Jim Fetzer: The Strange Death of Paul Wellstone

[Evan Burton]

"Ask yourself why three Ph.D.s--one also an Ed.D.--are committing themselves to the thesis that Paul Wellstone was taken out for political reasons."

No offense to those people, but they (apparently) have no expertise in aviation and are not aware of the pitfalls. They do not necessarily have the expertise to determine the conditions of flight and how events may have affected a pilot. They are not aware of the skills required for IFR, UA, or other flight regimes.

[Evan Burton]

"TWA 800 and Electromagnetic Interference: Work Already Completed and Work that Still Needs to be Done By Elaine Scarry"

Now this reference is completely ridiculous. The causes of TWA800's explosion were very well documented. People tried to claim it was a USN missile, that it was a bomb, etc - it was a combination of events.

In regard to aviation accidents, people should look up 'the Reason model' and the Boeing 'chain of events'.

[Evan Burton]

Low-airspeed systems recommended by NTSB

by Gordon Gilbert

The NTSB believes currently required stall-warning systems are not adequate to cover all critically low-airspeed conditions and has recommended that the FAA require the installation of so-called “low-airspeed alert” systems on all airplanes used in FAR Parts 121 and 135 commercial operations.

The Safety Board's recommendation stems from its investigation into several Part 121 and Part 135 accidents since 1982 (most recently the crash of a King Air that killed the two pilots and six passengers, including Sen. Paul Wellstone [D-Minn.]) in which “a stall or failure to maintain airspeed during the approach or landing phases was cited as a causal or contributing factor and in which icing was not cited as a factor.”

In the Wellstone accident, the NTSB determined that the airplane was being flown below the “recommended approach speed for about the last 50 seconds of the flight.”

Current systems provide a warning at a speed that is at least five knots higher than the stall speed. But the NTSB doesn’t believe this is adequate for all situations. “Stall warnings do not always provide flight crews with timely notification of developing hazardous low-airspeed conditions. For example, abrupt maneuvering can increase angle of attack so rapidly that a stall could occur nearly simultaneously with the stall warning, and ice accumulation, which raises the stall speed, could degrade the stall-warning margin to the point at which little or no stall-warning is provided.”

Because the King Air carrying Wellstone did not have a cockpit voice recorder, because of the approximate nature of the airspeed calculations and because abrupt maneuvering or even small amounts of ice accumulation can defeat the airplane’s stall-warning system, the Safety Board was not able to determine “when or if the stall-warning horn activated before the onset of the stall.” Regardless of when or whether the stall-warning horn activated, it is clear that the pilots “failed to maintain airspeed during the approach,” the NTSB said.

A 1996 FAA/industry report titled “The Interfaces Between Flight Crews and Modern Flight Deck Systems” expressed concern about the history of Part 121 and 135 accidents involving lack of low-airspeed awareness in the context of flight crews’ monitoring automated systems. This report states: “Flight crews may not be provided adequate awareness of airplane energy state, particularly when approaching or trending toward a low-energy state…Transport-category airplanes are required to have adequate warnings of an impending stall, but at this point the airplane may already be in a potentially hazardous low-energy state. Better awareness is needed of energy state trends such that flight crews are alerted prior to reaching a potentially hazardous low-energy state.”

Low-airspeed Warnings Proposed for New Airplanes

Regulatory action toward requiring a low-airspeed warning system when using autopilots is already under way as a result of a Jan. 9, 1997 accident involving a Comair Brasilia that crashed near Monroe, Mich., during a rapid descent after an uncommanded roll excursion in icing. Also considered was the March 19, 2001 incident involving another Comair Brasilia, whose crew lost control during cruise and descended 10,000 feet after the airplane encountered icing. A low-airspeed alert system was developed for the Brasilia, and installation is mandated by an AD.

An FAA/industry aviation rulemaking advisory committee has proposed a change to FAR 25.1329 (automatic pilot systems) that would require low-airspeed protection and alerting during autopilot operations for newly certified transport-category airplanes. But the ARAC recommendation has yet to be turned into an FAA notice of proposed rulemaking.

The requirement for speed protection is based on the premise that reliance on flight-crew attentiveness to airspeed indications alone during autopilot operation “is not adequate to avoid unacceptable speed excursions outside the speed range of the normal flight envelope…Standard stall warning and high-speed alerts are not always timely enough for the flight crew to intervene to prevent unacceptable speed excursions during [autopilot] operation,” the NTSB said.

For example, a low-speed alert and a transition to the speed-protection mode at approximately 1.2 Vs or an equivalent speed defined in terms of Vsr (reference stall speed) for the landing flap configuration has been found to be acceptable. If a low-airspeed alert activates when the airspeed drops below 1.2 Vs, pilots would receive several seconds advance notice before reaching the airplane’s estimated stall speed. In addition, if the pilots maintain an airspeed at or above the threshold set by such an early low-airspeed alert the additional airspeed could prevent an accelerated stall initiated by an abrupt last-second maneuver or provide an improved speed margin above a premature stall caused by ice accumulation on the wings.

The Board said it recognizes “that there are unresolved technical, operational and human-factors issues that will need to be carefully evaluated and addressed in connection with the design and implementation of a low-airspeed alert system.” Some of the issues that should be addressed include defining the target speed at which the alert system would activate; effectively integrating such a system with other aircraft systems; preventing nuisance alarms and flight-crew over-reliance on such a system; differentiating such an alert from other kinds of cockpit alert and warning; and developing flight-crew procedures and training for the use of such systems.

“Despite these unresolved issues, the Safety Board concludes that the development of and requirement for the installation of low-airspeed alert systems could substantially reduce the number of accidents and incidents involving flight-crew failure to maintain airspeed.”

At press time the FAA had not responded to the recommendation.

http://www.ainonline.com/issues/01_04/01_0...irspeedp32.html

[Evan Burton]

"The Saab 340B’s autopilot was in the altitude-hold mode and the engines were producing near-flight-idle power during a circling approach. The stall-warning system did not activate before the aircraft stalled. The flight crew recovered control of the aircraft 112 feet above the ground."

"The flight crew of the Ilyushin IL-76TD freighter conducted two approaches based on a user-defined global positioning system waypoint that incorrectly depicted the location of the runway threshold. The first approach led to a go-around. The second approach was not stabilized; the descent rate was high when the airplane struck rising terrain."

"Improper Response to Stall Warning Cited in A310 CFIT off Ivory Coast - The pilot flying applied forward pressure on the control column but did not increase power when the stall-warning system activated during takeoff. The airplane descended into water soon thereafter. The controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT) accident occurred on a dark night with limited external visual references available for the flight crew."

"Investigators said that published procedures were not followed when the repair was performed more than 20 years before a structural failure occurred and the aircraft broke apart during flight."

"Noncompliance With Instrument Approach Procedures Cited in King Air CFIT Accident in Australia - The report said that dark night conditions during the emergency medical services positioning flight also were a significant factor in the fatal controlled-flight-into-terrain accident."

"During the approach, the crew was unaware of 40-knot winds that led to the controlled-flight-into-terrain accident during instrument meteorological conditions. At the time of the accident, no emergency locator transmitter was required on the turbojet; the accident site was not located until nearly three years after the aircraft was reported missing."

"Pilot Becomes Spatially Disoriented, Aircraft Breaks Apart During Descent - A Raytheon Super King Air 200 was transporting members of a collegiate basketball team in instrument meteorological conditions when the alternating-current electrical system malfunctioned. The report said that the pilot became spatially disoriented. The pilot’s control inputs placed a large aerodynamic load on the aircraft and caused it to break apart at low altitude."

"Pilot Incapacitation by Hypoxia Cited in Fatal Five-hour Flight of Beech King Air - The report said that the pilot apparently was unable physically to respond to air traffic control radio transmissions after the aircraft ascended above the assigned altitude, 25,000 feet. The aircraft likely continued flying on autopilot, with no input from the pilot, for several hours before it struck terrain."

"The crew of a Raytheon Beech 1900D used self-programmed global positioning system (GPS) waypoints for navigation during a night approach to a Canadian airport with weather conditions below minimums for the published nonprecision instrument approach."

"The Boeing 747 was configured for a dry-runway landing when heavy rain occurred on final approach to Bangkok, Thailand. The captain told the first officer (the pilot flying) to go around but then retarded the throttle levers when the main landing gear touched the runway. The airplane was substantially damaged. None of the occupants was injured seriously during the approach-and-landing accident, but the delay in evacuation of the aircraft focused attention on improving training for emergencies."

"Investigators concluded that a flammable mixture of fuel and air in the center-wing fuel tank likely was ignited by voltage from an external short circuit that was conducted into the tank by electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system." TWA 800

"Investigators said that the controlled-flight-into-terrain accident resulted from the flight crew’s failure to properly plan for a night departure from an unfamiliar airport. The crew of the U.S. Air Force C-130H did not follow published instrument departure procedures."

"The accident report said that the corporate pilot selected an incorrect source of distance-measuring equipment information and did not fly the proper descent profile for the instrument landing system approach. Airspeed decreased rapidly during the final segment of the approach before the Beech Super King Air 200 stalled and struck the ground."

"Investigators concluded that the airplane had a blocked pitot tube and that, during departure, the flight crew became confused by false indications of increasing airspeed and did not respond to a stall warning. All the occupants were killed when the airplane struck the Caribbean Sea off the northern coast of the Dominican Republic."

"Deviations from standard operating procedures, deficient crew resource management and crew distraction were cited as factors in a controlled-flight-into-terrain accident that caused substantial airplane damage but no injuries"

"The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said that the absence of adequate aircraft-certification standards and operating procedures for flight in icing conditions was a probable cause of the accident, and that the flight crew’s acceptance of a relatively low airspeed restriction while operating in icing conditions was a contributing factor."

http://www.flightsafety.org

Aviation can be a hazardous business.

[Evan Burton]

Now, looking at the safety recommendations, the first thing I notice is:

"These discrepancies included the following: Aviation Charter was not operating in accordance with its weight and balance load manifest procedures, it did not have adequate stall recovery guidance, it did not have consistent deicer boot operational guidance, it did not have an in-range checklist, it was not adequately making its pilots aware of its standard operating procedures (SOPs), and it was not training its pilots on CRM in accordance with its FAA-approved training module."

Edited September 17, 2005 by Evan Burton

[Evan Burton]

Also:

"However, stall warnings do not always provide flight crews with timely notification of developing hazardous low-airspeed conditions. For example, abrupt maneuvering can increase angle-of-attack so rapidly that a stall could occur nearly simultaneously with the stall warning, and ice accumulation, which raises the stall speed, could degrade the stall warning margin to the point at which little or no stall warning is provided."

Edited September 16, 2005 by Evan Burton

[Evan Burton]

"However, because the airplane was not equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), because of the approximate nature of the airspeed calculations, and because abrupt airplane maneuvering or even small amounts of ice accumulation can defeat the airplane’s stall warning system, the Safety Board was not able to determine when or if the stall warning horn activated before the onset of the stall."

[Evan Burton]

"The Safety Board has investigated numerous accidents and incidents involving commercial flight crews that inadvertently failed to maintain adequate airspeed. For example, the Board has investigated at least 11 events since 1982 involving Part 135 flights and at least 7 events involving Part 121 flights in which stall or failure to maintain airspeed during the approach or landing phases was cited as a causal or contributing factor and in which icing was not cited as a factor."

Edited September 16, 2005 by Evan Burton

[Len Colby]

Evan beware Dr. Fetzer has nasty streak and is a bit paranoid.

Get ready to be attacked.

He accused me of being "cognitively impaired", then decided I was disreputable and probably an agent of the US gov't and now he thinks I'm crazy!! Funny he also claimed I (the stupid, corrupt, crazy spy) was making ad hominem attacks.

If you go back over the older posts you will see that he lashed out at Steve and Pat for very mildly and politely disagreeing with him. He accused one of being "massively ignorant" among other things and then denied having called him an idiot.

I saw in your bio that you are a military officer. I wouldn't be surprised if Fetzer starts insinuating that you must be an intelligence asset working on a joint US/Australian project to discredit him. How far is Norwa from Melbourne? Maybe you are one of the "spooks" keeping track John Costella the grammar school teacher who fancies him self a major threat to the US gov't.

Len

Edited September 16, 2005 by Len Colby

[Len Colby]

Fetzer please explain how this GPS manipulation worked I imagine your high school teacher is an expert on that too.

Explain how this contraption diverted one plane until its doom and then affected another plane 500 miles [+/- 800 Km] away but no other planes or people reported any problems? O'Hare the World's busiest airport is probably only 10 - 20 furthur away.

Since the target was the Wellstone plane we would have to assume what ever was done had a 500 mile radius which would include all of Minnesota and Wisconsen and parts of Illinos, Iowa, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, Manitoba and Ontario.

Do you have any evidence that such technology exists?

Do you have any evidence that they were using GPS? They were definately using VOR my understanding is that pilots use one or the other but not both [Evan?].

How could the assassins know they would use GPS?

[David G. Healy]

Mr. Colby ranted on:

Evan beware Dr. Fetzer has nasty streak and is a bit paranoid.

Get ready to be attacked.

He accused me of being "cognitively impaired", then decided I was disreputable and probably an agent of the US gov't and now he thinks I'm crazy!!

If you go back over the older posts you see that he lashed out at Steve and Pat for very mildly and politely disagreeing with him. He accused one of being "massively ignorant" among other things and then denied having called him an idiot.

I saw in your bio that you are a military officer. I wouldn't be surprised if Fetzer will start insinuating that you must be an intelligence asset working on a joint US/Australian project to discredit him.

[...]

____________

Considering your entire career here on this forum (evidently other forums, too) has been spent attacking Jim Fetzer, one MIGHT come to the conclusion, it is YOU Mr. Colby, that miay be a 'bit' "paranoid", not to mention uncomfortable with published authors findings and conclusions regarding specific subjects. Of course if you're a published author and qualified to correct and/or add to the evidentiary mix regarding certain subjects -- that'd be nice to know... If all you have is "opinion", well you know what we say in the states; opinions are like a**holes, everyone has one.

Dr. Tink tried to ease your entry to this forum - now, he's a known quantity, when it comes to JFK [not the Z-film much anymore, I'm sorry to opine] probably careless about Paul Wellstone's death, other than the cursory, "Too Bad, he seemed a nice guy and took his job seriously". You, on the other hand aren't a known commodity! Have you published (other than the internet forum posts) anything related to Fetzer's current subject matter? Title, and reviews of the titles? If the best you have is 'bashing' those that present material that may be uncomforable for you and/or, yes, a employer, perhaps - here's a suggestion: USNET alt.conspiracy.jfk ! Well, better yet: alt.assassination.jfk would perhaps suit you bette., The "conspiracy" site has a habit of calling those that can't deliver and/or skew related evidence in the death of JFK, LIARS... those usually high tail it to the .john board, where anything/anyone that supports WCR findings is protected....

Even Dr. Tink's upcoming presention partner Dr. GaryA. posts to the 'conspiracy' board, has for years ---

Hey, how about starting a pro USGovenment Paul Wellstone conspiracy USNET board? That good taste? Well, hell, no need for thanks - just trying to help your cause...

David Healy

Edited September 16, 2005 by David G. Healy

[Evan Burton]

Do you have any evidence that they were using GPS? They were definately using VOR my understanding is that pilots use one or the other but not both [Evan?].

How could the assassins know they would use GPS?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

You would only be flying one type of an approach at any one time, however it is common to have another system as a backup. This is especially so if the approaches follow the same path but even if they do not, having another approach set up can help you maintain situational awareness.

[Len Colby]

HOW ABOUT 2 PILOTS SIMPLEY LETTING THE PLANE RUN OUT OF FUEL?

(see below)

People screw up Jim it happens. It even happens to very competent people, let alone incompetents like Conry and Guess. I know you idolized Wellstone and I imagine it is easier for you to picture him as a martyr than the victim of an unfortunate accident, but the fact just don't support your conclusions

The real world is not the Land of Oz where a certificate [remember the scarecrow's diploma] in and of itself makes you smart or qualified. So Conry had an ATP, just like 80 % professional pilots.

So he just passed his flight check irrelevant. Since pilots are tested every 6 months all pilots who crash have been recently tested. Why would a pilot be less likely to crash the week following his flight check rather the week proceeding it?

I imagine if some one did a statistical analysis of crashes and classified them by the number of weeks since the pilot's last flight check the distribution would be fairly even. Every six month would be every 26 weeks, 1/26 would be with in a week, 1/26 would be1 - 2 weeks after etc. Another words the check is just another irrelevant tidbit unless we remember he didn't fly fast enough out of a simulated stall.

Date: January 25, 1990

Type: Boeing 707-321B

Registration: HK 2016

Operator: Avianca, the Airline of Columbia

Where: Cove Neck, New York

Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/04

Report Date: April 30, 1991

Pages: 285

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract. New format.]

On January 25. 1990, at approximately 2134 eastern standard time,

Avianca Airlines flight 052, a Boeing 707-321B with Colombian

registration HK 2016, crashed in a wooded residential area in Cove

Neck, Long Island, New York. AVA052 was a scheduled international

passenger flight from Bogota, Colombia, to John F. Kennedy

International airport, New York, with an intermediate stop at Jose

Maria Cordova Airport, near Medellin, Colombia. Of the 158 persons

aboard, 73 were fatally injured.

Because of poor weather conditions in the northeastern part of the

United States, the flightcrew was place in holding three times by air

traffic control for a total of about 1 hour and 17 minutes. During

the third period of holding, the flightcrew reported that the airplane

could not hold longer than 5 minutes, that it was running out of fuel,

and that it could not reach its alternate airport, Boston-Logan

International. Subsequently, the flightcrew executed a missed approach

to John F. Kennedy International Airport. While trying to return to

the airport, the airplane experienced a loss of power to all four

engines and crashed approximately 16 miles from the airport.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable

cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to adequately

manage the airplane's fuel load, and their failure to communicate an

emergency fuel situation to air traffic control before fuel exhaustion

occurred. Contribution to the accident was the flightcrew's failure

to use an airline operation control dispatch system to assist them

during the international flight into a high-density airport in poor

weather. Also contributing to the accident was inadequate traffic

flow management by the Federal Aviation Administration and the lack of

standardized understandable terminology for pilots and controllers for

minimum and emergency fuel states.

http://dnausers.d-n-a.net/dnetGOjg/250190.htm

Edited September 17, 2005 by Len Colby

[Evan Burton]

After reading the accident investigation report, I can only concur with its findings.

The aircraft was high on approach, and had to lose a lot of height to get back on the correct descent profile. When they found themselves off the radial and at low airspeed, they should have called a missed approach and gone around again. Instead, they pushed a bad approach and it killed them.

This situation has happened before, and it will most likely happen again.

[Len Colby]

That Colby is a slick one. He will deny the obvious and twist the truth, ignore evidence and assail character until no one will have the courage to speak up or search for the truth! It is a method tried and true. It is a method that worked for Hitler and it works for Bush just as well.

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.ph...indpost&p=39724

Jim - My response to this should be to tell you to perform a biologically impossible act. You complain that I "assail character" and in the next sentence you compare me to Hitler*! This is especially unconscionable considering you should know that I'm Jewish from our participation in the Yahoo Forum and that you repeatedly cite Bollyn a Holocaust 'revisionist' who has close ties to various neo-Nazi's as a reliable source.

It's ironic that the person who complains the most about others 'assailing character' and nasty posts is the worst offender. Cite ONE example of where I have intimidated others "until no one will have the courage to speak up or search for the truth!". Wasn't it you who attacked Pat and Steve? Isn't it you who keeps on implying that anyone who agrees with me is being "taken in" "gullible", "a sap" or "a dupe"**?

To quote Joseph Welsh from the Army-McCarthy hearings "Have you no sense of decency, sir? At long last, have you left no sense of decency?"

*Comparing me to Bush as bad enough

** He used those words just in the post I'm quoting, anyone who has been following this thread will have seen various examples of this