Jump to content
The Education Forum
Jon G. Tidd

Was Oswald an Intelligence Agent?

Recommended Posts

It is a fake - a part of the previously exposed Crowley - Zipper Docs - not from the JFK Collection at the NARA - but cleverly crafted forgeries that stem back to Gregory Douglas and his bogus book "Regicide."

Its a disinformation ploy and not a simple scam.

BK

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Chuck Schwartz @ post #103:

In my opinion, that document is a fabrication. I say this for several reasons. Mostly because it gets certain things wrong.

As an analyst, "Oswald" would have had to examine material having a security classification higher than CONFIDENTIAL. That is the lowest security classification for an item.

Furthermore, contrary to popular belief, an individual does not have a graded security clearance. An individual who has been screened by C.I. operatives may be assigned to any one of a number of intelligence jobs. Depending on his or her job, he or she may have access to a exquisitely sensitive information that is held very tightly. The access depends on the individual's job and need to know. Not on some abstract determination the individual is allowed to see A, B, and C but not E.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Doug - the article is indeed interesting. In a nutshell, both Oswald and Atta took actions in the months preceding the major events they are both credited with performing that should have resulted in more intense scrutiny on the part of Intelligence, rather than less. But we know that Oswald (or an imposter) took very provocative actions in New Orleans and Mexico City especially that perversely resulted in a blackout of info on him and his removal by the FBI from an important watch list, exactly the opposite of what should have happened. It looks like the same thing occurred with Atta, though we don't have the benefit of 50 years of research. We do know in essence that the CIA failed to inform the FBI that a certain group of terrorist suspects they had under close watch in Malaysia (maybe Indonesia - might have this detail wrong) had entered the US in the months preceding 9/11. In both the JFK coup and the 9/11 attacks we have a kind of 'standing down' on the part of our intelligence branch protectors when the opposite was clearly called for. JFK was in danger, as the Chicago and Miami incidents show, and Al Qaida was a domestic terror threat, as NSC Rice was forced to admit to Congress.

Can we draw conclusions from this bizarre comparison? I sense this is uncomfortable territory here, but I am really curious what you all think. For me the two brazen acts committed in the full light of day (three if you count Ruby shooting Oswald, and of course 9/11 wasn't just one plane but 4) suggest something deeper, still hidden. If forced to say what that might be, I would suggest that the results of those acts suggest the reasons behind them: Increased military budgets and operations is the most obvious, and the sense of disempowerment and even acquiescence in the populace a deeper long lasting effect.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Doug - the article is indeed interesting. In a nutshell, both Oswald and Atta took actions in the months preceding the major events they are both credited with performing that should have resulted in more intense scrutiny on the part of Intelligence, rather than less. But we know that Oswald (or an imposter) took very provocative actions in New Orleans and Mexico City especially that perversely resulted in a blackout of info on him and his removal by the FBI from an important watch list, exactly the opposite of what should have happened. It looks like the same thing occurred with Atta, though we don't have the benefit of 50 years of research. We do know in essence that the CIA failed to inform the FBI that a certain group of terrorist suspects they had under close watch in Malaysia (maybe Indonesia - might have this detail wrong) had entered the US in the months preceding 9/11. In both the JFK coup and the 9/11 attacks we have a kind of 'standing down' on the part of our intelligence branch protectors when the opposite was clearly called for. JFK was in danger, as the Chicago and Miami incidents show, and Al Qaida was a domestic terror threat, as NSC Rice was forced to admit to Congress.

Can we draw conclusions from this bizarre comparison? I sense this is uncomfortable territory here, but I am really curious what you all think. For me the two brazen acts committed in the full light of day (three if you count Ruby shooting Oswald, and of course 9/11 wasn't just one plane but 4) suggest something deeper, still hidden. If forced to say what that might be, I would suggest that the results of those acts suggest the reasons behind them: Increased military budgets and operations is the most obvious, and the sense of disempowerment and even acquiescence in the populace a deeper long lasting effect.

incompetence or cover up ?? OPPS OPPS OPPS 911 sorry 911 sorry

=============

see http://www.historycommons.org/essay.jsp?article=essaykhalidandnawaf

Who Knew About the Meeting, and What Did They Do About It?

After the Kuala Lumpur meeting, the CIA was in possession of a substantial amount of incriminating evidence concerning the two future 9/11 hijackers. The CIA knew that Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi had ties to Osama bin Laden because they both had attended what the CIA considered “to be a gathering of al-Qaeda agents.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] And, as mentioned above, the agency was aware that Khalid Almihdhar “held a US B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa” and had made his travel arrangements to Malaysia through a Yemeni organization considered by the CIA to be a “logistical center” for al-Qaeda.

As the CIA later admitted, they should have put the names of Almihdhar and Alhazmi on a watch list at this time. The watch list, a database known as TIPOFF, currently consists of over 80,000 names, with about 2,000 new names being added every month. [Los Angeles Times, 9/22/02] Regulations require that the list is checked for visa applications or whenever someone enters or leaves the US (note that it is not checked for domestic flights). Officials are liable to be subject to criminal penalties if they fail to consult TIPOFF when required. The Congressional inquiry noted that “the threshold for adding a name to TIPOFF is low,” explaining that even a “reasonable suspicion” that a person is connected with a terrorist group, warrants the addition of the person’s name to the database. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] Why were Almihdhar and Alhazmi, whose names were reportedly important enough to have been mentioned to the CIA Director several times that January [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02], not added to the watch list?

National Security Agency (NSA) Director Michael Hayden later claimed, “In early 2000, at the time of the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, we had the Alhazmi brothers, Nawaf and Salem, as well as Khalid Almihdhar, in our sights. We knew of their association with al-Qaeda, and we shared this information with the [intelligence] community. I’ve looked at this closely.” [NSA Director Congressional Testimony, 10/17/02] However, according to a Congressional inquiry report, the NSA did not share this information with other US intelligence agencies even though “it was in the NSAs database.” Nor did the NSA itself submit the names to the TIPOFF database. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, AP, 9/26/2002]

The big question mark however lies with the FBI, who claims it was left out of the loop by the CIA. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director of the Congressional investigation into 9/11, reported: “A CIA communication in early January 2000 states that Almihdhar’s travel documents, including his multiple entry visa for the United States, were shared with the FBI for further investigation. No one at the FBI recalls having received such documents at the time. No confirmatory record of the transmittal of the travel documents has yet been located at either the CIA or the FBI.” There are details about e-mails by a CIA employee while the Malaysian meeting was still in progress claiming that he briefed two FBI agents about Almihdhar. But even if this in fact happened, the agent does not recall telling the FBI about Almihdhar’s multiple-entry visa. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02]

That the FBI was not provided with this information is significant because, had this intelligence been shared, it is very likely that the FBI would have added the two Saudis to the TIPOFF database.

====================

On to Southern California

On January 8, 2000, Alhazmi and Almihdhar flew from Malaysia seated together and on the same airplane as Khallad bin Atash, an important al-Qaeda terrorist. Presumably they flew to Thailand. The CIA learned this the next day, but did nothing with the information, and failed to follow them. [New York Times, 10/17/02, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]

On January 15, Alhazmi and Almihdhar flew from Bangkok, Thailand, to Los Angeles, California. [MSNBC, 12/11/01] According to Newsweek, the CIA tracked the flight into the US, but was aware only of Alhazmi being on the plane, not Almihdhar. But given their knowledge of the latter’s multiple-entry US visa, the agency must have conjectured that it was certainly possible that Almihdhar might also travel to the country. Yet, as the magazine noted, “astonishingly, the CIA did nothing with this information. Agency officials didn’t tell the INS, which could have turned them away at the border, nor did they notify the FBI, which could have covertly tracked them to find out their mission.” [Newsweek, 6/2/02] About two months later, the FBI claims the CIA learned that Almihdhar had also been on the flight (the CIA denies it), but again failed to do anything about it. [Michael Rolince Testimony, 9/20/02, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]

A March 5, 2000 cable sent to CIA headquarters concerning Alhazmi’s presence in the US was interestingly marked “Action Required: None.” The next day a different overseas CIA station noted that the cable had been “read with interest,”“particularly the information that a member of this group traveled to the US…”—but again the CIA did not act. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] The CIA Director maintains no one read the cable. [New York Times, 10/17/02] The Congressional inquiry noted that, “Although the individuals had already entered the United States, the sharing of this information with the FBI and appropriate law enforcement authorities could have prompted investigative efforts to locate these individuals and surveil their activities within the United States.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02]

Or Were They There Already?

For the most part, the media has consistently reported that Alhazmi and Almihdhar first moved to the United States in early 2000, and the FBI Director has recently concurred. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/02]. However, numerous other reports suggest otherwise; that the two Saudis had been in the US before, and in the case of Alhazmi, long before. Soon after the attacks, the Wall Street Journal cited public records that put Alhazmi in San Diego as early as 1996. [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] Another story, reported by the Associated Press, placed Alhazmi in Cody, Wyoming in the fall of 1999. Witnesses said he was one of two men making a truck delivery from Canada to a high school there and had asked for directions to Florida. They left a very memorable impression. [AP, 10/23/01, Las Vegas Review Journal, 10/26/01]

===

But certainly by November 1999, Alhazmi and Almihdhar were in San Diego. [Washington Post, 9/30/01, San Diego Channel 10, 10/5/01, Newsweek, 6/2/02] Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, they met a man by the name of Omar Al-Bayoumi, who offered to drive them to San Diego and help them get settled. He brought them to the Parkwood Apartments, a well-kept building in a middle-class suburban neighborhood, and even paid their first two months’ rent. (Al-Bayoumi is under investigation and it is still unclear if he acted as terrorist support or just a remarkably good Samaritan). [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02]

If the two Saudis were in the US prior to the January Malaysia meeting, then there should be immigration records documenting their entry—records that the CIA would have discovered as they were investigating Almihdhar between December 1999 and the January meeting. The two had a habit of doing everything openly in their own names: Where are their immigration, credit card, and other records from 1999? Was the CIA aware in January 2000 that they had already visited the US?

The early movements of these two take on greater importance with the recent revelation of an early 1999 NSA communications intercept “in which a ‘Nawaf Alhazmi’ was referenced.” [AP, 9/25/02] Significantly, the intercept was not mentioned in the Joint Staff Inquiry report published on September 20, 2002 but instead was leaked a few days later to the Associated Press. Unfortunately, the anonymous intelligence official who informed the news agency of the intercept disclosed no additional details. Notwithstanding, the revelation of this early 1999 intercept suggests the possibility that Alhazmi, and perhaps Almihdhar, were under some degree of surveillance by US intelligence before January 2000.

===

The Truth Must Come Out

The recent Congressional Intelligence Committee report on who knew what and when about Alhazmi and Almihdhar resembles more a whitewash than a true investigation. The FBI, CIA and others are taken at their word, even though they are known to have lied about this very issue in the past.

For instance, up until June 2002, the CIA maintained that it had not learned of Almihdhar’s connections to al-Qaeda or his visits to the US until August 2001. [New York Times, 6/3/02] But as is well-known now, these links had been established by US intelligence before the January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. If it had not been for leaks and the diligent work of investigative journalists, this information would never have made it to the public. Another example of their tendency to misrepresent the truth was made apparent when the FBI claimed it had begun “an aggressive, ‘full field’ investigation” immediately after the August 23 bulletin. But to the embarrassment of the FBI, it was discovered that the agency did not conduct even the simplest and most basic of searches, neglecting to check national databases of bank records, credit card records, and so on. [Newsweek, 6/2/02] The CIA and FBI’s inability to concur on whether or not the August 23 warning was labeled “immediate” is another case in point.

Another curious inconsistency is that the Congressional inquiry failed to mention that both Alhazmi and Almihdhar lived in California with FBI informant Abdussattar Shaikh from September until December 2000. The Congressional report stated that while Alhazmi had lived in the informant’s home until December, “official records have Almihdhar leaving the US on June 10, 2000, and not returning until July 4, 2001.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] But this is in complete contradiction to all previous media reports, the accounts from neighbors, and quotes from Abdussattar Shaikh himself! [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01, Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01, San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/16/01, Newsweek, 9/9/02] There is a similar unwillingness to admit that Hanjour was in the US in the year 2000 before December, again because that would contradict immigration records. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] With actions like this, the investigation is further obscuring the truth, not uncovering it.

The Congressional committee, the mainstream media, and major US officials have all repeatedly stated that there was no “smoking gun”—no single thing they could have done differently to stop the attacks. For instance, on June 7, 2002, President Bush purported, “Based on everything I’ve seen, I do not believe anyone could have prevented the horror of September the 11th.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 6/8/02] This is clearly wrong. Alhazmi and Almihdhar were the smoking gun—many times over. The Wall Street Journal claimed that even if the FBI knew the two had entered the US early on, “more-vigilant law enforcement is unlikely to have caught all of them.” Then they alleged, “it’s difficult to imagine how to prevent [terrorists] from operating here in the future without making the nation less free, less open and less tolerant of outsiders.” [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] But with what we now know of the connections between Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the other hijackers, it is clear all of them could have been caught, as FBI agents themselves have conceded. The gross failures and even crimes of intelligence officials should not be used as an excuse to destroy our freedoms.

Questions, Questions

The most serious questions have not even been asked by the Congressional committee. What does FBI informant Abdussattar Shaikh really know? Why does he contradict neighbors’ claims that Mohamed Atta was a frequent visitor to his house? Who do phone records show Alhazmi and Almihdhar called so frequently? Was there a deliberate sabotage of John O’Neill’s investigation in Yemen? Why did the CIA fail to share information on Alhazmi and Almihdhar? Why were even well known, top level terrorists like Khallad bin Atash not put on watch lists, much less investigated? Could the meetings in late night limousines have been the communication link between the hijackers and some group outside of al-Qaeda? Do we really know the true identities of the hijackers? Why can’t we see the video footage of them passing through airport security? Why does the FBI still use a photo of an innocent man for Salem Alhazmi? Is there any reason to believe Khalid Almihdhar is still alive?

Most importantly, at what point do incompetence and bureaucratic barriers cease to be reasonable explanations for so many failures surrounding Alhazmi and Almihdhar? Could the US government have been protecting these two for some reason? When will investigators and the media start asking these difficult questions?

=======================

incompetence or cover up ?? OPPS OPPS OPPS 911 sorry 911 sorry opps were incompetent not evil no we are not evil .....TRUST US ..... opps sorry 911 sooooooooooooooo sorry trust us trust us .....you are getting sleepy very very sleepy your eyelids are getting heavy sooooo heavy ...... trust us trust us

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

NSA Lied About Knowledge Of 2 9/11 Hijackers In U.S., Didn't Inform The FBI
Posted by Jon Gold on Sat, 08/09/2014 - 4:11pm

By Jon Gold

8/9/2014

=====

see http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=21401&p=290208

you are getting sleepy very very sleepy your eyelids are getting heavy sooooo heavy

Edited by Steven Gaal

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Paul:

In answer to your question, my opinion is that both the JFK assassination and 9/11 were carefully planned conspiracies, several years in the making. The roles to be played by Oswald and Atta were key in the planning by the ultimate conspirators although it remains unclear the degree to which these two individuals were privy to the roles planned for them.

Doug

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Military - yes - as was double-agent Ali Mohamid and were others who fit the COP - Covert Operational Personality profile - Frank Sturgis was run by AF Attache at US Embassy in Havana, not CIA.

deMorn's contacts were with US Army Reserve intelligence - not CIA,

The CIA is often a scapegoat for the covert actions of other agencies - especially military.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Military - yes - as was double-agent Ali Mohamid and were others who fit the COP - Covert Operational Personality profile - Frank Sturgis was run by AF Attache at US Embassy in Havana, not CIA.

deMorn's contacts were with US Army Reserve intelligence - not CIA,

The CIA is often a scapegoat for the covert actions of other agencies - especially military.

So Atta was a volunteer suicidal military operative.

Or maybe he was drafted, and they told him "If you don't do this, were're gonna kill ya."

LOL

--Tommy :sun

Edited by Thomas Graves

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Does he look like he needed convincing? Military carriage and dead-black junkie's eyes.

He's no disaffected Urban Planning student. If he weren't military he wouldn't be in operational command of the cell.

Edited by David Andrews

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Atta took part (and coordinated) in the murder of over 2000 Americans. LHO did not murder anyone- he was set to take the fall for the real murderers.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Atta and "Oswald" shared one thing in common: they were incompetent to commit the crimes they are alleged to have committed.

Oswald was a mediocre shot with a superior rifle, the M-1. His alleged murder weapon had a worn and rusted barrel, a nearly inoperable bolt, and a mis-aligned scope. A huge step down from a USMC M-1. Atta couldn't fly a big Boeing jet.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

If Oswald was being used as an agent by some intelligence agency, his actions to an outside observer would not appear to be unusual for him. His actions would be in keeping with the pattern he had established. That way, nothing would easily catch the eye of a counter-intelligence operative.

What catches my eye -- I was trained as an army counter-intel officer during the Viet Nam war -- is his fluency in Russian. How did a poor, relatively uneducated kid who moved around, acquire such fluency? The fluency needs explaining.

I know, because I was trained in a language at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), that he didn't teach himself to speak and read Russian. You don't learn a language, especially a Level 5 (on a scale of 5) language like Russian, that way. It's impossible, unless you're a baby learning from your parents (or others) how to talk. In that situation, the learning is effortless. As an adult, one becomes a fluent speaker in another language only by listening and speaking to a speaker of that language.

When I was at DLI in 1970, the teachers were native speakers. The instruction was methodical and rigorous. Russian, one of the many languages taught at DLI, was a 47-week course. That's 5 days a week, 6 hours per day, another 2 hours at night, for 47 weeks. No way Oswald received such instruction. Just no way.

So as a counter-intel officer I would ask, how did he gain fluency, even with a Baltic accent? The only explanation is that he was a native speaker; that he learned to speak Russian as a baby; that he acquired written knowledge of Russian somehow and somewhere along the line, likely beginning in childhood.

Now as a counter-intel officer I'd ask, why did Oswald never admit he learned Russian from birth? Why did he keep this fact secret. Why did he lie about how he acquired facility with the Russian language? Big red flag here. Something important here.

Next, if it were 1963 and I was trying to figure out Oswald, I'd take a look at his defection to Russia. That might make sense to me. A speaker of a language naturally wants to be among people and in a culture where the language is spoken. It wouldn't puzzle me that he'd taken up with a Russian woman. Nor would it puzzle me that he didn't give up his U.S. citizenship. All of this would make sense to me.

If I somehow knew, as John Armstrong learned years later, that Oswald didn't go around speaking Russian in the Soviet Union but did converse with Marina in Russian, I would have wanted to know why. Was he some sort of controlling person? Was he encouraged by Russians to get along in English? Maybe so that they could sharpen their English speaking skills. Was there some extrinsic reason? Another red flag here, but not as big a flag.

Next, I'd want to check out his family situation and talk with some of the people who knew him. Standard counter-intel stuff. Here's where I'd get a shock: none of his family spoke Russian. Uh, oh. That big red flag has just become the overriding matter in my investigation of Oswald. Something's seriously incongruent. That's a signal Oswald is being used by some intelligence agency, His cover's just been blown.

More to come if readers here want more of the story.

Edited by Peter McGuire

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

We know of a number of official CI investigations of Oswald, one after the assassination by USMC and two others by ONI, one after defection and the other after the assassination, with the USMC report concluding Oswald was not capable of killing JFK alone.

We have recorded interviews with ONI investigators who wrote the reports - reports not among the JFK collection but records the NARA doesn't even recognize are missing so they aren' looking for them.

Oswald's language ability is only one of a number of attributes that identifies him as fitting the Covert Operational Profile (COP) that designates him as an intelligence operative.

Others include his military training, use of Post Office boxes, alias, an apartment apart from his family and intelligence trade craft.

But as the designated Patsy- Oswald had a limited role in the actual assassination

BK

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Please sign in to comment

You will be able to leave a comment after signing in



Sign In Now

×