Tim Carroll

So the bottom-line is that the autopsy evidence (photos and x-rays), deemed authentic by Pat, shows that Kennedy was shot by two shooters firing from behind???" T.C.

It was clearly Dr. Hume's "intention to call that piece of matter stuck to the hair near the neckline a bullet wound" during his HSCA testimony. His position in the late Seventies is reflected in the post-autopsy Warren Commission Dealey Plaza re-enactment, when the wounds were marked on the body doubles. The photo I posted above demonstrates that as late as the date of the re-enactment, the official position was that the hairline spot was the head's entrance wound. T.C.

I second Bill's question.And Tom [rudeness for Tim] just sit tight, unless of course your another mouth piece for Miller --Maybe it is only fair to present this matter to John Simkin and see if he feels that the forum rules should be enforced because if they are not enforced, then why have any rules at all. When someone actually considers that I may be a mouthpiece for Bill, you know said someone's got a screw loose. T.C.

I am implying the precise opposite of what was just represented: that the assassination did have an effect, overwhelmingly for the worse in the long run. T.C.

That's great work Robin did with F8. I've never seen that before. T.C.

I see what I've understood to be the back of the head, which shows a notch that appears to lead toward a lower entrance wound, and a rear exit wound just to the lower right, corresponding to what is commonly thought to be a rear evulsion. The lower of the two rear head entrance wounds is shown in the following photo: Humes' actual testimony to the HSCA is in David Lifton's Best Evidence, pgs. 536-538: The disagreement began when Dr. Petty showed the doctors the lateral X-ray and asked: "Is this the point of entrance that I'm pointing to?" "No," replied Humes. "This is not?" said Petty. "No," replied Humes and Boswell simultaneously. Petty asked: "Where is the point of entrance?" Humes responded that it was "below the external occipital protuberance." The transcript continued: Petty: It's below it? Humes: Right. Petty: Not above it? Boswell: No. It's to the right and inferior to the external occipital protruberance. Humes: Precisely coincides with that wound on the scalp. By "that wound on the scalp," Humes designated a spot at the bottom of the back of the head that the others felt was merely brain tissue, or some other artifact. But Humes believed otherwise. "I'm quite confident," said Humes.... With that statement, there began a subdued but - if the transcript is any indication - somewhat tense argument. It went on for many pages.... Petty began what was tantamount to a cross-examination. He noted the ruler in the picture seemed positioned to measure the upper location. But Humes denied that. Petty: Then this ruler that is held in the photograph is simply to establish a scale and no more? Humes: Exactly. When Dr. Davis, looking at the photograph, stated his opinion the entry was at the top, Humes said: "No, no, that's no wound." Referring to what the others were calling a bullet entrance wound, he said: "I don't know what that is. It could be clotted blood.... I just don't know what it is, but it certainly was not any wound of entrance." A bit later, Dr. Loquvam spoke up: "I don't think this discussion belongs in the record.... We have no business recording this. This is for us to decide between ourselves." When Dr. Coe pointed out to Humes that other pathologists disagreed with him on the wound location, Loquvam interrupted again: "You guys are nuts. You guys are nuts writing this stuff. It doesn't belong in that damn record.... Why not turn off the record and explain to him and then go back and talk again." Incredibly, the lower hairline spot was considered the entrance of the head wound in the early days of the WC investigation (after the autopsy): If they couldn't get it straight among themselves back then, including the autopsy doctor, how are we to solve this now? Very frustrating! Anyone who thinks this is all simple, obvious and straightforward, while producing x-rays that show a blown out eye socket, should think again. T.C.

I second Bill's question. T.C.

I appreciate the clarification. I do perceive that Kennedy had a sense of a higher power ("God"), whose works on earth "must surely be our own." That is a beautiful characterization of politics. This goes directly to an almost political statement attributed to Christ: "Love thy neighbor as thyself." It is through implementation of right-minded public policy that we can manifest this tenet. T.C.

Here is a statement from Raymond earlier in this thread: Interesting that on a historical forum, someone would make an argument that "forseeing [sic] the past is about as close to an exact science as forseeing [sic] the future is." So we can evaluate history about as well as Madame Ruby can tell the future in her crystal ball? Give me a break! I consider this thread to have grown far too personal, and couldn't agree more with Tim Gratz that the logic being applied is "specious." It wasn't just the names of schools, airports and boulevards that changed following the assassination. I am an extreme leftist, and Tim Gratz is a rightist (probably not as extreme as me), but we can agree that the assassination changed the political landscape to some degree. That is not a reflection of the kind of sophistry that could mangle that statement into an assertion that JFK's death was good for the country. I just read where Bobby acknowledged that largely as a result of the assassination, the extreme right was in disarray. On this thread, when I said that the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed more easily as a result of the assassination, my statement was twisted into saying that the measure would not have passed without Dallas. I don't like such disingenuous spin, and wonder why it passes inspection here without the molestation it deserves. T.C.

It is a fundamental truth that "JFK was a man who liked to keep his options open." Researchers and historians do well to be mindful of this, whether the topic is Cuba or Vietnam or LBJ. The introduction of Richard Reeves' biography of President Kennedy says it well:"He had little ideology beyond anti-Communism and faith in active, pragmatic government. And he had less emotion. What he had was an attitude, a way of taking on the world, substituting intelligence for ideas or idealism, questions for answers. What convictions he did have, on nuclear proliferation or civil rights or the use of military power, he was often willing to suspend, particularly if that avoided confrontation with Congress or the risk of being called soft. If some would call that cynicism, he would see it as irony. 'Life is unfair,' he said, in the way the French said, C'est la vie. Irony was as close as he came to a view of life: things are never what they seem." Kennedy seems to have maintained and developed an equanimous relationship with the world in spite of this sort of thing. And his grip on his ego allowed him to choose for himself what to do. This characteristic ,I'd argue, seems to be a recognition of a 'higher good' and a courage from prioritising life itself. (what I mean is: for example he could say 'in the greater scheme of things, how important is my life?'). This is often a characteristic of a genuine 'believer'. This reordering of the 'normal' set of priorities that many people have can make him seen as 'chaotic', however there was a reason there. So an analysis of Kennedy must address his christianity. Once before when John Dolva emphasized JFK's Christianity, I responded with a quote from Jackie lamenting the electoral opposition to Kennedy's presidential candidacy on the basis of his Catholicism, when she said, "But he's such a bad Catholic." That comment wasn't received in contextual fashion, so I don't expect much in that regard now. But the idea of President Kennedy as a truebelieveroonie ("genuine believer") is completely contrary to the JFK I understand. While being a practicing Christian (although modern fundamentalist Christians don't consider Catholicism to be Christian), he admitted in private that he supported a woman's right to choose (but couldn't publicly admit it) and opposed school prayer. The bottom line is that he was skeptical of everything, and it was this trait which allowed him to second-guess the so-called experts. Bobby noted, as JFK had, that his fulfillment came from having "influence." Bobby said, "It's the Greek definition of happiness: exercise of vital powers along the lines of excellence, and a life affording them scope." A "genuine 'believer,'" as John charaterized Kennedy, would never be able to exert the zest for life (hedonism even) and the critical reason that personified JFK. T.C.

It is a fundamental truth that "JFK was a man who liked to keep his options open." Researchers and historians do well to be mindful of this, whether the topic is Cuba or Vietnam or LBJ. The introduction of Richard Reeves' biography of President Kennedy says it well: "The Kennedy I found certainly did not know what he was doing at the beginning, and in some ways never changed at all, particularly in a certain love for chaos, the kind that kept other men off-balance. The man at the center was a gifted professional politician reacting to events he often neither forsaw nor understood, handling some well, others badly, but always ready with plausible explanations. He was intelligent, detached, curious, candid if not always honest, and he was careless and dangerously disorganized. He was also very impatient, addicted to excitement, living his life as if it were a race against boredom. He was a man of soaring charm who believed that one-on-one he would always prevail - a notion that betrayed him when he first confronted the premier of the Soviet Union. Kennedy was decisive, though he never made a decision until he had to, and then invariably he chose the most moderate of available options. His most consistent mistake in governing, as opposed to politics, was thinking that power could be hoarded for use at the right moment - but moments and conditions defied reason. He had little ideology beyond anti-Communism and faith in active, pragmatic government. And he had less emotion. What he had was an attitude, a way of taking on the world, substituting intelligence for ideas or idealism, questions for answers. What convictions he did have, on nuclear proliferation or civil rights or the use of military power, he was often willing to suspend, particularly if that avoided confrontation with Congress or the risk of being called soft. If some would call that cynicism, he would see it as irony. 'Life is unfair,' he said, in the way the French said, C'est la vie. Irony was as close as he came to a view of life: things are never what they seem. 'No one ever knew John Kennedy, not all of him,' said Charlie Bartlett. That was obviously the way Kennedy wanted it. All his relationships were bilateral. He was a compartmentalized man with much to hide, comfortable with secrets and lies. He needed them because that was part of the stimulation: things were rarely what they seemed. He called people when he wanted them, for what he wanted then. His children came at the clap of his hands and were swooped up and taken away at a nod to a nanny. After his election, he said his White House organization would look like a wheel with many spokes and himself at what he called 'the vital center.' 'It was instinctive at first,' he said. 'I had different identities, and this was a useful way of expressing each without compromising the others.'" Wouldn't it be great to have pragmatic, non-ideological governance today? Bill Clinton, upon leaving office, was asked what was the most important quality in a president. He answered: "curiosity." There is a vitality in the asking of questions that cannot be approached by those with smug answers. Kennedy was the first postmodern president. T.C.

Len, rumours were abounding thoughout Washington that this was indeed the case. If so, it may have had to do with the financial scandals swirling around LBJ at the time. Serve-u corp, General dynamics kick-backs, Baker forced to resign as LBJ's secretary, Fred Korth forced to resign over the TFX contract, and the Bobby Baker $100'000 suitcase scandal. Perhaps Kennedy was simply thinking of protecting his own ass during a second term. There were many people close to JFK who had different understandings about which way the president was leaning on the issue of keeping LBJ on the ticket in 1964. JFK's secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, asserted that Terry Sanford, a moderate southerner, would be the choice. Ken O'Donnell wrote that there was no question but that LBJ was to be kept on the ticket. In Bobby's oral history interviews, not disclosed for decades, he is also clear that LBJ was to be retained: "There was never any intention of dropping him. There was, you know, discussion about his personality." At another point, Bobby said: "Subsequently, there were a lot of stories that my brother and I were interested in dumping Lyndon Johnson and that I'd started the Bobby Baker case in order to give us a handle to dump Lyndon Johnson. Well, number one, there was no plan to dump Lyndon Johnson. That didn't make any sense. Number two, I hadn't gotten really involved in the Bobby Baker case until after a good number of newspaper stories had appeared about it." And it's not as though he was cleaning up his words for public consumption. Here is what he said about LBJ: "Johnson is - as President Kennedy said Thursday night, November 21, [1963] - incapable of telling the truth. I mean, I had a conversation with him at the White House in 1962, at one of those dances after a dinner, at which he said he never tried to beat the President, he never ran for President, he was never interested in being President, he was just interested in helping John Kennedy - there were people he couldn't dissuade right away, but he never lifted a finger himself - and that he never heard of anybody saying anything bad about President Kennedy, that he never knew about John Connally saying anything bad. And my experience with him since then is that he lies all the time. I'm telling you, he just lies continuously, about everything. In every conversation I have with him, he lies. As I've said, he lies even when he doesn't have to." Bobby also said: "As I described here, this man is not.... He's mean, bitter, vicious - an animal in many ways." I take it from these last comments that Bobby wasn't varnishing the truth when he said that there were no plans to dump LBJ from the ticket in 1964. Tim

Lady Bird? T.C.

Especially interested in the names of the people concerned and any information on individual operations.As you know, part of the operation was a spin from the 5412 group. Operatives would come and go as specialized support personal and they were controlled and dispatched by the 40 group which was part of the 5412 group. In reality there was no covert team named as "Operation 40" that I am aware of and as some have claimed. Liberties have been taken for whatever reasons and 40 has been cast into a different function than what it really was. Some of the operatives that from time to time did launch missions in behalf of the 40 or 5412 were mostly from the "School of The America" and other specialized operational personal and their training commands. Kind of like TDY ( Temp Duty assignments). As to the mechanics and various operations I can only name about four I was associated with and those are questionable as being dispatched solely by OPS-40 command and cleared by the 5412 Group. Our Teams were dispatched from the Pentagon with logistical support gave by the CIA. In most cases you could say ".. they were not really "CIA" operations, but in reality Military INTEL OPS with CIA logistical support..." At any rate the operations were "layered" and numerous "Locks" and "cut-outs" were assigned to protect the knowledge of these operations and the operational personal. Regarding Operation 40, I have previously posted about an Operation 40 plan to manipulate the politics of post-Castro Cuba following the Bay of Pigs: "The Bay of Pigs planning also included manipulating the politics of the Cuban exiles in the aftermath of what was hoped to be a successful takeover. Even many of the Cuban exiles would have been shocked at how far some in the United States were willing to go in this regard. The President’s directive that the exile leadership include more people from the left-of-center orientation to counter charges that the exiles were nothing more than Batisteros in disguise caused some dissension in the CIA’s ranks. E. Howard Hunt’s resentment of the change led him to “resign” or be “fired” from his job as Political Action Officer for the invasion, depending on who’s version one believes. He thought these changes amounted to a policy of Fidelismo sin Fidel, Fidelism without Fidel. Hunt’s political orientation, which was distinctly right wing, was far more amenable to Batistism sin Batista. One of the moderate Cuban leaders, stung by Hunt’s charge, stated: “I don’t know what it means to be a leftist. If it means to be in favor of all the people and for the welfare of the masses, then I am.” Hunt retorted: “Fidel Castro could not have phrased it better.” His ideology was reflected in a quote he was fond of citing: “The liberal’s arm cannot strike with firmness against communism . . . because the liberal dimly feels that in doing so he would be somehow wounding himself.” The right wing Cubans and those in the CIA like Hunt who were most sympathetic to counter-revolutionary politics did make contingency plans for the exiles’ leadership after the landing. “Operation 40 [a high level, government-connected Cuban exile group] called for assassinating the moderates after their return to the island following an invasion.” The U.S. supported the creation of a moderate provisional government during the planning, while its own agents were plotting to install a more right-wing one later. The moderates were intended to legitimize the efforts of the exile force while at the same time becoming targets themselves for some later murderous manipulation." The recently published book, Ultimate Sacrifice, makes its only mention of Operation 40 in the same context of manipulating the anti-Castro leadership. But what is so important about Tosh's post is the distinction that Operation 40 was a decisionmaking group, and did not include the operatives that were used. I have actually read that this offshoot of the 5412 Committee originally obtained its designation based upon the number of participants, but that it had quickly grown to include approximately 70 such decisionmakers. When we read that Marita Lorenz described the participants in the caravan to Dallas as members of Operation 40, I believe that creates a significant misunderstanding about the group's nature as compared with the mechanics employed for this or that purpose. Here's how Ultimate Sacrifice deals with the subject, pp. 394-395: "A White House memo shows that Kennedy officials only learned months after the Bay of Pigs that the CIA formed a small group called Operation 40 - which, according to some accounts, included Trafficante bagman Frank Fiorini - supposedly to assassinate more progressive elements of a new Cuban government. JFK aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote a memo to Richard Goodwin about it, saying that 'liberal Cuban exiles believe that the real purpose of Operation 40' after the Bay of Pigs was to first 'kill Communists - and, after eliminating hard-core Fidelistas, to go on to eliminate first the followers of Ray, then the followers of Varona and finally to set up a right-wing dictatorship, presumably under Artime.' Newly released documents show that David Morales was involved with Operation 40." I believe that Waldron and Hartmann missed the mark with the mention of Frank Sturgis as a member, although according to Tosh's framework, he could very well have been contracted for some Operation 40 task. The book goes on to mention that Cubela, "former leader of a rebel group called the DR," was on board prior to the Bay of Pigs in this scramble for leadership positions in the anticipated post-Castro period. Many authors have included Felix Rodriguez as Operation 40. There have been photos posted of a "covert squad formed from Operation 40" (phraseology that doesn't conflict with the conception of a higher up, decisionmaking group) and an Operation 40 "reunion" (phraseology that does imply that Operation 40, or some similarly named offshoot, included operational personnel. So the root question is whether Operation 40 itself was a decisionmaking or operational subgroup. T.C.

With the greatest respect, I suggest that "There is little room for argument " is a bit strong when you are asserting as fact something that in reality cannot be anything but speculation. Forseeing the past is about as close to an exact science as forseeing the future is. My language that "there is little room for argument..." was overly assumptive, even pompous. I should have phrased that better. It is a misreading to assert that I suggested that JFK "would have lost" the Civil Rights Act battle. I did not speculate about whether or not it would have passed, only about how "easily." To assert that the outcome was certain at the time of JFK's death would also be presumptive. I of course agree that JFK was a master politician, and my speculation on the "What If JFK Had Lived" question as it relates to civil rights centered on how much the societal growing pains might have been managed better had he been around. T.C.

Tim has finally come straight out with it. I predicted many months ago that, sooner or later, Tim would openly assert that the assasination of JFK may have been a good thing for America. This theme lurks as a subliminal message encoded in many of his posts, but its nice to see him finally make it explicit. I don't understand Tim Gratz to really be saying that "the assasination of JFK may have been a good thing for America," but that there may have been some good to come out of it, such as a heightened support for the Civil Rights movement. The world was certainly a different place as a result of Dallas, and there is little room for argument that the 1964 Civil Rights Act didn't pass more easily than it would have had JFK lived. It's often forgotten how low JFK's numbers had plummeted (53%, I believe) after he sent the troops into the South, with Bull Connor acting up and a white backlash emerging. Overnight following the assassination, the segregationist position was diminished in the mainstream. Allowing for Tim Gratz's devil's advocate-type assertion, I would say that in the long run, civil rights in America was set back by the Kennedy assassination. The late Sixties are better remembered for the anti-war movement than for the localized eruptions in America's inner cities every summer, beginning with the Watts riot in 1965. Not allowing ourselves to be overly taken in by LBJ's adoption of Kennedy's legacy, we remember J. Edgar Hoover's persecution of the black movement under Johnson. This was followed by Nixon's "Southern Strategy," with constant winks and nods to "states rights" protagonists. Bigotry became quieter and more insidious. The "What If JFK Had Lived?" is equally applicable to civil rights as to Vietnam. T.C.

Generally, the argument is made that Senators don't have executive experience the way governors do. Senators only administer their own staffs, don't have to execute budgets, etc. There's also the problem that Senators have a voting record on national issues (partisan) and an ongoing high-profile exposure that doesn't seem to work to their benefit. T.C.

It is outrageous to overly simplify that Kennedy ordered Diem's assassination. If the case had been made sufficiently for history, there would have been no need for Nixon's White House to assign E. Howard Hunt the job of fabricating a State Department cable implicating JFK. The Hunt story is illustrative of how important history is to the political process. T.C.

Too easy: Warren G. Harding, a real doozy! T.C.

A metaphor for the Angel Murgado story, wherein the involvement of Bobby's associates with Oswald supposedly silenced him. Besides that, you are being dishonest here when you say it is only qualified as a "metaphor" in the notes. I don't believe that I'm the one being dishonest. Taking my above quote in context, it had nothing to do with Murgado, and the explicit quote from the book immediately preceding the segment quoted by Owen plainly demonstrates that: My point about the metaphor is that the problems with the historicity of the book run far deeper than the source notes problem. T.C.

Noted. I made the correction within the post so that no one would be misled. Anything out there about Op 40 or the issue I addressed? T.C.

There is a lot wrong with Professor Mellen's sourcing, and it isn't just the way the source notes get off track toward the end of Chapter 11, and are consistently one page off beginning with Chapter 12. An example of a source note like none I've ever seen in any historical work is the way she explains the use of Hemming's spinning, imagining, postulating.... The source note reads: "Hemming spins what amounts to a metaphor of a face-to-face meeting between Bobby Kennedy and Lee Harvey Oswald." This raises numerous questions about the use and manner of use of the Hemming story, only to qualify it as a "metaphor" in the notes. A metaphor of what? Of how an author can rationalize the use of non-factual material? No, it can't be that, since that's not a metaphor, it's what actually happened. Are we back to the disinfo accusation again; anyone who criticizes the book has "an agenda?" T.C.

T.C.

I have never heard before that Phillips lived on Humboldt Street, and from the inference I take it that he had some association with the Humboldt Apartments massacre. I would ask Tosh if he knows anything about this. This is the first I've heard that Silvia Odio's two Latin visitors were ever identified as the Novo brothers. I assume the article was meant to say that the documentation will not be unclassified until 2013. That's sooner than my expectation. T.C.