the CIA, Army, Air Force and Navy….As they examined the film, the interpreters wrote their observations on the worksheets provided and passed them to their team leaders for review….

The two cans of film covering the San Cristobol and the trapezoidal area of concern were given to the scan team of Gene Lydon, a CIA photo interpreter, and Jim Holmes, an Air Force interpreter, for exploitation….Then they spotted six long canvas-covered objects. Lydon and Holmes made rough estimates of the measurements of the objects several times. Each time, their measurements showed the objects to be more than sixty feet long. It was about noon, and both men paused for lunch. After lunch, they resumed their efforts but still could not positively identify the canvas-covered objects….Jim Holmes, a civilan Air Force employee, was a soft spoken, yet tough-minded and intense, photo interpreter. A native of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, he was only twenty-nine but a veteran of twelve years of government service. He began his government career at seventeen as a GS-2 cartographic technician at the Army Map Service, where his aunt was a training officer….Twenty-two year old Second Lieutenant Ricahrd Reninger was the Army member of the team. Born in Laramie, Wyoming, he had a B.A. in history from the University of Wyoming. He had graduated from the U.S. Army Photo Interpretation School at Fort Holabird in June 1961 and was assigned to the missile backup team at the Center….

A native of Maine, Joe Sullivan, a civilian Navy employee, was a puckish, attractive Irishman. At fifty, he was the senior member of the team…Vince DiRenzo was the CIA representative on the team, from Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, he was thirty-two and former Marine…(Clark University)…He and his branch chief Bob Boyd had performed detailed support studies for covert operations...

DiRenzo called me and said he needed some support regarding the missiles. I called Jay Quantrill, who worked for me and who was the Center's collateral specialist on missiles…DiRenzo was assured and straightforward when he contacted his chief, Bob Boyd, and announced, "We've got MRBMs in Cuba." …

After reviewing the evidence on the size and shape of the missile transporters with Reninger at about 4 P.M., Shoemaker said, "We've got to let Mr. Lundahl know before he goes home." Shoemaker and Boyd went to their division chief, Jack Gardner, and his intelligence production officer, Gordon Duvall….Holmes was unable to contact Air Force lieutenant colonel Robert Saxon, so he sought out Ted Tate, Saxon's civilian deputy….Reninger informed Army colonel George C. Eckert, his commanding officer. Joe Sullivan however, had problems. His chief, Lieutenant Commander Pete Brunette,…had a dinner engagement that evening…Joe said he was working on a project and that Lundahl was about to be briefed….Sullivan called Brunette's deputy, Clay Dalryple,…and posted Brunette on the details.

Lundahl was called by Gardener, and Duvall escorted him into the room where the backup team was working. Lundahl had a distinctive list to his walk as a result of an old football injury. He was immediately recognized by us in the semidarkened enclosed room. "I understand you fellows have found a beauty," he said as he approached.

…Lundahl turned from the table and looked at us and then said, "I think I know what you guys think they are, and if I think they are the same thing and we both are right, we are sitting on the biggest story of our time."

…Lundahl rose and walked a short distance. His hands were clasped behind his back. We remained silent. The strange stillness suggested the extreme seriousness of the moment. Lundahl looked at us and said, "If there was ever a time I want to be right in my life, this is it."

He asked if anything had been committed to paper. He was shown a few notes…Lundahl pointed to each of us by name and asked if we agreed the missiles in question were MRBMs. Each reply was affirmative. He then asked if there were any other possibilities. Di Renzo mentioned what is always considered at such a time – the possibility that these missiles were dummies. All signs however, pointed to their being real…

He did not doubt or delay reacting to the situation. The ruddy-complexioned , silver-haired director looked at each of us again. "Gentlemen. I am convinced. Because of the grave responsibility of this find, I want to personally sign the cable."

All of those present knew these images represented a grave moment in history. All knew that the future turn of events would surely involve the president personally. Lundahl asked who knew about the find. Jack Gardner said that the "service chiefs" had been informed but had been told not to divulge the information to their superiors until the analysis had been completed. Lundahl asked Gardner to invoke the code word PSALM on all the information. I was the custodian of this closely held directive for the Center and said that I would furnish it to Gardner.

…Lundahl asked that all those present remain and work through the night if necessary to glean all the information possible from the images….I ran downstairs and told my superiors, Hans Scheufele and Bill Banfield, that photographic laboratory support would be needed that night…

On his way downstairs to his fifth floor office, Lundahl was thinking how he could clearly and unmistakably get his message across to Ray Cline if he had to use open phone lines. There was a good working relationship beween Cline and Lundahl. Cline was one of the founding fathers of the Agency...He had replaced Robert Amory in March 1962 as the deputy director of intelligence. Cline had full confidence in Lundahl and the abilities of his people....Cline was incredulous. He paused and asked, "Are you fellows sure?"

Edited by William Kelly
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