Did Fidel Kill Kennedy?

[Bill Miller]

I personally believe that Castro had every reason to keep Kennedy alive and in office. Kennedy had assured the world that the U.S. would not invade Cuba. Castro could not be assured that the next President would feel the same way. That doesn't mean Casto didn't have people doing things behind his back as Kennedy was experiencing, but the question deals with Casto's involvement, so I have to say Castro would not have wanted Kennedy assassinated in 1963.

[Dawn Meredith]

I personally believe that Castro had every reason to keep Kennedy alive and in office. Kennedy had assured the world that the U.S. would not invade Cuba. Castro could not be assured that the next President would feel the same way. That doesn't mean Casto didn't have people doing things behind his back as Kennedy was experiencing, but the question deals with Casto's involvement, so I have to say Castro would not have wanted Kennedy assassinated in 1963.

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__________________________

Tim:

"Castro did not do it". Your utilization of the KISS method totally leaves out Lisa Howard and that JFK and Kennedy were in the midst of reconciliation. " A" was saying one thing to appease the public and anti-Castro folks, but the reality is that he was to actually meet with Castro "after a brief trip to Dallas". Period.

We know this is the plain fact. And if someone would just post the darn Castro speech I have made so many references to you would see that not only did Castro not kill JFK, he knows who did.

Let's try this, I will scan it at Wim's website and if you go there after he posts it, just click on the little icon that enlarges the print so that it can be easily read.

(I posted recently here an email from researcher Steve Jones and John posted it, it's very small, but I clicked on the little icon and then could read it without difficulty. )

We even now know who actually FLEW Lisa Howard to Cuba to arrange these meetings. He's travelling now, but he did say on this forum he was that pilot. So you just cannot have it both ways. JFK called off the kill Castro stuff. We have so much proof of this. Start with the Bay of Pigs, set up primarily by Nixon, who was to win the election and then go into Cuba, get rid of Castro so that his Mafia buddies could get back into business. But alas, the election was lost and Bay of Pigs became Kennedy's problem. What did he do? Call off the Castro hits. Even later, after the Cuban Missile Crises, he was NOT trying to kill Castro. He was trying to prevent a world war. And he succeeded.

So the only way your KISS method works is if you just totally dismiss the Lisa Howard evidence, and Castro's own words, on 11/23/63.

If Castro had killed JFK the entire country would have backed an invasion and many would have personally volunteered for the job of offing Castro himself.

The Mob did not kill JFK nor did Castro. The mob had means motive and opportunity, but they did not have the POWER to steal the body from the state of Tx. which had legal jurisdiction over this homicide (It was not yet a federal crime to kill a president), no power to alter the wounds on the president's body, no power to send his entire cabinet halfway around the world just prior to Dallas. Nor did Castro have this kind of power. Hell we can't even buy cuban cigars in the US.

Dawn

[Robert Charles-Dunne]

Robert Charles-Dunne wrote:

Clearly, after the assassination we were intended to believe that Oswald was acting as an agent for Castro when he fired the rifle.

To the contrary, sir.  As you should know, every effort was made, starting the night of the assassination, to deny any foreign involvement.  LBJ's assistant called the assistant district attorney in Dallas to order him to remove an allegation in his complaint or indictment against LHO that he was acting pursuant to a foreign conspiracy.  CIA agents and FBI agents in Mexico City were ordered to desist any investigation that would indicate Cuban involvement, which almost caused them to revolt. (I assume you are aware of this--if not I will get you the cite.)

And of course there is the famous Katzenbach memo that all good assassination researchers can probably quote from memory.

From the very night of the assassination, the marching orders were out: LHO did it, and he acted on his own.

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The fact that Washington denuded the act of its political dimension, by portraying LHO as a maladjusted loner unaffiliated with the Soviets or Cubans, doesn't mean this was the conspirators' intention. It is merely the way it played out, in large measure because Oswald was apprehended. This was the one key failing of the plot, as we'll discuss elsewhere.

Clearly, the conpirators intended to generate a groundswell of support for another invasion of Cuba by attributing the assassination to a putative Castro agent. The evidence provided by the plotters to bolster that supposition was - by your own points above - taken seriously enough by Washington to squelch it. You cannot assume the plotters - whether Castro, CIA or the Girl Guides - planned for Washington to hide evidence of Cuban complicity. To that extent, the plotters succeeded in killing the President, but failed to achieve the secondary goal, to incite a military incursion against Castro.

If Castro was responsible for killing Kennedy, how could he have known in advance that Washington would accommodatingly hide all evidence of his perfidy, as it seems you argue? It's counter-intuitive.

[Robert Charles-Dunne]

To Robert Charles-Dunne (and Dawn):

You wrote:

I've repeatedly requested that you provide citations and evidence for your assertions, which you have thus far continually failed to do. None of the above feeble reductionism answers a single question, or includes a single piece of evidence, to my chagrin. [Emphasis supplied.]

Okay, let's debate this point by point.  I have already posted several items of evidence pointing toward Cuban involvement in the assassination, and I will be posting more later.  But let the debate commence.

To simplify the debate, I want to go over the evidence item by item to obtain your comments or reply.  Of course, anyone else can reply if they want to as well.

First, let's talk about why "KISS" post, that you characterize as "feeble" and "stupid". 

I didn't use the words "feeble" and "stupid" to critique your KISS post.  What I thought "feeble" was the math-style reductionism of "If A equals B, et al."  Math may be a pure science, but the case we face, and are theoretically trying to solve to a legal and historical certainty, is complex and filled with nuance.  Because it is a complex case, trying to keep it simple only keeps us stupid.  That is what I said, and what I meant.  You are too good a writer not to discern the difference.

Perhaps I do not quite understand, but Dawn should.

In a murder trial, a statement by the defendant threatening to kill the victim is admissible evidence.  In fact, it is very strong evidence--almost as strong as an admission after the fact.

In a murder trial, motive is also relevant, though, as Dawn knows, not necessary for a conviction.  The fact that the U.S. government (and, per Desmond Fitzgerald, personally approved by RFK)

We are not certain that this was approved by RFK, the protests of CIA personnel and their literary lackeys notwithstanding.  For example, if it were true that plots on Castro's life had that high level of authorization, why would William Harvey have found it necessary to hide the plots from his own top boss, John McCone?  Why do you think CIA personnel hid the plots from McCone, the Kennedy-appointed DCI, if not to preclude the Kennedys learning of the plots?

was trying to kill Castro at the time of JFK's assassination is evidence that Castro had the strongest motive for murder.

Parenthetically, there were threats also made against JFK by Santo Trafficante, Jr. and Carlos Marcello, as you know, and they each had motive.  Had they been tried, their threats and motive could have been introduced against them.  Had it been possible to try Fidel, his lawyer could have (would have) pointed out that others had both threats and motive.  But the prosecuting attorney would have argued, convincingly, the primacy of Castro's threat to JFK's assassination.

First you stated that Trafficante and Castro were working in common cause to kill Kennedy, which I find absurd, but it's an opinion and you're entitled to hold it.  Now you seem to treat the uttered threats of Trafficante and Castro as separate entities, as though they were not working together.

That said, let us also remember that any number of anti-Castro exiles had expressed similarly vitriolic threats against Castro, yet you seem to feel them above suspicion in the President's murder.  Apparently, Castro's "threat" [which I believe can be characterized differently, a point to which we'll return later] takes "primacy" in your view.

So my initial questions to you are as follows:

(1)  Do you deny that a threat to kill someone is admissible evidence in a

      court of law?

No such denial from me.  But if a thousand people uttered threats against Kennedy, from Minutemen and Birchers, to Alpha 66 and DRE personnel, how does one conclude that only Castro's "threat" matters; that only Castro's "threat" can be introduced as evidence; that only Castro's "threat" carries that legal weight?

(2)  Do you deny that self-defense (for that, I think is the best way to characterize it) against an attempt by the victim to kill the defendant is evidence? 

Self-defence is a legal rationale for having committed a crime.  But, first and foremost, a prosecutor must establish that a defendant committed that crime.  Only then does such a plea become tenable.  It is not your purview, as Castro's self-proclaimed prosecutor, to enter a plea for him.  That's a totalitarian technique, unworthy of US jurisprudence.  

If you deny that threats and motive would not constitute evidence in a criminal murder proceeding, let me have your legal citations (Dawn can help you with this).  I'll put the ball in your court.  I'm sure I can find law in every state in the union that threats and motive are admissible evidence.

If you admit that threats and motive are admissible evidence, then please, sir, and in all respect because I have appreciated the intelligence of your postings in other matters, why would you say I have not cited "a single piece of evidence?"

I think a threat to kill and the strongest possible motive to kill are two of the strongest items of evidence that could be adduced in a court of law.

In the absence of any other compelling evidence against a defendant, the fact that he was one of a thousand people making such a "threat" is meaningless.  Moreover, what makes you think that your suggested rationale - Castro wishing to retain power - is any more compelling a motive than the motives we can ascribe to a hundred other parties, all of whom also either held a grudge against the President for past deeds, or stood to benefit by his demise?

Tim, just so we are totally clear, I respect the way you write, and don't wish to deny you your passionate pursuit of your theory.  I just wish that your talent and passion were used in the service of a theory with more evidence - not just CIA rewrites and revisions - to bolster it.

If I criticize the message you bring, please don't confuse that with a criticism of the messenger.

After we have discussed these two items we'll go on to the two Cubans who fled Texas to Cuba in the days after the assassination.  But let's start with the above.  I await your reply.

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[Robert Charles-Dunne]

To Robert Charles-Dunne:

You wrote:

Yet if forty years of dogged research and investigation has taught us anything, it is that Oswald didn't fire the rifle and Castro wasn't his sponsor. So, the questions now are: "Who fired the rifle?" and "Who sponsored the deed?"

I would agree with you, sir, that LHO was not a shooter.  I am still not sure whether he was involved in the assassination in some fashion.

I would suggest that he was, though not in the accepted context of the official version.

Turn-about being fair play, I would ask you to itemize the evidence that you claim exculpates Senor Castro. 

Sorry, my friend, but if you make the claim, you provide the proof.

I would be rich if I had a penney for every word that has been written pointing fingers at David Atlee Phillips, David Morales, William Harvey, etc.

Perhaps because that's what the evidence suggests?

but the only evidence that I have seen against any of these individuals is the statement made by Morales, a statement that John Simkin acknowledges could be dismissed as nothing but drunken braggadocia.

Were that the only reason to suspect Morales and his colleagues, his 'admission' would be about as useful as a Castro-uttered "threat," without evidence to prove that "threat" was made good by the person who uttered it.  Perhaps if you would at least consider that personnel from the security agencies of your own country were involved, you would find more evidence than just Morales' own drunken admission.

I have said it before but I'll say it again.  I do not believe any CIA official participated in the assassination,

Then you'll find succor and comfort in the fictions peddled by Agency shills like Russo.  Time and again, you have cited books which have as their main sources, and inspiration, Agency personnel.  The result is hardly surprising.

but I am not a defender of the CIA's activities in the early 1960s.  The CIA tried, at least, to kill Castro, Trujillo and Lumumba.  It was as wrong for the CIA to plot their murders as it would have been had the CIA plotted the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Thank you for inadvertently making my point for me.  The CIA was actively plotting against the three you mentioned, two of whom did disappear from the planet.  How can you be so sure - in the face of substantial evidence to the contrary - that CIA personnel would balk at killing a head of state, just because the state was their own? 

Let me also say this:  Probably the evidence against Castro would not be sufficient to convict him in an American court of law, using the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt".  (And, of course, I have suggested that Castro might very well have been able to use "self-defense" as a defense had he been prosecuted.)

One of the reasons more evidence does not exist, of course, is that investigators were ordered not to pursue evidence pointing to Cuban involvement.

I ask you to consider that they were ordered to abandon the cause because each piece of "so-called" evidence [to use Oswald's own phrase] became useless with his apprehension.  If in custody, Oswald could hardly have boarded a plane at Redbird, fly to Mexico City, and from there to Havana.  That is what the "delayed Cubana plane" story alluded to, and had to be aborted; that is why LHO's luggage - found at the Mexico City airport - was made to evaporate. 

It is my opinion, however, that there is more evidence pointing to Castro's involvement than there is evidence pointing to involvement by any other person or group.  I have already posted some of this evidence (including not only Castro's threat and motive but also the identification of two of the probable shooters who fled to Cuba immediately after the assassination).  More evidence will follow.

So my challenge to you is to list specific evidence that exculpates Fidel.

Please see above.

Final comment:  John has developed a persuasive case that LBJ had a strong motive to kill JFK: his fear of possible indictment in the ongoing scandals.  Fear of jail is certainly a strong motive, but not as strong as the desire for self-preservation.  I have been reading with great interest William Reymond's recent postings regarding a tape recording by Cliff Carter in which Carter alleged LBJ's involvement (and his own).  And of course we have the issue of the Wallace fingerprint.  I believe these matters deserve the most careful scrutiny.

Hey, I lied: here is my final, final comment:  I do not believe this is a psychological factor influencing my opinion, but I would point out that only if "Castro did it" can we deduce a lasting important lesson for our country:  Do not engage assassination as a tool of foreign policy.  What is our lesson if LBJ did it?  That one of our former presidents was an amoral murderer?  What is our lesson if we learn that "rogue" CIA agents did it?  That these rogue agents were evil men who got by with murder?  But that does not indict the CIA as an institution.

Agreed, although one must question the sanity of creating/providing the means to assassinate anyone.  This brings to mind the comments that you claim were a "threat" by Castro: that leaders of the US who seek to eliminate others will not themselves be safe.  That turned out to be true, irrespective of whether Castro or the CIA were the culprits on November 22, 1963.

If, however, "Castro did it", we have the strongest moral.  Our country paid a great price for the murderous foreign policy the CIA pursued, starting in the Eisenhower Administration and continued in the Kennedy Administration.

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Or, the moral could be that the monster you create, through your National Security apparatchiks, may turn on you when it disgrees with your policies. And then ensure your populace cannot be certain who did it.

[Robert Charles-Dunne]

To Robert Charles-Dunne:

You wrote to me:

Can you cite a single instance of Mob proxies being used by Castro against a US head of state? If so, please share the details.

With all due respect, sir, this seems like one of the silliest arguments I have ever encountered.  You seem to be saying Castro must not have done it because he did participate in the assassination of any of the earlier U.S. Presidents who were assassinated, nor did he assassinate any presidents after President Kennedy.  Correct me if I misunderstood you.

The logical corrollary of your argument is that NOBODY killed Kennedy.

Due respect returned, that is not the point at all.  On the one hand, we have a security agency with a demonstrated record of planning to kill heads of state; you've pointed to three targets yourself [Castro, Trujillo, Lumumba].  Two of the three were assassinated.  You seem to ignore that this not only demonstrably indicates an institutional intent to murder, but makes likelier CIA's culpability in two of the three instances you cite.  Yet you somehow have divined that CIA would shun killing their own head of state.  I wonder, on what basis? 

On the other hand, we have your accusations against Castro, where there is no such precedent or antecedant to demonstrate what has clearly been proven about CIA a quarter century ago.  This is not nearly so difficult to distinguish as you labour to make it appear.

Since Kennedy was the last president assassinated, whoever you think assassinated Kennedy did not assassinate any Presidents

How about Presidential candidates?  How about civil rights leaders?  I use the plural in each case, deliberately.

after Kennedy any more than Castro did.  And I seriously doubt that you can prove your suspected conspirators participated in the assassinations of Lincoln or McKinley.

No, though it is worth remembering that while Boothe took the "historical" rap, a number of other corpses hung from the gallows, for the same crime.  None of them worked for Castro, either.

So if failure to be involved in another assassination of a U.S. President excludes the involvement of Castro, it must exclude every other suspect, leaving us to only one conclusion--no one did it!

Or that the agency we know had the legally-established means, motive and opportunity to kill foreign leaders turned the cross-hairs on its own.

Feel free to indulge in whatever philosophical or semantic gymnastics you like.  It doesn't approach the evidentiary level of proof.

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[Robert Charles-Dunne]

To Robert Charles-Dunne:

At 3:02 pm yesterday(?)  you posted a statement that I had thus far produced no evidence ("nada" as you put it) that Castro was involved in the Kennedy assassination.  We previously discussed the fact that a threat to kill someone coming a few month's before that persons demise, and a very strong motive to kill someone, is fairly good evidence of that person's involvement.  At least it would be so viewed in a court of law.

What is incredible is that, several hours before you maade the statement that I had posted "nada" suggestive of Cuban involvement in the assassination,  I had even identified the Cubans who, according to Joseph Trento's sources, participated in the assassination: two men who were in Texas on November 22, 1963 and left the country and returned to Cuba shortly thereafter.

I request that you address the questions raised by those men separately.

                                  MIGUEL CASAS SAEZ      

          

Which, if any, of the following assertions re Miguel Casas Saez do you dispute?  For each assertion you dispute, state your basis for disputing it.

(1)   That he had been in the Soviet Union to receive training.

(2)    That he was a member of DGI.

(3)    That the afternoon of the assassination, he fle in a small private plane

        from Dallas, Texas to Tijuana, Mexico and then to Mexico City.

(4)   That he was met at the Mexico City Airport by people from the Cuban

        diplomatic corps.

All of the foregoing may or may not be true.  Thus far, we have only reports from Agency personnel making the assertion.  Given the Agency's track record for veracity and truthfulness, it is foolhardy to put much trust in its assertions, without corroboration.  If you have contemporaneous FBI or INS reports verifying those assertions - not merely repeating them - I would love to see those.

(5)    That on November 22, 1963, he flew from Mexico City to Havana in the    cockpit of the airplane.

This is where you run into trouble, for the Cubana flight left Mexico City before the US-departed plane arrived there, meaning that this "mystery" passenger wasn't Casas, or anyone else arriving on that light plane. 

(6)     That, according to James Richards' sources (and let me make it clear that I am confident he does not support my scenario) Saez was a "fruit loop" type who was "up for anything".

In light of my response to point 5 above, it's irrelevant.

Next, sir, please answer the following question.  Whether you have any basis for disputing those facts are not, would you agree that the presence of a Cuban intelligence officer in Dallas the day of the assassination, and his flight out of Dallas shortly after the assassination, is in fact fairly strong evidence of the possibility of the involvement of Cuban intelligence in the assassination?

Were it credible, I'm sure it would have found great currency in the extreme right wing circles of the day.  That it does so with you, today, is another matter entirely.

Heck, members of this Forum spend hours trying to decide whether a face in the crowd in Dealey Plaza looks like Rip Robertson or David Morales, or whether E. Howard Hunt was one of the tramps.  (And in no way do I beliitle the importance of that line of inquiry and I commend the members who are taking the lead in examining that evidence.)  But if the presence in Dallas on November 22, 1963 of a CIA officer raises questions about possible CIA involvement, certainly the presence of a DGI officer raises questions of possible Cuban involvement.

If you can spot Casas or Lopez, or any other purported Castro agent, in Dealey Plaza, I'd welcome a citation of which person, in which photo.  If other researchers feel they have located Agency personnel in Dealey Plaza photos, perhaps it's because the preponderance of evidence made the researchers seek to find them in the photographic evidence.

How then, sir, could you say I had offered "nada" (nothing) to support my scenario of Cuban involvement?

Now let us turn to Gilberto Policarpo Lopez.

                               GILBERTO POLICARPO LOPEZ

Again, which, if any, of the following assertions re Policarpo do you dispute?  For each assertion you dispute, state your basis for disputing it.

(1)   That he lived in Key West, FL from sometime in 1961 to sometime in 1963.

(2)   That a few months (or less) before the assassination he moved from Key

West to the home city of Santo Trafficante, Jr.

(3)    That in Tampa on November 20, 1963 he received a visa to visit Mexico City

for only fourteen or fifteen days?

(4)     That the day after the assassination, as soon as the border opened, he passed from Nuevo Laredo, Texas into Mexico.

(5)      That within a week after the assassination he flew to Havana as the sole

passenger on a Cubana air flight--never to return to the U.S.

All of the foregoing may or may not be true.  Thus far, we have only reports from Agency personnel making the assertion.  Given the Agency's track record for veracity and truthfulness, it is foolhardy to put much trust in its assertions, without corroboration.  If you have contemporaneous FBI or INS reports verifying those assertions - not merely repeating them - I would love to see those.

(6)       That Policarpo's brother was a high-ranking member of Castro's military.

And Veciana's cousin worked for the DGI.  That doesn't mean Veciana also did.

Again, I would ask you if the travels of this Policaropo fellow has, in your opinion, any evidentiary value re possible Cuban participation in the assassination?  The HSCA characterized his movements as "troublesome" and deplored the fact that they had not been investigated in 1963-1964.

But they had.  A whole series of CIA cables and name-traces originated throughout December 1963.  If the Agency failed to disclose that data to the proper authorities, that should be considered "troublesome."

And a French OAS assassin was deported from Dallas to Montreal shortly after the assassination.  Does that mean DeGaulle did it?

You seem to feel that the above is somehow shockingly new information.  It isn't.  It was dealt with by the Senate Select Committee, and the HSCA, and was well covered by Henry Hurt's "Reasonable Doubt" twenty years ago, a few years after the documents were made public via a FOIA request.  This isn't something that Gus Russo found.  He only retooled it for yet another kick at the can.  It's as compelling today as it was in 1963.

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Edited January 16, 2005 by Robert Charles-Dunne

[Tim Gratz]

The chilling possibility that Oswald may have re-entered the United States as an agent for the KGB is raised by the fact that a Soviet defector from the KGB who claimed special knowledge of Oswald showed deception when he was asked the following question on a polygraph examination:

"Was Oswald recruited by the KGB as an agent?"

The full story of the defection of Yuri Nosenko deserves careful consideration and I am preparing an on-line seminar on it.

For purposes of this post, I am including the full text of the report of the special committee of the House Select Committee on Assassinations that examined the polygraphs administered to Jack Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald.

The HSCA seemed as intent on denying foreign involvement in the Kennedy assassination as did the Warren Commission. It did not even mention the Nosenko polygraph.

For reasons that are almost impossible to understand, the CIA never asked Nosenko if the KGB had instructed Oswald to kill President Kennedy. This seems like it was both an obvious and the penultimate question that should have been asked.

Any one wanting to challenge Trento's assertion that the KGB was involved in the assassination must, I submit, deal with the Nosenko polygraph. It seems there are only three ways to do this: (1) argue that polygraphs are inhrerently unreliable; (2) argue that there was something wrong with this specific polygraph examination; or (3) argue that although he was a KGB agent, LHO did not participate in the Kennedy assassination--at least not on behalf of, or with the support or encouragement of the KGB.

However, the most reasonable assumption based on Nosenko’s failed polygraph is that when LHO returned to the U.S. he was a KGB agent. The chilling inference of that fact is that there may very well have been KGB involvement in the assassination, just as Trento reports.

BELOW: THE FULL TEXT OF THE HSCA POLYGRAPH REPORT

THE ANALYSIS OF YURI NOSENKO'S POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION

Submitted by

Richard O. Arther, President, Scientific Lie Detection, Inc., New York, N.Y., and Director, National Training Center on Polygraph Science

Report to the Select Committee on Assassinations

U.S. House of Representatives

Ninety-fifth Congress

Second Session

March 1979

CONTENTS

Introduction

Selection of the expert

Procedures

A polygraph examination

Findings and conclusions of Richard O. Arther

Materials examined

Procedures

Evaluation of the polygraph examinations

Comparison of the 1966 and 1968 examinations

Opinions

INTRODUCTION*

* * As part of its investigation into the possibility that Lee Harvey Oswald was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate John F. Kennedy, the select committee looked into whether he might have been a Soviet agent.

One controversial source of information on this point has been former high-ranking KGB official, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. Nosenko had been, on two occasions, in charge of coordinating surveillance and recruitment of American tourists in Russia. At the time of Oswald's defection to Russia, Nosenko claimed to have personally reviewed Oswald's file.

In February 1964, Nosenko defected to the United States and was placed under custody of the Central Intelligence Agency. Because strong doubts within the Agency that Nosenko was a bona fide defector, he was later placed in solitary confinement for 3 years. He was subjected to extensive interrogation, and during three periods took [missing info?/RHS] 1964; October 18, 1966; and August 6, 1968. The examinations were wide-ranging, but only the second dealt with Oswald in any depth. On all occasions, Nosenko maintained categorically that the KGB had never been interested in Oswald and had never used him as an agent.

The polygraphist conducting the first two tests concluded that on the first test Nosenko had lied, though not to the Oswald question. On the second, he had lied to two of the Oswald questions. Another polygraphist conducted the third test. He concluded that Nosenko was answering truthfully.

In the 1970's, the CIA investigated the overall handling of the Nosenko matter and concluded, with respect to the first two polygraph tests, that they should be considered "invalid or inconclusive" because deficiencies in the way they were conducted. For example, the first had been designed principally to create a hostile atmosphere for Nosenko. The polygraphist was instructed to tell Nosenko that the tests showed he was lying, regardless of what they actually showed. (The expert, in fact, interpreted the results as showing that Nosenko was lying.) However, the CIA did conclude that the third examination was valid and that the results could be considered credible.

The Warren Commission was aware of the Nosenko issue, but was unable to make much of it since most of the material was classified and unavailable. Similarly, critics of the Warren Commission have not dealt with it in any depth.

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* Materials submitted lot this report by the committee's polygraph consultant were compiled by HSCA staff members G. Robert Blakey and Whitney Warriss.

** Arabic numerals in parentheses at the beginning of paragraphs indicate the paragraph number for purposes of citation and referencing; italic numerals in parentheses in the middle or at the end of sentences indicate references which can be found at the end of each report or section.

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The select committee decided to have an independent analysis of the polygraph tests conducted. First, such an examination had never been carried out. Second, it wished to know if the tests had been properly conducted and interpreted and if the answers could be considered credible. If so, then it could be stated with considerable certainty that Nosenko was a valuable source of information. If not, the committee would explore other avenues in order to decide what, if any, relation Oswald had to the KGB.

Selection of the expert

The committee retained Richard O. Arther to conduct an independent analysis of the three polygraph tests taken by Nosenko. Arther had been a member of the committee's polygraph panel that examined the Jack Ruby and James Earl Ray polygraph tests. He had been selected because of his extensive qualifications and lack of prior involvement with either assassination investigation.

Arther received a B.S. with honors in police science from Michigan State University in 1951, and an M.A. in psychology from Colombia University in 1960. Arther has been in private practice in New York City since 1963. He rounded Scientific Lie Detection, Inc., and cofounded the National Training Center of Polygraph Science. He has taught at Brooklyn College, Seton Hall University, the John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Graduate School of Public Administration of New York University.

Arther has authored over 200 professional articles and two books. He is a member of the Academy of Certified Polygraphists and the American Polygraph Association.

Procedures

As noted, Arther was asked to analyze the material related to the three examinations to determine if they had been validly conducted and interpreted and if the results were credible. On June 2, 1978, he made the first of three trips to CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. Following proceders standard for an analysis of past polygraph tests, he reviewed the polygraph charts "blind," that, is, without any knowledge of whether the questions were control, relevant, or irrelevant. The purpose was to try to determine solely from the tracings on the charts to which questions Nosenko appeared to be lying. This procedure was followed on two separate occasions. After each review, Arther then checked the question sheets to determine which questions were control, relevant, or irrelevant (see below for an explanation of these terms).

The other trips were made on June 7 and August 24. Subsequently, Arther submitted his final report, which appears in full following this introductory section.

A polygraph examination

A polygraph examination records physiological responses to questions asked. The polygraphist attempts to design the examination in such a way that the truthful person will react to the control questions and the lying person to the relevant questions The test structure must be constructed so that it poses a threat to both the truthful and untruthful person. The polygraphist attempts to determine the "psychological set" of the examinee. He tries to determine, by reading the physiological activity of the examinee in the polygraph charts, what 191 questions or question areas pose the greatest threat to the examinee's well-being. A "psychological set" is "a person's fears, anxieties, and apprehension, [which] are channeled toward that situation causing the greatest threat to the individual's well-being. He will tune in on that which is of a greater threat, and tune out that of a lesser threat."

Responses to questions are recorded on a polygraph chart, which consists of tracings produced by three different types of psychological reactions associated with the circulatory, nervous, and respiratory systems:

The breathing pattern is recorded by means of a rubber tube placed around the person's chest.

The Galvanic skin response is measured by placing the attachments on either the fingers or the palms.

Changes in blood pressure, heart beat, and pulse rate are obtained by a standard blood pressure cuff placed around the upper arm.

Questions are broken down into three categories:

Relevant--those pertinent to the investigation.

Irrelevant--hopefully, meaningless, nonemotion-producing ones to get the person used to being, questioned and giving answers.

Control--nonrelevant, to which it can be assumed the person will lie during the test. These provide a standard for comparing the responses to relevant questions. If a person reacts more to a proper control question than to the relevant questions, then he is considered to be truthful to the relevants. On the other hand, if he reacts more to the relevants than to the proper control question, he is considered to be lying to the relevants.

Relevant, irrevelant, and control questions are interspersed throughout the polygraph chart. The examination may consist of various series covering, various relevant issues. Each relevant issue must be asked a minimum of two times in a series, but as many times as necessary to conclude that relevant issue successfully. Each series should have a minimum of two charts, but as many charts as necessary to conclude the relevant issues in that series successfully.

The procedure for a polygraph examination is as follows:The polygraphist first conducts a pretest interview, during which the test questions are read to the person exactly as they are going to be asked. It is vital that all questions be properly worded and discussed with the person. Then the actual test is conducted.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF RICHARD O. ARTHER

Materials examined

On June 2, 1978, I went to Central Intelligence Agency headquarters to study the polygraph examinations administered by the CIA to Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. I was given what they claimed was the complete file. When I asked for the polygraphists handwritten notes, handwritten question sheets, chart analyses and other papers from the examinations, I was again told I had the complete file. This amazed me, since I had been given only official reports, typed test

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*From the Curriculum of the U.S. Army Provost Marshal General Polygraph School, Ft. McClellan, Georgia. 192 questions and charts. Handwritten notes have always been included in every polygraph file I have ever reviewed. Either on this day, June 2, or on June 7 (the date of any second visit), I asked for the tape recordings from the examinations. I was told there were none. This also greatly surprised me.

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On both June 2 and June 7, CIA polygraphists were assigned to me to provide all the background information they had on all three examinations. I was assured that they were holding nothing back.

My third trip to the CIA headquarters was on August 24. Again I had a polygraphist assigned to me. I was given only material provided in June.

Procedures

June 2 visit

The purpose of this visit was to get an overview of Nosenko's polygraph examinations, including the quality of the test questions and testing procedures, and to conduct an analysis of the polygraph recordings to determine if I agreed with the interpretations of the CIA polygraph experts.

I spent the first several hours analyzing the polygraph reactions-without knowing if any given question was a relevant, irrelevant, or control Such a procedure is referred to as a "blind chart analysis" and is a standard one, designed to eliminate all preconceived opinions a polygraphist might have as to a persons truthfulness. That is, I formed my opinions as to Nosenko's truthfulness to each test question prior to knowing if any given question was a relevant, irrelevant, or control.

Only after I finished this blind chart analysis did I learn which questions were relevant, irrelevant, or control. I then determined if I agreed with the CIA expert's analysis of Nosenko's polygraph recordings.

On June 2, Kenneth Klein, committee counsel, asked if I wanted to conduct my own polygraph examination of Nosenko and/or personally interview the two CIA polygraph experts. I replied that I would consider both possibilities.

June 7 visit

On June 7, I returned to CIA headquarters to reevaluate the polygraph examinations, decide if Nosenko should be given another polygraph examination, and determine if interviews of the two CIA experts would Drove beneficial. I also did another blind chart analysis to determine if I was consistent with my June 2 analysis. The results were substantially identical.

August 24 visit

The objective of this visit was to reevaluate the charts and question sheets to make sure that my preliminary written report was as accurate as possible. I had had to write it from memory as the CIA requested I not take my notes away from the Agency's control.

Evaluation of the polygraph examinations

April 4, 1964

The April 4, 1964, examination was administered exactly 2 months after Nosenko had defected. It consisted of more than 50 relevant questions, divided into 13 individual tests. (The great major- 193 ity of polygraph examinations are limited to three or four relevant issues.)

It was obvious that the CIA's purpose was to determine Nosenko's truthfulness to a wide variety of issues. Only one question in one test dealt with Lee Harvey Oswald: "Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey Oswald?" The answer was "Yes."

The wording of this question is very general. It is the type of broad question that many polygraphists use only at the very end of a test, after at least three or four relevant questions have been asked on the same issue.

Further, this question was the 51st one asked. It occurred in the 12th test and was the 3rd of 11 questions in the test. Because important questions are generally placed at the beginning, with questions of lesser importance near the rear, it would appear that the Oswald issue had an extremely low priority.

As noted, in this examination over 50 relevant questions were asked. Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, authors of the classic textbook on polygraphy, Lie Detection & Criminal Interrogation (3d edition, 1953), recommended that no more than three relevant test questions be asked. This is because the more a person is asked relevant questions, the more likely he will become "test-tired," that is, even though lying, he will not react because he has become emotionally exhausted.

Further compounding this situation, the examination started at 10:45 a.m. and ended at 3:15 p.m.--a period of 4 1/2 hours--whereas the usual polygraph examination lasts less than 2 hours, with four or five separate tests. Again there is a definite risk that a person will become "test-tired" if the examination runs too long.

Although the CIA expert's opinion was that Nosenko gave a "reaction" (I presume by this he means that Nosenko was "lying") to 6 of the 11 questions, he listed Nosenko as showing "no reaction" to the Oswald question.

In both my blind chart analyses, I picked the Oswald question as showing the greatest valid "lie" reaction by Nosenko, certainly greater than those for the six questions indicated by the CIA expert as having produced lies.

In spite of all the above problems, which would normally lead a polygraphist to believe that Nosenko should be "emotionally unresponsive," Nosenko gives a substantial "lie" reaction to the Oswald question.

October 18, 1966

The October 18, 1966, examination was administered by the same CIA polygraphist who had administered Nosenko's 1964 examination. In his written report, dated October 23, 1966, he stated:

The specific purpose of the October 18, 1966, polygraph test was to:

a. Attempt to establish whether subject was in fact actually involved in the Oswald case while Oswald was in the Soviet Union, or if his association with the Oswald case was only part of his cover story legend.

b. Determine if subject was personally active in the Oswald case in 1963 after President Kennedy's assassination. 194

c. Ascertain if subject received special instructions from KGB to pass on to the American Government regarding the Oswald case.

This series of examinations began on October 18 and ended on October 28. The thrust of the first day of examinations had to do with Oswald. The subsequent examinations, that is, October 19 through October 28, had nothing to do with Oswald. It would appear that the CIA now fully appreciated the significance of Nosenko/Oswald, and that their polygraphist was doing his best to determine Nosenko's truthfulness regarding Oswald.

During the examination, Nosenko was asked 32 questions in which the name Oswald appears. On my blind analysis, I selected the following questions as containing valid indicators of lying:

Did you receive special instructions about what to tell Americans about the Oswald case? (No)

Was Oswald recruited by the KGB as an agent? (No)

Did the KGB consider Oswald abnormal? (Yes)

To your knowledge did Oswald talk to a KGB officer in Mexico?

Is your contact with the Oswald case part of your legend?

Did you hear of Oswald prior to President Kennedy's assassination? (Yes)

Did you hear of Oswald only after President Kennedy's assassination? (No)

Did you personally order __________________in 1959, to collect material on Oswald? (Yes)

Did the KGB instruct you to tell us Oswald was a bad shot? (No)

Did the KGB give the Oswalds any kind of help in their departure from the Soviet Union? (No)

When a xxxx is asked a large number of relevant test questions, he will not react as lying to all questions. Instead he will pick out the questions most significant to him and react as lying only to those. Generally, the questions he does not regard as significant, he will not react to, even though he is lying.

On test series 1, the CIA expert wrote that the "most significant reactions" were to questions 1 and 6 above. For test series 2, the CIA expert wrote that the "most significant reactions" were to questions 5, 6 and 7 above, plus two questions not on my list.*

By having the Oswald questions the first clay of this second series of polygraph examinations, both the validity and reliability were greatly increased.

AUGUST 6, 1968

The third series of polygraph examinations was administered in August 1968. These examinations were conducted by a different CIA polygraph expert. The first series of tests was administered on August 2.

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*Since my blind analysis involved selecting only the two or three questions to which Nosenko was reacting the most strongly within each test, I did not expect to agree fully with the CIA expert. 195

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Twenty-three relevant test questions were asked, but not one had to do with Oswald. The second day of testing was August 6, 1968. At this time, 27 relevant questions preceded the first Oswald question, of which there were 2.

It is obvious that once again the Oswald issue was considered extremely minor. As noted, the Oswald questions did not occur until quite far into the procedure. The longer a question is postponed, the more likely a xxxx will come out as "truthful" because he has become "test tired" that is unresponsive. On the first day, the polygraphist himself acknowledged the possibility of Nosenko's becoming unresponsive when he wrote, after the sixth test of August 2, 1968: No further polygraph tests were administered on this date because the examiner did not want to run the risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalin exhaustion.

Thus he stopped on August 2, after 6 tests and 23 relevant questions. Yet on the second day of testing (August 6), it was not until test 7 and the 28th relevant question that he first asked about Oswald.

Further, the wording of the two Oswald questions was very startling:

Did you actually review the KGB file on Oswald? (Yes)

Did Lee Harvey Oswald receive any KGB training or assignments? (No)

No date was referred to within this first question, a serious error in wording. Nosenko was claiming that he had reviewed Oswald's file before the assassination. Therefore, the question should have been worded:

"Before November 1963, had you actually reviewed Oswald's KGB file?" Leaving out the date meant that Nosenko could have truthfully answered this question even if he had first reviewed Oswald's file after the assassination. In fact, he could have reviewed it 1 week before he was told to defect and still come out as truthful to the question.

The second question is also very poor in that it has the word "or" in it, which automatically means that it is really two questions. When there are two questions within one question, if a person happens to be truthful to one of those questions and lying about the other, generally he will come out as truthful.

For example, if Oswald did not receive any KGB training but was told to assassinate President Kennedy, Nosenko could possibly truthfully answer "yes" to this question.

Comparison of 1966 and 1968 examinations

Not only was the first day of the 1966 examination directed totally toward the Oswald issue, but the questions were very specific and basically worded properly. In 1968, neither was the case.

In 1966, the CIA polygraph expert rendered an opinion that Nosenko was lying both about why he defected and as about Oswald. On the other hand, in 1968, the polygraphist rendered an opinion that Nosenko was "substantially truthful." This second expert even had Nosenko answering truthfully to the question: "Is there any possibility that the KGB would dispatch an officer to defect to the Americans? Answer: "No." 196

The HSCA has informed me that without exception every intelligence officer interviewed--including KGB defectors--has stated that the KGB is capable of dispatching an officer to defect. The fact that Nosenko denies this and the polygraphist finds him truthful makes the entire examination suspect.

Opinions

1. For two major reasons, there would be no point in interviewing the two CIA polygraph experts. First, the charts spoke for themselves. Second, since I supposedly had the complete case file, I would rather go by the file than by someone's memory of what happened some 10 to 14 years ago.

2. Another polygraph examination is not recommended for Nosenko. After such a long period of time and such extensive testing, the results could not be trusted.

3. The polygraph examination given on October 18, 1966, should be considered the most valid and reliable of the, three regarding Lee Harvey Oswald. Given the state of the art in 1966, this examination met the criteria of validity and reliability.

4. Both the 1964 and 1968 examinations involving Lee Harvey Oswald should be disregarded because of the large number of inherent deficiencies in both examinations.

5. On another occasion, I provided four questions which I would have asked had I examined Nosenko:

Did the KGB order Oswald to assassinate President Kennedy?

Before November 1963, had you ever heard of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Did the KGB order you to defect?

Did the KGB instruct you what to tell the Americans about Oswald?

Note: My August 16, 23, 24, and 28 review of the reports, charts, and my blind chart analysis at the Select Committee on Assassinations' offices served only to strengthen the above opinions.

Edited January 16, 2005 by Tim Gratz

[John Simkin]

It is interesting that you have used Joseph Trento's book, The Secret History of the CIA, as your main source for your theories. Trento was of course the long-term assistant of Jack Anderson. See the following discussion of Anderson's background. His employer, Philip Graham, is also a former member of the intelligence service and head of Project Mockingbird, the CIA program to infiltrate the American news media.

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=2911

Anderson's employer at the Washington Post was Philip Graham. He like Anderson was a former member of the intelligence service in the Far East. Graham was also head of Project Mockingbird, the CIA program to infiltrate the American news media.

[Tim Gratz]

John, I was not aware of Trento's background. As you know, Graham was one of the biggest proponents of LBJ as Veep in 1960. Do you think there was possibly a connection between Graham's suicide and the assassination?

Please read my post under "William Harvey and M15" re how we need to interpret books, etc. If the author cites a source that can be verified, it really makes no difference what the author's background is, provided he is accurately summarizing the primary sources. With respect to the author's opinion re the assimilation of the facts he or she reaches based on the facts he or she has gathered, that is something the reader can consider. The important point is the facts presented, which is largely dependent on the quality of the source.

Trento identifies his sources, but I do admit the sources are not "in the public record" and I am going to try to contact Trento to determine if he has copies of documents that can be made available since the subject is of such importance. He does, however, identify his sources.

I would point out, however, that you have credited a book claiming an unidentified oilman financed the assassination. That book does not name the oilman nor does it identify the source of its information. I do not think much credence can be given to a book that does not identify its sources and is unwilling to even name the conspirators.

What lends credence to Trento's book is that (1) he identifies his sources; and (2) he identifies the conspirators by name. Presumably, he did not simply manufacture these names.

I would also point out that the indications that Nosenko was a false defector and that his 1966 polygraph indicated he was lying when he denied LHO was a KGB agent lend support to Trento's theory.

I know you are going to read Trento's book and I know you will find it interesting even if you continue to dispute its theory about the KGB assassination.

Edited January 16, 2005 by Tim Gratz

[Tim Gratz]

To Robert Charles-Dunne (and John Simkin):

I appreciate your time and thought in replying to my posts. Your comments deserve an equally thoughtful reply on my behalf and time does not permit me to do it tonight.

I should be able to reply Sunday night.

Have a great Sunday, ladies and gentlemen.

[Robert Charles-Dunne]

The chilling possibility that Oswald may have re-entered the United States as an agent for the KGB is raised by the fact that a Soviet defector from the KGB who claimed special knowledge of Oswald showed deception when he was asked the following question on a polygraph examination:

"Was Oswald recruited by the KGB as an agent?"

As polygraphs are notoriously unreliable, and even at their purported best are only as good as the polygrapher conducting the tests, I fail to see the relevance.  Were this an exact science, such tests results would be admissible in court.  Yet polygraphs are not admissible, because they are about as reliable as Star Chamber methodology.

The full story of the defection of Yuri Nosenko deserves careful consideration and I am preparing an on-line seminar on it.

Yes, it certainly does deserve careful consideration.  Unfortunately, this has never been extended to the topic by James Angleton or his sycophants [which include Epstein, Trento, Russo and virtually all of the sources they quote.]  I hope your seminar will not repeat the same willful myopia they all displayed, based on your reliance solely upon the output of these Agency shills.

For purposes of this post, I am including the full text of the report of the special committee of the House Select Committee on Assassinations that examined the polygraphs administered to Jack Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald.

The HSCA seemed as intent on denying foreign involvement in the Kennedy assassination as did the Warren Commission.  It did not even mention the Nosenko polygraph.

You, yourself, provide the reason to eschew it, below.

For reasons that are almost impossible to understand, the CIA never asked Nosenko if the KGB had instructed Oswald to kill President Kennedy.  This seems like it was both an obvious and the penultimate question that should have been asked.

Unless the Agency either: A] already knew the answer; B] already knew who killed Kennedy, and that it wasn't the KGB; or C] knew Nosenko didn't know the answer.  Take your pick.

Any one wanting to challenge Trento's assertion that the KGB was involved in the assassination must, I submit, deal with the Nosenko polygraph. It seems there are only three ways to do this: (1) argue that polygraphs are inhrerently unreliable;

No need to argue this point.  That argument was settled ages ago.

(2) argue that there was something wrong with this specific polygraph examination;

You, yourself, provide the evidence for this assertion, below.

or (3) argue that although he was a KGB agent, LHO did not participate in the Kennedy assassination--at least not on behalf of, or with the support or encouragement of the KGB.

The first two points above render this third one irrelevant and superfluous.

However, the most reasonable assumption based on Nosenko’s failed polygraph is that when LHO returned to the U.S. he was a KGB agent.  The chilling inference of that fact is that there may very well have been KGB involvement in the assassination, just as Trento reports.

            BELOW:  THE FULL TEXT OF THE HSCA POLYGRAPH REPORT

THE ANALYSIS OF YURI NOSENKO'S POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION

Submitted by

Richard O. Arther, President, Scientific Lie Detection, Inc., New York, N.Y., and Director, National Training Center on Polygraph Science

Report to the Select Committee on Assassinations

U.S. House of Representatives

Ninety-fifth Congress

Second Session

March 1979

CONTENTS

Introduction

Selection of the expert

Procedures

A polygraph examination

Findings and conclusions of Richard O. Arther

Materials examined

Procedures

Evaluation of the polygraph examinations

Comparison of the 1966 and 1968 examinations

Opinions

INTRODUCTION*

* * As part of its investigation into the possibility that Lee Harvey Oswald was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate John F. Kennedy, the select committee looked into whether he might have been a Soviet agent.

One controversial source of information on this point has been former high-ranking KGB official, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. Nosenko had been, on two occasions, in charge of coordinating surveillance and recruitment of American tourists in Russia. At the time of Oswald's defection to Russia, Nosenko claimed to have personally reviewed Oswald's file.

In February 1964, Nosenko defected to the United States and was placed under custody of the Central Intelligence Agency. Because strong doubts within the Agency that Nosenko was a bona fide defector, he was later placed in solitary confinement for 3 years. He was subjected to extensive interrogation, and during three periods took [missing info?/RHS] 1964; October 18, 1966; and August 6, 1968. The examinations were wide-ranging, but only the second dealt with Oswald in any depth. On all occasions, Nosenko maintained categorically that the KGB had never been interested in Oswald and had never used him as an agent.

The polygraphist conducting the first two tests concluded that on the first test Nosenko had lied, though not to the Oswald question. On the second, he had lied to two of the Oswald questions. Another polygraphist conducted the third test. He concluded that Nosenko was answering truthfully.

Bingo!  The first polygrapher conducted two tests, and reached a different conclusion on these key questions.  The second polygrapher, conducting a third test, disputed the results of the first two.  Below, you uncritically cite the opinion of an expert who found flaws in, and fault with, the methodology of all three tests.  How can you place any faith in the outcome of a test so utterly useless and devoid of evidentiary value?  This is what you use to conclude Moscow helped to kill Kennedy???  This is what constitutes evidence in your mind?

In the 1970's, the CIA investigated the overall handling of the Nosenko matter and concluded, with respect to the first two polygraph tests, that they should be considered "invalid or inconclusive" because deficiencies in the way they were conducted. For example, the first had been designed principally to create a hostile atmosphere for Nosenko. The polygraphist was instructed to tell Nosenko that the tests showed he was lying, regardless of what they actually showed. (The expert, in fact, interpreted the results as showing that Nosenko was lying.) However, the CIA did conclude that the third examination was valid and that the results could be considered credible.

So, by the very evidence you cite herein, the third test - in which Nosenko was found to be truthful - your scenario is rendered rendunant and superfluous.  Despite CIA's own stated cavils about these two tests, you've opted to accept the second one as accurate, because the expert retained by the HSCA gave it the highest likelihood of being correct.

The Warren Commission was aware of the Nosenko issue, but was unable to make much of it since most of the material was classified and unavailable. Similarly, critics of the Warren Commission have not dealt with it in any depth.

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* Materials submitted lot this report by the committee's polygraph consultant were compiled by HSCA staff members G. Robert Blakey and Whitney Warriss.

** Arabic numerals in parentheses at the beginning of paragraphs indicate the paragraph number for purposes of citation and referencing; italic numerals in parentheses in the middle or at the end of sentences indicate references which can be found at the end of each report or section.

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The select committee decided to have an independent analysis of the polygraph tests conducted. First, such an examination had never been carried out. Second, it wished to know if the tests had been properly conducted and interpreted and if the answers could be considered credible. If so, then it could be stated with considerable certainty that Nosenko was a valuable source of information. If not, the committee would explore other avenues in order to decide what, if any, relation Oswald had to the KGB.

Selection of the expert

The committee retained Richard O. Arther to conduct an independent analysis of the three polygraph tests taken by Nosenko. Arther had been a member of the committee's polygraph panel that examined the Jack Ruby and James Earl Ray polygraph tests. He had been selected because of his extensive qualifications and lack of prior involvement with either assassination investigation.

Arther received a B.S. with honors in police science from Michigan State University in 1951, and an M.A. in psychology from Colombia University in 1960. Arther has been in private practice in New York City since 1963. He rounded Scientific Lie Detection, Inc., and cofounded the National Training Center of Polygraph Science. He has taught at Brooklyn College, Seton Hall University, the John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Graduate School of Public Administration of New York University.

Arther has authored over 200 professional articles and two books. He is a member of the Academy of Certified Polygraphists and the American Polygraph Association.

Procedures

As noted, Arther was asked to analyze the material related to the three examinations to determine if they had been validly conducted and interpreted and if the results were credible. On June 2, 1978, he made the first of three trips to CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. Following proceders standard for an analysis of past polygraph tests, he reviewed the polygraph charts "blind," that, is, without any knowledge of whether the questions were control, relevant, or irrelevant. The purpose was to try to determine solely from the tracings on the charts to which questions Nosenko appeared to be lying. This procedure was followed on two separate occasions. After each review, Arther then checked the question sheets to determine which questions were control, relevant, or irrelevant (see below for an explanation of these terms).

The other trips were made on June 7 and August 24. Subsequently, Arther submitted his final report, which appears in full following this introductory section.

A polygraph examination

A polygraph examination records physiological responses to questions asked. The polygraphist attempts to design the examination in such a way that the truthful person will react to the control questions and the lying person to the relevant questions The test structure must be constructed so that it poses a threat to both the truthful and untruthful person. The polygraphist attempts to determine the "psychological set" of the examinee. He tries to determine, by reading the physiological activity of the examinee in the polygraph charts, what 191 questions or question areas pose the greatest threat to the examinee's well-being. A "psychological set" is "a person's fears, anxieties, and apprehension, [which] are channeled toward that situation causing the greatest threat to the individual's well-being. He will tune in on that which is of a greater threat, and tune out that of a lesser threat."

Responses to questions are recorded on a polygraph chart, which consists of tracings produced by three different types of psychological reactions associated with the circulatory, nervous, and respiratory systems:

The breathing pattern is recorded by means of a rubber tube placed around the person's chest.

The Galvanic skin response is measured by placing the attachments on either the fingers or the palms.

Changes in blood pressure, heart beat, and pulse rate are obtained by a standard blood pressure cuff placed around the upper arm.

Questions are broken down into three categories:

Relevant--those pertinent to the investigation.

Irrelevant--hopefully, meaningless, nonemotion-producing ones to get the person used to being, questioned and giving answers.

Control--nonrelevant, to which it can be assumed the person will lie during the test. These provide a standard for comparing the responses to relevant questions. If a person reacts more to a proper control question than to the relevant questions, then he is considered to be truthful to the relevants. On the other hand, if he reacts more to the relevants than to the proper control question, he is considered to be lying to the relevants.

Relevant, irrevelant, and control questions are interspersed throughout the polygraph chart. The examination may consist of various series covering, various relevant issues. Each relevant issue must be asked a minimum of two times in a series, but as many times as necessary to conclude that relevant issue successfully. Each series should have a minimum of two charts, but as many charts as necessary to conclude the relevant issues in that series successfully.

The procedure for a polygraph examination is as follows:The polygraphist first conducts a pretest interview, during which the test questions are read to the person exactly as they are going to be asked. It is vital that all questions be properly worded and discussed with the person. Then the actual test is conducted.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF RICHARD O. ARTHER

Materials examined

On June 2, 1978, I went to Central Intelligence Agency headquarters to study the polygraph examinations administered by the CIA to Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. I was given what they claimed was the complete file. When I asked for the polygraphists handwritten notes, handwritten question sheets, chart analyses and other papers from the examinations, I was again told I had the complete file. This amazed me, since I had been given only official reports, typed test

Uh-Oh Number One!

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*From the Curriculum of the U.S. Army Provost Marshal General Polygraph School, Ft. McClellan, Georgia. 192 questions and charts. Handwritten notes have always been included in every polygraph file I have ever reviewed. Either on this day, June 2, or on June 7 (the date of any second visit), I asked for the tape recordings from the examinations. I was told there were none. This also greatly surprised me.

Uh-Oh Number Two!

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On both June 2 and June 7, CIA polygraphists were assigned to me to provide all the background information they had on all three examinations. I was assured that they were holding nothing back.

My third trip to the CIA headquarters was on August 24. Again I had a polygraphist assigned to me. I was given only material provided in June.

Procedures

June 2 visit

The purpose of this visit was to get an overview of Nosenko's polygraph examinations, including the quality of the test questions and testing procedures, and to conduct an analysis of the polygraph recordings to determine if I agreed with the interpretations of the CIA polygraph experts.

I spent the first several hours analyzing the polygraph reactions-without knowing if any given question was a relevant, irrelevant, or control Such a procedure is referred to as a "blind chart analysis" and is a standard one, designed to eliminate all preconceived opinions a polygraphist might have as to a persons truthfulness. That is, I formed my opinions as to Nosenko's truthfulness to each test question prior to knowing if any given question was a relevant, irrelevant, or control.

Only after I finished this blind chart analysis did I learn which questions were relevant, irrelevant, or control. I then determined if I agreed with the CIA expert's analysis of Nosenko's polygraph recordings.

On June 2, Kenneth Klein, committee counsel, asked if I wanted to conduct my own polygraph examination of Nosenko and/or personally interview the two CIA polygraph experts. I replied that I would consider both possibilities.

June 7 visit

On June 7, I returned to CIA headquarters to reevaluate the polygraph examinations, decide if Nosenko should be given another polygraph examination, and determine if interviews of the two CIA experts would Drove beneficial. I also did another blind chart analysis to determine if I was consistent with my June 2 analysis. The results were substantially identical.

August 24 visit

The objective of this visit was to reevaluate the charts and question sheets to make sure that my preliminary written report was as accurate as possible. I had had to write it from memory as the CIA requested I not take my notes away from the Agency's control.

Evaluation of the polygraph examinations

April 4, 1964

The April 4, 1964, examination was administered exactly 2 months after Nosenko had defected. It consisted of more than 50 relevant questions, divided into 13 individual tests. (The great major- 193 ity of polygraph examinations are limited to three or four relevant issues.)

It was obvious that the CIA's purpose was to determine Nosenko's truthfulness to a wide variety of issues. Only one question in one test dealt with Lee Harvey Oswald: "Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey Oswald?" The answer was "Yes."

The wording of this question is very general. It is the type of broad question that many polygraphists use only at the very end of a test, after at least three or four relevant questions have been asked on the same issue.

Further, this question was the 51st one asked. It occurred in the 12th test and was the 3rd of 11 questions in the test. Because important questions are generally placed at the beginning, with questions of lesser importance near the rear, it would appear that the Oswald issue had an extremely low priority.

Care to speculate why that was so?

As noted, in this examination over 50 relevant questions were asked. Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, authors of the classic textbook on polygraphy, Lie Detection & Criminal Interrogation (3d edition, 1953), recommended that no more than three relevant test questions be asked. This is because the more a person is asked relevant questions, the more likely he will become "test-tired," that is, even though lying, he will not react because he has become emotionally exhausted.

Uh-Oh Number Three!

Further compounding this situation, the examination started at 10:45 a.m. and ended at 3:15 p.m.--a period of 4 1/2 hours--whereas the usual polygraph examination lasts less than 2 hours, with four or five separate tests. Again there is a definite risk that a person will become "test-tired" if the examination runs too long.

Uh-Oh Number Four!

Although the CIA expert's opinion was that Nosenko gave a "reaction" (I presume by this he means that Nosenko was "lying") to 6 of the 11 questions, he listed Nosenko as showing "no reaction" to the Oswald question.

Uh-Oh Number Five!

In both my blind chart analyses, I picked the Oswald question as showing the greatest valid "lie" reaction by Nosenko, certainly greater than those for the six questions indicated by the CIA expert as having produced lies.

Uh-Oh Number Six!

In spite of all the above problems, which would normally lead a polygraphist to believe that Nosenko should be "emotionally unresponsive," Nosenko gives a substantial "lie" reaction to the Oswald question.

October 18, 1966

The October 18, 1966, examination was administered by the same CIA polygraphist who had administered Nosenko's 1964 examination. In his written report, dated October 23, 1966, he stated:

The specific purpose of the October 18, 1966, polygraph test was to:

a. Attempt to establish whether subject was in fact actually involved in the Oswald case while Oswald was in the Soviet Union, or if his association with the Oswald case was only part of his cover story legend.

b. Determine if subject was personally active in the Oswald case in 1963 after President Kennedy's assassination. 194

c. Ascertain if subject received special instructions from KGB to pass on to the American Government regarding the Oswald case.

This series of examinations began on October 18 and ended on October 28. The thrust of the first day of examinations had to do with Oswald. The subsequent examinations, that is, October 19 through October 28, had nothing to do with Oswald. It would appear that the CIA now fully appreciated the significance of Nosenko/Oswald, and that their polygraphist was doing his best to determine Nosenko's truthfulness regarding Oswald.

During the examination, Nosenko was asked 32 questions in which the name Oswald appears. On my blind analysis, I selected the following questions as containing valid indicators of lying:

Did you receive special instructions about what to tell Americans about the Oswald case? (No)

Was Oswald recruited by the KGB as an agent? (No)

Did the KGB consider Oswald abnormal? (Yes)

To your knowledge did Oswald talk to a KGB officer in Mexico?

Is your contact with the Oswald case part of your legend?

Did you hear of Oswald prior to President Kennedy's assassination? (Yes)

Did you hear of Oswald only after President Kennedy's assassination? (No)

Did you personally order __________________in 1959, to collect material on Oswald? (Yes)

Did the KGB instruct you to tell us Oswald was a bad shot? (No)

Did the KGB give the Oswalds any kind of help in their departure from the Soviet Union? (No)

When a xxxx is asked a large number of relevant test questions, he will not react as lying to all questions. Instead he will pick out the questions most significant to him and react as lying only to those. Generally, the questions he does not regard as significant, he will not react to, even though he is lying.

Uh-Oh Number Seven!

On test series 1, the CIA expert wrote that the "most significant reactions" were to questions 1 and 6 above. For test series 2, the CIA expert wrote that the "most significant reactions" were to questions 5, 6 and 7 above, plus two questions not on my list.*

By having the Oswald questions the first clay of this second series of polygraph examinations, both the validity and reliability were greatly increased.

AUGUST 6, 1968

The third series of polygraph examinations was administered in August 1968. These examinations were conducted by a different CIA polygraph expert. The first series of tests was administered on August 2.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

*Since my blind analysis involved selecting only the two or three questions to which Nosenko was reacting the most strongly within each test, I did not expect to agree fully with the CIA expert. 195

Uh-Oh Number Eight!

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Twenty-three relevant test questions were asked, but not one had to do with Oswald. The second day of testing was August 6, 1968. At this time, 27 relevant questions preceded the first Oswald question, of which there were 2.

And yet this number of relevant questions [23 and 27] breaches the protocols established by Inbau and Reid, as cited by the HSCA expert: "Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, authors of the classic textbook on polygraphy, Lie Detection & Criminal Interrogation (3d edition, 1953), recommended that no more than three relevant test questions be asked."

It is obvious that once again the Oswald issue was considered extremely minor. As noted, the Oswald questions did not occur until quite far into the procedure. The longer a question is postponed, the more likely a xxxx will come out as "truthful" because he has become "test tired" that is unresponsive. On the first day, the polygraphist himself acknowledged the possibility of Nosenko's becoming unresponsive when he wrote, after the sixth test of August 2, 1968: No further polygraph tests were administered on this date because the examiner did not want to run the risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalin exhaustion.

Thus he stopped on August 2, after 6 tests and 23 relevant questions. Yet on the second day of testing (August 6), it was not until test 7 and the 28th relevant question that he first asked about Oswald.

Further, the wording of the two Oswald questions was very startling:

Did you actually review the KGB file on Oswald? (Yes)

Did Lee Harvey Oswald receive any KGB training or assignments? (No)

No date was referred to within this first question, a serious error in wording. Nosenko was claiming that he had reviewed Oswald's file before the assassination. Therefore, the question should have been worded:

"Before November 1963, had you actually reviewed Oswald's KGB file?" Leaving out the date meant that Nosenko could have truthfully answered this question even if he had first reviewed Oswald's file after the assassination. In fact, he could have reviewed it 1 week before he was told to defect and still come out as truthful to the question.

The second question is also very poor in that it has the word "or" in it, which automatically means that it is really two questions. When there are two questions within one question, if a person happens to be truthful to one of those questions and lying about the other, generally he will come out as truthful.

For example, if Oswald did not receive any KGB training but was told to assassinate President Kennedy, Nosenko could possibly truthfully answer "yes" to this question.

Comparison of 1966 and 1968 examinations

Not only was the first day of the 1966 examination directed totally toward the Oswald issue, but the questions were very specific and basically worded properly. In 1968, neither was the case.

In 1966, the CIA polygraph expert rendered an opinion that Nosenko was lying both about why he defected and as about Oswald. On the other hand, in 1968, the polygraphist rendered an opinion that Nosenko was "substantially truthful." This second expert even had Nosenko answering truthfully to the question: "Is there any possibility that the KGB would dispatch an officer to defect to the Americans? Answer: "No." 196

The HSCA has informed me that without exception every intelligence officer interviewed--including KGB defectors--has stated that the KGB is capable of dispatching an officer to defect. The fact that Nosenko denies this and the polygraphist finds him truthful makes the entire examination suspect.

Opinions

1. For two major reasons, there would be no point in interviewing the two CIA polygraph experts. First, the charts spoke for themselves. Second, since I supposedly had the complete case file, I would rather go by the file than by someone's memory of what happened some 10 to 14 years ago.

I have above highlighted the word "supposedly," since its very inclusion illustrates that the HSCA reviewer disbelieved it, or at very least found it startling, as he stated herein above.

2. Another polygraph examination is not recommended for Nosenko. After such a long period of time and such extensive testing, the results could not be trusted.

This presupposes that such test results can ever be "trusted," a position one would expect from a polygrapher, but is inconsistent with the posture taken - with cause - by US courts.  This comment regarding the passage of time is interesting.  Presumably, after a certain stale-date, lies become truth, according to this expert reviewer.

3. The polygraph examination given on October 18, 1966, should be considered the most valid and reliable of the, three regarding Lee Harvey Oswald. Given the state of the art in 1966, this examination met the criteria of validity and reliability.

So the HSCA expert placed the greatest confidence in the 1966 test, despite the fact that the 1966 test breached the protocols established by Inbau and Reid, whom the HSCA expert relied upon.

4. Both the 1964 and 1968 examinations involving Lee Harvey Oswald should be disregarded because of the large number of inherent deficiencies in both examinations.

5. On another occasion, I provided four questions which I would have asked had I examined Nosenko:

Did the KGB order Oswald to assassinate President Kennedy?

Before November 1963, had you ever heard of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Did the KGB order you to defect?

Did the KGB instruct you what to tell the Americans about Oswald?

And yet, when given the chance to ask those four questions of Nosenko for himself - or any others that sprang into his mind - the same man declined the opportunity.

Note: My August 16, 23, 24, and 28 review of the reports, charts, and my blind chart analysis at the Select Committee on Assassinations' offices served only to strengthen the above opinions. 

There are any number of good, common-sense rationales for questioning Nosenko's veracity, his true sponsors and motives, et al.  None of them is resolved by - and the key ones weren't even asked in -  these polygraph results.

However, I think the most vital point is one that has you working at cross-purposes with yourself.  You have repudiated the SBT, and seem to be convinced that Oswald didn't fire a rifle at Kennedy [please correct me if this is an inaccurate characterization of your position]. 

If so, of what import is it that, as you hypothesized in your intro: "when LHO returned to the U.S. he was a KGB agent."  If he didn't fire the weapon, it becomes immaterial for whom he acted when he didn't fire the weapon. 

Again, we must at least consider the likelihood that his Soviet "defection" was merely used against him by the actual conspirators, which is precisely what Oswald himself said, upon being asked by reporters while in custody:  "They've arrested me because I lived in the Soviet Union."  [or words to that effect] 

And we must at least consider the likelihood that his brief pantomime of pro-Castro advocacy was precisely what it was designed to be used for: spurious proof, after the assassination, that he must have been acting as an agent of Moscow and Havana.

It's transparently bogus.  But that hasn't stopped it from attracting adherents, apparently. 

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

[Tim Gratz]

To Mr. Miller:

Bill, I assume you are familar with the Cubela story. Kennedy met with French journalist Jean Daniel on Tuesday, November 19, 1963, and said some encouraging words about the prospects for normalizing relations with Cuba. Daniel was scheduled to meet with Castro the next day but Castro changed the meeting to early Friday afternoon. The change in the meeting was probably calculated by Castro, for two things were happening at the very time Castro was meeting with Daniel and Daniel was telling Castro about Kennedy's interest in negotiations.

At one 'o' clock Cuban time, it was early evening in Paris France and a member of Castro's Cabinet, Major Rolando Cubela was meeting with his CIA case officer, Nestor Sanchez. Sanchez was delivering to Cubela a pen specially designed by the CIA with a hypodermic needle capable of injecting a deadly poison into Castro so he would be dead within days without ever knowing who had killed him. Discussions were also under way for the CIA to deliver weapons into Cuba for Cubela to use in a coup against Castro. Cubela had made clear to the CIA that the "elimination" of Castro was necessary for a successful coup. Three weeks earlier, a high-ranking CIA official had met Cubela in Paris and told Cubela that he was the "personal emissary" of Robert F. Kennedy and that Robert F. Kennedy approved of Cubela's plan for Castro's murder and the subsequent coup.

There are sound reasons to believe that Cubela was an agent provocateur for Castro, and that he had reported the earlier meeting to the Maximum Leader. Therefore, Castro knew that while President Kennedy was talking "peace" his brother was plotting his violent death followed by a violent coup to overthrow his regime. That may have been the reason Castro rescheduled the meeting with Daniel to coincide with a second event that also occured at the same time: the murder of John Kennedy in Dallas.

Historians debate whether the Kennedys were aware of the Cubela operation. If they were witting of what the CIA was doing, the talk of peace was as cynical as the Japanese whose peace negotiators were meeting in Washington as the Japanese military prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor. You do not negotiate in good faith with someone whose murder your assistants are planning, obviously. (Any Forum member who thinks to the contrary, please advise, for I would never want to enter any business negotiations with you.

But even if the Kennedys were not aware of the Cubela operation, Castro had every reason to believe they were, due to the representations made to Cubela by Fitzgerald.

So regardless whether the Cubela operation was Kennedy-sanctioned or not, on November 22, 1963, Castro thought that Robert Kennedy had approved a plot to kill him and overthrow his regime. He also knew that even while he was meeting with Jean Daniel, the CIA was scheduled to deliver to his associate Cubela an instrument to violently kill him, believing that Cubela would be Castro's Brutus.

Moreover, regardless of the Kennedys' knowledge, or lack thereof, of the Cubela plot, it is clear that the Kennedys were planning a second invasion of Cuba, despite the "pledge" not to invade Cuba made as part of the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy certainly knew that the replacement of Castro with a democrat would guarantee his re-election. I have even read, but I would neccessarily vouch for it, that Kennedy and Khruschev had made a secret deal to replace Castro.

Castro's justifiable belief that the Kennedys continued to personally plot his murder was enough for him to conclude that the peace talk of Daniel was cynical and hypocritical, and for Castro to take his chances on Johnson. How could Johson be worse than Kennedy, who talked peace while his brother's "personal emissary" flew to Paris to encourage his would-be assassin?

In the event, Castro's gamble succeeded. For LBJ called off the actions against Castro within months after his taking office.

There is little doubt in my mind that had Kennedy not been assassinated, Castro would have been removed prior to the 1964 election, and JFK would have been handily re-elected, with or without LBJ on the ticket. Kennedy would have assured that the moon landing would have occured no later than October of 1968 and Kennedy's choice of his successor (which would not have been LBJ even if he had remained on the tickets and managed to avoid a criminal conviction) would have easily defeated Richard Nixon.

[Tim Gratz]

To Dawn:

What difference does it make who flew Lisa Howard to Cuba? I don't care if it was David Ferrie or Tosh Plumlee who flew her to Havana. I know Howard met with Castro and was trying to encourage peace talks.

I also know what flight Desmond Fitzgerald took to Paris on October 29, 1963, when, after lunching with his daughter Frances, he met at the CIA safe house in and told Major Cubela that Robert Kennedy wanted Cubela to kill Castro for the United States. And I can find out what flight Nestor Sanchez took to Paris, carrying in his pocket the pen that Cubela could use to kill Castro.

Which takes precedence, I wonder, talk of peace or conspiracy to commit murder together with delivery of the murder weapon to the proposed killer? What if you were suing a client for unpaid fees, and he proposed a sit down meeting in a neutral setting to try to negotiate a settlement of the fee dispute. Suppose you found out that your ex-client had hired a "friend" of yours to kill you, and had even delivered a deadly poison to your friend. Would you want to meet with that ex-client? I think not!

I'm not sure why you credit the peace talks given the Cubela operation, the poison pen delivered to Cubela and the plans for a second invasion.

By the way, do you have an opinion why in 1968 Howard was said to despise Robert Kennedy and opposed his election to the U.S. Senate from the State of New York?

Also, I wonder your source for your assertion that Kennedy "called off the Castro hits" (you mean attempted hits, of course). I am aware of no authority that says he did that. On October 31, 1963, Castro's forces captured a group of CIA-trained exiles invading Cuba intending to kill him (showing the CIA was not putting all of its eggs in Cubela's basket, by the way). When Houston and Edwards met with Robert F. Kennedy on May 7, 1962, RFK objected to the CIA's association with gangsters but he did not object to the concept of assassination. And both General Landsdale and Robert Strange McNamara talked of the assassination of Castro.

Threre is an old adage, I'm sure you've heard it: actions speak louder than words, President Kennedy may have talked about peace, but the actions of our country in launching scheme after scheme to kill our bearded neighbor spoke far louder than mere words of peace.

Edited January 17, 2005 by Tim Gratz

[Tim Gratz]

To Robert Charles-Dunne:

I gather from the your post #33 that it would be your position that the people behind the plot (who you believe were trying to "pin it on Castro" to generate a "groundswell of support" for another invasion of Cuba) were not the people orchestrating the cover-up (e.g LBJ who ordered his aid to tell the DA in Dallas to remove any references to a foreign conspiracy and pleaded with Earl Warren to chair the commission to prevent a war that could kill 40 million innocent Americans).

This is an important point because Dawn has argued that Castro could not have "done it" because he was not in a position to control the cover-up. But John has pointed out that the cover-up could very well have been orchestrated by people who played no role in the assassination. Even Robert Kennedy had reasons of his own to want to discourage a full investigation. (Discovering the conspirators would not bring back his brother but the investigation might reveal some of the "dark side of Camelot" injuring his brother's historical reputation and damaging his own political ambitions as well.)

I do find it interesting that you believe this grand conspiracy was planned to prompt an invasion of Cuba but the your conspirators failed in their objective because the last thing LBJ wanted was a war with Cuba that might escalate into a nuclear exchange. I suggest Castro did it to stop the continued CIA plots against his life and to stop the Kennedys' plan for a second, successful invasion of Cuba. If Castro did it, he got what he wanted--because LBJ did shut down the operations against Cuba. You objected to my scenario since how did Castro know he would get what he wanted if he replaced JFK with LBJ. But obviously your proposed conspirators could not be certain they would get what they wanted either, and in the end they did not.

In think a scenario of a plot that accomplished the conspirator's objectives is inherently more logical than a scenario in which the plot of the conspirators failed.