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Last Days in Vietnam


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http://www.ctka.net/2015/RoryKVietnam.html

I found this film both interesting and gripping. It is really skillfully made and contains film snips from the collapse of Saigon that I never saw before, and it explains more deeply other film segments we have seen but did not full grasp.

Its one more exposure of the Nixon/ Kissinger Decent Interval charade that CIA officer Frank Snepp, who appears in the film, was the first to reveal, and was punished for.

The American humiliation in Vietnam went on all the way to the end, and this film shows how the American ambassador there caused the final exit debacle. A guy who I never even heard of before.

JFK was right way back when. And this film reminds us just how right, As he told Forrestal in 1963, just before Dallas, America had about a 100 to 1 chance of winning in Vietnam. Nixon did not understand that until 1969. And then when he did, he disguised the defeat with the whole Decent Interval masque. What a disgrace.

But as this film shows, there were some Americans who tried to find some decency amid the disgrace.

Edited by James DiEugenio
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Jim,

I agree the U.S. left many South Vietnamese friends to the tender mercies of the NVA. The 1973 Paris accords also left many U.S. airmen to the tender mercies of the Laotion communists, as the accords applied only to U.S. prisoners IN North Viet Nam.

The downfall of the South Vietnamese government was guaranteed by two things: [1] the 1973 Paris accords, which allowed the North to maintain the territory it had captured in the South in 1972; and [2] the resolution by the U.S. congress to cut off spare parts to South Vietnam, which occurred in the midst of the Watergate scandal.

Nixon and Kissinger were dirtbags when it came to the 1973 Paris accords. Agreed.

But the war in Viet Nam was not as simple as you present. You ignore the attitudes of most ordinary South Vietnamese citizens in 1972, for example. Those individuals didn't want a takeover by the North. They were powerless.

I speak as one who had ground-level experience.

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One of my best friends was a quadriplegic Vietnam War veteran. The only thing he ever asked me for was a copy of Neil Sheehan's A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. After my friend passed away, I got a package in the mail, in it was the book I had given him and a note from his caregiver saying that he wanted me to promise I would read it. It's a large volume but for those interested, there was a TV dramatization that was really good: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0126220/

Nixon and Kissinger were dirtbags when it came to the 1973 Paris accords. Agreed.

That Nixon blew up the talks 5 years earlier shouldn't come as any real surprise. What a POS.

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/nixon-prolonged-vietnam-war-for-political-gainand-johnson-knew-about-it-newly-unclassified-tapes-suggest-3595441/?no-ist

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Thanks for that link.

I didn't know that they made Sheehan's book into a film.

Vann was a very interesting character, because after the battle of Ap Bac, he was one of the first advisors who understood that the problem was that, as constituted, the ARVN could not really defeat the Viet Cong at that time, 1963, let alone the regular army of North Vietnam. Therefore, Saigon needed American combat troops in order to win. Which, of course, is what Halberstam was saying back then before he switched sides and became a dove.

Kennedy, of course, did not want to hear this because that was the last thing he wanted to do. But Vann was also anathema to the American Military inside Saigon. Because his picture was quite different than the one they were trying to present of America winning the war.

Anyway, Last Days in Vietnam was a real eye opener for me, since I did not fully comprehend why the US exit was such a mess. I had a much better understanding why after watching this film. Although the film has some faults to it, which i pointed out, overall its worth seeing. Nick Turse and The Nation crowd were very unfair to the movie. Its one reason I did not see it in the theater. They seemed to think that there was no part of the Vietnam War where America did anything right. But as this film points out, there were some people who did try and do the right thing at the end, when the war was technically over, or at least American involvement in it.

Even if they had to disobey orders to do so. That is why we have so many Vietnamese in America today, especially on the West Coast.

Edited by James DiEugenio
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Vann's helicopter was shot down in June 1972. At that time, there was heavy fighting in South Viet Nam. On April 30, 1972, North Viet Nam sent 15 divisions crashing into the South, the largest offensive to date.

North of Saigon, the border town of Loc Ninh was overrun, and the provincial capital of An Loc became surrounded by elements of three NVA-outfitted divisions. That siege lasted for months; eventually the NVA were routed. In I Corps, near the DMZ, NVA troops overran the city of Dong Ha and threatened to capture Hue. That siege lasted into late summer-early fall 1972, when again the NVA were routed.

The ground fighting was conducted by Vietnamese soldiers on both sides. The American contribution to the South's effort was, as of June 1972 when Vann was killed, limited to bombing and intelligence. American ground combat forces were withdrawn by then.

Remarkably but lost to history, the South Vietnamese army units performed very well. They had gotten a whole lot better since Ap Bac.

The Wiki article on Vann maintains he favored small-unit as opposed to big unit operations. The fact is that beginning with the Ia Drang battle in November 1965, the battles in South Viet Nam were fought by big units. Sure, the Viet Cong inflicted plenty of damage on American forces and the Vietnamese people. The big threat to the South Vietnamese government beginning with Ia Drang, however, was main-line NVA divisions, something Vann didn't see at Ap Bac.

Vann's theory of how to fight in Viet Nam, and he was not opposed to the war per se, would have succeeded IMO if the worthless politicians in the U.S. had committed to what military experts wanted: to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail by stringing the U.S. Fourth Division across the trail into Laos at the level of the DMZ demarcation and blocking the DMZ. The argument here is complex. The concept was to block the flow of NVA men and supplies into South Viet Nam and Cambodia. And to leave the ARVN to tend to and protect their own people. This concept wouldn't have worked in 1963; it could have worked by 1968 or 1969.

In addition to "A Bright and Shining Lie" I recommend "A Better War".

Edited by Jon G. Tidd
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If you read Fatal Politics by Ken Hughes, you will see that in 1969, Kissinger asked everyone involved in Vietnam if it was possible for the ARVN to win without American support, which included combat troops.

This was called NSSM-1, meaning it was a study memorandum, not an action memo.

Everyone, repeat: everyone, said no it was not. The person whose opinion weighed the most on Nixon was Gen. Abrams who had succeeded Westmoreland. The problems were manifold. But the essential ones were that the combination of the regular army of the north, plus the Viet Cong in the south just presented too much of a tactical problem for the ARVN, which lacked inspirational leadership. I mean just think of this: Khe Sanh and Tet. Giap pulled off both of those at the same time with hundreds of thousands of US troops there. When Nixon got this study memo back, he went to his speechwriters and said, words to the effect, "Its hopeless. We can't win. Even Abrams says that."

So he tried the Madman Act with the threat of atomic warfare, he threatened to bomb the dikes--which would have killed 200,000 people. None of it worked. So then he decided to bomb Cambodia and Laos. Which did nothing except annihilate those countries.

There never should have been a second Vietnam War. And if the Dulles brothers and Nixon had not screwed over the north at Geneva, there wouldn't have been.

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If you read Fatal Politics by Ken Hughes, you will see that in 1969, Kissinger asked everyone involved in Vietnam if it was possible for the ARVN to win without American support, which included combat troops.

This was called NSSM-1, meaning it was a study memorandum, not an action memo.

Everyone, repeat: everyone, said no it was not. The person whose opinion weighed the most on Nixon was Gen. Abrams who had succeeded Westmoreland. The problems were manifold. But the essential ones were that the combination of the regular army of the north, plus the Viet Cong in the south just presented too much of a tactical problem for the ARVN, which lacked inspirational leadership. I mean just think of this: Khe Sanh and Tet. Giap pulled off both of those at the same time with hundreds of thousands of US troops there. When Nixon got this study memo back, he went to his speechwriters and said, words to the effect, "Its hopeless. We can't win. Even Abrams says that."

So he tried the Madman Act with the threat of atomic warfare, he threatened to bomb the dikes--which would have killed 200,000 people. None of it worked. So then he decided to bomb Cambodia and Laos. Which did nothing except annihilate those countries.

There never should have been a second Vietnam War. And if the Dulles brothers and Nixon had not screwed over the north at Geneva, there wouldn't have been.

If Harriman & Ball et al hadn't pushed thru Cable 243 there would have been no Vietnam War.

North and South were on the path to reconciliation until Diem was whacked.

"Today's World Report: Truce Moves Reported In Viet Nam," New York World-Telegram & Sun, (Friday), 25 October 1963, p.6: "LONDON - The government of South Vietnam and Communist North Viet Nam are apparently making exploratory contacts that could lead to a truce, diplomatic sources said. There was no official confirmation…Diplomatic sources said the current moves were believed to be aiming at some sort of truce arrangement with possible wider ramifications."

Edited by Cliff Varnell
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Thanks for that link.

I didn't know that they made Sheehan's book into a film.

Vann was a very interesting character, because after the battle of Ap Bac, he was one of the first advisors who understood that the problem was that, as constituted, the ARVN could not really defeat the Viet Cong at that time, 1963, let alone the regular army of North Vietnam. Therefore, Saigon needed American combat troops in order to win. Which, of course, is what Halberstam was saying back then before he switched sides and became a dove.

Kennedy, of course, did not want to hear this because that was the last thing he wanted to do. But Vann was also anathema to the American Military inside Saigon. Because his picture was quite different than the one they were trying to present of America winning the war.

vann also said vietnam was the kind of war you didn't win with artillery and bombs. instead you used a rifle so you knew who you were killing.

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Vann's helicopter was shot down in June 1972. At that time, there was heavy fighting in South Viet Nam. On April 30, 1972, North Viet Nam sent 15 divisions crashing into the South, the largest offensive to date.

North of Saigon, the border town of Loc Ninh was overrun, and the provincial capital of An Loc became surrounded by elements of three NVA-outfitted divisions. That siege lasted for months; eventually the NVA were routed. In I Corps, near the DMZ, NVA troops overran the city of Dong Ha and threatened to capture Hue. That siege lasted into late summer-early fall 1972, when again the NVA were routed.

The ground fighting was conducted by Vietnamese soldiers on both sides. The American contribution to the South's effort was, as of June 1972 when Vann was killed, limited to bombing and intelligence. American ground combat forces were withdrawn by then.

Remarkably but lost to history, the South Vietnamese army units performed very well. They had gotten a whole lot better since Ap Bac.

The Wiki article on Vann maintains he favored small-unit as opposed to big unit operations. The fact is that beginning with the Ia Drang battle in November 1965, the battles in South Viet Nam were fought by big units. Sure, the Viet Cong inflicted plenty of damage on American forces and the Vietnamese people. The big threat to the South Vietnamese government beginning with Ia Drang, however, was main-line NVA divisions, something Vann didn't see at Ap Bac.

Vann's theory of how to fight in Viet Nam, and he was not opposed to the war per se, would have succeeded IMO if the worthless politicians in the U.S. had committed to what military experts wanted: to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail by stringing the U.S. Fourth Division across the trail into Laos at the level of the DMZ demarcation and blocking the DMZ. The argument here is complex. The concept was to block the flow of NVA men and supplies into South Viet Nam and Cambodia. And to leave the ARVN to tend to and protect their own people. This concept wouldn't have worked in 1963; it could have worked by 1968 or 1969.

In addition to "A Bright and Shining Lie" I recommend "A Better War".

i would recommend John Newman's JFK and Vietnam

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You have a firm second there Martin.

But I would also add that Kaiser's book, American Tragedy is also good.

Edited by James DiEugenio
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Let's blame the American people for the second Viet Nam war. Through1969 at least, through the hard-hat demonstration in NYC, the American people clearly supported the war.

IMO, no one has the creds to weigh in on the details of the war who didn't serve in the war. And among those who served, there are as many views as the number of those who served.

As to the big picture of the war, I always ask, what's the agenda.

As one who served, I say no one here or elsewhere wants to know the details. You really don't.

As to one who served, I say if you're looking at the big picture, look at the agenda of the presenter.

You might say, screw that. Nixon did this and that. And so did Kissinger. They're both POS. Screw 'em.

As to one who served, I say this: the ground-level facts, which you don't want to know, are the truth of the war.

In 1972, you would have wanted a complete American withdrawal. Without regard to what happened to South Vietnamese citizens.

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