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Arthur Lundahl


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Brigioni on Lundahl - Part IV - Excerpted from "Eyeball to Eyeball" (Random House, 1990)

...(Ray) Cline said, "Well, we've got to get on this right away. I'll get hold of Carter….I want you to plan on being in my office with the evidence b seven-thirty tomorrow morning."

Lundahl agreed. The call had been made…One of my duties was to prepare all of the briefing notes for Lundahl, and he called me down to his office and explained that the note on all of the materials that were to be produced that night should be as complete as possible…Lundahl checked his calendar for any appointments that would conflict with the next day's briefings. He wrote crash and MRBM on the page for October 15. He looked back at the page for October 14 on which he had jotted mission 3101. Printed on the right side of the calender's date was DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER BORN 1890….

The evening of October 15 was a night of parties, not atypical for Washington during the month of October....The secretary of defense was attending a Hickory Hill seminar at Bobby Kennedy's home in McClean, Virginia. General and Mrs. Maxwell Taylor were giving a formal dinner party at their Fort McNair residence in Southwest Washington…Bundy was hosting a dinner party for Charles "Chip" Bohlen, the newly appointed Ambassador to France…Cline next called Roger Hilsman at his home. He had difficulty indicating over the insecure phone that he meant MRBMs…..Meanwhile Norman Smith, the SAM specialist,…called Sidney Graybeal, his division chief….Greaybeal…was shown the imagery under the stereoscope and given a description of the find. He agreed that these had to be offensive missiles….Graybeal told the missile backup team that he did not want to disturb them in their work but would like to remain, listen to their converstations, and jot down all pertinent details….

Col. David Parker, the deputy director of NPIC, called John Hughes, a special assistant to the director of he Defense Intelligence Agency, and asked him to come over to the Center…and John McLauchlin, a photo interpreter specialist….McLauchlin proceeded to General Carroll's Bolling Air Force Base home…Carroll called Roswell Gilpatrick…and said that Hughes and McClauchlin were coming over to fill him in on some new and very important intelligence on Cuba.

Hughes and McLauchlin got in Hughes' old yellow DeSoto,…experiencing transmission problems and painfully growled…McLauchlin kidded Hughes, "We have the secret of the century…If this thing breaks down, you'll run the rest of the way on foot." They arrived at Gilpatrick's apartment at 4201 Cathedera Avenue in northwest….

Lundahl asked me to provide him with a map showing Cuba and the United States. He asked me to swing a 1,100 mile arc on the map, the range of the MRBM from the area where the missile was found.…NPIC photo laboratory personnel had waited since 5 P.M. that evening for the photo interpreters to relinquish the duplicate positives so they might make the necessary prints, enlargements, and additional duplicate positives for study. Jimmy Allen, a photo-laboratory section chief, had much experience waiting or imagery from the photo interpreters. He contentedly puffed on a large cigar. Jack Davis, the new chief of the photo laboratory, waited nervously.

At 8:30 P.M. Earl Shoemaker brought a duplicate positive from the laboratory.

...Normally a control code word was given to priority or special laboratory processing work. When Allen asked what code word should he apply to the Cuban Material, Davis replied, "This is all so confused, a good term might be mass confusion" All the photo-laboratory work that night and throughout the missile crisis received priority treatment if it bore the title "Mass Confusion."

Leon Coggin was listed as the off-duty photogammetrist….Dick Reninger…Eugene Ricci…An around-the-clock atmosphere soon pertained at NPIC – one of sleeplessness and anxiety….Most stepped out of the Steuart Building onto Fifth Street. It was a warm fall night and most crossed over New York Avenue and Sixth Street to Havran's Restaurant, a favorite after-hours eating place for Steuart Building people and policemen from the Second Precinct. Hambergers, french fries, pies and coffee were popular menu selections – in fact, the only food available.

Joe Sullivan…..tried to located prominent landmarks in the vicinity of Los Palacios…as he scanned the photography…Leon Coggin…began measuring the missiles…John Wyman, the senior NPIC computer operator…Dean Frazier,…the Center's graphics duty officer…graphic analysis officer Dan McDevitt, illustrator Glenn Farmer, and headliner (typesetting) operator Loretta Huggins, arrived at the Steuart Building about 4:30 A.M….The first three sites at San Cristobal were numbered MR-1, MR-2, MR-3, and the Sagua la Grande sites MR-4 and MR-5, The Guanajay IRBM sites were numbered IR-1, …and the Remedies site IR-3…

LUNDAHL ARRIVED at the Steuart Building at 6 A.M. on October 16 and carefully reviewed the briefing boards and notes that Shoemaker and I had assembled. They seemed to impart an extraordinary, almost surrealistic, feeling. In stark stillness they depicted a moment in time that had been frozen as visual history. It was as if the world was holding its breath for a moment. And the effect was total, devastating loneliness…

Frank Beck, the courier, was waiting. Lundahl closed the large, black briefing board case and said, "Let's go." He paused and asked Shoemaker and me to thank all the people who had worked through the night and to send them home to get some sleep. It was 7 A.M.

About the same time, Walter Elder, a special assistant to the DCI, called McCone in Seattle and cryptically reported, "That which you always expected has occurred."

Lundahl and Beck arrived at Ray Cline's office at 7:30 A.M….Lundahl placed the briefing boards on Cline's desk and everyone in the room listened, almost in awe, as Lundahl pointed out each salient featue…After Lundahl finished briefing Cline, he stepped back so that those gathered could review the photography for themselves. …Cline, Lundahl and the courier, Beck, left the CIA headquarters for the White House shortly before 8 A.M. Conference delegates…being intelligence officers, wondered why they were obviously in such a hurry with the courier and large bag of briefing boards. Later, Walter Pforzheimer, longtime agency legislative counsel, would write a poem about the departing members of the intelligence methods conference.

At the White House, Cline, Lundahl, and Beck went directly to McGeorge Bundy's office in the basement….Cline summarized the photo-intelligence findings and asked Lundahl to explain what had been found…Bundy made a telephone call…and took the elevator to the president's private quarters…The president, sitting on his bed and still in his pajamas, was looking at the morning newspapers…Bundy told the president about the missiles being in Cuba and together they reviewed the president's appointments for that morning. The only free time was at 11:45. The president asked that a meeting of all principals be scheduled for that time….A number of military exercises were underway … PHIBRIGLEX-62 (Amphibious Brigade Landing)…

It was obvious that the president had called Bobby Kennedy concerning the missiles in Cuba because at about 9 A.M. on the morning of October 16, he came storming into Bundy's office asking to see the photography. Cline repeated his assessment and Lundahl took Kennedy over the briefing boards, pointing out the fourteen missiles. Kennedy looked at the photos and moaned, "Oh xxxx! Oh xxxx! Those sons of bitches Russians."

Lundahl described Bobby's movements as being like those of a prizefighter. He walked several times about the room, snorting like a prizefighter, smacking the palm of one hand with his fist….Bobby Kennedy came back to Lundahl and Cline. The seriousness of the moment was broken when Kennedy pointed to the map NPIC had prepared showing the range of the SS-4. He pointed to the map and asked, "Will those goddamn things reach Oxford, Mississippi?" Before Lundahl could stop himself, he replied, "Sir, well beyond Oxford." He then looked up to catch a slight gleam in Kennedy's eyes and a wry smile on his face. Oxford, Mississippi, of course, was where the Kennedys were having trouble attempting to register James Meredith into the University of Mississippi. Bobby thanked Ludahl and Cline and said he was going up to talk to the president. When Lundahl returned to the Steuart Building and told about Bobby's Oxford remarks, it was decided all subsequent maps showing the ranges of missiles deployed in Cuba would also show as reference points such principal cities of the United States as St. Louis, New York, Atlanta, and in the same bold type, Oxford, Mississippi.

C. Douglas Dillon, the secretary of the treasury, came to Bundy's office and asked to see the photographs. An urbane, scholarly New York Republican, Dilllon was a popular figure in the Kennedy cabinet. Tall, bald, outgoing, studious, and unpretentious, he was listened to when he spoke. Suave and courteous, he was one of Kennedy's favorite cabinet members. Possessed of a quick grasp for complex detail, his penetrating intellect enabled him to contribute precise logic to resolving problems not only in the Treasury Department but in other departments as well.

Lundahl repeated his briefing….At 9:30 A.M. General Carter arrived at Bundy's office. Cline felt that Carter, as acting DCI, should handle the scheduled 11:45 meeting. Carter agreed, and Cline advised him that Lundahl would perform the briefing but that he would be sending over Sydney Graybeal, the Agency's offensive missile specialist, to provide analytical backup to Lundahl if needed.

General Taylor had asked that the JCS members be briefed on the Cuban photography as soon as possible…When the office door closed, Colonel Eckert abruptly stated his mission. "Sir, last evening the National Photographic Interpretation Center discovered MRBM missile sites on photography flown over Cuba on October 14." General Wheeler reeled back in is chair,…stunned, as if he had been hit by a baseball bat….

The Center also prepared additional copies of the briefing boards and notes for the Navy and Air Force. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Saxon took the briefing boards from the Steuart Building to General LeMay's office and Lieutenant Commander Pete Brunette took copies to Admiral Anderson's office…After all the participants were seated in the Cabinet Room, General Carter read a prepared statement that MRBM missiles had been discovered on U2 photography of October 14 at two locations and that Lundahl would brief the group using enlargements of that photography. The president was seated, as usual, at the center of the long conference table in the Cabinet Room, with his back to the windows. Lundahl had placed the briefing boards on an easel at the far end of the room near the fireplace. He gave a brief description of the MRBM sites and then asked permission of the president to come to the table and show him the evidence at close range. The president replied, "By all means." Lundahl approached the conference table and stood between the president and Secretary Rusk. Handing the president a large magnifying glass, so he had on numerous occasions, he placed the briefing boards on the table in front of the president and proceeded to point out details of the three sites.

Lundahl was acutely aware that photo interpreters can recognize and point out things that the unsophisticated and untrained eye would easily miss. He therefore dwelt on the enlargements of the missiles….After asking a few questions he turned to his right and, looking Lundahl straight in the eye and carefully spacing out his words, asked, "Are you sure?" Lundahl was anxious to be measured in his response but at the same time leave no doubt in the president's mind that the evidence was conclusive. Lundahl replied, "Mr. President, I am as sure of this as a photo interpreter can be sure of anything. And I think, sir, you might agree that we have not misled you on anything we have reported to you. Yes, I am convinced they are missiles."

…The president's eyes rose again from the photos. He looked at Lundahl again and asked, "How long will it be before they can fire those missiles?" Lundahl stated that Sydney Graybeal, the Agency's expert on offensive missiles, would comment on that question. Graybeal moved into position next to Lundahl. He discussed the SS-4 missile system…Lundahl and Graybeal tried very carefully to differentiate what was known and what was unknown…The question and answer period lasted for over ten minutes.

The briefing left a particularly somber mood in the room. The worst fears had come to pass and the worse of conjectures were on many minds. Dramatic reaction was uppermost in many minds – war, with all its new, devastating consequences – a nuclear confrontation.

Lundahl would relate: "In an era which demanded immediate response and rebuttal, the president listened to all remarks and weighed all positions without surprise. He had the curiosity, sensitivity, and intellect to assimilate any proposition. With that grace and charm, he stimulated the best in all those with whom he came in contact and that day was no exception."

According to Lundahl, "The president never panicked, never shuddered, his hands never shook. He was crisp and businesslike and speedy in his remarks and he issued them with clarity and dispatch, as though he were dispatching a train or a set of instructions in an office group." General Taylor would confirm the president's attitude: "Kennedy gave no evidence of shock or trepidation resulting from the threat to the nation implicit in the discovery of the missile sites, but rather a deep but controlled anger at the duplicity of the Soviet officials who had tried to deceive him." 9

Lundahl removed the boards from the table. The president turned to the group and said he wanted the whole island covered – he didn't care how many missions it too. "I want the photography interpreted and the finds from the readouts as soon as possible." The discussion then turned to how many U2 missions could be flown and the possibility of using low-altitude aircraft…

At the conclusion of the meeting, the president turned to General Carter and Lundahl and said he wanted to express the nation's gratitude to the men who had collected these remarkable photographs and to the photo interpreters for finding and analyzing the missile sites. Carter graciously accepted the compliment and motioned to Lundahl and Graybeal to remove the briefing boards and prepare to leave the room.

The Cuban missile crisis was on!

When Lundahl returned from the meeting at the White House, he held a meeting in his office and warned us that "all hell was going to break loose" and for us to be prepared to receive a lot of photography in the coming days. He outlined specific duties and responsibilities in getting ready for the influx of photography…Questions arose about the number of Air Force pilots qualified to fly the Agency's U2s…A decision was reached to use both SAC and CIA U2 pilots to cover all of Cuba. The CIA pilots were to be used only in "extreme circumstances" and they would be recommissioned into the Air Force and given Air Force credentials…

The Navy had devoted considerable time and effort to develop an effective low-altitude jet reconnaissance capability. Commander (later Captain) Willard D. Dietz had perceived and pushed for the development of small-format aerial cameras….Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc.'s KA-45 and KA-46, six inch focal length framing cameras with a film width of five inches and a capacity of 250 feet of film…installed in the F-8U-1P Crusader….Lundahal recommended that the Navy's Light Photographic Squadron No. 62 (VFP-62) be selected…based at the U.S. Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, just outside Jacksonville, Florida…Joe Sullivan, the Navy photo interpreter on the NPIC "discovery" team, had gone home about 4:30 A.M. on October 16, having been told by his supervisors to take the day off but to be available…his supevisor Clay Dalrymple, …told in no uncertain terms to, "get his tail over to the Pentagon as fast as possible" because there was going to be a special meeting of the GMAIC (Guided Missile Astronautics Intelligence Committee). Sullivan had a difficult time finding a parking place at the Pentagon…

Dr. Albert "Bud" Wheelon, CIA Chairman of the committee…He realized too that this photographic lode had to be incorporated with other sources and succinct and definitive reports created for policymakers…..was also director of the Agency's Office of Scientific Intelligence...thirty-three at the time, was an MIT physicist…Ramo-Woolridge Corportation….met with McCone and sketched out procedures for handling and reporting information concerning this crisis…He recommended that selected representatives of all the standing United States Intelligence Boards's scientific committees transfer their activities on an ad hoc baiss to NPIC in order to expediate their considerations of the findings from the photography. McCone approved, and the next day, representatives of the GMAIC, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), and members of the Agency's Guided Missile Task Force began moving certain of their files to NPIC.

[p.238]

The president formulated a group of special advisors to advise and assist him in decisions affecting the missile crisis. It became known as the Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the National Security Council and would be formally established by National Security Action Memorandum 196, signed by the president on October 22, 1962. 15 …

The first meeting of the EXCOM opened with a briefing on the photographs by Lundahl and intelligence estimates….the president specifically asked that Robert Lovett be included…Dean Rusk recommended…Dean Acheson…The president approved.

Lundahl held a prolonged staff meeting at the Center on the morning of October 17 to structure operational changes for the duration of the crisis. Center personnel were equally divided into two twelve-hour shifts, with the shift change at 8 A.M. each morning. Robert Boyd was put in charge of one shift of the photo interpreters and Gordon Duvall the other. Photo interpreters would brief Lundahl on photo intelligence derived the previous day at a morning meeting that would take place at 6:30 to 7 AM. Duvall and Boyd and I would be at that meeting. My staff would have prepared notes for Lundahl on each photographic briefing board, along with other pertinent collateral information. Notes on operational matters, such as the number of missions to be flown, the weather, etc., would have been prepared by Dutch Scheufele.

Various film processing sites also worked around the clock during the crisis. Navy and Air Force jet transports shuttled exposed film from the U2 missions to the airfields nearest to the processing sites, and the processed film was expected, similarly, to Washington and the Center for exploitation. Eastman Kodak also went into shift operations to meet the increased demand for aerial photographic film. Camera manufacturers were alerted, and their best technicians, along with truckloads of spare parts, were sent to Orlando, MacDill and Boca Chica to make sure that cameras were maintained and functioned properly. Additional Lockheed U2 technicians and maintenance personnel were dispatched to Orlando to keep the U2s flying.

The EXCOM met several times in George Ball's State Department conference room on October 17…President Kennedy brought General Maxwell Taylor to the White House as a military consultant to the president after the Bay of Pigs…It was in Taylor's office, room 303 in the Executive Office Building that the powerful 303 Committee met and reviewed all covert CIA operations. On the 303 Committee were McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and McCone…Admiral George W. Anderson, fifty-five, the chief of naval operations,…had been picked by Kennedy's first Navy secretary, John Connally, to replace…Arleigh Burke…

And so a pattern developed. Photography acquired by U2 missions flown in the morning would be processed in the afternoon, then analyzed in the late afternoon and nightly at the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Teams of photo interpreters working with missile and nuclear experts from other components of the intelligence community produced situation summaries that were then disseminated the following morning. To keep track of information other than photography, a special situation room was established in the Agency's Office of Current Intelligence, at Langley, Virginia. John Hicks, who had recently returned from a tour of duty in Australia, was placed in charge and had the responsibility of issuing the CIA daily bulletin. After being briefed each morning at the Center on the information generated the previous evening, Lundahl would depart for a briefing of the United States Intelligence Board, which met each morning at 8 A.M. in the East Building of the Agency, located in the Foggy Bottom section of Washington.

The USIB was the highest level of all national intelligence committees, acting as a board of review for all strategic estimates and current intelligence assessments. The Board was also cognizant of all clandestine collection efforts…

After Lundahl's daily briefing of the USIB, he would proceed to brief the EXCOM. The EXCOM met several times daily, usually at 10 A.M. and 2 P.M. in the Cabinet Room of the White House during the early days of the crisis and thereafter in George Ball's Conference Room at the State Department…

Whenever McCone thought the president should be informed about items of special significance or whenever the president expressed an interest, Lundahl, usually accompanied by McCone, would proceed to the White House. The president was briefed at least once a day with the aerial photos. At one meeting with the president, McCone raised the question of how and when the photographic evidence should be shown to congressional leaders. The president asked that the full PSALM security directive be sustained….

The Air Defense Command had directed the large ballistic detection radar at Morristown, New Jersey, and the space-tracking radar at Laredo, Texas, and Thomasville, Georgia, be aligned for missile warning from Cuba…

A relatively new and large air-conditioned classroom at Homestead Air Force Base was selected to be the Command CenterAt the U.S. Army Pictorial Center, in New York City, Major Robert Vaughn received an order from headquarters of the U.S. Continental Army Command, at Fort Monroe, Virginia, to install a closed-circuit television system at the Florida command site. Vaughn knew such a system was at Fort Gordon, Georgia, but unfortunately it had been dismantled and placed in a convoy and was on its way to the Brooke Army Medical Center, in San Antonio, Texas, for demonstration purposes….Maps and charts were hung on the wall panels and the latest information on the Cuban situation was posted. The panels were used to conduct briefings several times daily. The closed-circuit television system permitted this data to be transmitted simultaneously to the offices and conference rooms of admirals and generals newly assigned to the task group coordinating the response….

President Kennedy once warned McCone, "If you have a secret, do me a favor - don't tell Salinger." … Salinger had not been told of the missiles being in Cuba by the president….

A new phase of analysis of the U2 imagery began on October 19 at the Center to determine whether (or when) the MRBM missile sites in Cuba would become operational. Criteria were developed by the GMAIC, and the Center applied that criteria in the analysis of all the imagery being received…

At about one o'clock on that Saturday afternoon, October 20, word was received at the Center that Robert Kennedy and Robert McNamara would pay a visit. Some fifteen minutes later a black limousine rolled up to the entrance of the Center, and Kennedy, McNamara, Gilpatrick, and McCone stepped out. They were quickly ushered to the seventh floor of the Center, where photo interpreters were exploiting the latest U2 photography.

The first concern of the four important visitors appeared to be the certainty of our identification of the newly discovered IRBM sites…Lundahl invited the visitors to view the missile sites at light tables fitted with stereoscopic viewers. The four visitors took turns at the light tables, while photo interpreters pointed out details of what they were seeing…At this point, Air Force brigadier general Robert N. Smith arrived at the Center. General Smith, director of intelligence of the Strategic Air Command, was an old friend of Lundahl,. He brought with him the latest U2 photography that had been processed by the Strategic Air Command's 544 Reconnaissance Tactical Wing at Omaha. It was not unusual for high ranking officers to accompany such film shipments inasmuch as the photography was extremely sensitive from a security standpoint. Escorting mission film to the Center also afforded field-command officers an opportunity to view the latest photography firsthand, with immediate access to the most recent intelligence derived in Washington….

…Finally McCone asked Bobby and McNamara if they were satisfied with what they had seen. Both replied in the affirmative. Bobby then asked the interpreters if they were getting enough sleep. Lundahl interrupted, stating that the Center was working on a two-shift basis and would continue to operate that way. Bobby then moved around the room shaking the hands and encouraging everyone to keep up the good work.

The unannounced purpose of the visit to the Center was to confirm details of the findings to help draft a televised address to the nation by the president and for an important meeting to be held at the White House…in the Yellow Oval room….The president walked into the room and said with a wry smile, "Gentlemen, today we're going to earn our pay." He then waved to McCone to begin the meeting. McCone gave Cline the task of summarizing…When Lundahl took over, he first made sure the president in particular, had a clear view of the easel….When Lundahl finished he turned to the president and said, "Mr. President, gentlemen, this summarizes the totality of the missile and other threats as we've bee able to determine it form aerial photography…"

The president was on his feet the moment Lundahl finished. He crossed the room directly towards Lundahl and said, "I want you to extend to your organization my gratitude for a job very well done." Lundahl, rather embarrassed, hesitantly thanked the president. The president then extended his hand and smiled. Lundahl was again surprised.

At 4 P.M. the president was scheduled to meet with his cabinet. When McCone asked if the president would like to have the cabinet briefed by him and Lundahl, the president said no. Mr. McCone also wondered if the president would like to show the cabinet members some of the aerial photos of Cuba. The president replied, "No, it just might confuse the issues."….

The president had summoned congressional leaders to Washington from various parts of the country to apraise them of the Cuban situation…Hale Boggs, the Democratic whip, was deep-sea fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. An Air Force plane, after making several warning passes over the boat, dropped a plastic message bottle. The message: "Call Washington – urgent message from the president." …Boggs was helicoptered to an airfield, where a two-seat jet trainer was waiting…He was flown to Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington and was helicoptered from their to the White House lawn, "still smelling of fish…"

At 5 P.M. that Monday afternoon, President Kennedy waited for the congressional leaders in the Cabinet Room…All chairs were occupied and people were standing several deep along the walls. The doors were closed. The president apologized for the inconvenience he had caused the legislators by interrupting their campaigns. He said, however, that the nation was facing an international emergency – offensive missiles…in Cuba. Mr. McCone and his briefer would provide the details….He then turned the meeting over to McCone. Mr. McCone made a short statement summarizing the finds that had been presented to the National Security Council earlier in the afternoon, and asked Lundahl to show the telltale photographs.

As Lundahl began to unfold the pictures of MRBM and IRBM launch sites and their targets, an incredible hush settled over the room….When Lundahl finished his presentation, he felt as if everyone was looking at him "as though I were holding a cobra rather than a pointer n my right hand." The enormity of the threat was being seen and heard for the first time by the congressmen and senators and they were obviously surprised and angered. Attention then shifted to the president. A great buzzing arose among the group….

At 7 P.M. Washington time on October 23, the Pentagon placed the entire U.S. military establishment on Defcon 3 (defense condition), an increased state of alert. The greatest mobilization since World War II was underway. SAC B-47 bombers were dispursed according to plan…The first Crusader, No. 923, landed at the naval air station at Jacksonville and taxied to the front line. When the aircraft stopped, there was an immediate flurry of activity as photographer mates unloaded the film magazines and rushed to the nearby Fleet Air Photo Laboratory. The activity inside the lab was just as intense as that on the flight line. The film was placed in the processors and within minutes the first negatives were finished… "Run the duplicate positives and let's get them to Washington."

…As the flight crews were busy fueling and preparing the aircraft for another mission and photographer mates were reloading the cameras, a young enlisted man on the flight line decided that each mission should be recorded on the side of the aircraft. He made a stencil depicting a dead hanging chicken, the chicken an obvious reference to Castro's chicken episode at the UN and Washington. (Castro and his entourage cooked chicken in their hotel rooms, much to the consternation and disgust of hotel managers.) He began stenciling them on the side of each aircraft. It became a ritual for the pilot when he opened the canopy after each mission to call out, "Chalk up another chicken."

[Kelly notes: There is also a logo patch for one of the photo recon outfits that has a role of film wrapped around the head of a chicken].

The Joint Chiefs wanted a firsthand report of the mission and Commander Ecker was ordered to fly to Washington. He landed at Andrews Air Force Base and, still in his flying suit, was rushed to the Pentagon….The Joint Chiefs queried the commander about the mission and asked if any anti-aircraft fire had been seen. Ecker proudly reported that the mission was, "a piece of cake." The low-altitude photography added a new dimension to NPIC reporting….

On the afternoon of October 26, the FBI reported that the Soviets were burning their archives not only at the Washington embassy, tub also at the Soviet UN enclave at Glen Cove, Long Island. The burning of sensitive files is normally the last diplomatic act in preparation for war…If nuclear war became a distinct possibility, the Office of Emergency Management had formulated plans for the evacuation of the president from Washington. The coordinater within the White House staff for preparing such a move was General Chester V. "Ted" Clifton, the president's military advisor. However, there appeared to be some conflict in responsibilities, because Secret Service chief Jim Rowley also was checking out details of his own plan for the evacuation of the president…

Luncahl arrived at the Steuart Building early on the morning of October 27. There was much work to be done. At the usual morning staff briefing he was shocked when told that all twenty-four MRBM sites in Cuba were now considered fully operational….

As the governors were assembling at the Pentagopn on the morning of October 27, Lundahl spent a few minutes with us before he went into his office and rehearsed in his mind what photography he was going to show them and what he was going to say. This would be the first time that most of these distinguished men would be exposed to serial reconnaissance, and Lundahl felt the briefing should be a "tutorial." McCone called for Lundahl at the Center in his personal car. One the way to the Pentagon, McCone informed Lundahl that he would personally conduct the briefing. He wanted to impress the governors with both his and the president's creditilblty…At 8:40 A.M. McCone began his briefing…Following McCone's presentation, Roswell Gilpatrick briefed the governors n the state of U.S. military prepardness…Following the Pentagon briefings, the governors were driven to the White House to meet with the president…Lundahal and McCone had hurried from the governors' meeting to the EXCOM, which met, as usual, at 10 A.M….

…U Thant…saying his military advisor, Indian brigadier Indar JiT Rikhye, would supply the details. William Tidwell, a CIA expert in aerial reconnaissance and a military reserve officer, was sent to New York to seek carification from Brigadier Rikhye. But if U Thant was confused, Rikhye was completely out of touch with reality. A short, stocky Punjabi with a deceptive smile, Rikhye's first service with the UN was as a colonel commanding an Indian unit in the Gaza Strip during the Middle East cease fire of 1957. He had helped organize the UN force sent to the Congo in 1960-61 and, in 1962, had worked to supervise the peacekeeping force in Neartherlands New Guinea. During World War II, as a major, he commanded an armor unit of the famed Bengal lancers in General Mark Clark's Fifth Army. Tidwell soon determined Rikhye…knew absolutely nothing about Soviet MRBM and IRBM sites. He had no plans…

[bK notes: Ruth Forbes Paine Young (Michael Paine's mother), and other World Federalists worked closely with Gen. Rikhye at the UN on a number of projects.]

…Throughout the crisis, Lundahl had alerted his staff to post him of any evidence of comic relief observed on the photography. President Eisenhower had appreciated a number of humorous briefing boards prepared during critical situations. Lundahl felt President Kennedy would also welcome a litter humor in this situation. President Kennedy, himself adept at clear, concise usage of the English language, particularly disliked anything smacking of military jargon. On several occasions during the crisis he had shown a certain displeasure with daily intelligence reports referring to the number of missile launch positions "occupied" and "unoccupied." He felt that, somehow, there must be a better way to describe how many of the four launch positions at each of the missile sites had missile launchers on them. McCone had struggled unsuccessfully to find appropriate terms of clarification throughout the crisis…At that point, a U.S. reconnaissance plane flying very low over a military camp happened to photograph a soldier using an open "three hole" latrine. We produced a briefing board from the photograph, and Lundahl showed it to McCone and included it in the White House briefing package. Lundahl finished his routine briefing of the president and McCone asked if the president would like to see a new three position military site discovered in Cuba, with one position occupied. The president's face froze momentarily, since he was aware that each of the missile sties in Cuba had four positions rather than three. As the president studied the photo, there came first a smile and then a booming laugh. When he finally stopped, he asked, "Why didn't I have this earlier? Now I understand the occupied and unoccupied problem perfectly.

The president was generous with his thanks and praise….McCone was the first to recognize the work of the National Photographic Interpretation Center with a formal memo of commendation on November 2, 1962….On November 8, 1962, the president sent the following letter to Lundahl: "While I would like to make public the truly outstanding accomplishments of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, I realize that the anonymity of an organization of your high professional competence in the intelligence field must be maintained.

"I do want you and your people to know of my very deep appreciation for the tremendous task you are performing under most trying circumstances. The analysis and interpretation of the Cuban photography and the reporting of your findings promptly and succinctly to me and to my principal policy advisors, most particularly the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has been exemplary.You have my thanks and the thanks of your government for a very remarkable performance of duty and my personal commendation goes to all of you."

John F. Kennedy

…President Kennedy decided the American people should be briefed on the photographic evidence…The president preferred that Lundahl handle the report to the nation, but McCone was reluctant to surface Lundahl and the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Lundahl recommended that John Hughes, who had been outstanding in his service at the National Photographic Interpretation Center as an Army lieutenant and became special assistant to General Joseph Carroll, director of the Defense Intelligence Agnecy, conduct the public briefing. NPIC supported Hughes in preparing the briefing…on nationwide TV. The presentation did much to allay the fears of the American public, but some intelligence specialists questioned whether too much had been revealed…

The president would be dead before the 1964 election and Bobby before that of 1968… McCone found Lyndon Johnson colorless and crude in intelligence matters and, as president, clumsy and heavy-handed in international affairs. Instead of personally carefully considering prepared intelligence memorandums on intelligence matters, he preferred to be briefed by trusted advisors. Increasingly, the president sought intelligence information almost exclusively from Secretary McNamara and the Defense Department. McCone's advice simply was no longer actively sought by the president. His role diminished, his influence faded, and the ready access he had enjoyed during the Kennedy administration became very limited…President Johnson replaced McCone with a fellow Texan, retired U.S. Navy vice-admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. The admiral had played an important role in development of the Polaris missile system, but had no experience in intelligence, which soon became apparent to CIA veterans….

Of all the awards and honors Lundahl achieved, one he seldom displays reflects most appropriately his contributions to this nation. It is an autographed photograph of Allen Dulles and himself, which reads: "Art Lundahl has done as much to protect the security of this nation as any man I know. Allen W. Dulles."

Edited by William Kelly
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The complete excerpt on Arthur Lundahl by Dino Brugioni from his "Eyeball to Eyeball" can be found here: Inside the NPI Center

http://jfkcountercoup.blogspot.com/2010/03/inside-npi-center.html

Besides giving a realy good insight into the operations of the center, much of which confirms the descriptins from Homer McMahon and Ben Hunter, Dino gives us the names of many employees and their job descriptions, along with some interesting insights into the major players during the crisis, many of whom dovetail with similar roles in the assassination drama.

Most significantly, he accurately describes LBJ's attitude towards McCone, who he didn't bother to even listen to.

Brugioni wrote: "McCone found Lyndon Johnson colorless and crude in intelligence matters and, as president, clumsy and heavy-handed in international affairs. Instead of personally carefully considering prepared intelligence memorandums on intelligence matters, he preferred to be briefed by trusted advisors. Increasingly, the president sought intelligence information almost exclusively from Secretary McNamara and the Defense Department. McCone's advice simply was no longer actively sought by the president. His role diminished, his influence faded, and the ready access he had enjoyed during the Kennedy administration became very limited…"

There's a book by one of McCone's assistants (Inside the CIA?) in which he describes accompaning McCone on the day after the assassination to Bundy's office in the basement of the White House next to the Situation Room.

LBJ and Bundy were huddled together and when McCone and his assistant show up to brief the President on the world situation, LBJ waves them off and tells them to just go away. There's nothing McCone could tell LBJ that he needed to know.

And then we have Dino Brugioni's report of the Zapruder film arriving at NPIC on Saturday night at about 10 PM.

According to the official records, SAIC Secret Service Dallas Sorrels got two of the first generation copies of the Z-film from Zapruder, one went to the FBI and another SS agent signed off to sending one copy to Washington on a military jet from Grand Prarie NAS at 10 PM on Nov. 22.

Twenty four hours later, the Secret Service show up at NPIC with the Z-film and they work all night to make still enlargments and briefing boards and analysize the thing, and the next day Lundahl briefs DCI McCone.

In IARRB (Vol. IV, Chapter 14) Doug Horne writes:

"Timing of the event: In the final analysis, Dino was of the very firm opinion that the event at NPIC which he supervised, as NPIC duty officer the weekend of the assassination, began on Saturday night, November 23, and ended early Sunday morning, November 24. In his first interview with Peter, Dino referred to the event as occurring the night of the assassination, but in subsequent interviews, as Dino refreshed his recollection, he became adamant that it commenced the next night—a day after the assassination. The event began about 10 PM in the evening, when Dino personally met two Secret Service agents at the entrance to the NPIC, and ended at about 6 or 7 AM the next morning when Brugioni's boss, Art Lundahl (the Director of NPIC), arrived and the briefing boards which Brugioni and the NPIC staff had created were presented to Lundahl, along with the briefing notes Brugioni had prepared. Lundahl then took both sets of briefing boards to the office of CIA Director John McCone, along with the briefing notes Brugioni had prepared for him; briefed the DCI; and then returned to NPIC later Sunday morning, November 24, and thanked everyone for their efforts the previous night, telling them that his briefing of McCone had gone well. Brugioni told Janney that the two Secret Service agents who had delivered the film to NPIC had departed with the film early Sunday morning, as soon as the last frames from the home movie had been enlarged and the briefing boards had been completed."

But they don't discuss exactly what it was that the photo interpreters and analysists concluded and what Lundahl told McCone in his briefing that Sunday morning.

In his Journals 1952-2000 (Penguin Press 2007) , Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., for the Diary entry

of December 5, 1963 (page 184) wrote: "Schlesinger and Robert Kennedy discussion

Schlesinger: I asked him, perhaps tactlessly about Oswald. He said there could be no serious doubt that he was guilty, but there still was argument whether he did it by himself or as a part of a larger plot, whether organized by Castro or by gangsters. He said the FBI people thought he had done it by himself, but that McCone thought there were two people involved in the shooting."

Why would McCone think there were two people involved in the shooting, and tell that to Bobby Kennedy?

McCone would think that there were two people involved in the shooting if Lundahl told him that in his briefing after the NPIC analysis of the Z-film.

And McCone would tell RFK that if the source was reliable enough, and Lundahl was the most reliable briefer McCone or Kennedy knew.

But LBJ knew what the CIA knew, and he knew what McCone was going to tell him, so he blew him off, totally, and not only didn't LBJ want to know what Lundahl learned from the NPIC "exploitation" of the Z-film, he didn't want to hear anything from him about anything. Period.

So it is my speculative conclusion that the NPIC analysis of the Z-film on Saturday night led them to report to the director of the CIA that there was evidence that "two people were involved in the shooting."

McCone knew this, but was prohibited from reporting this to LBJ, who didn't want to hear it.

Comments and alternative possibilities invited. - BK

Edited by William Kelly
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