John Bevilaqua

From my perspective, Evica's book, also pointed out the links between Fairfield Osborn the 2nd President of The Pioneer Fund and Wickliffe P. Draper who built the Hopedale Unitarian Church in Hopedale, MA. to my thinking this book cements the connections of the Draper crowd with the Richard Giesbrecht Winnipeg Airport Incident. Recall that I had postulated the identity of the person being discussed at that meeting with a "textiles background" was none other than Wickliffe P. Draper himself. Subsequent articles by Doug A. Blackmon in the Wall St Journal, identified Draper as the person sending money to finance the Mississippi Sovereignty Commission right around the timeframe of 2 other infamous assassinations in the 1960's that of Medgar Evers, Jr. by the nephew of Senator James O. Eastland who ran Draper's Genetics Committees, and later The Freedom Riders, Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman. Either way, Evica's book is a worthwhile read. I would encourage anyone else who has materials or information about Major Carleton S. Coon or Colonel Ulius S. Amoss to forward them to me or post them here. These two ran the US Gov's version of Murder, Inc. via ISI in Baltimore until the reins were handed over to Ray S. Cline who was identified by Richard Condon in The Manchurian Candidate. Evica also spend considerable amount of time on C. D. Jackson who was so close to Wick Draper that he was in the wedding party of Draper's younger sister in about 1924 when Draper was 33 years old. C. D. Jackson was in fact Mr. Psychological Warfare for decades. And do not forget that it was none other than Mary Ferrell herself who closed the final loop between the street level operatives in Dealey Plaza and the highest level plotmaster and paymaster, Wickliffe P. Draper, when her best informant Roy Hargraves identified a Pioneer Fund operative as putting together the killing team that day, including Robert Emmett Johnson. To continue to marginalize or minimize these links back through The Pioneer Fund and the eventual takeover of Draper Corporation on 3/22/1967 by one of the major beneficiaries of The Viet Nam war, Rockwell International, would in my opinion be an oversight of a tremendous magnitude. Rockwell never made a penny on the Draper Corp. and shut them down as a bankrupt concern a few years later. It was an obvious payback to Draper and his cohorts for pulling off the crime of the century. I actually had a Rockwell brochure which touted the marriage of rocket science and textile loom equipment science as being the perfect marriage. What a joke. And the other major plotter from The Giesbrecht Incident who profited immensely in the Spring of 1964 was Rev. Gerald L. K. Smith who had only $5,000.00 in the bank at the end of 1963 and yet managed to build a $500,000.00 theme park called Christ of the Ozarks in Arkansas a few months after the Giesbrecht Incident and the subsequent payoff in March in Wichita, KS where The Constitution Party of the USA run by Milteer and Gale held its annual confabs in 1965 and 1966 and probably in 1964 as well. The Ghosts of Mississippi and the Confederate Yankees in King Camelot's Court like Frank G. Wisner from Laurel, MS and Wickliffe Draper from Hopedale, MA and Carleton S. Coon's and Ulius L. Amoss' crews of professional assassins who had their start during World War II eventually ended up under the control of Ray S. Cline who left the CIA for greener pastures in the World Anti Communist League where he became President and Chief Assassin for anyone who could put up the money. And his targets included totally unrprotected and innocent persons like Archbishop Romero and Benito Aquino. Richard Condon was on to Ray S. Cline but had no where to go to report his finding.

Past Programs - Audio RealAudio files hosted by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society Please click on the red links below to listen to these programs. Many of the older selections have been edited for broadcast on Boston Radio Station WHDH, which aired Forum events from the late 1940's through the early 1970's. The more recent programs are presented in unedited form. "Crisis in Education" (Nathan Pusey - President, Harvard University; Frederick Weed - Headmaster, Roxbury Latin School; Dr. Robert Ulich - Harvard Graduate School of Education; Lee Dunn - Senior Advisor, Boston Latin School; moderator David Cavers - Assoc. Dean, Harvard Law School) - October 22, 1954 Walter Reuther, "Priorities for Survival"- May 1, 1960 General Maxwell Taylor, "Blueprint for Defense" (with panel including Dr. Henry Kissinger and others) - April 21, 1961 "The First Hundred Days" (Barry Goldwater and others) - April 30, 1961 "Unrest Within the Democratic Party" (Eleanor Roosevelt and others) - May 1, 1961- Part I, Part II Dr. Leo Szilard (Professor of Bio-Physics, University of Chicago; Developer of Atomic Chain Reaction with Enrico Fermi) "Are We on the Road to War?" - November 17, 1961 Billy Graham, "Evangelism and the Intellectual"- April 1, 1962 - Part I, Part II Jimmy Hoffa, "Area Contracts and the Teamsters" - April 8, 1962 - Part I, Part II Martin Luther King, Jr., "The Future of Integration" - October 24, 1962 - Part I, Part II Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, Member of Parliament, South Vietnam - October 14, 1963 Allen Dulles, "The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making" - December 13, 1963 Malcolm X - "The African Revolution and Its Impact on the American Negro" - December 16, 1964 - 30 second audio clip only General Lewis Hershey, Director of The Selective Service System, "Future of the American Draft" - November 21, 1965 Bishop Fulton Sheen, "God and the Intellectual" - February 13, 1966 "Women - Dare We Not Discriminate?" - Betty Friedan (Author, The Feminine Mystique), Mary I. Bunting (President, Radcliffe College), Pauli Murray (Lawyer, Author, Jane Crow and the Law) - February 18, 1966 Edward Bennett Williams (Counsel to Joe McCarthy, Jimmy Hoffa, Bobby Baker, Adam Clayton Powell...) - October 14, 1966 "LSD: Methods of Control" (Dr. Timothy Leary, Dr. Norman Zinberg) - November 4, 1966 "$50 Billion for What? The Federal Welfare Program" (Dr. Ellen Winston, Edward C. Banfield, Daniel P. Moynihan) - December 9, 1966 "The Johnson Presidency" - Panel discussion with Prof. Hans Morgenthau, Robert Novak, and Prof. Adam Yarmolinsky - March 17, 1967 "American Movies: Growing Up?" - Panel discussion with Joshua Logan (Warner Brothers; Producer-Director of "Camelot"), Judith Crist (Film and Drama Critic, NBC-TV), Shirley Clark - (Director, "Underground," "Portrait of Jason") - October 27, 1967 "Abortion: The Issues" - Panel discussion with Dr. Alan Guttmacher (President, Planned Parenthood); Robert F. Drinan, S. J. (Dean, Boston College Law School); Hon. Albert Blumenthal (New York General Assembly) - December 4, 1967 - Part I, Part II Justice Tom C. Clark (U.S. Supreme Court, Retired) - December 6, 1967 - Part I, Part II Dr. Wernher Von Braun, "After the Moon --What?" - September 6, 1970 - Part I, Part II George McGovern, "U.S. Foreign Policy: A Critique" - October 28, 1982 Ernest "Fritz" Hollings (U.S. Senator, D, South Carolina), "Economic Alternatives for the 80's" - October 25, 1983 Caspar Weinberger - November 11, 1983 Alan Cranston (U.S. Senator, D., California), "Peace and Jobs" - November 30, 1983 Shimon Peres, "Israel: Today and Tomorrow" - December 5, 1983 Andrew Young (Mayor of Atlanta; Former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.), "Civil Rights with a Global Perspective" - April 8, 1984 (first few minutes missing) Stevie Wonder - April 19, 1984 Phyllis Schlafly - "The ERA - Is There a Future?" - April 25, 1984 Rev. Jerry Falwell, "The Role of Religion in Politics" (introduction by Professor Laurence Tribe) - September 20, 1984 Commandante Daniel Ortega (Coordinator of the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua; Presidential Candidate, Nicaragua) (introduction by Carlos Fuentes) - October 8, 1984 Joseph Wapner (Judge, "The People's Court") - "Law, The Media, and 'The People's Court'" - October 25, 1984 Peter Jennings (ABC World News Tonight Anchorman and Chief Correspondent), "U.S.-Soviet Relations: A View From the Media" - February 21, 1985 Cesar Chavez (President, United Farm Workers of America) - "The New Grape Boycott -- Will it Work in the Eighties?" - February 28, 1985 - Part I, Part II John Chancellor (Commentator, NBC Nightly News), "Lawyers and Journalists: Differences and Similarities" - April 11, 1985 Simon Wiesenthal (Investigator of Nazi War Criminals), "Murders Among Us/ Consequences of the Holocaust" - November 16, 1985 Ed Koch - "Juvenile Crime" - February 12, 1986 Ruth Bader Ginsberg (Judge, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals) - February 16, 1986 Rev. William Sloane Coffin, "Religion and Politics" - February 25, 1986 Willie Brown, "Politics and the Press" - October 2, 1986 Rev. Jerry Falwell, "The Evangelical Vote: Is It Monolithic?" - October 6, 1986 Carl Sagan, "The Nuclear Arms Race" - October 23, 1986 Ted Turner - October 29, 1986 Rev. Jesse Jackson - Harvard Law School Forum Fortieth Anniversary Lecture - November 11, 1986 Dan Rather, "The Changing Role of Television News in America" - November 18, 1986 Sergio Ramirez (Vice-President of Nicaragua), "Nicaragua versus U.S. in the World Court: American Policy on Trial" - November 24, 1986 General William Westmoreland, "My Experiences with the Media - March 2, 1987 - Part I, Part II Christy Hefner (President & CEO, Playboy Enterprises, Inc.), "Media, Morality and the First Amendment" - April 7, 1987 Paul Kirk (Chairman, Democratic National Committee), "The Politics of Values and the Value of Politics - 1988" - April 16, 1987 Judith Martin ("Miss Manners"), "Miss Manners Lays Down the Law" - April 22, 1987 Dennis Conner (Skipper, "Stars and Stripes"), "The America's Cup: Past, Present and Future" - October 21, 1987 Lesley Stahl (Moderator, "Face the Nation"), "Network Television News Coverage in Washington, D.C." - November 2, 1987 Rudolph Giuliani, "Organized Crime, Corruption, and Insider Trading: Current Happenings in the U.S. Attorney's Office" - November 9, 1987 Arturo Cruz (Former Director, Unified Opposition in Nicaragua), "Why I Left the Contras" - November 19, 1987 Sheikh Zaki Yamani (Former Minister of Petroleum, Saudi Arabia), "Islam and Its Legal System: Past, Present and Future" November 24, 1987 Marybeth Whitehead Gould (Surrogate Mother in the "Baby M" Case) and Harold Cassidy (attorney to Ms. Gould), "The Baby M Case and its Effects on the Future of Surrogate Motherhood" - February 10, 1988 "The Homeless Crisis: A Street View" - Joyce Brown ( Homeless Woman who challenged NYC's Homeless Policy) with her attorneys Norman Siegel & Robert Levy, NYCLU - February 18, 1988 Erma Bombeck, "The Exploitation of Kids, Family and Marriage for Profit" - March 15, 1988 Scott Turow, "1L Revisited: Thoughts on Legal Education After 10 Years in Legal Practice" - April 25, 1988 Alejandro Serrano Caldera (Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United Nations, Former President of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court) - December 1, 1988 Edward Asner, "Patriotism and Other Spectator Sports" - December 12, 1988 William Sessions (Director, FBI), "Balancing Individual Rights with the Rights of Society: Sensitive Investigative Techniques" - February 8, 1989 Madeline Kunin (Governor of Vermont), "The Power Shift to the States: View from the Executive Branch" - February 13, 1989 Marion Barry (Mayor of Washington, D.C.) - "The 90's Challenge to Public Service" - October 30, 1989 - Part I, Part II Maynard Jackson (Mayor of Atlanta) - April 25, 1990 - Part I, Part II C. Boyden Gray (Special Counsel to President Bush), "The Bush Administration's Environmental and Energy Policy" - October 23, 1990 Arthur Liman (Fmr. Chief Senate Counsel, Iran-Contra Investigation; Fmr. President, Legal Aid Society of New York; Fmr. Chief Counsel, New York Special Commission on Attica) - "Can Congressional Investigations Be Conducted Fairly?" - November 14, 1991 Edwin Meese III (Former U.S. Attorney General), "Freedom, Free Speech and the Courts" - February 10, 1992 F. Lee Bailey, "Television in the Courts" - February 27, 1992 Nadine Strossen (President, American Civil Liberties Union), "Civil Liberties and the Supreme Court" - March 4, 1992 Dr. Ruth Westheimer - December 10, 1992 Jean Bertrand Aristide (President of Haiti) - April 8, 1994 "Public Policy Responses to the Changing Dynamics of the AIDS Epidemic" - panel discussion with Kristine Gebbie (National AIDS Policy Coordinator), Nicolàs Parkhurst Carballeira (Executive Director, Boston's Latino Health Institute), Rodger McFarlane (Executive Director, Broadway Cares/Equity Fights AIDS), Mindy Thompson Fullilove (Assoc. Professor of Clinical Psychiatry and Public Health, Columbia University), moderator Jean McGuire (Former Executive Director, AIDS Action Council) - April 26, 1994 Charlton Heston, "Winning the Cultural War" - February 16, 1999 - Part I (prepared remarks); Part II - Q&A Asa Hutchinson, "Prosecuting the President: Reflections of a House Manager" - March 22, 1999 Vince McMahon (Chairman, Titan Sports, Inc., World Wrestling Federation), "The First Amendment Firsthand" (edited) - April 15, 1999 Mario Cuomo, "Public Spirit in the Private Sector" - April 20, 1999 - Part I, Part II Ralph Nader, "The Laws, The Practice, The Education: Continuing Illusion or Wake-up Time?" - October 29, 1999 - Part I, Part II Jack Gargan (Chairman-elect, The Reform Party) "New Politics for the New Millennium" - December 2, 1999 Helen Thomas (Senior White House Correspondent, UPI), "Covering the Presidents: From Kennedy to Clinton" - February 23, 2000 Stephen Reinhardt (Judge, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals), "The Supreme Court and You: Life, Death and the Quality of Life" - March 1, 2000 Nadine Strossen (President, American Civil Liberties Union), "Current Challenges to Civil Liberties" - March 7, 2000 "Innocent on Death Row: The Causes of and Remedies for Unjust Convictions" - panel discussion with Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld & Jim Dwyer (authors, Actual Innocence); Richard Lewontin (Professor of Population Genetics, Harvard); Bill Kovach (Curator, Nieman Foundation for Journalism, Harvard); Michael Seidman (Professor of Criminal Law, Georgetown); moderator Charles Nesson (Professor, Harvard Law School) - March 15, 2000 Arun Gandhi (Director, M.K. Gandhi Institute for Nonviolence), "The Enduring Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi: Lessons Learned from Grandfather" - March 20, 2000 Joel Klein (Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice), "Antitrust in the New Economy" - April 10, 2000 A RealAudio player is required to listen to these programs. (available from www.real.com) These recordings are for research use only and may NOT be used for commercial purposes. The original copies of these recordings are on deposit with the Harvard Law School Library Special Collections Department. Many historic Forum audio and video recordings not posted here are also part of the library collection. November, 1999

Home Upcoming Speakers Recent Speakers History Sampling of Past Speakers Guide to Past Programs Photo Gallery Past Programs in RealAudio Sponsors Executive Board Past Programs - Audio RealAudio files hosted by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society Please click on the red links below to listen to these programs. Many of the older selections have been edited for broadcast on Boston Radio Station WHDH, which aired Forum events from the late 1940's through the early 1970's. The more recent programs are presented in unedited form. "Crisis in Education" (Nathan Pusey - President, Harvard University; Frederick Weed - Headmaster, Roxbury Latin School; Dr. Robert Ulich - Harvard Graduate School of Education; Lee Dunn - Senior Advisor, Boston Latin School; moderator David Cavers - Assoc. Dean, Harvard Law School) - October 22, 1954 Walter Reuther, "Priorities for Survival"- May 1, 1960 General Maxwell Taylor, "Blueprint for Defense" (with panel including Dr. Henry Kissinger and others) - April 21, 1961 "The First Hundred Days" (Barry Goldwater and others) - April 30, 1961 "Unrest Within the Democratic Party" (Eleanor Roosevelt and others) - May 1, 1961- Part I, Part II Dr. Leo Szilard (Professor of Bio-Physics, University of Chicago; Developer of Atomic Chain Reaction with Enrico Fermi) "Are We on the Road to War?" - November 17, 1961 Billy Graham, "Evangelism and the Intellectual"- April 1, 1962 - Part I, Part II Jimmy Hoffa, "Area Contracts and the Teamsters" - April 8, 1962 - Part I, Part II Martin Luther King, Jr., "The Future of Integration" - October 24, 1962 -

Au contraire... Wickliffe Draper funded the MissSovComm... Au contraire... Wickliffe Draper funded the MissSovComm, the Assn of Medgar Evers, Jr. by the nephew of Sen. James O. Eastland, Byron DeLa Beckwith, the murder of The Freedom Riders and of course, the Assn of JFK...

Major Carleton S. Coon, the prototype for "Indiana Jones" who worked for Colonel Ulius L. Amoss in both the Cairo OSS office and at ISI in Baltimore, MD has been linked into the MKULTRA program over the years. See my recent posts on Carleton S. Coon, and his links to The Pioneer Fund of Wickliffe Draper as well as to MKULTRA. Recall that Dr. Hans J. Eysenck is the only person to receive funding for BOTH MKULTRA and other Pioneer Fund projects. Coon took over the Amoss spy operations in Cairo, Egypt and Baltimore, MD after Amoss died in 1961 and was running them in 1963 when JFK was killed. Whether or not he was fully cognizant of what went down that day, some of his star pupils were in Dallas that fateful afternoon and they were suspected of having undergone ManCand style programming. Coon had advocated the assassination of Hitler and Mussolini in 1942 in an article in the Washington Post on April 19, 1942 the day before Hitler's birthday. Allen Dulles was later involved with The Plot to Kill Hitler run by my Great Uncle Klaus Schenck von Stauffenberg, but Dulles did it only to prevent Germany from being destroyed by US bombers because Hitler would not surrender under any circumstances. Trust me when I tell you that these links into Carleton S. Coon and Ulius L. Amoss are the biggest breakthrough in years in this case because they finally link together MKULTRA, The Pioneer Fund, Wick Draper and former OSS operatives with know Soldiers of Fortune active in Miami and Interpen. This is the big one folks. After doing a Google on Carleton Coon MKULTRA this is just a small sampling of what you will get... I am not forcing a link between Ulius Amoss, Carleton Coon and MKULTRA... it exists and others have found it too. <H2 class=r>Carleton S. Coon and Wickliffe P. Draper's Pioneer Fund - The ...</H2>... links both the CIA'S MKULTRA efforts at Mind Control and Programmed Assassins with .... Main article: Multi-regional originCarleton Coon believed Whites ... educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=11528&mode=threaded - 104k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this<H2 class=r>The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection</H2>Carleton Coon, a professor of anthropology at Harvard, trained Moroccan resistance ... the CIA's Operation MKUltra, which conducted mind-control research. ... www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/august_2005/7_05_2.html - 101k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this<H2 class=r>AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes #46-06 dated 20 November 2006</H2>In 1953, the CIA launched Project MK-ULTRA, which tested a number of drugs .... Browne and Carleton Coon) as U.S. Ambassador to Thailand from August 1953. ... www.afio.org/sections/wins/2006/2006-47.html - 48k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this<H2 class=r>Resources on Systems of Surveillance</H2>Project MKULTRA, The CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification - ...... but for the fact that subsequently Carleton Coon was chosen by "Wild Bill ... www.well.com/user/jmalloy/gunterandgwen/resources.html - 221k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this<H2 class=r>Revelations of Secret Surveillance - Notes - Nov 11</H2>Project MKULTRA, The CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral ...... Carleton Coon was chosen by "Wild Bill" Donovan as an agent of the fledging OSS. ... www.well.com/user/jmalloy/gunterandgwen/refs.html - 334k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this[PDF] <H2 class=r>Anthropologyand Counterinsurgency:</H2>File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML Carleton Coon, A North Africa Story: The Anthropologist as OSS Agent 1941- ... Conspiracy theories abound concerning Bateson’s involvement with MK-Ultra. ... www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/mcfate.pdf - Similar pages - Note this<H2 class=r>Neil Brick's NHHI Conference Presentation - 2001</H2>Data proving the existence of recovered memory, ritual abuse, mk-ultra and ..... OTTAWA RECOVERED MEMORY PAGE http://www.carleton.ca/~whovdest/calof2.html ... members.aol.com/smartnews/nb_nhhi01.htm - 35k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this[PDF] <H2 class=r>44 LGO MISTERIOSO está acontecendo no Departamento de Defesa. Nos ...</H2>File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML Carleton Coon, A North Africa Story:The Anthropologist as OSS Agent 1941- ... Teorias de Conspiração a respeito do envolvimento de Bateson com MK-Ultra. ... usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/portuguese/MayJun05/mcfate.pdf - Similar pages - Note this[PDF] <H2 class=r>48 LGO MISTERIOSO está sucediendo en el DepartamentodeDefensa( DOD ...</H2>File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML ración MK-Ultra de la CIA., donde se realizaran inves- ...... Carleton Coon, A North Africa Story:The Anthropologist as OSS Agent 1941- ... usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/Spanish/MayJun05/mcfatesp.pdf - Similar pages - Note this<H2 class=r>Shane Connolly — Willaim Connolly : ZoomInfo Business People ...</H2>Connolly, Sharon, Ottawa-Carleton District School Board, Sharon Margaret Connolly . ..... 110 suz@mk-ultra.com - San Francisco, California - May 5, 2001 - . ... www.zoominfo.com/people/level2page7882.aspx - 115k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this

Wild Bill Donovan, Admiral Darlan and Carleton S. Coon... When Donovan put forth this plan to Roosevelt, a storm of protest broke about his head from U.S. military leaders. General Sherman Miles, head of the Army Intelligence (G-2) wrote to Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall that he considered the formation of a new super-intelligence agency "very disadvantageous, if not calamitous." J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI was enraged at the thought that Donovan might create an agency competitive with the FBI. He personally went to Roosevelt to complain about the idea. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wrote in his diary that Hoover "goes to the White House… and poisons the mind of the President" about Donovan's plans. General Marshall noted Hoover's incessant badgering of Roosevelt to discard any notion of activating Donovan's plan, calling the FBI Director "very childish," "petulant," and "more of a spoiled child than a responsible officer." Virginia Hall of Special Operations Branch receiving the Distinguished Service Cross from General Donovan, September 1945. Actually, Hoover had planned to have just such an intelligence agency spring from his own FBI domain, one in which he would create a worldwide system of "legal attachés" (FBI officers) in every U.S. embassy, consulate and legation. As it was, when the OSS came into existence over his vitriolic objections, Hoover had to be content with getting all areas of the Western Hemisphere only as his absolute jurisdiction in gathering information, although the FBI was ordered to cooperate with the OSS (and its successor, the CIA), providing all intelligence it had on hand in those areas to the OSS when requested to do so. This was easier said than done, particularly when dealing with the possessive, self-aggrandizing Hoover who became incensed at anyone who thought to enter the criminal investigation or intelligence fields which he believed were his private fiefdoms. He remained the eternal foe of Donovan's for his invasion into the intelligence field, albeit much of the FBI's early work in the area was woefully incompetent, inept and non-productive. Hoover was so envious of any OSS activity that he made ridiculous accusations against Donovan. In 1942, Hoover carped that Donovan had more than ninety OSS agents operating in South America when Donovan had but one and that agent had been given permission to pick up some papers in Mexico by the New York branch of the FBI. Hoover had his agents put together dossiers on all of those who might exercise authority over him, from Presidents to members of Congress, from cabinet members to agency directors. He maintained a very large file on William Joseph Donovan that was crammed with rumor and gossip but not a single indictment of misbehavior. In an article appearing in a 1941 edition of Collier's Magazine, an FBI spokesman reassured citizens that the FBI was cooperating with the OSS by sending it all the intelligence it had collected. Said the FBI agent in a snide fashion: "Donovan knows everything we know except what we know about Donovan." This, of course, clearly implied that the FBI was maintaining a file on Donovan. Hoover nervously followed up this article by sending a letter to Donovan in which he flatly denied that the FBI maintained a dossier on the OSS director. This was a lie, but J. Edgar Hoover's entire career was pockmarked with inconsistencies, misrepresentations and outright lies. Such conduct was his hallmark. General Donovan addressing Jedburghs in England, 1944. Roosevelt was very much in favor of a super-intelligence agency, but, at first, he thought to name his boyhood chum, Vincent Astor to head such an agency. The wealthy Astor had been Roosevelt's social spy in Washington for years, reporting the gossip and rumor of cocktail parties and fetes. He was totally unqualified for such a position. Donovan, on the other hand, was one of the few Americans who had a perfect grasp of world matters, and the best intelligence system in the world at that time, SIS. He had the support of Frank Knox, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morganthau, Jr., and Winston Churchill, along with all of the leading British intelligence chiefs (with the exception of the venomously anti-American Claude Dansey). Donovan had already submitted his concepts of the proposed intelligence agency. He insisted that "intelligence operations should not be controlled by party exigencies. It is one of the most vital means of national defense. As such someone appointed by the President, directly responsible to him and no one else should head it. It should have a fund solely for the purpose of investigation and the expenditures under this fund should be secret and made solely at the discretion of the President." With this statement, Donovan had laid the cornerstone idea for not only the OSS but also the CIA that was to follow. The organization Donovan envisioned came into being as the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) on June 18, 1941, when Roosevelt announced its formation and Donovan at its head. Donovan recruited agents and workers for this new service from the Ivy League, Wall Street and media. His first lieutenant, so to speak, was playwright Robert E. Sherwood, who was a friend of Donovan's. Sherwood was made head of propaganda arm of the new organization, called Foreign Information Service (FIS) and large offices in New York were rented. Within a year more than 800 journalists, writers and broadcasters were employed by FIS. Another branch of the COI, the Research and Analysis department, had as its chief recruiter Archibald MacLeish. He drew heavily from the Academy and from the field of journalism. James P. Warburg, the New York banker, joined this staff, as did Wallace Deuel, correspondent for the Chicago Daily News. Donovan recruited Thomas A. Morgan from the Sperry Corporation; James Roosevelt, one of the President's sons; Estelle Frankfurter, sister of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter; Atherton C. Richards, who owned a goodly portion of Hawaii; film director John Ford and film producer Mirian C. Cooper. Letter from William Donovan to returning OSS personnel Six months after the U.S. went to war with the Axis Powers, the COI came under the supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 13, 1942, and its name was changed to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). As Roosevelt had warned Donovan, the military commanders tried to absorb the various branches of the OSS but Donovan was able to resist such moves and kept his organization intact and under his direct control. Before the OSS was disbanded, more than 60,000 persons would be employed in its many services. Many OSS agents performed the same duties as the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), going behind enemy lines to work with underground and resistance fighters, in Europe, the Middle East and throughout Asia and the Pacific. OSS agents swarmed into French North Africa in advance of the Allied invasion, preparing the way by meeting with Vichy French officers and convincing many to welcome rather than resist the Allies. One of those resisting OSS overtures was French Admiral Jean Darlan. He had earlier told the Allies that if they appeared with a well-equipped force of 500,000 men, he would abandon Vichy and side with them. When learning that the Allies were headed for Algiers, Darlan did just the opposite, ordering his men to resist. The embarrassing situation was settled when Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle, shot and killed Darlan in his offices on December 24,1942. An investigation by French officials soon had it that the OSS was behind the assassination. Suspicion was cast upon William A. Eddy, OSS chief in Algiers, and his right-hand man, Carleton S. Coon whose job it was to train Free French fighters in the ways of sabotage. These Frenchmen belonged to a paramilitary organization called Corps Franc. Bonnier, Darlan's assassin, had been a member of the Corps Franc. Though neither OSS man was accused openly of being involved with Bonnier's murder of Darlan, both quickly left Algiers. Coon went to work with a British SOE operation in Tunisia, using the identity of a British officer who had recently been killed. When he returned to the U.S. he met with Donovan, submitting a report that urged political assassination as an OSS procedure, one that was not adopted. Crew members of a B-24 bomber flown by OSS on special missions over Central Europe pose beside their plane at Area T. Though accusations were flung about, the assassination of Admiral Darlan was never proven to be an OSS-sponsored act. Bonnier, who was a Gaulist and monarchist, had apparently acted out of his own accord. At the same time the North African invasions took place, Donovan's best spymaster, Allen Dulles, arrived in Bern, Switzerland (with two un-pressed suits and a $1 million letter of credit) to organize OSS operations there. He was to provide invaluable information on military and political operations inside Italy and Germany. Dulles was indirectly in touch with Germany's spymaster, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, and he established a spy network equal to and eventually superior than the long-standing British networks headquartered in Switzerland. The American spymaster was also in contact with most of those inside Germany's underground, euphemistically called the Black Orchestra. It was Dulles who accepted Fritz Kolbe as a genuine top spy inside of Germany after the British spymaster Claude Dansey denounced Kolbe as a Nazi "plant." Kolbe proved to be the most important German spy working for the Allies during World War II. At the same time that Donovan was supervising worldwide OSS operations behind enemy lines, operations in neutral countries such as Switzerland, Portugal, Sweden, he was also directing a host of operatives in Washington, D.C. who spied upon the embassies of many countries who were reportedly neutral. Few persons could devote as much time, sixteen hours a day, to his exhausting tasks, as did Donovan, then in his sixties. Moreover, he had to contend at the same time with sniping from military intelligence chiefs such as the vainglorious, back-shooting General George Veazey Strong, head of Army Intelligence and General Marshall's handpicked hatchet man. This OSS "Beano" grenade exploded upon impact. This uniform button is really a compass. Strong was forever writing sarcastic and demeaning memos about Donovan and the OSS He had at his disposal, where the OSS did not, the military intelligence services of Magic, the American computerized system of intelligence analysis which was to break the Japanese codes, and Ultra, the British counterpart, which had broken the German codes almost at the beginning of World War II and continued to superbly analyze information through its computer system Colossus, developed toward the end of the war. To discredit OSS efforts at every opportunity (and waste valuable time doing it), Strong compared Donovan's intelligence data with that produced by Magic and Ultra to show OSS failings. He could not, however, replace the human factor which was the hub of OSS operations and which produced, in the end, raw information from which genuine high-level intelligence was gleaned. Donovan continued to be personally on hand to oversee many OSS operations. He was present at the Allied invasion of Sicily and at the OSS operations around Bari, Italy. He was present at the Normandy invasion in 1944 and closely supervised his massive OSS operations carried out behind German lines shortly before the Allies landed. Donovan's agents, many of them spectacular heroes, felt that they could do no less than "the chief." One of these was the courageous Moe Berg, former baseball player, who parachuted into Nazi-occupied Yugoslavia for the OSS to meet with Yugoslavian partisan Tito and report that the Allies should support the guerrilla leader which they did. The easily concealed ‘Liberator’ pistol. Caltrops were designed to puncture tires. The OSS had proven its worth countless times over during World War II, and, given the Communist aims at the end of that conflict, Roosevelt believed that there was a future for the organization in the years to come. On October 31, 1944, he sent a note to Donovan, asking that he provide a report on an American intelligence agency in the postwar period. Donovan drew up a plan for a revamped OSS to continue its intelligence gathering duties and submitted this to Roosevelt. The President's death the following year, however, delayed these plans. When President Harry S. Truman came to power, he believed that there was no need to have a world-wide American spy network now that the war was over, a view he would later change when confronted with the Russian menace. Truman disbanded the OSS on September 20, 1945, a month after the Japanese surrender and the official end of the war. Donovan retired a major general. The OSS went silently out of business but by the time of its demise, it had earned the respect of intelligence communities throughout the world. Of its 16,000 agents and subagents in the combat zones, more than 2,000 of them had won medals for gallantry. Donovan had lost only 143 men and women. About 300 had been captured and imprisoned. It was a remarkable record of limited casualties, far many less than Donovan had lost in World War I. Donovan's personal contribution was vast, and, as usual, valiant. A deck of playing cards conceal a map which would be revealed when the top layer was soaked off. Donovan retired to private life but helped to create the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947. He served as Ambassador to Thailand in 1953-54 before going into permanent retirement. In January 1959, a huge portrait of Donovan was hung in the lobby of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The oil painting showed an erect, commanding figure wearing the uniform of a major general, his chest bedecked with ribbons topped by the blue Congressional Medal of Honor. Donovan attended the ceremony. He was ill at the time; in fact, he was dying. "Wild Bill" gazed at his portrait and suddenly his bent frame came to life. One report had it that "the bowed head came up, the jaw hardened, the sagging body stiffened to attention. Straight as a soldier, the general about-faced and strode down the corridor and through the foyer, and climbed without help into the car. He died a month later, on February 8, 1959. When President Dwight D. Eisenhower heard the news he remarked: "What a man! We have lost the last hero!" 1 posted on 01/19/2004 12:03:26 AM PST by SAMWolf [ Post Reply | Private Reply | View Replies ] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- To: snippy_about_it; PhilDragoo; Johnny Gage; Victoria Delsoul; Darksheare; Valin; bentfeather; radu; .. OSS Office of Strategic Services U.S. Intelligence Service in World War II (1942 - 1945) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prior to World War II, America had no overall intelligence system beyond that operated by the armed forces. To coordinate secret information of all types at the start of U.S. involvement in World War II, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), on January 13, 1942, created the Central Office of Information and placed General William "Wild Bill" Donovan at its head. Donovan, a World War I hero, quickly organized a vast network of experts in all intelligence fields. The organization's title was changed a short time later to the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS. The agency was responsible for espionage and sabotage in countries occupied by the Germans, Italians, and Japanese. It became legendary through the feats of its agents. OSS Insignia WWII Donovan was a tolerant spymaster, allowing his agents a great deal of freedom in accomplishing their missions. He encouraged inventiveness, even recklessness. More than 13,000 men and women worked for the OSS during World War II. They parachuted or were smuggled into all the countries occupied by the enemy to work closely with underground units, the SOE, and the SIS, as well as other national intelligence agencies operated by Allied countries. One of the most effective operations conducted by the OSS was its preparations for the Allied landings in North Africa in 1942. OSS agents deftly negotiated terms with Vichy French officials to make sure that no French warships in African ports would be given over to the Germans who then occupied most of France. Moreover, they were able to place scores of agents in North Africa, ostensibly as monitors of foodstuffs going to refugees. These agents spent most of their time recording the movements of German warships and aircraft through the Mediterranean, while placating indecisive French officials and military commanders in preparation for the Allied landings. When American and British troops did storm the beaches, OSS agents were waiting for them to lead them through minefields and direct them to the strategic objectives, OSS agents performed the same kind of incredible feats in preparation of the 1944 Normandy landings. The agency's agents were also effective in China, 1943-1945, working with Chiang Kai-shek in discovering weaknesses in the Japanese war machine. In 1943, OSS agents, with Donovan's approval and without informing the Joint Chief of Staff, broke into the Japanese Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, in search of documents and codebooks. They managed to obtain information that was, for the moment, valuable, but in the long run, this covert operation, which was quickly discerned by the Japanese, was devastating to U.S. military intelligence. Though U.S. military intelligence had broken the Japanese "Ultra Code" in early 1942 and continued to monitor all important military and diplomatic messages throughout the war, the OSS break-in caused the Japanese to change its entire military attachß code, or that used by its intelligence service. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of South Pacific Operations, refused to allow the OSS to operate in his theater of war, preferring to rely upon the intelligence provided to him form the Army's G-2. The most truculent opponent facing the OSS was J. Edgar Hoover, chief of the FBI, who thought Donovan's OSS to be and upstart agency that might usurp his own power and the jurisdiction of the Bureau, even though FDR constantly assured Hoover that the OSS mandate was to operate outside the Western Hemisphere, a regulation that later applied to the CIA, which succeeded the OSS. "To those of us here today, this is General Donovan's greatest legacy. He realized that a modern intelligence organization must not only provide today's tactical intelligence, it must provide tomorrow's long-term assessments. He recognized that an effective intelligence organization must not allow political pressures to influence its counsel. And, finally, he knew that no intelligence organization can succeed without recognizing the importance of people—people with discretion, ingenuity, loyalty, and a deep sense of responsibility to protect and promote American values." >From DCI William Webster's remarks at the dedication of the statue of Gen. William J. Donovan, CIA Headquarters, 28 October 1988. British intelligence during World War II was, on the other hand, extremely cooperative with Donovan who visited SIS chiefs in 1940 to confer about his aims in establishing the OSS. He was shown the complete operations of the SOE (Special Operations Executive), which worked with the underground resistance fighters in occupied Europe. So impressed was Donovan that he modeled the OSS organization after the SOE. The British gave Donovan full cooperation, much more than might otherwise have been given in any other time, in that England was then desperate to draw the U.S. into the war against Germany. At the end of World War II in 1945, President Harry Truman disbanded the OSS, believing that America had no more need of a super intelligence agency. This attitude quickly changed, however, when the Soviet Union was perceived to be a very real threat to the security of the U.S. and the world, causing the creation of another intelligence agency in 1946, the CIA.

http://www.jimhougan.com/index2.html Even Jim Hougan has the Coon quote on the front page of his website...

CIA Mind-Control Operations and THE SYNDROME [Editor's Note: The following article was forwarded to John Case by Susan Ford (Brice Taylor) <sueford@earthlink.net>. She prefaced the story with following note: "I have highlighted and emphasized portions of this important article. The infamous Tavistock Institute, which operates under the aegis of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in Great Britain, is the brainchild and executor for the CIA regarding mind control experimentation and its implementation." Ken Adachi] By John Case http://educate-yourself.org/mc/mcthesyndrome13jun01.shtml June 13, 2001 THE SYNDROME is a thriller driven by a secret culled from the deepest recesses of the Cold War. It is a secret that encompasses an illicit program of human experimentation, using pain, drugs and hypnosis to create the perfect assassin. So sensitive was this program that only a handful of people have ever been privy to more than a small part of it. The activity's existence was first hinted at by the Rockefeller Commission in a 1974 report on domestic CIA operations. The Commission devoted just two sentences to the program, whose documentary record had been destroyed by an outgoing CIA Director. Despite that Director's attempt to impose institutional amnesia on the Agency he'd headed, seven boxes of financial documents were later found in a dusty cabinet at the Agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The paper-trail contained within those boxes wound its way through a complex of medical institutes, hospitals and foundations that had given cover to a behavioral modification program in which human guinea pigs had been "tested to destruction" without their knowledge or consent. Beyond those seven boxes, no other records are known to exist. Even so, the New York District Attorney's office continues to seek homicide indictments against CIA officers who are believed to have murdered a key scientist in the program. Though few records of its existence remain, the program is known to have begun during World War II, when the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) attempted to develop "a truth drug" in an effort to elicit information from recalcitrant Prisoners of War. The subjects of these earliest experiments were captured Axis soldiers, and American GIs facing court-martial for various crimes. When the war came to an end, the program did not. Instead, it took a strange turn--and gained momentum. What had been a search for a truth-drug morphed into a mind-control program whose purpose was to create a murderous automaton whose memory could be "edited" by his handlers at headquarters. The need for an assassination "utility" of this kind had been articulated a few years earlier by a professor of anthropology at Harvard, a former OSS operative who was himself implicated in World War II assassination plots. This was the late Carleton Coon who, in an after-action report to OSS chief "Wild Bill" Donovan, wrote, "...we cannot be sure that the clear and objective scholars who study the existing social systems and draw up the blueprints for a society to suit our technology will always be heard, or that their plans will be put into operation. We can almost be sure that this will not be the case. Therefore some other power, some third class of individuals aside from the leaders and the scholars must exist, and this third class must have the task of thwarting mistakes, diagnosing areas of potential world disequilibrium, and nipping the causes of potential disturbances in the bud. There must be a body of men whose task it is to throw out the rotten apples as soon as the first spots of decay appear. A body of this nature must exist undercover. It must either be a power unto itself, or be given the broadest discretionary powers by the highest human authorities." With the outbreak of the Korean War, Coon's proposal seems to have been melded with the truth-drug investigations then under way, and given a jump-start. The Pentagon and the CIA arranged for the publication of articles about "communist brainwashing" in popular magazines such as The Reader's Digest and Saturday Evening Post. The message was explicit: there was a "mind-control gap." This created a groundswell of political support for the Agency's decision to embark upon a full-fledged "mind-control" program of its own. Beginning in 1952, the CIA began to work with the Special Operations Division of the Army's biological research center at Fort Detrick, studying the covert use of chemical and biological weapons. Among the drugs studied was LSD. The subjects in these experiments were people on the margins of society. They included the inmates of prisons and mental institutions, as well as homeless alcoholics on Skid Row. Those who espoused unpopular political views or whose lifestyle was perceived as immoral were also considered "fair game"--and so became unwitting guinea pigs in the spooks' quest to create a "Manchurian Candidate." Occasionally, the Agency experimented on its own--and, sometimes, with terrible consequences. In 1954, Dr. Frank Olson was invited to a gathering at a CIA retreat near Deep Creek Lake, Maryland. At that gathering, we are told that Olsen and nine other people were given high doses of LSD without their knowledge. By all accounts, Olson's reaction was negative in the extreme. Plunged into severe depression, he suffered hallucinations for days, and was taken to see a therapist in New York. While there, and under the most mysterious circumstances, he fell to his death from an upper-story window of the Statler Hotel. Though Olsen's death was pronounced a suicide, the case has since been re-opened, and is now under investigation by the New York District Attorney's office. Meanwhile, the Agency forged ahead. Fearful of adverse publicity from incidents such as the one that claimed Olsen's life, the CIA shifted many of its operations to the West Coast and abroad. One such activity involved safe-houses in New York and Washington, where prostitutes were paid to bring clients. "Fair game," the clients would be dosed with drugs, and their behavior observed by CIA operatives sitting behind two-way mirrors. With Olsen's death, these and other operations were moved to San Francisco, where the fallout from such activities could be more easily controlled. Still other experiments were funded abroad. At McGill University in Montreal, Dr. Ewen Cameron carried out a series of experiments for the CIA, effectively turning his patients into "vegetables." The process, which Cameron called "depatterning," relied upon intensive electroshocks, followed by 30-60 days of drug-induced sleep, to destroy existing patterns of behavior. In the end, the patient would become a tabula rasa, her mind wiped clean and empty. Elsewhere, scientists such as Maitland Baldwin agreed to go one step further, volunteering to carry out "terminal experiments" in sensory deprivation. Patients-subjects-victims would be buried alive for an "indefinite" period in stimulus-free "boxes." In effect, they would become the CIA's very own zombies. Behind the codewords, BLUEBIRD and PANDORA and ARTICHOKE, the CIA and its sister agencies experimented upon a large and diverse group of subjects, many of whom suffered terribly. Using drugs and hypnosis, microwaves and radiation, the experimenters sought ways to affect moods, impose "selective amnesia," create multiple personalities, induce trance-states by rapid and remote means, and generate so-called "screen memories." This last involved the creation of false "memories" as a way of blocking genuine ones. A key plot-point in THE SYNDROME, it is also a way to impel an agent to commit suicide when his usefulness is at an end. The mind-control program initiated by the CIA in the 1950s was officially discontinued in the 1960s, though many critics of the Agency insist that the most "promising" research continues under other auspices, at home and abroad. This book--THE SYNDROME--is about that. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright© 2001 by John Case. Published online by permission of Ballantine, a division of Random House, Inc. All rights reserved.

Proclamation of Freedom by Carleton Coon, Gordon Browne and Randolph Gusus To the Riffs and Berbers (Moroccan tribes) The proclamation was written first in English by Carleton Coon, Gordon Browne and Randolph Mohammed Gusus for William J. Donovan and subsequently delivered to FDR. Coon and Browne "had reworded 'the English in a more Arabic-sounding way, and Randolph Mohammed Gusus would sing out an Arabic poetical version and then write it down. Every time God was mentioned in the original text, Gusus named Him six times, and 'the result was a piece of poetry that might have come out of the Koran.' " (Wild Bill Donovan, The Last Hero, Anthony Cave Brown, p. 252-253) Franklin D. Roosevelt, Operation Torch, Nov. 8, 1942 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Davidic Chiasmus -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. Word of the Lord. Praise be unto the only God. In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. B. New Things - The Lord's Covenant. O ye Moslems. O ye beloved sons of the Moghreb. May the blessings of God be upon you. This is a great day for you and for us, for all of the sons of Adam who love freedom. Behold. D. The Lord's Servant. We the American Holy Warriors have arrived. Our numbers are as the leaves on the forest trees and as the grains of sand in the sea. We have come here to fight the great Jihad of Freedom. C. The World. We have come to set you free. We have sailed across the great sea in many ships, on many beaches we are landing, and our fighters swarm across the sands and into the city streets, and into the wide country side, and along the highways. Light fires on the hilltops; shout from your housetops, and from the high places, and say the sound of the drum be heard in the land, and the ululation of the women, and the voices of small children. Assemble along the highways to welcome your brothers. We have come to set you free. E. Preservation. Speak with the fighting men and you will find them pleasing to the eye and gladdening to the heart. F. The Suffering Servant. We are not as some other Christians whom ye have known, and who trample you under foot. E. Salvation. Our soldiers consider you as their brothers, for we have been reared in the way of free men. Our soldiers have been told about your country and about their Moslem brothers and they will treat you with respect and with a friendly spirit in the eyes of God. D. The Lord's Davidic Servant. Look in their eyes and smiling faces, for they are Holy Warriors happy in their holy work. Greet us therefore as brothers as we will greet you, and help us [fight the great Jihad of Freedom.] C. Overcoming the World. If we are thirsty, show us the way to water. If we lose our way, lead us back to our camping places. [if needs be,] Show us the paths over the mountains if needs be, and if you see our enemies, the Germans or Italians, making trouble for us, kill them with knives or with stones or with any weapon that you may have set your hands upon. B. Fulfillment. Help us as we have come to help you, and rich will be the reward unto you as all who love justice and righteousness and freedom. Pray for our success in battle, and help us, and God will help us both. Lo. The day of freedom hath come. May God grant his blessing upon you and upon us. A. Salvation Song. [Ellipsis] _____ - Roosevelt. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Return to Davidic Chiasmus Home Page

NY Times article which began the vehement response to The Bell Curve publishing in 1994 after I discovered it at a local college on a NY Times microfiche collection and published it. The Pioneer Fund as promulgators of fascism Editor's hyperbolic diatribe: The Pioneer Fund was the primary financial sponsor of Proposition 187 on the California ballot. They have an extended legacy of sponsoring similar legislation over the past 57 years of their existence. The agenda that they are attempting to advance is one of fascism, repression and racism. Linkage of their past goals and ideals to their present visions for the future of America can go a long way toward stopping them in their tracks. Note: The comments contained in braces [ ] are those of the editor. Some typographical errors in the original article have been corrected for ease of comprehension. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE NEW YORK TIMES - Sunday, December 11, 1977 Fund Backs Controversial Study of "Racial Betterment" by Grace Lichtenstein A private trust fund based in New York has for more than 20 years supported highly controversial research by a dozen scientists who believe that blacks are genetically less intelligent than whites. The Pioneer Fund, a tax-exempt foundation incorporated in 1937 for the express purpose of research into "racial betterment," was worth more than $2 million, according to its 1975 Internal Revenue Service return. Yet several officers of the leading geneticists profession- al organization say they never heard of it. A month-long study of the Pioneer Fund's activities by The New York Times shows it has given at least $179,000 over the last 10 years to Dr. William B. Shockley, a leading proponent of the theory that whites are inher- ently more intelligent than blacks. The money was paid through Stanford University, where professor Shockley was a Nobel Prize-winning professor of engineering science, as well as through his own personal foundation - a customary method of foundation disbursement. Another major beneficiary is Dr. Arthur R. Jensen, an educational psychologist at the University of California, whose article in 1969 theorizing that intelligence was hereditary touched off a furor over the value of compensatory education for disadvantaged black students. Some Others Who Got Grants Dr. Travis Osborn of the University of Georgia, Dr. Frank C. J. McGurk and Dr. Audrey Shuey are other well-known researchers in the same area who got Pioneer grants. Two researchers known to few specialists in the genetics field, Dr. Roger Pearson and Dr. Ralph Scott, also got substantial grants, which they declined to discuss. Neither man is a geneticist. Theories of racial inferiority pursued by Pioneer's staff of researchers have been widely discredited in recent years. Some data developed by Cyril Burt, a British scientist, which had underpinned the theory, are now alleged by leading geneticists to be without scientific value. In addition, at least one major association of professional geneticists has publicly decried the use of what it regards as questionable material on heredity and race to buttress political positions. However, Burke Judd, former secretary of the Genetics Society of America, and Hope Punnett, secretary of the American Society of Human Genetics, said that in principle they were in favor of any legitimate genetics research, even when it encompasses what some feel is an extreme point of view. "If you really believe in open research you've got to let these people do their 'research' and then let the rest of us question it," said Dr. Punnett. She said she did not take either Dr. Jensen or Dr. Shockley "too seriously" because she did not think they had developed good scientific information to support their theories. Some Are Embarrassed Other colleges that have accepted Pioneer grants for "eugenics and heredity" include the University of California at Berkeley, University of Georgia, University of Southern Mississippi, Randolph-Macon College, Montana College of Mineral Science and Technology and the University of Northern Iowa. High officials of the last two schools said hey now were embarrassed by the grants. They asked to remain anonymous, on the ground that criticism by them would suggest interference with academic freedom. It is not known whether Pioneer financed research in fields other than heredity and eugenics. Spokesmen at all the schools who knew about the grants said they did not know the Pioneer Fun had been chartered for research into "racial betterment." Nor did those scientists who The Times was able to reach who would answer questions. A spokesman for the University of California at Berkeley said its records showed no Pioneer Fund grants to Dr. Jensen, although it did accept a Pioneer grant for a political science professor. Dr. Jensen confirmed that some of his grants came through the university. In each case the university, or another foundation, was named as recipient of the grants, although the actual work was done by a specific professor in residence. This is common practice in grant-giving everywhere. However, in at least one school, Northern Iowa, the professor, Dr. Ralph Scott, used some of the money not only for research but for anti-busing, anti-school integration seminars in such off-campus places as Louisville, (KY) and Boston (MA), according to the school's grants administrator. Question of Tax Exemption "This might put the fund's tax-exempt status in jeopardy," an Internal Revenue Service spokesman said when asked about general rules applying to funds such as Pioneer. Under Federal law, such funds remain tax-exempt as long as "no substantial part of the activity" is "carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation." "You're in a very sticky area," the I.R.S. spokesman replied when asked about the definition of propaganda. Pioneer Fund is currently in a tax- exempt category applying to groups exclusively charitable, religious, testing and educational. Although it has been a major "banker" in the financing of research on race and genetics, Pioneer's chief executive will not talk to reporters. Nor will some of the scientists who take its money acknowledge their connection with Pioneer. The president of Pioneer Fund is Harry F. Weyher [pronounced like "wire"], a lawyer whose office at 299 Park Avenue also is the fund's office. Questioned by telephone about Pioneer, Mr. Weyher said, "It's a client." Then he added, "I'm not going to talk to you any more," and hung up. Mr. Weyher, several directors and the fund's founder have had long-standing connections with conservative causes or political candidates, although no one has suggested that the conservatives in question shared their interest in eugenics and heredity research. The founder, Wickliffe [Preston] Draper, a 1913 graduate of Harvard who died in 1972, was the reclusive heir to a Massachusetts textile-machinery fortune, according to published accounts. Two Committees Supported In the 1950's and 1960's Mr. Draper supported two now-defunct committees that gave grants for genetics research. Mr. Weyher was his lawyer. The committee members included Representative Francis E. Walter, chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee [HUAC]; Henry E. Garrett, an educator known for his belief in the genetic inferiority of blacks, and Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi. When it was disclosed in 1960 that Richard Arens, staff director for the Un-American Activities Committee, was also a paid consultant to the Draper- financed committees, Mr. Arens was forced to leave his Congressional job. In 1960 published reports quoted some leading American geneticists as saying they had turned down requests from Mr. Draper to do research into theories of racial inferiority among blacks. Mr. Weyher, in a newspaper interview at the time, said Mr. Draper had already sponsored a book on restricting immigration and another on the intelligence of blacks by Dr. Shuey, a retired professor at Randolph- Macon Woman's College. Mr. Draper also gave money to right wing political candidates, including the late Representative Donald Bruce [Republican] of Indiana, and the late Representative Walter, as well as to conservative lobbying organiza- tions such as the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies. When Mr. Draper died his estate turned over $1.4 million to the Pioneer Fund. Among two men listed as directors of Pioneer in 1975, the most recent year for which Internal Revenue Service records are available, is John B. Trevor, [Jr.] of New York, [whose father was] a founder of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, adviser to Billy James Hargis' Christian Crusade and author of an article on South Africa that appeared in The Citizen, the publication of the White Citizens' Councils. Testifying against more liberal immigration laws in 1965, Mr. Trevor warned against "a conglomeration of racial and ethnic elements" that he said led to "a serious culture decline." The other Pioneer director [in 1975] is Thomas F. Ellis of Raleigh, N.C., manager of [senator] Jesse Helm's 1972 campaign for Senator and an impor- tant backer of Ronald Reagan's 1976 Presidential campaign. Pioneer-sponsored research in eugenics, a movement devoted to improving the human species through control of hereditary factors in mating, and dysgenics the study of trends in population leading to the deterioration of hered- itary , is a subject of much dispute in the genetics field. An 'Inescapable Opinion' Dr. Shockley, co-inventor of the transistor, has for years been collecting material on eugenics and dysgenics research. He said in a telephone inter- view a few days ago from his home in Palo Alto, Calif., that he had reached "the inescapable opinion that a major cause of American Negroes' intellectual and social deficits is hereditary and racially genetic in origin." This, he continued, "is not remediable to a major degree by practical improvements in environment," such as better schools, jobs or living con- ditions. He said he was "very grateful" for Pioneer's grants. A spokesman for Stan- ford said that $179,000 over 10 years to Dr. Shockley from Pioneer sounded correct, although the school did not have an exact dollar figure. The views of Dr. Shockley and Dr. Jensen and their supporters, have come under attack recently from, among other sources, the Genetics Society of America, a leading professional organization. In July 1976 it published a statement of its committee on genetics, race and intelligence that was endorsed by nearly 1,400 members. "In our views there is no convincing evidence as to whether there is or is not an appreciable genetic difference in intelligence between races," it said. "Well designed research... may yield valid and socially useful results and should not be discouraged. We feel that geneticists can and must also speak out against the misuse of genetics for political purposes and the drawing of social conclusions from inadequate data." Genetics and Busing When informed about Dr. Scott's activities on busing at Northern Iowa, Professor Judd said it sounded contrary to normal academic practices for an educational, tax-exempt foundation to finance genetics research linked to the school-busing controversy. "But I don't have enough information," he added. According to Northern Iowa officials, Dr. Scott is studying "forced busing and its relationship to genetic aspects of educability." In this context he sent a graduate student to Mississippi and held seminars on busing, according to sources at the university. Dr. Scott, a professor of education, refused to comment on his research and to say whether its results had been published anywhere. Roger Pearson, a British-educated economist who has been the beneficiary of two Pioneer grants for work while he was dean at Montana Tech, also refused to talk about his research. Such nonresponses are unusual in the field of academic research openly sponsored by tax-exempt foundations. Standford, for example, has a policy stating that "findings and conclusions" of research supported by outside grants "should be available for scrutiny and criticism. Dr. Pearson, who served for the 1974-1975 academic year as dean at Montana Tech before leaving by mutual consent in a disagreement over educational goals, got $60,000 from Pioneer while he was there. Montana Tech officials said they had no idea that he apparently was the same man who some years ago edited Western Destiny, a journal with many pro-South Africa, anti-Communist and anti-racial mixing articles and who wrote a number of pamphlets for the conservative-oriented Noontide Press such as "Eugenics and Race" and "Early Civilizations of the Nordic Race." -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- How many goals of Hitler's Third Reich are mentioned in this article? Anti-immigration legislation, sentiments and testimony Anti-civil rights legislation, sentiments and activities Anti-minority pseudo scientific research into racial inferiority Anti-communist and anti-liberal agendas of the radical right Attempts at genetic manipulation by pseudo science towards a Master Race Use of "internal security" at HUAC as a direct smokescreen for racism Supporting the most anti-union Senator who ever lived in Jesse Helms Using the veneer of "academic respectability" and "science" for racism Wickliffe Preston Draper, the founder of The Pioneer Fund, is the epitome of an American Hitler in the guise of a philanthropic and well educated millionaire. His family owned Draper Corporation, in Hopedale, MA and both North and South Carolina and he was a staunch anti-Union activist from the early days of Sacco and Vanzetti Trial in Dedham, MA only 30 miles from his hometown of Hopedale, MA in the heart of the Blackstone Valley which was the home of the Industrial Revolution. He was also among the most ardent and vehement racists and anti-civil rights advocates in the history of this cause from as early as the 1930's and perhaps earlier. His hatred of the United Nations, liberals, and his dislike for anyone who participated in the Nye Committees of the 1930's which attempted to punish so-called "war profiteering" by the DuPonts, led to Draper's deliberate persecution of Alger T. Hiss between 1948 and 1951 with the assistance of his cohort in racism, eugenics and white supremacy, Nathaniel Weyl, who is still alive today. Draper's vitriolic hatred for President John F. Kennedy was epitomized by his direct financial sponsorship of several publications that led the character assassination attacks on him during the 1950's when he was a Senator from Massachusetts. These included Human Events, Right magazine, Noontide Press, The American Mercury and comparable rightist publications ostensibly owned and operated by The Liberty Lobby or affiliates, the foremost racist, proto-fascist and anti-Semitic organization that has ever existed in a Democracy. Only a Democracy could be brought to its knees by the sinister forces of fascism, operating under the protection of the First Amendment to the Constitution. This is a very sad commentary on our times and on the foibles of our once magnificent system of egalitarian democracy. The Draper attacks and assaults on President Kennedy intensified even more during the 1960's when he was President and culminated in the final character assassination in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963. The Draper family, in 1967 became the largest shareholder in Rockwell-Standard, which later became Rockwell International, one of the two largest defense contractors in the entire universe along with the Lockheed Corp. of Marietta, GA which is championed by Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA). Rockwell bought out the failing Draper Corporation, a manufacturer of textile loom machinery and equipment just before the acceleration of military activity in Vietnam and shortly before the Draper Corporation was liquidated by Rockwell as a bankrupt concern in the late 1970's. Rockets, missiles and warplanes are apparently a much easier place to make money than in the arena of textile loom equipment and textile machinery. Neither Kennedy's opposition to the Cost Plus Fixed Fee method of compensating defense contractors nor the CIA's opposition to the National Intelligence Estimates of March 22, 1963 called NIE 11-4-63 stood in the way of the plans for the future of this country as defined and designed by those in the Draper- Rockwell coalition which reached its culmination during their merger. Draper's fascist-inspired vitriolic hatred of Communism and anything liberal led to his support of McCarthyism and the activities of HUAC, the House Un-American Activities Committee for over a decade. In the spirit of Dr. Josef Goebbels, he and his close associate at The Pioneer Fund, Dr. Harry H. Laughlin, actually created and then championed the "involuntary sterilization movement in America" the so-called "Buck vs. Bell" Supreme Court case which was favorably reviewed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. It led directly to the involuntary sterilization of over 75,000 human beings between 1924 and 1972 in the approximately 24 states which passed similar laws at the behest and encouragement of The Pioneer Fund. Sound familiar? But the first major achievement of his work and that of Herr Laughlin, was when Hitler and Goebbels invited Laughlin to receive an honorary degree for his work in passing "The Model Eugenics Laws in America". Hitler used the Draper-inspired American Eugenics Model to pass the law which will go down in infamy as the Nuremberg Laws: "On the Prevention of Hereditarily Ill Progeny" - the so-called Holocaust Laws. Are you beginning to get the picture here? Are you willing to put your actions and money where your realistic concerns are? The last time that Immigration laws were severely tightened was the 1924 Immigration Act which was accomplished, in my opinion, in direct anticipa- tion of the coming unrest in Europe during the 1930's and 1940's. These laws kept may legitimate refugees, all targeted for elimination by the Third Reich, from ever reaching a safe haven in the United States. The precisely identical intentions are at work today with this renewed emphasis on "Proposition 187", which is intended to become "The Model Anti-Immigration Legislation in America" and for the rest of the world. When a Rwanda or Zaire-style deliberately initiated crisis occurs in Bosnia-Herzegovina or elsewhere in the world, the intention of the sponsors of "Proposition 187" is to prevent those refugees targeted for "ethnic extinction" from ever reaching a safe haven in American or anywhere else in the free world for that matter. This is a very real and serious concern and every American who recognizes the true intentions of Proposition 187 should oppose it with their last breath and their last ounce of strength before it is too late.

My condolences go out to his family, to you and to all those who were fortunate enough to cross his path during our mutual journeys in the New England area.

<H2 align=center>Ethnic Cleansing in Connecticut Our state's role in the Nazi eugenics movement</H2> by Edwin Black September 11, 2003 Also see cover art Peter M. Morlock Photo Illustration Photo Courtesy Max Planck Gesellscharf Archive Nazi eugenicist Dr. Otmar Freiherr von Verschuer examining twins with eye color chart.American Philosophical Society Photo "Some people are born to be a burden on the rest," circa 1926.Auschwitz Archive Auschwitz's murderous doctor, Josef Mengele. Hitler and his henchmen victimized an entire continent and exterminated millions in his quest for a co-called "Master Race." But the concept of a white, blond-haired, blue-eyed master Nordic race was not Hitler's. The idea was created in the United States, and cultivated in Connecticut, two to three decades before Hitler came to power, the product of the American eugenics movement. Hartford and indeed the state of Connecticut played an important albeit unknown role in this country's campaign of ethnic cleansing. What's more, Connecticut was an important player in America's eugenic nexus with Nazi Germany. Eugenics was the racist American pseudoscience determined to wipe away all human beings except those who conformed to a Nordic stereotype. The philosophy was enshrined into national policy by forced sterilization and segregation laws, as well as marriage restrictions enacted in 27 states. In 1909, Connecticut became the third state to adopt such laws. Ultimately, eugenics coercively sterilized some 60,000 Americans, barred the marriage of thousands, forcibly segregated thousands in "colonies," and persecuted untold numbers in ways we are just learning. In Connecticut, only some 600 were coercively sterilized, but hundreds of thousands more were slated for the surgery before the plan was abandoned. Eugenics would have been so much bizarre parlor talk had it not been for massive financing by corporate philanthropies, specifically the Carnegie Institution, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Harriman railroad fortune. They were all in league with America's most respected scientists hailing from such prestigious universities as Yale, Harvard, and Princeton. These academicians faked and twisted data to serve eugenics' racist aims. Connecticut was considered both an epicenter for eugenic propaganda and a test case for ethnic cleansing. The Carnegie Institution literally invented the American movement by establishing a laboratory complex at Cold Spring Harbor on Long Island. This complex stockpiled millions of index cards on ordinary Americans as the movement carefully plotted the removal of families, bloodlines and whole peoples. From Cold Spring Harbor, eugenics advocates agitated in the legislatures of America, as well as the nation's social service agencies and associations. The Harriman railroad fortune paid local charities, such as the New York Bureau of Industries and Immigration, to seek out Jewish, Italian and other immigrants in New York and other crowded cities and subject them to deportation, trumped up confinement or forced sterilization. The Rockefeller Foundation helped found and fund the German eugenics program and even funded the program that ultimately sent Josef Mengele into Auschwitz. Much of the spiritual guidance and political agitation for the American movement came from the American Eugenics Society of New Haven, and the Eugenics Research Association of Long Island, which coordinated much of its activity with the AES. These organizations -- which functioned as part of a closely-knit network, published racist eugenic newsletters and pseudoscientific journals such as Eugenical News and Eugenics, and propagandized for the Nazis. Eugenics was born as a scientific curiosity in the Victorian age. In 1863, Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, theorized that if talented people only married other talented people, the result would be measurably better offspring. At the turn of the last century, Galton's ideas were imported into the United States just as Gregor Mendel's principles of heredity were rediscovered. American eugenic advocates believed with religious fervor that the same Mendelian concepts determining the color and size of peas, corn and cattle also governed the social and intellectual character of man. In an America demographically reeling from massive immigration upheaval and torn by post-Reconstruction chaos, race conflict was everywhere in the early 20th century. Elitists, utopians and so-called "progressives" fused their smoldering race fears and class bias with their desire to make a better world. They reinvented Galton's eugenics into a repressive and racist ideology. The intent: populate the earth with vastly more of their own socio-economic and biological kind -- and less or none of everyone else. The superior species the eugenics movement sought was not merely tall, strong, talented people. Eugenicists craved blond, blue-eyed Nordic types. This group alone, they believed, was fit to inherit the earth. In the process, the movement intended to subtract Negroes, Indians, Hispanics, East Europeans, Jews, dark-haired hill folk, poor people, the infirm and really anyone classified outside the gentrified genetic lines drawn up by American raceologists. How? By identifying so-called "defective" family trees and subjecting them to lifelong segregation and sterilization programs to kill their bloodlines. The grand plan was to literally wipe away the reproductive capability of those deemed weak and inferior -- the so-called "unfit." Eighteen solutions were explored in a Carnegie-supported 1911 "Preliminary Report of the Committee of the Eugenic Section of the American Breeder's Association to Study and to Report on the Best Practical Means for Cutting Off the Defective Germ-Plasm in the Human Population." Although point eight was euthanasia, the breeders believed it was too early to implement this solution. Instead, the main solution was the rapid expansion of forced segregation and sterilization, as well as more marriage restrictions. The most commonly suggested method of eugenicide in America was a "lethal chamber" or gas chamber. Even the United States Supreme Court endorsed eugenics as national policy. In its infamous 1927 decision, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind ... . Three generations of imbeciles are enough." This decision opened the floodgates for thousands to be coercively sterilized or otherwise persecuted as subhuman. Years later, the Nazis at the Nuremberg trials quoted Holmes' words in their own defense. In late 1936, Connecticut governor Wilbur Cross commissioned a "Survey of the Human Resources of Connecticut," to be undertaken by Carnegie Institution researcher Harry H. Laughlin. The purpose of the survey was to bring ethnic cleansing to Connecticut in an organized scientific fashion. Laughlin was the perfect choice. He was editor of Eugenical News, a leader of the AES, and America's most accomplished authority on preparing government-backed elimination of unfit families. After helping transplant his idea into Nazi Germany, he was awarded an honorary degree in 1937 by the University of Heidelberg. Laughlin's plan was to sterilize approximately 175,000 Connecticut residents -- or about 10 percent of the state's population. The state's eugenical laws did not require a court order. The plan was to emulate Hitler's eugenical regime whereby doctors were required to denounce those citizens considered racially or medically "unfit. "The state's official report called upon the state's 2,400 physicians to assume personal responsibility for "selection of an individual for sterilization under the state's statutes which govern this means of preventing future degeneracy... . Thus when in social medicine the physician works for the elimination of human defect, he performs an invaluable service." These ideas were incorporated into a formal public address that was presented to the Yale Medical School by the eugenic commission's chairman, former U.S. Sen. Frederick C. Walcott. The state placed much of its hopes on "physicians who specialize in diseases of the eye, the ear, on nervous or mental disorders, on the heart, the lungs, the digestive system and upon crippled bodies." The plan was to eliminate the family bloodlines of anyone who was sick. Indeed, special emphasis was placed on those with even the slightest vision problems. In that regard, the nation's organized ophthalmologists had long promoted legislation to identify all those related to anyone with a vision problem so they could be rounded up, placed in camps, and their marriages prohibited or annulled. Ultimately those related to anyone with a vision problem would be forcibly sterilized. Connecticut's survey was to parallel similar biological surveys of "useful plant and animal life," as its preamble makes clear. Because eugenicists saw themselves as breeders, and indeed were encouraged by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, they considered the human species as one to be pruned and cultivated, like any herd of cattle or field of corn. Eugenicists believed that crime, poverty, immorality, unchaste behavior and other undesired traits were genetic and could not be stamped out unless the entire family was prevented from reproducing. To save expense, others would not be sterilized but simply thrown out of the state. Immigrants would be deported to their native countries. Unfit Americans would be expelled to their family's original locale. For example, an American judged unfit might be traced generations back to Kentucky or Massachusetts. That person and his entire family, under the plan, would be rounded up and deposited into the so-called originating state. Ultimately, so many people would be dumped into ancestral towns and states, creating so vast a social displacement problem, that concentration camps would be needed to handle the uprooted population. Property was to be seized to pay for their economic drain on the state. In other words, the joint Carnegie Institution-Connecticut plan was to create domestic refugees or displaced persons in a fashion identical to that employed by the Nazis at that very moment in refugee-torn Europe. Connecticut established 21 human cross-classifications to qualify them for life or eugenic treatment. Age, for example was cross-classified by "Race Descent," "Nativity and Citizenship," and "Kin in Institutions." Just being related to someone in an institution was a mark against your reproductive record. The same racial and family linkages were measured for intelligence, and criminal record. Even before the survey was undertaken, Laughlin's proposal made it clear that the targets were Negroes, Orientals, Mexicans and others who had found their way into the United States. A proposed population registry card was designed for any future IBM processing. Connecticut's plan to use IBM punch cards never came to fruition. Indeed, the American eugenics movement was less successful precisely because it lacked the punch card technology that IBM so carefully developed for the Nazi eugenic and extermination campaigns. Ironically, IBM's Nazi technology was actually first tested by the company in a pilot program in Jamaica in 1928, five years before the Hitler regime. The Carnegie Institution's 1928 Jamaica Race Crossing Project introduced the race classification card that evolved into the SS card IBM used in Germany. The Jamaica Race Crossing Project was the first step in a plan to wipe out all black people on earth. In Connecticut, Laughlin quietly surveyed 160 towns in eight counties. The first 11,960 citizens slated to be sterilized were to be residents of penal institutions -- weak, disabled, morally unacceptable or otherwise "socially inadequate." One town, Rocky Hill, was selected as a model for biological surveillance. Nearly all of the town's 2,190 citizens were registered, and almost half fingerprinted. A proposed racial registration card for IBM technology was part of the state's study. Although the planning phase of the state's comprehensive survey was completed in 1938, it was never implemented on the scope desired and as WWII approached, was cast aside. Just a few copies of the full secret report were ever circulated. Only after eugenics and race biology became entrenched as an American ideal was the campaign transplanted into Germany, where it came to Hitler's attention. Hitler studied American eugenic laws and rationales and preferred to legitimize his innate race hatred and anti-Semitism by medicalizing it, and wrapping it in a more palatable pseudoscientific facade -- eugenics. Indeed, Hitler was able to recruit more followers among reasonable Germans by claiming that science was on his side. While Hitler's race hatred sprung from his own mind, the intellectual outlines of eugenics that Hitler adopted in 1924 were strictly American. During the '20s, Carnegie Institution eugenic scientists cultivated deep personal and professional relationships with Germany's fascist eugenicists. In 1924, when Hitler wrote Mein Kampf, he frequently quoted American eugenic ideology and openly displayed a thorough knowledge of American eugenics and its phraseology. "There is today one state," wrote Hitler, "in which at least weak beginnings toward a better conception [of immigration] are noticeable. Of course, it is not our model German Republic, but the United States." Hitler proudly told his comrades just how closely he followed American eugenic legislation. "I have studied with great interest," he told a fellow Nazi, "the laws of several American states concerning prevention of reproduction by people whose progeny would, in all probability, be of no value or be injurious to the racial stock." Hitler even wrote a fan letter to American eugenic leader Madison Grant calling his race-based eugenics book, The Passing of the Great Race, his "bible." Hitler's deputy, Rudolf Hess, coined a popular adage in the Reich: "National Socialism is nothing but applied biology." Hitler's struggle for a superior race would be a mad crusade for a Master Race. Now, the American term "Nordic" was freely exchanged with "Germanic" or "Aryan." Race science, racial purity and racial dominance became the driving force behind Hitler's Nazism. Nazi eugenics would ultimately dictate who would be persecuted in a Reich-dominated Europe, how people would live, and how they would die. Nazi doctors would become the unseen generals in Hitler's war against the Jews and other Europeans deemed inferior. Doctors would create the science, devise the eugenic formulas, and even hand-select the victims for sterilization, euthanasia and mass extermination. During the Reich's first 10 years, eugenicists across America welcomed Hitler's plans as the logical fulfillment of their own decades of research and effort. Ten years after Virginia passed its 1924 sterilization act, Joseph DeJarnette, superintendent of Virginia's Western State Hospital, complained in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, "The Germans are beating us at our own game." In 1934, as Germany's sterilizations were accelerating beyond 5,000 per month, the California eugenic leader C. M. Goethe upon returning from Germany ebulliently bragged to a key colleague, "You will be interested to know, that your work has played a powerful part in shaping the opinions of the group of intellectuals who are behind Hitler in this epoch-making program. Everywhere I sensed that their opinions have been tremendously stimulated by American thought ... . I want you, my dear friend, to carry this thought with you for the rest of your life, that you have really jolted into action a great government of 60 million people." More than just the scientific roadmap, America used its money to fund and help found Germany's eugenic institutions. By 1926, Rockefeller had donated some $410,000 -- almost $4 million in 20th century money -- to hundreds of German researchers. For example, in May of 1926, Rockefeller awarded $250,000 to the German Psychiatric Institute of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute to become the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Psychiatry. Among the leading psychiatrists at the German Psychiatric Institute was Ernst Rüdin, who became director and eventually an architect of Hitler's systematic medical repression. Another in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute's eugenic complex of institutions was the Institute for Brain Research. Since 1915, it had operated out of a room. Everything changed when Rockefeller money arrived in 1929. A grant of $317,000 allowed the Institute to construct a major building and take center stage in German race biology. The Institute for Brain Research received additional grants from the Rockefeller Foundation during the next several years. Leading the Institute, once again, was Hitler's medical henchman Ernst Rüdin. Rüdin's organization became a prime director and recipient of the murderous experimentation and research conducted on Jews, Gypsies and others. Beginning in 1940, thousands of Germans taken from old age homes, mental institutions and other custodial facilities were systematically gassed. Between 50,000 and 100,000 were eventually killed. Leon Whitney, executive secretary of the American Eugenics Society declared of Nazism, "While we were pussy-footing around ... the Germans were calling a spade a spade." A special recipient of Rockefeller funding was the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics in Berlin. For decades, American eugenicists had craved twins to advance their research into heredity. The Institute was now prepared to undertake such research on an unprecedented level. On May 13, 1932, the Rockefeller Foundation in New York dispatched a radiogram to its Paris office: JUNE MEETING EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE NINE THOUSAND DOLLARS OVER THREE YEAR PERIOD TO KWG INSTITUTE ANTHROPOLOGY FOR RESEARCH ON TWINS AND EFFECTS ON LATER GENERATIONS OF SUBSTANCES TOXIC FOR GERM PLASM. At the time of Rockefeller's endowment, Otmar Freiherr von Verschuer, a hero in American eugenics circles, functioned as a head of the Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics. Rockefeller funding of the Institute for Anthropology continued directly and through other research conduits during Verschuer's early tenure. In 1935, Verschuer left the Institute to form a rival eugenic facility in Frankfurt that was much heralded in the American eugenic press. Research on twins in the Third Reich exploded, backed up by government decrees mobilizing all twins. At about that time, Verschuer wrote in Der Erbarzt, a eugenic doctor's journal he edited, that Germany's war would yield a "total solution to the Jewish problem." Verschuer had a long-time assistant. His name was Josef Mengele. On May 30, 1943, Mengele arrived at Auschwitz. Verschuer notified the German Research Society, "My assistant, Dr. Josef Mengele (M.D., Ph.D.) joined me in this branch of research. He is presently employed as Hauptsturmführer [captain] and camp physician in the Auschwitz concentration camp. Anthropological testing of the most diverse racial groups in this concentration camp is being carried out with permission of the SS Reichsführer [Himmler]." Mengele began searching the boxcar arrivals for twins. When he found them, he performed beastly experiments, scrupulously wrote up the reports and sent the paperwork back to Verschuer's Institute for evaluation. Often, cadavers, eyes and other body parts were also dispatched to Berlin's eugenic institutes. Rockefeller executives never knew of Mengele. With few exceptions, the foundation had ceased all eugenic studies in Nazi-occupied Europe before the war erupted in 1939. But by that time the die had been cast. The talented men Rockefeller and Carnegie had financed, the great institutions they helped found, and the science it helped create took on a scientific momentum of their own. What stopped the race biologists of Berlin, Munich and Auschwitz? Certainly, the Nazis felt they were unstoppable. They imagined a Thousand-Year Reich of super-bred men. But something did defeat Mengele and his colleagues. On June 6, 1944, the Allies invaded at Normandy and began defeating the Nazis, town by town and often street by street. They closed in on Germany from the west. The Soviet army overran the Auschwitz death camp from the east on January 27, 1945. Mengele fled. Hence, Auschwitz was indeed the last stand of eugenics. The science of the strong almost completely prevailed in its war against the weak. Almost. After the war, eugenics was declared a crime against humanity -- an act of genocide. Germans were tried. Their American collaborators were not. Verschuer himself esped prosecution. He re-established his connections with American eugenicists who had gone underground and renamed their crusade "human genetics." Soon, Verschuer once again became a respected scientist in Germany and around the world. In 1949, he became a corresponding member of the newly formed American Society of Human Genetics, organized by American eugenicists and geneticists. In the fall of 1950, the University of Münster offered Verschuer a position at its new Institute of Human Genetics, where he later became a dean. In the early and mid-1950s, Verschuer became an honorary member of numerous prestigious societies, including the Italian Society of Genetics, the Anthropological Society of Vienna, and the Japanese Society for Human Genetics. The genocidal eugenic roots of genetics were lost to a victorious generation that refused to link itself to the crimes of Nazism, and succeeding generations that never knew the truth of the years leading up to war. Human genetics became an enlightened endeavor in the later 20th century. Hard-working, devoted scientists finally cracked the human code via the Human Genome Project. Now every individual can be biologically identified and classified by trait and ancestry. Yet even now, leading voices in the genetic world are calling for a cleansing of the unwanted among us, and even a master human species. Newgenics has wracked the insurance and employment world. At press time, America's first genetic anti-discrimination legislation had passed the House and Senate. Yet most informed observers believe that because globalization now dominates genetics, no nation's law can stop the abuses. Edwin Black is the New York Times best-selling author of the award-winning IBM and the Holocaust and the just-released War Against the Weak (Four Walls Eight Windows) from which this article is adapted. He can be reached via http://www.edwinblack.com/. Copyright 2003 Edwin Black All Rights Reserved Original Source

Main problem is that it was none other than The Liberty Lobby that first started pushing this garbage about the "Moon Landing was Faked" or "9/11 Sponsored by US Gov and the CIA" or Theresa Seay's famous line about a Liberty Lobby "Spotlight" article claiming that Ma Bell could take your phone headset off-hook to listen in to any conversations behing held withing 20 feet of any extension set. And that was why they encouraged you to install a phone extension in every room, so they could hear everything said in any room. Poor thing was serious, too. Her husband: "UDont" Seay used to sit there silently on the stage while she poked a yardstick under his arm then besides his head to prove her theories about the flight paths of various bullets. Anyone remember that little show? And I maintain that Liberty Lobby and Spotlight deliberately intermix wacko conspiracy theories with anti-Gov rhetoric and partially logical and barely conceivable theories until Spotlight fans like Terry Mauro and Dan Jennings can not even tell the difference. Sad but true.

"United States of the World" From: Anthony Cave Brown The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan Times Books, 1982, pp. 269-270 If anyone has this book can you post this Memo from Carleton S. Coon to Wild Bill Donovan from page 269-270 for us? It might be the 1st case of a reference to creating The New World Order by the use of political assassinations. Coon was rewarded with an appointment to the fledgling OSS at the time and later ended up with ISI in Baltimore, after Col. Ulius L. Amoss died in 1961. Coon was also 2nd in command to Amoss in the Cairo, Egypt OSS office. Both of them ran Robert E. Johnson at one time or another in their careers. When did Coon take over ISI? A week after Oswald came back to the USA. My thought is that both Oswald and Johnson were Manchurian Candidate styled programmed assassins, one from Taiwan via Ray S. Cline and the other from Tsingtao, Manchuria. Do not get all knee jerk reactioned on me. Whether or not Oswald even fired a shot is TOTALLY IRRELEVANT to this thesis. He was inserted into the JFK conundrum in order to elicit a knee jerk cover-up response from the US Gov and guess what... it worked to a perfect 'T'! Amoss (and Coon) at one time or another ran over 3.000 spies and agents for the OSS and the CIA. Amoss was called 'the world's foremost spy!' in his obituary. How did we all overlook this guy for so long? Yes, he was dead by 1961 but he was OSS, Oh So Socially connected, what with his Harvard degree and Harvard Professorship and everything. Plus he was a classic Eugenicist and his father must have been close to Wickliffe P. Draper. His Dad was a Cotton Broker, living in Wakefield Massachusetts, the home state of Draper Corp. and Wickliffe P. Draper was at one time the world's largest exporter and spinner of cotton. The Draper Looms spun over 85% of the US production of cotton for over 75 years. Take your cotton picking hands off our cotton pickers said Draper #1 to Abe Lincoln. Take your cotton picking hands off our cotton spinners said Draper #2 to FDR. And take your cotton picking hands off our barriers to cotton and textile imports said Draper #3 to JFK. None of them listened and look what happened. Drapers made sure that Lincoln and Kennedy were both neutralized and only Gen. Smedley Butler's opposition to the FDR coup prevented a similar fate from befalling FDR. See: The Plot Against the White House by Jules Archer for the story of the attempted coup against FDR. Prevent Future Wars", The Washington Post, April 19, 1942. http://www.well.com/user/jmalloy/gunterand.../resources.html "Carleton S. Coon, Harvard, Conrad M. Arensberg, Brooklyn College, and Eliot D. Chapple, Harvard Medical School and President of the Society for Applied Anthropology propose a "United States of the World" with a world police force that would control the whole federation. The proposal would seem merely ludicrous but for the fact that subsequently Carleton Coon was chosen by "Wild Bill" Donovan as an agent of the fledging OSS. Anthony Cave Brown (Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan, NY: Times Books, 1982, pp. 269-270) quotes a memo from Coon to Donovan in which Coon not only advocates political assassination but also suggests that a group of men be chosen for this purpose from the OSS and the British SOE." "You stay in your village and I will stay in mine. If your sheep eat our grass we will kill you, or we may kill you anyhow to get all the grass for our own sheep. Anyone who tries to make us change our ways is a witch and we will kill him. Keep out of our village." — Former Harvard Professor, Pioneer Fund minion and OSS Colonel Carleton S. Coon - The Story of Man, 1954, page 376 On the occasion of voicing opposition to Brown vs. Board of Education - 1954 the Earl Warren led Supreme Court decision.

Carleton S. Coon, took over the ISI assassination operations of Col. Ulius Amoss in Baltimore and ran Robert Emmett Johnson until Coon died in 1981. At that point these assassination teams were passed on to Ray S. Cline of the World Anti-Communist League and the package included Robert Emmett Johnson as well. "You stay in your village and I will stay in mine. If your sheep eat our grass we will kill you, or we may kill you anyhow to get all the grass for our own sheep. Anyone who tries to make us change our ways is a witch and we will kill him. Keep out of our village." — Carleton Coon - The Story of Man, 1954, page 376 On the occasion of voicing opposition to Brown vs. Board of Education - 1954 the Earl Warren Court decision.

Wait until you hear this one. Carleton S. Coon trained as a linguist and an anthropologist and later with the OSS, worked with both Ulius Amoss the Cairo OSS Station Chief and Robert Emmett Johnson. Coon was very heavily involved with both Wickliffe Preston Draper and The Pioneer Fund as a White Supremacist, Race Hygienist and Eugenics proponent as was Draper of course. http://comm.colorado.edu/jjackson/research/coon.pdf And Wickliffe P. Draper was involved with both Dr. Has J. Eysenck who worked on MKULTRA projects, and the MKULTRA based H. Smith Richardson Foundation through The Pioneer Fund and his links to THE MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE, Anastse Vonsiatsky. Quod Est Demonstratum. NOW DO YOU BELIEVE THAT RICHARD CONDON IN THE MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE KNEW ABOUT DRAPER AND VONSIATSKY AND MACARTHUR AND WILLOUGHBY AND THURMOND AND MORRIS AND ANGLETON AND FELLERS? Even George Michael Evica in A Certain Arrogance references former Korean Prisoners of War who had been brainwashed during their imprisonment. And talks about what Dulles and Wisner did to conceal them. Do a Google for Draper Asselar Man or Draper Tuaregs and see what you get. Condon wrote about the Tuaregs in THE MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE, too... and Draper, playing amateur anthropologist went along for a fossil dig and now claims to have discovered Asselar Man. In fact all he did was measure some Tuareg facial features, gathering Coon style racial metrics which was very popular at the time. You guys are not getting this are you?

Then Colonel Edwin A. Walker and Darby's Rangers... CHAPTER 2 Special Operations in the Mediterranean The opening blows against Hitler's Fortress Europe came not in Western Europe but in the Mediterranean. Once the United States had entered the war, American leaders pressed for a direct cross-channel assault against the Continent. Through 1942 and much of 1943, however, they yielded to British concerns over Allied readiness for such a large step and accepted less ambitious endeavors against the "soft underbelly" of Axis-dominated Europe. The soft underbelly proved to be a hard shell as Allied armies, after driving the Germans and Italians from North Africa and Sicily, made slow progress against a tenacious German defense in the wet climate and rugged highlands of the Italian peninsula. In this theater of sandy wastes and jagged mountains bordered by the placid waters of the Mediterranean, American forces discovered both a need and a favorable environment for their first major special operations of the war. Darby's Rangers While the U.S. Army's Rangers would perform several special operations in the course of the war, they traced their origins to a provisional formation created by the chief of staff to remedy the Army's lack of combat experience during the early months of 1942. When Marshall visited Great Britain in April to urge a cross-channel invasion, he met Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the charismatic head of British Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), and later visited COHQ's commando training center in Scotland. In Mountbatten's commando raiding program, Marshall perceived a means of providing American soldiers with at least some combat experience. At his direction Col. Lucian K. Truscott met with British lead- Page 12 ers to determine the best way of fulfilling this objective. Subsequently, Truscott recommended the formation of an American commando unit which would bear the designation Ranger. Under Truscott's concept, most personnel would join the new Ranger force on a temporary basis and then return to their parent units after several months of field operations. Marshall approved the proposals, and on 19 June 1942, Truscott officially activated the 1st Ranger Battalion in Northern Ireland.1 As commander of the battalion, Truscott selected Capt. William O. Darby. At the time Darby was serving as an aide to Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle, the commander of American forces in Northern Ireland. When Hartle recommended Darby for the command of the new unit, Truscott was receptive, having found the young officer to be "outstanding in appearance, possessed of a most attractive personality, . . . keen, intelligent, and filled with enthusiasm." 2 His judgment proved accurate. The 31-year-old Darby, a graduate of West Point in 1933, soon demonstrated an innate ability to gain the confidence of his superiors and the deep devotion of his men.3 Using the model of the British commandos, Darby energetically organized his new unit. Circulars, calling for volunteers, soon appeared on bulletin boards of the 34th Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division, and other American units training in Northern Ireland. Darby and an officer from Hartle's staff personally examined and selected officers, who, in turn, interviewed the enlisted volunteers, looking especially for athletic individuals in good physical condition. The recruits, ranging in age from seventeen to thirty-five, came from every part of the United States; they included a former lion tamer and a full-blooded Sioux Indian. Although several units attempted to unload misfits and troublemakers on the new unit, most recruits joined out of a yearning for adventure and a desire to be part of an elite force. As the volunteers arrived at the battalion's camp, Darby formed them into a headquarters company and six line companies of sixty-seven men each, an organization which sacrificed firepower and administrative self-sufficiency for foot and amphibious mobility.4 The advanced commando training of the battalion lasted approximately three months. Immediately on arriving at Fort William in northern Scotland, the recruits embarked on an exhausting forced march to their camp in the shadow of Ach- Page 13 Photo: Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott Jr. (U.S. Army photograph) Photo: Col. William O. Darby (U.S. Army photograph) nacarry Castle, a trek that foreshadowed a month of rigorous training. The future Rangers endured log-lifting drills, obstacle courses, and speed marches over mountains and through frigid rivers under the watchful eye of British commando instructors. In addition, they received weapons training and instruction in hand-to-hand combat, street fighting, patrols, night operations, and the handling of small boats. The training stressed realism, including the use of live ammunition. On one occasion, a Ranger alertly picked up a grenade that a commando had thrown into a boatload of trainees and hurled it over the lake before it exploded. In early August the battalion transferred to Argyle, Scotland, for training in amphibious operations with the Royal Navy and later moved to Dundee where they stayed in private homes while practicing attacks on pillboxes and coastal defenses.5 While training proceeded, fifty Rangers participated in the raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942. Although the Allies apparently hoped that the raid would ease German pressure on the Soviets, the ostensible purpose was to test the defenses of the port and force the German Air Force to give battle. To clear the way for the main assault on the town by the 2d Canadian Page 14 Photo: Rangers train on the terrain of the 8 November assault at Arzew (U.S. Army Photograph) Page 15 Division, two British commando battalions, accompanied by American Ranger personnel, were to seize a pair of coastal batteries flanking the port. Although one of the battalions successfully landed, destroyed its assigned battery west of Dieppe, and withdrew, the flotilla carrying the second battalion was dispersed by German torpedo boats, permitting only a fraction of the force to reach shore. By accurate sniper fire, a small party of this group prevented the battery from firing on the Allied fleet, but many of their American and British comrades were captured. In the meantime, the main assault had turned into a disaster, suffering 3,400 casualties of the 5,000 engaged. While the Allied high command claimed to have learned lessons that proved invaluable to the success of the landings on Normandy two years later, the raid remains a subject of controversy.6 North Africa Dieppe proved to be the only operation undertaken by Darby's Rangers in accordance with Marshall's original concept. In late July the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, under pressure from a president anxious for action against the Germans on some front, reluctantly bowed to British arguments for an invasion of French North Africa, code named Operation TORCH. As planners examined the task of securing the initial beachheads, they perceived a need for highly trained forces that could approach the landing areas and seize key defensive positions in advance of the main force. Accordingly, Darby's battalion received a mission to occupy two forts at the entrance of Arzew harbor, clearing the way for the landing of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division of the Center Task Force (Map 1). 7 The performance of the Rangers in their first independent mission reflected their emphasis on leadership, training, and careful planning. In the early morning hours of 8 November two companies under Darby's executive officer, Maj. Herman W. Dammer, slipped through a boom blocking the entrance to the inner harbor of Arzew and stealthily approached Fort de la Pointe. After climbing over a seawall and cutting through barbed. wire, two groups of Rangers assaulted the position from opposite directions. Within fifteen minutes, they had the fort and sixty startled French prisoners. Meanwhile, Darby and the remaining four companies landed near Cap Carbon and Page 16 Map1: Darby's Rangers in Northwest Africa, November1942-March 1943 Page 17 climbed a ravine to reach Batterie du Nord, overlooking the harbor. With the support of Company D's four 81-mm. mortars, the force assaulted the position, capturing the battery and sixty more prisoners. Trying to signal his success to the waiting fleet, Darby, whose radio had been lost in the landing, shot off a series of green flares before finally establishing contact through the radio of a British forward observer party. The Rangers had achieved their first success, a triumph tempered only by the later impressment of two companies as line troops in the 1st Infantry Division's beachhead perimeter. Ranger losses were light, but the episode foreshadowed the future use of the Rangers as line infantry.8 While Allied forces occupied Northwest Africa and advanced into Tunisia, Darby kept his Rangers busy with a rigorous program of physical conditioning and training in night and amphibious operations. Rumors of possible raiding missions spread within the battalion, but, as December and January passed without any further assignments, morale rapidly declined. Many Rangers transferred to other units. As yet, the Army still had no doctrine or concept of the employment of such units on the conventional battlefield, or elsewhere, and American field commanders were more concerned about their advance into the rear of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps than in any program of seaborne commando raids.9 In early February 1943 the Allied high command finally found a mission for the Rangers. Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's theater headquarters attached the battalion to Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall's II Corps in Tunisia. Hoping to gather intelligence and mislead the enemy regarding Allied strength and intentions, Fredendall directed the battalion to launch a series of raids against the Italo-German lines. The Rangers struck first against the Italian outpost at Sened. On the night of 10-11 February three Ranger companies marched through eight miles of rugged Tunisian terrain to a chain of hills overlooking the position. After observing the outpost by day, the Rangers, about midnight, began a four-mile approach march, advancing to successive phase lines and using colored lights to maintain formation. At 200 yards the Italians spotted their advance and opened fire, but most of the shots passed harmlessly overhead. The Rangers waited until they were fifty Page 18 yards away before launching a bayonet assault. Within twenty minutes, they had overrun the garrison, killing fifty and capturing eleven before withdrawing to friendly lines.10 The raiding program was soon cut short by developments to the north. Within days of the action at Sened, the Germans launched a counteroffensive through Kasserine Pass, roughly handling the green American units and forcing Fredendall to withdraw his exposed right flank. After serving as a rear guard for the withdrawal, the Rangers held a regimental-size front across Dernaia Pass and patrolled in anticipation of a German attack in the area. It would not be the last time that field commanders, short of troops, used the Rangers as line infantry in an emergency.11 When the II Corps, now under Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., returned to the offensive in March, the 1st Ranger Battalion played a key role in the Allied breakthrough. After spear-heading the 1st Infantry Division's advance to El Guettar, the Rangers found the Italians blocking the road at the pass of Djebel el Ank. The terrain to either side of the position appeared impassable, but Ranger patrols found a twelve-mile path through the mountains and ravines north of the pass to the Italian rear. During the night of 20-21 March, the battalion, accompanied by a heavy mortar company, followed this tortuous route, reaching a plateau overlooking the Italian position by 0600. As the sun rose, the Rangers, supported by the mortars, struck the Italians from flank and rear, while the 26th Infantry made a frontal assault. The enemy fled, leaving the pass and 200 prisoners in American hands. After patrolling and helping to repulse enemy counterattacks from a defensive position near Djobel Berda, the Rangers returned to Algeria for a rest. Shortly afterward, the Axis surrender of Tunis and Bizerte concluded the North African campaign.12 Sicily and Italy The performance of Darby's forces in North Africa and the continuing need for troops to spearhead amphibious landings led Eisenhower's headquarters to form additional Ranger units. Patton and Maj. Gen. Terry Allen, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, praised the Rangers in glowing terms, and Allied planners requested authorization from the War Department to form two more battalions for the invasion of Sicily. Page 19 Map 2: Southern Italy and Sicily, 1943-1944 Page 20 Marshall approved the expansion but again stipulated that Ranger-trained soldiers be returned to their parent units once the need for the battalions had passed. His attitude underlined the continuing status of these battalions as temporary organizations. Nevertheless, Darby and his officers enthusiastically sought out volunteers for the new formations, making stump speeches at replacement depots throughout North Africa. At Nemours, where Dammer had created a replica of the commando training depots, the recruits endured physical conditioning, weapons training, and amphibious landings under live fire.l3 In Sicily the Rangers served first as assault troops in the landing and then in various task forces in the drive across the island (Map 2). At Gela in the early morning darkness of 10 July the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, under Darby and Maj. Roy Murray, attacked across a mined beach to capture the town and coastal batteries. They then withstood two days of counterattacks, battling tanks with thermite grenades and a single 37-mm. gun in the streets of Gela. For all the courage of individual Rangers, naval gunfire support proved decisive in holding the town. As Allied forces expanded the beachhead, one Ranger company captured the formidable fortress town of Butera in a daring night attack, while to the west Dammer's 3d Ranger Battalion moved by foot and truck to capture the harbor of Porto Empedocle, taking over 700 prisoners. In the ensuing drive to Palermo, the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions joined task forces guarding the flanks of the advance, and the 3d Ranger Battalion later aided the advance along the northern Sicilian coast to Messina by infiltrating through the mountains to outflank successive German delaying positions. By the fall of Messina on 17 August, marking the end of the Sicilian campaign, the Rangers were already preparing for the invasion of Italy.14 At Salerno the Rangers once again secured critical objectives during the amphibious assault, but, cut off by the rapid German response to the main landings, they were forced to hold their positions for about three weeks, a defensive mission unsuitable for such light units. Landing on a narrow, rocky beach to the left of the main beachhead early on the morning of 9 September, the Rangers quickly occupied the high ground of the Sorrentino peninsula, dominating the routes between Page 21 Photo: Soldiers of the 3d Ranger Battalion board LCIs that will take them to Anzio. Two weeks later, nearly all would be killed or captured at Cisterna (U.S. Army Photograph) Page 22 the invasion beaches and Naples. To the south the Germans contained the main landing, preventing Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army from linking up with the Ranger position. Nevertheless, Darby's three battalions, assisted by paratroopers and British commandos, held their position against repeated German attacks. Lacking enough troops to hold a continuous line, the Rangers adopted a system of mutually supporting strongpoints and relied on the terrain and naval gunfire, which they directed to harass the routes from Naples until Clark's force broke through to them on 30 September.l5 Casualties mounted when the Rangers served as line infantry in the offensive against the German Winter Line. Lacking troops on the Venafro front, Clark used the Rangers to fill gaps in Fifth Army's line from early November to mid-December. Attached to divisions, the battalions engaged in bitter mountain fighting at close quarters. Although reinforced by a cannon company of four 75-mm. guns on half-tracks, they still lacked the firepower and manpower for protracted combat. By mid-December the continuous fighting and the cold, wet weather had taken a heavy toll. In one month of action, for example, the 1st Ranger Battalion lost 350 men, including nearly 200 casualties from exposure. Moreover, the quality of the battalions declined as veterans were replaced by enthusiastic, but inadequately trained, replacements.l6 A botched infiltration mission on the Anzio beachhead in early 1944 completed the destruction of Darby's Rangers. After a nearly unopposed Allied amphibious assault on 22 January 1944, Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, commander of the VI Corps, failed to press his advantage, and the Germans were able to contain the Allies within a narrow perimeter. Seeking to push out of this confined area, Truscott, now a major general and commander of the 3d Infantry Division, ordered the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions to infiltrate four miles behind enemy lines to the crossroads town of Cisterna. One hour after their departure, the 4th Ranger Battalion and the rest of the division would launch a frontal assault and use the confusion created by the infiltrating Rangers to drive a deep wedge into the German defenses. American intelligence, however, had failed to notice a large German buildup opposite the American lines, and Ranger reconnaissance of the target area was poor. Page 23 When the two battalions began their infiltration on the night of 29-30 January, the enemy quickly detected them and by dawn had surrounded them with infantry and armor just outside Cisterna. In a desperate attempt to rescue the isolated units, the 4th Ranger Battalion repeatedly attacked the German lines throughout the morning but succeeded in losing half of its combat strength in the futile effort. About noon, the remnants of the 1st and 3d surrendered. Only eight men escaped to American lines.17 Left with a fragment of the Ranger force, American theater commanders decided to deactivate rather than reconstitute the damaged units. Even before Cisterna, the lack of time to train replacements had diluted the quality of the battalions. In truth, the Rangers had become little more than line infantry units, but without the firepower of the normal American infantry regiments of the time. Anticipating tough, methodical fighting for which Ranger units were unsuited, theater commanders preferred to use the remaining Rangers to alleviate the perennial shortage of replacements. Accordingly, in March Rangers with enough points for overseas service returned to the United States, while the remainder joined the 1st Special Service Force, a similar type of formation that had recently arrived in the theater. 18 The 1st Special Service Force The 1st Special Service Force traced its origins to Marshall's trip to Great Britain in early 1942, the same visit that had inspired the formation of the 1st Ranger Battalion. Between conferences on grand strategy, Mountbatten had introduced Marshall to Geoffrey Pyke, an eccentric British scientist who had developed a scheme to divert up to half-a-million German troops from the main fronts. Under Pyke's plan, commandos, using special vehicles, would conduct a series of winter raids against snowbound German garrisons of such vulnerable points as hydroelectric stations in Norway and oil refineries in Romania. Exactly how the raiding units would enter and leave the target areas remained hazy, but the concept fascinated Marshall. After returning to the United States, he gave the project a high priority despite the skepticism of War Department planners. Studebaker, an automobile manufactur- Page 24 Photo: Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick (U.S. Army Photograph) er, received a contract for the design and production of the vehicle later known as the Weasel. In June the Allies also agreed to form a Canadian-American force under Col. Robert T. Frederick to conduct the raids. Although as a War Department staff officer he had opposed the project, the tall, vigorous Frederick proved to be a natural leader, respected by superiors and idolized by his men.19 At Fort William Henry Harrison, an isolated post near Helena, Montana, Frederick assembled his new unit, which he named the 1st Special Service Force in an apparent attempt to disguise its true purpose. Initially, it consisted of three battalion-size units of light infantry (officially designated as regiments) and a service echelon. For American personnel, who would constitute about 60 percent of the unit, inspection teams canvassed Army units in the Southwest and on the Pacific seaboard for hardened volunteers, especially those with a background as "lumberjacks, forest rangers, hunters, north-woodsmen, game wardens, prospectors, and explorers." 20 As was the case with the Rangers, many post commanders used the recruiting drive to empty their stockades and rid themselves of malcontents, and some "volunteer" contingents even arrived at Fort Harrison under armed guard. Frederick soon weeded out unfit recruits, driving his men through an intensive Page 25 program that stressed physical conditioning, weapons training, hand-to-hand fighting, demolitions, rock climbing, and the operation of the Weasel. For training in winter warfare, the recruits lived in boxcars on the Continental Divide while receiving instruction in cross-country skiing from Norwegian instructors. The accelerated schedule allowed only six days for airborne training. Frederick wanted to have the unit ready for operations by the winter of 1942-43. 21 Unfortunately for Frederick's raiders, the Allied high command canceled their mission before they could even take the field. When Frederick visited Great Britain in September 1942, he found that support for the project had evaporated. The Royal Air Force showed little enthusiasm for the diversion of the necessary planes from its bombing campaign, and the Special Operations Executive had already laid plans for a more economic sabotage program that was preferred by Norway's government-in-exile. Mountbatten thus recommended that the project be canceled, and Frederick agreed. While his unit broadened its training to include more general infantry skills and amphibious operations, Frederick investigated other areas Page 26 Photo: Mount La Difensa (U.S. Army Photograph) where his men could use their special capabilities, including the Caucasus Mountains, New Guinea, and the North Pacific. In August 1943 the unit finally went into action for the first time, spearheading the bloodless recapture of Kiska in the Aleutians. The rapid conclusion of the campaign again left Frederick's unit without a mission. Finally, in October, General Clark, desperate for troops, secured the transfer of the 1st Special Service Force to his Fifth Army in the Mediterranean, and the combat history of the 1st Special Service Force began.22 Shortly after its arrival in late November, the 1st Special Service Force received its initial mission. Looming over Fifth Army's front, the twin peaks of Monte La Difensa and Monte La Rementanea presented formidable barriers to the Allied advance into the Liri River Valley. A German panzer grenadier division deeply entrenched along the slopes of the two masses had already thrown back repeated Allied attempts to gain control of the heights. Attached to the 36th Infantry Division, the 1st Special Service Force received orders to carry the two peaks. After a personal reconnaissance of the 3,000-foot La Difensa, Frederick decided to avoid the trail leading up the Page 27 south side and instead to launch a surprise attack via a 200-foot cliff on the opposite slope. On the night of 2-3 December 600 riflemen of the 2d Regiment moved silently up the face to a position only yards away from the German defenders on the crest. When noise from displaced stones alerted the enemy, the special servicemen assaulted the position and within two hours gained control of the crest. From there, they pushed down a saddle to capture neighboring Monte La Rementanea and to link up with British units on the other side of the valley. The fall of the twin peaks cracked the Winter Line and opened the way for the Allied advance to Cassino.23 Any euphoria that Frederick's men might have felt over their success dissipated soon after the unit reentered the fighting as line infantry in late December. Poor weather and a skillful German defense among rocks and gullies slowed the advance to a crawl and took a heavy toll of the special servicemen. Like the Ranger units, they lacked the heavier weapons needed to blast the Germans out of their positions, as well as an adequate system to replace their growing combat and non-combat casualties. After a bitter struggle, the 1st Regiment captured Monte Sammucro but lost much of its fighting power. The 3d Regiment used a surprise night assault to overwhelm the defenders of Monte Majo but then suffered heavy casualties in a three-day defense of the height against German counterattacks. In one month of service before its transfer to Anzio, the force had lost 1,400 of its 1,800 men and badly needed the qualified replacements made available by the disbandment of the Rangers.24 Deploying to the Anzio beachhead in early February 1944, the 1st Special Service Force anchored the Allied right flank along the Mussolini Canal and later spearheaded the drive on Rome. At Anzio Frederick's 1,300 troops defended 13 kilometers of the 52-kilometer-long Allied perimeter. Their position in the flat, open tableland adjoining the canal was dominated by German artillery in the heights overlooking the beachhead. Defending its sector, the unit used night patrols to locate targets for artillery, conduct raids on German outposts, and maintain control of the area between the lines. In late May Frederick's troops participated in the breakout from the beachhead and reinforced an armored task force covering the flank Page 28 of the subsequent Allied drive on Rome. Early on the morning of 4 June the first elements of the combined force entered Rome and secured the bridges over the Tiber River. The 1st Special Service Force then withdrew to Lake Albano for rest and reorganization.25 After the fall of Rome, the unit's final six months proved anticlimactic. Assigned to Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch's Seventh Army for the invasion of southern France, the force received orders to seize German batteries on the Iles d'Hyeres, three rocky land masses on the left flank of the invasion beaches. On the night of 14-15 August the special servicemen, now under the command of Col. Edwin A. Walker, used rubber boats to land on the shores of Ile de Port Cros and Ile du Levant. Within forty-eight hours, the surprised defenders on both islands had surrendered, and Walker's troops prepared to join the main army. Guarding the right flank of Patch's advance, the unit's ensuing drive along the Riviera, the so-called Champagne Campaign, seemed more like an extended route march than a battle. Only a few German rear guards offered any resistance. By early September the unit had established a static defensive position in the mountains along the Franco-Italian border, where it remained for the next three months. In early December Eisenhower's headquarters, under orders from the War Department, dissolved the unit, returning the Canadians to their own army and transferring the Americans to a separate infantry regiment assigned to Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley's 12th Army Group.26 The Office of Strategic Services in the Mediterranean In North Africa and Italy the Army ignored the role that commando-type units, such as the 1st Special Service Force, might have played in operations behind enemy lines, leaving the field to the Office of Strategic Services. Both OSS personnel and their British counterparts in the Special Operations Executive were supervised by the G-3 Division of the theater headquarters, but the Americans tended to be dominant in North Africa, while the British enjoyed greater influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Although OSS personnel initially lacked experience, resources, and the respect of skeptical staff officers in the theater, the agency soon proved its value. Prior Page 29 to TORCH, agents established contact with Allied sympathizers in North Africa and gathered intelligence vital to the invasion. To guard against a possible Axis thrust through Spanish Morocco into the Allied rear, two civilian operatives even organized warrior tribesmen of the region into a guerrilla force. At Salerno an OSS detachment provided critical tactical intelligence to Darby's Rangers during their defense of the Sorrentino peninsula. Nevertheless, OSS personnel often complained that their operations were misunderstood by field commanders, citing one colonel who expected them to "sit in foxholes and toss petard grenades and Molotov cocktails at German heavy tanks as they rolled over us." 27 Nevertheless, their activities earned the interest and approval of General Clark, who gave them vehicles, rations, and a free hand. 28 As the Allied armies expanded their foothold on the Italian peninsula during the fall of 1943, the newly arrived operational groups began to establish bases on offshore islands for raids against the German-held northern coastline. In February 1943 Eisenhower agreed to allow the OSS's Special Operations staff at Algiers to employ four to eight of these commando cells to organize and otherwise assist guerrilla forces in Italy and southern France. Shortly after the Italian surrender in September, Donovan, who was visiting Algiers at the time, ordered an operational group to accompany a French expeditionary force to Corsica, where partisans had revolted against the German garrison. Since the Germans had already decided to withdraw their troops to the Italian mainland, the operational groups and their French allies merely harassed the departing enemy. Immediately following the German evacuation, the groups established an advance base there, as well as observation posts on the nearby islands of Gorgona and Capraia. At Corsica, they were only thirty-five miles from the Italian coast.29 From their new bases, the operational groups conducted raids against German communications along the Italian coast in an attempt to divert enemy troops from the main front (Map 3). The narrow, rocky coastal plains of the Italian peninsula were crossed by numerous roads and railways, which the Germans used as lines of supply. Night after night, operational groups crawled ashore to attack the most vulnerable points and reconnoiter enemy installations. Observers at Gorgona Page 30 Map 3: Northern Italy, 1943-1945 Page 31 directed air strikes against oil tanks in the harbor at Livorno before German raids finally forced evacuation of the island. But not all OG missions ended successfully. In March 1944 a fifteen-man force, code named GINNY, landed south of La Spezia with orders to dynamite a railway tunnel on the main supply line for the front south of Rome. Local inhabitants discovered the party's poorly concealed rubber boats and alerted the Germans, who found the party hiding in a barn. Although in uniform at the time, the captured OG members were summarily executed in accordance with Adolph Hitler's orders to liquidate all commandos.30 After transferring its bases to the Italian mainland in the late summer of 1944, the Office of Strategic Services placed a greater emphasis on partisan warfare. Up to that time, the lack of airlift and other resources and the confused political situation resulting from the sudden collapse of Italy in the fall of 1943 had hindered OSS efforts to establish contact with the resistance in northern Italy. In mid-1944, however, the Americans began to drop supplies and operatives into the region on a much larger scale. At that time, nine operational groups parachuted into the area to discover an indigenous resistance movement already in place, but desperately in need of equipment and supplies. As supply drops and word of Allied successes swelled their strength, the partisans subsequently took the offensive, harassing German forces withdrawing to the Gothic Line during the summer and fall of 1944. With winter, the decline in air resupply due to poor flying weather enabled the Germans to strike back against the guerrillas, who faded into the mountains. Their retreat proved only temporary, for by the spring of 1945 seventy-five OSS teams were equipping and training the resistance bands in preparation for the final Allied effort in Italy.31 When the Allied offensive crossed the Po River in late April 1945, partisans, supported by operational groups, rose in revolt throughout northern Italy. Assisted by these American operatives, partisans cut key routes from Lake Como to the Brenner Pass, while south of Piacenza and Parma OG teams organized successful roadblocks on key transport routes and harassed German columns and troop concentrations. Guerrilla roadblocks aided the 92d Infantry Division in its capture of Page 32 Pontremoli, and in Genoa 15,000 partisans, directed by operational groups, prevented the destruction of the port facilities and took some 3,000 prisoners. In all, Italian partisans killed or wounded over 3,000 Axis troops, captured 81,000 others, and prevented the destruction of key facilities in the Genoa, Milan, Venice, and Modena areas.32 Although British SOE agents dominated operations in the eastern Mediterranean, the Office of Strategic Services still played an important role there. Seeking to pin down German forces far from the OVERLORD invasion, American operatives agreed to provide arms to Communist and socialist guerrillas in Greece as early as October 1943 in return for their subordination to the authority of the theater commander. While the partisans increased their activities, operational groups began to infiltrate into Greece early in 1944 to conduct a series of raids against German road and rail communications in Macedonia, Thessaly, and the Peloponnesus. With the aid of Communist guerrillas, an SO party in May demolished two bridges on the Orient Express line, temporarily interrupting the supply of Turkish chrome to Germany. Extensive OSS operations in Greece continued up to the German withdrawal, ending only in December with the outbreak of a local, but bitter, civil war between the various resistance groups. Off the coast of Yugoslavia, operational groups helped defend the island of Vis, a key base for the supply of Communist partisans under Josip Broz Tito, and joined British commandos in raids along the Dalmatian coast, remaining in the field up to the German departure from Yugoslavia in July 1944. 33 In the initial assault against Axis-dominated Europe, U.S. forces could thus claim many significant achievements in the field of special operations. At Arzew, El Guettar, Gela, Salerno, Monte La Difensa, Anzio, and the Iles d'Hyeres, the Ranger battalions and 1st Special Service Force had performed missions critical to the success of conventional forces, while in the interior OSS commandos had raided German communications and provided direct support to partisans in northern Italy and the Balkans. The ability of these forces to take advantage of the rough terrain and extended coastlines characteristic of the theater proved to be a major factor in their success. Nevertheless, for the most part, the conventional Allied campaign in the Mediterranean proceeded as if special operations never exist- Page 33 ed. The relative insignificance of such activities reflected both American inexperience and a chronic shortage of materiel and manpower resources. But the basic cause was the absence of any doctrine of special operations. Field commanders, uncertain about the proper employment of the Ranger battalions and the 1st Special Service Force, depleted their strength in line operations and eventually disbanded them rather than employ them in a systematic program of raids that would have used their special capabilities. Moreover, the partisan efforts in Italy and the Balkans had only a nuisance value and were rarely tied into the operations of conventional Allied combat units. Thus, despite some isolated successes, special operations made only a limited contribution to the hard-earned success of Allied arms in the Mediterranean. Notes 1. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Command Missions: A Personal Story (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1954), pp. 22-25, 37-40; Memo, Truscott for Brig Gen Charles L. Bolte, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces British Isles (USAFBI), 26 May 42, Box 10, Folder 3, Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.; Cable, Marshall to USFOR, 27 May 42, Section IA, Ranger File, U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Operations, Records Section, Decimal File, March 1950-1951, 322 Ranger, Record Group (RG) 319, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. 2. Quote from Michael J. King, William Orlando Darby: A Military Biography (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981), p. 32. 3. Ibid., pp. 1-3, 9, 16, 177. Testimonies of Darby's leadership ability abound: see James J. Altieri, The Spearheaders (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), pp. 31-32; William O. Darby and William H. Baumer, Darby's Rangers: We Led the Way (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980), pp. 1-2. 4. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 25-27, 83; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 15-22, 66-67; Memo, Col I.B. Summers, Adj Gen, USAFBI, for Hartle, 13 Jun 42, Theodore J. Conway Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, (USAMHI), Carlisle, Pa. 5; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 38-41, 80-81; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 27-49; Instructions and Key to Programme of Work for USA Rangers, 1st to 31st July 1942, and Darby's Progress Report to Truscott, 17 Jul 42, both in Sgt Harry Perlmutter Ranger Battalions of World War II Collection, Ranger Battalions: Historical Background Information on Ranger Battalions and Tables of Organization and Equipment (hereafter cited as Perlmutter Collection), Roll 8, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Library, Fort Bragg, N.C. 6. Rpt, Darby to Adj Gen, 11 Jan 43, and Capt Roy Murray's report on Dieppe, 26 Aug 42, both in U.S. Army, Adj Gen's Office, World War II Operations Reports, 1940-1948, Infantry (hereafter cited as WWII Ops Reports), INBN 1-0, RG 407, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md. From the extensive literature on Dieppe, note especially Lord Lovat, March Past. A Memoir (New York: Homes & Meier, 1978), pp. 237-78; Peter Young, Commando (New York: Ballantine, 1969), pp. 128-53. 7. Maurice Matloff, ea., American Military History, Army Historical Series, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 444; AFHQ Outline Plan, TORCH, 20 Sep 42, U.S. Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, ABC Decimal File, 1942-48, 381 (7-25-42), Sec. I to 4, RG 319, NARA; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 10-13; King, William Orlando Darby, p. 44. 8. Darby's report of action at Arzew, I Jan 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 8-10, 17-23; Altieri, The Spearheaders, p. 137. 9. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 53-55; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 146-53, 169-91; Michael J. King, Rangers: Selected Combat Operations of World War II, Leavenworth Papers 11 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1985), p. 14. 10. Leilyn M. Young, "Rangers in a Night Operation," Military Review 24 July 1944): 64-69; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 56-60; Darby's report of Sened, 5 Mar 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC. Page 35 11. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 60-65; Darby's report for the period 14-28 Feb 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC. 12. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 67-77; Darby's report of El Guettar, 9 Apr 43, in WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC; King, Wilham Orlando Darby, p. 62; King, Rangers, pp. 15-22. 13. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 78, 83-84; King, Wilham Orlando Darby, pp. 68, 75-76; Msg. Algiers to War Department, 18 Apr 43, U.S. War Department, Operations Division, War Department Message File: Incoming Top Secret, April 1-30, 1943, RG 165, NARA; Cable, Marshall to Eisenhower, 19 Apr 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 241, 246-47. 14. Darby's report of action at Gela, Sicily, 5 Aug 43, U.S. War Department, Operations Division, OPD 381 ETO, Section V, Cases 108-137, Case 108, RG 165, NARA; Rpt, Dammer to Adj Gen, 31 Jul 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 3-0.3, RG 407, WNRC; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 85-99, 104-09; King, Wilham Orlando Darby, p. 88; King, Rangers, pp. 23-28. 15. Darby's report of Salerno, 15 Nov 43, INBN 1-0, and Dammer's report, 25 Nov 1943, INBN 3-0.3, both in WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 113-22; Alexander M. Worth, Jr., "Supporting Weapons and High Ground: The Rangers at Salerno," Infantry Journal 56 (May 1945): 33-34. 16. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 128-40; King, William Orlando Darby, pp. 103, 106, 121, 129-30, 137, 145, 185; Darby's report of offensive against Winter Line, 29 Mar 44, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC. 17. See reports on Cisterna in WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0.3 and INBN 3-0.3, RG 407, WNRC; King, William Orlando Darby, pp. 136, 145; King, Rangers, pp. 29-40; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 148-55, 159-69; Truscott, Command Missions, p p. 312- 14. 18. Memo, Lt Gen Jacob Devers, Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, for War Department, 25 Feb 44; Memo, Devers for War Department, 13 Mar 44; and Memo, Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, Asst Chief of Staff, for FREEDOM, 28 Feb 44. All in U.S. War Department, Operations Division, OPD 320.2 Africa, Cases 584-616, RG 165, NARA; King, William Orlando Darby, pp. 136, 145. 19. Robert D. Burhans, The First Special Service Force. A War History of the North Americans, 1942-44 (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 1-5, 8-12; Robert H. Adleman and George Walton, The Devil's Brigade (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1966), pp. 2-4, 11, 25-35. 20. Quote from Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, p. 48. 21. Burhans, The First Special Service Force, pp. 13-15, 23, 60; Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 48-50, 57, 73-84. 22. Burhans, The First Special Service Force, pp. 35-37, 45-46, 86; Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 86-91, 103-09. 23. Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 119-32, 142-45. 24. Ibid., pp. 148, 159-61; Scott R. McMichael, A Histoncal Perspective on Light Infantry, Research Survey 6 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1987), pp. 186-92. 25. Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Bngade, pp. 168-74, 202-04, 211-19; McMichael, A Histoncal Perspective on Light Infantry, pp. 198-201. 26. Burhans, The First Special Service Force, pp. 257, 273, 299; Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 227-30, 233, 243-44; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Page 36 and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 9 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) 4: 2232n. 27. Carleton S. Coon, A North Africa Story: The Anthropologist as OSS Agent, 1941-1943 (Ipswich, Mass.: Gambit Press, 1980), p. 96. 28. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1: 206-07, and 2: 9, 13-15, 67; Coon, A North Africa Story, pp. 124-25; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 25-26; MS, Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), History of Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater, 1942-45, pp. 17-18, NARA. 29. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1:108, and 2: 60-61, 77-78; Brown, The Hero, pp. 471-72. 30. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 77-80; Report of ICEBERG Operation, Folder 682, and Rpt, Col Russell Livermore to Commander, 2677th HQ Company Exp (Prov), 4 Jan 44, both in OSS, Algiers SO-OP-9, Entry 97, Box 40, RG 226, NARA; Brown, The Last Hero, pp. 474-80. 31. MS, AFHQ' History of Special Operations, Mediterranean, pp. 23, 25-26; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 107-13, 115; Smith, OSS, pp. 107, 109. 32. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 115-16; MS, AFHQ, History of Special Operations, Mediterranean, pp. 26-27; Smith, OSS, pp. 116-17. 33. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 124, 127-29. Brown, The Last Hero, pp. 430-33, 439-42. Carleson S Coon and Nine Spies from Harvard: Hal Vaughan on FDR’s 12 Apostles 7:00 PM A year and a half before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ’04 bypassed his own State Department and secretly sent 12 young spies into North Africa. The network they established paved the way for the eventual Allied invasion and victory in North Africa. These 12 spies included nine from Harvard: Gordon H. Brown ’23; Franklin O. Canfield ’32; Carleton S. Coon ’25, G’28; Frederic F. Culbert (’10-’11), David W. King (’12-’14); Kenneth W. Pendar ’30, John E. Utter ’25, Ridgway B. Knight B’31, and Harry A. Woodruff (class unknown). Using unpublished memoirs and recently declassified documents, Hal Vaughan tells the story of these men, the women they loved, and the clandestine adventures, full of treachery and intrigue, that led to the success of Operation Torch. Hal Vaughan is a former U.S. Foreign Service officer and a journalist who has worked for ABC News, the New York Daily News, and Voice of America. He admits to having helped CIA operatives to penetrate Soviet and Chinese targets while serving in the Foreign Service in Pakistan and as a U.S. diplomatic spokesman to international conferences. Spence Porter, Program Committee For reservations contact Programs at 212-827-1202 or at programs@hcny.com.

Nine Spies from Harvard: Hal Vaughan on FDR’s 12 Apostles 7:00 PM A year and a half before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ’04 bypassed his own State Department and secretly sent 12 young spies into North Africa. The network they established paved the way for the eventual Allied invasion and victory in North Africa. These 12 spies included nine from Harvard: Gordon H. Brown ’23; Franklin O. Canfield ’32; Carleton S. Coon ’25, G’28; Frederic F. Culbert (’10-’11), David W. King (’12-’14); Kenneth W. Pendar ’30, John E. Utter ’25, Ridgway B. Knight B’31, and Harry A. Woodruff (class unknown). Using unpublished memoirs and recently declassified documents, Hal Vaughan tells the story of these men, the women they loved, and the clandestine adventures, full of treachery and intrigue, that led to the success of Operation Torch. Hal Vaughan is a former U.S. Foreign Service officer and a journalist who has worked for ABC News, the New York Daily News, and Voice of America. He admits to having helped CIA operatives to penetrate Soviet and Chinese targets while serving in the Foreign Service in Pakistan and as a U.S. diplomatic spokesman to international conferences. Spence Porter, Program Committee For reservations contact Programs at 212-827-1202 or at programs@hcny.com.

Colonel Edwin A. Walker and Darby's Rangers... CHAPTER 2 Special Operations in the Mediterranean The opening blows against Hitler's Fortress Europe came not in Western Europe but in the Mediterranean. Once the United States had entered the war, American leaders pressed for a direct cross-channel assault against the Continent. Through 1942 and much of 1943, however, they yielded to British concerns over Allied readiness for such a large step and accepted less ambitious endeavors against the "soft underbelly" of Axis-dominated Europe. The soft underbelly proved to be a hard shell as Allied armies, after driving the Germans and Italians from North Africa and Sicily, made slow progress against a tenacious German defense in the wet climate and rugged highlands of the Italian peninsula. In this theater of sandy wastes and jagged mountains bordered by the placid waters of the Mediterranean, American forces discovered both a need and a favorable environment for their first major special operations of the war. Darby's Rangers While the U.S. Army's Rangers would perform several special operations in the course of the war, they traced their origins to a provisional formation created by the chief of staff to remedy the Army's lack of combat experience during the early months of 1942. When Marshall visited Great Britain in April to urge a cross-channel invasion, he met Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the charismatic head of British Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), and later visited COHQ's commando training center in Scotland. In Mountbatten's commando raiding program, Marshall perceived a means of providing American soldiers with at least some combat experience. At his direction Col. Lucian K. Truscott met with British lead- Page 12 ers to determine the best way of fulfilling this objective. Subsequently, Truscott recommended the formation of an American commando unit which would bear the designation Ranger. Under Truscott's concept, most personnel would join the new Ranger force on a temporary basis and then return to their parent units after several months of field operations. Marshall approved the proposals, and on 19 June 1942, Truscott officially activated the 1st Ranger Battalion in Northern Ireland.1 As commander of the battalion, Truscott selected Capt. William O. Darby. At the time Darby was serving as an aide to Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle, the commander of American forces in Northern Ireland. When Hartle recommended Darby for the command of the new unit, Truscott was receptive, having found the young officer to be "outstanding in appearance, possessed of a most attractive personality, . . . keen, intelligent, and filled with enthusiasm." 2 His judgment proved accurate. The 31-year-old Darby, a graduate of West Point in 1933, soon demonstrated an innate ability to gain the confidence of his superiors and the deep devotion of his men.3 Using the model of the British commandos, Darby energetically organized his new unit. Circulars, calling for volunteers, soon appeared on bulletin boards of the 34th Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division, and other American units training in Northern Ireland. Darby and an officer from Hartle's staff personally examined and selected officers, who, in turn, interviewed the enlisted volunteers, looking especially for athletic individuals in good physical condition. The recruits, ranging in age from seventeen to thirty-five, came from every part of the United States; they included a former lion tamer and a full-blooded Sioux Indian. Although several units attempted to unload misfits and troublemakers on the new unit, most recruits joined out of a yearning for adventure and a desire to be part of an elite force. As the volunteers arrived at the battalion's camp, Darby formed them into a headquarters company and six line companies of sixty-seven men each, an organization which sacrificed firepower and administrative self-sufficiency for foot and amphibious mobility.4 The advanced commando training of the battalion lasted approximately three months. Immediately on arriving at Fort William in northern Scotland, the recruits embarked on an exhausting forced march to their camp in the shadow of Ach- Page 13 Photo: Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott Jr. (U.S. Army photograph) Photo: Col. William O. Darby (U.S. Army photograph) nacarry Castle, a trek that foreshadowed a month of rigorous training. The future Rangers endured log-lifting drills, obstacle courses, and speed marches over mountains and through frigid rivers under the watchful eye of British commando instructors. In addition, they received weapons training and instruction in hand-to-hand combat, street fighting, patrols, night operations, and the handling of small boats. The training stressed realism, including the use of live ammunition. On one occasion, a Ranger alertly picked up a grenade that a commando had thrown into a boatload of trainees and hurled it over the lake before it exploded. In early August the battalion transferred to Argyle, Scotland, for training in amphibious operations with the Royal Navy and later moved to Dundee where they stayed in private homes while practicing attacks on pillboxes and coastal defenses.5 While training proceeded, fifty Rangers participated in the raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942. Although the Allies apparently hoped that the raid would ease German pressure on the Soviets, the ostensible purpose was to test the defenses of the port and force the German Air Force to give battle. To clear the way for the main assault on the town by the 2d Canadian Page 14 Photo: Rangers train on the terrain of the 8 November assault at Arzew (U.S. Army Photograph) Page 15 Division, two British commando battalions, accompanied by American Ranger personnel, were to seize a pair of coastal batteries flanking the port. Although one of the battalions successfully landed, destroyed its assigned battery west of Dieppe, and withdrew, the flotilla carrying the second battalion was dispersed by German torpedo boats, permitting only a fraction of the force to reach shore. By accurate sniper fire, a small party of this group prevented the battery from firing on the Allied fleet, but many of their American and British comrades were captured. In the meantime, the main assault had turned into a disaster, suffering 3,400 casualties of the 5,000 engaged. While the Allied high command claimed to have learned lessons that proved invaluable to the success of the landings on Normandy two years later, the raid remains a subject of controversy.6 North Africa Dieppe proved to be the only operation undertaken by Darby's Rangers in accordance with Marshall's original concept. In late July the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, under pressure from a president anxious for action against the Germans on some front, reluctantly bowed to British arguments for an invasion of French North Africa, code named Operation TORCH. As planners examined the task of securing the initial beachheads, they perceived a need for highly trained forces that could approach the landing areas and seize key defensive positions in advance of the main force. Accordingly, Darby's battalion received a mission to occupy two forts at the entrance of Arzew harbor, clearing the way for the landing of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division of the Center Task Force (Map 1). 7 The performance of the Rangers in their first independent mission reflected their emphasis on leadership, training, and careful planning. In the early morning hours of 8 November two companies under Darby's executive officer, Maj. Herman W. Dammer, slipped through a boom blocking the entrance to the inner harbor of Arzew and stealthily approached Fort de la Pointe. After climbing over a seawall and cutting through barbed. wire, two groups of Rangers assaulted the position from opposite directions. Within fifteen minutes, they had the fort and sixty startled French prisoners. Meanwhile, Darby and the remaining four companies landed near Cap Carbon and Page 16 Map1: Darby's Rangers in Northwest Africa, November1942-March 1943 Page 17 climbed a ravine to reach Batterie du Nord, overlooking the harbor. With the support of Company D's four 81-mm. mortars, the force assaulted the position, capturing the battery and sixty more prisoners. Trying to signal his success to the waiting fleet, Darby, whose radio had been lost in the landing, shot off a series of green flares before finally establishing contact through the radio of a British forward observer party. The Rangers had achieved their first success, a triumph tempered only by the later impressment of two companies as line troops in the 1st Infantry Division's beachhead perimeter. Ranger losses were light, but the episode foreshadowed the future use of the Rangers as line infantry.8 While Allied forces occupied Northwest Africa and advanced into Tunisia, Darby kept his Rangers busy with a rigorous program of physical conditioning and training in night and amphibious operations. Rumors of possible raiding missions spread within the battalion, but, as December and January passed without any further assignments, morale rapidly declined. Many Rangers transferred to other units. As yet, the Army still had no doctrine or concept of the employment of such units on the conventional battlefield, or elsewhere, and American field commanders were more concerned about their advance into the rear of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps than in any program of seaborne commando raids.9 In early February 1943 the Allied high command finally found a mission for the Rangers. Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's theater headquarters attached the battalion to Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall's II Corps in Tunisia. Hoping to gather intelligence and mislead the enemy regarding Allied strength and intentions, Fredendall directed the battalion to launch a series of raids against the Italo-German lines. The Rangers struck first against the Italian outpost at Sened. On the night of 10-11 February three Ranger companies marched through eight miles of rugged Tunisian terrain to a chain of hills overlooking the position. After observing the outpost by day, the Rangers, about midnight, began a four-mile approach march, advancing to successive phase lines and using colored lights to maintain formation. At 200 yards the Italians spotted their advance and opened fire, but most of the shots passed harmlessly overhead. The Rangers waited until they were fifty Page 18 yards away before launching a bayonet assault. Within twenty minutes, they had overrun the garrison, killing fifty and capturing eleven before withdrawing to friendly lines.10 The raiding program was soon cut short by developments to the north. Within days of the action at Sened, the Germans launched a counteroffensive through Kasserine Pass, roughly handling the green American units and forcing Fredendall to withdraw his exposed right flank. After serving as a rear guard for the withdrawal, the Rangers held a regimental-size front across Dernaia Pass and patrolled in anticipation of a German attack in the area. It would not be the last time that field commanders, short of troops, used the Rangers as line infantry in an emergency.11 When the II Corps, now under Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., returned to the offensive in March, the 1st Ranger Battalion played a key role in the Allied breakthrough. After spear-heading the 1st Infantry Division's advance to El Guettar, the Rangers found the Italians blocking the road at the pass of Djebel el Ank. The terrain to either side of the position appeared impassable, but Ranger patrols found a twelve-mile path through the mountains and ravines north of the pass to the Italian rear. During the night of 20-21 March, the battalion, accompanied by a heavy mortar company, followed this tortuous route, reaching a plateau overlooking the Italian position by 0600. As the sun rose, the Rangers, supported by the mortars, struck the Italians from flank and rear, while the 26th Infantry made a frontal assault. The enemy fled, leaving the pass and 200 prisoners in American hands. After patrolling and helping to repulse enemy counterattacks from a defensive position near Djobel Berda, the Rangers returned to Algeria for a rest. Shortly afterward, the Axis surrender of Tunis and Bizerte concluded the North African campaign.12 Sicily and Italy The performance of Darby's forces in North Africa and the continuing need for troops to spearhead amphibious landings led Eisenhower's headquarters to form additional Ranger units. Patton and Maj. Gen. Terry Allen, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, praised the Rangers in glowing terms, and Allied planners requested authorization from the War Department to form two more battalions for the invasion of Sicily. Page 19 Map 2: Southern Italy and Sicily, 1943-1944 Page 20 Marshall approved the expansion but again stipulated that Ranger-trained soldiers be returned to their parent units once the need for the battalions had passed. His attitude underlined the continuing status of these battalions as temporary organizations. Nevertheless, Darby and his officers enthusiastically sought out volunteers for the new formations, making stump speeches at replacement depots throughout North Africa. At Nemours, where Dammer had created a replica of the commando training depots, the recruits endured physical conditioning, weapons training, and amphibious landings under live fire.l3 In Sicily the Rangers served first as assault troops in the landing and then in various task forces in the drive across the island (Map 2). At Gela in the early morning darkness of 10 July the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, under Darby and Maj. Roy Murray, attacked across a mined beach to capture the town and coastal batteries. They then withstood two days of counterattacks, battling tanks with thermite grenades and a single 37-mm. gun in the streets of Gela. For all the courage of individual Rangers, naval gunfire support proved decisive in holding the town. As Allied forces expanded the beachhead, one Ranger company captured the formidable fortress town of Butera in a daring night attack, while to the west Dammer's 3d Ranger Battalion moved by foot and truck to capture the harbor of Porto Empedocle, taking over 700 prisoners. In the ensuing drive to Palermo, the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions joined task forces guarding the flanks of the advance, and the 3d Ranger Battalion later aided the advance along the northern Sicilian coast to Messina by infiltrating through the mountains to outflank successive German delaying positions. By the fall of Messina on 17 August, marking the end of the Sicilian campaign, the Rangers were already preparing for the invasion of Italy.14 At Salerno the Rangers once again secured critical objectives during the amphibious assault, but, cut off by the rapid German response to the main landings, they were forced to hold their positions for about three weeks, a defensive mission unsuitable for such light units. Landing on a narrow, rocky beach to the left of the main beachhead early on the morning of 9 September, the Rangers quickly occupied the high ground of the Sorrentino peninsula, dominating the routes between Page 21 Photo: Soldiers of the 3d Ranger Battalion board LCIs that will take them to Anzio. Two weeks later, nearly all would be killed or captured at Cisterna (U.S. Army Photograph) Page 22 the invasion beaches and Naples. To the south the Germans contained the main landing, preventing Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army from linking up with the Ranger position. Nevertheless, Darby's three battalions, assisted by paratroopers and British commandos, held their position against repeated German attacks. Lacking enough troops to hold a continuous line, the Rangers adopted a system of mutually supporting strongpoints and relied on the terrain and naval gunfire, which they directed to harass the routes from Naples until Clark's force broke through to them on 30 September.l5 Casualties mounted when the Rangers served as line infantry in the offensive against the German Winter Line. Lacking troops on the Venafro front, Clark used the Rangers to fill gaps in Fifth Army's line from early November to mid-December. Attached to divisions, the battalions engaged in bitter mountain fighting at close quarters. Although reinforced by a cannon company of four 75-mm. guns on half-tracks, they still lacked the firepower and manpower for protracted combat. By mid-December the continuous fighting and the cold, wet weather had taken a heavy toll. In one month of action, for example, the 1st Ranger Battalion lost 350 men, including nearly 200 casualties from exposure. Moreover, the quality of the battalions declined as veterans were replaced by enthusiastic, but inadequately trained, replacements.l6 A botched infiltration mission on the Anzio beachhead in early 1944 completed the destruction of Darby's Rangers. After a nearly unopposed Allied amphibious assault on 22 January 1944, Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, commander of the VI Corps, failed to press his advantage, and the Germans were able to contain the Allies within a narrow perimeter. Seeking to push out of this confined area, Truscott, now a major general and commander of the 3d Infantry Division, ordered the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions to infiltrate four miles behind enemy lines to the crossroads town of Cisterna. One hour after their departure, the 4th Ranger Battalion and the rest of the division would launch a frontal assault and use the confusion created by the infiltrating Rangers to drive a deep wedge into the German defenses. American intelligence, however, had failed to notice a large German buildup opposite the American lines, and Ranger reconnaissance of the target area was poor. Page 23 When the two battalions began their infiltration on the night of 29-30 January, the enemy quickly detected them and by dawn had surrounded them with infantry and armor just outside Cisterna. In a desperate attempt to rescue the isolated units, the 4th Ranger Battalion repeatedly attacked the German lines throughout the morning but succeeded in losing half of its combat strength in the futile effort. About noon, the remnants of the 1st and 3d surrendered. Only eight men escaped to American lines.17 Left with a fragment of the Ranger force, American theater commanders decided to deactivate rather than reconstitute the damaged units. Even before Cisterna, the lack of time to train replacements had diluted the quality of the battalions. In truth, the Rangers had become little more than line infantry units, but without the firepower of the normal American infantry regiments of the time. Anticipating tough, methodical fighting for which Ranger units were unsuited, theater commanders preferred to use the remaining Rangers to alleviate the perennial shortage of replacements. Accordingly, in March Rangers with enough points for overseas service returned to the United States, while the remainder joined the 1st Special Service Force, a similar type of formation that had recently arrived in the theater. 18 The 1st Special Service Force The 1st Special Service Force traced its origins to Marshall's trip to Great Britain in early 1942, the same visit that had inspired the formation of the 1st Ranger Battalion. Between conferences on grand strategy, Mountbatten had introduced Marshall to Geoffrey Pyke, an eccentric British scientist who had developed a scheme to divert up to half-a-million German troops from the main fronts. Under Pyke's plan, commandos, using special vehicles, would conduct a series of winter raids against snowbound German garrisons of such vulnerable points as hydroelectric stations in Norway and oil refineries in Romania. Exactly how the raiding units would enter and leave the target areas remained hazy, but the concept fascinated Marshall. After returning to the United States, he gave the project a high priority despite the skepticism of War Department planners. Studebaker, an automobile manufactur- Page 24 Photo: Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick (U.S. Army Photograph) er, received a contract for the design and production of the vehicle later known as the Weasel. In June the Allies also agreed to form a Canadian-American force under Col. Robert T. Frederick to conduct the raids. Although as a War Department staff officer he had opposed the project, the tall, vigorous Frederick proved to be a natural leader, respected by superiors and idolized by his men.19 At Fort William Henry Harrison, an isolated post near Helena, Montana, Frederick assembled his new unit, which he named the 1st Special Service Force in an apparent attempt to disguise its true purpose. Initially, it consisted of three battalion-size units of light infantry (officially designated as regiments) and a service echelon. For American personnel, who would constitute about 60 percent of the unit, inspection teams canvassed Army units in the Southwest and on the Pacific seaboard for hardened volunteers, especially those with a background as "lumberjacks, forest rangers, hunters, north-woodsmen, game wardens, prospectors, and explorers." 20 As was the case with the Rangers, many post commanders used the recruiting drive to empty their stockades and rid themselves of malcontents, and some "volunteer" contingents even arrived at Fort Harrison under armed guard. Frederick soon weeded out unfit recruits, driving his men through an intensive Page 25 program that stressed physical conditioning, weapons training, hand-to-hand fighting, demolitions, rock climbing, and the operation of the Weasel. For training in winter warfare, the recruits lived in boxcars on the Continental Divide while receiving instruction in cross-country skiing from Norwegian instructors. The accelerated schedule allowed only six days for airborne training. Frederick wanted to have the unit ready for operations by the winter of 1942-43. 21 Unfortunately for Frederick's raiders, the Allied high command canceled their mission before they could even take the field. When Frederick visited Great Britain in September 1942, he found that support for the project had evaporated. The Royal Air Force showed little enthusiasm for the diversion of the necessary planes from its bombing campaign, and the Special Operations Executive had already laid plans for a more economic sabotage program that was preferred by Norway's government-in-exile. Mountbatten thus recommended that the project be canceled, and Frederick agreed. While his unit broadened its training to include more general infantry skills and amphibious operations, Frederick investigated other areas Page 26 Photo: Mount La Difensa (U.S. Army Photograph) where his men could use their special capabilities, including the Caucasus Mountains, New Guinea, and the North Pacific. In August 1943 the unit finally went into action for the first time, spearheading the bloodless recapture of Kiska in the Aleutians. The rapid conclusion of the campaign again left Frederick's unit without a mission. Finally, in October, General Clark, desperate for troops, secured the transfer of the 1st Special Service Force to his Fifth Army in the Mediterranean, and the combat history of the 1st Special Service Force began.22 Shortly after its arrival in late November, the 1st Special Service Force received its initial mission. Looming over Fifth Army's front, the twin peaks of Monte La Difensa and Monte La Rementanea presented formidable barriers to the Allied advance into the Liri River Valley. A German panzer grenadier division deeply entrenched along the slopes of the two masses had already thrown back repeated Allied attempts to gain control of the heights. Attached to the 36th Infantry Division, the 1st Special Service Force received orders to carry the two peaks. After a personal reconnaissance of the 3,000-foot La Difensa, Frederick decided to avoid the trail leading up the Page 27 south side and instead to launch a surprise attack via a 200-foot cliff on the opposite slope. On the night of 2-3 December 600 riflemen of the 2d Regiment moved silently up the face to a position only yards away from the German defenders on the crest. When noise from displaced stones alerted the enemy, the special servicemen assaulted the position and within two hours gained control of the crest. From there, they pushed down a saddle to capture neighboring Monte La Rementanea and to link up with British units on the other side of the valley. The fall of the twin peaks cracked the Winter Line and opened the way for the Allied advance to Cassino.23 Any euphoria that Frederick's men might have felt over their success dissipated soon after the unit reentered the fighting as line infantry in late December. Poor weather and a skillful German defense among rocks and gullies slowed the advance to a crawl and took a heavy toll of the special servicemen. Like the Ranger units, they lacked the heavier weapons needed to blast the Germans out of their positions, as well as an adequate system to replace their growing combat and non-combat casualties. After a bitter struggle, the 1st Regiment captured Monte Sammucro but lost much of its fighting power. The 3d Regiment used a surprise night assault to overwhelm the defenders of Monte Majo but then suffered heavy casualties in a three-day defense of the height against German counterattacks. In one month of service before its transfer to Anzio, the force had lost 1,400 of its 1,800 men and badly needed the qualified replacements made available by the disbandment of the Rangers.24 Deploying to the Anzio beachhead in early February 1944, the 1st Special Service Force anchored the Allied right flank along the Mussolini Canal and later spearheaded the drive on Rome. At Anzio Frederick's 1,300 troops defended 13 kilometers of the 52-kilometer-long Allied perimeter. Their position in the flat, open tableland adjoining the canal was dominated by German artillery in the heights overlooking the beachhead. Defending its sector, the unit used night patrols to locate targets for artillery, conduct raids on German outposts, and maintain control of the area between the lines. In late May Frederick's troops participated in the breakout from the beachhead and reinforced an armored task force covering the flank Page 28 of the subsequent Allied drive on Rome. Early on the morning of 4 June the first elements of the combined force entered Rome and secured the bridges over the Tiber River. The 1st Special Service Force then withdrew to Lake Albano for rest and reorganization.25 After the fall of Rome, the unit's final six months proved anticlimactic. Assigned to Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch's Seventh Army for the invasion of southern France, the force received orders to seize German batteries on the Iles d'Hyeres, three rocky land masses on the left flank of the invasion beaches. On the night of 14-15 August the special servicemen, now under the command of Col. Edwin A. Walker, used rubber boats to land on the shores of Ile de Port Cros and Ile du Levant. Within forty-eight hours, the surprised defenders on both islands had surrendered, and Walker's troops prepared to join the main army. Guarding the right flank of Patch's advance, the unit's ensuing drive along the Riviera, the so-called Champagne Campaign, seemed more like an extended route march than a battle. Only a few German rear guards offered any resistance. By early September the unit had established a static defensive position in the mountains along the Franco-Italian border, where it remained for the next three months. In early December Eisenhower's headquarters, under orders from the War Department, dissolved the unit, returning the Canadians to their own army and transferring the Americans to a separate infantry regiment assigned to Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley's 12th Army Group.26 The Office of Strategic Services in the Mediterranean In North Africa and Italy the Army ignored the role that commando-type units, such as the 1st Special Service Force, might have played in operations behind enemy lines, leaving the field to the Office of Strategic Services. Both OSS personnel and their British counterparts in the Special Operations Executive were supervised by the G-3 Division of the theater headquarters, but the Americans tended to be dominant in North Africa, while the British enjoyed greater influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Although OSS personnel initially lacked experience, resources, and the respect of skeptical staff officers in the theater, the agency soon proved its value. Prior Page 29 to TORCH, agents established contact with Allied sympathizers in North Africa and gathered intelligence vital to the invasion. To guard against a possible Axis thrust through Spanish Morocco into the Allied rear, two civilian operatives even organized warrior tribesmen of the region into a guerrilla force. At Salerno an OSS detachment provided critical tactical intelligence to Darby's Rangers during their defense of the Sorrentino peninsula. Nevertheless, OSS personnel often complained that their operations were misunderstood by field commanders, citing one colonel who expected them to "sit in foxholes and toss petard grenades and Molotov cocktails at German heavy tanks as they rolled over us." 27 Nevertheless, their activities earned the interest and approval of General Clark, who gave them vehicles, rations, and a free hand. 28 As the Allied armies expanded their foothold on the Italian peninsula during the fall of 1943, the newly arrived operational groups began to establish bases on offshore islands for raids against the German-held northern coastline. In February 1943 Eisenhower agreed to allow the OSS's Special Operations staff at Algiers to employ four to eight of these commando cells to organize and otherwise assist guerrilla forces in Italy and southern France. Shortly after the Italian surrender in September, Donovan, who was visiting Algiers at the time, ordered an operational group to accompany a French expeditionary force to Corsica, where partisans had revolted against the German garrison. Since the Germans had already decided to withdraw their troops to the Italian mainland, the operational groups and their French allies merely harassed the departing enemy. Immediately following the German evacuation, the groups established an advance base there, as well as observation posts on the nearby islands of Gorgona and Capraia. At Corsica, they were only thirty-five miles from the Italian coast.29 From their new bases, the operational groups conducted raids against German communications along the Italian coast in an attempt to divert enemy troops from the main front (Map 3). The narrow, rocky coastal plains of the Italian peninsula were crossed by numerous roads and railways, which the Germans used as lines of supply. Night after night, operational groups crawled ashore to attack the most vulnerable points and reconnoiter enemy installations. Observers at Gorgona Page 30 Map 3: Northern Italy, 1943-1945 Page 31 directed air strikes against oil tanks in the harbor at Livorno before German raids finally forced evacuation of the island. But not all OG missions ended successfully. In March 1944 a fifteen-man force, code named GINNY, landed south of La Spezia with orders to dynamite a railway tunnel on the main supply line for the front south of Rome. Local inhabitants discovered the party's poorly concealed rubber boats and alerted the Germans, who found the party hiding in a barn. Although in uniform at the time, the captured OG members were summarily executed in accordance with Adolph Hitler's orders to liquidate all commandos.30 After transferring its bases to the Italian mainland in the late summer of 1944, the Office of Strategic Services placed a greater emphasis on partisan warfare. Up to that time, the lack of airlift and other resources and the confused political situation resulting from the sudden collapse of Italy in the fall of 1943 had hindered OSS efforts to establish contact with the resistance in northern Italy. In mid-1944, however, the Americans began to drop supplies and operatives into the region on a much larger scale. At that time, nine operational groups parachuted into the area to discover an indigenous resistance movement already in place, but desperately in need of equipment and supplies. As supply drops and word of Allied successes swelled their strength, the partisans subsequently took the offensive, harassing German forces withdrawing to the Gothic Line during the summer and fall of 1944. With winter, the decline in air resupply due to poor flying weather enabled the Germans to strike back against the guerrillas, who faded into the mountains. Their retreat proved only temporary, for by the spring of 1945 seventy-five OSS teams were equipping and training the resistance bands in preparation for the final Allied effort in Italy.31 When the Allied offensive crossed the Po River in late April 1945, partisans, supported by operational groups, rose in revolt throughout northern Italy. Assisted by these American operatives, partisans cut key routes from Lake Como to the Brenner Pass, while south of Piacenza and Parma OG teams organized successful roadblocks on key transport routes and harassed German columns and troop concentrations. Guerrilla roadblocks aided the 92d Infantry Division in its capture of Page 32 Pontremoli, and in Genoa 15,000 partisans, directed by operational groups, prevented the destruction of the port facilities and took some 3,000 prisoners. In all, Italian partisans killed or wounded over 3,000 Axis troops, captured 81,000 others, and prevented the destruction of key facilities in the Genoa, Milan, Venice, and Modena areas.32 Although British SOE agents dominated operations in the eastern Mediterranean, the Office of Strategic Services still played an important role there. Seeking to pin down German forces far from the OVERLORD invasion, American operatives agreed to provide arms to Communist and socialist guerrillas in Greece as early as October 1943 in return for their subordination to the authority of the theater commander. While the partisans increased their activities, operational groups began to infiltrate into Greece early in 1944 to conduct a series of raids against German road and rail communications in Macedonia, Thessaly, and the Peloponnesus. With the aid of Communist guerrillas, an SO party in May demolished two bridges on the Orient Express line, temporarily interrupting the supply of Turkish chrome to Germany. Extensive OSS operations in Greece continued up to the German withdrawal, ending only in December with the outbreak of a local, but bitter, civil war between the various resistance groups. Off the coast of Yugoslavia, operational groups helped defend the island of Vis, a key base for the supply of Communist partisans under Josip Broz Tito, and joined British commandos in raids along the Dalmatian coast, remaining in the field up to the German departure from Yugoslavia in July 1944. 33 In the initial assault against Axis-dominated Europe, U.S. forces could thus claim many significant achievements in the field of special operations. At Arzew, El Guettar, Gela, Salerno, Monte La Difensa, Anzio, and the Iles d'Hyeres, the Ranger battalions and 1st Special Service Force had performed missions critical to the success of conventional forces, while in the interior OSS commandos had raided German communications and provided direct support to partisans in northern Italy and the Balkans. The ability of these forces to take advantage of the rough terrain and extended coastlines characteristic of the theater proved to be a major factor in their success. Nevertheless, for the most part, the conventional Allied campaign in the Mediterranean proceeded as if special operations never exist- Page 33 ed. The relative insignificance of such activities reflected both American inexperience and a chronic shortage of materiel and manpower resources. But the basic cause was the absence of any doctrine of special operations. Field commanders, uncertain about the proper employment of the Ranger battalions and the 1st Special Service Force, depleted their strength in line operations and eventually disbanded them rather than employ them in a systematic program of raids that would have used their special capabilities. Moreover, the partisan efforts in Italy and the Balkans had only a nuisance value and were rarely tied into the operations of conventional Allied combat units. Thus, despite some isolated successes, special operations made only a limited contribution to the hard-earned success of Allied arms in the Mediterranean. Notes 1. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Command Missions: A Personal Story (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1954), pp. 22-25, 37-40; Memo, Truscott for Brig Gen Charles L. Bolte, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces British Isles (USAFBI), 26 May 42, Box 10, Folder 3, Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.; Cable, Marshall to USFOR, 27 May 42, Section IA, Ranger File, U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Operations, Records Section, Decimal File, March 1950-1951, 322 Ranger, Record Group (RG) 319, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. 2. Quote from Michael J. King, William Orlando Darby: A Military Biography (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981), p. 32. 3. Ibid., pp. 1-3, 9, 16, 177. Testimonies of Darby's leadership ability abound: see James J. Altieri, The Spearheaders (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), pp. 31-32; William O. Darby and William H. Baumer, Darby's Rangers: We Led the Way (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980), pp. 1-2. 4. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 25-27, 83; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 15-22, 66-67; Memo, Col I.B. Summers, Adj Gen, USAFBI, for Hartle, 13 Jun 42, Theodore J. Conway Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, (USAMHI), Carlisle, Pa. 5; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 38-41, 80-81; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 27-49; Instructions and Key to Programme of Work for USA Rangers, 1st to 31st July 1942, and Darby's Progress Report to Truscott, 17 Jul 42, both in Sgt Harry Perlmutter Ranger Battalions of World War II Collection, Ranger Battalions: Historical Background Information on Ranger Battalions and Tables of Organization and Equipment (hereafter cited as Perlmutter Collection), Roll 8, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Library, Fort Bragg, N.C. 6. Rpt, Darby to Adj Gen, 11 Jan 43, and Capt Roy Murray's report on Dieppe, 26 Aug 42, both in U.S. Army, Adj Gen's Office, World War II Operations Reports, 1940-1948, Infantry (hereafter cited as WWII Ops Reports), INBN 1-0, RG 407, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md. From the extensive literature on Dieppe, note especially Lord Lovat, March Past. A Memoir (New York: Homes & Meier, 1978), pp. 237-78; Peter Young, Commando (New York: Ballantine, 1969), pp. 128-53. 7. Maurice Matloff, ea., American Military History, Army Historical Series, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 444; AFHQ Outline Plan, TORCH, 20 Sep 42, U.S. Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, ABC Decimal File, 1942-48, 381 (7-25-42), Sec. I to 4, RG 319, NARA; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 10-13; King, William Orlando Darby, p. 44. 8. Darby's report of action at Arzew, I Jan 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 8-10, 17-23; Altieri, The Spearheaders, p. 137. 9. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 53-55; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 146-53, 169-91; Michael J. King, Rangers: Selected Combat Operations of World War II, Leavenworth Papers 11 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1985), p. 14. 10. Leilyn M. Young, "Rangers in a Night Operation," Military Review 24 July 1944): 64-69; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 56-60; Darby's report of Sened, 5 Mar 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC. Page 35 11. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 60-65; Darby's report for the period 14-28 Feb 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC. 12. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 67-77; Darby's report of El Guettar, 9 Apr 43, in WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC; King, Wilham Orlando Darby, p. 62; King, Rangers, pp. 15-22. 13. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 78, 83-84; King, Wilham Orlando Darby, pp. 68, 75-76; Msg. Algiers to War Department, 18 Apr 43, U.S. War Department, Operations Division, War Department Message File: Incoming Top Secret, April 1-30, 1943, RG 165, NARA; Cable, Marshall to Eisenhower, 19 Apr 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 241, 246-47. 14. Darby's report of action at Gela, Sicily, 5 Aug 43, U.S. War Department, Operations Division, OPD 381 ETO, Section V, Cases 108-137, Case 108, RG 165, NARA; Rpt, Dammer to Adj Gen, 31 Jul 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 3-0.3, RG 407, WNRC; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 85-99, 104-09; King, Wilham Orlando Darby, p. 88; King, Rangers, pp. 23-28. 15. Darby's report of Salerno, 15 Nov 43, INBN 1-0, and Dammer's report, 25 Nov 1943, INBN 3-0.3, both in WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 113-22; Alexander M. Worth, Jr., "Supporting Weapons and High Ground: The Rangers at Salerno," Infantry Journal 56 (May 1945): 33-34. 16. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 128-40; King, William Orlando Darby, pp. 103, 106, 121, 129-30, 137, 145, 185; Darby's report of offensive against Winter Line, 29 Mar 44, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC. 17. See reports on Cisterna in WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0.3 and INBN 3-0.3, RG 407, WNRC; King, William Orlando Darby, pp. 136, 145; King, Rangers, pp. 29-40; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 148-55, 159-69; Truscott, Command Missions, p p. 312- 14. 18. Memo, Lt Gen Jacob Devers, Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, for War Department, 25 Feb 44; Memo, Devers for War Department, 13 Mar 44; and Memo, Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, Asst Chief of Staff, for FREEDOM, 28 Feb 44. All in U.S. War Department, Operations Division, OPD 320.2 Africa, Cases 584-616, RG 165, NARA; King, William Orlando Darby, pp. 136, 145. 19. Robert D. Burhans, The First Special Service Force. A War History of the North Americans, 1942-44 (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 1-5, 8-12; Robert H. Adleman and George Walton, The Devil's Brigade (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1966), pp. 2-4, 11, 25-35. 20. Quote from Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, p. 48. 21. Burhans, The First Special Service Force, pp. 13-15, 23, 60; Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 48-50, 57, 73-84. 22. Burhans, The First Special Service Force, pp. 35-37, 45-46, 86; Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 86-91, 103-09. 23. Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 119-32, 142-45. 24. Ibid., pp. 148, 159-61; Scott R. McMichael, A Histoncal Perspective on Light Infantry, Research Survey 6 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1987), pp. 186-92. 25. Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Bngade, pp. 168-74, 202-04, 211-19; McMichael, A Histoncal Perspective on Light Infantry, pp. 198-201. 26. Burhans, The First Special Service Force, pp. 257, 273, 299; Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 227-30, 233, 243-44; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Page 36 and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 9 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) 4: 2232n. 27. Carleton S. Coon, A North Africa Story: The Anthropologist as OSS Agent, 1941-1943 (Ipswich, Mass.: Gambit Press, 1980), p. 96. 28. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1: 206-07, and 2: 9, 13-15, 67; Coon, A North Africa Story, pp. 124-25; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 25-26; MS, Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), History of Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater, 1942-45, pp. 17-18, NARA. 29. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1:108, and 2: 60-61, 77-78; Brown, The Hero, pp. 471-72. 30. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 77-80; Report of ICEBERG Operation, Folder 682, and Rpt, Col Russell Livermore to Commander, 2677th HQ Company Exp (Prov), 4 Jan 44, both in OSS, Algiers SO-OP-9, Entry 97, Box 40, RG 226, NARA; Brown, The Last Hero, pp. 474-80. 31. MS, AFHQ' History of Special Operations, Mediterranean, pp. 23, 25-26; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 107-13, 115; Smith, OSS, pp. 107, 109. 32. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 115-16; MS, AFHQ, History of Special Operations, Mediterranean, pp. 26-27; Smith, OSS, pp. 116-17. 33. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 124, 127-29. Brown, The Last Hero, pp. 430-33, 439-42.

Colonel Edwin A. Walker and Darby's Rangers... CHAPTER 2 Special Operations in the Mediterranean The opening blows against Hitler's Fortress Europe came not in Western Europe but in the Mediterranean. Once the United States had entered the war, American leaders pressed for a direct cross-channel assault against the Continent. Through 1942 and much of 1943, however, they yielded to British concerns over Allied readiness for such a large step and accepted less ambitious endeavors against the "soft underbelly" of Axis-dominated Europe. The soft underbelly proved to be a hard shell as Allied armies, after driving the Germans and Italians from North Africa and Sicily, made slow progress against a tenacious German defense in the wet climate and rugged highlands of the Italian peninsula. In this theater of sandy wastes and jagged mountains bordered by the placid waters of the Mediterranean, American forces discovered both a need and a favorable environment for their first major special operations of the war. Darby's Rangers While the U.S. Army's Rangers would perform several special operations in the course of the war, they traced their origins to a provisional formation created by the chief of staff to remedy the Army's lack of combat experience during the early months of 1942. When Marshall visited Great Britain in April to urge a cross-channel invasion, he met Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the charismatic head of British Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), and later visited COHQ's commando training center in Scotland. In Mountbatten's commando raiding program, Marshall perceived a means of providing American soldiers with at least some combat experience. At his direction Col. Lucian K. Truscott met with British lead- Page 12 ers to determine the best way of fulfilling this objective. Subsequently, Truscott recommended the formation of an American commando unit which would bear the designation Ranger. Under Truscott's concept, most personnel would join the new Ranger force on a temporary basis and then return to their parent units after several months of field operations. Marshall approved the proposals, and on 19 June 1942, Truscott officially activated the 1st Ranger Battalion in Northern Ireland.1 As commander of the battalion, Truscott selected Capt. William O. Darby. At the time Darby was serving as an aide to Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle, the commander of American forces in Northern Ireland. When Hartle recommended Darby for the command of the new unit, Truscott was receptive, having found the young officer to be "outstanding in appearance, possessed of a most attractive personality, . . . keen, intelligent, and filled with enthusiasm." 2 His judgment proved accurate. The 31-year-old Darby, a graduate of West Point in 1933, soon demonstrated an innate ability to gain the confidence of his superiors and the deep devotion of his men.3 Using the model of the British commandos, Darby energetically organized his new unit. Circulars, calling for volunteers, soon appeared on bulletin boards of the 34th Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division, and other American units training in Northern Ireland. Darby and an officer from Hartle's staff personally examined and selected officers, who, in turn, interviewed the enlisted volunteers, looking especially for athletic individuals in good physical condition. The recruits, ranging in age from seventeen to thirty-five, came from every part of the United States; they included a former lion tamer and a full-blooded Sioux Indian. Although several units attempted to unload misfits and troublemakers on the new unit, most recruits joined out of a yearning for adventure and a desire to be part of an elite force. As the volunteers arrived at the battalion's camp, Darby formed them into a headquarters company and six line companies of sixty-seven men each, an organization which sacrificed firepower and administrative self-sufficiency for foot and amphibious mobility.4 The advanced commando training of the battalion lasted approximately three months. Immediately on arriving at Fort William in northern Scotland, the recruits embarked on an exhausting forced march to their camp in the shadow of Ach- Page 13 Photo: Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott Jr. (U.S. Army photograph) Photo: Col. William O. Darby (U.S. Army photograph) nacarry Castle, a trek that foreshadowed a month of rigorous training. The future Rangers endured log-lifting drills, obstacle courses, and speed marches over mountains and through frigid rivers under the watchful eye of British commando instructors. In addition, they received weapons training and instruction in hand-to-hand combat, street fighting, patrols, night operations, and the handling of small boats. The training stressed realism, including the use of live ammunition. On one occasion, a Ranger alertly picked up a grenade that a commando had thrown into a boatload of trainees and hurled it over the lake before it exploded. In early August the battalion transferred to Argyle, Scotland, for training in amphibious operations with the Royal Navy and later moved to Dundee where they stayed in private homes while practicing attacks on pillboxes and coastal defenses.5 While training proceeded, fifty Rangers participated in the raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942. Although the Allies apparently hoped that the raid would ease German pressure on the Soviets, the ostensible purpose was to test the defenses of the port and force the German Air Force to give battle. To clear the way for the main assault on the town by the 2d Canadian Page 14 Photo: Rangers train on the terrain of the 8 November assault at Arzew (U.S. Army Photograph) Page 15 Division, two British commando battalions, accompanied by American Ranger personnel, were to seize a pair of coastal batteries flanking the port. Although one of the battalions successfully landed, destroyed its assigned battery west of Dieppe, and withdrew, the flotilla carrying the second battalion was dispersed by German torpedo boats, permitting only a fraction of the force to reach shore. By accurate sniper fire, a small party of this group prevented the battery from firing on the Allied fleet, but many of their American and British comrades were captured. In the meantime, the main assault had turned into a disaster, suffering 3,400 casualties of the 5,000 engaged. While the Allied high command claimed to have learned lessons that proved invaluable to the success of the landings on Normandy two years later, the raid remains a subject of controversy.6 North Africa Dieppe proved to be the only operation undertaken by Darby's Rangers in accordance with Marshall's original concept. In late July the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, under pressure from a president anxious for action against the Germans on some front, reluctantly bowed to British arguments for an invasion of French North Africa, code named Operation TORCH. As planners examined the task of securing the initial beachheads, they perceived a need for highly trained forces that could approach the landing areas and seize key defensive positions in advance of the main force. Accordingly, Darby's battalion received a mission to occupy two forts at the entrance of Arzew harbor, clearing the way for the landing of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division of the Center Task Force (Map 1). 7 The performance of the Rangers in their first independent mission reflected their emphasis on leadership, training, and careful planning. In the early morning hours of 8 November two companies under Darby's executive officer, Maj. Herman W. Dammer, slipped through a boom blocking the entrance to the inner harbor of Arzew and stealthily approached Fort de la Pointe. After climbing over a seawall and cutting through barbed. wire, two groups of Rangers assaulted the position from opposite directions. Within fifteen minutes, they had the fort and sixty startled French prisoners. Meanwhile, Darby and the remaining four companies landed near Cap Carbon and Page 16 Map1: Darby's Rangers in Northwest Africa, November1942-March 1943 Page 17 climbed a ravine to reach Batterie du Nord, overlooking the harbor. With the support of Company D's four 81-mm. mortars, the force assaulted the position, capturing the battery and sixty more prisoners. Trying to signal his success to the waiting fleet, Darby, whose radio had been lost in the landing, shot off a series of green flares before finally establishing contact through the radio of a British forward observer party. The Rangers had achieved their first success, a triumph tempered only by the later impressment of two companies as line troops in the 1st Infantry Division's beachhead perimeter. Ranger losses were light, but the episode foreshadowed the future use of the Rangers as line infantry.8 While Allied forces occupied Northwest Africa and advanced into Tunisia, Darby kept his Rangers busy with a rigorous program of physical conditioning and training in night and amphibious operations. Rumors of possible raiding missions spread within the battalion, but, as December and January passed without any further assignments, morale rapidly declined. Many Rangers transferred to other units. As yet, the Army still had no doctrine or concept of the employment of such units on the conventional battlefield, or elsewhere, and American field commanders were more concerned about their advance into the rear of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps than in any program of seaborne commando raids.9 In early February 1943 the Allied high command finally found a mission for the Rangers. Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's theater headquarters attached the battalion to Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall's II Corps in Tunisia. Hoping to gather intelligence and mislead the enemy regarding Allied strength and intentions, Fredendall directed the battalion to launch a series of raids against the Italo-German lines. The Rangers struck first against the Italian outpost at Sened. On the night of 10-11 February three Ranger companies marched through eight miles of rugged Tunisian terrain to a chain of hills overlooking the position. After observing the outpost by day, the Rangers, about midnight, began a four-mile approach march, advancing to successive phase lines and using colored lights to maintain formation. At 200 yards the Italians spotted their advance and opened fire, but most of the shots passed harmlessly overhead. The Rangers waited until they were fifty Page 18 yards away before launching a bayonet assault. Within twenty minutes, they had overrun the garrison, killing fifty and capturing eleven before withdrawing to friendly lines.10 The raiding program was soon cut short by developments to the north. Within days of the action at Sened, the Germans launched a counteroffensive through Kasserine Pass, roughly handling the green American units and forcing Fredendall to withdraw his exposed right flank. After serving as a rear guard for the withdrawal, the Rangers held a regimental-size front across Dernaia Pass and patrolled in anticipation of a German attack in the area. It would not be the last time that field commanders, short of troops, used the Rangers as line infantry in an emergency.11 When the II Corps, now under Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., returned to the offensive in March, the 1st Ranger Battalion played a key role in the Allied breakthrough. After spear-heading the 1st Infantry Division's advance to El Guettar, the Rangers found the Italians blocking the road at the pass of Djebel el Ank. The terrain to either side of the position appeared impassable, but Ranger patrols found a twelve-mile path through the mountains and ravines north of the pass to the Italian rear. During the night of 20-21 March, the battalion, accompanied by a heavy mortar company, followed this tortuous route, reaching a plateau overlooking the Italian position by 0600. As the sun rose, the Rangers, supported by the mortars, struck the Italians from flank and rear, while the 26th Infantry made a frontal assault. The enemy fled, leaving the pass and 200 prisoners in American hands. After patrolling and helping to repulse enemy counterattacks from a defensive position near Djobel Berda, the Rangers returned to Algeria for a rest. Shortly afterward, the Axis surrender of Tunis and Bizerte concluded the North African campaign.12 Sicily and Italy The performance of Darby's forces in North Africa and the continuing need for troops to spearhead amphibious landings led Eisenhower's headquarters to form additional Ranger units. Patton and Maj. Gen. Terry Allen, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, praised the Rangers in glowing terms, and Allied planners requested authorization from the War Department to form two more battalions for the invasion of Sicily. Page 19 Map 2: Southern Italy and Sicily, 1943-1944 Page 20 Marshall approved the expansion but again stipulated that Ranger-trained soldiers be returned to their parent units once the need for the battalions had passed. His attitude underlined the continuing status of these battalions as temporary organizations. Nevertheless, Darby and his officers enthusiastically sought out volunteers for the new formations, making stump speeches at replacement depots throughout North Africa. At Nemours, where Dammer had created a replica of the commando training depots, the recruits endured physical conditioning, weapons training, and amphibious landings under live fire.l3 In Sicily the Rangers served first as assault troops in the landing and then in various task forces in the drive across the island (Map 2). At Gela in the early morning darkness of 10 July the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, under Darby and Maj. Roy Murray, attacked across a mined beach to capture the town and coastal batteries. They then withstood two days of counterattacks, battling tanks with thermite grenades and a single 37-mm. gun in the streets of Gela. For all the courage of individual Rangers, naval gunfire support proved decisive in holding the town. As Allied forces expanded the beachhead, one Ranger company captured the formidable fortress town of Butera in a daring night attack, while to the west Dammer's 3d Ranger Battalion moved by foot and truck to capture the harbor of Porto Empedocle, taking over 700 prisoners. In the ensuing drive to Palermo, the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions joined task forces guarding the flanks of the advance, and the 3d Ranger Battalion later aided the advance along the northern Sicilian coast to Messina by infiltrating through the mountains to outflank successive German delaying positions. By the fall of Messina on 17 August, marking the end of the Sicilian campaign, the Rangers were already preparing for the invasion of Italy.14 At Salerno the Rangers once again secured critical objectives during the amphibious assault, but, cut off by the rapid German response to the main landings, they were forced to hold their positions for about three weeks, a defensive mission unsuitable for such light units. Landing on a narrow, rocky beach to the left of the main beachhead early on the morning of 9 September, the Rangers quickly occupied the high ground of the Sorrentino peninsula, dominating the routes between Page 21 Photo: Soldiers of the 3d Ranger Battalion board LCIs that will take them to Anzio. Two weeks later, nearly all would be killed or captured at Cisterna (U.S. Army Photograph) Page 22 the invasion beaches and Naples. To the south the Germans contained the main landing, preventing Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army from linking up with the Ranger position. Nevertheless, Darby's three battalions, assisted by paratroopers and British commandos, held their position against repeated German attacks. Lacking enough troops to hold a continuous line, the Rangers adopted a system of mutually supporting strongpoints and relied on the terrain and naval gunfire, which they directed to harass the routes from Naples until Clark's force broke through to them on 30 September.l5 Casualties mounted when the Rangers served as line infantry in the offensive against the German Winter Line. Lacking troops on the Venafro front, Clark used the Rangers to fill gaps in Fifth Army's line from early November to mid-December. Attached to divisions, the battalions engaged in bitter mountain fighting at close quarters. Although reinforced by a cannon company of four 75-mm. guns on half-tracks, they still lacked the firepower and manpower for protracted combat. By mid-December the continuous fighting and the cold, wet weather had taken a heavy toll. In one month of action, for example, the 1st Ranger Battalion lost 350 men, including nearly 200 casualties from exposure. Moreover, the quality of the battalions declined as veterans were replaced by enthusiastic, but inadequately trained, replacements.l6 A botched infiltration mission on the Anzio beachhead in early 1944 completed the destruction of Darby's Rangers. After a nearly unopposed Allied amphibious assault on 22 January 1944, Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, commander of the VI Corps, failed to press his advantage, and the Germans were able to contain the Allies within a narrow perimeter. Seeking to push out of this confined area, Truscott, now a major general and commander of the 3d Infantry Division, ordered the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions to infiltrate four miles behind enemy lines to the crossroads town of Cisterna. One hour after their departure, the 4th Ranger Battalion and the rest of the division would launch a frontal assault and use the confusion created by the infiltrating Rangers to drive a deep wedge into the German defenses. American intelligence, however, had failed to notice a large German buildup opposite the American lines, and Ranger reconnaissance of the target area was poor. Page 23 When the two battalions began their infiltration on the night of 29-30 January, the enemy quickly detected them and by dawn had surrounded them with infantry and armor just outside Cisterna. In a desperate attempt to rescue the isolated units, the 4th Ranger Battalion repeatedly attacked the German lines throughout the morning but succeeded in losing half of its combat strength in the futile effort. About noon, the remnants of the 1st and 3d surrendered. Only eight men escaped to American lines.17 Left with a fragment of the Ranger force, American theater commanders decided to deactivate rather than reconstitute the damaged units. Even before Cisterna, the lack of time to train replacements had diluted the quality of the battalions. In truth, the Rangers had become little more than line infantry units, but without the firepower of the normal American infantry regiments of the time. Anticipating tough, methodical fighting for which Ranger units were unsuited, theater commanders preferred to use the remaining Rangers to alleviate the perennial shortage of replacements. Accordingly, in March Rangers with enough points for overseas service returned to the United States, while the remainder joined the 1st Special Service Force, a similar type of formation that had recently arrived in the theater. 18 The 1st Special Service Force The 1st Special Service Force traced its origins to Marshall's trip to Great Britain in early 1942, the same visit that had inspired the formation of the 1st Ranger Battalion. Between conferences on grand strategy, Mountbatten had introduced Marshall to Geoffrey Pyke, an eccentric British scientist who had developed a scheme to divert up to half-a-million German troops from the main fronts. Under Pyke's plan, commandos, using special vehicles, would conduct a series of winter raids against snowbound German garrisons of such vulnerable points as hydroelectric stations in Norway and oil refineries in Romania. Exactly how the raiding units would enter and leave the target areas remained hazy, but the concept fascinated Marshall. After returning to the United States, he gave the project a high priority despite the skepticism of War Department planners. Studebaker, an automobile manufactur- Page 24 Photo: Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick (U.S. Army Photograph) er, received a contract for the design and production of the vehicle later known as the Weasel. In June the Allies also agreed to form a Canadian-American force under Col. Robert T. Frederick to conduct the raids. Although as a War Department staff officer he had opposed the project, the tall, vigorous Frederick proved to be a natural leader, respected by superiors and idolized by his men.19 At Fort William Henry Harrison, an isolated post near Helena, Montana, Frederick assembled his new unit, which he named the 1st Special Service Force in an apparent attempt to disguise its true purpose. Initially, it consisted of three battalion-size units of light infantry (officially designated as regiments) and a service echelon. For American personnel, who would constitute about 60 percent of the unit, inspection teams canvassed Army units in the Southwest and on the Pacific seaboard for hardened volunteers, especially those with a background as "lumberjacks, forest rangers, hunters, north-woodsmen, game wardens, prospectors, and explorers." 20 As was the case with the Rangers, many post commanders used the recruiting drive to empty their stockades and rid themselves of malcontents, and some "volunteer" contingents even arrived at Fort Harrison under armed guard. Frederick soon weeded out unfit recruits, driving his men through an intensive Page 25 program that stressed physical conditioning, weapons training, hand-to-hand fighting, demolitions, rock climbing, and the operation of the Weasel. For training in winter warfare, the recruits lived in boxcars on the Continental Divide while receiving instruction in cross-country skiing from Norwegian instructors. The accelerated schedule allowed only six days for airborne training. Frederick wanted to have the unit ready for operations by the winter of 1942-43. 21 Unfortunately for Frederick's raiders, the Allied high command canceled their mission before they could even take the field. When Frederick visited Great Britain in September 1942, he found that support for the project had evaporated. The Royal Air Force showed little enthusiasm for the diversion of the necessary planes from its bombing campaign, and the Special Operations Executive had already laid plans for a more economic sabotage program that was preferred by Norway's government-in-exile. Mountbatten thus recommended that the project be canceled, and Frederick agreed. While his unit broadened its training to include more general infantry skills and amphibious operations, Frederick investigated other areas Page 26 Photo: Mount La Difensa (U.S. Army Photograph) where his men could use their special capabilities, including the Caucasus Mountains, New Guinea, and the North Pacific. In August 1943 the unit finally went into action for the first time, spearheading the bloodless recapture of Kiska in the Aleutians. The rapid conclusion of the campaign again left Frederick's unit without a mission. Finally, in October, General Clark, desperate for troops, secured the transfer of the 1st Special Service Force to his Fifth Army in the Mediterranean, and the combat history of the 1st Special Service Force began.22 Shortly after its arrival in late November, the 1st Special Service Force received its initial mission. Looming over Fifth Army's front, the twin peaks of Monte La Difensa and Monte La Rementanea presented formidable barriers to the Allied advance into the Liri River Valley. A German panzer grenadier division deeply entrenched along the slopes of the two masses had already thrown back repeated Allied attempts to gain control of the heights. Attached to the 36th Infantry Division, the 1st Special Service Force received orders to carry the two peaks. After a personal reconnaissance of the 3,000-foot La Difensa, Frederick decided to avoid the trail leading up the Page 27 south side and instead to launch a surprise attack via a 200-foot cliff on the opposite slope. On the night of 2-3 December 600 riflemen of the 2d Regiment moved silently up the face to a position only yards away from the German defenders on the crest. When noise from displaced stones alerted the enemy, the special servicemen assaulted the position and within two hours gained control of the crest. From there, they pushed down a saddle to capture neighboring Monte La Rementanea and to link up with British units on the other side of the valley. The fall of the twin peaks cracked the Winter Line and opened the way for the Allied advance to Cassino.23 Any euphoria that Frederick's men might have felt over their success dissipated soon after the unit reentered the fighting as line infantry in late December. Poor weather and a skillful German defense among rocks and gullies slowed the advance to a crawl and took a heavy toll of the special servicemen. Like the Ranger units, they lacked the heavier weapons needed to blast the Germans out of their positions, as well as an adequate system to replace their growing combat and non-combat casualties. After a bitter struggle, the 1st Regiment captured Monte Sammucro but lost much of its fighting power. The 3d Regiment used a surprise night assault to overwhelm the defenders of Monte Majo but then suffered heavy casualties in a three-day defense of the height against German counterattacks. In one month of service before its transfer to Anzio, the force had lost 1,400 of its 1,800 men and badly needed the qualified replacements made available by the disbandment of the Rangers.24 Deploying to the Anzio beachhead in early February 1944, the 1st Special Service Force anchored the Allied right flank along the Mussolini Canal and later spearheaded the drive on Rome. At Anzio Frederick's 1,300 troops defended 13 kilometers of the 52-kilometer-long Allied perimeter. Their position in the flat, open tableland adjoining the canal was dominated by German artillery in the heights overlooking the beachhead. Defending its sector, the unit used night patrols to locate targets for artillery, conduct raids on German outposts, and maintain control of the area between the lines. In late May Frederick's troops participated in the breakout from the beachhead and reinforced an armored task force covering the flank Page 28 of the subsequent Allied drive on Rome. Early on the morning of 4 June the first elements of the combined force entered Rome and secured the bridges over the Tiber River. The 1st Special Service Force then withdrew to Lake Albano for rest and reorganization.25 After the fall of Rome, the unit's final six months proved anticlimactic. Assigned to Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch's Seventh Army for the invasion of southern France, the force received orders to seize German batteries on the Iles d'Hyeres, three rocky land masses on the left flank of the invasion beaches. On the night of 14-15 August the special servicemen, now under the command of Col. Edwin A. Walker, used rubber boats to land on the shores of Ile de Port Cros and Ile du Levant. Within forty-eight hours, the surprised defenders on both islands had surrendered, and Walker's troops prepared to join the main army. Guarding the right flank of Patch's advance, the unit's ensuing drive along the Riviera, the so-called Champagne Campaign, seemed more like an extended route march than a battle. Only a few German rear guards offered any resistance. By early September the unit had established a static defensive position in the mountains along the Franco-Italian border, where it remained for the next three months. In early December Eisenhower's headquarters, under orders from the War Department, dissolved the unit, returning the Canadians to their own army and transferring the Americans to a separate infantry regiment assigned to Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley's 12th Army Group.26 The Office of Strategic Services in the Mediterranean In North Africa and Italy the Army ignored the role that commando-type units, such as the 1st Special Service Force, might have played in operations behind enemy lines, leaving the field to the Office of Strategic Services. Both OSS personnel and their British counterparts in the Special Operations Executive were supervised by the G-3 Division of the theater headquarters, but the Americans tended to be dominant in North Africa, while the British enjoyed greater influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Although OSS personnel initially lacked experience, resources, and the respect of skeptical staff officers in the theater, the agency soon proved its value. Prior Page 29 to TORCH, agents established contact with Allied sympathizers in North Africa and gathered intelligence vital to the invasion. To guard against a possible Axis thrust through Spanish Morocco into the Allied rear, two civilian operatives even organized warrior tribesmen of the region into a guerrilla force. At Salerno an OSS detachment provided critical tactical intelligence to Darby's Rangers during their defense of the Sorrentino peninsula. Nevertheless, OSS personnel often complained that their operations were misunderstood by field commanders, citing one colonel who expected them to "sit in foxholes and toss petard grenades and Molotov cocktails at German heavy tanks as they rolled over us." 27 Nevertheless, their activities earned the interest and approval of General Clark, who gave them vehicles, rations, and a free hand. 28 As the Allied armies expanded their foothold on the Italian peninsula during the fall of 1943, the newly arrived operational groups began to establish bases on offshore islands for raids against the German-held northern coastline. In February 1943 Eisenhower agreed to allow the OSS's Special Operations staff at Algiers to employ four to eight of these commando cells to organize and otherwise assist guerrilla forces in Italy and southern France. Shortly after the Italian surrender in September, Donovan, who was visiting Algiers at the time, ordered an operational group to accompany a French expeditionary force to Corsica, where partisans had revolted against the German garrison. Since the Germans had already decided to withdraw their troops to the Italian mainland, the operational groups and their French allies merely harassed the departing enemy. Immediately following the German evacuation, the groups established an advance base there, as well as observation posts on the nearby islands of Gorgona and Capraia. At Corsica, they were only thirty-five miles from the Italian coast.29 From their new bases, the operational groups conducted raids against German communications along the Italian coast in an attempt to divert enemy troops from the main front (Map 3). The narrow, rocky coastal plains of the Italian peninsula were crossed by numerous roads and railways, which the Germans used as lines of supply. Night after night, operational groups crawled ashore to attack the most vulnerable points and reconnoiter enemy installations. Observers at Gorgona Page 30 Map 3: Northern Italy, 1943-1945 Page 31 directed air strikes against oil tanks in the harbor at Livorno before German raids finally forced evacuation of the island. But not all OG missions ended successfully. In March 1944 a fifteen-man force, code named GINNY, landed south of La Spezia with orders to dynamite a railway tunnel on the main supply line for the front south of Rome. Local inhabitants discovered the party's poorly concealed rubber boats and alerted the Germans, who found the party hiding in a barn. Although in uniform at the time, the captured OG members were summarily executed in accordance with Adolph Hitler's orders to liquidate all commandos.30 After transferring its bases to the Italian mainland in the late summer of 1944, the Office of Strategic Services placed a greater emphasis on partisan warfare. Up to that time, the lack of airlift and other resources and the confused political situation resulting from the sudden collapse of Italy in the fall of 1943 had hindered OSS efforts to establish contact with the resistance in northern Italy. In mid-1944, however, the Americans began to drop supplies and operatives into the region on a much larger scale. At that time, nine operational groups parachuted into the area to discover an indigenous resistance movement already in place, but desperately in need of equipment and supplies. As supply drops and word of Allied successes swelled their strength, the partisans subsequently took the offensive, harassing German forces withdrawing to the Gothic Line during the summer and fall of 1944. With winter, the decline in air resupply due to poor flying weather enabled the Germans to strike back against the guerrillas, who faded into the mountains. Their retreat proved only temporary, for by the spring of 1945 seventy-five OSS teams were equipping and training the resistance bands in preparation for the final Allied effort in Italy.31 When the Allied offensive crossed the Po River in late April 1945, partisans, supported by operational groups, rose in revolt throughout northern Italy. Assisted by these American operatives, partisans cut key routes from Lake Como to the Brenner Pass, while south of Piacenza and Parma OG teams organized successful roadblocks on key transport routes and harassed German columns and troop concentrations. Guerrilla roadblocks aided the 92d Infantry Division in its capture of Page 32 Pontremoli, and in Genoa 15,000 partisans, directed by operational groups, prevented the destruction of the port facilities and took some 3,000 prisoners. In all, Italian partisans killed or wounded over 3,000 Axis troops, captured 81,000 others, and prevented the destruction of key facilities in the Genoa, Milan, Venice, and Modena areas.32 Although British SOE agents dominated operations in the eastern Mediterranean, the Office of Strategic Services still played an important role there. Seeking to pin down German forces far from the OVERLORD invasion, American operatives agreed to provide arms to Communist and socialist guerrillas in Greece as early as October 1943 in return for their subordination to the authority of the theater commander. While the partisans increased their activities, operational groups began to infiltrate into Greece early in 1944 to conduct a series of raids against German road and rail communications in Macedonia, Thessaly, and the Peloponnesus. With the aid of Communist guerrillas, an SO party in May demolished two bridges on the Orient Express line, temporarily interrupting the supply of Turkish chrome to Germany. Extensive OSS operations in Greece continued up to the German withdrawal, ending only in December with the outbreak of a local, but bitter, civil war between the various resistance groups. Off the coast of Yugoslavia, operational groups helped defend the island of Vis, a key base for the supply of Communist partisans under Josip Broz Tito, and joined British commandos in raids along the Dalmatian coast, remaining in the field up to the German departure from Yugoslavia in July 1944. 33 In the initial assault against Axis-dominated Europe, U.S. forces could thus claim many significant achievements in the field of special operations. At Arzew, El Guettar, Gela, Salerno, Monte La Difensa, Anzio, and the Iles d'Hyeres, the Ranger battalions and 1st Special Service Force had performed missions critical to the success of conventional forces, while in the interior OSS commandos had raided German communications and provided direct support to partisans in northern Italy and the Balkans. The ability of these forces to take advantage of the rough terrain and extended coastlines characteristic of the theater proved to be a major factor in their success. Nevertheless, for the most part, the conventional Allied campaign in the Mediterranean proceeded as if special operations never exist- Page 33 ed. The relative insignificance of such activities reflected both American inexperience and a chronic shortage of materiel and manpower resources. But the basic cause was the absence of any doctrine of special operations. Field commanders, uncertain about the proper employment of the Ranger battalions and the 1st Special Service Force, depleted their strength in line operations and eventually disbanded them rather than employ them in a systematic program of raids that would have used their special capabilities. Moreover, the partisan efforts in Italy and the Balkans had only a nuisance value and were rarely tied into the operations of conventional Allied combat units. Thus, despite some isolated successes, special operations made only a limited contribution to the hard-earned success of Allied arms in the Mediterranean. Notes 1. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Command Missions: A Personal Story (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1954), pp. 22-25, 37-40; Memo, Truscott for Brig Gen Charles L. Bolte, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces British Isles (USAFBI), 26 May 42, Box 10, Folder 3, Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.; Cable, Marshall to USFOR, 27 May 42, Section IA, Ranger File, U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Operations, Records Section, Decimal File, March 1950-1951, 322 Ranger, Record Group (RG) 319, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. 2. Quote from Michael J. King, William Orlando Darby: A Military Biography (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981), p. 32. 3. Ibid., pp. 1-3, 9, 16, 177. Testimonies of Darby's leadership ability abound: see James J. Altieri, The Spearheaders (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), pp. 31-32; William O. Darby and William H. Baumer, Darby's Rangers: We Led the Way (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980), pp. 1-2. 4. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 25-27, 83; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 15-22, 66-67; Memo, Col I.B. Summers, Adj Gen, USAFBI, for Hartle, 13 Jun 42, Theodore J. Conway Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, (USAMHI), Carlisle, Pa. 5; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 38-41, 80-81; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 27-49; Instructions and Key to Programme of Work for USA Rangers, 1st to 31st July 1942, and Darby's Progress Report to Truscott, 17 Jul 42, both in Sgt Harry Perlmutter Ranger Battalions of World War II Collection, Ranger Battalions: Historical Background Information on Ranger Battalions and Tables of Organization and Equipment (hereafter cited as Perlmutter Collection), Roll 8, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Library, Fort Bragg, N.C. 6. Rpt, Darby to Adj Gen, 11 Jan 43, and Capt Roy Murray's report on Dieppe, 26 Aug 42, both in U.S. Army, Adj Gen's Office, World War II Operations Reports, 1940-1948, Infantry (hereafter cited as WWII Ops Reports), INBN 1-0, RG 407, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md. From the extensive literature on Dieppe, note especially Lord Lovat, March Past. A Memoir (New York: Homes & Meier, 1978), pp. 237-78; Peter Young, Commando (New York: Ballantine, 1969), pp. 128-53. 7. Maurice Matloff, ea., American Military History, Army Historical Series, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 444; AFHQ Outline Plan, TORCH, 20 Sep 42, U.S. Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, ABC Decimal File, 1942-48, 381 (7-25-42), Sec. I to 4, RG 319, NARA; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 10-13; King, William Orlando Darby, p. 44. 8. Darby's report of action at Arzew, I Jan 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 8-10, 17-23; Altieri, The Spearheaders, p. 137. 9. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 53-55; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 146-53, 169-91; Michael J. King, Rangers: Selected Combat Operations of World War II, Leavenworth Papers 11 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1985), p. 14. 10. Leilyn M. Young, "Rangers in a Night Operation," Military Review 24 July 1944): 64-69; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 56-60; Darby's report of Sened, 5 Mar 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC. Page 35 11. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 60-65; Darby's report for the period 14-28 Feb 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC. 12. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 67-77; Darby's report of El Guettar, 9 Apr 43, in WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC; King, Wilham Orlando Darby, p. 62; King, Rangers, pp. 15-22. 13. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 78, 83-84; King, Wilham Orlando Darby, pp. 68, 75-76; Msg. Algiers to War Department, 18 Apr 43, U.S. War Department, Operations Division, War Department Message File: Incoming Top Secret, April 1-30, 1943, RG 165, NARA; Cable, Marshall to Eisenhower, 19 Apr 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC; Altieri, The Spearheaders, pp. 241, 246-47. 14. Darby's report of action at Gela, Sicily, 5 Aug 43, U.S. War Department, Operations Division, OPD 381 ETO, Section V, Cases 108-137, Case 108, RG 165, NARA; Rpt, Dammer to Adj Gen, 31 Jul 43, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 3-0.3, RG 407, WNRC; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 85-99, 104-09; King, Wilham Orlando Darby, p. 88; King, Rangers, pp. 23-28. 15. Darby's report of Salerno, 15 Nov 43, INBN 1-0, and Dammer's report, 25 Nov 1943, INBN 3-0.3, both in WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 113-22; Alexander M. Worth, Jr., "Supporting Weapons and High Ground: The Rangers at Salerno," Infantry Journal 56 (May 1945): 33-34. 16. Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 128-40; King, William Orlando Darby, pp. 103, 106, 121, 129-30, 137, 145, 185; Darby's report of offensive against Winter Line, 29 Mar 44, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0, RG 407, WNRC. 17. See reports on Cisterna in WWII Ops Reports, INBN 1-0.3 and INBN 3-0.3, RG 407, WNRC; King, William Orlando Darby, pp. 136, 145; King, Rangers, pp. 29-40; Darby and Baumer, Darby's Rangers, pp. 148-55, 159-69; Truscott, Command Missions, p p. 312- 14. 18. Memo, Lt Gen Jacob Devers, Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, for War Department, 25 Feb 44; Memo, Devers for War Department, 13 Mar 44; and Memo, Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, Asst Chief of Staff, for FREEDOM, 28 Feb 44. All in U.S. War Department, Operations Division, OPD 320.2 Africa, Cases 584-616, RG 165, NARA; King, William Orlando Darby, pp. 136, 145. 19. Robert D. Burhans, The First Special Service Force. A War History of the North Americans, 1942-44 (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 1-5, 8-12; Robert H. Adleman and George Walton, The Devil's Brigade (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1966), pp. 2-4, 11, 25-35. 20. Quote from Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, p. 48. 21. Burhans, The First Special Service Force, pp. 13-15, 23, 60; Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 48-50, 57, 73-84. 22. Burhans, The First Special Service Force, pp. 35-37, 45-46, 86; Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 86-91, 103-09. 23. Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 119-32, 142-45. 24. Ibid., pp. 148, 159-61; Scott R. McMichael, A Histoncal Perspective on Light Infantry, Research Survey 6 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1987), pp. 186-92. 25. Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Bngade, pp. 168-74, 202-04, 211-19; McMichael, A Histoncal Perspective on Light Infantry, pp. 198-201. 26. Burhans, The First Special Service Force, pp. 257, 273, 299; Adleman and Walton, The Devil's Brigade, pp. 227-30, 233, 243-44; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Page 36 and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 9 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) 4: 2232n. 27. Carleton S. Coon, A North Africa Story: The Anthropologist as OSS Agent, 1941-1943 (Ipswich, Mass.: Gambit Press, 1980), p. 96. 28. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1: 206-07, and 2: 9, 13-15, 67; Coon, A North Africa Story, pp. 124-25; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 25-26; MS, Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), History of Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater, 1942-45, pp. 17-18, NARA. 29. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1:108, and 2: 60-61, 77-78; Brown, The Hero, pp. 471-72. 30. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 77-80; Report of ICEBERG Operation, Folder 682, and Rpt, Col Russell Livermore to Commander, 2677th HQ Company Exp (Prov), 4 Jan 44, both in OSS, Algiers SO-OP-9, Entry 97, Box 40, RG 226, NARA; Brown, The Last Hero, pp. 474-80. 31. MS, AFHQ' History of Special Operations, Mediterranean, pp. 23, 25-26; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 107-13, 115; Smith, OSS, pp. 107, 109. 32. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 115-16; MS, AFHQ, History of Special Operations, Mediterranean, pp. 26-27; Smith, OSS, pp. 116-17. 33. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 124, 127-29. Brown, The Last Hero, pp. 430-33, 439-42.

Carleton S Coon invented detonating mule turds during World War II... http://books.google.com/books?id=imz1pPtkq...4#PRA1-PA278,M1

Operation Torch run by Carleton S. Coon and Peter Tompkins... From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia • Ten things you may not know about images on Wikipedia •Jump to: navigation, search Operation Torch Part of World War II, North African Campaign Allied troops hit the beaches near Algiers, behind a large American flag (left). Date 8 November 1942 Location Morocco, Algeria Result Allied victory Combatants United States United Kingdom Free French Forces Vichy France Commanders Dwight Eisenhower Andrew Cunningham François Darlan Strength 73,500 60,000 Casualties 479+ dead 720 wounded 1,346+ dead 1,997 wounded [show]v • d • eMediterranean Campaign Mers-el-Kébir – Calabria – Spada – Taranto – Spartivento – Matapan – Tarigo – Crete – Duisburg – Bon – 1st Sirte – 2nd Sirte – Harpoon – Vigorous – Pedestal –Agreement – Torch – Toulon – Skerki – Sicily – Sinking of Roma [show]v • d • eNorth African campaign Libya & Egypt – Torch – Tunisia Operation Torch (initially called Operation Gymnast) was the British-American invasion of French North Africa in World War II during the North African Campaign, started 8 November 1942. The Soviet Union had pressed the United States and Britain to start operations in Europe, and open a second front to reduce the pressure of German forces on the Russian troops. While the American commanders favored Operation Sledgehammer, landing in Occupied Europe as soon as possible, the British commanders believed that such a course would end in disaster. An attack on French North Africa was proposed instead, which would clear the Axis Powers from North Africa, improve naval control of the Mediterranean Sea, and prepare an invasion of Southern Europe in 1943. American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt suspected the African operation would rule out an invasion of Europe in 1943 but agreed to support British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Contents [hide] 1 Background 1.1 Preliminary contact 2 Battle 2.1 Casablanca 2.2 Oran 2.2.1 Airborne landings 2.3 Algiers 2.3.1 Resistance and coup 2.3.2 Invasion 3 Aftermath 3.1 Political results 3.2 Military consequences 4 See also 5 References 5.1 War Official reports 5.2 War correspondent report 5.3 Academic work 5.4 General 6 External links [edit] Background The Allies planned an Anglo-American invasion of northwestern Africa — Morocco and Algeria, territory nominally in the hands of the Vichy French government. The Vichy French had around 60,000 soldiers in Morocco as well as coastal artillery, a handful of tanks and aircraft, with ten or so warships and 11 submarines at Casablanca. The Allies believed that the Vichy French forces would not fight, partly because of information supplied by American Consul Robert Daniel Murphy in Algiers. However they harboured suspicions that the Vichy French navy would bear a grudge over the British action at Mers-el-Kebir in 1940. An assessment of the sympathies of the French forces in North Africa was essential, and plans were made to secure their cooperation, rather than resistance. The Allies intended to advance rapidly eastwards into Tunisia and attack the German forces in the rear. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was given command of the operation, and he set up his headquarters in Gibraltar. The Allied Naval Commander of the Expeditionary Force would be Sir Andrew Cunningham; his deputy was Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay; Ramsay would plan the landing effort. [edit] Preliminary contact To gauge the feeling of the Vichy French forces, Murphy was appointed to the American consulate in Algeria. His covert mission was to determine the mood of the French forces and to make contact with elements that might support an Allied invasion. He succeeded in contacting several French officers, including General Charles Emmanuel Mast, the French commander-in-chief in Algiers. These officers were willing to support the Allies, but asked for a clandestine conference with a senior Allied General in Algeria. Major-General Mark W. Clark, one of Eisenhower's senior commanders, was dispatched to Cherchell in Algeria aboard HMS Seraph, a submarine, and met with these Vichy French officers on 21 October 1942. The Allies also succeeded, with resistance help, in slipping French General Henri Giraud out of Vichy France on Seraph, intending to offer him the post of commander in chief of French forces in North Africa after the invasion. However, Giraud would take no position lower than commander in chief of all the invading forces, a job already given to Eisenhower. When he was refused, he decided to remain "a spectator in this affair." [edit] Battle Map of Operation TorchThe Allies planned a three-pronged amphibious landing to seize the key ports and airports of Morocco and Algeria simultaneously, targeting Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. The Western Task Force (aimed at Casablanca) comprised American units, with Major General George Patton in command and Rear Admiral Henry K. Hewitt heading the naval operations. This Western Task Force consisted of the U.S. 2nd Armored Division, the U.S. 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions—35,000 troops in all. They were transported directly from the United States. The Center Task Force, aimed at Oran, included the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, and the 1st Armored Division—18,500 troops. They sailed from Britain and were commanded by Major-General Lloyd Fredendall, the naval forces being commanded by Commodore Thomas Troubridge. The Eastern Task force, aimed at Algiers, was commanded by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson and consisted of the British 78th and the US 34th Infantry Divisions - 20,000 troops. Naval forces were commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Burrough. Aerial operations were split into two, east of Cape Tenez in Algeria, with British aircraft under Air Marshal Sir William Welsh and west of Cape Tenez, all American aircraft under Major General Jimmy Doolittle, under the direct command of General Patton. [edit] Casablanca The Western Task Force landed before daybreak on 8 November 1942, at three points: Safi, Morocco (Operation Blackstone), Fedala, Morocco (Operation Brushwood), and Mehdiya-Port Lyautey, Morocco (Operation Goalpost). Because it was hoped that the French would not resist, there was no preliminary bombardment. During the previous night, a coup attempt had been made by French General Bethouard, whose forces surrounded the villa of pro-Vichy General Auguste Paul Nogues. However, Nogues managed to telephone nearby Vichy forces which prevented Nogues's capture. In addition, the coup attempt alerted Nogues to the likelihood of an impending Allied amphibious invasion, and he immediately bolstered Vichy coastal defenses. At Safi, Morocco, the landings were mostly successful. The landings were initially conducted without covering fire, hoping that the French might not resist at all. However, once the Allied transports were fired on by Vichy coastal batteries, the Allied ships returned fire. By the time Allied commanding General Harmon arrived, French snipers had pinned the assault troops (most of whom were in combat for the first time) on Safi's beaches. Most of the landings occurred behind schedule; air support from the carriers destroyed a French convoy of trucks intended to reinforce the defenses. Safi surrendered on the afternoon of 8 November. By 10 November, the remaining defenders were pinned down, and the bulk of Harmon's forces raced to join the siege of Casablanca. Around Port-Lyautey, Morocco, the landing troops were uncertain of their position, and the second wave was delayed. This gave the Vichy defenders time to organize resistance, and the remaining landings were conducted under artillery bombardment. With the assistance of air support from the carriers, the troops pushed ahead, and the objectives were captured. Around Fedala, Morocco (the largest landing with 19,000 men), weather disrupted the landings. The landing beaches again came under Vichy fire after daybreak. U.S. General Patton landed at 08:00, and the beachheads were secured by later in the day. The Americans surrounded the port of Casablanca by 10 November, and the city surrendered an hour before the final assault was due to take place. Patton entered the city unopposed. In general, Vichy French resistance in Morocco (apart from the coastal batteries) was sporadic. A strong squadron of the Vichy French navy at Casablanca, including the unfinished battleship Jean Bart, along with numerous cruisers and destroyers, made a sortie to oppose the landings but was defeated by superior firepower. Many French ships were lost, mainly running aground, and those that survived joined the Allies. [edit] Oran The Center Task Force was split between three beaches, two west of Oran and one east. Landings at the westernmost beach were delayed because of a French convoy which appeared while the minesweepers were clearing a path. Some delay and confusion, and damage to landing ships, was caused by the unexpected shallowness of water and sandbars; although periscope observations had been carried out, no reconnaissance parties had been landed on the beaches to determine local conditions. This was in contrast to later amphibious assaults, such as Operation Overlord, in which considerable weight was given to pre-invasion reconnaissance. The U.S. 1st Ranger Battalion landed east of Oran and quickly captured the shore battery at Arzew. An attempt was made to land U.S. infantry at the harbour directly, in order to quickly prevent destruction of the port facilities and scuttling of ships. The operation, code named Operation Reservist, failed as the two destroyers were shattered by crossfire from the French vessels there. The French Navy broke from the harbour and attacked the Allied invasion fleet but were sunk or driven ashore. French batteries and the invasion fleet exchanged fire throughout 8 November and 9 November, with French troops defending Oran and the surrounding area stubbornly. Heavy fire from the British battleships brought about the surrender on 9 November. [edit] Airborne landings Torch was the first major airborne assault carried out by the United States in World War II. The U.S. 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion flew all the way from Britain, over Spain, intending to drop near Oran and capture airfields at Tafarquay and Youk-Les-Bains. The drop was marked by navigational and communication problems with French forces on the ground, and the extreme range forced several aircraft to land in the desert. Nevertheless, both airports were captured, despite the 509th being widely scattered. [edit] Algiers [edit] Resistance and coup As agreed at Cherchell, starting at midnight and continuing through the early hours of 8 November, as the invasion troops were approaching the shore, a group of 400 French resistance under the command of Henri d'Astier de La Vigerie and José Aboulker staged a coup in the city of Algiers. They seized key targets, including the telephone exchange, radio station, governor's house and the headquarters of 19th Corps. Robert Murphy then drove to the residence of General Alphonse Juin, the senior French Army officer in North Africa, with some resistance fighters. While the resistance surrounded the house, making Juin effectively a prisoner, Murphy attempted to persuade him to side with the Allies. However he was treated to a surprise: Admiral François Darlan, the commander of all Vichy French forces, was in Algiers on a private visit. Juin insisted on contacting Darlan, and Murphy was unable to persuade either to side with the Allies. In the early morning the Vichy Gendarmerie arrived and released Juin and Darlan. During the day Vichy troops lost their time retaking almost all the positions seized by the resistance during the coup, allowing the Allied landed forces to encircle Algiers with practically no opposition. [edit] Invasion The invasion was led by the U.S. 34th Infantry with one brigade of the British 78th, the other acting as reserve. Major-General Charles W. Ryder, commander of the 34th, was given explicit command of the first wave, since it was believed that the French would react more favourably to an American commander than a British one. The landings were split between three beaches—two west of Algiers and one east. Some landings went to the wrong beaches, but this was immaterial since there was practically no French opposition; coastal batteries had been neutralized by French resistance. One French commander openly welcomed the Allies. The only fighting took place in the port of Algiers itself, where in Operation Terminal two British destroyers attempted to land a party of U.S. Rangers directly onto the dock, in order to prevent the French destroying port facilities and scuttling ships. Heavy artillery fire prevented one from landing, and drove the other from the docks after a few hours, leaving 250 of the infantry behind. The landing troops pushed quickly inland; General Juin surrendered the city to the Allies at 18:00. [edit] Aftermath [edit] Political results It quickly became clear that Henri Giraud lacked the authority to take command of the French forces. Moreover, he preferred to wait in Gibraltar for the result of the landing. Eisenhower, with the support of Roosevelt and Churchill, therefore made agreements with Admiral François Darlan that he would be given control if he joined the Allied side. This meant the Vichy regime was maintained in North Africa, with its Hitlerian laws and concentration camps for opponents. Consequently, Charles de Gaulle of the Free French, French resistants, along with Allied war correspondents, all responded with fury. The problem did not vanish when a local French anti-Nazi, Ferdinand Bonnier de la Chapelle, murdered Darlan on December 24, 1942: Giraud was then installed in his place. He maintained the Vichy regime and arrested the Algiers resistance leaders of 8 November, without any opposition from Murphy. When Adolf Hitler found out what Admiral Darlan intended to do, he immediately ordered the occupation of Vichy France and reinforced German forces in Africa. The Darlan-Giraud authority, initially resolutely Vichyist, was gradually forced to take part in the war effort against Nazi Germany, to democratize, to eliminate its principal head Vichyist rulers, and to eventually merge with the French national Committee of London. Months later, the "Comité Français de la Libération Nationale" (CFLN) born from this fusion passed under the authority of General de Gaulle (despite opposition from President Roosevelt), becoming the U.S.- and British-recognized government of France. [edit] Military consequences Main article: Tunisia Campaign As a result of the German occupation of Vichy France and their failed attempt to capture the interned French fleet at Toulon (Operation Lila), the French Armée d’Afrique sided with the Allies, providing a third corps (XIX Corps) for Anderson. Elsewhere, French warships, such as the battleship Richelieu, rejoined the Allies. On 8 November and 10 November, French Tunisian forces under the command of General Barré left the whole country open to the Germans, withdrawing to the Algerian border. Starting on 14 November, Juin ordered Barré to resist, but he waited until 18 November to begin fighting against the Germans. From then on the Tunisian army fought courageously despite its lack of equipment. The French were quickly helped by British forces. After consolidating in French territory, the Allies struck into Tunisia. Forces in the British 1st Army under Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson almost reached Tunis before a counterattack at Djedeida by German troops under General Walther Nehring thrust them back. In January 1943, German troops under General Erwin Rommel retreating westwards from Libya reached Tunisia. The British 8th Army in the East, commanded by General Bernard Montgomery, stopped around Tripoli to allow reinforcements to arrive and build up the Allied advantage. In the West the forces of General Anderson came under attack in February at Faïd Pass on 14 January and at Kasserine Pass on 19 January. The Allied forces retreated in disarray until heavy Allied reinforcements blunted the German advance on 22 January. General Harold Alexander arrived in Tunisia in late February to take command. The Germans attacked again in March, eastwards at Medenine on 6 March but were easily repulsed. Rommel counselled Hitler to allow a full retreat to a defensible line but was denied, and on 9 March Rommel left Tunisia to be replaced by Jürgen von Arnim, who had to spread his forces over 100 miles (160 km) of northern Tunisia. These setbacks forced the Allies to consolidate their forces and develop their lines of communication and administration so that they could support a major attack. The 1st Army and the 8th Army then attacked the Germans. Hard fighting followed, but the Allies cut off the Germans from support by naval and air forces between Tunisia and Sicily. On 6 May, as the culmination of Operation Vulcan, the British took Tunis, and American forces reached Bizerte. By 13 May the Axis forces in Tunisia had surrendered. [edit] See also Mieczysław Zygfryd Słowikowski. RMS Mooltan Troopship [edit] References [edit] War Official reports Les Cahiers Français, La part de la Résistance Française dans les évènements d'Afrique du Nord (Official reports of French Resistance Group leaders who seized Algiers on 8 November 1942, to allow allied landing), Commissariat à l'Information of Free French Comité National, London, Aug. 1943. [edit] War correspondent report Melvin K. Whiteleather, Main street's new neighbors, J.B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1945. [edit] Academic work Anderson, Charles R. (1990?). Algeria-French Morocco 8 November 1942-11 November 1942, CMH Online bookshelves: WWII Campaigns. Washington: US Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 72-11. Aboulker, Professeur José; Levisse-Touzé, Christine (2002). "8 novembre 1942 : Les armées américaine et anglaise prennent Alger en quinze heures" (in French). Espoir (n° 133). Breuer, William B. (1985). Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa. New York: St.Martins Press. Danan, Professeur Yves Maxime (1963). La vie politique à Alger de 1940 à 1944 (in French). Paris: L.G.D.J.. Funk, Arthur L. (1974). The politics of Torch. University Press of Kansas. Howe, George F. [1957] (1991). North West Africa: Seizing the initiative in the West, CMH Online bookshelves. Washington: US Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 6-1. Levisse-Touzé, Christine (1998). L'Afrique du Nord dans la guerre, 1939-1945 (in French). Paris: Albin Michel. Meyer, Leo J. [1960] (2000). "Chapter 7: The Decision To Invade North Africa (TORCH)", in Greenfield, Kent Roberts: Command Decisions, CMH Online bookshelves. Washington: US Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 72-7. Michel, Henri (1993). Darlan. Paris: Hachette. Moses, Sam (Nov. 2006). At All Costs; How a Crippled Ship and Two American Merchant Mariners Turned the Tide of World War II. Random House. [edit] General Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, Henry Holt, 2002 (ISBN 0-8050-6288-2). [edit] External links Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Operation TorchThe Decision To Invade North Africa (TORCH) US Army history of the operation A detailed history of 8th November 1942 Combined Ops USS Augusta (CA-31) - Flagship of Operation Torch (Western Naval Task Force) The accord Franco-Américan of Messelmoun (in French) Operation TORCH Planning Exercise by Stephen Sledge (Very detailed) Royal Engineers Museum Royal Engineers and Second World War (Operation Torch) Report of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces to the Combined Chief of Staff on Operations in North Africa Operation Torch: Allied Invasion of North Africa article by Williamson Murray

Peter Tomkins and Carleton S. Root were buddies from way back... How is this for a Peter Tompkins link to Carleton S. Coon... Posted by: Loren Coleman on January 24th, 2007 Hot on the heels of the death of superspy E. Howard Hunt (whose first wife had a magical middle name, Wetzel), now comes word of the passing of a Fortean writer of some note who also was a spy, Peter Tompkins. Peter Tompkins, 87, a former journalist, World War II spy and best-selling author, died this morning, Wednesday, January 24, 2007, at his home in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. Among those interested in the unknown, Tompkins will be remembered for several books about pyramids and other “mysteries,” the most famous being The Secret Life of Plants. He also had several friends (with varied OSS and other intelligence backgrounds) who were interested and involved in the backstory to the search for the Yeti. His son, Ptolemy Tompkins, once wrote that Tompkins home frequently visited by “Yeti hunters.” I think I know some of those Ptolemy was talking about. Peter Tompkins was born April 19, 1919, in Athens, Georgia, but spent much of his childhood in Rome after his parents moved there to study art. His father was a sculptor; his mother, a painter. Schooled in France, Italy and Switzerland, Tompkins returned to the United States to attend Harvard College, but left early to become a war correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune and NBC. In 1941, Tompkins was recruited by “Wild Bill” Donovan to join the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the CIA. He served as deputy to the chief of psychological warfare during the British-American invasion of north Africa in November 1942, as part of Operation Torch. Guess who was the head of Operation Torch? None other than someone who was to become one of Tom Slick’s earliest Yeti consultants, Carleton Coon, who was also a friend of Ivan T. Sanderson (who was in British naval intelligence, as was Ian Fleming). Coon was to go on to be a famed professor of anthropology after World War II, who wrote and spoke about Yeti and Bigfoot. Coon died on June 6, 1981, soon after he granted me an interview shortly before his death at his seaside home in Gloucester, Massachusetts. Within espionage circles Coon’s work for the OSS was legendary. One of the first missions of Donovan’s spy organization was Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, and Coon worked with Peter Tompkins. Carleton Coon was in charge of Torch and the affair was such a success that it insured the future of the OSS. OSS’s leadership, who were later connected to the Central Intelligence Group, then the Central Intelligence Agency, would never forget Coon for his contributions to the budding American intelligence community. Tompkins too became linked to spy work for several years and was thought of very highly within the OSS. With paramilitary, parachute and secret radio training, Tompkins was sent to Salerno in southwestern Italy in 1943 to infiltrate agents into enemy territory. Tompkins spent five months filing intelligence by secret radio and promoting partisan activities before being transferred to Berlin to spearhead OSS activities there. He was OSS Officer in Charge, Rome Area, and after the liberation of Italy moved on to spy in France and Germany. He resigned from the OSS in 1946 and declined to join the CIA, unlike Carleton and the former OSS agent George Agogino who would go on to be associated with the CIA and the Yeti search. After the war, Tompkins was hired by CSB newsman Edward R. Murrow to cover the 1948 elections in Italy. Later, in 1954, he returned to New York to join CBS-TV as writer-director of hour-long weekly features: “Adventure” and “The American Week.” Tompkins later wrote mainstream magazine articles and numerous books, including The Secret Life of Plants (written with another shadowy figure, Christopher Bird, with whom he wrote other works), Secrets of the Great Pyramid, Mysteries of the Mexican Pyramids, The Magic of Obelisks, A Spy in Rome and Italy Betrayed. Here’s hoping Peter Tompkins is solving some of those mysteries now.

Peter Tompkins, Carleton Coon and Operation Torch... http://www.cryptomundo.com/cryptozoo-news/tompkins-obit Posted by: Loren Coleman on January 24th, 2007 Hot on the heels of the death of superspy E. Howard Hunt (whose first wife had a magical middle name, Wetzel), now comes word of the passing of a Fortean writer of some note who also was a spy, Peter Tompkins. Peter Tompkins, 87, a former journalist, World War II spy and best-selling author, died this morning, Wednesday, January 24, 2007, at his home in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. Among those interested in the unknown, Tompkins will be remembered for several books about pyramids and other “mysteries,” the most famous being The Secret Life of Plants. He also had several friends (with varied OSS and other intelligence backgrounds) who were interested and involved in the backstory to the search for the Yeti. His son, Ptolemy Tompkins, once wrote that Tompkins home frequently visited by “Yeti hunters.” I think I know some of those Ptolemy was talking about. Peter Tompkins was born April 19, 1919, in Athens, Georgia, but spent much of his childhood in Rome after his parents moved there to study art. His father was a sculptor; his mother, a painter. Schooled in France, Italy and Switzerland, Tompkins returned to the United States to attend Harvard College, but left early to become a war correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune and NBC. In 1941, Tompkins was recruited by “Wild Bill” Donovan to join the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the CIA. He served as deputy to the chief of psychological warfare during the British-American invasion of north Africa in November 1942, as part of Operation Torch. Guess who was the head of Operation Torch? None other than someone who was to become one of Tom Slick’s earliest Yeti consultants, Carleton Coon, who was also a friend of Ivan T. Sanderson (who was in British naval intelligence, as was Ian Fleming). Coon was to go on to be a famed professor of anthropology after World War II, who wrote and spoke about Yeti and Bigfoot. Coon died on June 6, 1981, soon after he granted me an interview shortly before his death at his seaside home in Gloucester, Massachusetts. Within espionage circles Coon’s work for the OSS was legendary. One of the first missions of Donovan’s spy organization was Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, and Coon worked with Peter Tompkins. Carleton Coon was in charge of Torch and the affair was such a success that it insured the future of the OSS. OSS’s leadership, who were later connected to the Central Intelligence Group, then the Central Intelligence Agency, would never forget Coon for his contributions to the budding American intelligence community. Tompkins too became linked to spy work for several years and was thought of very highly within the OSS. With paramilitary, parachute and secret radio training, Tompkins was sent to Salerno in southwestern Italy in 1943 to infiltrate agents into enemy territory. Tompkins spent five months filing intelligence by secret radio and promoting partisan activities before being transferred to Berlin to spearhead OSS activities there. He was OSS Officer in Charge, Rome Area, and after the liberation of Italy moved on to spy in France and Germany. He resigned from the OSS in 1946 and declined to join the CIA, unlike Carleton and the former OSS agent George Agogino who would go on to be associated with the CIA and the Yeti search. After the war, Tompkins was hired by CSB newsman Edward R. Murrow to cover the 1948 elections in Italy. Later, in 1954, he returned to New York to join CBS-TV as writer-director of hour-long weekly features: “Adventure” and “The American Week.” Tompkins later wrote mainstream magazine articles and numerous books, including The Secret Life of Plants (written with another shadowy figure, Christopher Bird, with whom he wrote other works), Secrets of the Great Pyramid, Mysteries of the Mexican Pyramids, The Magic of Obelisks, A Spy in Rome and Italy Betrayed. Here’s hoping Peter Tompkins is solving some of those mysteries now.