If it goes very badly in Iraq and we leave, the Arabs and the Iranians will be pulled into the war one way or another, either through surrogates or directly. If it stays chaotic, the chaos will migrate to the other side of the Gulf.
Every time you kill a Muslim, whether it's an Israeli killing them or an American or a Brit, there is humiliation, anger, reaction and bombs go off somewhere.
I was in Baghdad at the end of the second Gulf war. You could see the US military had destroyed every piece of armour the Iraqis owned. Not only armour but museums, too, cultural looting, the destruction of all infrastructure. It was a war against the Iraqi state, against an Arab country. That creates the humiliation and anger which fuel suicide bombing attacks. If you keep it up, you're going to get hit. You can't go randomly kill Muslims and not expect a reaction here.
Full Version: Iraq
It has quickly become clear that Iraq is not a liberated country, but an occupied country. We became familiar with that term during the second world war. We talked of German-occupied France, German-occupied Europe. And after the war we spoke of Soviet-occupied Hungary, Czechoslovakia, eastern Europe. It was the Nazis, the Soviets, who occupied countries. The United States liberated them from occupation.
Now we are the occupiers. True, we liberated Iraq from Saddam Hussein, but not from us. Just as in 1898 we liberated Cuba from Spain, but not from us. Spanish tyranny was overthrown, but the US established a military base in Cuba, as we are doing in Iraq. US corporations moved into Cuba, just as Bechtel and Halliburton and the oil corporations are moving into Iraq. The US framed and imposed, with support from local accomplices, the constitution that would govern Cuba, just as it has drawn up, with help from local political groups, a constitution for Iraq. Not a liberation. An occupation.
And it is an ugly occupation. On August 7 2003 the New York Times reported that General Sanchez in Baghdad was worried about the Iraqi reaction to occupation. Pro-US Iraqi leaders were giving him a message, as he put it: "When you take a father in front of his family and put a bag over his head and put him on the ground, you have had a significant adverse effect on his dignity and respect in the eyes of his family." (That's very perceptive.)
We know that fighting during the US offensive in November 2004 destroyed three-quarters of the town of Falluja (population 360,000), killing hundreds of its inhabitants. The objective of the operation was to cleanse the town of the terrorist bands acting as part of a "Ba'athist conspiracy".
But we should recall that on June 16 2003, barely six weeks after President Bush had claimed victory in Iraq, two reporters for the Knight Ridder newspaper group wrote this about the Falluja area: "In dozens of interviews during the past five days, most residents across the area said there was no Ba'athist or Sunni conspiracy against US soldiers, there were only people ready to fight because their relatives had been hurt or killed, or they themselves had been humiliated by home searches and road stops ... One woman said, after her husband was taken from their home because of empty wooden crates which they had bought for firewood, that the US is guilty of terrorism."
Soldiers who are set down in a country where they were told they would be welcomed as liberators and find they are surrounded by a hostile population become fearful and trigger-happy. On March 4 nervous, frightened GIs manning a roadblock fired on the Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena, just released by kidnappers, and an intelligence service officer, Nicola Calipari, whom they killed.
We have all read reports of US soldiers angry at being kept in Iraq. Such sentiments are becoming known to the US public, as are the feelings of many deserters who are refusing to return to Iraq after home leave. In May 2003 a Gallup poll reported that only 13% of the US public thought the war was going badly. According to a poll published by the New York Times and CBS News on June 17, 51% now think the US should not have invaded Iraq or become involved in the war. Some 59% disapprove of Bush's handling of the situation.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,...1547587,00.html
Now we are the occupiers. True, we liberated Iraq from Saddam Hussein, but not from us. Just as in 1898 we liberated Cuba from Spain, but not from us. Spanish tyranny was overthrown, but the US established a military base in Cuba, as we are doing in Iraq. US corporations moved into Cuba, just as Bechtel and Halliburton and the oil corporations are moving into Iraq. The US framed and imposed, with support from local accomplices, the constitution that would govern Cuba, just as it has drawn up, with help from local political groups, a constitution for Iraq. Not a liberation. An occupation.
And it is an ugly occupation. On August 7 2003 the New York Times reported that General Sanchez in Baghdad was worried about the Iraqi reaction to occupation. Pro-US Iraqi leaders were giving him a message, as he put it: "When you take a father in front of his family and put a bag over his head and put him on the ground, you have had a significant adverse effect on his dignity and respect in the eyes of his family." (That's very perceptive.)
We know that fighting during the US offensive in November 2004 destroyed three-quarters of the town of Falluja (population 360,000), killing hundreds of its inhabitants. The objective of the operation was to cleanse the town of the terrorist bands acting as part of a "Ba'athist conspiracy".
But we should recall that on June 16 2003, barely six weeks after President Bush had claimed victory in Iraq, two reporters for the Knight Ridder newspaper group wrote this about the Falluja area: "In dozens of interviews during the past five days, most residents across the area said there was no Ba'athist or Sunni conspiracy against US soldiers, there were only people ready to fight because their relatives had been hurt or killed, or they themselves had been humiliated by home searches and road stops ... One woman said, after her husband was taken from their home because of empty wooden crates which they had bought for firewood, that the US is guilty of terrorism."
Soldiers who are set down in a country where they were told they would be welcomed as liberators and find they are surrounded by a hostile population become fearful and trigger-happy. On March 4 nervous, frightened GIs manning a roadblock fired on the Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena, just released by kidnappers, and an intelligence service officer, Nicola Calipari, whom they killed.
We have all read reports of US soldiers angry at being kept in Iraq. Such sentiments are becoming known to the US public, as are the feelings of many deserters who are refusing to return to Iraq after home leave. In May 2003 a Gallup poll reported that only 13% of the US public thought the war was going badly. According to a poll published by the New York Times and CBS News on June 17, 51% now think the US should not have invaded Iraq or become involved in the war. Some 59% disapprove of Bush's handling of the situation.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,...1547587,00.html
Here is an article written by Henry Kissinger that was published in The Australian on 12th August.
George Casey, the commander of US forces in Iraq, has announced that the US intends to begin a "fairly substantial" withdrawal of US forces from Iraq soon after the projected December elections establish a constitutional government. Other sources have indicated that this will involve 30,000 troops, or about 22 per cent of the total US forces in Iraq. The withdrawal is said to be made possible by improvements in the security situation and progress in the training of Iraqi forces to replace American troops.
But how are these terms to be defined? In a war without front lines, does a lull indicate success or a strategic decision by the adversary? Is a decline in enemy attacks due to attrition or to a deliberate enemy strategy of conserving forces to encourage American withdrawal?
For someone like me, who observed at first hand the anguish of the original involvement in Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and who later participated in the decisions to withdraw during the Nixon administration, Casey's announcement revived poignant memories.
History, of course, never repeats itself precisely. Vietnam was a battle of the Cold War; Iraq is an episode in the struggle against radical Islam. The stake in the Cold War was perceived to be
the political survival of independent nation-states allied with the US around the Soviet periphery. The war in Iraq is less about geopolitics than a clash of ideologies, cultures, religious beliefs.
Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have an even deeper significance than Vietnam. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Muslim minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled.
This is why many opponents of the decision to start the war agree with the proposition that a catastrophic outcome would have grave global consequences: a fundamental difference from the Vietnam debate.
On the other hand, the military challenge in Iraq is more elusive. Local Iraqi forces are being trained for a form of combat entirely different from the traditional land battles of the last phase of the Vietnam War. There are no front lines; the battlefield is everywhere. We face a shadowy enemy pursuing four principal objectives: to expel foreigners from Iraq; to penalise Iraqis co-operating with the occupation; to create a chaos out of which a government of their Islamist persuasion will emerge as a model for other Muslim states; and to turn Iraq into a base for training for the next round of fighting, probably in moderate Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Jordan.
In essence, the Iraqi war is a contest over which side's assessment turns out to be correct. The insurgents bet that by exacting a toll among supporters of the Government and collaborators with the US, they can frighten an increasing number of civilians into at least staying on the sidelines, thereby undermining the Government and helping the insurgents by default.
The Iraqi Government and the US count on a different kind of attrition: that possibly the insurgents' concentration on civilian carnage is because of the relatively small number of insurgents, which obliges them to conserve manpower and to shrink from attacking hard targets; hence the insurgency can gradually be worn down.
Because of the axiom that guerillas win if they do not lose, stalemate is unacceptable. American strategy, including a withdrawal process, will stand or fall not on whether it maintains the existing security situation but whether the capacity to improve it is enhanced.
In Iraq, each of the various ethnic and religious groups sees itself in an irreconcilable, perhaps mortal, confrontation with the others. Each group has what amounts to its own geographically concentrated militia. In the Kurdish area, for example, internal security is maintained by Kurdish forces, and the presence of the national army is kept to a minimum, if not totally prevented. The same holds true to a substantial extent in the Shia region.
Is it then possible to speak of a national army at all? Today the Iraqi forces are mostly composed of Shias while the insurrection is mostly in traditional Sunni areas. It thus foreshadows a return to the traditional Sunni-Shia conflict, only with reversed capabilities. These forces may co-operate in quelling the Sunni insurrection. But will they, even when adequately trained, be willing to quell Shia militias in the name of the nation? Do they obey the ayatollahs, especially Sayyid Ali Husayni Sistani, or the national Government in Baghdad? And if these two entities are functionally the same, can the national army make its writ run in non-Shia areas except as an instrument of repression? And is it then still possible to maintain a democratic state?
The ultimate test of progress will therefore be the extent to which the Iraqi armed forces reflect the ethnic diversity of the country and are accepted by the population at large as an expression of the nation. Drawing Sunni leaders into the political process is an important part of an anti-insurgent strategy. Failing that, the process of building security forces may become the prelude to a civil war.
Can a genuine nation emerge in Iraq through constitutional means? The answer to that question will determine whether Iraq becomes a signpost for a reformed Middle East or the pit of an ever-spreading conflict.
For these reasons, a withdrawal schedule should be accompanied by some political initiative inviting an international framework for Iraq's future. Some of our allies may prefer to act as bystanders, but reality will not permit this for their own safety. Their co-operation is needed, not so much for the military as for the political task, which will test, above all, the West's statesmanship in shaping a global system relevant to its necessities.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/commo...5E31477,00.html
George Casey, the commander of US forces in Iraq, has announced that the US intends to begin a "fairly substantial" withdrawal of US forces from Iraq soon after the projected December elections establish a constitutional government. Other sources have indicated that this will involve 30,000 troops, or about 22 per cent of the total US forces in Iraq. The withdrawal is said to be made possible by improvements in the security situation and progress in the training of Iraqi forces to replace American troops.
But how are these terms to be defined? In a war without front lines, does a lull indicate success or a strategic decision by the adversary? Is a decline in enemy attacks due to attrition or to a deliberate enemy strategy of conserving forces to encourage American withdrawal?
For someone like me, who observed at first hand the anguish of the original involvement in Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and who later participated in the decisions to withdraw during the Nixon administration, Casey's announcement revived poignant memories.
History, of course, never repeats itself precisely. Vietnam was a battle of the Cold War; Iraq is an episode in the struggle against radical Islam. The stake in the Cold War was perceived to be
the political survival of independent nation-states allied with the US around the Soviet periphery. The war in Iraq is less about geopolitics than a clash of ideologies, cultures, religious beliefs.
Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have an even deeper significance than Vietnam. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Muslim minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled.
This is why many opponents of the decision to start the war agree with the proposition that a catastrophic outcome would have grave global consequences: a fundamental difference from the Vietnam debate.
On the other hand, the military challenge in Iraq is more elusive. Local Iraqi forces are being trained for a form of combat entirely different from the traditional land battles of the last phase of the Vietnam War. There are no front lines; the battlefield is everywhere. We face a shadowy enemy pursuing four principal objectives: to expel foreigners from Iraq; to penalise Iraqis co-operating with the occupation; to create a chaos out of which a government of their Islamist persuasion will emerge as a model for other Muslim states; and to turn Iraq into a base for training for the next round of fighting, probably in moderate Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Jordan.
In essence, the Iraqi war is a contest over which side's assessment turns out to be correct. The insurgents bet that by exacting a toll among supporters of the Government and collaborators with the US, they can frighten an increasing number of civilians into at least staying on the sidelines, thereby undermining the Government and helping the insurgents by default.
The Iraqi Government and the US count on a different kind of attrition: that possibly the insurgents' concentration on civilian carnage is because of the relatively small number of insurgents, which obliges them to conserve manpower and to shrink from attacking hard targets; hence the insurgency can gradually be worn down.
Because of the axiom that guerillas win if they do not lose, stalemate is unacceptable. American strategy, including a withdrawal process, will stand or fall not on whether it maintains the existing security situation but whether the capacity to improve it is enhanced.
In Iraq, each of the various ethnic and religious groups sees itself in an irreconcilable, perhaps mortal, confrontation with the others. Each group has what amounts to its own geographically concentrated militia. In the Kurdish area, for example, internal security is maintained by Kurdish forces, and the presence of the national army is kept to a minimum, if not totally prevented. The same holds true to a substantial extent in the Shia region.
Is it then possible to speak of a national army at all? Today the Iraqi forces are mostly composed of Shias while the insurrection is mostly in traditional Sunni areas. It thus foreshadows a return to the traditional Sunni-Shia conflict, only with reversed capabilities. These forces may co-operate in quelling the Sunni insurrection. But will they, even when adequately trained, be willing to quell Shia militias in the name of the nation? Do they obey the ayatollahs, especially Sayyid Ali Husayni Sistani, or the national Government in Baghdad? And if these two entities are functionally the same, can the national army make its writ run in non-Shia areas except as an instrument of repression? And is it then still possible to maintain a democratic state?
The ultimate test of progress will therefore be the extent to which the Iraqi armed forces reflect the ethnic diversity of the country and are accepted by the population at large as an expression of the nation. Drawing Sunni leaders into the political process is an important part of an anti-insurgent strategy. Failing that, the process of building security forces may become the prelude to a civil war.
Can a genuine nation emerge in Iraq through constitutional means? The answer to that question will determine whether Iraq becomes a signpost for a reformed Middle East or the pit of an ever-spreading conflict.
For these reasons, a withdrawal schedule should be accompanied by some political initiative inviting an international framework for Iraq's future. Some of our allies may prefer to act as bystanders, but reality will not permit this for their own safety. Their co-operation is needed, not so much for the military as for the political task, which will test, above all, the West's statesmanship in shaping a global system relevant to its necessities.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/commo...5E31477,00.html
Hi all
Inasmuch as it looks as if the different Iraqi factions have failed to come up with the constitution that was due today (August 15) and given the increasing calls for autonomy for various groups and regions, it could be that Kissinger's second scenario, that Iraq will become "the pit of an ever-spreading conflict" will become the likelier outcome. The foolishness of the Iraq venture will then become even more starkly obvious.
Chris George
Inasmuch as it looks as if the different Iraqi factions have failed to come up with the constitution that was due today (August 15) and given the increasing calls for autonomy for various groups and regions, it could be that Kissinger's second scenario, that Iraq will become "the pit of an ever-spreading conflict" will become the likelier outcome. The foolishness of the Iraq venture will then become even more starkly obvious.
Chris George
AMY GOODMAN: An Italian court has dismissed the trial of a US soldier accused in the fatal shooting of an Italian intelligence agent in Iraq. Specialist Mario Lozano of the New York National Guard allegedly shot Nicola Calipari as he escorted the then-newly freed Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena to the airport in March of 2005. The Bush administration has refused to hand over Lozano, so prosecutors sought to try him in absentia. But last week, an Italian judge ruled Italy has no jurisdiction to pursue the case and threw out the charges.
In an interview with Reuters, Lozano expressed his relief at hearing the news.
MARIO LOZANO: I feel like there’s a weight off my shoulder. I could sleep easier, I feel now, even though I have to still live with the fact that I was involved in a innocent man's death. But I feel good. I feel good for the Italian people that believed in me, you know, that they would dispense and my really innocent. You know, I showed them pictures, how close the car was. You know, I showed them facts. So I guess they put it all together, and they finally came with the truth.
AMY GOODMAN: Specialist Mario Lozano goes on to directly blame Giuliana Sgrena, the kidnapped journalist, for what happened. Sgrena was in Iraq reporting for the Italian newspaper Il Manifesto, when she was kidnapped. Lozano criticized Sgrena for going to Iraq and reporting on the war.
MARIO LOZANO: I don’t blame her for being upset, but she has to take the focus off me a little bit and look at Sgrena, because if it wasn’t for Sgrena, this situation wouldn’t happen. You know, she went out there. She wanted to mingle with the terrorists and all that. And then she gets caught. Now we have to send -- now we have to send good men to go after this one person that knows that she put herself in the situation. You know, she knows that if she’s going to go talk to terrorists, she knows there’s a 99% chance she will get caught. So, why did she do that for? It’s beyond my -- you know, I don’t understand. So it’s her fault that this is happening, not my fault. It’s not my fault. It’s not America's fault. It’s not the Italian government's fault. It’s Sgrena’s fault.
AMY GOODMAN: That was New York National Guardsman Mario Lozano. He also said he lives under fear of being sought out for revenge over the shooting.
MARIO LOZANO: Mentally, I’ve endured so much stress, you know, looking in my rearview mirror to see whether anybody is following me, always thinking about, “Wait a minute, I just saw this car here; why is this car doing here again?” And, you know, there was always scenarios in my head, because you never know. You know, you never know who’s out there, you know, who -- you know, you got a lot of psychos out there, you know, for whatever reason. I don’t know -- situation that don’t never know.
AMY GOODMAN: That’s Specialist Mario Lozano. We go now to Rome, where we’re joined by Giuliana Sgrena, the veteran foreign correspondent for the Italian newspaper Il Manifesto. She wrote about the incident in her book Friendly Fire: The Remarkable Story of a Journalist Kidnapped in Iraq, Rescued by an Italian Secret Service Agent, and Shot by US Forces. Giuliana Sgrena, welcome to Democracy Now!
GIULIANA SGRENA: Thank you. Good morning.
AMY GOODMAN: It’s good to have you with us. I want to start first by your reaction to the Italian court throwing out the case against Mario Lozano.
GIULIANA SGRENA: I am really disappointed for the decision of the Italian court about the Lozano case, because they decided that Italy has no jurisdiction to put on trial Lozano. And this decision is based on a letter, a Colin Powell letter, that’s attached to the resolution -- UN resolution. But it is a unilateral letter that was not accepted by other governments. So, also the prosecutors and our lawyers found that this is not a base to avoid our sovereignty on the Calipari case.
But I think that Lozano is -- so he didn’t understand what happened in the court. So it was not absolved by the court, because there was no trial on the -- against Lozano for the moment, because this decision, it was just about the possibility or not to put Lozano on trial, but we will go to another court, a higher court, the Cassazione, to appeal against this sentence. And we hope and we are sure that this court will cancel the sentence, because a lot of jurists, very important jurists, said that it is a big mistake not to consider the jurisdiction of Italy. So I think that is just a step, this one, and we will succeed and put Lozano on trial. So I think that -- I don’t know if the lawyers didn’t explain him what happened in Italy. So, it’s not the case of a trial that absolved him; it’s just a case of no jurisdiction for the moment, but, I repeat, for the moment.
AMY GOODMAN: Giuliana Sgrena, I now wanted to ask you about what Mario Lozano said, saying that it’s your fault, that you went out there, you wanted to “mingle with the terrorists and all that.” He goes on to say, “Then she gets caught. Now we have to send -- now we have to send good men to go after this one person,” that “she put herself in the situation. […] She knows that if she’s going to go talk to terrorists, she knows there’s a 99% chance she will get caught. So, why did she do that for? […] I don’t understand. So it’s her fault that this [is happening] […] It’s not my fault.” Your response, Giuliana?
GIULIANA SGRENA: Oh, it’s not true. I was just doing my work, and many other journalists went to interview the refugees, the refugees of Fallujah. Me, I usually go to interview the refugees, because I think that it’s the people that more suffer for the situation. And also, in this case, I went there just to interview these refugees.
I know that for military, army, it’s not the case to go around and to do an independent work, because they want the journalists just to be embedded, but I can say that in the same day, the same moment that I was there doing to interview the refugees of Fallujah, there was also a photographer working for the US Time taking pictures there. So I was not doing a work with terrorists, because if not everybody work with terrorists. I was just there to interview refugees.
And I think that this is the only way to do our job as we have to do it, because we have to listen to the people that is suffering under the occupation and not just interview the commanders or people that have weapons in their -- that they’re using weapons. So I think that I was in a right position, and I will do always the same when I go around the world.
And I don’t understand what mean Lozano by saying that I was going there, doing something with terrorists. They were not terrorists. What means? So we don’t have the chance to do our work? Is it true that now we have not the chance to do our work true in Iraq, but this is because of the occupation and, of course, also because nobody in Iraq want to have witness there to see what is going on. But I was just doing my work.
AMY GOODMAN: Giuliana Sgrena, can you remind us what happened when you were released? From the point, well, that you learned you were going to be released -- first who you were held by and then what happened, all the way through the shooting on your road to the airport?
GIULIANA SGRENA: Yes, when I was released, Calipari came to pick me up, and we were on the road to the airport, after, of course, giving the news to the person that were interested in, and we were on the way to the airport. It was dark, because it was night. And at a certain point, we were not so far from the airport, when they started to shoot us. At the beginning, I couldn’t understand who was shooting, because we were in the area controlled by the Americans, and I couldn’t believe that the Americans, they were shooting to us. There was Italian agents with me. So, really, it was really a shock.
And immediately, when they started to shoot, Calipari stopped to talk, and I realized that something was going wrong, because he didn’t speak to me. And the agent that was driving the car started to shout and to say that we were Italian, we were of the Italian embassy, just to try to stop the shooting. And when the shooting stopped, I saw that Calipari was killed. Me, I was wounded, and also the other agent. So, it was really a big shock.
But there were no warnings before the shooting. And the shooting, they reached the car, and they were, after -- we can say now, after the inquiry, the Italian inquiry, because there was an Italian inquiry of the Italian justice, that against the car was shooted fifty-eight bullets, and fifty-seven bullets were against the passengers of the car and only the last one against the engine of the car. So if they wanted to stop the car, they had to shoot to the engine or to the wheels, but not to the passengers. And that’s why the Italian justice asked the trial for Lozano for voluntarily killing of Nicola Calipari. That’s the point. It’s not only my testify now; it’s the conclusion of the Italian justice inquiry.
AMY GOODMAN: The United States says that though the Italian authorities had informed the US forces of the operation to free you after a month in captivity, there was a breakdown in their communications when the Italians’ car was heading to the airport. Now, the Italian report, ballistic experts found that the driver, another secret service officer, was driving at a normal speed and that US troops gave no warnings before opening fire. The Italian probe also found there were no sign posts warning of the checkpoint. Lozano has contended that you all speeded up on your way to the airport.
GIULIANA SGRENA: No, that is not true. And also, the experts that analyzed the car, when came back to Italy, they found out that the car was not going fast. It was not going fast, and really there was no time for warnings, from when we appeared on the road and when they started shooting. So this is also the result of the inquiry, as I told before, because I have seen no warning before the shooting, and the car was not going fast. So there was no reason for a shooting.
And also, from my car, the agent that was driving the car, he called the Italian general that was in touch with the Americans in the airport to say that we were on the way to the airport. And even more, when I was released, under my head there was an American helicopter going around that was there all the time that I was waiting for Calipari to come and to pick me up. So they knew exactly what was going on.
And after, during the inquiry, when the Italians asked for the communication, for the tape of the communication, so they said that they were destroyed because there were no reason to keep this communication tape. I think that it’s an important point, this one, that they didn’t give the tape to the Italians to hear what happened during their way to the airport.
AMY GOODMAN: Who has that tape right now? And might this come out in the appeal?
GIULIANA SGRENA: I hope -- we think that, as many jurists said, that the result of the -- the sentence of the court last week was a big mistake. So we think that the higher court will cancel this sentence, and so she will appoint another court to go on with the trial, so we hope so, at least.
AMY GOODMAN: You are going to appeal?
GIULIANA SGRENA: Yes, of course. Me and also the wife of Calipari and also the prosecutors -- everybody will go on.
AMY GOODMAN: The response of the wife of Calipari. I mean, for people to understand, he was one of the highest ranking intelligence officers in Italy, came to Iraq to negotiate your freedom, very close to the Bush ally, the former prime minister of Italy, Berlusconi.
GIULIANA SGRENA: Yes, she is also very disappointed, because she said, “My husband was killed twice,” because what we are asking is not just to condemn Lozano -- we don’t want a scapegoat -- we want to know what happened that night. And we think that the trial will be useful to know what happened. So that’s why we want a trial, and we are fighting together for a trial.
AMY GOODMAN: Finally, Giuliana Sgrena, what do you think happened that night? Why do you think Mario Lozano, the New York National Guardsman, opened fire on your car?
GIULIANA SGRENA: Why?
AMY GOODMAN: Yes.
GIULIANA SGRENA: I don’t know why. I don’t know if he knew who was -- who were the passenger of the car, of course. I don’t know if maybe he just answered to an order. So that’s why I wanted Mario Lozano to tell the truth to the trial or in any way to tell the truth, and not just accusing me that it’s my fault. It’s not my fault. He was shooting to us. I didn’t shoot to anybody. So, he shooted, and he has to give us a reason why he shooted, even if it was an order. When I was in United States, I heard from a lot of veterans against the war that they were obliged to shoot when they were in Iraq. So I think that we can understand that he also was a victim of the war. But he has to tell the truth, not just to tell that it’s my fault. It’s not my fault. He has to realize that it is his fault, because he shoot to us and to Calipari. He killed Calipari. So he has to explain. I can imagine that he has psychological problems because of the shooting, because it’s normal for a normal person, it’s normal to have psychological problems if you kill a man. So I think that he has to realize --
AMY GOODMAN: Giuliana Sgrena, we're going to have to leave it there, but I thank you very much for joining us. Giuliana Sgrena is the veteran foreign correspondent for the Italian newspaper Il Manifesto. And she has written a book about her experience of the kidnapping in Iraq -- her kidnapping -- and what happened to her when she was released. Her book is called Friendly Fire: The Remarkable Story of a Journalist Kidnapped in Iraq.
www.democracynow.org Oct 30, 2007
In an interview with Reuters, Lozano expressed his relief at hearing the news.
MARIO LOZANO: I feel like there’s a weight off my shoulder. I could sleep easier, I feel now, even though I have to still live with the fact that I was involved in a innocent man's death. But I feel good. I feel good for the Italian people that believed in me, you know, that they would dispense and my really innocent. You know, I showed them pictures, how close the car was. You know, I showed them facts. So I guess they put it all together, and they finally came with the truth.
AMY GOODMAN: Specialist Mario Lozano goes on to directly blame Giuliana Sgrena, the kidnapped journalist, for what happened. Sgrena was in Iraq reporting for the Italian newspaper Il Manifesto, when she was kidnapped. Lozano criticized Sgrena for going to Iraq and reporting on the war.
MARIO LOZANO: I don’t blame her for being upset, but she has to take the focus off me a little bit and look at Sgrena, because if it wasn’t for Sgrena, this situation wouldn’t happen. You know, she went out there. She wanted to mingle with the terrorists and all that. And then she gets caught. Now we have to send -- now we have to send good men to go after this one person that knows that she put herself in the situation. You know, she knows that if she’s going to go talk to terrorists, she knows there’s a 99% chance she will get caught. So, why did she do that for? It’s beyond my -- you know, I don’t understand. So it’s her fault that this is happening, not my fault. It’s not my fault. It’s not America's fault. It’s not the Italian government's fault. It’s Sgrena’s fault.
AMY GOODMAN: That was New York National Guardsman Mario Lozano. He also said he lives under fear of being sought out for revenge over the shooting.
MARIO LOZANO: Mentally, I’ve endured so much stress, you know, looking in my rearview mirror to see whether anybody is following me, always thinking about, “Wait a minute, I just saw this car here; why is this car doing here again?” And, you know, there was always scenarios in my head, because you never know. You know, you never know who’s out there, you know, who -- you know, you got a lot of psychos out there, you know, for whatever reason. I don’t know -- situation that don’t never know.
AMY GOODMAN: That’s Specialist Mario Lozano. We go now to Rome, where we’re joined by Giuliana Sgrena, the veteran foreign correspondent for the Italian newspaper Il Manifesto. She wrote about the incident in her book Friendly Fire: The Remarkable Story of a Journalist Kidnapped in Iraq, Rescued by an Italian Secret Service Agent, and Shot by US Forces. Giuliana Sgrena, welcome to Democracy Now!
GIULIANA SGRENA: Thank you. Good morning.
AMY GOODMAN: It’s good to have you with us. I want to start first by your reaction to the Italian court throwing out the case against Mario Lozano.
GIULIANA SGRENA: I am really disappointed for the decision of the Italian court about the Lozano case, because they decided that Italy has no jurisdiction to put on trial Lozano. And this decision is based on a letter, a Colin Powell letter, that’s attached to the resolution -- UN resolution. But it is a unilateral letter that was not accepted by other governments. So, also the prosecutors and our lawyers found that this is not a base to avoid our sovereignty on the Calipari case.
But I think that Lozano is -- so he didn’t understand what happened in the court. So it was not absolved by the court, because there was no trial on the -- against Lozano for the moment, because this decision, it was just about the possibility or not to put Lozano on trial, but we will go to another court, a higher court, the Cassazione, to appeal against this sentence. And we hope and we are sure that this court will cancel the sentence, because a lot of jurists, very important jurists, said that it is a big mistake not to consider the jurisdiction of Italy. So I think that is just a step, this one, and we will succeed and put Lozano on trial. So I think that -- I don’t know if the lawyers didn’t explain him what happened in Italy. So, it’s not the case of a trial that absolved him; it’s just a case of no jurisdiction for the moment, but, I repeat, for the moment.
AMY GOODMAN: Giuliana Sgrena, I now wanted to ask you about what Mario Lozano said, saying that it’s your fault, that you went out there, you wanted to “mingle with the terrorists and all that.” He goes on to say, “Then she gets caught. Now we have to send -- now we have to send good men to go after this one person,” that “she put herself in the situation. […] She knows that if she’s going to go talk to terrorists, she knows there’s a 99% chance she will get caught. So, why did she do that for? […] I don’t understand. So it’s her fault that this [is happening] […] It’s not my fault.” Your response, Giuliana?
GIULIANA SGRENA: Oh, it’s not true. I was just doing my work, and many other journalists went to interview the refugees, the refugees of Fallujah. Me, I usually go to interview the refugees, because I think that it’s the people that more suffer for the situation. And also, in this case, I went there just to interview these refugees.
I know that for military, army, it’s not the case to go around and to do an independent work, because they want the journalists just to be embedded, but I can say that in the same day, the same moment that I was there doing to interview the refugees of Fallujah, there was also a photographer working for the US Time taking pictures there. So I was not doing a work with terrorists, because if not everybody work with terrorists. I was just there to interview refugees.
And I think that this is the only way to do our job as we have to do it, because we have to listen to the people that is suffering under the occupation and not just interview the commanders or people that have weapons in their -- that they’re using weapons. So I think that I was in a right position, and I will do always the same when I go around the world.
And I don’t understand what mean Lozano by saying that I was going there, doing something with terrorists. They were not terrorists. What means? So we don’t have the chance to do our work? Is it true that now we have not the chance to do our work true in Iraq, but this is because of the occupation and, of course, also because nobody in Iraq want to have witness there to see what is going on. But I was just doing my work.
AMY GOODMAN: Giuliana Sgrena, can you remind us what happened when you were released? From the point, well, that you learned you were going to be released -- first who you were held by and then what happened, all the way through the shooting on your road to the airport?
GIULIANA SGRENA: Yes, when I was released, Calipari came to pick me up, and we were on the road to the airport, after, of course, giving the news to the person that were interested in, and we were on the way to the airport. It was dark, because it was night. And at a certain point, we were not so far from the airport, when they started to shoot us. At the beginning, I couldn’t understand who was shooting, because we were in the area controlled by the Americans, and I couldn’t believe that the Americans, they were shooting to us. There was Italian agents with me. So, really, it was really a shock.
And immediately, when they started to shoot, Calipari stopped to talk, and I realized that something was going wrong, because he didn’t speak to me. And the agent that was driving the car started to shout and to say that we were Italian, we were of the Italian embassy, just to try to stop the shooting. And when the shooting stopped, I saw that Calipari was killed. Me, I was wounded, and also the other agent. So, it was really a big shock.
But there were no warnings before the shooting. And the shooting, they reached the car, and they were, after -- we can say now, after the inquiry, the Italian inquiry, because there was an Italian inquiry of the Italian justice, that against the car was shooted fifty-eight bullets, and fifty-seven bullets were against the passengers of the car and only the last one against the engine of the car. So if they wanted to stop the car, they had to shoot to the engine or to the wheels, but not to the passengers. And that’s why the Italian justice asked the trial for Lozano for voluntarily killing of Nicola Calipari. That’s the point. It’s not only my testify now; it’s the conclusion of the Italian justice inquiry.
AMY GOODMAN: The United States says that though the Italian authorities had informed the US forces of the operation to free you after a month in captivity, there was a breakdown in their communications when the Italians’ car was heading to the airport. Now, the Italian report, ballistic experts found that the driver, another secret service officer, was driving at a normal speed and that US troops gave no warnings before opening fire. The Italian probe also found there were no sign posts warning of the checkpoint. Lozano has contended that you all speeded up on your way to the airport.
GIULIANA SGRENA: No, that is not true. And also, the experts that analyzed the car, when came back to Italy, they found out that the car was not going fast. It was not going fast, and really there was no time for warnings, from when we appeared on the road and when they started shooting. So this is also the result of the inquiry, as I told before, because I have seen no warning before the shooting, and the car was not going fast. So there was no reason for a shooting.
And also, from my car, the agent that was driving the car, he called the Italian general that was in touch with the Americans in the airport to say that we were on the way to the airport. And even more, when I was released, under my head there was an American helicopter going around that was there all the time that I was waiting for Calipari to come and to pick me up. So they knew exactly what was going on.
And after, during the inquiry, when the Italians asked for the communication, for the tape of the communication, so they said that they were destroyed because there were no reason to keep this communication tape. I think that it’s an important point, this one, that they didn’t give the tape to the Italians to hear what happened during their way to the airport.
AMY GOODMAN: Who has that tape right now? And might this come out in the appeal?
GIULIANA SGRENA: I hope -- we think that, as many jurists said, that the result of the -- the sentence of the court last week was a big mistake. So we think that the higher court will cancel this sentence, and so she will appoint another court to go on with the trial, so we hope so, at least.
AMY GOODMAN: You are going to appeal?
GIULIANA SGRENA: Yes, of course. Me and also the wife of Calipari and also the prosecutors -- everybody will go on.
AMY GOODMAN: The response of the wife of Calipari. I mean, for people to understand, he was one of the highest ranking intelligence officers in Italy, came to Iraq to negotiate your freedom, very close to the Bush ally, the former prime minister of Italy, Berlusconi.
GIULIANA SGRENA: Yes, she is also very disappointed, because she said, “My husband was killed twice,” because what we are asking is not just to condemn Lozano -- we don’t want a scapegoat -- we want to know what happened that night. And we think that the trial will be useful to know what happened. So that’s why we want a trial, and we are fighting together for a trial.
AMY GOODMAN: Finally, Giuliana Sgrena, what do you think happened that night? Why do you think Mario Lozano, the New York National Guardsman, opened fire on your car?
GIULIANA SGRENA: Why?
AMY GOODMAN: Yes.
GIULIANA SGRENA: I don’t know why. I don’t know if he knew who was -- who were the passenger of the car, of course. I don’t know if maybe he just answered to an order. So that’s why I wanted Mario Lozano to tell the truth to the trial or in any way to tell the truth, and not just accusing me that it’s my fault. It’s not my fault. He was shooting to us. I didn’t shoot to anybody. So, he shooted, and he has to give us a reason why he shooted, even if it was an order. When I was in United States, I heard from a lot of veterans against the war that they were obliged to shoot when they were in Iraq. So I think that we can understand that he also was a victim of the war. But he has to tell the truth, not just to tell that it’s my fault. It’s not my fault. He has to realize that it is his fault, because he shoot to us and to Calipari. He killed Calipari. So he has to explain. I can imagine that he has psychological problems because of the shooting, because it’s normal for a normal person, it’s normal to have psychological problems if you kill a man. So I think that he has to realize --
AMY GOODMAN: Giuliana Sgrena, we're going to have to leave it there, but I thank you very much for joining us. Giuliana Sgrena is the veteran foreign correspondent for the Italian newspaper Il Manifesto. And she has written a book about her experience of the kidnapping in Iraq -- her kidnapping -- and what happened to her when she was released. Her book is called Friendly Fire: The Remarkable Story of a Journalist Kidnapped in Iraq.
www.democracynow.org Oct 30, 2007
John,
Thanks for the Kissinger quote. Knowing that Kissinger was one of the biggest tools ever used by the elite to conduct their foreign policy, I think such quotes are useful decoders for what is really going on. I cannot really take credit for such analysis, because decoding someone like Henry is all to easy; all you have to do is invert what he says, to wit....
Whoa! Did he just say that he experienced first hand anguish? Sorry, lost my train of thought there trying to swallow the image of Kissinger actually being anguished during the heyday of his career.
What Mr. Kissinger means to say of course is that Vietnam was just an excuse to extend our control over a wealthy drug producing region (Cf. The Golden Triangle) that U.S. organized crime longed to profit [more greatly] from. The bowing out of French colonial forces (and the Corsican mob) gave us a great opportunity. (Except for that pesky Hồ Chí Minh guy. Luckily, Vang Pao and others were more flexible.)
Kissinger would also like to say that control over Iraq will bring short-term riches to the "nation rebuilding" industry, greater control over OPEC and its customers (Cf. The "Red Line Agreement" for the historical precedent as to why we need 'control' more than the oil itself), and a beachhead for our [possible, but not quite worked out yet] domination over Central Asia. (He's sorry for omitting Afghanistan, but you have to understand that the opium being produced there (Cf. The Golden Crescent) is much more visible due to the lack of any other economic engine.)
In other words, it's TOTALLY about geopolitics.
A little liberal on the hyperbole don't you think? Saying the Muslims are going to rise up and smite the global infidels is a little like saying the "South shall rise again!"--i.e., guaranteed to start an argument or discussion, but not very interesting intellectually. Really, if the Mongols weren't afraid of the wrath of [the Muslim] God, why should the United States be?
What?! Is he now saying that Vietnam--either before, during, or after our involvement--wasn't expected to have grave global consequences? I'm actually a little bit surprised that Henry "Domino" Kissinger is now downplaying the significance of Vietnam, although I saw an interview years ago where he admitted (off the record, naturally) that Vietnam was a worthless activity. Hindsight is 20/20 right?
Since when is the democratic reform of a nation a "military challenge"? We certainly failed in Cuba and the Phillipines. South Korea was sort of a mixed bag in this area and Japan's trajectory had less to do with our military occupation than the fact they had been a potent nation state for far longer than ours has even existed.
Then, um, why don't we stop creating such a large target for their emotional needs? (The cynic in me would also like to point out that we should stop training them too. (Cf. WHINSEC))
I just wanted to say that I'm glad that all of us here in the U.S. worship the same god in the same way and that any small differences which might crop up are quickly and amicably worked out peacefully. Just saying.
But Henry, weren't you briefed that this wasn't the plan? We disbanded their army and their government as soon as we got there and scuttled any plans for a quick transition (Cf. Jay Garner and his quick exit from the theater). Then we closed our eyes while Al Qa'qaa was emptied of 380 tons of high explosives and kicked up the tensions a notch by running Abu Ghraib just like Saddam did. Coincidence?
A conflict against whom? Ask yourself this: If U.S. foreign policy is really about facilitating democratic reforms in the Middle East, then why haven't we tied even one reform to the trillions in oil money that we've provided to the region? It's like an organized union representing 25% of all Wal-Mart shoppers complaining about how Wal-Mart doesn't read their minds. Simply talk to the CEO and tell him! Instead, we've gotten in bed with the oil and drug producing nations and write off militant insurgencies as the cost of doing business.
Kind of practical in a strange way unless your son or daughter is one of those "costs."
Thanks for the Kissinger quote. Knowing that Kissinger was one of the biggest tools ever used by the elite to conduct their foreign policy, I think such quotes are useful decoders for what is really going on. I cannot really take credit for such analysis, because decoding someone like Henry is all to easy; all you have to do is invert what he says, to wit....
QUOTE (John Simkin @ Aug 15 2005, 05:19 PM) 
For someone like me, who observed at first hand the anguish of the original involvement in Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations ...
Whoa! Did he just say that he experienced first hand anguish? Sorry, lost my train of thought there trying to swallow the image of Kissinger actually being anguished during the heyday of his career.
QUOTE (John Simkin @ Aug 15 2005, 05:19 PM)
History, of course, never repeats itself precisely. Vietnam was a battle of the Cold War; Iraq is an episode in the struggle against radical Islam.
What Mr. Kissinger means to say of course is that Vietnam was just an excuse to extend our control over a wealthy drug producing region (Cf. The Golden Triangle) that U.S. organized crime longed to profit [more greatly] from. The bowing out of French colonial forces (and the Corsican mob) gave us a great opportunity. (Except for that pesky Hồ Chí Minh guy. Luckily, Vang Pao and others were more flexible.)
Kissinger would also like to say that control over Iraq will bring short-term riches to the "nation rebuilding" industry, greater control over OPEC and its customers (Cf. The "Red Line Agreement" for the historical precedent as to why we need 'control' more than the oil itself), and a beachhead for our [possible, but not quite worked out yet] domination over Central Asia. (He's sorry for omitting Afghanistan, but you have to understand that the opium being produced there (Cf. The Golden Crescent) is much more visible due to the lack of any other economic engine.)
QUOTE (John Simkin @ Aug 15 2005, 05:19 PM)
The war in Iraq is less about geopolitics than a clash of ideologies, cultures, religious beliefs.
In other words, it's TOTALLY about geopolitics.
QUOTE (John Simkin @ Aug 15 2005, 05:19 PM)
Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have an even deeper significance than Vietnam. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Muslim minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled.
A little liberal on the hyperbole don't you think? Saying the Muslims are going to rise up and smite the global infidels is a little like saying the "South shall rise again!"--i.e., guaranteed to start an argument or discussion, but not very interesting intellectually. Really, if the Mongols weren't afraid of the wrath of [the Muslim] God, why should the United States be?
QUOTE (John Simkin @ Aug 15 2005, 05:19 PM)
This is why many opponents of the decision to start the war agree with the proposition that a catastrophic outcome would have grave global consequences: a fundamental difference from the Vietnam debate.
What?! Is he now saying that Vietnam--either before, during, or after our involvement--wasn't expected to have grave global consequences? I'm actually a little bit surprised that Henry "Domino" Kissinger is now downplaying the significance of Vietnam, although I saw an interview years ago where he admitted (off the record, naturally) that Vietnam was a worthless activity. Hindsight is 20/20 right?
QUOTE (John Simkin @ Aug 15 2005, 05:19 PM)
On the other hand, the military challenge in Iraq is more elusive.
Since when is the democratic reform of a nation a "military challenge"? We certainly failed in Cuba and the Phillipines. South Korea was sort of a mixed bag in this area and Japan's trajectory had less to do with our military occupation than the fact they had been a potent nation state for far longer than ours has even existed.
QUOTE (John Simkin @ Aug 15 2005, 05:19 PM)
Local Iraqi forces are being trained for a form of combat entirely different from the traditional land battles of the last phase of the Vietnam War. There are no front lines; the battlefield is everywhere. We face a shadowy enemy pursuing four principal objectives: to expel foreigners from Iraq; to penalise Iraqis co-operating with the occupation; to create a chaos out of which a government of their Islamist persuasion will emerge as a model for other Muslim states; and to turn Iraq into a base for training for the next round of fighting, probably in moderate Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Jordan.
Then, um, why don't we stop creating such a large target for their emotional needs? (The cynic in me would also like to point out that we should stop training them too. (Cf. WHINSEC))
QUOTE (John Simkin @ Aug 15 2005, 05:19 PM)
In Iraq, each of the various ethnic and religious groups sees itself in an irreconcilable, perhaps mortal, confrontation with the others.
I just wanted to say that I'm glad that all of us here in the U.S. worship the same god in the same way and that any small differences which might crop up are quickly and amicably worked out peacefully. Just saying.
QUOTE (John Simkin @ Aug 15 2005, 05:19 PM)
The ultimate test of progress will therefore be the extent to which the Iraqi armed forces reflect the ethnic diversity of the country and are accepted by the population at large as an expression of the nation. Drawing Sunni leaders into the political process is an important part of an anti-insurgent strategy. Failing that, the process of building security forces may become the prelude to a civil war.
But Henry, weren't you briefed that this wasn't the plan? We disbanded their army and their government as soon as we got there and scuttled any plans for a quick transition (Cf. Jay Garner and his quick exit from the theater). Then we closed our eyes while Al Qa'qaa was emptied of 380 tons of high explosives and kicked up the tensions a notch by running Abu Ghraib just like Saddam did. Coincidence?
QUOTE (John Simkin @ Aug 15 2005, 05:19 PM)
Can a genuine nation emerge in Iraq through constitutional means? The answer to that question will determine whether Iraq becomes a signpost for a reformed Middle East or the pit of an ever-spreading conflict.
For these reasons, a withdrawal schedule should be accompanied by some political initiative inviting an international framework for Iraq's future. Some of our allies may prefer to act as bystanders, but reality will not permit this for their own safety. Their co-operation is needed, not so much for the military as for the political task, which will test, above all, the West's statesmanship in shaping a global system relevant to its necessities.
For these reasons, a withdrawal schedule should be accompanied by some political initiative inviting an international framework for Iraq's future. Some of our allies may prefer to act as bystanders, but reality will not permit this for their own safety. Their co-operation is needed, not so much for the military as for the political task, which will test, above all, the West's statesmanship in shaping a global system relevant to its necessities.
A conflict against whom? Ask yourself this: If U.S. foreign policy is really about facilitating democratic reforms in the Middle East, then why haven't we tied even one reform to the trillions in oil money that we've provided to the region? It's like an organized union representing 25% of all Wal-Mart shoppers complaining about how Wal-Mart doesn't read their minds. Simply talk to the CEO and tell him! Instead, we've gotten in bed with the oil and drug producing nations and write off militant insurgencies as the cost of doing business.
Kind of practical in a strange way unless your son or daughter is one of those "costs."
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