JFK's Foreign Policy: A Motive for Murder

[James DiEugenio]

From Destiny Betrayed second edition, p. 37:

"Kennedy's revision envisioned air operations only after the landing force had secured a beachhead. In light of this, the CIA therefore switched the landing site from Trinidad, in the center of Cuba, on the south coast, to Playa GIron which was slightly west. One of the specific reasons this site was chosen was because, "The beachhead area contains one and possibly two airstrips...."

Later on on pages 45, 46:

"But yet, it seems clear in both reports, and from other sources, that these D-Day air strikes were to be launched only from a strip secured within the beachhead. Which meant that the invasion force had to capture and maintain a protected beach zone large enough to contain an air strip. In fact, the CIA agreed to this. In their revised version of the plan, delivered on March 15th, they mention it at least three times. For instance, this March 15 memo reads that air operations over Cuba would be "Conducted from an air base within territory held by opposition forces."

"Later, in describing the sequence of the actual military landing, the memo reads, "The second phase, preferably commencing at dawn following the landing, will involve the movement into the beachhead of tactical aircraft and their prompt commitment for strikes against the Castro air force.

Then, a couple of sentences later, it reads, "The whole tactical air operation will be based in the beachhead..." Therefore it is clear that the CIA understood this fact a month before the invasion began."

Later, on page 46:

"In furtherance of this declassified information, Kirkpatrick's report contains an interview with Hawkins. He states that once the Trinidad Plan was revised, Bissell told him that the State Department and Kennedy had imposed new restrictions, one of them being they had to capture an airfield from the first day for air operations. Therefore, from this testimony, we know Bissell understood this requirement."

"In the Taylor Report, it clearly states that McGeorge Bundy...told Cabell the night before the brigade landed that there would no D Day air strikes unless they were launched from a strip within the beachhead".

FInally, also on page 46:

"On April 16th, when the idea of a D Day air strike from Nicaragua came up with UN Representative Adlai Stevenson and Dean Rusk, Kennedy specifically said he was not signed onto that decision. It was his understanding that any further air strikes would come from inside the beachhead. So, with these declassified reports, the evidence on this issue is compelling."

I have a lot of respect and affection for Prouty. But in an essay he wrote about the Bay of Pigs, he seemed to lay the blame for a cancellation of the D Day air strikes on Bundy. In light of all this new information, such is not the case. Bundy was simply carrying out Kennedy''s orders about the establishment of a beach head first.

IMO, this is all involved with Kennedy's revisionist view of America's role in the Third World. Which is the sub theme of my visual essay. Kennedy was not going to unleash American forces there. He would help, supply, finance certain groups opposing fascism and communism. But he was not going to send in American power to do the job itself.

Eisenhower, Burke, Nixon etc did not understand this.

BTW, does anyone read my books? Apparently not on this forum.

Edited November 26, 2015 by James DiEugenio

[Paul Brancato]

Your presence here is appreciated enormously.

[James DiEugenio]

Thanks Paul.

Have a nice Thanksgiving.

[Cliff Varnell]

From Destiny Betrayed second edition, p. 37:

"Kennedy's revision envisioned air operations only after the landing force had secured a beachhead.

Don't you mean the CIA revision prepared for Kennedy, not "Kennedy's revision"?

Here's the CIA memo of 3/15/61:

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d61

Richard Bissell's wet dream:

<quote on>

3. Phases of the Operation:

a. The operation will begin with a night landing. There are no known enemy forces (even police) in the objective area and it is anticipated that the landing can be carried out with few if any casualties and with no serious combat. As many supplies as possible will be unloaded over the beaches but the ships will put to sea in time to be well offshore by dawn. The whole beachhead area including the air strips will be immediately occupied and approach routes defended. No tanks will be brought ashore in the initial landing. It is believed that this operation can be accomplished quite unobtrusively and that the Castro regime will have little idea of the size of the force involved.

b. The second phase, preferably commencing at dawn following the landing, will involve the movement into the beachhead of tactical aircraft and their prompt commitment for strikes against the Castro Air Force. Concurrently C-46's will move in with gas in drums, minimal maintenance equipment, and maintenance personnel. As rapidly as possible, the whole tactical air operation will be based in the beachhead but initially only enough aircraft will be based there plausibly to account for all observable activity over the island.

c. In the third phase, as soon as there is adequate protection for shipping from enemy air attack, ships will move back into the beach to discharge supplies and equipment (including tanks). It must be presumed that counter attacks against the beachhead will be undertaken within 24 to 48 hours of the landing but the perimeter can easily be held against attacks along the most direct approach routes. The terrain may well prevent any sizable attacks (providing the enemy air force has been rendered ineffective) until the opposition force is ready to attempt to break out of the beachhead.

<quote off>

This air plan -- first secure the beachhead and the landing strips, then attack the Castro air force -- did not pass muster with McGeorge Bundy.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d64

<quote on>

CIA will present a revised plan for the Cuban operation.¹ They have done a remarkable job of reframing the landing plan so as to make it unspectacular and quiet, and plausibly Cuban in its essentials.

The one major problem which remains is the air battle. I think there is unanimous agreement that at some stage the Castro Air Force must be removed. It is a very sketchy force, in very poor shape at the present, and Colonel Hawkins (Bissell's military brain) thinks it can be removed by six to eight simultaneous sorties of B-26s. These will be undertaken by Cuban pilots in planes with Cuban Air Force markings. This is the only really noisy enterprise that remains.

My own belief is that this air battle has to come sooner or later, and that the longer we put it off, the harder it will be. Castro's Air Force is currently his Achilles' heel, but he is making drastic efforts to strengthen it with Russian planes and Russian-trained pilots.

Even the revised landing plan depends strongly upon prompt action against Castro's air. The question in my mind is whether we cannot solve this problem by having the air strike come some little time before the invasion. A group of patriotic airplanes flying from Nicaraguan bases might knock out Castro's Air Force in a single day without anyone knowing (for some time) where they came from, and with nothing to prove that it was not an interior rebellion by the Cuban Air Force, which has been of very doubtful loyalty in the past; the pilots will in fact be members of the Cuban Air Force who went into the opposition some time ago. Then the invasion could come as a separate enterprise, and neither the air strike nor the quiet landing of patriots would in itself give Castro anything to take to the United Nations.

<quote off>

The idea of knocking out Castro's air force prior to the invasion came from Bundy.

They started with 16 B-26s disguised as Cuban planes but Dean Rusk cut that down to 8 -- a fateful decision which allowed 4 Cuban planes to survive the D-Day -2 "false flag" attacks.

In light of this, the CIA therefore switched the landing site from Trinidad, in the center of Cuba, on the south coast, to Playa GIron which was slightly west. One of the specific reasons this site was chosen was because, "The beachhead area contains one and possibly two airstrips...."

Later on on pages 45, 46:

"But yet, it seems clear in both reports, and from other sources, that these D-Day air strikes were to be launched only from a strip secured within the beachhead. Which meant that the invasion force had to capture and maintain a protected beach zone large enough to contain an air strip. In fact, the CIA agreed to this. In their revised version of the plan, delivered on March 15th, they mention it at least three times. For instance, this March 15 memo reads that air operations over Cuba would be "Conducted from an air base within territory held by opposition forces."

"Later, in describing the sequence of the actual military landing, the memo reads, "The second phase, preferably commencing at dawn following the landing, will involve the movement into the beachhead of tactical aircraft and their prompt commitment for strikes against the Castro air force.

Then, a couple of sentences later, it reads, "The whole tactical air operation will be based in the beachhead..." Therefore it is clear that the CIA understood this fact a month before the invasion began."

After the 3/15/61 meeting with Kennedy the CIA understood that the air strikes would precede the landings.

Later, on page 46:

"In furtherance of this declassified information, Kirkpatrick's report contains an interview with Hawkins. He states that once the Trinidad Plan was revised, Bissell told him that the State Department and Kennedy had imposed new restrictions, one of them being they had to capture an airfield from the first day for air operations. Therefore, from this testimony, we know Bissell understood this requirement."

All of which was null and void within hours.

"In the Taylor Report, it clearly states that McGeorge Bundy...told Cabell the night before the brigade landed that there would no D Day air strikes unless they were launched from a strip within the beachhead".

FInally, also on page 46:

"On April 16th, when the idea of a D Day air strike from Nicaragua came up with UN Representative Adlai Stevenson and Dean Rusk, Kennedy specifically said he was not signed onto that decision. It was his understanding that any further air strikes would come from inside the beachhead. So, with these declassified reports, the evidence on this issue is compelling."

I have a lot of respect and affection for Prouty. But in an essay he wrote about the Bay of Pigs, he seemed to lay the blame for a cancellation of the D Day air strikes on Bundy. In light of all this new information, such is not the case. Bundy was simply carrying out Kennedy''s orders about the establishment of a beach head first.

In light of what new information?

The CIA suggested an initial invasion without air support and Bundy came back with the view there had to be a false flag take out of the Cuban air force before D-Day.

It's clear that there was no way American forces were going to intercede if the invasion force faced slaughter on the beach.

And there was absolutely no basis for Dulles thinking Cabell would change Kennedy's mind about D-Day air strikes..

IMO, this is all involved with Kennedy's revisionist view of America's role in the Third World. Which is the sub theme of my visual essay. Kennedy was not going to unleash American forces there. He would help, supply, finance certain groups opposing fascism and communism. But he was not going to send in American power to do the job itself.

Eisenhower, Burke, Nixon etc did not understand this.

BTW, does anyone read my books? Apparently not on this forum.

Edited November 26, 2015 by Cliff Varnell

[James DiEugenio]

Cliff:

Unlike you, I don't like arguing for the sake of arguing. The CIA revised the original plan because Kennedy did not like it. Therefore, it was revised according to his strictures.

I don't know why you are bringing up these points about Bundy. Maybe because he is Skull and Bones? The idea of knocking out the Cuban Air Force was alway a part of the CIA's agenda. But Bissell and Dulles understood that Kennedy was not vey enthusiastic about it since it so much relied on direct American involvement. The idea that it was all Bundy simply does not jibe with the known facts. Especially when you have curtailed your direct presentation of the March 15th memo. The actual memo is something like four pages long. It appears in Peter Kornbluh's invaluable book Bay of Pigs Declassified, which I think is the best book on the subject. (see pgs. 125-28) And my quotes about the air strip being secured on the island for the strikes all come from the beginning of the memo and at the end.

But further, , when push came to shove, Bundy carried out Kennedy's orders. Just as everyone else in the White House did. Including McNamara, who I did not quote. But McNamara is also on record as saying that the D Day air strikes were not in the revised plan. That the CIA came back to the White House and asked for them. This is in Noel Twyman's book, Bloody Treason. Kennedy harped to Bissell on this point, that is reducing the number of air sorties.

An important point--adduced by Larry Hancock-- is that Bissell tried to keep Hawkins out of any direct meetings with JFK on the subject of his plan. Since he likely knew that Hawkins would object to the drastic revisions made upon Kennedy's requests. To the point that he would have asked that it be aborted. In fact, I think Larry quotes him as actually saying that.

This would not have been in keeping with the secret agenda of Dulles and Bissell. As Talbot notes in his new book, Bissell also kept another memo from going to Kennedy. This one said that the plan as now revised--the first revision, where it went form guerrilla style to strike force-- would require that the operation be a joint CIA/Pentagon operation since it would not likely succeed.( The Devil's Chessboard, p. 398, galley uncorrected proof) Again, Bissell knew that this would likely kill the operation.

Therefore, they kept up appearances, i.e. misleading JFK as to the number of likely defections, the lack of police at Playa GIron, and the possibility of "going guerrilla" and linking up with other dissidents. This was all pure malarkey. But its what Dulles and Bissell knew they had to say to keep the fey operation alive in the White House.

It was all surgically exposed by both Lyman Kirkpatrick in his IG report, and Bobby Kennedy during the Taylor Commission investigation. Talbot adds that during the latter, according to a CIA liaison, Dulles made for a very bad witness. That is probably because RFK was such a ferocious antagonist. Once he was familiar with the plan revisions, Bobby never bought the idea that Dulles still proffered: that the concept was to achieve a beachhead and then build it up, allowing for air strikes. He actually attacks Dulles on this specific point. In fact, in his cross examination, he makes it clear he does not buy it at all. (DiEugenio, p. 42)

And this was the beginning of the end for Dulles, Bissell and Cabell. Because RFK then presented witnesses that also exposed the other lie, that is about "going guerrilla". Bobby presented the Hunt/Dulles bete noire, Manuelo Ray. And he helped blow that one up. (ibid, p. 43)

This all led to Bobby consulting with Lovett, finding the Bruce/Lovett report, and Lovett being called in to see JFK. Lovett told him Dulles had a history of doing this kind of stuff--that is going beyond the parameters of a mission's guidelines. And then adding things in afterwards--as in this case the request for D Day air strikes. And that was it. Later, both Dulles and Bissell admitted their secret agenda. Although I don't think Dulles did this on purpose. I think the CIA failed to pick up those notes at Princeton that he stupidly left behind.

BTW, Talbot notes in his new book that Dulles started this proposed 1966 article in direct reaction to Schlesinger and Sorenson getting their books excerpted in Life and Look. And in the former, Schlesinger argued that the Bay of Pigs came about because Kennedy was misled. Dulles started his article, but then realized that what he would eventually write would not contradict Schlesinger, but actually bolster his tenet. So he wisely called it off. But evidently, his wife picked up the leftovers and the CIA did not fleece them from Princeton. Where this direct evidence of his secret agenda was discovered many years later.

Edited November 26, 2015 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

Let me add, I never wanted this thread to focus on the Bay of Pigs.

In fact, in my original presentation, I actually said I did not want to talk about Cuba and Vietnam. Since that is what we have been talking about for about 45 years.

There was much more to JFK's foreign policy that was ignored. Including Africa and the Middle East and Indonesia.

But some people don't want to look at this new aspect. For what reasons, I do not know.

But IMO, this new stuff is more integral to the modern world. Vietnam and Cuba are more or less history.

Much of the newer stuff is ongoing.

Edited November 26, 2015 by James DiEugenio

[Cliff Varnell]

Cliff:

Unlike you, I don't like arguing for the sake of arguing. The CIA revised the original plan because Kennedy did not like it. Therefore, it was revised according to his strictures.

That plan was never signed off on by anybody outside the CIA.

That plan didn't survive the March 15 meeting.

Bundy deftly sabotaged it by pushing for B-26 false flag strikes before D-Day, not after D-Day as envisioned by Bissell et al.

That changed everything about the operation.

I don't know why you are bringing up these points about Bundy.

I don't know why you can't wrap your head around the following (for the third time!)

From the Bundy memo 3/15/61:

<quote on, emphasis added>

Even the revised landing plan depends strongly upon prompt action against Castro's air. The question in my mind is whether we cannot solve this problem by having the air strike come some little time before the invasion. A group of patriotic airplanes flying from Nicaraguan bases might knock out Castro's Air Force in a single day without anyone knowing (for some time) where they came from, and with nothing to prove that it was not an interior rebellion by the Cuban Air Force, which has been of very doubtful loyalty in the past; the pilots will in fact be members of the Cuban Air Force who went into the opposition some time ago. Then the invasion could come as a separate enterprise, and neither the air strike nor the quiet landing of patriots would in itself give Castro anything to take to the United Nations.

<quote off>

It was Bundy's bright idea to launch the false flag strikes before the invasion.

Maybe because he is Skull and Bones?

How did Bundy get his job?

He was recommended by Robert Lovett.

How did Dean Rusk get his job?

He was recommended by Robert Lovett.

Dean Rusk was head of the Rockefeller Foundation for eight years before he became S of S.

Robert Lovett -- Skull & Bones 1918. McGeorge Bundy -- Skull & Bones 1940.

To whom did Rusk and Bundy owe their loyalty, Jim?

Kennedy?

The idea of knocking out the Cuban Air Force was alway a part of the CIA's agenda. But Bissell and Dulles understood that Kennedy was not vey enthusiastic about it since it so much relied on direct American involvement.

Is that right, Jim?

Sure about that, are you?

Because according to you, David Talbot, Greg Burnham, Bill Kelly and many others-- Dulles attempted to trap Kennedy into using US military intervention to salvage the operation.

Here's how Talbot put it in an interview with Salon:

http://www.salon.com/2015/10/15/every_president_has_been_manipulated_national_security_officials_david_talbot_investigates_americas_deep_state/

<quote on, emphasis added>

[Kennedy and Dulles] had this very acrimonious split over CIA-led invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, where Kennedy felt he had been lied to and sandbagged, and forced into supporting this invasion. I think that the plan all along was the CIA had wanted the invasion to fail, but Dulles hoped and was completely convinced that Kennedy would be forced to send in the full might of the U.S. military to save the invasion and to crush Castro. When Kennedy didn’t do that and refused to escalate it into an international crisis, it provoked this split within the Kennedy government that led to Dulles being forced out of power, much to his shock. He had never been treated that way by a president.

<quote off>

This is your position as well, correct?

So let's get this straight -- even though Dulles knew that Kennedy wanted nothing to do with US military intervention, and that it had been explicitly ruled out at the March 15 meeting which Dulles had attended -- Dulles was "convinced" Kennedy would over-rule this collective decision on the basis of a plea from none other than Deputy DCI Charles Cabell.

That's your story, right?

Dulles was convinced that the mighty Cabell would -- by the sheer force of his personality, I suppose - get Kennedy to countermand a non-intervention policy chiseled in concrete.

Dulles was so confident this would happen that he went to Puerto Rico D-Day -1 and sacrificed direct control over the operation, sacrificed a direct connection to Kennedy and the opportunity to plead for the US intervention he expected all along?

Wow.

What a crock you guys are pushing!

The idea that it was all Bundy simply does not jibe with the known facts.

You obviously never read the one page Bundy memo which introduced the idea of D-Day-2 B-26 false flag attacks.

It was Bundy's plan which carried the day, not Bissell's.

Especially when you have curtailed your direct presentation of the March 15th memo. The actual memo is something like four pages long.

Not the Bundy memo!

One page.

Didn't read it, did you?

It appears in Peter Kornbluh's invaluable book Bay of Pigs Declassified, which I think is the best book on the subject. (see pgs. 125-28)

Or you can go to the source:

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/comp1

And my quotes about the air strip being secured on the island for the strikes all come from the beginning of the memo and at the end.

A memo that was dead on arrival.

But further, , when push came to shove, Bundy carried out Kennedy's orders. Just as everyone else in the White House did.

Jim, I live in a town that has a very attractive orange bridge. Now, by a series of events I won't bore you with I have a proprietary interest in this orange bridge and I'm looking for some smart co-investors.

I think you"d be a good candidate for investing.

PM if interested.

Including McNamara, who I did not quote. But McNamara is also on record as saying that the D Day air strikes were not in the revised plan.

There was never any plan for D-Day airstrikes. The CIA proposed strikes based from the beach-head, but Bundy won the day with his proposal that the strikes occur before the invasion.

This under-cuts your claim that Dulles was trying to force Kennedy to intervene.

It was never on the table!

How can you claim that Dulles was attempting to force JFK into a course of action that was always off the table?

That the CIA came back to the White House and asked for them. This is in Noel Twyman's book, Bloody Treason. Kennedy harped to Bissell on this point, that is reducing the number of air sorties.

You're referring to the number of air sorties by the false flag B-26s?

Kennedy directly told Bissell to reduce the number of planes for the false flag attacks?

Citation, please.

It's not in Bloody Treason, near as I can tell.

An important point--adduced by Larry Hancock-- is that Bissell tried to keep Hawkins out of any direct meetings with JFK on the subject of his plan. Since he likely knew that Hawkins would object to the drastic revisions made upon Kennedy's requests. To the point that he would have asked that it be aborted. In fact, I think Larry quotes him as actually saying that.

This would not have been in keeping with the secret agenda of Dulles and Bissell. As Talbot notes in his new book, Bissell also kept another memo from going to Kennedy. This one said that the plan as now revised--the first revision, where it went form guerrilla style to strike force-- would require that the operation be a joint CIA/Pentagon operation since it would not likely succeed.( The Devil's Chessboard, p. 398, galley uncorrected proof) Again, Bissell knew that this would likely kill the operation.

Therefore, they kept up appearances, i.e. misleading JFK as to the number of likely defections, the lack of police at Playa GIron, and the possibility of "going guerrilla" and linking up with other dissidents. This was all pure malarkey. But its what Dulles and Bissell knew they had to say to keep the fey operation alive in the White House.

So where did Dulles get the idea that the CIA could force Kennedy to change a policy already set in stone?

This claim of Dulles perfidy is unsupported by the facts.

It was all surgically exposed by both Lyman Kirkpatrick in his IG report, and Bobby Kennedy during the Taylor Commission investigation. Talbot adds that during the latter, according to a CIA liaison, Dulles made for a very bad witness. That is probably because RFK was such a ferocious antagonist. Once he was familiar with the plan revisions, Bobby never bought the idea that Dulles still proffered: that the concept was to achieve a beachhead and then build it up, allowing for air strikes. He actually attacks Dulles on this specific point. In fact, in his cross examination, he makes it clear he does not buy it at all. (DiEugenio, p. 42)

This concept to stage air strikes from a beach head did not -- I cannot stress enough -- DID NOT prevail.

Bundy's plan prevailed on March 15, not Dulles'.

And this was the beginning of the end for Dulles, Bissell and Cabell. Because RFK then presented witnesses that also exposed the other lie, that is about "going guerrilla". Bobby presented the Hunt/Dulles bete noire, Manuelo Ray. And he helped blow that one up. (ibid, p. 43)

This all led to Bobby consulting with Lovett, finding the Bruce/Lovett report, and Lovett being called in to see JFK.

Ding! Ding! Ding! Ding! Ding!

NOW we're getting into the weeds of the Bay of Pigs failure.

Robert Lovett and Joe Kennedy and others tried for over 4 years to get Ike to fire Allen Dulles.

http://cryptome.org/0001/bruce-lovett.htm

Joe Kennedy post-BOP:

"I know that outfit, and I wouldn't pay them a hundred bucks a week. It's a lucky thing they were found out early."

Dean Rusk started bitching about the Cuban operation as soon as he got into office.

The CIA revised the plan, and McGeorge Bundy revised their revision to include false flag strikes before the invasion.

They started with a fleet of 16 B-26s but the State Department raised hell and they cut it to 8 planes.

This doomed the entire operation since the D-Day-2 air sorties left 4 Cuban planes intact.

Rusk told Bundy to tell Cabell that there would be no D-Day-1 false flag sorties -- and that was that.

Jim, never assume that the primary outcome of an intelligence operation wasn't the primary intent.

The primary consequence of the BOP failure was the dismissal of the top 3 guys at the CIA.

Looks to me like it was mission accomplished.

Lovett told him Dulles had a history of doing this kind of stuff--that is going beyond the parameters of a mission's guidelines. And then adding things in afterwards--as in this case the request for D Day air strikes. And that was it. Later, both Dulles and Bissell admitted their secret agenda. Although I don't think Dulles did this on purpose. I think the CIA failed to pick up those notes at Princeton that he stupidly left behind.

BTW, Talbot notes in his new book that Dulles started this proposed 1966 article in direct reaction to Schlesinger and Sorenson getting their books excerpted in Life and Look. And in the former, Schlesinger argued that the Bay of Pigs came about because Kennedy was misled. Dulles started his article, but then realized that what he would eventually write would not contradict Schlesinger, but actually bolster his tenet. So he wisely called it off. But evidently, his wife picked up the leftovers and the CIA did not fleece them from Princeton. Where this direct evidence of his secret agenda was discovered many years later.

Edited November 27, 2015 by Cliff Varnell

[James DiEugenio]

See my post at number 21.

Ok Cliff, I will start another thread. This one is yours.

Your hijacking was successful

[Jon G. Tidd]

Cliff,

FWIW, I believe JFK had the power to cancel the BOP invasion; had sufficient knowledge of the impending invasion to do so; and failed to do so.

IMO, it's easy and fair to blame the CIA for the invasion and its failure. The CIA was running the operation. But it was running the operation with JFK's permission, implicit or explicit. Given JFK's constitutional role as CIC of military forces (including CIA forces), I don't see how the BOP operation can be laid at anyone's doorstep except JFK's. For sure, if the BOP invasion had succeeded in toppling Castro, the JFK administration would have claimed and received credit, at least domestically.

[Cliff Varnell]

See my post at number 21.

Ok Cliff, I will start another thread. This one is yours.

Your hijacking was successful

I didn't hijack xxxx.

YOU wrote in post #10:

<quote on>

As myself, Greg Burnham, Larry Hancock and others have shown, Allen Dulles and Dick Bissell lied their heads off about Operation Zapata to JFK. Because they knew he was predisposed against the project. And when Kennedy saw it was a disaster he refused to commit American troops to salvage it.

<quote off>

How convenient. You think you can just spew this garbage un-challenged?

American troops were never on the table under JFK

And when you take the worst of the argument -- as you always do in your discussions -- you need to get indignant.

Nice dance around your incoherent interpretation of the Bay of Pigs.

Edited November 27, 2015 by Cliff Varnell

[Cliff Varnell]

Cliff,

FWIW, I believe JFK had the power to cancel the BOP invasion; had sufficient knowledge of the impending invasion to do so; and failed to do so.

IMO, it's easy and fair to blame the CIA for the invasion and its failure.

Sure. They took the fall. But it was Rusk and Bundy who pushed the project forward while whittling it down.

The CIA was running the operation. But it was running the operation with JFK's permission, implicit or explicit.

Looks to me like it was a trap. Robert Lovett and Joe Kennedy wanted Dulles out. Rusk and Bundy allowed the project to proceed under ever-tighter restrictions which eventually guaranteed failure.

Lovett and Kennedy had the motive, means and opportunity to force the ouster of Allen Dulles, even if it meant embarrassing the new president.

Given JFK's constitutional role as CIC of military forces (including CIA forces), I don't see how the BOP operation can be laid at anyone's doorstep except JFK's.

His foreign policy team wasn't loyal to him.

They were loyal to the Rockefeller/Harriman oligarchy which dominated American foreign policy in the 20th century.

For sure, if the BOP invasion had succeeded in toppling Castro, the JFK administration would have claimed and received credit, at least domestically.

[Cliff Varnell]

Your hijacking was successful

Ok. Cool.

Why did Allen Dulles go to Puerto Rico on D-Day-1 thereby giving up operational control of the largest operation of his career, which deprived the operation of a direct connection to Kennedy?

Looks to me like it was the first day of his retirement and he knew it; he knew he'd been set up by tools of his enemies Lovett and Kennedy.

[Cliff Varnell]

Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November, pg 185:

<quote on>

"The government was split in two," Robert Kennedy recalled. "It was the only time really in three years, the government was broken in two in a very disturbing way."

<quote off>

In the summer/fall of 1963, was the Kennedy administration broken in two by JFK's policies in Africa?

No.

Broken in two by JFK's policies in the Middle East?

No.

ibid

<quote on>

Washington, August 26-27, 1963

...In the cool halls of the White House the hectic plotting of the weekend took on an air of unreality. Robert Kennedy had talked with Taylor and McNamara and discovered that "nobody was behind it, nobody knew what we were going to do, nobody knew what our policy was; it hadn't been discussed, as everything else had been discussed since the Bay of Pigs in full detail before we did anything--nothing like that had been done before the decision made on Diem, and so by Tuesday we were trying to pull away from that policy..."

President Kennedy belatedly realized that no one had spelled out to him the ramifications for the policy he had approved so lightly. He was irritated at the disagreement among his advisers. Taylor, McNamara, and McCone all were critical of the attempt to run a coup in Saigon. Even Rusk seemed to have second thoughts. "The government was split in two," Robert Kennedy recalled. "It was the only time really in three years, the government was broken in two in a very disturbing way."

<quote off>

Vietnam policy broke the government in two.

The claim that JFK was murdered for the whole of his foreign policy is the a-historical conclusion of complexity fetishists.

[Greg Burnham]

Cliff,

You and I have gone round and round on this topic many times. By that I mean: "Round and round on the circular logic Ferris Wheel." As Jim noted, you seem to want to argue for its own sake. Although Jim and I don't see 100% eye-to-eye on this topic, the differences are mostly negligible.

Having said that, you are correct that there was never any contingency plan for the BOP that would have involved direct US military intervention as far as JFK was concerned. Not at the end. Not at its inception. Not during the middle planning phases. Never. Direct US intervention was NEVER a fall back position. However, within the "power structure" of the National Security State there was a "contingency plan" that attempted to usurp the authority of the President of the United States.

It is also true that at least one aircraft carrier had been moved (without proper authorization) into a strike force position to support the landing at the BOP. This is a smoking gun, as well as an indication of what was being attempted. The original BOP Operation was successfully sabotaged (by canceling the pre-dawn airstrikes) for a reason. Was it simply for the purpose of "failure for its own sake?" Nope.

The purpose of the sabotage was to place the young, new POTUS in a double-bind; between a rock and a hard place: the Scylla and Charybdis. It was anticipated that he would refuse introducing US military into the operation as it was both a violation of International Law and there was no contingency plan for it. However, once he was made aware of the desperate plight of Brigade 2506, the conspirators hoped he would cave with respect to International Law. If so, there would only be two things lacking to motivate JFK to send in US air support. First, lack of a contingency plan remained as a huge obstacle to US intervention. And second, but most importantly: As far as JFK knew, no assets were within range to offer support. However, since the needed aircraft had been unexpectedly maneuvered into position, the necessary assets were, in fact, available. This would therefore clear a path for JFK to order direct US military action. And, it would have worked, had JFK been a lesser man. So Cabell made the case from Dean Rusk's home on the morning of the BOP after it was too late to hope for success without direct US intervention.

As it turned out, the Agency's contingency plan to force the hand of an autonomous Commander-in-Chief failed.

Edited November 28, 2015 by Greg Burnham

[James DiEugenio]

Greg:

You have the patience of a saint.

I could never deal with such matters, which to me seem rather obvious.

Bu thanks anyway.

Adieu. Again.