Michael Clark Posted March 31, 2018 Author Share Posted March 31, 2018 (edited) 22 November 1963 http://studylib.net/doc/8858696/november-22--1963--friday- Edited June 2, 2018 by Michael Clark Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted April 1, 2018 Author Share Posted April 1, 2018 (edited) Edited April 13, 2018 by Michael Clark Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
John Kowalski Posted May 1, 2018 Share Posted May 1, 2018 Michael: Just began reading this thread. Really enjoy reading all the original source material. It's a really good idea. John Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted May 2, 2018 Author Share Posted May 2, 2018 On 5/1/2018 at 10:58 AM, John Kowalski said: Michael: Just began reading this thread. Really enjoy reading all the original source material. It's a really good idea. John I am glad you see some usefulness in it. Feel free to reserve some posting space so you can edit-in items of interest as you come across them. This thread is for anyone to use. Cheers, Michael Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
John Kowalski Posted May 3, 2018 Share Posted May 3, 2018 Here are some files I found on the McClaughry's Blog. Declassified CIA Documents: https://mikemcclaughry.wordpress.com/the-reading-library/cia-declassified-document-library/ Number 29 on the list is the Director's Log, from 1951. It is a report of events occurring in different countries that are of interest to the CIA director such as propaganda, Otto Skorzeny and the Korean war. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Paz Marverde Posted May 4, 2018 Share Posted May 4, 2018 On 3/31/2018 at 5:04 AM, Michael Clark said: Reserved ? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted May 7, 2018 Author Share Posted May 7, 2018 (edited) Test @Michael Clark Edited June 30, 2018 by Michael Clark Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted May 18, 2018 Author Share Posted May 18, 2018 (edited) Disarmament initiative document, Fall of 1963 "Treaty" proposed? https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626311.pdf ------------------------ JCSM's referenced https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626317.pdf JCSM-685-63 3 September, 63. U-USSR Negotiations on the Establishment of Observation Posts https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626318.pdf --------------------------------- "A New Disarmament Strategy: Table of contents" The "tabs" listed below in this post are indicated in this table. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626309.pdf "Tab B: Definitions" https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626312.pdf "Tab C Soviet Views, Public and Private" https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626313.pdf "Tab D Economic Impact" https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626314.pdf "Tab H: Inspection" https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626316.pdf ---------------------------------- "Possible Strategy Toward France" Undated https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626315.pdf ------------------------- 44 page doc. October 1, 1963: "Considerations Involved in a Separable First Stage Disarmament Agreement". https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626321.pdf --------------------------- October 29, 1963: "Chemical and Biological Weapons" https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626322.pdf September 11, 1963: "Biological Warfare Ban; Campaign Against Biological Disease" https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32626324.pdf Edited June 2, 2018 by Michael Clark Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted May 18, 2018 Author Share Posted May 18, 2018 Playing with my iPad voice response function for translating documents. Using the split screen function is handy. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/157-10011-10019.pdf In to discuss what Harvey reviews to as an executive action capability i.e. a general standby capability to carry out assassinations when required. Harvey's notes "Bissell as saying "the White House has twice urged me to create such a capability" "Bissell Recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability with Harvey. Then there is further discussion the of dates, but not of substance, and at the bottom of the page the substance continues as follows: "After some discussion of the problems involved in developing an executive action capability, Bissell placed Harvey in charge of the effort. Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with "now we have some blank out here in hardcopy" Are they not names which we have already seen? Mr. Breckenridge. You have seen those names – you have seen one of them I am not sure you have seen the other. Send me your swagger. In view of the fact that we use this as the point, would you furnish us with that? Otherwise we can't very well understand the statement without those two names. Mr. Breckenridge. Yes. Let me give you those names. I have given you one of those names as someone we interviewed. And we didn't give it in this context. The names of the two people are Arnold silver and Sidney Gottlieb. Mr.Schwartz . And Mr. Gottlibb was a person who work in the technical service division, was he? mr. Breckenridge. Yes. Mr. Swarts. And he was the kind of person who made exploding cigars and poison and syringe is and that sort of thing? mr. Breckenridge. That organization could do this sort of thing. The next one is, since silver was already cut in. mr. Schwartz. What was silver is function? mr. Breckenridge. Silver with silver was at this time I don't recall silver is a man who is primarily a case officer in the European area. Here earlier recruited an asset, an agent, who came to be considered for use in the lumumba instance Mr. Schwartz. Was that the person we already have on the record called QJ WINN? mr. Swarts. And that recruiting had taken place sometime in 1960, is that right? mr. Breckenridge. The exact place I don't recall now. QJ win was recruited separately from this later activity. So he was someone that already existed. mr. Bader. Excuse me. mr. Breckenridge. At one time he was. He spent many years in Europe. And it was because of his service there that...... page break p. 76 missing since silver was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing executive capability, although never with respect to Castro. and then after that: we did not question silver on his knowledge. mr. Breckenridge. No, we did not question gottlied. Mr. Swarts. Where is Mr. Gottlieb today? mr. Breckenridge. He is retired and I understand he is living overseas. Mr. Swarts. Is he living in India today? Mr. Breckenridge. I am not sure whether it is India or Africa. mr. Swarts. Going along, there is a notation by blank that Harvey instructed blank to discuss techniques with blank without associating the discussion with the Castro operation. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted May 18, 2018 Author Share Posted May 18, 2018 (edited) Wesley J. Liebler September 6, 1964 Memorandum re the galley proofs of chapter 4 of the report. I set forth below comments on the galley proofs of chapter 4 of the report, a report of which I obtained from Mr. Reidlich on September 4, 1964. Other comments and suggestions are set forth in the margin of the galley itself. Purchase of the rifle by Oswald 1. On galley page 30, query if the name hi Dell was stamped on the membership application blanks of the New Orleans branch FPCC. 2. The text near the top of page 30 gives the impression that the name Hydell was stamped on all of the New Orleans chapters printed literature. It was not. Oswald stamped his own name on some of it. Oswald palm print on the rifle barrel 1. Wary if the palm print provides additional evidence of ownership of the rifle as is stated. The most it does is show that Oswald had possession of the rifle at sometime it does not show that he owned it. 2. Second paragraph states that Lieutenant Day determined the wooden stock was too rough to take prints "from visual examination". Day does not say that in his testimony. While it is a minor point he just said that he noted it was too rough. For all I know he may have reached that conclusion by feeling the stock. 3. It may be noted hear that the conclusion for the section on rifle ownership, that appears on Callie page 32, states that the presence of the palm print on the rifle so is that Oswald "had disassembled it". That conclusion is not warranted from the existence of the palm print on the rifle. The conclusion that Oswald handled the rifle while it was disassembled is justified. 4. The palm print section must be changed to reflect the latest findings of the FBI that the palmprint had to have been lifted from the barrel because of the marks that appear on the lift that correspond to those on the rifle barrel itself. Fibers on the rifle 1.I think this section is written a little too strongly considering directly record. For example, there is no footnote after the statement that the commission found no credible evidence that Oswald used the rifle between September 23 and the assassination. Furthermore, even if he did not "use" it he might very well have handled it at some point during that period. Also, Stombaugh was not able to estimate the period of time within which the fibers were placed on the rifle, but much of the language in the section is designed to bring one to the conclusion that they were put there on the day of the assassination, even though that is not said. 2. In the last sentence of the section, it is not the commissions conclusion that provides proof, it is the fact that the fibers most probably came from Oswald's shirt. Also, does that show that he "owned" the rifle, or just that he or someone that wore the shirt had handled the rifle at sometime? Photograph of Oswald with rifle 1. It is interesting to note that the conclusion to the ownership section, on page 32, states that "a photograph taken in the yard of Oswald's apartment showed him holding this rifle". That statement appears in the conclusion in spite of the fact that Shaneyfelt specifically testified that he could not make a positive identification of the rifle that Oswald was holding in the picture and in spite of the fact that the commission was not able to conclude, In the discussion of this subject on page 31, that Oswald was holding the assassination weapon in the picture. Rifle among Oswald's possessions 1. I do not believe there is any real authority for the proposition that Oswald cited through the telescope site on the porch in New Orleans. Marina Oswald first said she did not know what he did with the rifle out on the porch and then was led into a statement which might be thought to support the instant proposition. It is not very convincing. 2. On the top of page 32 it is stated that Ruth and Michael Payne "both noticed the rolled up blanket in the garage throughout the time that marina Oswald was living in their home". I am sure the record will not support that statement, a rather important one, too. I recall that there was a period of time before the assassination that neither of them saw the blanket. I have always had the opinion that there was a gap in the proof as to the rifle being continuously in the garage, one that probably could not be filled. It cannot be filled by ignoring it. The conclusion is even worse when it states that "The rifle was being kept among Oswald's possessions from the time of its purchase until the day of the assassination. I do not think the record provides any real evidence to support that broad statement. The fact is that not one person alive today ever saw that rifle in the pain garage in such a way that it could be identified as that rifle. The curtain rod story 1. The report states that Fraser was surprised when Oswald asked for a ride on November 21, 1963. I am not able to find anything in the record to support that statement. 2. The last paragraph of this section is miss leading when it at times to show the falsity of the curtain rod story by stating that Oswald's room at 102 six N. Beckley had curtains, and does not take account of the fact that Fraser specifically testified that Oswald said he wanted the curtain rods to put in an apartment. This takes an added significance when we remember that Oswald was talking about renting an apartment so that his family could live in Dallas with him. That aspect of the problem should be specifically treated if we are going to mention the fact that his rooming house had curtains. The long and bulky package 1. The last sentence states: "Fraser could easily have been mistaken when he stated that Oswald held the bottom of the bag cupped in his hand, or when he stated that the upper end was tucked under the armpit." On the very next page of the galleys, in the discussion of the Prince that appear on the paper bag, it is stated that the palm print was "found on the closed and of the bag. It was from Oswald's right hand in which he carried the long package as he walked from Fraser's car to the building." I am advised that the palm print is right on the end of the bag, just where it would be if Oswald had carried it cupped in his hand. If we say in the discussion of prints that that print was put on the bag when he carried it into the TSBD (which we don't quite do)'and if the print is where it would be if he carried it kept in his hand, then we must face up on the preceding page and admit that Fraser was right when he said that that is the way Oswald carried it. If the print story is right and the implication left there as to when the print was put on the bag is valid, Fraser could not have been mistaken when he said Oswald carried the bottom of the bag cupped in his hand. Scientific evidence linking rifle and Oswald to the paper bag 1. The section on fibers in the bag is very thin. The most that can be said is that there was a possibility that the fibers came from the blanket. The FBI expert would not even state that such was possible. conclusion 1. I am at a loss to know why the fact that Oswald apparently failed to turn out Ruth Paine's garage light is mentioned in the conclusion. Palm prints and fingerprints on cartons and paper bag 1. The problem of all the identified prints has already been discussed. The FBI has been requested to conduct additional investigation to attempt to identify those prints. The results of that investigation must be incorporated in the report. 2. This section emphasized the freshness of one palm print on one carton. That palmprint was the only one of 28 prints that could be developed by powder as opposed to a chemical process. As a result it was held to have been placed on the carton recently, within from 1 to 3 days prior to the time it was developed. The inference may be drawn from the present language of this section that all of the other prints, which could be developed only through a chemical process because the cartons had already absorb them, must have been older than the palm print. Thus, it could be argued that Oswald's other prints had to have been placed on the cartons at least a day before they were developed and perhaps as much is three days before. While there may be some reason within the realm of fingerprint technology why that is not so, it does not appear in the report. Under those circumstances the presence of Oswald's other prints, which must be treated pari passu with the prints of others on these cartons, seems to have very little significance indeed. This relates to the prints on one of the rolling readers cartons near the window, the existence of which is emphasized by stating that they "take on added significance" because of the work being done on the six floor. The report also states that the commission placed great weight on the fingerprint and palm print identifications. I don't think we should say that in any event. We certainly should not until we deal with the problem of the apparent age of Oswald's other prints and the presence of all those on identified prints. 3. The report states that it is "significant that none of the prints on the cartons should be identified as the prince of a warehouse employee." It also states that those employees "like Oswald, might have handled the cartons" presumably in the ordinary course of business. It is significant. But not necessarily to the point that the report tries to make. The fact that only Oswald's prints appear on the cartons could show that he was the soul warehouse employee that handled them in the ordinary course of business. The fact that Oswald was the only employee whose prints appeared on the cartons does not help to convince me that he moved them in connection with the assassination. It shows the opposite just as well. 4. It is also difficult to tell just what happened to all of the cartons or who developed what prints. While it appears that all four cartons were forwarded to the FBI, some confusion is created by the later statement that the right palm print on the box on the floor next to the three near the window was also sent to the FBI. Why was that necessary if the carton had already been sent? The use of the passive voice in the second sentence of the second full paragraph on page 35 of the galleys leaves open the question of who developed the prints. Eyewitness identification of assassin. 1. There is a duplication of a long quote from Brennon's testimony that also appears at page 15 of the galleys, the first page of chapter 3. It does not seem to be needed in both places. If left the way it is, the form as to omitted material should be standardized. 2. Following that "it says that Brandon's description most probably lead to the radio alert sent out to please in which the assassin was described. Can't this be more definite? One of the questions that has been raised is the speed with which the assassin was described, the implication being that Oswald had been picked out as a patsy before the event. The Dallas police must know what led to the radio alert in the description. If they do we should be able to find out. If they do not know, the circumstances of their not knowing should be discussed briefly. 3. On page 36 it says that at 1:29 PM the police radio reported that the description of the suspect in the Tippitn shooting was similar to the description which had been given by Brennan in connection with the assassination. On page 46 it is stated that it was unlikely that any officer said anything like "kill the president, will you?" The reason given is that the officers did not know "that Oswald was a suspect in the killing of the President". But they very likely had heard the police Radio note that the description of the two were similar and may have been drawn their own conclusions. The statement on page 46 should be taken out or qualified . 4. There should be a picture of the inside of the TSBD 6th floor showing the low windows sills and a reference to that picture in connection with the discussion of Brennan's testimony that he saw the man standing. 5. Where we if we need such a long paragraph and Eunis' testimony merely to conclude that it is inconclusive as to the identity of the man in the window. 6. In the last sentence of the second to the last paragraph in the section it says that Altgen's picture was taken about two seconds "after the shot which entered the back of the presidents neck". We should say after that shot was fired or heard or something. The sentence is not a good one as it now stands. Oswald's actions in building after assassination. 1. I do not think the description of the baker Oswald sequence is sufficiently clear. I am confused as to how many entrance doors there are to the vestibule, even though after a close reading there appeared to be only two, the one connecting to the second floor landing and the one connecting to the lunch room. It is also not clear whether baker saw Oswald through the window in the vestibule landing door, or whether that door was still open as is implied by Baker's testimony. Mention of the window previously, however, implies Baker saw Oswald through the window. It does not seem likely that Oswald would still have been visible through the window if the door had already closed, although that depends on how far the door closes, which is something I would like to know. What kind of a stairway is it that someone coming up can't see nothing at the top of the landing? Truly may in fact have seen Oswald if the latter had just come down the stairs from the third floor has truly was coming up on the second. I think additional effort should be made with the writing and a picture of the view coming up to the second floor and a diagram or other pictures of the landing and vestibule area would be a good idea. 2. The first sentence in the third from the last paragraph on galley page 38 leaves a false inference concerning Oswald's presence on the sixth floor. It should be rewritten along the following lines: "Thebfact that Oswald could not have come down in the elevators, the only other possible means of dissent, is shown by their movements after the time Baker and Truly tried to use them to go up in the building." 3. In the same paragraph, the statement that both elevators occupy the same shaft is not clear. It would be better to say: "both elevators, which operate adjacently in the same shaft," 4. Last paragraph on page 38 galley: the testimony of the employees as set forth in that paragraph is also consistent with Oswald having been in Ethiopia at the time of the assassination or with his having used the elevators to get down from the six floor. Since those employees did not see either Oswald or Dougherty, their testimony says nothing on the point under discussion. The whole paragraph should be cut. 5. The next two paragraphs, the first two on galley page 39, or a complete mystery to me. When I left the bottom of page 38 I was looking for additional testimony showing that Oswald came down the stairs and not the elevator. After two paragraphs of excellent analysis I am convinced that at Victoria Adams either came down the stairs before or after as well did and it is clear that that is so because we know that Oswald came down the stairs and not the elevators. I still do not understand, however, how the fact that Victoria Adams came down the stairs before or after Oswald did shows that Oswald came down the stairs. If the idea is to show that Adams was not on the stairway when Oswald was, I am not convinced by the analysis or speculation in these two paragraphs. Furthermore, if that is the idea that it is not clearly set forth. How about a first sentence like: "Victoria Adams testified that she came down the stairway, within about one minute after the shots, from the fourth floor to the first floor where is he encountered to depository employees bill Shelly and bill love lady. If Miss Adams was on the stairway at that time, The question is raised as to why she did not see Oswald......" 6. In the conclusion: I do not see how the commission can possibly stay that "fingerprint and palmprint evidence establishes that Oswald arranged the cartons in the window." That evidence establishes that at some time Oswald handled one of the three cartons in the window, as suggested above, probably prior to the assassination by at least 1 to 3 days. That evidence establishes with equal validity that perhaps about 20 other persons "arranged the curtains in the window." Oswald's movements after leaving the depository building 1. The description of Oswald's bus ride sequence is very confusing and holy unable to stand by itself without a map. Even if we include a map, which I assume we will, the text should be clear enough to stand by itself. The basic problem is that there is no indication of the relationship of various intersections to each other, it should be simple enough to set forth the relationships between Saint Paul and Elm, Field and Elm and Poydras and Lamar. 2. There also seems to be a mistake in description of directions. I don't see how Oswald could walk west on Elm and board a bus heading back in the direction of the Depository and which was also traveling west. Somebody had to have gone east. (Oswald) 3. The second to the last full paragraph on galley page 40 is not very clear as to what all those buses actually do and what they are supposed to do. I have set forth suggested clarifying changes in the margin of the galley. 4. On galley page 41 the terms lineup and show up are used interchangeably. It should be one or the other throughout. I have always thought it was lineup. 5. There are direct quotes in the first paragraph on galley page 42 for which there are no footnotes. It is my understanding that there are to be footnotes for each direct quote and that there is to be uniformity on this point throughout the report. Description of the shooting 1. References here to what the Dallas police radio ordered Tippit to do should be qualified to indicate that a transcript of the recording of the radio communications indicates the material being set forth. This should be done at least until we have cleared up the problems with the transcript and recordings, if we have not already done so. 2. There are no footnotes at all in the last paragraph of this section. Eyewitnisses 1. There is more confusion between lineups and show up at the top of galley page 43. 2. As to any attempt to explain Mrs. Markham's description (so called) of Oswald as having bushy hair by showing the world a picture of Oswald "taken at the time of the arrest:" I suggest that even the slowest of readers would imagine that their hair might be in an uncombed state – which is the suggested explanation of the bushy condition – after they had fought with a dozen policeman in an attempt to resist arrest. In fact Pizzo Exhibit 453 – C, the evidence for this proposition, shows Oswald with cuts and bruises on his face. I don't think Mrs. Markham's testimony needs much comment and neither does her statement to Lane. Any attempt, such as is presently in the report will merely play into lanes hands and make the commission look naïve. 3. Query statement that Markhams identification was mostly from his face. I think she was all over the lot on that one. Murder weapon 1. Why don't we take a sentence or two and explain why the bullets fired from the revolver or smaller than the barrel there is no way to tell from the report now and an obvious question is raised as to why. 2. There is an unclear sentence in the middle of the third paragraph of this heading which states: "Alec the bullets were mutilated." Which ones? 3. The paragraph dealing with the number of shots fired and the manufacture of the cases and the slugs seems to me to be an exercise in pedantry, and possibly subject to error. Is it not possible that a Winchester western slug could have been fired from a Remington Peter's case? Even if not, why leave ourselves open to question when it does not really matter how many shots were fired, as between four or five. 4. The last paragraph of this heading need some footnote, either in or out. Ownership of the revolver 1. The first sentence refers to "this type of revolver." I think it would be better to say the "type of revolver that was used to kill Patrolman Tippit." Oswald's jacket 1. The second paragraph of this heading needs some footnotes. 2. There are inconsistencies in the description of commission Exhibit 162. The same problem occurred above, when an exhibit was described sometimes as "exhibit ______" and at other times as "Comission Exhibit ______". A little thing but why not do it right? 3. The conclusion to this heading reaches the crushing result that Oswald disposed of his jacket as he fled from the scene of the typical killing. I submit that that is really not the conclusion we work toward. Why not: "Those facts strongly support the finding that it was Lee Harvey Oswald who killed Patrolman Tippit and then fled through the parking lot adjoining Jefferson Boulevard, disposing of his jacket as he did so." Oswald's arrest 1. At first I was surprised to learn that Johnny Calvin Brewer knew that a patrolman had been shot one Oswald walked by his place of business, less than eight blocks from the point of the typical killing which Oswald apparently left as fast as he could. 2. Then I was surprised to learn that the police radio did not send out information about the sunset back being in the Texas theater until 145, about 30 minutes after the police first learned of the typical killing from Benevides over tippets radio. What were Oswald and Brewer doing during this 30 minutes? Oswald was strangely in active during this period, considering all that he had done in the 45 minutes following the assassination. 3. Well I know that I will be thought mad to suggest that some editing be done on this chapter, consider the following sentence that appears on gallery page 46: "As Oswald, handcuffed, was lead from the theater, he was, according to McDonald, cursing a little bit and hollering police brutality." There are only five commas is in that sentence. How about: "McDonald testified that Oswald was cursing a little bit and hollering "police brutality" as he was the lead hand carved from the theater." 4. Here compare the note above concerning page 36 that the police radio had noted the similarity of the descriptions between the man wanted for the assassination and the man wanted for the tip at killing, by the time Oswald was arrested at the theater. It could be, therefore, that some of the officers suspected that the man they were arresting was wanted in connection with the assassination. statements of Oswald during detention 1. There are entirely too many subheadings under this general heading. None are really necessary. We reach the sublime when we have one hole heading for one short, for sentence paragraph. They should all be cut out and the whole discussion comprehended under the above general title. 2. In the paragraph on denial of rifle ownership appears the statement "small bore .22 rifle." That is redundant, since I presume we do not mean to distinguish from large bore 22 rifles. It should probably just read "22 caliber rifle." 3. The second to last sentence in that paragraph needs a footnote. Shooting of Major General Edwin A. Walker 1. There is no footnote after the sentence concerning the 15-year-old boy who saw two men leave the area. 2. Same after the statement that a friend of Walker gave information to the police about the two men snooping around. Also that statement is not correct. Walker gave the information to the police. 3. No footnote after statement regarding results of private investigation. 4. No footnote after statement that the note was in the "Book of Useful Advice." 5. The second full paragraph on page 48 assumes a lot of knowledge about Oswald's movements and about the pains that the reader had not gotten anywhere yet, except in the first chapter narrative. A few extra words as suggested in the margin of the galley might improve things considerably. Furthermore, the first sentence needs a footnote, as does the entire next paragraph, which has not one footnote to its name. 6. In the paragraph on photographs, a footnote is needed after the first sentence. The second sentence must be changed because at present it implies that Oswald told Marina about the notebook or rather showed it to her when he returned the night after the attack. She stated in her testimony in July and she did not see what was in the notebook until three days after the attack and there is nothing in her early testimony that I know about to support the proposition now in this report. 7. Statement that Oswald apparently destroyed the notebook should be changed in order to reflect fact that he did destroy it, and at the suggestion of his wife. 8. Second to last sentence in photographs section must be changed to indicate that Oswald did not bury his rifle in some bushes, but rather that he may have hidden it there. 9. Query usage of "ballistics" in first paragraph of "firearms identification" section. Same as to last paragraph thereof. 10. Under "Corroboration by Marina Oswald" we learn for the first time about a postponement of the attempt to kill Walker. There is no mention of from when, what the circumstances of the postponement were, what happened to the rifle in the meantime, etc. it should be set forth, since there is no mention of it above, as I recall. Oswald's rifle capability 1. The purpose of this section is to determine Oswald's ability to fire a rifle. The third word at the top of page 50 of the galleys, which is apparently meant to describe Oswald, is marksman. A marksman is one school that shooting at a Mark; one who shoots well. Not only do we beg the question a little but the sentence is in exact in that the shot, which it describes, would be the same for a marksman as it would be for one who is not a marksman. How about: "The assassins shots from the easternmost window of the southside of the Texas school book depository were at a slow-moving target proceeding on a downgrade virtually straight away from the assassin, at a range of 177 to 266 feet." 2. The last sentence in the first paragraph on galley page 50 should indicate that the slope of Elm Street is downward. 3. The section on the nature of the shots deals basically with the range and the effect of a telescopic site. Several experts conclude that the shots were easy. There is, however, no consideration given here to the time allowed for the shots. I do not see how someone can conclude that he sat is easy or hard unless he knows something about how long the firer had to shoot, i.e., how much time is allotted for the shots. 4. On nature of the shots – freezer testify that one would have no difficulty and hitting a target with a telescopic site, since all you have to do is put this crosshairs on the target. On page 51 of the galleys, however, he testified that shots fired by FBI agents with the assassination weapon were "a few inches high and to the right of the target because of a defect of the scope." Apparently no one knows when that defect appeared, or if it was in the scope at the time of the assassination. If it was and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary one may assume that it was, putting the crosshairs on the target would clearly have resulted in a mess, or very late lately would, in any event. I have raise this question before. There is a great deal of testimony in the record that a telescopic sight is a sensitive proposition. You can't leave a rifle and scope lying around in the garage under foot for almost 3 months, just haven't brought it back from New Orleans in the back of the station wagon, and expect to hit anything with it, unless you take the trouble to fire it and site the scope in. This would have been a problem that should have been dealt with in any event, and now that it turns out that there actually was a defect in the scope, it is perfectly clear that the question must be considered. The present draft leaves the commission open to severe criticism. Furthermore, to the extent that it leaves testimony suggesting that the shots might not have been so easy out of the discussion, thereby giving only a part of the story, it is simply dishonest. 5. Why do we have a statement concerning the fact that Oswald's marine records show that he was familiar with the Browning automatic rifle, 45 caliber pistol and 12 gauge riot gun? That is completely irrelevant to the question of his ability to fire a rifle, unless there is evidence that the same skills are involved. It is, furthermore, prejudicial to some extent. 6. Under the heading as well as rifle practice outside the Marines we have a statement concerning his activities in Russia. It says that he joined a hunting club, obtained license and went hunting about six times. It does not say what kind of weapon he used. While I am not completely familiar with the record on this point, I do know for a fact that there is some indication that he used his shotgun. Under what theory do we include activities concerning a shotgun under a heading related to rifle practice, and then presume not to advise the reader of that fact? 7. The statements concerning Oswald's practice with the assassination weapon or miss leading.they tend to give the impression that he did more practicing in the record suggest that he did. My recollection is that there is only one specific time when he might have practiced. We should be more precise in this area, because the commission is going to have its work in this area examined very closely. 8. On the top of galley page 51 we have that statement about Oswald citing the telescope site at night on the porch in New Orleans. I think the support for that proposition is then indeed. Marina Oswald first testified that she did not know what he was doing out there and then she was clearly laid into the only answer that gives any support to this proposition. 9. I think the level of reaching that is going on in this whole discussion of rifle capability is nicely shown by the fact that under the heading of rifle practice outside the Marine Corps it appears the damning statement that "Oswald showed an interest in rifles by discussing that subject with others (in fact only one person as I remember it) and reading gun magazines." 10. I do not think the record will support the statement that Oswald did not leave his Beckley Avenue rooming house on one of the weekends that he was supposedly seen at the Sports Dome rifle range. 11. There is a miss statement in the third paragraph under rapidfire test when it says "four of the firers missed the second shot." The preceding paragraph states that there were only three firers. 12. There are no footnotes whatsoever in the fifth paragraph under rapidfire test and some rather important statements are made which require some support from someplace. 13. A minor point as to the next paragraph – bullets are better said to strike rather than land. 14. As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that 15 different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert rifleman of the FBI and other places. According to my calculations those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming that time is calculated commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means the average time it took to fire The two remaining shots was about 6.2 seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much. I recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to be lapse between shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set of fast shots fired by Fraser of the FBI. The conclusion indicates that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two heads in from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of three shots described above, only three were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including the three just mentioned, were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The conclusion at its most extreme states that as well and fire faster than the commission expert fired and 12 of their 15 tries and that in any event he could fire faster than the experts did intent of their 15 tries. If we are going to set forth material such as this, I think we should set forth some information on how much training and how much shooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then have something on which to base their judgment concerning the relative abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the commission and the ability of Lee Harvey Oswald. 15. The problem is raised by the above analyses should be met at some point in the text of the report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum firing time for each shot is used throughout chapter 3. The present discussion of rifle capability shows the expert rifleman could not fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of the experts managed to do so, and his shots, like those of other FBI experts, we're high and to the right of the target. The fact is that most of the experts were much more proficient with a rifle then Oswald could ever be expected to be, and the record indicates that fact, according to my recollection of the response of one of the experts to a question by Mr. McCloy asking for a comparison of the NRA master marksman to a Marine Corps sharpshooter. 16. The present section on rifle capability fails to set forth material in the record tending to indicate that Oswald was not a good shot and that he was not interested in his rifle while in the Marine Corps. It does not set forth material indicating that a telescopic sight must be tested and sighted-in after a period of nonuse before it can be expected to be accurate. That problem is emphasized by the fact that the FBI actually found that there was a defect in the scope which cause the rifle to fire hi and to the right. In spite of the above the present section takes only part of the material in the record to show that Oswald was a good shot and that he was interested in rifles. I submit that the testimony of Delgade that Oswald was not interested in his rifle while in the Marines is at least as probative as Alba's testimony that Oswald came into his garage to read rifle and hunting magazines. To put it bluntly that sort of selection from the record could seriously affect the integrity and credibility of the entire report. 17. It seems to me that the most honest and the most sensible thing to do given the present state of the record on Oswald's rifle capability would be to write a very short section indicating that there is testimony on both sides of several issues. The commission could then conclude that the best evidence that Oswald could fire his rifle as fast as he did and hit the target is the fact that he did so. It may have been pure luck. It probably was to a very great extent. But it happened. He would have had to have been lucky to hit as he did if he had only 4.8 seconds to fire the shots. Why don't we admit that instead of reaching and using only part of the record to support the propositions presently set forth in the galleries. These conclusions will never be excepted by critical person's anyway. General comment. 1. The above was written without having the footnotes to the chapter, a considerable disadvantage when one would like to check this accuracy and precision of statements made in the text. 2. The placement of footnotes is not consistent within the chapter, nor with in the general rule that there are to be footnotes after all direct quotes. Many times there are no footnotes where it appears to me that there should be. 3. Form as to omitted material should be checked. The form of citations to the appendix is not consistent with chapter 3 or internally. 4. I forgot to mention that some question might be raised when the public discovers that there was only one eye witness to the Tippit killing, i.e., One person who saw Oswald kill him. All the rest only saw subsequent events. Mrs. Markham is nicely buried there, but I predict not for long. Edited May 21, 2018 by Michael Clark Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted May 20, 2018 Author Share Posted May 20, 2018 (edited) William R. Kopatish, died May, 9 2018 Chief - Personnel Security Division https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=26676#relPageId=2&tab=page From his memorial page... "Bill was a true friend and mentor to many. I am proud to count myself in that group. His wisdom and vision in the mid-1970's set the stage for the transformation of our Service following the tumult of the Church inquiries. In each of us who he personally engaged, Bill insured that we knew what was expected of us, both personally and professionally. Bill, I owe so much to you for the unique and challenging opportunities you entrusted to me as well as the Top Cover and confidence..." ------------ "On the eve of Mother's Day, in the year 2018, how happy Bill must be now reunited forever with his beloved Fran! Bill and I crossed paths at the CIA from the mid 1960's to the mid 1980's. They were busy and challenging years at the Agency, and we were fortunate to be a part of a young, vibrant organization. But Bill's first and most enduring love was his beautiful family. As I last chatted with him on 3 May-at Hospice, he beamed..." Has the most clearances among 37 (McCord and Bruce Solie included) approved for BYECOM clearance. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10123-10404.pdf Edited May 26, 2018 by Michael Clark Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted May 20, 2018 Author Share Posted May 20, 2018 (edited) Bernard Barker and Sturgis working together in Feb. of 65 https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10221-10301.pdf Edited July 4, 2018 by Michael Clark Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted May 25, 2018 Author Share Posted May 25, 2018 (edited) 1 minute ago, Michael Clark said: I started transcribing Walcotts testimony, it is largely copy-pastable... http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/hsca/secclass/pdf/Wilcott_3-22-78.pdf The subcommittee met at IO:20 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2344 of the Raybum Office Building, the Honorable Richard Preyer (Chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Present: Representatives Preyer (presiding), Dodd and Sawyer. Also Present: Michael Goldsmith, Counsel, and Gary Cornwell, Counsel. Also Present: Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk, and Charles Berk, Betsy Wolf and James Wolf. Mr. Preyer. Thank you for being here today, and I will call the subcommittee to order at this time. I will ask if you will stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Wilcott. I do. Mr. Preyer. I would like before we begin to read a written statement concerning the subject of the investigation. We are operating under House Resolution 222, which man- dates the Committee to conduct a full and complete investi- gation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assas- sination and death of President John F. Kennedy, including determining whether the existing laws of the United States concerning the protection of the President and the investiga- tory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in their provisions and enforcement; and whether there was full disclosure of evidence and information among agencies and department of the United States Government and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency of department would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination and why such information was not provided or collected by that agency or department, and to make recommendations to the House if the Select Committee deems it appropriate for the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation. That is what we are attempting to accomplish, which is quite a big order. We appreciate your being here today, Mr. Wilcott. (Whereupon, a recess was taken while the members of the Committee went to the floor of the House for a vote.) 3 Mr. Preyer. We will come to order. We will resume the session, and I will recognize Counsel to begin his questioning. TESTIMONY OF JAMES B. WtLCOlT, A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, would you please state your name and address and occupation? Mr. Wilcott. My name is James B. Wilcott. My address is 2761 Atlantic Street, in Concord, and my occupation is electronic technician. Mr. Goldsmith. Where is Concord located? Mr. Wilcott. It is a little bit east of Oakland, California. Mr. Goldsmith. Have you received a copy of the Committee’s rules? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. And a copy of the relevant House Resolutions? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. And, Mr. Wilcott, is it true that you are a former employee with the CIA and that you are here today testifying voluntarily without a subpoena? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. During what years did you work for the CIA? Mr. Wilcott. Iworked from the years, May, of 1957 to, April, of 1966. Mr. Goldsmith. And in what general capacity did you work with the CIA? Mr. Wolcott. All in the finance -- in accounting all of the time. Mr. Goldsmith. How did you become employed with the CIA? Mr. Wrlcott. I was recruited from the school in Syracuse New York, where I was taking a course in accounting and busi- ness administration. Mr. Goldsmith. Very generally now, what were your responsibilities as a finance employee with the agency? Mr. Wilcott. Well, from May of 1957 to January of 1960 - Mr. Goldsmith - excuse me, just answer the question very generally, without referring to anything right now, and please describe generally what your responsibilities were as a finance officer. Mr. Wilcott. My. responsibilities were primarily record keeping and disbursing of funds. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, are you here with Counsel today? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I am. Mr. Goldsmith. Would your Counsel identify himself for the recorder? Mr. Shapp. My name is William Schapp. And I am an Attorney here in Washington. I will give my card to the Committee. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, did I ask you to prepare a list indicating the dates that you were employed with the CIA and where you were stationed? Mr. Wrlcott. Yes, you did. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you prepare such a list? Mr. Alcott. Yes, I did. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have that list with you? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. I do. Mr. Goldsmith. Referring to that list, would you tell the Committee where you were stationed during your period with the CIA? Mr. Wrlcott. Certainly, from May of 1957 to January of 1960, I was in the pre-fab building on the Potomac in finance. During the period, it was unvouchered funds, and my duties were general accounting, and my rate in status was GS-5. From about January of 1960 to about June of 1960, I was transferred to Finance Field Payroll, also, in this same building, on the Potomac. This was making payments and keeping pay records. From June of 1960 to June of 1964, I was stationed at XXXXXXX Station, and my primary duty was finance and cash disbursements. This was all cash payments and record keeping for the station. And during that period, I had been promoted GS-7 and also gained a career status. From June of 1964 to about December of 1964, I was at Roseland. This was just prior to moving to Langley, in finance, and my duties there were policing accounts, and included auditing of special accounts. From January of 1965 to about March of 1965, I was at Langley in the same area, in finance, policing accounts and auditing of special accounts, and I was promoted up to GS 9. From April of 1965 to April of 1966, I was at Miami Station in finance, and I was handling the staff payroll. This was preparing and reconciling payrolls. In April of 1966, I resigned from the CIA. Mr. Goldsmith. I take it, from your testimony, that in November of 1963, you were stationed in XXXXXXXXXXXXX Station, is that correct? Mr. Wilcott. That is right. Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to the period immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy, at that time, did you come across any information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald’s relationship with the CIA? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did. Mr. Goldsnith. And will you tell the Committee what that relationship was? Mr. Wrlcott. Well, it was my understanding that Lee Harvey Oswald was an employee of the agency and was an agent of the agency. Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean by the term “agent”? Mr. Wilcott. That he was a regular employee, receiving a full-time salary for agent work for doing CIA operational work. Mr. Goldsmith. How did this information concerning Oswald first come to your attention? Mr. Wolcott. The first time I heard about Oswald being connected in any way with CIA was the day after the Kennedy assassination. Mr. Goldsmith. And how did that come to your attention? Mr. Wrlcott. Well, I was on day duty for the station. It was a guard-type function at the station, which I worked for overtime. There was a lot of excitement going on at the station after the Kennedy assassination. Towards the end of my tour of duty, I heard certain things about Oswald somehow being connected with the agency, and I didn’t really believe this when I heard it, and I thought it was absurd. Then, as time Went on, I began to hear more things in that line. Mr. Goldsmith. I think we had better go over that one more time. When, exactly, was the very first time that you heard or came across information that Oswald was an agent? Mr. Wilcott. I heard references to it the day after the assassination. . Goldsmith. And who made these references to Oswald being an agent of the CIA? Mr. Wilcott. I can’t remember the exact persons. There was talk about it going on at the station, and several months following at the station. Mr. Goldsmith. How many people made this reference to Oswald being an agent of the CIA? Mr. Wilcott. At least - there was at least six or seven people, specifically, who said that they either knew or believed Oswald to be an agent of the CIA. Mr. Goldsmith. Was Jerry Fox one of the people that made. this allegation? Mr. Wrlcott. To the best of my recollection, yes. Mr. Goldsmith. And who is Jerry Fox? Mr. Wilcott. Jerry Fox was a Case Officer for his branchthe Soviet Russia Branch, XXXXXXXXXX Station, who purchased information from the Soviets. Mr. Wilcott. Yes, you did. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you prepare such a list? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did. Mr. Goldsmith. Is that list complete and does it have every CIA Case Officer who worked XXXXXXXXXX in 1963? Mr. Wilcott. Oh, no. It doesn’t have every one. It has every one that I can remember. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you bring that list with you today? Mr. Wrlcott. Yes, I did. Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of these people on your list possible subjects who made references to Oswald being a CIA agent? Mr. Wrlcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read the list to the Committee? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Only of Case Officers. Ms. Beming. I think we ought to state that the record shows that Mr. Sawyer is a member of the Kennedy Subcommittee Preyer. We will. Mr. Goldsmith. Upon your memory and the list that your brought with you today, will you tell the Committee the names of the CIA Case Officers who you remember working XXXXXXXXXX in 1963? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. There was XXXXXXXXXXXX Branch, who had XXXXXXXXXXX cover. Jerry Fox, SR Branch, Soviet Russia Branch -- Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me, please proceed very slowly. Mr. Wrlcott. Jerry Fox, SR Branch, Reid Dennis, Chief of Soviet Satellite Branch; and XXXXXXXXXX, China Branch, and he also had a cover. John P. Horton, XXXXXXXXX Section; XXXXXXXXXXXXX Branch; and Chester Ito, XXXXXXXXX Branch; and Kan Takai, XXXXX Branch; and Jim Delaney, China Branch; and Bob Rentner, SR Branch -- and there is some question about that, the branch he was with. Larry Watanabi, XXXXXX Branch, Senior Case Officer; and XXXXXXXXXXX, deep commercial cover agent. There was a person, Dave, who was a Deputy Chief. Dave - I can’t remember his last name, Deputy Chief of the China Branch; and then a person whose last name was XXXXXXXXX in the XXXXXXXXX Branch. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember which of these individuals if any, made the specific allegation or reference that Oswald was an agent? Mr. Wtlcott. It has been 15 years, and I can’t remember specifically who said what, but certainly I am sure that Jerry Fox, for instance, had at least made some mention of it. Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that this allegation first came to your attention, did you discuss it with anyone? Mr. Wilcott. Oh, yes. I discussed it with my friends and the people that I was associating with socially. Mr. Goldsmith. Who were your friends that you discussed this with? Mr. Alcott. XXXXXXXXXXXX George Breen, Ed Luck, and xxxxxxxxxxxxx Mr. Goldsmith. Who was George Breen? Mr. Wrlcott. George Breen was a person in Registry, who was my closest friend while I was in XXXXXXXXXXXXXX. Mr. Goldsmith. Was he a CIA employee? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, he was. Mr. Goldsmith. And would he corroborate your obser- vation that Oswald was an agent? Mr. Wilcott. I don’t know. Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that this allegation first came to your attention, did you learn the name of Oswald’s Case Officer at the CIA? Mr. Wilcott. No. Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any other times during your stay with the CIA at XXXXXXXXXX Station that you came across information that Oswald had been a CIA agent? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. When was that? Mr. Wrlcott. The specific incident was soon after the Kennedy assassination, where an agent, a Case Officer -- I am sure it was a Case Officer - came up to my window to draw money, and he specifically said in the conversation that ensued, he specifically said, “Well, Jim, the money that I drew the last couple of weeks ago or so was money,” either for the Oswald project or for Oswald. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember the name of this Case Officer? Mr. Wilcott. No, I don’t. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember when specifically this conversation took place? Mr. Wrlcott. Not specifically, only generally. Mr. Goldsmith. How many months after the assassination was this? Mr. Wilcott. I think it must have been two or three omths (sic) after the assassination. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember where this conver- sation took place? Mr. Wilcott. It was right at my window, my disbursing cage window. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you discuss this information with anyone? Mr. Wilcott. Oh, yes. Mr. Goldsmith. With whom? Mr. Wtlcott. Certainly with George Breen, XXXXXXXXXXX the circle of social friends that we had. Mr. Goldsmith. How do you spell XXXXXXXXXX last name? Mr. Wilcott. XXXXXXXXXXXXX (spelling). Mr. Schaap. For the record, I have made a list of all of these spellings of the names which have been mentioned, which I will give to the stenographer so that he will have them correctly. Mr. Goldsmith. Did this Case Officer tell you what Oswald’s cryptonym was? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, he mentioned the cryptonym specifically under which the money was drawn. Mr. Goldsmith. And what did he tell you the cryptonym was? Mr. Wrlcott. I cannot remember. Mr. Goldsmith. What was your response to this revelation as to what Oswald’s cryptonym was? Did you write it down or do anything? Mr. Wilcott. No; I think that I looked through my advance book -- and I had a book where the advances on projects were run, and I leafed through them, and I must have at least leafed through them to see if what he said was true. Mr. Goldsmith. And are you saying then that you attempted to investigate this allegation? Mr. Wilcott. No, I am not saying that. It was more of a casual kind of thing, to my way of thinking. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you check your cash disbursement files? Mr. Wrlcott. Not the files, no. Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure I am following, then, what specifically you did check. Mr. Wtlcott. It was a book that I had. At the end of the day we would list all of the advances that were made in an advance book. It was just a three-ring binder, and we would list down the advances by cryptonym and the amounts and then reconcile that with the daily disbursements. Mr. Goldsmith. How long were these records maintained? Mr. Wilcott. They were maintained on a thirty-day basis, and then they were closed off at the end of the month. Mr. Goldsmith. So, does that mean you were able to check back only thirty days from the time that you were given this information? Mr. Wilcott. Yes Mr. Goldsmith. I realize this is testimony 15 years after the fact. However, if you received this information two or three months after the assassination, at a time that Oswald was already dead and had been dead for two or three months, what purpose would have been served by checking records that were only 30 days old? Do you follow the question? Mr. Wilcott. No. Mr. Goldsmith. Well, in other words, if you got the information three months after the assassination, Oswald had already been dead for three months, is that right? Mr. Wrlcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Answer “yes” or “no” for the recorder. Mr. Wtlcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. You testified that your records were only kept for thirty days, is that correct? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Then, by checking your records, which only went back thirty days, isn’t it true that you wouldn’t have gotten any information concerning Oswald anyway because Oswald had already been dead for one or two months? Mr. Wtlcott. That is true. Mr. Goldsmith. So, then, really, no purpose would have Mr. Wilcott. That is right. Mr. Goldsmith. And did you check any other records? Mr. Wilcott. No. Mr. Preyer. I understand this might be a good place for us to break and go and vote, so that we will take another recess for about ten minutes. I am sorry. Whereupon, a recess was taken while the members of the Committee went to the floor of the House for a v . Edited May 25, 2018 by Michael Clark Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted May 28, 2018 Author Share Posted May 28, 2018 On 3/30/2018 at 11:04 PM, Michael Clark said: https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10102-10224.pdf Secret – sensitive Draft memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey Dated 27 November 1962 This is not a controlled item Operational plan – Cuba Situation: A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central intelligence agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during fiscal year – 63 and for such longer as may be directed. B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made: 1. National objectives with regard to Cuba are a sensually as follows: a. Isolate Castro / Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations. b. Further discredit the Castro / Cmmunist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere. c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro / Communist regime to retard development of Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources. d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements. e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split and Cuban-Bloc relationships. II. Mission: Covertly support the above cited US national objectives with respect to Cuba. III. Tasks: A. Intelligence / counter intelligence. 1. Provide the maximum a telogen's coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following: a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government. b. Activities of Cuban G –2 c. Soviet activities in Cuba. d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population. e. Military and militia order of battle. f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain upon the "power centers" in the Cuban government. g. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cuban relationships. h. Economic. B. Political: 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin American country support for the sentiment or overthrow of Castro. 2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups. 3. Provide covert support to the CRG into such other Cuba political groups as appropriate. 4. Develop ********** in the "power centers" of the Cuban Government as a possible means of splitting the region. C. Economics: 1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution. 2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba. 3. Harass Free World to Trade with Cuba. D. Psychological: 1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism. 2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the hemisphere and elsewhere. 3. Develop an exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet Bloc members. E. Resistance: 1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnal and ********'support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising. 2. Be prepared to support US military against U.S. Military against Cuba. --------------------- Text here is upside down I will come back to it -------------------- amounts of equipment. 2. Maintain sufficient covert assess to meet requirements levied on CIA in approved US military contingency plans. We are internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally. V. Support received from other agencies: None VI. Estimated cost to CIA: A. Personnel B. Estimated budget: FY-63 Fy-64 Secret - sensitive 27 November 1962 Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully occurred on by DD/P. Memorandum for: director of central intelligence Through: Director of Plans Subject: Operational plan for continuing operations against Cuba. 1. Action: this memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for actions are contained in paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the re-orientation of the current effort into a long-term denied area type of operation of the highest priority. I. Assumptions: A. The United States government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba. B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counterreaction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by major United States military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantánamo. C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly per military, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy. D. The Castro communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with it security in control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offense weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-Communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened. E.The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will severely damage the morale and motivation of air table is in Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba in the Castro communist regime. F. Despite the above factors, higher authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba in May even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States government and it's overt dealings with Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here. G. In view of these factors, the so-called "track to course" of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States government. H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, rates, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued. I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve a little purpose; also they will be counterproductive sense, if undertaking, they will make the collection of intelligence or difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where in unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba. J.in view of the policy factors, and increased use of facilities, real estate and pacing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable. K. Adequate cereal reconnaissance of Cuba will continue. II. Objectives: Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba: A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World. B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world. C. Maintain through Clandestina means, short of commando and gorilla tape operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of ensuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba. D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on: 1. Capabilities and intentions of the government. 2. Activities of the Cuban G2 and it's other security organs. 3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba. 4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace. 5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment. 6. The loci of power and possible stresses and strains in the power centers of the Cuban government. 7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations 8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy. E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible and any significant uprising, bravo, resistance, split in the region, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or Cuban/Bloc relationships . III. Operational plan A. Espionage and intelligence collection – all feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational of activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in attachment A, which was prepared to serve as The basis for the IG's Report on this particular matter to the Presidents Board of Comsultants on Foreign Inrelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous subheadings the intelligence coverages which have been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba 1. Intelligence exploitation of refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locks Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the center have been retained intact. In order to reestablish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that pan American airways and KLM be induced to re-institute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. It should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and U.N. discussions. Coincident with this, the Opah-locks refugee interrogation center will be reestablished with the same Personel. 2. Resident agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, reestablish communications with the 131 recruit agents the resident in Cuba. To an extent the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast. 3. Third country operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba and through the development of additional legal travelers. 4. Redacted: we will continue to press the redacted Who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The redacted most effectively cooperating at this point in the connection are the three lines redacted Direct approaches to several of these redacted either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation but are you to the redacted underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other redacted with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the redact problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the redact to make greater use of their redact assets, both inside and outside of Cuba, particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the redact. 5. Maritime operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through redact we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit semen and particularly Cuban seamen to increase the 20 officers in crewmembers aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban installations abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can get access and concerning whom we may have reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through redact operations and where appropriate in conjunction with redact. 7. Audio penetrations of Cuban installation is a broad: at the present time we have audio and or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in redact. No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and whenever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such insulation worthwhile. 8. Communications intelligence score: We will continue our present CIA close support coverage from the KOLA station in redact at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation normalizes it should be possible for NSA to re-institute and perhaps even increase their seaborn intercept coverage of Cuban communications. 9. Communist party operations: A complete survey has been made worldwide of all Communist Party penetration operations and were ever any such penetrations can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, in those cases were such action would result in an acceptable/prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 has some direct pertinent access to Cuban target. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are being individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets. 10. Illegally infiltrated agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced a substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pindar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents in teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRENT teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally residence in Cuba. 11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba Will be ex feel treated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal tavel channel's, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets. B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidence of stress or strain with in the resume in between the resume and other nations, but particularly, the Block. An intensive program will be continue to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the resume and any possible fashion. This is basically a long-term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and of the proposed further exploitation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interest of brevity and this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the resume, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, and the willingness of the United States government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in paragraph I above would appear unlikely. C. Sabotage. On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or widescale program is contemplated. D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerilla Type Operations: Given the assumptions in paragraph I above, no widescale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur. E. Economic warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive borrowing and inducing friendly US and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba. F. Counterintelligence: The current counter intelligence and counterespionage programs against the current Cuban G2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political action, propaganda, psychological warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop an exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and or overthrow of the Castro communist regime. 2. Assist State in the development of post- Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Clark Posted June 9, 2018 Author Share Posted June 9, 2018 Bart Kamp wrote: I would like to know if anyone here can help me with a request by a highly respected researcher who doesn't frequent forums. Hence me posting. Two FBI numbers,105-82555 -5712 and 105 82555-5713. Over the years I periodically checked the file box at NARA to see if those two redacted documents had been released or were less redacted,there was no change in their status....then last year when I went to that file box at NARA the documents were not there for whatever reason.As you can see from the minimal words released these docs are to do with Oswald's identity... Doubly interesting is the fact that Ray Wannell's name is on the documents, he was liaison between the FBI and NSA...Wannell's Church Committee testimony is still locked up or was,maybe that's out now? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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