Jeff Carter

Regarding what Robert Kennedy may have said in a 1964 interview, it worthwhile to recall he was still, at that point, Attorney General and member of LBJ’s cabinet, thus subject to direction as set out in paragraph 4 of NSAM 273:

4. The President expects that all senior officers of the Government will move energetically to insure the full unity of support for established U.S. policy in Vietnam. Both in Washington and in the field, it is essential the Government be unified.

More detail on the development of NSAM 263, including more information on McNamara’s input both at the time and his recollections afterwards, can be found in James Galbraith’s Boston Review article "Exit Strategy" from 2003:

https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/galbraith-exit-strategy-vietnam/

Noam Chomsky published a reply shortly after, many of which talking points have been repeated by the dissenting voice on this thread. Galbraith in turn replies to Chomsky:

https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/chomsky-galbraith-letters-vietnam-jfk-kennedy/

4 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Dr. James Giglio, a historian and author of the book The Presidency of John F. Kennedy, provided a good summary of some of the problems with using the 1,000-man withdrawal/NSAM 263 to support the unconditional-withdrawal myth, in an article he wrote for the American Historical Association's magazine Perspectives on History in 1992:

          The 1,000-force cutback slated for the end of 1963 mostly involved a construction battalion that had completed its work; it was understood that it would be replaced by other troops. Moreover, the testimony of several contemporaries and Kennedy's own statements suggest that he intended no pullout after the 1964 election. In a 1964 oral history interview, Robert Kennedy, who knew his brother best, confirmed that the administration had not considered a withdrawal. When asked what the president would have done if the South Vietnamese appeared doomed, Robert answered in a way that truthfully expressed the ad hoc nature of the Kennedy presidency: "We'd face that when we came to it." The recently published Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume 4, Vietnam, August-December 1963, further affirms the no-pullout conclusion. (Oliver Stone's JFK in Historical Perspective | Perspectives on History | AHA (historians.org)

Far-left author and Noam Chomsky disciple Andy Piascik discussed some of the reasons that even most ultra-liberals reject the myth that JFK was determined to unconditionally withdraw from Vietnam after the election:

          This fixation on what he might have done is understandable, for the historical record -- what JFK actually did -- is quite horrifying and laid the groundwork for the decade of slaughter that followed.

          First was the escalation in Laos, accompanied by diplomatic shenanigans that undermined coalition governments that included the Pathet Lao revolutionaries despite they're being the most popular force in the country. The goal, as always with empire, was victory and the annihilation of anyone who favored national liberation.

          In Vietnam, a similar approach led to massive devastation. In the winter of 1961-62, Kennedy initiated the full-scale bombing of those parts of South Vietnam controlled by the National Liberation Front (all but Saigon and its immediate surroundings). The justification that bombing was needed to defeat the revolution masked the indiscriminate nature of the aerial assault, which resulted in casualties that were overwhelmingly civilian. And so the tone was set for the next eleven years of war.

          It was also Kennedy who authorized the first use of Chemicals of Mass Destruction in Southeast Asia, with napalm the best-known and most deadly. Never had chemical warfare been used so extensively, though the U.S. had also used napalm in Korea in the early 1950's. Again, the tone was established as massive amounts of phosphorous, Agent Orange and other chemicals were used for the rest of the war, chemicals the deadly affects of which are being felt to this day throughout Indochina.

          And it was under Kennedy that the notorious strategic hamlets were set up throughout South Vietnam. "Strategic Hamlets" is a term worthy of Orwell at his best or Madison Avenue at its worst, designed to induce thoughts of happy, grateful peasants gathered around a campfire. The more accurate phrase would be Concentration Camps, as Vietnamese by the thousands were rounded up at gunpoint and forced to live behind barbed wire. . . .

          As each of these moves failed and the NLF grew stronger, Kennedy ordered ground troops to Southeast Asia in the spring of 1962 and gradually increased their numbers until his death. There is no evidence to indicate any plan for withdrawal short of victory. . . .

          Significantly, Schlesinger and the many other memoirists, biographers and historians of Camelot never mentioned withdrawal short of victory until domestic opinion had turned dramatically against U.S. aggression long after Kennedy's death. Only then did the myth of "Kennedy the Peacemaker" emerge. (https://www.ctpost.com/opinion/article/kennedy-s-never-ending-cult-5076200.php)
 

Giglio:  “The 1,000-force cutback slated for the end of 1963 mostly involved a construction battalion that had completed its work; it was understood that it would be replaced by other troops…”

John Newman’s “JFK and Vietnam” discusses in detail what happened to the 1000 man withdrawal, which was not carried out as envisioned (see 2017 edition Chapter 22 p529-532). This detail derives from the Honolulu Meeting Briefing Book (November 1963). Newman’s information substantially corrects and supplants what appears in the Pentagon Papers, which is missing three crucial documents regarding this issue (see footnote 1155).

Giglio: “The recently published Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume 4, Vietnam, August-December 1963, further affirms the no-pullout conclusion.”

This blanket statement offers no citations, and contradicts a close reading of the discussions which culminate in 263. A close reading leads to exactly the opposite conclusion.

Piascik: “There is no evidence to indicate any plan for withdrawal short of victory. . . .”

The evidence and the plan is known as NSAM 263 as seen below.. Does “without impairment of the war effort” actually mean “victory”? That could serve as a quibbling debate, but what I see is that the academic critics of the withdrawal plans prefer to avoid referring to the language altogether because it upends their concepts, and the changes represented by 273 appear too obvious.

2 A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.

3 In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.

3 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

we’re not just talking about his public statements. We’re also talking about the JFK White House tapes and meeting minutes.

The non-public discussions are self-contradictory as well.

3 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

In every single firsthand statement from JFK himself we see him reaffirming his determination to win the war. You cannot cite a single firsthand statement from JFK to support your view.

You are twisting the focus of the debate  (I.e. withdrawal or engagement)  into a construct (i.e. to win or to lose) which is not relevant to the specific terms by which the policy (263) was developed. The specific terms dealt with the question of whether the United States military had a direct role to play in the Vietnam conflict. The determination, as unambiguously expressed by the actual language of 263, was it did not and thus the personnel would be withdrawn.

3 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

NSAM 263 simply does not support the unconditional-withdrawal myth. In fact, it refutes the myth.

The “unconditional-withdrawal myth” is something you made up. There’s nothing in Prouty or Newman’s extensive work which endorses this alleged “myth”. In fact, the expression of this “myth” which does appear in the record (with your preferred definition I.e. a complete withdrawal regardless or despite a Communist victory) is attributed to Robert McNamara, spoken during a classified debrief in October 1963 regarding his McNamara-Taylor trip to Vietnam. Over the past year, on this Forum, you have variously and erroneously attributed McNamara’s own words to Prouty, Newman, Galbraith, DiEugenio, and “JFK”’s screenwriters.

3 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

NSAM 263 itself is less than one page long and merely announces the 1,000-man withdrawal and refers to sections of the Taylor-McNamara report. If you read that report and the instructions that JFK himself gave to Lodge afterward, it is crystal clear that the withdrawal was conditioned on the situation on the ground...

The first sentence is about as disingenuous as you have ever posted on this Forum - and that is saying a lot. The entire paragraph is in fact disingenuous. You make sweeping statements referring to “instructions that JFK himself gave to Lodge afterward” which supposedly make it “crystal clear that the withdrawal was conditioned on the situation on the ground” - without actually identifying what you are referring to or why anybody should accept what you say. I don’t see any “ifs” or “buts” or otherwise conditional language in the approved recommendations. Further, the recommendations were not about “winning the war” as you insist, they were about replacing US personnel with Vietnamese personnel.

3 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

I know some here will never abandon this mythical spin. A few facts...

All you are doing here is repeating Establishment talking points as first set out by Les Gelb in the New York Times in December 1991. While these points seek to contradict the informed commentary of persons such as Fletcher Prouty and John Newman, they fail to address the actual point of contention - which is the understanding of the Kennedy administration’s Vietnam policy as expressed in NSAM 263. Your personal rejection of these “mythical” views relies on a straw-man “unconditional-withdrawal myth”, and the rather questionable opinion that Kennedy would have actually introduced combat forces in Vietnam during his second term. Your commentary in general on the Vietnam War, as expressed on this Forum, reveals a belief the US war effort was in fact a noble endeavour, an opinion shaped by a conservative worldview imbued with a strong, if somewhat antiquated, anti-communist bent. That, it seems to me, is a formula for exactly misunderstanding the Kennedy administration and/or its policies.

4 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Critics pounced on three blunders in Stone's 1991 JFK to discredit the movie in the eyes of most journalists and academics. Those three blunders were (1) the claim that Ed Lansdale was one of the plotters, (2) the claim that JFK was determined to abandon the Vietnam War after the election, and (3) Stone's use of Fletcher Prouty as a source. 

One of Stone's own aides, Jane Rusconi, who checked into Prouty, warned Stone five months before the movie's release that Prouty must have known about Liberty Lobby's "unsavory" nature:

          “Basically, there’s no way Fletcher could be unaware of the unsavory aspects of the Liberty Lobby. The Anti-Defamation Leagues keeps a close watch on the Liberty Lobby and are very aware of Fletcher’s involvement. It could come back to haunt us if we don’t find a way to deal with this.”

And Rusconi was apparently unaware that Prouty had actually spoken at an IHR Holocaust-denial conference and had written a letter praising the primary goals of the IHR's Holocaust-denying journal.

Yet, just the information that Rusconi found on Prouty should have been enough to cause Stone to drop him, but Stone decided to use Prouty as a source anyway. This decision came back to haunt Stone in a major way when critics pounced on Prouty's bogus claims and documented Prouty's record of prolonged and close associations with anti-Semites, Holocaust deniers, and white supremacists.

The critics of the “JFK” film - that is, the mainstream establishment - attacked (or “pounced on”) the film due to its overarching premise that Kennedy had been assassinated by a far-reaching officially sanctioned conspiracy. Specific reference to Lansdale, Prouty, John Newman etc do not really factor into this equation. In fact, outside of Anson’s Esquire Magazine hatchet-job, I’m not aware of Prouty, Newman, or Lansdale at the time being directly referred at all.  The idea that the entire Establishment was prepared to accept a JFK conspiracy hypothesis but pulled back from the abyss solely due to the film’s references to Lansdale, Prouty, and/or Vietnam is, outside of Leslie Gelb’s NY Times op/ed, almost entirely made-up.

Similarly, Prouty’s alleged “prolonged and close associations” with the Liberty Lobby milieu in fact consists of a single paid speaking engagement (for The Spotlight) and a contract for a small reprint run (500 copies) of “The Secret Team” (both occurring in September 1990). In context, at the time, both Mark Lane and Dick Gregory spoke at the same conference, Bernard Lewin’s “Report From Iron Mountain” was also reprinted by the same publishing house, and Noam Chomsky lectures on cassette were available from the publisher’s mail-order list.

Relying solely on public statements from the time, one could make a case for either withdrawal or engagement simply by cherry-picking from the self-contradictory record. Critics such as Prouty and Newman look closely at what was done rather than what was said. They give more weight to the production of NSAM 263 - culminating a period of intense concentration on a strategic plan for Vietnam led personally by Kennedy - rather than discourse which may have been subject to electioneering and political persuasion. The intention of 263 is not ambiguous.

What is notable with the argument that “JFK never faced” what LBJ “had to confront” - which was first broached in Les Gelb’s NY Times op-ed December 1991) - is that rhetorically it dismisses the withdrawal argument for its presumption regarding the “unknown”, while simultaneously presuming to in fact "know" the “unknown” (i.e. JFK would have reacted the same as LBJ). It also fails to factor the escalatory measures initiated by the Johnson administration, beginning with NSAM 273.

2 hours ago, Sandy Larsen said:

 

Jeff,

Is it true that someone's (Krulak's) wife also identified Lansdale in the tramp photo? If so, when did that take place?

I have no information regarding this.

1 hour ago, Joe Bauer said:

Totally agree with your postulation here JC. Krulak's praise of Prouty and his stellar career back when Prouty retired in the early 60's is important. Did Krulak let Livingstone know if he felt Prouty had flat out lied about Krulak IDing Lansdale in the Tramp photo?

You would think Krulak would have personally called Prouty and complained to him about the inference of his (Krulak's ) take on the Tramp photo. I assume Krulak never complained to Prouty personally about it...correct?

I am not aware of further communications between Prouty and Krulak on this topic. Prouty would most likely have kept such a private matter. The original (1985) communications are authentic. 

23 hours ago, Joe Bauer said:

Was Krulak alive when Prouty published his claim regarding Krulak IDing Lansdale in the three tramps photo?

An accurate timeline relevant to this issue has been offered several times, but is consistently misrepresented by persons who approach the topic as a means of scoring partisan points rather than establishing the facts.

Prouty was part of an interested group (I think loosely connected to Richard Sprague) who had access to high-quality 8x10 copies of photos taken in Dealey Plaza. The complete set of “Tramps” photos was part of this collection. This is late 60s/early 70s -  second generation pre-HSCA era. Sprague was publishing assassination related articles in his journal Computers and Automation.

Prouty would later say he immediately recognized Lansdale in the one photo, but did not speak of it to  his colleagues.

Prouty, with Sprague collating photos, published his first assassination related article “Guns of Dallas” in 1975. This article features a brief discussion of the Tramp photos (as well as referencing the Military Intelligence stand down later misrepresented by the ARRB panel). No mention of Lansdale.                    https://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/GoD.html

Prouty contacted Krulak regarding the Tramp photos in early 1985 - more than a decade after initially viewing the photos. Krulak’s response is dated March 15, 1985. He says: “That is indeed a picture of Ed Lansdale . The haircut, the stoop, the twisted left hand, the large class ring. It's Lansdale. “

To be consistent, at this point the self-styled Prouty critics should be identifying Krulak himself as a “crackpot and fraud.” But they won’t do that because Krulak retains a stellar reputation for personal integrity, and the critics would themselves become the laughing-stocks. So instead they posit, apropos of nothing but their partisan imaginations, that the letter is a “forgery” ( note that in December 1963 Krulak celebrated Prouty’s military career with a Letter of Appreciation for his “outstanding performance of duty”: “your unique knowledge and appreciation of the inner-relationship of political and military factors have contributed materially to the achievement of national objectives…You take with you both the gratitude of your associates and the confident hope that in your forth-coming responsibilities in civilian life you will profit from the same high standards that have characterized your outstanding service with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” This is the person certain posters on EF claim is an “extreme fringe kook.”)

Five years later (March 1990), Prouty writes his “Lansdale hypothesis” letter to Garrison. He doesn’t directly ID Krulak when he writes: “Others who knew Lansdale as well as I did, have said the same thing, ‘That's him and what's he doing there?’ “ Portions of this letter make their way into the "JFK" script.

Prouty did however mention in confidence Krulak’s ID to his colleague Harrison Livingstone - who, for reasons of his own, broke Prouty’s trust, publicized the issue, and made a direct cold call to Krulak, who understandably reacted defensively. Krulake, however, did not refute his communication five years previously with Prouty - another matter which is consistently misrepresented by agenda-driven partisans. It was Livingstone who broke this information publicly, not Prouty. Livingstone had been difficult at the time with Stone and the "JFK" office, which Stone refers to in his published response to Esquire's hit piece on the film.

1 hour ago, Roger Odisio said:

What jumped out at me in your article, Jeff, was Prouty saying Johnson had not asked for the 273 draft (did he think Bundy wrote it on his own and it just happened to coincide with Johnson's preferred policy?) and that Johnson "had no expectation whatever of being President on Nov 21".  Nobody's perfect.

I think Prouty is using a slight bit of sarcasm to sharpen the lens through which the origin of 273 might be best viewed.

He also pointed out the draft may have actually been composed on the plane returning from Honolulu. In that case, the request to his brother to show the draft to McNamara sticks out because McNamara was present on the same plane. It was a long flight, why didn’t Bundy just show it to McNamara himself? Your thoughts on why this didn’t and wouldn’t occur are sharply rendered.  The utility of having a draft dated November 21, of course, is it could be plausibly labelled, after the fact, a Kennedy administration document.

Regarding this draft:  “There’s enough there to present the feeling that somehow somebody knew things were going to change.”      Prouty interview with John Judge 1992

2 hours ago, Roger Odisio said:

Jeff,

Do you have any information about to whom Bundy circulated his Nov 21 draft of 273?  Is there a routing slip? A cover memo from Bundy?

This is the relevant footnote from the article (36):

“I have other copies of this draft document that were done on various typewriters and they certainly indicate that this draft document had to have been quickly circulated through all of the highest governmental levels...on the 21st. On these draft copies there are some notes, and line outs.” Also: “in this original draft that he circulated among many of the top echelons of the Government, with personal ‘Cover Letters’ to the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone and to his brother William in McNamara's office…” Prouty The Highly Significant Role Played By Two Major Presidential Policy Directives 1997. Collected Works

Prouty also identifies a copy “sent to Don Wilson with USIA”.

Distribution corroborated (Bundy acknowledges notes and revisions) in Newman's "JFK and Vietnam".

Here is a thread on Lansdale from 2008, with fascinating commentary from Sterling Seagrave, whose book "Gold Warriors" is engrossing. 

I think Fletcher's "Lansdale Hypothesis" letter to Garrison may have been written under the influence of potent painkillers prescribed for his back surgery. It's a little hyperbolic by his standards. 

However, one of Seagraves' gems - which may relate to cover stories and red herrings generated in Dealey Plaza - is that one of Lansdale's quirks was a fondness for use of umbrellas in covert ops.

1 hour ago, Greg Doudna said:

On Robert Morrow’s claim that Lansdale killed JFK: so far as I can see the only claimed evidence is argument that he was in Dealey Plaza, and motive. Is that it? That’s insubstantial, not evidence of killing Kennedy, a wild leap. Thousands of civil servants had motive in the sense of passed over for promotion or fired from a job or disagreed on policies, motive is not proof of anything. Did Prouty have anything more than the Dealey Plaza photo claim? So what if that was Lansdale? How go from that to he killed JFK? Why not rephrase that to that’s enough to put Lansdale on a short list of maybe only 5000 or 10,000 possible suspects, at least the vast vast majority of whom are assuredly completely innocent. Would that not be more accurate reasoning?

Greg - for the record, Prouty never speculated that “Lansdale killed JFK” or had a direct operational role in the assassination itself.

In his letter to Prouty in response to the photo and the Lansdale ID, Krulak asked: “What was he (Lansdale) doing there?” That is a fair question. To the extent that he speculated, Prouty thought Lansdale, using his public relations and covert operations background, may have been assigned to create cover stories and red herrings - such as the bizarre march of the tramps.

Of course, Lansdale may have just been there because he was in the area and the President was in town. Or the figure might not be Lansdale at all, and the similar identification points may just be coincidental. In my opinion, although of interest, very little of the important information Prouty had to share hinges in any way on this identification, and it is therefore of secondary value.

10 hours ago, Sandy Larsen said:

 

Michael,

What makes you think that Kennedy was going to sign NSAM 273? He hadn't even read it. Wasn't it, therefore, just a recommendation made by the military and advisors?

@Jeff Carter, is the characterization I made of 273, in the prior paragraph, accurate?

 

It can be said there was a faction within the foreign policy / national security bureaucracy which was not prepared to accept a withdrawal from Vietnam on the terms Kennedy had devised. Being generous, one could say the Bundy draft merely reflected these concerns in a way which kept all options open. On the other hand, and this is what Prouty emphasized, Kennedy’s policy had been fully expressed with NSAM 263 and a dissenting opinion submitted weeks later would not change anything. So why would Bundy go to the trouble of not only writing it up (in the form of a NSAM), but distributing it to a fair number of persons on November 21?

There is no record anywhere which shows that Kennedy had asked for, read, or was even aware of Bundy’s draft. I assume the dissenting voice on this thread bases his opposite opinion on material in Selverstone’s book. To assert that Kennedy was prepared to sign 273 is just wishful thinking.

4 hours ago, Robert Morrow said:

Michael Griffith says:

QUOTE

Finally, regarding "fringe claims," yes, Prouty most certainly made a number of fringe claims. The claim that Ed Lansdale was a key plotter and was in Dealey Plaza is a nutty, obscene, fringe claim, and is recognized as such by 99.99% of the scholars and historians who have written on the subject. 

UNQUOTE

There are many fine students of the JFK assassination who think that Gen. Edward Lansdale was photographed 5 feet of the Texas School Book Depository at 2:30PM on the afternoon of 11-22-1963.

Need I remind you that the vast majority of history and political science professors at colleges and universities are a bunch of politically-controlled morons who will tell you with a straight face that a Lone Nut Killed JFK and that Gerald Posner's book Case Closed is a great book to read on the JFK case. So no wonder they can't handle Gen. Edward Lansdale being involved in the JFK assassination.

A few years ago I went to a lecture in Austin, TX where Max Boot was promoting his biography on Lansdale The Road Not Taken and in that talk he slurred Fletcher Prouty with the ridiculous assertion that the man was a kook because he said Gen. Edward Lansdale was at Dealey Plaza. Afterwards I went up to "Lone Nutter" Neocon Kook Max Boot (who never met a war he did not like) and told him the Gen. Victor Krulak ALSO identified Edward Lansdale in that photo taken at Dealey Plaza and I asked Boot "So was Krulak a kook too?" 

Neocon kook (and lone nutter) Max Boot replied, "No."

Krulak's Lansdale identification: http://www.ratical.com/ratville/JFK/USO/appD.html

Boot did not even know that Krulak had also identified Lansdale at Dealey Plaza- and this man was a published author on Lansdale! It seems like that would be highly relevant to any biography of Edward Lansdale.

Danny Sheehan on May 23, 2016 said that even Lansdale's second wife Patrocinio Yapcinco Lansdale had identified Lansdale at Dealey Plaza! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JiRqNiG19dg

I then told the Crazed Neocon Kook Max Boot that around 1990 John Newman and David Lifton together went out to the Hoover Institution to go through the Lansdale papers. The reason Newman/Lifton were doing this was to find some sort of an alibi for Lansdale to PROVE that he was not at Dealey Plaza on 11-22-1963. Max Boot listened intensely to watch I will tell you next:

INSTEAD, what Newman and Lifton found was a piece of paper from a note pad at the Hotel Texas in Fort Worth - that happens to be the exact same hotel that JFK and Lyndon Johnson stayed at on the night of 11/21/1963, the night before the JFK assassination.

Newman/Lifton ALSO found correspondence between Edward Lansdale and his very good friend Gen. "Hanging Sam" Williams. In the letters, Lansdale said I am going to come make a personal visit to you this fall. Gen. "Hanging Sam" Williams lived in Denton, TX.

I am referring to Lansdale's great friend Samuel Tankersley Williams: 1) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Tankersley_Williams and 2)  https://www.amazon.com/Hanging-Sam-Military-Biography-Williams/dp/0929398122 

Denton, TX is located exactly 38 miles to the northwest of Dealey Plaza.

John Newman told me, and I have this on videotape, that after he went through the Lansdale papers at the Hoover Institution, a few days later the librarian there called him and said government agents are here in the Lansdale papers and they are classifying as "top secret" everything that you and David Lifton just went through!!

Both John Newman and David Lifton confirmed to me personally they had indeed made this trip to the Hoover Institution to see the Lansdale papers and it was circa 1990 - before the movie JFK came out. The reason they went was because Oliver Stone wanted John Newman to go to Hoover and see if they could find an alibi for Edward Lansdale that would place him somewhere else than Dealey Plaza on 11-22-1963.

JFK researcher Alan Dale is very close to John Newman. Alan Dale told me that exact same things that John Newman and David Lifton told me about the visit to the Lansdale papers at Hoover.

Newman and Lifton were unable to find an alibi for Lansdale; instead they found letters of Lansdale to Gen. Sam Williams in which he said I will be coming to visit you in Denton, TX sometime this fall.

In Max Boot's book on Lansdale, he mentions that a mere 11 days after the JFK assassination, Gen. Edward Lansdale was back in government in the LBJ Administration in the Food for Peace program and he HAD AN OFFICE ON WHITE HOUSE GROUNDS IN THE OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING. That is the same building that Lyndon Johnson had his Vice-Presidential office.

Lyndon Johnson was a big fan of Lansdale and so was front row seat Kennedy-hater Sen. Thomas Dodd who hated the Kennedys as much as LBJ did. Deranged Neocon Kook author Max Boot will tell you that JFK-hater Sen. Thomas Dodd was Edward Landale's TOP CONGRESSIONAL SPONSOR.

In summer of 1964, Lyndon Johnson toyed with the idea of making JFK-hater Sen. Thomas Dodd as his vice presidential running mate. Instead, LBJ picked subservient Hubert Humprey as his VP candidate. And let's not forget that Sen. Hubert Humphrey was ALSO a huge fan of Gen. Edward Lansdale.

Fast forward to summer 1965. Lyndon Johnson has completely resurrected Lansdale's career and has given him his cherished Vietnam portfolio back. Newspapers across the USA report on their front pages that Vietnam expert and guru Gen. Edward Lansdale is heading to Vietnam (see Max Boot's book). Lansdale has come a long way since he was run out of the Kennedy Administration and forced to retire on 10/31/1963.

The way I see things: Gen. Edward Lansdale murdered JFK on behalf of Lyndon Johnson and his Texas power brokers who had deep military and intelligence connections. Lansdale used some of his rabid anti-Castro, anti-JFK CIA or military operatives (the kind of people you would find by the score in Operation Mongoose) to kill Kennedy. 

As a payback for splattering JFK's head all over Elm Street, Lyndon Johnson resurrected the career of Lansdale and gave him a high profile Vietnam portfolio in 1965.

That is called payback. 

Robert, appreciate you putting this together. As my colleague Len Osanic handles the Prouty archive, people share with him various items from the inter-webs when Prouty’s name is invoked. From those non-scientific samplings it has been discernible that a contemporary wave of focussed negativity directed towards Prouty has been an actual “thing” over the past three or four years. At a cursory glance, much of this generates from an equally discernible rehabilitation of Ed Lansdale.

For many years, Prouty did not speak publicly of the three tramps photo or Krulak’s confirming ID, but he did share this information confidentially with other researchers. Harrison Livingstone broke Prouty’s confidence, and publicized the Lansdale ID and also directly confronted Krulak, who naturally reacted defensively. Most persons who attack Prouty on this issue are unaware of this background. They are also either unaware or in denial regarding the information about Lansdale’s presence in Denton Texas, which is most relevant and important.

1 hour ago, Roger Odisio said:

Vince Salandria first came across the message to Air Force One, which, btw, was also sent to the Cabinet Plane on its way back from Hawaii, from reading Theodore White's Making of the President, 1964.

According to Salandria, White wrote that the presidential party "learned that there was no conspiracy, learned of the identity of Oswald and his arrest".  

He contacted both White and Pierre Salinger who wrote about it in his book, With Kennedy.  Salinger contacted NARA and tried to get the message for Salandria, but surprise! it had disappeared.

Undaunted, Salandria contacted the White House Communications Agency and was rebuffed with the response:  the logs and tapes of radio transmissions "...are kept for official use only.  These tapes are not releasable, nor are they obtainable from commercial sources." Even though White and probably Salinger had seen them.  

This was in 1968.  The contents of the messages also was confirmed by Robert Manning, Kennedy's Asst Sec of State for Public Affairs in 1993, who was on AF One. 

This info is from Salandria's speech at the 1998 COPA conference, False Mystery Concealing a State Crime.  He goes on to explain the message, and its worth repeating:  what those on the plane "had heard, smelled and seen was of no consequence. The patsy had been selected, and the conclusion of conspiracy ruled out. Bundy was indirectly instructing the presidential party and the cabinet members that he was speaking for the killers. He was telling them that what they had observed in Dealey Plaza was merely evidence, and that the needs of the state rose above evidence....They were being circuitously informed that the assassination had been committed by a level of US power that was above and beyond punishment."  IOW, don't interfere.

There is no confusion about the content of the message.

In his speech, Salandria tells of a speech he gave in 1971 about Bundy, hoping that Bundy would sue him.  He didn't.

Salandria's opinion of Bundy may have been formed without even knowing about Bundy's role in rewriting NSAM 263 while Kennedy was still alive.

Yes, this is important and I'm a little perturbed more people here haven't responded to it.

Bundy was also the man who called off the late air-strike against Castro’s one remaining jet, thus assuring the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation.

15 minutes ago, Michael Griffith said:

Bundy wrote the first draft of NSAM 273 after consulting with JFK.

On what basis do you make this statement?

1 hour ago, Roger Odisio said:

Jeff, we don't need to look for an indication Kennedy knew about or had requested 273.  He didn't.  You have clearly set out the reversal of Kennedy's policy that 273 was.  Kennedy views on war in SE Asia were developed over decades.  Before 263, he had spent concentrated time developing the policy in it with the advisers he trusted.  

263 was signed October 11.  Bundy's draft of 273 was started one day before Kennedy was murdered.  Johnson signed it one day after Kennedy was buried.

It is impossible to believe that in the time between Oct. 11 and Nov. 21 Kennedy would have so completely changed his mind, and without consulting those advisors, unilaterally ordered a policy reversal. A new policy in 273, that happens to be in line with Johnson's views (LBJ later told McNamara he never agreed with JFK on Vietnam but kept this mouth shut).  

"It is not known why or under what direction McGeorge Bundy initiated the draft [of 273 on] November 21, 1963."  Those are the key questions aren't they?

Why start writing the draft while JFK was still alive? They had to know he wouldn't sign it.  Who ordered it?

If you believe that Vietnam policy was a key reason JFK was murdered, is it too much to suggest that the answers to those questions are likely to lead to the planners of the murder?  That reversal of 263 was part of the plan from the start.

John Newman spoke with McGeorge Bundy in the early 1990s regarding the draft of NSAM 273.  Bundy had a fuzzy memory, but did acknowledge he wrote the draft and added, cryptically, of the recommendations: “I tried to bring them in line with the words Kennedy might want to say.”

Bundy had been instructed to attend the meeting in Honolulu (November 1963), but it is not known by whom. Bundy wrote up “recommendations” supposedly reflecting a Honolulu consensus in the form of a draft NSAM, but it is not known what motivated him to do so.

There is no record anywhere which links Kennedy to the draft of this NSAM. Short of such a confirmation, it is difficult to consider the draft as an expression of “Kennedy administration” policy. This is because there is an established record of the extensive process leading to NSAM 263. There is no evidence of any “process” leading to the 273 draft.

What is striking is that the training/withdrawal plan from 263 entirely disappears beginning with the 273 draft, while the 1000 man December 1963 withdrawal remains and is used specifically to promote the idea that there was full continuity in Vietnam policies from Kennedy administration to Johnson administration.

4 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Part of what is disappointing about the OP and the article linked in the OP is that the authors keep repeating these fringe claims and never address or acknowledge contrary facts that have been presented to them. I know they are aware of these facts because I have personally presented these facts to them in this forum. 

As just one example, let's take a look at the original draft of NSAM 273, i.e., the version that JFK was going to sign when he returned from Dallas. Among other things, the original draft is further clear evidence that JFK was determined to win the war to keep South Vietnam free, and that he stipulated that all decisions and actions should be judged based on whether or not they contributed to this purpose:

          1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all decisions and U.S. actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose. . . .

Immediately after this statement, the draft mentions the 10/2/63 withdrawal announcement, i.e., NSAM 263.  Obviously, the objectives of NSAM 263 were to be judged by whether or not they helped South Vietnam to win the war and remain free, and if they began to harm that "central object," they would be abandoned.

Paragraph 6 directed that military and economic aid should be maintained at the same levels that they were during Diem's tenure:

          6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in the time of the Diem government…

Paragraph 7 called for "a wholly new level of effectiveness" in action against North Vietnam:

          7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action. . . .

Paragraph 10 called for making the case to the world that the Viet Cong were "controlled, sustained, and supplied" by the Hanoi regime:

          10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained, and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels.

None of these things should be the least bit surprising, given JFK's statements in the months leading up to the Texas trip, and given his statements during the Texas trip, in which he made it clear that he was determined to keep South Vietnam free and that he was opposed to abandoning the war effort.

However, you'd never imagine these things, much less know them, to read the way the defenders of the unconditional-withdrawal myth spin the original draft of NSAM 273. Nor do these authors ever bother to tell their readers that they are pushing a theory that is rejected even by most liberal Vietnam War scholars and historians, not to mention the overwhelming majority of moderate and conservative Vietnam War scholars and historians.

 

First - no one voted you into a position where you get to declare what is or is not a “fringe claim”.

Second - there are distinct differences between utterances which are “factual” and utterances which express an “opinion”. In my observation, you constantly blur the line between the two.

Third - your repeated angry attacks against scholars promoting a Kennedy Withdrawal thesis constantly refers to an “unconditional-withdrawal myth”. This “myth” supposedly follows a line such as: “ Kennedy advocated absolute withdrawal no matter what, even if the Communists take over Vietnam”.  You generally name Prouty, Newman, DiEugenio, Galbraith, ands even Stone’s “JFK” film as perpetuators of this myth. However, the myth is itself a myth. I have read just about everything Prouty wrote regarding Vietnam and I have never come across anything resembling an advocacy of an “unconditional withdrawal myth”. I have never found any such statement in Newman’s work. Neither does such claim appear in the “JFK” film. When pressed, all you can say is Newman says something like it in the JFK Revisited series (released three decades after Stone’s “JFK” film). He does (in the third episode), but in the context of paraphrasing something SecDef McNamara said during debriefs from his trip to Vietnam with Taylor (Sept 1963). That you bolster this false notion of an “unconditional withdrawal” with rhetoric such as “fringe”, “nutty”,”crackpot” etc establishes only that your “opinions” often arrive with an attached agenda.

7 hours ago, Sandy Larsen said:

 

How do you guys know that 273 was written before Kennedy's death? The document may have been antedated to make it look like it was Kennedy's.

 

Bundy's initial draft was dated, at the top, November 21, 1963 . This draft also was distributed to certain persons within foreign policy circles - such as Bundy's brother William - on that day. There remain a few notes and memoranda related to that. Prouty had collected several of these drafts, and noted the differing typewriters used for dissemination. 

John Newman posted one of these drafts:

https://jfkjmn.com/new-page-77/

1 hour ago, Roger Odisio said:

So what do you make of the fact that the draft that became 273 was started while Kennedy was still alive.  It's obvious Kennedy had no part in it, didn't know about it.  He would not have signed it.

It was being written by McGeorge Bundy, as I recall.  Who else knew about it?  Who ordered it?

Why would that person or persons have been working on it unless they knew Kennedy was going to be eliminated?

Johnson signed it shortly after Kennedy was buried.

The new essay has a section devoted to NSAM 273.  It is not known why or under what direction McGeorge Bundy initiated the draft November 21, 1963. Fletcher Prouty was probably the first person to speculate on the origins and purpose of 273. You are correct - there is no indication anywhere that JFK knew of or had requested such a draft.

A dispute between Prouty and John Newman over 273 on the set of “JFK” is obliquely referenced in the Esquire Magazine “hatchet job” on the film published October 1991. At that time, Prouty had a more complete collection of NSAM 273 drafts and the misunderstandings were eventually resolved.

The main problem for those who wish to dismiss the idea that a U.S. personnel/adviser withdrawal from Vietnam was Kennedy’s express policy, or feel that tagging such as a “fringe theory” carries any authority, is the indisputable presence, in the record, of NSAM 263 itself. The document exists, its  purpose and language is not ambiguous, and it is easily established that 263 was the culmination of weeks of focussed attention on the Vietnam question. In other words, it was indeed the fully-formed expression of the Kennedy Administration’s policy for Vietnam: that the primary focus of the U.S. effort from October 1963 onward, would be one of training Vietnamese personnel to replace American personnel with the goal of completing that process, with withdrawal of all remaining U.S. personnel,  by the end of 1965.

It is also indisputable that NSAM 273 signals a reversal of that policy by switching the primary focus of the U.S. effort from the training program designed to eventually replace U.S. personnel to a primary focus on using U.S. capabilities to assist S Vietnam “win the war.” With NSAM 273, the training program and eventual withdrawal of all U.S. personnel by end of 1965 disappears as an active goal. The first draft (and wide dissemination in national security circles) of what would come into the record as 273 occurred as Kennedy was still alive, although there is no record of JFK requesting or otherwise directing such an abrupt shift in focus after only a few weeks. NSAM 273, disingenuously, was described to the public as a “continuation” of Kennedy policy.

Prouty’s description of the process leading to 263 and 273 is more “nuts and bolts” than John Newman’s work in “JFK and Vietnam”, but the understanding of what was afoot in September through November 1963 is complimentary. Newman is the scholar working decades later from declassified documents, while Prouty had a ground-floor point of view from his position in Krulak’s office. They both came to see NSAM 263 as definitive Kennedy policy - and the attempts by critics to claim that it wasn’t lacks an explanation of why or how this policy was made official as it was.

Prouty did not venture that Kennedy’s Vietnam policy specifically led to his death. Prouty believed the  grievances were more widespread:

“(JFK) and his advisors were doing things that you might say were a throwback to the Roosevelt era or even further back to basic government. This of course built Kennedy an awful lot of very serious enemies, who were enemies from the point of view that he must not be re-elected in 1964. They could not permit him to win in 1964 because in the second four-years a president is beholden to nobody and Kennedy knew that. That’s what caused people to rise against him, because on any side - whether you are in the petroleum business, or in the banking business, or in the military - Kennedy was putting things back where they had been and not playing favourites quite as strongly as say the Eisenhower administration had been doing before him.”

As most on this Forum are aware, general knowledge of NSAM 263 (and its reversal with 273) was lacking until Oliver Stone’s film “JFK” foregrounded it (and was attacked hysterically for doing so). Stone’s key advisor on this point, Fletcher Prouty, became himself subject to reputational attacks - which, as can be seen above, continue to this day. Criticism of Prouty tends to be long on insult and short on substance. This new article works from Prouty’s own accounts and understandings of the historic record. It affirms NSAM 263 was unambiguous and the result of a deliberate process.

Working directly with General Krulak in the summer and autumn of 1963, Prouty was a first-hand witness to the development of Kennedy’s Vietnam policy culminating in NSAM 263. Although he was bound to secrecy on classified information, Prouty had more freedom to discuss the topic after the publication of “Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963 Volume IV: Vietnam August-December 1963” in 1991. Prouty sent a copy of that volume to Len Osanic with the following note:

"This is the best JFK and Vietnam book you can get. It is current in that it is of the exact months when JFK was making his Vietnam policy.

Note in those late and crucial days how many times JFK had White House meetings. Then note how many times Gen Krulak, my immediate  boss in the JCS, was there. Every time he came back he would call a few of us and we’d have a conference. Then he would assign our tasks  for the next meeting… it was usually the next day.

This (FRUS Vol. IV) should clear up a lot of questions you may have. I don’t see why serious and truthful writers have not made use of this class one book."

30 minutes ago, Michael Griffith said:

Your willingness to ignore contrary evidence is discrediting.

One, according to Newman, Jim, and Prouty, and few other like-minded authors, by late 1963 JFK had decided to pull out of Vietnam after the election, even if this allowed the Communists to take over South Vietnam. This claim is expressly made in JFK Revisited.

Two, you are once again repeating your fringe spin on NSAM 263 and on Kennedy's Vietnam intentions while ignoring the wording of the NSAM itself and ignoring the supporting documentation, not to mention the JFK White House tapes, JFK's own statements on Vietnam in the last few months of his life (including two he made on the day he died), and Bobby Kennedy's emphatic denial that JFK intended to pull out even if doing so meant a Communist victory in South Vietnam. 

Criticism of a “Kennedy withdrawal” seems to split into two camps. One is based on denial: i.e. the denial that NSAM 263 says what it says or that it means what it means. The second camp accepts the veracity of NSAM 263 and its stated policy, but argues its intentions would surely have been overrun by events.

The second camp finds initial expression in a Leslie Gelb op-ed in the New York Times (January 6, 1992). The first camp - which obviously you endorse - is notable for a stubborn refusal to acknowledge or accept the plain language of 263, choosing instead to highlight unrelated utterances or add unstated qualification.

4 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

you have taken this plan and grossly twisted it into a fictional determination to totally and unconditionally abandon South Vietnam after the election. 

"a fictional determination to totally and unconditionally abandon South Vietnam after the election.” 

Look at all the straw!

5 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

As Francis Bator, LBJ's Deputy National Security Adviser, pointed out in 2007:

          But as the “Record of Action No. 2472 Taken” at the October 2 NSC meeting and the October 11 National Security Action Memorandum 263 make clear, that plan was explicitly conditioned on Secretary McNamara’s and General Taylor’s “judgment that the major part of the US military task can be completed by the end of 1965…,” that “the long term program to replace US personnel with trained Vietnamese [could go forward] without impairment of the war effort.”

Record of Action 2472 is simply a brief summary of discussion held at an NSC meeting. It is not the expression of a “plan”. NSAM 263 is the expression of a plan, but Bator’s insistence such plan was “explicitly conditioned” on future “judgments” is clearly a misreading. The “plan” is based on judgments already rendered.

Prouty’s interview for the Church Committee speaks for itself. Because it was a classified session, he is free to describe in great detail the methodology of embedded CIA representatives across varying levels of government, and the means by which discerning insiders could navigate who was what. In lesser detail, Prouty tried to achieve the same years later when describing Oswald’s Marine activities to the clueless ARRB Board. Here, at the Church Committee, his interviewers are not naive and so quite a bit of information is shared - a lot of which would find independent confirmation years later.

On the other hand, in 1975, there was a parallel rendering of Prouty’s appearance to the Church Committee in the mainstream press, triggered it appears by a leaked limited hangout which produced a superficial pseudo-controversy which didn't rise much above the level of demands that Butterfield’s “CIA Agent” badge be produced for all to see. This superficiality is compounded by the fact the granular detail of the pseudo-controversy lies dormant in paywalled legacy media archives, and exists for quick reference only as compressed summaries on Wikipedia. 

Basically, the determined Prouty hatchet-job crew have been reduced to demanding the production of Oswald or Butterfield’s “Secret Agent” badges, or calling for “forensic tests” of 50-year-old scraps of Amtrak stationary.

50 minutes ago, Michael Griffith said:

This is your answer to the facts that Chomsky presented showing that JFK had no intention of unconditionally withdrawing from Vietnam??? At least Chomsky is an honest radical. He would love to believe that JFK had turned against the war and was going to withdraw no matter what, but he looked at the evidence and found that it shows the opposite.

Stone's 1991 movie was attacked because it peddled the unconditional-withdrawal myth, and because it peddled reckless and baseless claims about Edward Lansdale, about Mr. X's/Prouty's trip to the South Pole, about Mr. X's/Prouty's alleged role in presidential protection (he had none), about the fictional "stand-down order" given to the 112th MI Group, about the supposed phone blackout in DC right after the shooting, etc., etc.

The first combat troops arrived in Da Nang "about 3 1/2 months" after the WC volumes were released because the situation had drastically changed from what it had been before Diem was assassinated in early November 1963. As I've pointed out to you many times, and as you keep ignoring, JFK never faced the kind of massive Communist escalation and the degree of South Vietnamese government instability that LBJ faced in early 1965. 

As H. R. McMaster profusely documents in Dereliction of Duty, LBJ was not at all anxious to send large numbers of combat troops to South Vietnam and only did so reluctantly in the face of (1) North Vietnam's massive escalation in early 1965 and (2) continuing instability in South Vietnam's government following Diem's death. 

Chomsky believed Kennedy to be a committed “cold warrior”, and his analysis skews to conclusions supportive of that position.  Chomsky’s argument that NSAM 263 was laden with qualifying language is simply not correct.

The large majority of criticism directed against Stone’s JFK movie had to do with the proposition of a conspiracy tied to the assassination rather than specific Vietnam issues.

Chicken-egg comparisons regarding Vietnam circa 1964/65 are hypothetical and work from narrow presumptions. It could be argued JFK would not have had to face a “massive escalation” from the North because JFK would not have initiated the same provocative and aggressive escalations LBJ did in 1964.

On 11/6/2023 at 9:15 AM, Michael Griffith said:

Prouty’s ARRB interview was not the first time he back-peddled all over the place. In the mid-1970s, Prouty made the zany claim that E. Howard Hunt told him that Alexander Butterfield was a CIA contact in the White House. When Prouty’s claim became a news item when Butterfield angrily denied it, Prouty started waffling, offering the lame excuse in a phone interview that “they” may have “told me the wrong name in order to cover up the real informer." Oh, of course. And my dog ate my homework.

Senator Frank Church, a staunch liberal and fierce critic of the CIA, investigated Prouty’s claim and did not find a shred of evidence for it. When the Church Committee pressed Prouty on the matter, he admitted he had no evidence to support his claim.

Even the only moderately critical Wikipedia article on Prouty attacks him over his bogus claim:

          On July 12, 1975, prior to closed-door questioning by the staff of the House Select Intelligence Committee, Prouty told reporters that Alexander Butterfield was a contact for the CIA at the White House.[20] He said he had learned the information over four years earlier from E. Howard Hunt while doing work for the National League of Families.[20][21] Prouty said that most federal government departments, including the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department, had similar CIA contacts and that he assumed that former president Richard Nixon was aware of Butterfield's role.[20][21] Senator Frank Church said the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities had found no evidence that the CIA planted an undercover agent within the White House or other government agencies.[20]

         A few days later, Prouty partially walked back his comments in a telephone interview: "They may have told me the wrong name in order to cover up the real informer."[21] In a telephone statement to UPI that same day, Butterfield called the allegations "wholly false and defamatory" and stated that he had never met nor seen Hunt and had just recently heard of Prouty.[21] In an interview with CBS News from Eglin Air Force Base where he was serving his prison term for his involvement in the Watergate scandal, Hunt denied the allegation calling it an "unfortunate invention on Mr. Prouty's part."[22] Also interviewed by CBS, Prouty again stated it was Hunt who told him about Butterfield.[22]

         In a personal letter sent to Roger Feinman at CBS News Radio on July 14, 1975, Harold Weisberg expressed his belief that "the clear inference of the Prouty connection is that as a CIA man Butterfield pulled the plug on Nixon."[23]

         On July 19, Church said that his committee found that there was "no scintilla of evidence" to support Prouty's allegations, and that his committee had ruled out the possibility that Butterfield served as a liaison officer for the CIA.[24] Church also stated, "on close interrogation, Mr. Prouty is unable to substantiate his earlier statement and acknowledges this to be the case."[24] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L._Fletcher_Prouty)

How many times does this guy have to be caught peddling false claims before his defenders will admit he was a fraud and a crackpot?

Prouty testified to the Church Committee on July 15, 1975. The session was eventually declassified and can be read in full. Claims that he dissembled in any way, “walked back” information or “admitted he had no evidence” are not at all supported by the transcript. Claims that the testimony “exposed Prouty as a fraud” is not at all supported by the transcript. Contemporaneous claims against Prouty published in Time Magazine, Chicago Tribune, and CBS are contradicted by the transcript.

Note that suspicions regarding Butterfield can be found in most of the Watergate revisionist work, including Secret Agenda, Silent Coup, and Family of Secrets. To claim that it was just a “zany” theory on Prouty’s behalf is simply wrong.

Here is more information on Butterfield:     https://spartacus-educational.com/JFKbutterfield.htm

The Church Committee transcript features Prouty relating information about persons such as Robert Mullen, Joseph Califano, Al Haig, Butterfield, etc which would later be independently confirmed in work published well before Prouty’s Church Committee interview was declassified.

the transcript can be accessed here:  https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=1372#relPageId=1

5 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

LOL. Not cherry= picking at all - It's their war to win - did you miss that part?   

I'm only answering this for the sake of others, especially any guests. Well, yes, of course it was "their war to win." You keep quoting this statement as if you're somehow proving something and/or validating the unconditional-withdrawal myth. Heck, Nixon said it was "their war to win." So did Abrams. So did Colby. So did just about everybody.

The point, which you keep avoiding, is that (1) JFK made it clear that he opposed pulling out of South Vietnam and even opposed reducing aid to South Vietnam because he was determined to help them win the war, and (2) that JFK defended the war effort as vital, said we had to be patient and persist, and said he did not want a repeat of what happened in China. 

As you missed the Gen Maxwell Taylor memo in posts above?

Oh, boy. You must be reading the Taylor memo with pink-shaded glasses or with half the memo blacked out. The Taylor memo does not even come close to supporting the myth that JFK was determined to unconditionally and totally disengage from Vietnam after the election. Where in the world in that memo do you see any such thing? 

BTW, you cannot read the 10/4/63 memo in isolation from Taylor and McNamara's 10/2/63 memo to JFK. Have you read the 10/2/63 memo? The few times when the unconditional-withdrawal-myth folks cite that memo, they usually ignore the parts that make it clear that the withdrawal was neither unconditional nor irreversible. Here's a link to that memo: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963 - Office of the Historian.

I suspect you guys just don't care, but it should give you pause that even the vast majority of liberal historians, who have looked at all the same evidence that you guys cite, reject as spurious and fringe the Stone-Prouty-Newman-DiEugenio-Galbraith myth that JFK was determined to totally disengage from Vietnam, no matter what, after the election. That inexcusable myth was one of the two main points of scholarly attack against Stone's 1991 movie, the other point being the obscene myth that Ed Lansdale played a key role in the plot.

This is a straw-man argument, one that has been floated since the earliest attacks on the JFK film.

This is the straw:  “unconditionally and totally disengage”, as it appears in the following formulation:  “the myth that JFK was determined to unconditionally and totally disengage from Vietnam”

Language specifying “unconditional” or “total disengagement” does not appear in NSAM 263, and such concepts are not part of the argument advanced by the so-called “Stone-Prouty-Newman-DiEugenio-Galbraith” cabal. Les Gelb was one of the first to utilize this diversion, claiming “J.F.K. might never have issued the directive if he had thought it would mean losing the war.” Its an entirely hypothetical construct. The rhetorical strategy consists of substituting the hypothetical assertions - i.e. Kennedy would not just hand over South Vietnam to the Communists - in place of the actual policy, and attack the “unconditional withdrawal myth makers” based on the hypothesis.

Fact is - it is impossible to predict what the result of training Vietnamese personnel to replace U.S. personnel and withdrawing the “bulk of U.S. personnel” by the end of 1965 would have been. All that can be said is it was Kennedy’s policy to do the above, as expressed in NSAM 263, and the “Stone-Prouty-Newman-DiEugenio-Galbraith” faction are absolutely correct in pointing that out.