Dr. Athan G. Theoharis

[William Kelly]

Dr. Athan Theoharis

Ernie Lazar mentions Dr. Athan Theoharis in the Harry Dean FBI Informant? Thread.

Theoharis is a professor at Marquette University where I believe John McAdams is also a professor in residence, which made me wonder if they are pals, and whether McAdams straightened Theoharis for all the mistakes in Anna K. Nelson's contribution to his anthology A Culture of Secrecy?

Na, McAdams only bothers to try to straighten out the mistakes of Conspiracy Theorists, and he wouldn't peer review a fellow professor's book and inform him that one of his primary contributors didn't know what she was taking about.

But Dr. Theoharis, who was recruited to work with the Church Intelligence Committee, is a renown FBI document expert, as Ernie attests, and wrote a number of books on the subject.

Yet he published an Anthology on secrecy in government in which Anna Nelson wrongfully attests that the JFK Act, "was designed to strip away theories that implicated federal agencies in a conspiracy," that the third shot, "killed Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally," and the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) "examined all three of the assassinations that had rocked the country during the 1960s."

Theoharis' grad assistants and fact checkers should have picked up those obvious mistakes, which discredits the whole effort.

Among Theoharis' books is one on FBI COINTELPRO activities and another on the FBI's role in counterintelligence against Soviet and Communist spies. While both books are important, the COINTELPRO book mentions how the COINTELPRO program became known from the breakin at the Media, Pa. FBI office in 1970 when 1000 COINTELPRO docs were stolen and later released through various publications.

The COINTELPRO program is connected to the assassination of President Kennedy because the program was set up in the late 50s to monitor and infiltrate the Socialist Workes Party and Communist Party USA, whose magazines were subscribed to by the accused assassin and featured in the backyard photos along with the weapons said to have been used to kill the President and officer JD Tippitt. So the program went from 1956 to 1970 without anyone outside the FBI knowing about it, and the documents stolen from the Media FBI office are unique in that they were not intended to be released nor are they redacted.

What is unique about both of Theoharis' books on COINTELPRO and Chasing Spies, is a common attribute among mainstream academics, in that despite the political and historic nature of both books, both fail to even mention the assassination of the President, despite the fact that this major event happens right in the middle of both stories. Theoharis just mentions that the new President is LBJ, as if there were no changes in leadership or policies.

Here's some of the details for those who are interested:

/index.php?showtopic=15234&pid=195958&st=0& - entry195958

Anna K. Nelson, the distinguished professor from American University, was nominated to the ARRB by the Organization of American Historians, and was the only women on the ARRB. She objected to the hiring of Doug Horne as an analysist of military records because he had read books on the subject and acknowledged being a "conspiracy theorist."

When I came across an anthology on secrecy in government which included a chapter that she contributed, I was quite surprised at what she wrote, and later learned that Doug Horne was also surprised.

One of the things that was hammered into Doug's head by the lawyers who hired him (Marwell and Gunn) was that the JFK Act did not consitute a new investigation of the assassination and it was not the responsibility of the ARRB to solve or even inquire into the crime, but rather to identify assassination related government records and release them, or classify them for future release.

"A Culture of Secrecy The Government Versus the People's Right to Know," Anthology edited by Athan G. Theoharis (University Press of Kansas, 1998), with contribution by Matthew M. Aid, Jon Wiener, Anna Kasten Nielson, et al.

In Chapter 10 The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board. By Anna Kasten Nelson, she notes that one CIA agency representative, during a ARRB briefing, actually said,

"I've never seen any information released that ever did anyone any good."

The one thing that surprised me the most was when Anna Kasten Nelson wrote:

"The John F. Kennedy Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992 marked an important milestone in the ongoing conflict between the public's need to know and the culture of secrecy that evolved during the fifty years of the cold war. The act was designed to strip away theories that implicated federal agencies in a conspiracy to murder the young president. Its unintended consequence has been to crack open the door to the inner sanctums of the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies."

As Doug Horne notes in his response to this statement, the act was not designed to strip away theories but to release records and let the people decide for themselves what to believe.

It soon became clear however, that Nelson did not only have the wrong idea of what she was doing on the ARRB, but she didn't know the basic facts of the assassination, as she also wrote:

"…The Warren Commission Report concluded that President Kennedy had been killed by bullets fired by only one assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, from the sixth floor of the Texas Book Depository. Three shots had been fired; one hit the president but did not kill him, one went astray, and the third killed Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally of Texas, who shared the president's limousine as it slowly moved through downtown Dallas. The commission further concluded that, while Oswald was influenced by Marxist ideology and was sympathetic to Fidel Castro's government in Cuba, his decision to kill the president came from internal demons, not an external conspiracy…"

Of course it was the first shot that hit the president but did not kill him and reputedly went on to wound Connally, and not the third shot, that killed Kennedy.

Then she goes on to indicate that she also knew little about the investigations that produced the records she was suppose to be releasing when she wrote:

"The most thorough and direct study of President Kennedy's assassination was conducted in 1978-79 by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), which examined all three of the assassinations that had rocked the country during the 1960s those of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy…the HSCA questioned the 'single-bullet theory,' the conclusion that a single bullet killed the president and wounded Governor Connally…"

While the HSCA investigated the JFK and MLK cases, it did not investigate the RFK assassination, and the MLK HSCA investigation files remain sealed; ostensibly until Oliver Stone makes a movie about that assassination.

One of the basic factors written into the JFK Act was that the members and the staff would not include anyone who had worked for the government or been involved in the previous investigations, but she misinterpets this to mean:

"…How do five individuals deliberately chosen for their unfamiliarity with Kennedy assassination documents, arguments and theories, carry out their legal mandate?…"

The Review Board was to be composed of five individuals who had no prior experience working for the government, not deliberately chosen for their unfamiliarity with the JFK documents. They were supposed to be familiar with the documents as historians and librarians and scholars….

NEW YORK, Jan. 26 /PRNewswire/

-- Although he believes that J. Edgar Hoover did not deserve to have the FBI headquarters building named after him, Dr. Athan Theoharis, one of the leading authorities on Hoover's FBI, does not think that Hoover's name should now be removed as some Americans have requested.

"I believe that J. Edgar Hoover was a tyrant with a talent for organization, administration and promotion," Dr. Theoharis, a professor of modern U.S. history at Marquette University in Milwaukee, told a reporter for this week's issue of Parade magazine.

"He built the bureau, to which he was married from 1924 to 1972,…"

Chasing Spies

Political Counterintelligence

by Athan Theoharris

Chapter 5 of Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan, Temple University Press, 1978

Having secured authorization to investigate "subversive activities" and having carefully devised procedures to preclude disclosure of questionable investigative activities, FBI officials no longer were principally concerned that politically motivated investigations could be effectively challenged. They, however, did not remain satisfied merely to compile extensive files and indexes on organizations and individuals targeted as threats to the nation's security. The FBI became a national political force committed to averting "potential subversion," and in time devised alternative extralegal measures to safeguard the "national security."

For one, their conservatism rendered FBI officials responsive to using politically information obtained through intensive investigations to discredit dissident activities. In addition, because much of this information either had been illegally obtained (whether through wiretaps, break-ins, or without specific legislative or executive authority) or involved no criminal activities, FBI officials possessed quantities of otherwise unusable data.

At first, such FBI political efforts were nonstructured, informal, and instituted on an ad hoc basis. On one level, the FBI voluntarily alerted White House officials to the "subversive" background of dissident groups and individuals. (This political effort is discussed in greater detail in the succeeding chapter.) FBI officials simultaneously sought to influence national policy by a conscious policy of leaks to "friendly" sources in the media, the Congress, or conservative organizations.

If these efforts dated from the early 1940s, the first attempt to formalize this response occurred in February 1946. On February 27, D. M. Ladd (head of the FBI's Intelligence Division) wrote FBI Director Hoover to recommend that the bureau influence "public opinion" by releasing "educational material" through "available channels." This effort, Ladd emphasized, could undermine Communist support in the labor unions, among prominent religious personalities and "liberal elements," and demonstrate "the basically Russian nature of the Communist Party in this country." The Catholic priest Father John Cronin was one recipient of this FBI informational program; given access to FBI files, Cronin used them to prepare reports in 1945 for the American Catholic bishops and in 1946 for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Radio commentator Walter Winchell and other conservative reporters as well as congressmen were other recipients of similar FBI leaks. 1

In time, this FBI political effort was further refined. In addition to maintaining FBI records, the FBI's Crime Records Division was assigned other, political responsibilities. These included liaison with "friendly" congressmen, authors, and news reporters. By the 1960s the bureau developed a formally described Mass Media Program wherein derogatory information on prominent radicals was leaked to the news media. The Crime Records Division, moreover, helped draft speeches and/or letters for members of Congress and leaked information to conservative authors (like Don Whitehead) who in turn wrote books and articles either highly favorable toward the bureau or critical about bureau critics. Similarly, to further the bureau's liaison role, beginning in 1950 FBI agents were ordered to collect information first on candidates for Congress and then on prominent state political leaders -- the resultant files included information about the individual's attitudes toward the bureau and personal background. Earlier, on his own initiative, FBI Director Hoover approached American Legion officials to develop a liaison relationship. Hoover proposed (and a November 1940 Legion conference concurred) that Legion members furnish confidential information to the FBI. Last, while not the Crime Records Division's exclusive responsibility, that division (as well as the bureau division having this assignment) serviced White House name check requests. 2

These efforts to contain radicalism by leaking derogatory information about prominent radicals and organizations did not constitute the sole political activities of FBI officials. They also sought to reduce the ability of radical organizations to function effectively or to recruit new members. For a time, with the intensification of Cold War fears and the rise of McCarthyite politics, these informal efforts bore fruit. In 1948, for example, twelve Communist party leaders were indicted under the Smith Act of 1940….

Reflecting this conservative concern, FBI Director Hoover sent, in the spring of 1956, a series of reports to the White House alleging Communist influence and involvement in the civil rights movement. President Eisenhower responded by requesting that Hoover brief the Cabinet on the Southern racial situation. Hoover did so, emphasizing particularly the Communists' role in lobbying for civil rights objectives and the NAACP's plans to push for civil rights legislation. Following up on this effort, in 1957 the FBI prepared and disseminated to the military intelligence agencies a 137-page report on Communist influence and strategy toward the NAACP. 4

Sensitive to the restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court's rulings on the uses of the bureau's investigative findings, still alarmed over the seriousness of the internal security problem, in August 1956 FBI officials devised a formal program to provide alternative means for containing Communists.

Having successfully averted meaningful executive oversight (whether by the president or the attorney general) either when formulating the Security Index program or when securing presidential authorization to investigate "subversive activities," FBI officials unilaterally instituted a so-called counterintelligence program to neutralize the U.S. Communist party -- the first of a series of programs (captioned COINTELPROs). This COINTELPRO was initiated without the knowledge or authorization of either the attorney general or the president. Hoover's 1956 decision was unique not because the bureau began to "disrupt" radical organizations -- the FBI had been doing that at least since 1941 -- but because it initiated a formal program based on written directives and responsive to the direct supervisory control of the FBI director. No longer willing simply to prosecute Communist officials, bureau officials had concluded by 1956 that more aggressive and extralegal techniques were essential and feasible. 5

The memorandum formally instituting this program, dated August 28, 1956, sharply outlines the political nature of this decision. By August 1956 bureau officials no longer considered the Communist party an actual espionage or sabotage threat. Instead they were concerned about the Communist party's "influence over the masses, ability to create controversy leading to confusion and disunity, penetration of specific channels in American life where public opinion is molded, and espionage and sabotage potential." These officials' extreme anti-radicalism and elitism, in short, made them fearful that without effective counteraction the public might be unduly receptive to radical appeals. In a memorandum to FBI official L. V. Boardman, Alan Belmont (the head of the FBI's Internal Security Section) further highlighted these political objectives. The FBI had traditionally attempted to "foster factionalism" within the Communist party, Belmont wrote. Internal Communist party divisions resulting from developments at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Communist party and the disruptive impact of Smith Act prosecutions and Subversive Activities Control Board proceedings, however, provided an unparalleled opportunity for the bureau to "initiate on a broader scale than heretofore attempted, a counterintelligence program against the CP." Belmont then enumerated recommended FBI-initiated "disruptive" efforts and concluded: "The Internal Security Section is giving this program continuous thought and attention and we are remaining alert for situations which might afford additional opportunities for further disruption of the CP, USA." This COINTELPRO-Communist party was expanded in March 1960 and then in October 1963 to prevent Communist infiltration of mass organizations varying from the NAACP to Boy Scout troops. Significantly, under this expansion the program's focus shifted from party members to non-Communist groups or individuals whom FBI officials suspected might be susceptible to Communist influence. 6

The highly political nature of COINTELPRO activities as well as the fact that this program had been initiated without the knowledge of responsible administration officials necessitated procedures to ensure against public knowledge and, in addition, to control whatever information high-level administration officials received about this program. Prior to instituting a COINTELPRO-activity, FBI agents were required to secure advance approval (whether from FBI Director Hoover directly, FBI Assistant Director Clyde Tolson, or the head of the Intelligence Division) and to specify proposed safeguards that would preclude public knowledge of the FBI's involvement in these approved activities. A memorandum authorizing the initiation of a later COINTELPRO pointedly articulated this concern: "Under no circumstance should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations and techniques considered under the program." …

As in 1958, FBI Director Hoover technically informed his superiors about this COINTELPRO without having provided the information essential for an independent judgment. Kennedy, moreover, had not been informed that this program had been unilaterally instituted by Hoover without the attorney general's prior consent. This does not exonerate the attorney general; clearly he had failed to insist upon additional information about these activities and their authority. Nonetheless, when the Kennedy White House formally requested a later briefing on all "internal security programs," Hoover's July 25, 1961, description of' the FBI's "investigative programs" did not list the COINTELPRO's disruptive activities. 11

Hoover's and other high-level FBI officials' concern about the political activities of another radical organization -- in this case, the Socialist Workers party (SWP) -- resulted in yet another COINTELPRO, again initiated without the attorney general's prior knowledge or authorization. What particularly exercised Hoover, as his October 12, 1961 letter to all special agents in charge announcing this new "disruptive program" highlights, was the SWP's radical politics:

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has, over the past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis through running candidates for public office and strongly directing and/or supporting such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems arising in the South. The SWP has also been in frequent contact with international Trotskyite groups stopping short of open and direct contact with these groups.

Outlining this COINTELPRO's "educational" purpose, Hoover emphasized the need to "alert the public to the fact that the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky." This was not to be a crash program; "only carefully thought-out operations with the widest possible effect and benefit to the nation should be submitted." After careful evaluation, this program might subsequently be expanded. 12

While these FBI COINTELPROs (Communist party and Socialist Workers party) had been unilaterally initiated, the COINTELPRO-White Hate groups were indirectly responsive to Johnson administration pressures. ….

…On March 8, 1971, an activist antiwar group (the Citizens' Commission to Investigate the FBI) broke into the FBI's Media (Pennsylvania) resident agency office and stole approximately one thousand FBI documents. In subsequent weeks, this group selectively released carefully screened documents to members of Congress, individual journalists, and organizations identified in the pilfered documents as having been targeted by the FBI. These documents partially revealed investigative techniques, priorities, and the scope of the FBI's secret police activities. These included: surveillance of anti-war and black activist groups on college campuses, intelligence-gathering in black neighborhoods, and attempts to harass New Left activists. More important, one of the fourteen FBI documents released to the Washington Post was captioned COINTELPRO-New Left. This September 16, 1970, document recommended intensified FBI interviewing of' dissidents so that this "will enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and will further serve to get the point across there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox." 32 Release of these documents threatened to imperil COINTELPRO's continuance: should additional documents be pilfered front FBI offices revealing the scope and political nature of FBI COINTELPRO activities the integrity and authority of the FBI and its director could be severely undermined. (Hoover had reached mandatory retirement age in 1965 but had been allowed to continue as FBI director by an executive order of President Johnson.)

Although the Media documents confirmed the political biases of FBI investigations and hinted at COINTELPRO's existence (the captioned September 16, 1970, document), neither the Nixon White House nor Attorney General John Mitchell advocated an investigation of bureau practices and their legality. To the contrary. On March 23, 1971, Attorney General Mitchell warned that publication of these documents (which other Justice Department sources certified had been stolen front the FBI's Media office) could endanger national security and the lives of some federal agents. Before issuing this plea, Mitchell admitted to having considered seeking a court order restraining publication. The next day, however, Justice Department officials assumed the offensive and charged that the by-then released fourteen documents were among one thousand which had been stolen from the FBI office and that those responsible for this raid and dissemination had carefully selected documents to create an unwarranted impression of FBI illegality and irresponsibility. "Actually," one Department of Justice official affirmed, "a full examination of the stolen documents reveals the FBI showed restraint rather than overzealousness."

The next month (on April 14, 1971), Senators Gaylord Nelson and Edmund Muskie released copies of still other FBI reports disclosing FBI surveillance of Earth Day activities. Senator Nelson, moreover, demanded creation of a special commission to investigate domestic intelligence-gathering and surveillance activities. The Nixon White House responded by dismissing these charges as unfounded, "blatantly political," and intended to create the false impression that the FBI was spying on law-abiding citizens. Not Earth Day activities but persons known to foment violence had been under surveillance, Mitchell claimed. "One reason the FBI is the most respected investigative agency in the world," the attorney general affirmed, "is that it has steadfastly remained apart from politics and political activity, and has concerned itself solely with threats against national security and violations of federal law." The administration, moreover, was not the bureau's sole defender. Democratic Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield similarly dismissed criticisms of the FBI as "more noise than substance"; Mansfield strongly implied that he opposed a congressional investigation of the FBI. 33

Although the Nixon administration and the congressional leadership might have disdained to investigate FBI practices, release of the Media documents precipitated two internal FBI decisions. Within four months of the raid, FBI Director Hoover ordered the closing of 103 of the FBI's resident agencies; rules governing which papers and files would be kept in residence agencies were tightened and more strictly enforced. In addition, intricate alarm systems were installed in resident agencies not housed in well-guarded and secure buildings. Second, various COINTELPROs were formally terminated on April 28, 1971.

In an April 27, 1971, memorandum to William Sullivan (the head of the Domestic Intelligence Division), Charles Brennan recommended discontinuing COINTELPRO in order "to afford additional security to our sensitive techniques and operations." Brennan never alluded directly to the Media documents; his concern derived, however, less from COINTELPRO's illegality than the FBI director's requirement that all recommended COINTELPRO activities be submitted and authorized in writing by Washington headquarters. Brennan accordingly counseled:

These programs involve a variety of sensitive intelligence techniques and disruptive activities which are afforded close supervision at the Seat of Government [a bureau phrase for Washington headquarters]. They have been carefully supervised with all actions being afforded prior Bureau approval and an effort has been made to avoid engaging in harassment. Although successful over the years, it is felt they should now be discontinued for security reasons because of their sensitivity.

In exceptional instances where counterintelligence action is warranted, it will be considered on a highly selective individual basis with tight procedures to insure absolute security.

FBI Director Hoover concurred. On April 28, 1971, he ordered the immediate discontinuance of the various COINTELPROs but added:

In exceptional instances where it is considered counterintelligence action is warranted, recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to which it pertains. These recommendations will be considered on an individual basis.

You are reminded prior Bureau authority is required before initiating any activity of a counterintelligence nature. 34

The decision to terminate COINTELPRO was not then a decision to terminate COINTELPRO-type activities. The Media raid had confirmed that future raids on FBI field offices could compromise FBI investigative activities. COINTELPRO's Vulnerability, in fact, stemmed from Hoover's earlier requirements (1) that every proposal be submitted for his approval and (2) that field offices submit follow-up reports. In April 1971, Hoover had simply ordered discontinuance of a formal, and for that reason vulnerable, program. In the future such activities could still be instituted ad hoc.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities investigation of COINTELPRO, moreover, uncovered at least three COINTELPRO-type operations conducted after Hoover's April 28, 1971, termination order. The committee obtained information concerning two of these operations from the FBI; the third program (which involved the leaking of derogatory information about Daniel Ellsberg's lawyer to Ray McHugh, the chief of Copley News Service's Washington bureau) had been independently uncovered by the committee staff. In the Senate Select Committee report on COINTELPRO staff counsel Barbara Banoff concluded:

The Committee has not been able to determine with any greater precision the extent to which COINTELPRO may be continuing. Any proposals to initiate COINTELPRO-type action would be filed under the individual case caption. The Bureau has over 500,000 case files, and each one would have to be searched. In this context, it should be noted that a Bureau search of all field office COINTELPRO files [in 1975] revealed the existence of five operations in addition to those known to the [Assistant Attorney General Henry] Petersen committee [which was directed in 1974 to prepare a report on the FBI's COINTELPRO]. A search of all investigative files might be similarly productive. 35

The bureau's interest in limiting its vulnerability proved to be politically astute -- though not because the Nixon administration or the congressional leadership was willing to investigate the FBI. (Senator Nelson's 1971 resolution to create a joint congressional oversight committee died in committee. Reintroduced in 1973, 1974, and 1975, the resolution was seriously considered only after the dramatic revelations of the federal intelligence agencies' abuses of power were publicized in 1975 and 1976 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Responding to the impact of these revelations, in May 1976 the Senate approved a resolution to establish a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.) Rather, the FBI's COINTELPROs were uncovered, because of a suit brought by NBC correspondent Carl Stern……

…..Neither innocent nor benign, FBI COINTELPRO activities confirmed the FBI's consciously political efforts to undermine political movements which bureau officials found abhorrent. The FBI, moreover, had not merely responded to public, congressional, or executive pressure. FBI officials had unilaterally initiated the various COINTELPROs without the prior knowledge and consent of responsible leaders either in the Congress or the excecutive branch. Furthermore, elaborate procedures had been devised to ensure against the attorney general's, the Congress's, and the public's knowledge of those activities. This program was formally terminated, it should also be emphasized, only when the COINTELPROs' secrecy was compromised in 1971. The nature of the activities conducted under the various COINTELPROs, the quest to ensure secrecy, and the far-reaching abuses of power confirmed the extent to which the FBI had become a law unto itself, had successfully precluded meaningful external oversight, and had based investigations on political considerations…..

Edited July 5, 2010 by William Kelly

[John Dolva]

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=14067&view=findpost&p=163058

[William Kelly]

http://educationforu...ndpost&p=163058

John,

The New Left Underground publication I am looking for is WIN Magazine, of the Committee for NonViolent Action CNVA.

The 1970 issues with COINTELPRO documents in them.

BK

[William Kelly]

Dr. Athan Theoharis

Ernie Lazar mentions Dr. Athan Theoharis in the Harry Dean FBI Informant? Thread.

Theoharis is a professor at Marquette University where I believe John McAdams is also a professor in residence, which made me wonder if they are pals, and whether McAdams straightened Theoharis for all the mistakes in Anna K. Nelson's contribution to his anthology A Culture of Secrecy?

Na, McAdams only bothers to try to straighten out the mistakes of Conspiracy Theorists, and he wouldn't peer review a fellow professor's book and inform him that one of his primary contributors didn't know what she was taking about.

But Dr. Theoharis, who was recruited to work with the Church Intelligence Committee, is a renown FBI document expert, as Ernie attests, and wrote a number of books on the subject.

Yet he published an Anthology on secrecy in government in which Anna Nelson wrongfully attests that the JFK Act, "was designed to strip away theories that implicated federal agencies in a conspiracy," that the third shot, "killed Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally," and the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) "examined all three of the assassinations that had rocked the country during the 1960s."

Theoharis' grad assistants and fact checkers should have picked up those obvious mistakes, which discredits the whole effort.

Among Theoharis' books is one on FBI COINTELPRO activities and another on the FBI's role in counterintelligence against Soviet and Communist spies. While both books are important, the COINTELPRO book mentions how the COINTELPRO program became known – from the breakin at the Media, Pa. FBI office in 1970 when 1000 COINTELPRO docs were stolen and later released through various publications.

The COINTELPRO program is connected to the assassination of President Kennedy because the program was set up in the late 50s to monitor and infiltrate the Socialist Workes Party and Communist Party USA, whose magazines were subscribed to by the accused assassin and featured in the backyard photos along with the weapons said to have been used to kill the President and officer JD Tippitt. So the program went from 1956 to 1970 without anyone outside the FBI knowing about it, and the documents stolen from the Media FBI office are unique in that they were not intended to be released nor are they redacted.

What is unique about both of Theoharis' books on COINTELPRO and Chasing Spies, is a common attribute among mainstream academics, in that despite the political and historic nature of both books, both fail to even mention the assassination of the President, despite the fact that this major event happens right in the middle of both stories. Theoharis just mentions that the new President is LBJ, as if there were no changes in leadership or policies.

Here's some of the details for those who are interested:

/index.php?showtopic=15234&pid=195958&st=0& - entry195958

Anna K. Nelson, the distinguished professor from American University, was nominated to the ARRB by the Organization of American Historians, and was the only women on the ARRB. She objected to the hiring of Doug Horne as an analysist of military records because he had read books on the subject and acknowledged being a "conspiracy theorist."

When I came across an anthology on secrecy in government which included a chapter that she contributed, I was quite surprised at what she wrote, and later learned that Doug Horne was also surprised.

One of the things that was hammered into Doug's head by the lawyers who hired him (Marwell and Gunn) was that the JFK Act did not consitute a new investigation of the assassination and it was not the responsibility of the ARRB to solve or even inquire into the crime, but rather to identify assassination related government records and release them, or classify them for future release.

"A Culture of Secrecy – The Government Versus the People's Right to Know," Anthology edited by Athan G. Theoharis (University Press of Kansas, 1998), with contribution by Matthew M. Aid, Jon Wiener, Anna Kasten Nielson, et al.

In Chapter 10 The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board. By Anna Kasten Nelson, she notes that one CIA agency representative, during a ARRB briefing, actually said,

"I've never seen any information released that ever did anyone any good."

The one thing that surprised me the most was when Anna Kasten Nelson wrote:

"The John F. Kennedy Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992 marked an important milestone in the ongoing conflict between the public's need to know and the culture of secrecy that evolved during the fifty years of the cold war. The act was designed to strip away theories that implicated federal agencies in a conspiracy to murder the young president. Its unintended consequence has been to crack open the door to the inner sanctums of the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies."

As Doug Horne notes in his response to this statement, the act was not designed to strip away theories but to release records and let the people decide for themselves what to believe.

It soon became clear however, that Nelson did not only have the wrong idea of what she was doing on the ARRB, but she didn't know the basic facts of the assassination, as she also wrote:

"…The Warren Commission Report concluded that President Kennedy had been killed by bullets fired by only one assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, from the sixth floor of the Texas Book Depository. Three shots had been fired; one hit the president but did not kill him, one went astray, and the third killed Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally of Texas, who shared the president's limousine as it slowly moved through downtown Dallas. The commission further concluded that, while Oswald was influenced by Marxist ideology and was sympathetic to Fidel Castro's government in Cuba, his decision to kill the president came from internal demons, not an external conspiracy…"

Of course it was the first shot that hit the president but did not kill him and reputedly went on to wound Connally, and not the third shot, that killed Kennedy.

Then she goes on to indicate that she also knew little about the investigations that produced the records she was suppose to be releasing when she wrote:

"The most thorough and direct study of President Kennedy's assassination was conducted in 1978-79 by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), which examined all three of the assassinations that had rocked the country during the 1960s – those of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy…the HSCA questioned the 'single-bullet theory,' the conclusion that a single bullet killed the president and wounded Governor Connally…"

While the HSCA investigated the JFK and MLK cases, it did not investigate the RFK assassination, and the MLK HSCA investigation files remain sealed; ostensibly until Oliver Stone makes a movie about that assassination.

One of the basic factors written into the JFK Act was that the members and the staff would not include anyone who had worked for the government or been involved in the previous investigations, but she misinterpets this to mean:

"…How do five individuals deliberately chosen for their unfamiliarity with Kennedy assassination documents, arguments and theories, carry out their legal mandate?…"

The Review Board was to be composed of five individuals who had no prior experience working for the government, not deliberately chosen for their unfamiliarity with the JFK documents. They were supposed to be familiar with the documents as historians and librarians and scholars….

NEW YORK, Jan. 26 /PRNewswire/

-- Although he believes that J. Edgar Hoover did not deserve to have the FBI headquarters building named after him, Dr. Athan Theoharis, one of the leading authorities on Hoover's FBI, does not think that Hoover's name should now be removed as some Americans have requested.

"I believe that J. Edgar Hoover was a tyrant with a talent for organization, administration and promotion," Dr. Theoharis, a professor of modern U.S. history at Marquette University in Milwaukee, told a reporter for this week's issue of Parade magazine.

"He built the bureau, to which he was married from 1924 to 1972,…"

Chasing Spies

Political Counterintelligence

by Athan Theoharris

Chapter 5 of Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan, Temple University Press, 1978

Having secured authorization to investigate "subversive activities" and having carefully devised procedures to preclude disclosure of questionable investigative activities, FBI officials no longer were principally concerned that politically motivated investigations could be effectively challenged. They, however, did not remain satisfied merely to compile extensive files and indexes on organizations and individuals targeted as threats to the nation's security. The FBI became a national political force committed to averting "potential subversion," and in time devised alternative extralegal measures to safeguard the "national security."

For one, their conservatism rendered FBI officials responsive to using politically information obtained through intensive investigations to discredit dissident activities. In addition, because much of this information either had been illegally obtained (whether through wiretaps, break-ins, or without specific legislative or executive authority) or involved no criminal activities, FBI officials possessed quantities of otherwise unusable data.

At first, such FBI political efforts were nonstructured, informal, and instituted on an ad hoc basis. On one level, the FBI voluntarily alerted White House officials to the "subversive" background of dissident groups and individuals. (This political effort is discussed in greater detail in the succeeding chapter.) FBI officials simultaneously sought to influence national policy by a conscious policy of leaks to "friendly" sources in the media, the Congress, or conservative organizations.

If these efforts dated from the early 1940s, the first attempt to formalize this response occurred in February 1946. On February 27, D. M. Ladd (head of the FBI's Intelligence Division) wrote FBI Director Hoover to recommend that the bureau influence "public opinion" by releasing "educational material" through "available channels." This effort, Ladd emphasized, could undermine Communist support in the labor unions, among prominent religious personalities and "liberal elements," and demonstrate "the basically Russian nature of the Communist Party in this country." The Catholic priest Father John Cronin was one recipient of this FBI informational program; given access to FBI files, Cronin used them to prepare reports in 1945 for the American Catholic bishops and in 1946 for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Radio commentator Walter Winchell and other conservative reporters as well as congressmen were other recipients of similar FBI leaks. 1

In time, this FBI political effort was further refined. In addition to maintaining FBI records, the FBI's Crime Records Division was assigned other, political responsibilities. These included liaison with "friendly" congressmen, authors, and news reporters. By the 1960s the bureau developed a formally described Mass Media Program wherein derogatory information on prominent radicals was leaked to the news media. The Crime Records Division, moreover, helped draft speeches and/or letters for members of Congress and leaked information to conservative authors (like Don Whitehead) who in turn wrote books and articles either highly favorable toward the bureau or critical about bureau critics. Similarly, to further the bureau's liaison role, beginning in 1950 FBI agents were ordered to collect information first on candidates for Congress and then on prominent state political leaders -- the resultant files included information about the individual's attitudes toward the bureau and personal background. Earlier, on his own initiative, FBI Director Hoover approached American Legion officials to develop a liaison relationship. Hoover proposed (and a November 1940 Legion conference concurred) that Legion members furnish confidential information to the FBI. Last, while not the Crime Records Division's exclusive responsibility, that division (as well as the bureau division having this assignment) serviced White House name check requests. 2

These efforts to contain radicalism by leaking derogatory information about prominent radicals and organizations did not constitute the sole political activities of FBI officials. They also sought to reduce the ability of radical organizations to function effectively or to recruit new members. For a time, with the intensification of Cold War fears and the rise of McCarthyite politics, these informal efforts bore fruit. In 1948, for example, twelve Communist party leaders were indicted under the Smith Act of 1940….

Reflecting this conservative concern, FBI Director Hoover sent, in the spring of 1956, a series of reports to the White House alleging Communist influence and involvement in the civil rights movement. President Eisenhower responded by requesting that Hoover brief the Cabinet on the Southern racial situation. Hoover did so, emphasizing particularly the Communists' role in lobbying for civil rights objectives and the NAACP's plans to push for civil rights legislation. Following up on this effort, in 1957 the FBI prepared and disseminated to the military intelligence agencies a 137-page report on Communist influence and strategy toward the NAACP. 4

Sensitive to the restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court's rulings on the uses of the bureau's investigative findings, still alarmed over the seriousness of the internal security problem, in August 1956 FBI officials devised a formal program to provide alternative means for containing Communists.

Having successfully averted meaningful executive oversight (whether by the president or the attorney general) either when formulating the Security Index program or when securing presidential authorization to investigate "subversive activities," FBI officials unilaterally instituted a so-called counterintelligence program to neutralize the U.S. Communist party -- the first of a series of programs (captioned COINTELPROs). This COINTELPRO was initiated without the knowledge or authorization of either the attorney general or the president. Hoover's 1956 decision was unique not because the bureau began to "disrupt" radical organizations -- the FBI had been doing that at least since 1941 -- but because it initiated a formal program based on written directives and responsive to the direct supervisory control of the FBI director. No longer willing simply to prosecute Communist officials, bureau officials had concluded by 1956 that more aggressive and extralegal techniques were essential and feasible. 5

The memorandum formally instituting this program, dated August 28, 1956, sharply outlines the political nature of this decision. By August 1956 bureau officials no longer considered the Communist party an actual espionage or sabotage threat. Instead they were concerned about the Communist party's "influence over the masses, ability to create controversy leading to confusion and disunity, penetration of specific channels in American life where public opinion is molded, and espionage and sabotage potential." These officials' extreme anti-radicalism and elitism, in short, made them fearful that without effective counteraction the public might be unduly receptive to radical appeals. In a memorandum to FBI official L. V. Boardman, Alan Belmont (the head of the FBI's Internal Security Section) further highlighted these political objectives. The FBI had traditionally attempted to "foster factionalism" within the Communist party, Belmont wrote. Internal Communist party divisions resulting from developments at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Communist party and the disruptive impact of Smith Act prosecutions and Subversive Activities Control Board proceedings, however, provided an unparalleled opportunity for the bureau to "initiate on a broader scale than heretofore attempted, a counterintelligence program against the CP." Belmont then enumerated recommended FBI-initiated "disruptive" efforts and concluded: "The Internal Security Section is giving this program continuous thought and attention and we are remaining alert for situations which might afford additional opportunities for further disruption of the CP, USA." This COINTELPRO-Communist party was expanded in March 1960 and then in October 1963 to prevent Communist infiltration of mass organizations varying from the NAACP to Boy Scout troops. Significantly, under this expansion the program's focus shifted from party members to non-Communist groups or individuals whom FBI officials suspected might be susceptible to Communist influence. 6

The highly political nature of COINTELPRO activities as well as the fact that this program had been initiated without the knowledge of responsible administration officials necessitated procedures to ensure against public knowledge and, in addition, to control whatever information high-level administration officials received about this program. Prior to instituting a COINTELPRO-activity, FBI agents were required to secure advance approval (whether from FBI Director Hoover directly, FBI Assistant Director Clyde Tolson, or the head of the Intelligence Division) and to specify proposed safeguards that would preclude public knowledge of the FBI's involvement in these approved activities. A memorandum authorizing the initiation of a later COINTELPRO pointedly articulated this concern: "Under no circumstance should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations and techniques considered under the program." …

As in 1958, FBI Director Hoover technically informed his superiors about this COINTELPRO without having provided the information essential for an independent judgment. Kennedy, moreover, had not been informed that this program had been unilaterally instituted by Hoover without the attorney general's prior consent. This does not exonerate the attorney general; clearly he had failed to insist upon additional information about these activities and their authority. Nonetheless, when the Kennedy White House formally requested a later briefing on all "internal security programs," Hoover's July 25, 1961, description of' the FBI's "investigative programs" did not list the COINTELPRO's disruptive activities. 11

Hoover's and other high-level FBI officials' concern about the political activities of another radical organization -- in this case, the Socialist Workers party (SWP) -- resulted in yet another COINTELPRO, again initiated without the attorney general's prior knowledge or authorization. What particularly exercised Hoover, as his October 12, 1961 letter to all special agents in charge announcing this new "disruptive program" highlights, was the SWP's radical politics:

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has, over the past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis through running candidates for public office and strongly directing and/or supporting such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems arising in the South. The SWP has also been in frequent contact with international Trotskyite groups stopping short of open and direct contact with these groups.

Outlining this COINTELPRO's "educational" purpose, Hoover emphasized the need to "alert the public to the fact that the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky." This was not to be a crash program; "only carefully thought-out operations with the widest possible effect and benefit to the nation should be submitted." After careful evaluation, this program might subsequently be expanded. 12

While these FBI COINTELPROs (Communist party and Socialist Workers party) had been unilaterally initiated, the COINTELPRO-White Hate groups were indirectly responsive to Johnson administration pressures. ….

…On March 8, 1971, an activist antiwar group (the Citizens' Commission to Investigate the FBI) broke into the FBI's Media (Pennsylvania) resident agency office and stole approximately one thousand FBI documents. In subsequent weeks, this group selectively released carefully screened documents to members of Congress, individual journalists, and organizations identified in the pilfered documents as having been targeted by the FBI. These documents partially revealed investigative techniques, priorities, and the scope of the FBI's secret police activities. These included: surveillance of anti-war and black activist groups on college campuses, intelligence-gathering in black neighborhoods, and attempts to harass New Left activists. More important, one of the fourteen FBI documents released to the Washington Post was captioned COINTELPRO-New Left. This September 16, 1970, document recommended intensified FBI interviewing of' dissidents so that this "will enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and will further serve to get the point across there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox." 32 Release of these documents threatened to imperil COINTELPRO's continuance: should additional documents be pilfered front FBI offices revealing the scope and political nature of FBI COINTELPRO activities the integrity and authority of the FBI and its director could be severely undermined. (Hoover had reached mandatory retirement age in 1965 but had been allowed to continue as FBI director by an executive order of President Johnson.)

Although the Media documents confirmed the political biases of FBI investigations and hinted at COINTELPRO's existence (the captioned September 16, 1970, document), neither the Nixon White House nor Attorney General John Mitchell advocated an investigation of bureau practices and their legality. To the contrary. On March 23, 1971, Attorney General Mitchell warned that publication of these documents (which other Justice Department sources certified had been stolen front the FBI's Media office) could endanger national security and the lives of some federal agents. Before issuing this plea, Mitchell admitted to having considered seeking a court order restraining publication. The next day, however, Justice Department officials assumed the offensive and charged that the by-then released fourteen documents were among one thousand which had been stolen from the FBI office and that those responsible for this raid and dissemination had carefully selected documents to create an unwarranted impression of FBI illegality and irresponsibility. "Actually," one Department of Justice official affirmed, "a full examination of the stolen documents reveals the FBI showed restraint rather than overzealousness."

The next month (on April 14, 1971), Senators Gaylord Nelson and Edmund Muskie released copies of still other FBI reports disclosing FBI surveillance of Earth Day activities. Senator Nelson, moreover, demanded creation of a special commission to investigate domestic intelligence-gathering and surveillance activities. The Nixon White House responded by dismissing these charges as unfounded, "blatantly political," and intended to create the false impression that the FBI was spying on law-abiding citizens. Not Earth Day activities but persons known to foment violence had been under surveillance, Mitchell claimed. "One reason the FBI is the most respected investigative agency in the world," the attorney general affirmed, "is that it has steadfastly remained apart from politics and political activity, and has concerned itself solely with threats against national security and violations of federal law." The administration, moreover, was not the bureau's sole defender. Democratic Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield similarly dismissed criticisms of the FBI as "more noise than substance"; Mansfield strongly implied that he opposed a congressional investigation of the FBI. 33

Although the Nixon administration and the congressional leadership might have disdained to investigate FBI practices, release of the Media documents precipitated two internal FBI decisions. Within four months of the raid, FBI Director Hoover ordered the closing of 103 of the FBI's resident agencies; rules governing which papers and files would be kept in residence agencies were tightened and more strictly enforced. In addition, intricate alarm systems were installed in resident agencies not housed in well-guarded and secure buildings. Second, various COINTELPROs were formally terminated on April 28, 1971.

In an April 27, 1971, memorandum to William Sullivan (the head of the Domestic Intelligence Division), Charles Brennan recommended discontinuing COINTELPRO in order "to afford additional security to our sensitive techniques and operations." Brennan never alluded directly to the Media documents; his concern derived, however, less from COINTELPRO's illegality than the FBI director's requirement that all recommended COINTELPRO activities be submitted and authorized in writing by Washington headquarters. Brennan accordingly counseled:

These programs involve a variety of sensitive intelligence techniques and disruptive activities which are afforded close supervision at the Seat of Government [a bureau phrase for Washington headquarters]. They have been carefully supervised with all actions being afforded prior Bureau approval and an effort has been made to avoid engaging in harassment. Although successful over the years, it is felt they should now be discontinued for security reasons because of their sensitivity.

In exceptional instances where counterintelligence action is warranted, it will be considered on a highly selective individual basis with tight procedures to insure absolute security.

FBI Director Hoover concurred. On April 28, 1971, he ordered the immediate discontinuance of the various COINTELPROs but added:

In exceptional instances where it is considered counterintelligence action is warranted, recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to which it pertains. These recommendations will be considered on an individual basis.

You are reminded prior Bureau authority is required before initiating any activity of a counterintelligence nature. 34

The decision to terminate COINTELPRO was not then a decision to terminate COINTELPRO-type activities. The Media raid had confirmed that future raids on FBI field offices could compromise FBI investigative activities. COINTELPRO's Vulnerability, in fact, stemmed from Hoover's earlier requirements (1) that every proposal be submitted for his approval and (2) that field offices submit follow-up reports. In April 1971, Hoover had simply ordered discontinuance of a formal, and for that reason vulnerable, program. In the future such activities could still be instituted ad hoc.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities investigation of COINTELPRO, moreover, uncovered at least three COINTELPRO-type operations conducted after Hoover's April 28, 1971, termination order. The committee obtained information concerning two of these operations from the FBI; the third program (which involved the leaking of derogatory information about Daniel Ellsberg's lawyer to Ray McHugh, the chief of Copley News Service's Washington bureau) had been independently uncovered by the committee staff. In the Senate Select Committee report on COINTELPRO staff counsel Barbara Banoff concluded:

The Committee has not been able to determine with any greater precision the extent to which COINTELPRO may be continuing. Any proposals to initiate COINTELPRO-type action would be filed under the individual case caption. The Bureau has over 500,000 case files, and each one would have to be searched. In this context, it should be noted that a Bureau search of all field office COINTELPRO files [in 1975] revealed the existence of five operations in addition to those known to the [Assistant Attorney General Henry] Petersen committee [which was directed in 1974 to prepare a report on the FBI's COINTELPRO]. A search of all investigative files might be similarly productive. 35

The bureau's interest in limiting its vulnerability proved to be politically astute -- though not because the Nixon administration or the congressional leadership was willing to investigate the FBI. (Senator Nelson's 1971 resolution to create a joint congressional oversight committee died in committee. Reintroduced in 1973, 1974, and 1975, the resolution was seriously considered only after the dramatic revelations of the federal intelligence agencies' abuses of power were publicized in 1975 and 1976 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Responding to the impact of these revelations, in May 1976 the Senate approved a resolution to establish a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.) Rather, the FBI's COINTELPROs were uncovered, because of a suit brought by NBC correspondent Carl Stern……

…..Neither innocent nor benign, FBI COINTELPRO activities confirmed the FBI's consciously political efforts to undermine political movements which bureau officials found abhorrent. The FBI, moreover, had not merely responded to public, congressional, or executive pressure. FBI officials had unilaterally initiated the various COINTELPROs without the prior knowledge and consent of responsible leaders either in the Congress or the excecutive branch. Furthermore, elaborate procedures had been devised to ensure against the attorney general's, the Congress's, and the public's knowledge of those activities. This program was formally terminated, it should also be emphasized, only when the COINTELPROs' secrecy was compromised in 1971. The nature of the activities conducted under the various COINTELPROs, the quest to ensure secrecy, and the far-reaching abuses of power confirmed the extent to which the FBI had become a law unto itself, had successfully precluded meaningful external oversight, and had based investigations on political considerations…..

[William Kelly]

NEW YORK, Jan. 26 /PRNewswire/ [/url]

-- Although he believes that J. Edgar Hoover did not deserve to have the FBI headquarters building named after him, Dr. Athan Theoharis, one of the leading authorities on Hoover's FBI, does not think that Hoover's name should now be removed as some Americans have requested.

"I believe that J. Edgar Hoover was a tyrant with a talent for organization, administration and promotion," Dr. Theoharis, a professor of modern U.S. history at Marquette University in Milwaukee, told a reporter for this week's issue of Parade magazine.

"He built the bureau, to which he was married from 1924 to 1972,…"

Isn't saying J. E. Hover "was a tyrant with a talent for organization, administration and promotion" a bit like saying Hitler was responsible for the death and murders of tens of millions of people, but while he was in power the trains ran on time?

I've always been suspicious of the specially selected journalists and academics who are granted special access to closed and secret records, like the NBC reporter who the Soviets let see the JFK files, for fifteen minutes, and then pulled the plug on him, and Norman Mailer and this guy, Dr. Theoaris, who had previlidged access to government records. And then when he writes the difinitive histories of COINTELPRO and the FBI's Counter-Soviet Espionage, he neglects to even mention that, oh yea, and President Kennedy was assassinated in the meantime.

And no one has yet answered the question of whether Dr. Theoharis is a professor at the same Catholic Marquette Univeristy as our good friend John McAdams, and whether or not they are on campus associates?

Thanks to anyone who can,

BK

BK

[John Dolva]

noted. TY BK

[Bernice Moore]

http://www.marquette.edu/history/newsletters06_theoharis.shtml

[John Dolva]

? this one? First page jan 1970 + last page dec 1970.Which issue? Month?

[William Kelly]

? this one? First page jan 1970 + last page dec 1970.Which issue? Month?

Hi John,

Yea, that looks like it.

It's the issue(s) with the COINTELPRO docs.

----

Sorry John,

The burglary of the Media, Pa. FBI office when the COINTELPRO docs were stollen was in 1970, the docs were not published in WIN until March 1972.

BK

Edited July 9, 2010 by William Kelly

[John Dolva]

np, BK. ok

[Robert Howard]

This might help

http://www.google.com/search?q=WIN+Magazine%2C+of+the+Committee+for+NonViolent+Action+CNVA&btnG=Search+Books&tbs=bks%3A1&tbo=1

[John Dolva]

Bill, each scan is ~ 7 mb. I am sending the first 20 pages resized and compressed to mostly readable but the ideal would be an ftp site you"* could tell me about so I can send the full scans in full size so they are far more readable (and distributable). That is unless in the link above provides what you need.

There are 87 pages in march..

*or anyone

Edited July 11, 2010 by John Dolva

[John Dolva]

p3 march 72

http://i27.photobucket.com/albums/c168/yanndee/003.jpg

[William Kelly]

Bill, each scan is ~ 7 mb. I am sending the first 20 pages resized and compressed to mostly readable but the ideal would be an ftp site you"* could tell me about so I can send the full scans in full size so they are far more readable (and distributable). That is unless in the link above provides what you need.

There are 87 pages in march..

*or anyone

Hi John,

Thanks for tagging along down this alley. I think it will be a fruitfull one.

Will check out what you got. It looks good.

While the Evergreen Review was my favorite underground magazine in the Sixties, WIN might be a real winner.

I found some of their back issues at:

http://www.swarthmor...077WINPhoto.htm

Which just so happens is where Ruth Paine's papers are located.

But I don't think they've posted the issues on line.

What I'm looking for is the original COINTELPRO documents stollen from the FBI's Media, Pa. office in a breakin in 1970, just the plain old documents, unfettered by commentary or analysis, just the docs, and I think they were published, or some of them were published in the March '72 issue.

What I'm looking for is to see the documents unredacted to compare to the same redacted docs released under FOIA.

I also am interested in figuring out who it was who broke into the Media, Pa. FBI office, a slick black bag job if there ever was one, and one that is suposidely still unsolved, at least by the FBI. Now I wonder how and why a bunch of Sixties hippie radicals can pull such a fast one on the FBI without EVER getting caught, and not even taking credit for it after the statute of limitations ran out. Or sell the story to Hollywood. There's just something not right about this particular third rate burglarly.

While the breakin occured in 1970, the Counter-Intelligence Operation COINTELPRO was originally set up around 1954-6 and targeted the Socialists Workers Party and Communist Party USA, whose magazines Oswald subscribed to and can be seen holding in his hands with the alleged assassination rifle and pistol said to be used to kill DPD JD Tippit.

I don't think those who stole the documents could peddle them to mainstream media outlets but after the New Left publications like WIN started publishing them I think they followed suit, but I'm not sure on the chronology of mainstream publication.

I do know that WIN Mag was published by the Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA), who sponsored the Quebec to Guantamano Peace March that included two Oswald sitings, one in Canada and the other in Philadelpia, where the Quaker community at one time included Ruth Paine, Michael Paine, his mother Ruth Forbes Paine Young, her husband Arthur Young, Priscilla Johnson McMillan, Tink Thompson and oh yea, Ben Franklyn.

Edited July 11, 2010 by William Kelly

[John Dolva]

Hi, BK.

This is going to need some co-ordinating.

I have to scan (and rescan to get the settings right) 87 pages for March. The earlier and later issues need looking at.

This is a hell of a lot of reading, all of it involving endlessly repetitive stuff. I need an online repository. I'm not going to look for/organise one.

I'll do the raw stuff. What youi'll end up with is, (however many pages), in full size,, these have to then be made fully easily readable. That's up to someone else, ditto interpreting and guiding for more scans crossing over into other parts of the underfround collection. It likely spreads from the break-in on through the underground distribution network.

Many names will become known. You'll have to vet them and of course in the end there may or not be useful stuff.

I actually find it hard to read through this collection as just about every page of every publication has something of interest to me, so, I'll need comprehensive guidance. That's how I see it happening. The other option is for me to dribble bit by bit as I see fit.

Organise an exchange site and I'll start sending stuff as I scan it but I'll do no cropping nor enhancing.

Remember we're talking over a hundred + MB's.

edit:typo

Edited July 11, 2010 by John Dolva