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Ed Merritt

9/11 Prior Knowledge ?

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Sorry dude none of the false alarms were caused by the NORAD drills, your post makes that pretty clear, and despite all the confusion there's no evidence the false alarms delayed attempts to intercept any of the hijacked planes. To the contrary, the planes from Langley were launched in response to “phantom AA11” not AA77.

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Sorry dude none of the false alarms were caused by the NORAD drills, your post makes that pretty clear, and despite all the confusion there's no evidence the false alarms delayed attempts to intercept any of the hijacked planes. To the contrary, the planes from Langley were launched in response to “phantom AA11” not AA77.

SO SAYS 911 expert MILES KARA A KNOWN DOD COVERUP ARTIST

===========================================================

9/11 Prior Knowledge ? thread ? OK !!!

================================================================================

incompetence or cover up ?? OPPS OPPS OPPS 911 sorry 911 sorry

=============

see http://www.historyco...ykhalidandnawaf

Who Knew About the Meeting, and What Did They Do About It?

After the Kuala Lumpur meeting, the CIA was in possession of a substantial amount of incriminating evidence concerning the two future 9/11 hijackers. The CIA knew that Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi had ties to Osama bin Laden because they both had attended what the CIA considered “to be a gathering of al-Qaeda agents.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] And, as mentioned above, the agency was aware that Khalid Almihdhar “held a US B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa” and had made his travel arrangements to Malaysia through a Yemeni organization considered by the CIA to be a “logistical center” for al-Qaeda.

As the CIA later admitted, they should have put the names of Almihdhar and Alhazmi on a watch list at this time. The watch list, a database known as TIPOFF, currently consists of over 80,000 names, with about 2,000 new names being added every month. [Los Angeles Times, 9/22/02] Regulations require that the list is checked for visa applications or whenever someone enters or leaves the US (note that it is not checked for domestic flights). Officials are liable to be subject to criminal penalties if they fail to consult TIPOFF when required. The Congressional inquiry noted that “the threshold for adding a name to TIPOFF is low,” explaining that even a “reasonable suspicion” that a person is connected with a terrorist group, warrants the addition of the person’s name to the database. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] Why were Almihdhar and Alhazmi, whose names were reportedly important enough to have been mentioned to the CIA Director several times that January [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02], not added to the watch list?

National Security Agency (NSA) Director Michael Hayden later claimed, “In early 2000, at the time of the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, we had the Alhazmi brothers, Nawaf and Salem, as well as Khalid Almihdhar, in our sights. We knew of their association with al-Qaeda, and we shared this information with the [intelligence] community. I’ve looked at this closely.” [NSA Director Congressional Testimony, 10/17/02] However, according to a Congressional inquiry report, the NSA did not share this information with other US intelligence agencies even though “it was in the NSAs database.” Nor did the NSA itself submit the names to the TIPOFF database. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, AP, 9/26/2002]

The big question mark however lies with the FBI, who claims it was left out of the loop by the CIA. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director of the Congressional investigation into 9/11, reported: “A CIA communication in early January 2000 states that Almihdhar’s travel documents, including his multiple entry visa for the United States, were shared with the FBI for further investigation. No one at the FBI recalls having received such documents at the time. No confirmatory record of the transmittal of the travel documents has yet been located at either the CIA or the FBI.” There are details about e-mails by a CIA employee while the Malaysian meeting was still in progress claiming that he briefed two FBI agents about Almihdhar. But even if this in fact happened, the agent does not recall telling the FBI about Almihdhar’s multiple-entry visa. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02]

That the FBI was not provided with this information is significant because, had this intelligence been shared, it is very likely that the FBI would have added the two Saudis to the TIPOFF database.

====================

On to Southern California

On January 8, 2000, Alhazmi and Almihdhar flew from Malaysia seated together and on the same airplane as Khallad bin Atash, an important al-Qaeda terrorist. Presumably they flew to Thailand. The CIA learned this the next day, but did nothing with the information, and failed to follow them. [New York Times, 10/17/02, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]

On January 15, Alhazmi and Almihdhar flew from Bangkok, Thailand, to Los Angeles, California. [MSNBC, 12/11/01] According to Newsweek, the CIA tracked the flight into the US, but was aware only of Alhazmi being on the plane, not Almihdhar. But given their knowledge of the latter’s multiple-entry US visa, the agency must have conjectured that it was certainly possible that Almihdhar might also travel to the country. Yet, as the magazine noted, “astonishingly, the CIA did nothing with this information. Agency officials didn’t tell the INS, which could have turned them away at the border, nor did they notify the FBI, which could have covertly tracked them to find out their mission.” [Newsweek, 6/2/02] About two months later, the FBI claims the CIA learned that Almihdhar had also been on the flight (the CIA denies it), but again failed to do anything about it. [Michael Rolince Testimony, 9/20/02, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]

A March 5, 2000 cable sent to CIA headquarters concerning Alhazmi’s presence in the US was interestingly marked “Action Required: None.” The next day a different overseas CIA station noted that the cable had been “read with interest,”“particularly the information that a member of this group traveled to the US…”—but again the CIA did not act. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] The CIA Director maintains no one read the cable. [New York Times, 10/17/02] The Congressional inquiry noted that, “Although the individuals had already entered the United States, the sharing of this information with the FBI and appropriate law enforcement authorities could have prompted investigative efforts to locate these individuals and surveil their activities within the United States.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02]

Or Were They There Already?

For the most part, the media has consistently reported that Alhazmi and Almihdhar first moved to the United States in early 2000, and the FBI Director has recently concurred. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/02]. However, numerous other reports suggest otherwise; that the two Saudis had been in the US before, and in the case of Alhazmi, long before. Soon after the attacks, the Wall Street Journal cited public records that put Alhazmi in San Diego as early as 1996. [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] Another story, reported by the Associated Press, placed Alhazmi in Cody, Wyoming in the fall of 1999. Witnesses said he was one of two men making a truck delivery from Canada to a high school there and had asked for directions to Florida. They left a very memorable impression. [AP, 10/23/01, Las Vegas Review Journal, 10/26/01]

===

But certainly by November 1999, Alhazmi and Almihdhar were in San Diego. [Washington Post, 9/30/01, San Diego Channel 10, 10/5/01, Newsweek, 6/2/02] Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, they met a man by the name of Omar Al-Bayoumi, who offered to drive them to San Diego and help them get settled. He brought them to the Parkwood Apartments, a well-kept building in a middle-class suburban neighborhood, and even paid their first two months’ rent. (Al-Bayoumi is under investigation and it is still unclear if he acted as terrorist support or just a remarkably good Samaritan). [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02]

If the two Saudis were in the US prior to the January Malaysia meeting, then there should be immigration records documenting their entry—records that the CIA would have discovered as they were investigating Almihdhar between December 1999 and the January meeting. The two had a habit of doing everything openly in their own names: Where are their immigration, credit card, and other records from 1999? Was the CIA aware in January 2000 that they had already visited the US?

The early movements of these two take on greater importance with the recent revelation of an early 1999 NSA communications intercept “in which a ‘Nawaf Alhazmi’ was referenced.” [AP, 9/25/02] Significantly, the intercept was not mentioned in the Joint Staff Inquiry report published on September 20, 2002 but instead was leaked a few days later to the Associated Press. Unfortunately, the anonymous intelligence official who informed the news agency of the intercept disclosed no additional details. Notwithstanding, the revelation of this early 1999 intercept suggests the possibility that Alhazmi, and perhaps Almihdhar, were under some degree of surveillance by US intelligence before January 2000.

===

The Truth Must Come Out

The recent Congressional Intelligence Committee report on who knew what and when about Alhazmi and Almihdhar resembles more a whitewash than a true investigation. The FBI, CIA and others are taken at their word, even though they are known to have lied about this very issue in the past.

For instance, up until June 2002, the CIA maintained that it had not learned of Almihdhar’s connections to al-Qaeda or his visits to the US until August 2001. [New York Times, 6/3/02] But as is well-known now, these links had been established by US intelligence before the January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. If it had not been for leaks and the diligent work of investigative journalists, this information would never have made it to the public. Another example of their tendency to misrepresent the truth was made apparent when the FBI claimed it had begun “an aggressive, ‘full field’ investigation” immediately after the August 23 bulletin. But to the embarrassment of the FBI, it was discovered that the agency did not conduct even the simplest and most basic of searches, neglecting to check national databases of bank records, credit card records, and so on. [Newsweek, 6/2/02] The CIA and FBI’s inability to concur on whether or not the August 23 warning was labeled “immediate” is another case in point.

Another curious inconsistency is that the Congressional inquiry failed to mention that both Alhazmi and Almihdhar lived in California with FBI informant Abdussattar Shaikh from September until December 2000. The Congressional report stated that while Alhazmi had lived in the informant’s home until December, “official records have Almihdhar leaving the US on June 10, 2000, and not returning until July 4, 2001.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] But this is in complete contradiction to all previous media reports, the accounts from neighbors, and quotes from Abdussattar Shaikh himself! [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01, Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01, San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/16/01, Newsweek, 9/9/02] There is a similar unwillingness to admit that Hanjour was in the US in the year 2000 before December, again because that would contradict immigration records. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] With actions like this, the investigation is further obscuring the truth, not uncovering it.

The Congressional committee, the mainstream media, and major US officials have all repeatedly stated that there was no “smoking gun”—no single thing they could have done differently to stop the attacks. For instance, on June 7, 2002, President Bush purported, “Based on everything I’ve seen, I do not believe anyone could have prevented the horror of September the 11th.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 6/8/02] This is clearly wrong. Alhazmi and Almihdhar were the smoking gun—many times over. The Wall Street Journal claimed that even if the FBI knew the two had entered the US early on, “more-vigilant law enforcement is unlikely to have caught all of them.” Then they alleged, “it’s difficult to imagine how to prevent [terrorists] from operating here in the future without making the nation less free, less open and less tolerant of outsiders.” [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] But with what we now know of the connections between Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the other hijackers, it is clear all of them could have been caught, as FBI agents themselves have conceded. The gross failures and even crimes of intelligence officials should not be used as an excuse to destroy our freedoms.

Questions, Questions

The most serious questions have not even been asked by the Congressional committee. What does FBI informant Abdussattar Shaikh really know? Why does he contradict neighbors’ claims that Mohamed Atta was a frequent visitor to his house? Who do phone records show Alhazmi and Almihdhar called so frequently? Was there a deliberate sabotage of John O’Neill’s investigation in Yemen? Why did the CIA fail to share information on Alhazmi and Almihdhar? Why were even well known, top level terrorists like Khallad bin Atash not put on watch lists, much less investigated? Could the meetings in late night limousines have been the communication link between the hijackers and some group outside of al-Qaeda? Do we really know the true identities of the hijackers? Why can’t we see the video footage of them passing through airport security? Why does the FBI still use a photo of an innocent man for Salem Alhazmi? Is there any reason to believe Khalid Almihdhar is still alive?

Most importantly, at what point do incompetence and bureaucratic barriers cease to be reasonable explanations for so many failures surrounding Alhazmi and Almihdhar? Could the US government have been protecting these two for some reason? When will investigators and the media start asking these difficult questions?

=======================

incompetence or cover up ?? OPPS OPPS OPPS 911 sorry 911 sorry opps were incompetent not evil no we are not evil .....TRUST US ..... opps sorry 911 sooooooooooooooo sorry trust us trust us .....you are getting sleepy very very sleepy your eyelids are getting heavy sooooo heavy ...... trust us trust us

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

NSA Lied About Knowledge Of 2 9/11 Hijackers In U.S., Didn't Inform The FBI
Posted by Jon Gold on Sat, 08/09/2014 - 4:11pm

By Jon Gold

8/9/2014

=====

see http://educationforu...=21401&p=290208

you are getting sleepy very very sleepy your eyelids are getting heavy sooooo heavy

+++++++++++ COLGRINCHBY THE MAN WHO STOLE THE FACTSMAS

dsc_2012_12_26_the_grinch_by_theeyzmaste

Edited by Steven Gaal

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Sorry dude none of the false alarms were caused by the NORAD drills, your post makes that pretty clear, and despite all the confusion there's no evidence the false alarms delayed attempts to intercept any of the hijacked planes. To the contrary, the planes from Langley were launched in response to “phantom AA11” not AA77.

SO SAYS 911 expert MILES KARA A KNOWN DOD COVERUP ARTIST

No so indicates the material you cited in your previous post.

We've been over the rest already, sorry been there done that, I'm not into reruns.

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Ya vol commandant Colby ve understand, ve villt ignore the information below.......we only believe the official report, YA vole !! Long live the exceptionalist Fatherland !!

=

Caleh Maupin

You know, on September 11th 1973 there was a coup d'état, in which the people of Chile had their democratic government overthrown. Twenty thousand people were murdered by Pinochet, a US-backed thug but no one ever talks about that … and there is countless other examples of US aggression abroad but that never is allowed to be part of the narrative, especially not today.

There is no parade commemorating the victims, or the millions of the people the US has slaughtered around the world, there is no parade commemorating the people of Vietnam or the people of Korea or the people in Latin America who have been killed by US’ Contras.

==========================================================

see http://www.historyco...ykhalidandnawaf

Who Knew About the Meeting, and What Did They Do About It?

After the Kuala Lumpur meeting, the CIA was in possession of a substantial amount of incriminating evidence concerning the two future 9/11 hijackers. The CIA knew that Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi had ties to Osama bin Laden because they both had attended what the CIA considered “to be a gathering of al-Qaeda agents.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] And, as mentioned above, the agency was aware that Khalid Almihdhar “held a US B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa” and had made his travel arrangements to Malaysia through a Yemeni organization considered by the CIA to be a “logistical center” for al-Qaeda.

As the CIA later admitted, they should have put the names of Almihdhar and Alhazmi on a watch list at this time. The watch list, a database known as TIPOFF, currently consists of over 80,000 names, with about 2,000 new names being added every month. [Los Angeles Times, 9/22/02] Regulations require that the list is checked for visa applications or whenever someone enters or leaves the US (note that it is not checked for domestic flights). Officials are liable to be subject to criminal penalties if they fail to consult TIPOFF when required. The Congressional inquiry noted that “the threshold for adding a name to TIPOFF is low,” explaining that even a “reasonable suspicion” that a person is connected with a terrorist group, warrants the addition of the person’s name to the database. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] Why were Almihdhar and Alhazmi, whose names were reportedly important enough to have been mentioned to the CIA Director several times that January [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02], not added to the watch list?

National Security Agency (NSA) Director Michael Hayden later claimed, “In early 2000, at the time of the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, we had the Alhazmi brothers, Nawaf and Salem, as well as Khalid Almihdhar, in our sights. We knew of their association with al-Qaeda, and we shared this information with the [intelligence] community. I’ve looked at this closely.” [NSA Director Congressional Testimony, 10/17/02] However, according to a Congressional inquiry report, the NSA did not share this information with other US intelligence agencies even though “it was in the NSAs database.” Nor did the NSA itself submit the names to the TIPOFF database. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, AP, 9/26/2002]

The big question mark however lies with the FBI, who claims it was left out of the loop by the CIA. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director of the Congressional investigation into 9/11, reported: “A CIA communication in early January 2000 states that Almihdhar’s travel documents, including his multiple entry visa for the United States, were shared with the FBI for further investigation. No one at the FBI recalls having received such documents at the time. No confirmatory record of the transmittal of the travel documents has yet been located at either the CIA or the FBI.” There are details about e-mails by a CIA employee while the Malaysian meeting was still in progress claiming that he briefed two FBI agents about Almihdhar. But even if this in fact happened, the agent does not recall telling the FBI about Almihdhar’s multiple-entry visa. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02]

That the FBI was not provided with this information is significant because, had this intelligence been shared, it is very likely that the FBI would have added the two Saudis to the TIPOFF database.

====================

On to Southern California

On January 8, 2000, Alhazmi and Almihdhar flew from Malaysia seated together and on the same airplane as Khallad bin Atash, an important al-Qaeda terrorist. Presumably they flew to Thailand. The CIA learned this the next day, but did nothing with the information, and failed to follow them. [New York Times, 10/17/02, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]

On January 15, Alhazmi and Almihdhar flew from Bangkok, Thailand, to Los Angeles, California. [MSNBC, 12/11/01] According to Newsweek, the CIA tracked the flight into the US, but was aware only of Alhazmi being on the plane, not Almihdhar. But given their knowledge of the latter’s multiple-entry US visa, the agency must have conjectured that it was certainly possible that Almihdhar might also travel to the country. Yet, as the magazine noted, “astonishingly, the CIA did nothing with this information. Agency officials didn’t tell the INS, which could have turned them away at the border, nor did they notify the FBI, which could have covertly tracked them to find out their mission.” [Newsweek, 6/2/02] About two months later, the FBI claims the CIA learned that Almihdhar had also been on the flight (the CIA denies it), but again failed to do anything about it. [Michael Rolince Testimony, 9/20/02, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]

A March 5, 2000 cable sent to CIA headquarters concerning Alhazmi’s presence in the US was interestingly marked “Action Required: None.” The next day a different overseas CIA station noted that the cable had been “read with interest,”“particularly the information that a member of this group traveled to the US…”—but again the CIA did not act. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] The CIA Director maintains no one read the cable. [New York Times, 10/17/02] The Congressional inquiry noted that, “Although the individuals had already entered the United States, the sharing of this information with the FBI and appropriate law enforcement authorities could have prompted investigative efforts to locate these individuals and surveil their activities within the United States.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02]

Or Were They There Already?

For the most part, the media has consistently reported that Alhazmi and Almihdhar first moved to the United States in early 2000, and the FBI Director has recently concurred. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/02]. However, numerous other reports suggest otherwise; that the two Saudis had been in the US before, and in the case of Alhazmi, long before. Soon after the attacks, the Wall Street Journal cited public records that put Alhazmi in San Diego as early as 1996. [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] Another story, reported by the Associated Press, placed Alhazmi in Cody, Wyoming in the fall of 1999. Witnesses said he was one of two men making a truck delivery from Canada to a high school there and had asked for directions to Florida. They left a very memorable impression. [AP, 10/23/01, Las Vegas Review Journal, 10/26/01]

===

But certainly by November 1999, Alhazmi and Almihdhar were in San Diego. [Washington Post, 9/30/01, San Diego Channel 10, 10/5/01, Newsweek, 6/2/02] Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, they met a man by the name of Omar Al-Bayoumi, who offered to drive them to San Diego and help them get settled. He brought them to the Parkwood Apartments, a well-kept building in a middle-class suburban neighborhood, and even paid their first two months’ rent. (Al-Bayoumi is under investigation and it is still unclear if he acted as terrorist support or just a remarkably good Samaritan). [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02]

If the two Saudis were in the US prior to the January Malaysia meeting, then there should be immigration records documenting their entry—records that the CIA would have discovered as they were investigating Almihdhar between December 1999 and the January meeting. The two had a habit of doing everything openly in their own names: Where are their immigration, credit card, and other records from 1999? Was the CIA aware in January 2000 that they had already visited the US?

The early movements of these two take on greater importance with the recent revelation of an early 1999 NSA communications intercept “in which a ‘Nawaf Alhazmi’ was referenced.” [AP, 9/25/02] Significantly, the intercept was not mentioned in the Joint Staff Inquiry report published on September 20, 2002 but instead was leaked a few days later to the Associated Press. Unfortunately, the anonymous intelligence official who informed the news agency of the intercept disclosed no additional details. Notwithstanding, the revelation of this early 1999 intercept suggests the possibility that Alhazmi, and perhaps Almihdhar, were under some degree of surveillance by US intelligence before January 2000.

===

The Truth Must Come Out

The recent Congressional Intelligence Committee report on who knew what and when about Alhazmi and Almihdhar resembles more a whitewash than a true investigation. The FBI, CIA and others are taken at their word, even though they are known to have lied about this very issue in the past.

For instance, up until June 2002, the CIA maintained that it had not learned of Almihdhar’s connections to al-Qaeda or his visits to the US until August 2001. [New York Times, 6/3/02] But as is well-known now, these links had been established by US intelligence before the January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. If it had not been for leaks and the diligent work of investigative journalists, this information would never have made it to the public. Another example of their tendency to misrepresent the truth was made apparent when the FBI claimed it had begun “an aggressive, ‘full field’ investigation” immediately after the August 23 bulletin. But to the embarrassment of the FBI, it was discovered that the agency did not conduct even the simplest and most basic of searches, neglecting to check national databases of bank records, credit card records, and so on. [Newsweek, 6/2/02] The CIA and FBI’s inability to concur on whether or not the August 23 warning was labeled “immediate” is another case in point.

Another curious inconsistency is that the Congressional inquiry failed to mention that both Alhazmi and Almihdhar lived in California with FBI informant Abdussattar Shaikh from September until December 2000. The Congressional report stated that while Alhazmi had lived in the informant’s home until December, “official records have Almihdhar leaving the US on June 10, 2000, and not returning until July 4, 2001.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] But this is in complete contradiction to all previous media reports, the accounts from neighbors, and quotes from Abdussattar Shaikh himself! [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01, Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01, San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/16/01, Newsweek, 9/9/02] There is a similar unwillingness to admit that Hanjour was in the US in the year 2000 before December, again because that would contradict immigration records. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] With actions like this, the investigation is further obscuring the truth, not uncovering it.

The Congressional committee, the mainstream media, and major US officials have all repeatedly stated that there was no “smoking gun”—no single thing they could have done differently to stop the attacks. For instance, on June 7, 2002, President Bush purported, “Based on everything I’ve seen, I do not believe anyone could have prevented the horror of September the 11th.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 6/8/02] This is clearly wrong. Alhazmi and Almihdhar were the smoking gun—many times over. The Wall Street Journal claimed that even if the FBI knew the two had entered the US early on, “more-vigilant law enforcement is unlikely to have caught all of them.” Then they alleged, “it’s difficult to imagine how to prevent [terrorists] from operating here in the future without making the nation less free, less open and less tolerant of outsiders.” [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] But with what we now know of the connections between Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the other hijackers, it is clear all of them could have been caught, as FBI agents themselves have conceded. The gross failures and even crimes of intelligence officials should not be used as an excuse to destroy our freedoms.

Questions, Questions

The most serious questions have not even been asked by the Congressional committee. What does FBI informant Abdussattar Shaikh really know? Why does he contradict neighbors’ claims that Mohamed Atta was a frequent visitor to his house? Who do phone records show Alhazmi and Almihdhar called so frequently? Was there a deliberate sabotage of John O’Neill’s investigation in Yemen? Why did the CIA fail to share information on Alhazmi and Almihdhar? Why were even well known, top level terrorists like Khallad bin Atash not put on watch lists, much less investigated? Could the meetings in late night limousines have been the communication link between the hijackers and some group outside of al-Qaeda? Do we really know the true identities of the hijackers? Why can’t we see the video footage of them passing through airport security? Why does the FBI still use a photo of an innocent man for Salem Alhazmi? Is there any reason to believe Khalid Almihdhar is still alive?

Most importantly, at what point do incompetence and bureaucratic barriers cease to be reasonable explanations for so many failures surrounding Alhazmi and Almihdhar? Could the US government have been protecting these two for some reason? When will investigators and the media start asking these difficult questions?

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

NSA Lied About Knowledge Of 2 9/11 Hijackers In U.S., Didn't Inform The FBI
Posted by Jon Gold on Sat, 08/09/2014 - 4:11pm

By Jon Gold
8/9/2014

=====

see http://educationforu...=21401&p=290208

Edited by Steven Gaal

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More crap we've been over before.

When you put this information (from the post # 19 above)

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

NSA Lied About Knowledge Of 2 9/11 Hijackers In U.S., Didn't Inform The FBI
Posted by Jon Gold on Sat, 08/09/2014 - 4:11pm

By Jon Gold

8/9/2014

=====

see http://educationforu...=21401&p=290208

============================

with the info above the ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) line you,Colby, conclude CRAP (really your saying its old crap).

I see intelligence agency collusion and foreknowledge.

AND BTW THE NSA INFO IS NEWER INFORMATION <NOT OLD as you Colby assert.

Edited by Steven Gaal

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The NSA whistleblowers don't share Gold's paranoid vision.

So you dont still put the newer NSA info with the older Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi info and conclude 911 an intel plot

==

of course you dont !

and u think (well not think really) the whistleblowers have all the CIA datum or the full history of Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi ???????????????????

=

of course u dont !! because u dont _ _ _ _ _ (can yeah guess the next word ??)

Edited by Steven Gaal

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The official story of 911 depends on the CIA and NSA......not reliable sources

**************************************************************************

Ron Wyden: "For years, officials of intelligence agencies like the NSA, as well as the Department of Justice, made misleading and outright inaccurate statements to Congress about data surveillance programs — not once, but repeatedly for over a decade." (CLICK LINK)

=

Hardly a week goes by without a new report of some massive data theft that has put financial information, trade secrets or government records into the hands of computer hackers.

##################################

When you put this information (from the post # 19 above)

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

NSA Lied About Knowledge Of 2 9/11 Hijackers In U.S., Didn't Inform The FBI
Posted by Jon Gold on Sat, 08/09/2014 - 4:11pm

By Jon Gold
8/9/2014

=====

see http://educationforu...=21401&p=290208

============================

with the info above NSA Lie ect with the information above the ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) line in said # 19 post above

THEN , I see intelligence agency collusion and foreknowledge.

AND BTW THE NSA INFO IS NEWER INFORMATION <NOT OLD as has been asserted assert.

Edited by Steven Gaal

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The official story of 911 depends on the CIA and NSA......not reliable sources

**************************************************************************

Ron Wyden: "For years, officials of intelligence agencies like the NSA, as well as the Department of Justice, made misleading and outright inaccurate statements to Congress about data surveillance programs — not once, but repeatedly for over a decade." (CLICK LINK)

=

Hardly a week goes by without a new report of some massive data theft that has put financial information, trade secrets or government records into the hands of computer hackers.

##################################

When you put this information (from the post # 19 above)

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

NSA Lied About Knowledge Of 2 9/11 Hijackers In U.S., Didn't Inform The FBI
Posted by Jon Gold on Sat, 08/09/2014 - 4:11pm

By Jon Gold

8/9/2014

=====

see http://educationforu...=21401&p=290208

============================

with the info above NSA Lie ect with the information above the ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) line in said # 19 post above

THEN , I see intelligence agency collusion and foreknowledge.

AND BTW THE NSA INFO IS NEWER INFORMATION <NOT OLD as has been asserted assert.

The Inside Information That Could Have Stopped 9/11

--------------------------------------------------------------

Submitted by dtg86 on Thu, 01/22/2015 - 5:29pm
======================

Good confirmation of the presence of CIA Minders during commission interviews.

Original Source Link:

http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html

By: By Jeff Stein / January 14, 2015 9:24 AM EST

Just before Christmas, former FBI special agent Mark Rossini greeted me with his usual good cheer when we met for drinks in a midtown Manhattan restaurant. He told me his life had finally taken a turn for the better. He’s spending most of his time in Switzerland, where he works for a private global corporate-security firm. “Life’s good,” he said.

Good, but with a few major changes. Rossini was drinking club soda instead of the expensive cabernets he quaffed when I first knew him as a high-flying FBI official in Washington a decade ago, when he was a special assistant to the bureau’s chief spokesman, John Miller (now with the New York City Police Department). “I’ve cut back,” he said. “Feeling good.”

But when I ask him how he’s really doing, the light in his eyes dims. “Well, you know, I still miss the job,” he said, shaking his head. A boneheaded move—showing confidential FBI documents to his actress-flame Linda Fiorentino, who said she was researching a script about L.A. wiretapper extraordinaire Anthony Pellicano—cost him his career in 2008 and nearly landed him in jail.

1.25 per week

“What’s past is past,” he said. But not all of it. He quickly told me of an encounter the day before on a street in Yonkers, where he keeps an apartment. He’d run into a close family friend who’d lost relatives at the World Trade Center on 9/11. “Mark,” she told him, “you’ve got to get to the bottom of this.”

“She says that every time I see her,” he said, his mouth turning down. But now, at 53, six years out of the bureau, he’s making a determined effort to do just that—to close some of the gaping holes in the official 9/11 narrative, which blames the attacks on a vague “intelligence failure.”

Rossini is well placed to do just that. He’s been at the center of one of the enduring mysteries of 9/11: Why the CIA refused to share information with the FBI (or any other agency) about the arrival of at least two well-known Al-Qaeda operatives in the United States in 2000, even though the spy agency had been tracking them closely for years.

That the CIA did block him and Doug Miller, a fellow FBI agent assigned to the “Alec Station,” the cover name for CIA’s Osama bin Laden unit, from notifying bureau headquarters about the terrorists has been told before, most notably in a 2009 Nova documentary on PBS, “The Spy Factory.” Rossini and Miller related how they learned earlier from the CIA that one of the terrorists (and future hijacker), Khalid al-Mihdhar, had multi-entry visas on a Saudi passport to enter the United States. When Miller drafted a report for FBI headquarters, a CIA manager in the top-secret unit told him to hold off. Incredulous, Miller and Rossini had to back down. The station’s rules prohibited them from talking to anyone outside their top-secret group.

All these years later, Rossini still regrets complying with that command. If he had disobeyed the gag order, the nearly 3,000 Americans slaughtered on 9/11 would probably still be alive. “This is the pain that never escapes me, that haunts me each and every day of my life,” he wrote in the draft of a book he shared with me. “I feel like I failed, even though I know it was the system and the intelligence community on the whole that failed.”

‘I Finally Broke Down’

The various commissions and internal agency reviews that examined the “intelligence failure” of 9/11 blamed institutional habits and personal rivalries among CIA, FBI and National Security Agency (NSA) officials for preventing them from sharing information. Out of those reviews came the creation of a new directorate of national intelligence, which stripped the CIA of its coordinating authority. But blaming “the system” sidesteps the issue of why one CIA officer in particular, Michael Anne Casey, ordered Rossini’s cohort, Miller, not to alert the FBI about al-Mihdhar. Or why the CIA’s Alec Station bosses failed to alert the FBI—or any other law enforcement agency—about the arrival of Nawaf al-Hazmi, another key Al-Qaeda operative (and future hijacker) the agency had been tracking to and from a terrorist summit in Malaysia.

Because Casey remains undercover at the CIA, Rossini does not name her in his unfinished manuscript. But he wrote, “When I confronted this person...she told me that ‘this was not a matter for the FBI. The next al-Qaeda attack is going to happen in Southeast Asia and their visas for America are just a diversion. You are not to tell the FBI about it. When and if we want the FBI to know about it, we will.’”

Rossini recalled going to Miller’s cubicle right after his conversation with Casey. “He looked at me like I was speaking a foreign language.… We were both stunned and could not understand why the FBI was not going to be told about this.”

It remains a mystery. None of the post-9/11 investigating bodies were able to get to the bottom of it, in part because Rossini and Miller, who continued to work at Alec Station after the attacks, didn’t tell anyone what happened there. When congressional investigators came sniffing around, they kept their mouths shut.

“We were told not to say anything to them,” Rossini said. Who told you that? I asked. “The CIA. I can’t name names. It was just understood in the office that they were not to be trusted, that [the congressional investigators] were trying to pin this on someone, that they were trying to put someone in jail. They said [the investigators] weren’t authorized to know what was going on operationally.… When we were interviewed, the CIA had a person in the room, monitoring us.”

As a result, Rossini wasn’t interviewed by the subsequent 9/11 Commission, either. “Based on that interview, I guess the 9/11 Commission [which followed up the congressional probe] thought I didn’t have anything worthy to say.” He kept his secret, he said, from the Justice Department’s inspector general as well. “I was still in shock,” he added, and still fearful of violating Alec Station’s demand for omerta. Finally, when his own agency—the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)—came to him in late 2004, after the congressional probe and 9/11 Commission had issued their reports, he opened up.

===========================================

Edited by Steven Gaal

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The official story of 911 depends on the CIA and NSA......not reliable sources

**************************************************************************

Ron Wyden: "For years, officials of intelligence agencies like the NSA, as well as the Department of Justice, made misleading and outright inaccurate statements to Congress about data surveillance programs — not once, but repeatedly for over a decade." (CLICK LINK)

=

Hardly a week goes by without a new report of some massive data theft that has put financial information, trade secrets or government records into the hands of computer hackers.

##################################

When you put this information (from the post # 19 above)

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

NSA Lied About Knowledge Of 2 9/11 Hijackers In U.S., Didn't Inform The FBI
Posted by Jon Gold on Sat, 08/09/2014 - 4:11pm

By Jon Gold

8/9/2014

=====

see http://educationforu...=21401&p=290208

============================

with the info above NSA Lie ect with the information above the ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) line in said # 19 post above

THEN , I see intelligence agency collusion and foreknowledge.

AND BTW THE NSA INFO IS NEWER INFORMATION <NOT OLD as has been asserted assert.

The Inside Information That Could Have Stopped 9/11

--------------------------------------------------------------

Submitted by dtg86 on Thu, 01/22/2015 - 5:29pm
======================

Good confirmation of the presence of CIA Minders during commission interviews.

Rossini was a special case, he had worked in a top secret CIA station.

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Rossini was a special case, he had worked in a top secret CIA station.// COLBY

GAAL >> YES HE JUST DIDNT GO ALONG WITH THE OLD BOY NETWORK

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The Inside Information That Could Have Stopped 9/11

www.newsweek.com/.../information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.ht...

\l "

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:139SurfaFNMJ:www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

Jan 14, 2015 - Just before Christmas, former FBI special agent Mark Rossini greeted me with his usual good cheer when we met for drinks in a midtown ..

@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:AkAWuUPkDuYJ:www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp%3Fentity%3Dmark_rossini_1+&cd=11&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

Shortly Before October 1, 2008: FBI Denies Permission for Television Interview of Agents about Key Failure before 9/11

 

The FBI attempts to prevent two agents who were involved in a key pre-9/11 failure from talking about it in a television interview. The agents, Doug Miller and Mark Rossini, were on loan to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, before 9/11. They were involved in the deliberate blocking of a cable to the FBI saying that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar had a US visa (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000) and later, under pressure, falsely claimed not to remember anything about it when interviewed by the Justice Department’s inspector general (see (February 12, 2004)). The FBI allowed Miller and Rossini to be interviewed by author James Bamford for a book and they told him they helped block the cable on the orders of a female CIA officer known only as "Michael" and the station’s deputy chief, Tom Wilshire. However, when Bamford wants them to repeat their stories for a PBS documentary he is making, the FBI initially says yes, but then retracts its approval, saying the bureau "doesn’t want to stir up old conflicts with the CIA." [Congressional Quarterly, 10/1/2008] However, Rossini will actually appear in the documentary, although Miller will not. [PBS, 2/3/2009]

===================

The official story of 911 depends on the CIA and NSA......not reliable sources

**************************************************************************

Ron Wyden: "For years, officials of intelligence agencies like the NSA, as well as the Department of Justice, made misleading and outright inaccurate statements to Congress about data surveillance programs — not once, but repeatedly for over a decade." (CLICK LINK)

Edited by Steven Gaal

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We can not extrapolate that just because he had a CIA minder that other witnesses would as well.

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