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Winston Churchill and the death of Prince George, Duke of Kent


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I believe that a close study of the life of Donald Ewen Cameron raises doubts about the official story of MKULTRA. According to the CIA documents released in 1977, MKULTRA operated between 1957-64. However, Cameron was carrying out experiments into sensory deprivation and memory as early as 1938.

In 1943 he went to Canada and established the psychiatry department at Montreal's McGill University and became director of the newly-created Allan Memorial Institute that was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. At the same time he also did work for the OSS. It is almost certain that the US intelligence services were providing at least some of the money for his research during the war.

We know by 1947 he was using the “depatterning” technique to wipe out patients memories of the past. Cameron believed that after inducing complete amnesia in a patient, he could then selectively recover their memory in such a way as to change their behaviour unrecognisably." In other words, Cameron was giving them a new past. Is it possible that Cameron and the OSS was doing this during the Second World War. Was the OSS creating a new type of secret agent?

We know that Allen Dulles sent Cameron to assess Rudolf Hess in Nuremberg in November, 1945. Is it possible that the real reason for Cameron’s visit was that he wanted to assess the treatment he had been giving Hess since 1943? That Hess was one of Cameron’s guinea pigs.

If I am right about Hess knowing about Churchill’s peace negotiations in 1941, there were only two options available. The obvious solution and make it look like an accident or suicide. The second solution was for Hess to be treated by Cameron, who could use “depatterning” to wipe his memory clean. Then he could be brainwashed to believe that he was acting on his own instincts by travelling to Scotland in order to seek out the Duke of Hamilton. Is this what the son of the Duke of Hamilton meant when he said he was “set-up” over the Hess affair in order to protect people at the very top?

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKcameronDE.htm

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On 1st November, 1943, Cordell Hull (USA), Anthony Eden (Britain) and Vyacheslav Molotov (Soviet Union) signed in Moscow a declaration that warned that the Allies were determined to bring to justice those "German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for atrocities, massacres and executions."

In May 1945, Winston Churchill, Harry S. Truman, Joseph Stalin and Charles De Gaulle agreed that an international military tribunal should try the leaders of Nazi Germany for war crimes. It was decided to charge the men and women on four counts: crimes against peace (planning and making war); war crimes (responsibility for crimes during war); crimes against humanity (racial persecution) and conspiracy to commit other crimes.

The tribunal's judges included Frances Biddle (USA), Norman Birkett (Britain), Robert Falco (France), Geoffrey Lawrence (Britain), John Parker (USA), Roman Rudenko (Soviet Union) and Henry Donnedieu de Vabres (France).

Several Nazi leaders such as Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joseph Goebbels were dead while Martin Bormann and Heinrich Mueller had not been captured. The list of 23 defendants included Hermann Goering, Wilhelm Frick, Hans Frank, Rudolf Hess, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Albert Speer, Julius Streicher, Alfred Jodl, Fritz Saukel, Robert Ley, Erich Raeder, Wilhelm Keitel, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Hjalmar Schacht, Karl Doenitz, Franz von Papen, Constantin von Neurath and Joachim von Ribbentrop.

Robert Ley and Hermann Goering both committed suicide during the trial. Wilhelm Frick, Hans Frank, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Walther Funk, Fritz Saukel, Alfred Rosenberg, Julius Streicher, Alfred Jodl, Wilhelm Keitel, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and Joachim von Ribbentrop were found guilty and executed on 16th October, 1946. Rudolf Hess, Erich Raeder, were sentenced to life imprisonment and Albert Speer to 25 years. Karl Doenitz , Walther Funk, Franz von Papen, Alfried Krupp, Friedrich Flick and Constantin von Neurath were also found guilty and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. At other war crime trials Josef Kramer and Irma Grese were also executed.

This was the judgement on Rudolf Hess at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial.

Hess was an active supporter of the preparations for war. His signature established military service. He expressed a desire for peace and advocated international economic cooperation. But none knew better than Hess how determined Hitler was to realize his ambitions, how fanatical and violent a man he was.

With him in his flight to England, Hess carried certain peace proposals which he alleged Hitler was prepared to accept. It is significant to note that this flight took place only ten days after the date on which Hitler fixed, 22 June 1941, as the time for attacking the Soviet Union.

That Hess acts in an abnormal manner, suffers from the loss of memory, and has mentally deteriorated during the Trial, may be true. But there is nothing to show that he does not realize the nature of the charges against him, or is incapable of defending himself. There is no suggestion that Hess was not completely sane when the acts charged against him were committed. Defendant Rudolf Hess, the court sentences you to imprisonment for life.

In January, 1951, John McCloy, the US High Commissioner for Germany, announced that Alfried Krupp and eight members of his board of directors who had been convicted with him, were to be released. Krupt had been convicted of plundering occupied territories and being responsible for the barbaric treatment of prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates. Documents showed that Krupp initiated the request for slave labour and signed detailed contracts with the SS, giving them responsibility for inflicting punishment on the workers. His property, valued at around 45 million, and his numerous companies were also restored to him.

Others that McCloy decided to free included Friedrich Flick, one of the main financial supporters of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP). During the Second World War Flick became extremely wealthy by using 48,000 slave labourers from SS concentration camps in his various industrial enterprises. It is estimated that 80 per cent of these workers died as a result of the way they were treated during the war. His property was restored to him and like Krupp became one of the richest men in Germany.

The crimes of Alfried Krupp and Friedrich Flick were far worse than those of Hess. Others serving life-imprisonment at Spandau Prison were also released: Erich Raeder (1955), Karl Doenitz (1956), Friedrich Flick (1957) and Albert Speer (1966). All these played an important role in Nazi crimes between 1941-45. However, the Soviet Union and Britain refused to release Rudolf Hess, the man who had risked his life by flying to Britain in May 1941 in an attempt to negotiate a peace settlement. Why was he treated so differently to the other Nazi leaders?

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I believe that a close study of the life of Donald Ewen Cameron raises doubts about the official story of MKULTRA. According to the CIA documents released in 1977, MKULTRA operated between 1957-64. However, Cameron was carrying out experiments into sensory deprivation and memory as early as 1938.

In 1943 he went to Canada and established the psychiatry department at Montreal's McGill University and became director of the newly-created Allan Memorial Institute that was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. At the same time he also did work for the OSS. It is almost certain that the US intelligence services were providing at least some of the money for his research during the war.

We know by 1947 he was using the “depatterning” technique to wipe out patients memories of the past. Cameron believed that after inducing complete amnesia in a patient, he could then selectively recover their memory in such a way as to change their behaviour unrecognisably." In other words, Cameron was giving them a new past. Is it possible that Cameron and the OSS was doing this during the Second World War. Was the OSS creating a new type of secret agent?

We know that Allen Dulles sent Cameron to assess Rudolf Hess in Nuremberg in November, 1945. Is it possible that the real reason for Cameron’s visit was that he wanted to assess the treatment he had been giving Hess since 1943? That Hess was one of Cameron’s guinea pigs.

If I am right about Hess knowing about Churchill’s peace negotiations in 1941, there were only two options available. The obvious solution and make it look like an accident or suicide. The second solution was for Hess to be treated by Cameron, who could use “depatterning” to wipe his memory clean. Then he could be brainwashed to believe that he was acting on his own instincts by travelling to Scotland in order to seek out the Duke of Hamilton. Is this what the son of the Duke of Hamilton meant when he said he was “set-up” over the Hess affair in order to protect people at the very top?

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKcameronDE.htm

John,

This is fascinating.

And very well presented.

Sorry if I missed it but I'm confused about something.

Who was the 15th person killed in the S-25 Sunderland Mk III crash that killed the Duke of Kent if not Hess?

And why wasn't Hess on board if the purpose of the trip was to negotiate with him?

Do you think Churchill wanted Hess to be killed in the crash?

Also, did they use the flying boat because they had to land at the lake to pick up passengers?

I'm unclear on why all those skilled navigators would agree to fly the craft over land given that it was unsuitable for that purpose.

Do you know how the aircraft was sabotaged?

Thanks.

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John your latest theory about Hess, he was brainwashed, makes as little sense as your previous one that he was an impostor. I see little evidence for your speculation that during his period of waning influence “it is possible that Hess was playing a new secret role in Hitler's government”* do you have any that you haven’t presented? Even IF you are correct about Churchill holding secret negotiations with the Nazi’s up through mid 1941 it seems very unlikely that Hess was part of it for reasons I brought up earlier:

* http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERhess.htm

As for Hess’s trip to the UK if it were really part of some secret plan why wasn’t it done in a more discreet way than having him fly a German warplane to Scotland during the Blitz? Couldn’t he have slipped into a neutral country and from there to UK or perhaps send British negotiators to the same country?

It’s also unclear to me if Hess parachuted out of his plane or landed it. I’ve seen contradictory reports. Both versions indicate that he said he was low on fuel which is odd since the Bf 110’s use during the Battle of Britain would seem to indicate it was capable of a roundtrip between the Continent and Britain.

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERme110.htm

As most (if not all) historians note Hess had become increasingly isolated and sidelined in the years before his flight to Britain. As you put it “In the build up to the Second World War Hitler began to have growing doubts about the abilities of Hess and other leaders such as Hermann Göring, Heinrich Himmler, Joseph Goebbels and Martin Bormann became more important in the party.” http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERhess.htm

During this period one of his aides noted what he though odd behavior, “Hess, had gathered a small group of personal associates and friends with whom he would discuss strange matters such as astrology and herbal cures.” (Hess, The Missing Years 1941 –5, David Irving 65/69) It seems reasonable to suppose that his frustration regarding his diminished role as well as his stated nightmares regarding the slaughter the war would bring about motivated his flight. It also makes little sense that if Hess were to be sent on such a secret and sensitive mission that Hitler would undermine his status beforehand. Why would the British negotiate with him unless they were sure he had the full confidence and backing of the Fuhrer?

Also according to Irving a few months after his arrival in Scotland:

[british army psychiatrist] Colonel Rees asked Hess why he had flown to Scotland. Rees, with years of peacetime clinical experience in dealing with neurotics, delinquents and criminals, told the War Office afterwards: “I got a strong impression that the story [they he come of his own accord] was in general true.”

[…]

Rees was taken aback by the honesty of the man he had until now believed quite differently. “Hess’s lack of fluency in English makes it difficult, I should judge, for him to tell a convincing story that is completely untrue, and at times when he spoke of the slaughter, etc., there was emphasis and feeling in his voice that I felt sure was not simulated.”

(173-4/177-8)

Another question I asked you earlier but you didn’t get back to me about is why Hess would have been kept alive if he “knew too much” and was indeed talking to various people while imprisoned in Britain. Presumably it would have been relatively easy to fake a suicide at various points during the war after the tide turned against Germany in late 1942 (the invasion of Italy, D-Day, the fall of Paris the crossing of the Rhine the meeting at the Elbe, V-E Day etc etc without drawing suspicion. Even as far back as 1941 according to Irving Col. Rees saw Hess “as a suicide risk” (Irving 174/8). Another doctor (see below) agreed that he was potentially suicidal and Irving reports that sometime during the winter of 1941-2 “he withdrew his promise not to commit suicide” (Irving 312/316) and as you pointed out two fellow Nazis killed themselves at Nuremberg.

Long before Hess encountered Dr. Cameron he showed signs of being mentally unstable. As noted above Dr. Rees and others thought he might kill himself another British army doctor had and even more negative view of the Deputy Fuhrer’s metal state:

Gibson Graham had imparted to Rees his conclusions that Hess showed marked hypochondriacal tendencies with delusions of persecution, and described how Hess was “misinterpreting simple incidents” and giving them a sinister meaning. It is clear from Colonel Rees’s immediate report that he did not share Gibson Graham’s diagnosis.

Despite the language difficulty (unlike Dicks, Rees spoke no German) he formed the impression from their friendly talk that Rudolf Hess’s depression could be adequately accounted for as the result of his “sense of failure” and that it did not give any indication of a seriously diseased state of mind.

Soon after his capture Graham recounted that Hess told him “that his head feels confused from time to time, especially after any interview due to the strain under which he has recently been.”

(Irving 173/177)

In August 1941 Captain Munro Johnston, another army doctor, reported:

“He is suffering from paranoia…His moody introspection and the recent lengthy written statement he produced with its bizarre ideas of persecution and torture and its quoting of witnesses and proofs are pathognomonic of paranoia. In my opinion the prognosis is bad, and he requires the care and supervision necessary for a person of unsound mind with suicidal tendencies.”

(Irving 262/266)

Dr. Dicks another psychiatrist described his behavior as “characteristic of psychotics” (Irving 331/335)

But most damming to your theory he also seems to have shown signs of memory loss as far back as late 1941 Irving in fact devoted an entire chapter to his “First Loss of Memory” (starting on page 312/316)

At this point Rees assessment of Hess became more like Johnson’s, Dick's and Graham’s:

“Hess’s mental condition, has deteriorated since I was last there. The delusional, persecutory ideas have evidently fallen into the background for the moment but, as often happens, he has swung into a depression and with it a distinct loss of memory.”

Though Irving thinks the memory loss was partially or entirely feigned (based on diary entries) “Hess did not recall having received any letters from his wife (he had received two), nor even having been visited by the Swiss minister” (320/324). According to one of your main sources, the book Double Standards Rees reported that he suffered from “hysterical amenesia” towards the end of his stay in Britain. (pg 5)

Hess’s next "memory loss" was at Nuremberg but even that seems to have started before Cameron’s arrival. According to you the OSS psychiatrist visited him in November 1945 but Double Standards seems to indicate this started soon after he was brought back to Germany in October (pgs 2,4, & 5) before he was examined by 8 doctors from allied nations (including Cameron) indeed the doctors were called because of his signs of metal illness and his lawyers claims he was unfit to stand trial (pg 5). Where the lawyers in on it to? What would Dulles had done if Hess’s lawyers hadn’t claimed he was not competent to stand trial? The authors of the book citing Rees say that Hess declared in open court he had feigned his memory loss (pgs 8 –9). Humm Hess showing signs of memory loss then claiming it was an act, does that ring any bells?

Citing Gordon Thomas the authors of the book indicate that on the day Cameron examined him Hess was handcuffed to a British Military Police sergeant who refused to let him take the cuffs off or even unbutton the German’s shirt during the exam (pg 15). How then do you propose Cameron erased Hess’ memory using sensory deprivation? How exactly do you sensorly deprive a person handcuffed to an MP sergeant to the extent you can wipe out their memories and replace them with new ones? How do you do it without the sergeant or anybody else noticing or saying anything? Was he and the other people in the prison “in on it”? How do you sensorly deprive someone without their consent and without them telling anyone? How do you do it in a few hours and do it so effectively the memory lapse continues for decades? According to Double Standards his technique involved electro-shock with 24 hours of drug induced sleep (pg. 444). How could they have been sure it would work since at best Cameron had been working on this technique for 7 years? If Dulles and/or the British wanted to shut him up why no just kill him?

Also what would have motivated Dulles to get Cameron to do such a thing? The war was over, Hess couldn’t embarrass the US and by November 1945 Churchill was an ex-Prime Minister whose party held less that a third of the seats in parliament?

Further questions beyond the claims of “his research assistant, Dr. Peter Roper” what evidence was their Cameron could brainwash people in the way you propose? Can you source the Roper quote? When did Roper claim he did this? What evidence is there this can be done today? How does the Soviet's refusal to release him for 42 years fit into your theory?

Sources:

Double Standards http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0751532207/ - Most cited pages (1 –6) are part of the “Excerpt” the rest can be read via keyword searches.

Irving’s book on Hess can’t be read online AFAIK but it can be downloaded here:

http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Hess/index.html The 1st pg # refers to page of the print version the second to the PDF page.

Edited by Len Colby
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John,

The page linked below has what are purported to be excerpts from the book, Journey Into Madness, The True Story of Secret CIA Mind Control and Medical Abuse (Gordon Thomas, New York: Bantam Books, 1989), cited by you and the authors of Double Standards. Do you actually have it or access to it? Below are descriptions of Cameron’s technique. They are referring to how it was done in 1957. Are they accurate quotes?

“…a patient was first put to sleep for three days and then, still comatose, given between thirty to sixty electroshocks over a short period and, in between, doses of 1,000 milligrams of Largactil, a powerful tranquilizer, to combat anxiety” [p. 169]

“Madeleine had been kept in a chemically controlled sleep for thirty-six days and was awakened only to eat. In between her meals she received thirty more multiple shocks. … [p. 172]”

So lets assume that 12 years earlier he had discovered a way to do this in a few hours instead of 3 – 36 days. Why would he then progress to a far more time consuming process? Did he electroshock and drug Hess while he was handcuffed to the sergeant?

The 1st quote above continues:

“What especially disturbed Dr. Cleghorn’s sense of medical propriety was that when he finally queried the total amnesia the treatment produced, Dr. Cameron had simply said the patients’ families would have to “help them build a scaffold of normal events.”

In other words it took 3 days just to wipe the patients memory clean in 1957 building new memories would be a whole other time consuming process.

Another excerpt described Rubenstein as a “lanky twenty-eight-year-old ex-Army signalman” (in or after March 1957) which would have made him 16 or so when his boss visited the ex-Deputy Fuhrer. So obviously the quote about him playing tapes wasn’t referring to that period.

http://www.xs4all.nl/~sm4csi/nwo/MindContr...nto.madness.htm

Len

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While on holiday I have been researching the life of Albrecht Haushofer. It is a fascinating story and tells us a great deal about the peace negotiations with Germany that went onto right up to April 1945.

Albrecht Haushofer, the son of Karl Haushofer, was born in Munich on 7th January, 1903. His mother, Martha Mayer Doss, was the daughter of a Jewish merchant from Mannheim.

Albrecht studied at Munich University under his father, who taught geopolitics. Karl Haushofer developed the theory that the state is a biological organism which grows or contracts, and that in the struggle for space the strong countries take land from the weak.

A fellow student was Rudolf Hess who idolized Karl Haushofer. Hess wrote a prize-winning essay: How Must the Man be Constructed who will lead Germany back to her Old Heights? It included the following passage: "When necessity commands, he does not shrink from bloodshed... In order to reach his goal, he is prepared to trample on his closest friends."

In 1920 Rudolf Hess heard Adolf Hitler speak at a political meeting. Hess remarked: "Was this man a fool or was he the man who would save all Germany." Hess was one of the first people to join the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) and soon became a devoted follower and intimate friend of Hitler, who was also influenced by the teachings of Karl Haushofer.

In November, 1923, Rudolf Hess took part in the failed Beer Hall Putsch. Hess escaped and sought the help of Karl Haushofer. For a while he lived in Haushofer's home, Hartschimmelhof, in the Bavarian Alps. Later he was helped to escape to Austria. Hess was eventually arrested and sentenced to 18 months in prison. While in Landsberg he helped Adolf Hitler write My Struggle (Mein Kampf). According to James Douglas-Hamilton (Motive for a Mission) Haushofer provided "Hitler with a formula and certain well-turned phrases which could be adapted, and which at a later stage suited the Nazis perfectly".

Albrecht Haushofer visited Rudolf Hess and Adolf Hitler in Landsberg Prison. After leaving university Albrecht became Secretary General of Germany's Society for Geography, and later editor of the Periodical of the Society of Geography. He also taught political geography in Berlin.

In 1931, Hess asked Haushofer to become his advisor on foreign affairs. He accepted the position but did not play an active role in the Nazi Party. Haushofer believed that it was vitally important that Germany avoided becoming involved in a European war. He wrote: "The peoples of Europe are in a position in which they have to get on together lest they all perish; and although one realises that it is not commonsense but emotional urges which govern the world, one must try to control such urges."

Rudolf Hess gradually worked his way up the Nazi hierarchy and in December 1932 Adolf Hitler appointed him head of the Central Political Committee and deputy leader of the party and minister without portfolio. As a result Haushofer became an important figure in Hitler's government.

Once in power Hitler began to express anti-Semitic ideas. Based on his readings of how blacks were denied civil rights in the southern states in America, Hitler attempted to make life so unpleasant for Jews in Germany that they would emigrate. The campaign started on 1st April, 1933, when a one-day boycott of Jewish-owned shops took place. Members of the Sturm Abteilung (SA) picketed the shops to ensure the boycott was successful.

The hostility of towards Jews increased in Germany. This was reflected in the decision by many shops and restaurants not to serve the Jewish population. Placards saying "Jews not admitted" and "Jews enter this place at their own risk" began to appear all over Germany. In some parts of the country Jews were banned from public parks, swimming-pools and public transport.

Germans were also encouraged not to use Jewish doctors and lawyers. Jewish civil servants, teachers and those employed by the mass media were sacked. On 7th April 1933 the Nazi government passed the Civil Service Laws which excluded those of non-Aryan origin from public office within the Reich.

Albrecht Haushofer now became a second-class citizen because of his mother's Jewish father. However, in June 1933, Rudolf Hess intervened personally and issued a protective letter to Haushofer. Now an "honorary Aryan" this enabled him to continue working for the Nazi government.

Haushofer had serious doubts about continuing to work for the Nazi regime. He wrote to his parents on 27th July: "I sometimes ask myself how long we shall be able to carry the responsibility, which we bear and which gradually begins to turn into historical guilt or, at least, into complicity."

Adolf Hitler knew that both France and Britain were militarily stronger than Germany. However, he became convinced that they were unwilling to go to war. He therefore decided to break another aspect of the Treaty of Versailles by sending German troops into the Rhineland. Haushofer wrote a report warning of the dangers of expanding the Third Reich through the use of armed force.

The German generals were also against the plan, claiming that the French Army would win a victory in the military conflict that was bound to follow this action. Adolf Hitler ignored their advice and on 1st March, 1936, three German battalions marched into the Rhineland. The French government was horrified to find German troops on their border but were unwilling to take action without the support of the British. The British government argued against going to war over the issue and justified its position by claiming that "Germany was only marching into its own back yard." Hitler's gamble had come off and, full of confidence, he began to make plans to make Austria part of Germany (Anschluss).

In 1936 Albrecht Haushofer was sent by Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign minister, on a mission to Japan. The following year, Ribbentrop was given a similar task in China. Haushofer's reports argued that Ribbentrop should preach moderation to the Japanese.

Haushofer also attended the Olympic Games in Berlin in August 1936 and made contact with several members of the House of Commons including Douglas Douglas-Hamilton, Kenneth Lindsay and Jim Wedderburn. On 13th August, 1936, Albrecht Haushofer introduced Douglas-Hamilton to Herman Goering and General Erhard Milch, Chief of Staff of the German Air Force. During their discussion Milch told Douglas-Hamilton: "I feel we have a common enemy in Bolshevism."

In early 1937 Douglas Douglas-Hamilton wrote to Haushofer suggesting getting together. This took place on 23rd January, in Munich. His father, Karl Haushofer, also attended the meeting where they discussed the political situation. Haushofer told Douglas-Hamilton that "Hitler understands Churchill, but he will never understand Chamberlain."

In April 1938 Haushofer visited Britain and stayed with Douglas-Hamilton at his home Dungavel House in Scotland. Douglas-Hamilton attempted to arrange for Haushofer to meet with Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary. However, Halifax was unavailable as he was on a visit to France.

On 26th June, 1938, Haushofer sent a report of his meetings with British politicians to Joachim von Ribbentrop stating that: "Britain has still not abandoned her search for chances of a settlement with Germany... A certain measure of pro-German sentiment has not yet disappeared among the British people; the Chamberlain-Halifax government sees its own future strongly tied to the achievement of a true settlement with Rome and Berlin (with a displacement of Soviet influence in Europe.)"

Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop had become very disillusioned with Haushofer's attempts to obtain a peace agreement with Britain and in July, 1938, he ceased to work for the government. However, he remained close to Rudolf Hess and continued to meet with those sympathetic to the Nazi government.

In September 1938, Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, met Adolf Hitler at his home in Berchtesgaden in Germany. Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia unless Britain supported Germany's plans to takeover the Sudetenland. After discussing the issue with the Edouard Daladier (France) and Eduard Benes (Czechoslovakia), Chamberlain informed Hitler that his proposals were unacceptable.

Hitler was in a difficult situation but he also knew that Britain and France were unwilling to go to war. He also thought it unlikely that these two countries would be keen to join up with the Soviet Union, whose communist system the western democracies hated more that Hitler's fascist dictatorship.

Benito Mussolini suggested to Hitler that one way of solving this issue was to hold a four-power conference of Germany, Britain, France and Italy. This would exclude both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and therefore increasing the possibility of reaching an agreement and undermine the solidarity that was developing against Germany.

The meeting took place in Munich on 29th September, 1938. Desperate to avoid war, and anxious to avoid an alliance with Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier agreed that Germany could have the Sudetenland. In return, Hitler promised not to make any further territorial demands in Europe.

On 29th September, 1938, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Edouard Daladier and Benito Mussolini signed the Munich Agreement which transferred the Sudetenland to Germany. When Eduard Benes, protested at this decision, Chamberlain told him that Britain would be unwilling to go to war over the issue of the Sudetenland.

The German Army marched into the Sudetenland on 1st October, 1938. As this area contained nearly all Czechoslovakia's mountain fortifications, she was no longer able to defend herself against further aggression.

From their meetings with Neville Chamberlain, the Nazi government had discovered that he would do anything to avoid military conflict. Chamberlain was aware of the appalling destruction that would take place during a modern war. He also feared that a large-scale war in Western Europe would weaken the countries involved to the point where they would be vulnerable to a communist takeover. Adolf Hitler told Albrecht Haushofer: "This fellow Chamberlain shook with fear when I uttered the word war. Don't tell me he is dangerous."

The pressure on Jews to leave Germany intensified. Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels and Reinhard Heydrich organized a new programme designed to encourage Jews to emigrate. Crystal Night took place on 9th-10th November, 1938. Presented as a spontaneous reaction of the German people to the news that the German diplomat, Ernst vom Rath, had been murdered by Herschel Grynszpan, a young Jewish refugee in Paris, the whole event was in fact organized by the NSDAP.

During Crystal Night over 7,500 Jewish shops were destroyed and 400 synagogues were burnt down. Ninety-one Jews were killed and an estimated 20,000 were sent to concentration camps. Up until this time these camps had been mainly for political prisoners. The only people who were punished for the crimes committed on Crystal Night were members of the Sturm Abteilung (SA) who had raped Jewish women (they had broken the Nuremberg Laws on sexual intercourse between Aryans and Jews).

Albrecht Haushofer told his friend Fritz Hesse that "Hitler is now convinced that he can afford to do anything. Formerly he believed that we must have the maximum armaments because of the warlike menaces of the Powers striving to encircle us, but now he thinks that these Powers will crawl on all fours before him!" Haushofer added: "It's true that Hitler does not want war, but he is ready to risk it, and this, in my opinion, is a guarantee of disaster... We shall probably slither into the catastrophe we thought we had averted."

Haushofer continued to work behind the scenes in an attempt to persuade the British to accept a peace agreement. On 16th July, 1939, Haushofer wrote again to Douglas Douglas-Hamilton suggesting a way to avoid a war. Haushofer showed this letter to several members of the government including Winston Churchill. He replied that it was too late and that a war with Germany was inevitable.

In August 1939, a group of concentration camp prisoners were dressed in Polish uniforms, shot and then placed just inside the German border. Hitler claimed that Poland was attempting to invade Germany. On 1st September, 1939, the German Army was ordered into Poland.

Hitler, who wanted a series of localized wars, was surprised when Neville Chamberlain declared war on Germany. Even after it happened he found it difficult to believe that during the first few months of the war he genuinely believed that Britain would still negotiate a peace settlement.

In 1940 Albrecht Haushofer gave up his job as Secretary-General of the Berlin Society for Geography but continued teaching at the University of Berlin. According to his friend, Fritz Hesse: "Haushofer called Hitler and his circle scum, his collaborators gangsters."

On 8th September, 1940, Albrecht Haushofer, wrote to the Douglas-Hamilton (now the Duke of Hamilton): "You... may find some significance in the fact that I am able to ask you whether you could find time to have a talk to me somewhere on the outskirts of Europe, perhaps in Portugal." Haushofer also referred to people who the German government believed wanted an "German-English agreement." This included Samuel Hoare and Rab Butler.

Two days later, Haushofer sent a letter to his father, Karl Haushofer. The letter discussed secret peace talks going on with Britain. Karl talked about “middlemen” such as Ian Hamilton (head of the British Legion), the Duke of Hamilton and Violet Roberts, the widow of Walter Roberts. The Roberts were very close to Stewart Menzies (Walter and Stewart had gone to school together). Violet Roberts was living in Lisbon in 1940. Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland were the four main places where these secret negotiations were taking place.

On 19th September, 1940, Haushofer wrote to Rudolf Hess about his letter to the Duke of Hamilton. He explained that Hamilton would find it difficult to fly to Portugal without the permission of Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary and Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of State for Air. Haushofer suggested that it would probably be better to work through Samuel Hoare but planned to send the letter via an old friend.

The letter was intercepted by MI5 and Hamilton was persuaded to work as a double-agent. Hamilton agreed to go to Lisbon to meet Haushofer. Colonel Tar Robertson, head of MI5's double agent section, wrote in April 1941: "Hamilton at the beginning of the war and still is a member of the community which sincerely believes that Great Britain will be willing to make peace with Germany provided the present regime in Germany were superseded by some reasonable form of government... He is a slow-witted man, but at the same time he gets there in the end; and I feel that if he is properly schooled before leaving for Lisbon he could do a very useful job of work."

In 1959, Heinrich Stahmer, Albrecht Haushofer’s agent in Spain, claimed that meetings between Samuel Hoare, Lord Halifax and Rudolf Hess took place in Spain and Portugal between February and April 1941. The Vichy press reported that Hess was in Spain on the weekend of 20/22 of April 1941. The correspondence between British Embassies and the Foreign Office are routinely released to the Public Record Office. However, all documents relating to the weekend of 20/22 April, 1941 at the Madrid Embassy are being held back and will not be released until 2017.

Karl Haushofer was arrested and interrogated by the Allies after the war. The British government has never released the documents that include details of these interviews. However, these interviews are in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) archive. Karl told his interviewers that Germany was involved in peace negotiations with Britain in 1940-41. In 1941 Albrecht was sent to Switzerland to meet Samuel Hoare (Lord Templewood) the British ambassador to Spain. This peace proposal included a willingness to “relinquish Norway, Denmark and France”. Karl goes onto say: “A larger meeting was to be held in Madrid. When my son returned, he was immediately called to Augsburg by Hess. A few days later Hess flew to England.”

On 10th May, 1941, Rudolf Hess flew a Me 110 to Scotland. According to his friend, Rainer Hildebrandt, Haushofer became very distressed when he discovered that the Hess peace initiative had ended in failure. As Haushofer knew the true details of the operation, he feared for his life and expected the same fate as Karlheinz Pintsch. He was right, and on 11th May, 1941, Adolf Hitler ordered the arrest of Haushofer.

The following day he was taken to Berchtesgaden and ordered to write a full report on what he knew about the reasons for Rudolf Hess flying to Scotland. Haushofer also outlined his contacts with people like the Duke of Hamilton, Samuel Hoare (Viscount Templewood), Lord Halifax and Alec Douglas-Home (Lord Dunglass) during these peace negotiations.

After reading Haushofer's report Hitler ordered that he should be sent to the Prince Albrecht Strasse Gestapo Prison in Berlin to be interrogated by Heinrich Mueller, the head of the Gestapo. Haushofer was released in July 1941. The reason for this is that Hitler believed that Haushofer could still play a key role in any future peace negotiations with Britain. Haushofer was kept under surveillance and Martin Bormann sent a letter to important figures in the media that: "Professor Albrecht Haushofer should no longer be given any publicity".

Irmegard Schnuhr, one of Haushofer's favourite students, was recruited by Heinrich Mueller to spy on him. However, she remained loyal to her tutor and only gave the Gestapo information that was first cleared by Haushofer. However, she was not the only spy used and it soon became clear that Haushofer was in contact with other opponents of the Nazi government including Ulrich von Hassell, Ludwig Beck, Helmuth von Moltke, Peter von Wartenburg and Carl Goerdeler.

On Sunday, 7th December, 1941, 105 high-level bombers, 135 dive-bombers and 81 fighter aircraft attacked the the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor. In two hours 18 warships, 188 aircraft and 2,403 servicemen were lost in the attack. Luckily, the navy's three aircraft carriers, Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga, were all at sea at the time. The following day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared war on Japan.

Soon afterwards, Irmegard Schnuhr was summoned by Adolf Hitler and asked her to discover what Haushofer's views were on the possibility of negotiating a peace with Britain. Haushofer told Schnuhr that Hitler's foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, would make it impossible for any negotiations to get off the ground. Hitler replied that it "would be easy to sack Ribbentrop" if the British first sacked their Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden.

A group of anti-Nazis, including Claus von Stauffenberg, Wilhelm Canaris, Carl Goerdeler, Julius Leber, Ulrich Hassell, Hans Oster, Peter von Wartenburg, Henning von Tresckow, Friedrich Olbricht, Werner von Haeften, Fabian Schlabrendorff, Ludwig Beck and Erwin von Witzleben decided to assassinate Adolf Hitler (the July Plot). Haushofer was opposed to any attempt on Hitler's life because he did not believe it would bring an end to the war.

At least six attempts were aborted before Claus von Stauffenberg decided on trying again during a conference attended by Adolf Hitler on 20th July, 1944. It was decided to drop plans to kill Herman Goering and Heinrich Himmler at the same time. Stauffenberg, who had never met Hitler before, carried the bomb in a briefcase and placed it on the floor while he left to make a phone-call. The bomb exploded killing four men in the hut. Hitler's right arm was badly injured but he survived the bomb blast.

Albrecht Haushofer immediately went into hiding but was arrested by the Gestapo on 7th December 1944. He was taken to Moabit Prison in the Lehrterstrasse, Berlin. For the next few weeks Haushofer was interrogated constantly. However, unlike the other conspirators, Haushofer was not executed.

A fellow prisoner, Eberhard Bethge, later claimed that this was because Hitler had the "intention to make use of Haushofer at a later date." Hitler and Himmler were both still hoping that they could use Haushofer to negotiate a peace deal with Britain and the United States. Haushofer was given special privileges and during this period he wrote what became known as the Moabite Sonnets.

Irmegard Schnuhr approached Karl Haushofer about the possibility of using his influence to get his son released from prison. He replied: "Why should I do that? He has betrayed his country and his people and deserves no help from me."

In February 1945, Heinrich Himmler explored the possibility of doing a deal that involved capitulating to the Western Allies but not to the Soviet Union. Winston Churchill and Harry Truman considered this offer but with the Red Army advancing on Berlin, it was not a realistic option. On 21st April 1945, Himmler instructed Heinrich Mueller to execute Albrecht Haushofer. This was carried out two days later.

It was decided not to prosecute Karl Haushofer at Nuremberg because it was decided that his role had only been "academic and advisory". On 11th March 1946, Karl and his wife committed suicide.

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I thought it would be a good idea to give Albrecht Haushofer his own thread.

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=10902

As far as I know no one has written a biography of Haushofer. However, James Douglas-Hamilton was given access to the Haushofer papers when he was writing "Motive for a Mission". The main objective of the book is an attempt to clear his father, the Duke of Hamilton, of the charges that he was pro-Nazi. He of course does not mention the released MI5 files that show that he was involved in the 1930s with neo-Narzi organizations such as the Nordic League and the highly secret Right Club. Douglas-Hamilton makes use of the Haushofer papers to describe his attempts to reach a peace agreement with Britain between 1933 and 1945. It also explains why it was Hess who was sent to Britain (Haushofer was Hess' foreign policy advisor). The papers show that Haushofer also provided advice to Hitler throughout the war. The testimony of Irmegard Schnuhr, who was one of Haushofer's favourite students and was recruited by Heinrich Mueller to spy on him, is especially interesting. This includes her meeting with Adolf Hitler in December, 1941.

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As far as I know no one has written a biography of Haushofer. However, James Douglas-Hamilton was given access to the Haushofer papers when he was writing "Motive for a Mission". The main objective of the book is an attempt to clear his father, the Duke of Hamilton, of the charges that he was pro-Nazi. He of course does not mention the released MI5 files that show that he was involved in the 1930s with neo-Narzi organizations such as the Nordic League and the highly secret Right Club. Douglas-Hamilton makes use of the Haushofer papers to describe his attempts to reach a peace agreement with Britain between 1933 and 1945. It also explains why it was Hess who was sent to Britain (Haushofer was Hess' foreign policy advisor). The papers show that Haushofer also provided advice to Hitler throughout the war. The testimony of Irmegard Schnuhr, who was one of Haushofer's favourite students and was recruited by Heinrich Mueller to spy on him, is especially interesting. This includes her meeting with Adolf Hitler in December, 1941.

You can read some of these documents here:

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERhaushoferA.htm

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  • 2 weeks later...
The page linked below has what are purported to be excerpts from the book, Journey Into Madness, The True Story of Secret CIA Mind Control and Medical Abuse (Gordon Thomas, New York: Bantam Books, 1989), cited by you and the authors of Double Standards. Do you actually have it or access to it? Below are descriptions of Cameron’s technique. They are referring to how it was done in 1957. Are they accurate quotes?

“…a patient was first put to sleep for three days and then, still comatose, given between thirty to sixty electroshocks over a short period and, in between, doses of 1,000 milligrams of Largactil, a powerful tranquilizer, to combat anxiety” [p. 169]

“Madeleine had been kept in a chemically controlled sleep for thirty-six days and was awakened only to eat. In between her meals she received thirty more multiple shocks. … [p. 172]”

So lets assume that 12 years earlier he had discovered a way to do this in a few hours instead of 3 – 36 days. Why would he then progress to a far more time consuming process? Did he electroshock and drug Hess while he was handcuffed to the sergeant?

The 1st quote above continues:

“What especially disturbed Dr. Cleghorn’s sense of medical propriety was that when he finally queried the total amnesia the treatment produced, Dr. Cameron had simply said the patients’ families would have to “help them build a scaffold of normal events.”

In other words it took 3 days just to wipe the patients memory clean in 1957 building new memories would be a whole other time consuming process.

Another excerpt described Rubenstein as a “lanky twenty-eight-year-old ex-Army signalman” (in or after March 1957) which would have made him 16 or so when his boss visited the ex-Deputy Fuhrer. So obviously the quote about him playing tapes wasn’t referring to that period.

http://www.xs4all.nl/~sm4csi/nwo/MindContr...nto.madness.htm

Len

Sorry for the delay in replying. I have been on holiday and then I had some important work to finish (this forum is my hobby, not my full-time employment).

I do have a copy of the book.

I agree that it would have taken time for Cameron to brainwash Hess. I did not suggest this was done at Nuremberg. What I said was that he arrived at Nuremberg to assess his state of mind. The brainwashing was done while he was held in captivity in England. The point of the Nuremberg assessment was to check to see if the brainwashing had been successful and that it was still safe for him to testify.

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It’s a puzzle isn’t it? On 26 May 1940, the war cabinet met under Churchill and Neville Chamberlain quoted Churchill in his diary entry as telling the cabinet, ‘if we could get out of this jam by giving up Malta and Gibraltar and some African colonies he would jump at it.’ Given Britain’s position this seems a reasonable conclusion on Churchill’s part and one might reasonably expect him and his colleagues to do everything in their power to further peace negotiations with Germany, whatever the circumstances, even if only as a distraction.

Yet among Churchill’s first actions on coming to power was to get rid of arch-appeasers Samuel Hoare (as ambassador to Madrid) and Lord Halifax (as ambassador to Washington.) As usual, the problem is that one can interpret this two ways. It could either be an unmistakable signal to Berlin that Britain was under new management and that there would be no peace treaty; or it could be a tough bargaining move, laying the groundwork for concessions for a peace treaty!

It is a mistake to suggest that Churchill immediately got rid of his appeasers. In fact, he went out of his way to create a balanced cabinet. When Churchill took office he did not sack the arch-appeaser as foreign secretary, Lord Halifax. Instead he was allowed to hold onto his job. Churchill nominated Chamberlain as Leader of the House of Commons. Labour members of the war cabinet complained about this decision and so he became Lord President of the Council. However, he still remained in the government. So also did Sir John Simon, the third of the guilty men, who was given the job of Lord Chancellor.

Historians often claim that they only man to lose his job as a result of his appeasement policies was Samuel Hoare. Responsible for the Hoare-Laval Pact in 1935, he was forced to resign when the scheme was widely denounced as appeasement of Italian aggression. Hoare returned to the government under Chamberlain as Secretary of State for the Home Office. On the outbreak of the war in 1939 he joined the War Cabinet as Lord Privy Seal. Hoare lost this post when Churchill took power. However, Churchill sent Hoare to be British ambassador in Madrid. It was here that he carried out negotiations with the Nazis.

Duff Cooper, the man who resigned from the government over Munich only got the Ministry of Information. Yet, Lord Beaverbrook, who had used his newspaper empire to advocate appeasement right up to the outbreak of the war, was brought into the war cabinet as minister of aircraft production. Beaverbrook, who was considered to be Churchill’s most important adviser, was the leading figure, along with Lord Halifax, of what became known as the “Peace Party”. Beaverbook made it clear to friends in 1939 that the “British Jews were pushing the country into an unnecessary war” (Anne Chisholm and Michael Davie, Beaverbrook: A Life, page 347) and that entry into war was “mistaken and unnecessary” (A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook, page 231).

Churchill also allowed Sir Stewart Menzies to remain as head of MI6. Menzies had been a strong advocate of appeasement. Menzies, like others on the far-right, believed the real enemy was communism and argued that Churchill should form a military alliance with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. As head of MI6 Menzies “had the right of access at any time of the day or night to the King, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, making him the most powerful men in the country.” (Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, pages 13-14). According to Scott Newton (Profits of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, pages 124-127), Menzies was at the very centre of the peace group in Britain in 1940.

This was Churchill’s way of showing Hitler that he was willing to negotiate an end to the war. Hitler responded to this by making a speech in the Reichstag where he insisted that he was not his intention to destroy the British Empire and called for peace negotiations. “I consider myself in a position to make this appeal since I am not the vanquished begging favours, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on.” (Hitler, speech in the Reichstag, 19th July, 1940) This helps to explain why Hitler acted in the way he did at Dunkirk.

On 22nd May 1940 some 250 German tanks were advancing along the French coast towards Dunkirk, threatening to seal off the British escape route. Then, just six miles from the town, at around 11.30 a.m., they abruptly stopped. Hitler had personally ordered all German forces to hold their positions for three days. This order was uncoded and was picked up by the British. They therefore knew they were going to get away. German generals begged to be able to move forward in order to destroy the British army but Hitler insisted that they held back so that the British troops could leave mainland Europe.

Some historians have argued that this is an example of another tactical error made by Hitler. However, the evidence suggests that this was part of a deal being agreed between Germany and Britain. After the war, General Gunther Blumentritt, the Army Chief of Staff, told military historian Basil Liddell Hart that Hitler had decided that Germany would make peace with Britain. Another German general told Liddell Hart that Hitler aimed to make peace with Britain “on a basis that was compatible with her honour to accept”. (The Other Side of the Hill, pages 139-41)

Minutes of the Cabinet meetings in May 1940 reveal Churchill’s strategy. As Clive Ponting argues: “Churchill argued in favour, not of continuing the war until victory, but of trying to get through the next two or three months before making a decision on whether or not to ask for peace.” (Clive Ponting, 1940: Myth and Reality, 1990, page 108)

Why then did these negotiations fail? We know from German sources that Hitler was willing to withdraw from all his European gains in exchange for “German friendly governments”. All Hitler wanted from Churchill was to be given a free-hand against the Soviet Union. Churchill also wanted Soviet communism destroyed. The only problem for Churchill concerned his image. He had portrayed himself as the warrior who was unwilling to negotiate and end to the conflict. Despite saving the lives of possibly millions of British people, he might also be seen as an appeaser who had cynically engineered the removal of Chamberlain in order to gain power. Churchill cared more about his political reputation, something he had only just got back, than he did about the fate of the British people (his plane was always kept ready to take him to Canada if Germany invaded the country).

I would argue that the evidence suggests that these negotiations went on right up to at least May 1941. When Hess arrived in Scotland on 10th May 1941 Churchill was quick to deny that the two countries were involved in peace negotiations. Hitler then made a similar statement. Both men were concerned to portray Hitler as a man who had a mental breakdown. However, evidence is available that indicates that Hitler was fully aware of Hess’s flight to Scotland.

Karlheinz Pintsch, Hess adjutant, was given the task of informing Hitler about the flight to Scotland. James Leasor found him alive in 1955 and used him as a major source for his book, The Uninvited Envoy. Pintsch told Leasor of Hitler’s response to this news. He did not seem surprised, nor did he rant and rave about what Hess had done. Instead, he replied calmly, “At this particular moment in the war that could be a most hazardous escapade.” (Roger Nanvell & Heinrich Fraenkel, Hess: A Biograthy, page 107)

Hitler then went onto read the letter that Hess had sent him. He read the following significant passage out aloud. “And if this project… ends in failure… it will always be possible for you to deny all responsibility. Simply say I was out of my mind.” Of course, that is what both Hitler and Churchill did later on. However, at the time, Hitler at least, still believed that a negotiated agreement was possible.

The following day Hitler knew that Churchill had refused to do a deal and then the cover-up began. Pintsch was now a dangerous witness and he was arrested and was kept in solitary confinement until being sent to the Eastern Front in 1944. He was captured by the Soviets and kept alive until being released in 1955. (James Leasor, The Uninvited Envoy, page 69).

I agree with much of what you say here, but I would observe that the fact that the Wermacht allowed the BEF to escape with light casualties at Dunkirk doesn't necessarily mean that Hitler had done a deal or thought he had done a deal with the British right. It could also mean that Hitler was so keen to conclude such a deal that he was willing to go to almost any lengths to achieve it, including drawing back from open attack on vital British interests. He may even have imagined that such a show of "mercy" would ingratiate him with Whitehall.

The other observation I have is that there seems to have been (at least) two kinds of British right winger in the 1930s. There were those fearful of Russia and Communism, who found themselves in bed with Hitler and the Nazis whether they liked it or not. Then there were those who wholeheartedly accepted Nazi doctrines who were only too happy to get into bed with Hitler. It would be interesting to know which sort Menzies was. And isn't it ironic that while senior members of the intelligence community like Menzies were practising their Seig Heils in front of the shaving mirror in the privacy of their bathrooms, Maxwell Knight at MI5 was busy infiltrating all the right wing "clubs" to save the nation from fascism!

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What do the esteemed members here make of the following, a recent review contained in Canada's newspaper of record, The Globe & Mail? Has anyone yet had the chance to read the book being reviewed?

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/sto...1%2C000+days%22

HISTORY

When Britannia ruled no more

DAVID A. WILSON

September 15, 2007

THE LAST THOUSAND DAYS

OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

By Peter Clarke

Penguin/Allen Lane

'Here we are, in a damp little island that once ruled the world," a friend of mine remarked recently as we landed at Heathrow Airport. Well, not quite the whole world, but a fair chunk of it. In this stimulating book, University of Cambridge historian Peter Clarke (now living on Pender Island, B.C.) places the microscope on what he sees as the pivotal period in Britain's transition from imperial power to damp little island.

It begins during the Second World War, with Winston Churchill making stirring, morale-boosting speeches about fighting for the British Empire and Commonwealth, and about "victory at all costs." And it ends in August, 1947, with Clement Attlee's Labour government implementing its exit strategies for Palestine and for India, and with the United States well on the way to becoming the world's most powerful empire, even as it pretended that it wasn't an empire at all.

How did this happen? For Britain, Clarke argues, the cost of victory was the loss of its empire. British survival during the war depended on U.S. intervention. But this was anything but an alliance of equals. The United States was the senior economic and military partner, and although Americans had a vested interest in helping Britain to defeat Hitler, they were not fighting to save the British Empire.

And as the conflict continued, Britain's impressive relative contribution was dwarfed by the absolute scale of the American and Russian war effort. At the Teheran conference in 1943, a Soviet officer asked a member of the British delegation how many German divisions had fought at El Alamein, one of the great British victories in the war. Fifteen, came the exaggerated reply. "In the Soviet army, we do not call that a battle," he was told. "To us, that is a skirmish."

Britain was in no position to challenge the Soviet Union after the war, even though Churchill toyed with the idea in his Operation Unthinkable. Having gone to war ostensibly to protect Poland from Nazi aggression, Britain could do nothing to save it from Soviet aggression; ironically, those who had opposed appeasement in 1939 were vulnerable to the same charge in 1945-46, as it became clear that Stalin was turning Poland into a satellite state.

But the book's main focus is on Anglo-American relations, with the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt taking centre stage. And here, Clarke really gets into his myth-busting stride. Despite all the talk about the unity of the English-speaking peoples, the "special relationship" and the Lend-Lease program as "the most unsordid act in history," there were severe strains in the Anglo-American alliance. Lend-Lease had more to do with enlightened U.S. self-interest than any sentimental attachment to fellow English-speakers. U.S. politicians wanted to curtail British influence in the Mediterranean.

And there were deep divisions between Britain and the United States over military strategy in Europe, with Montgomery wanting a concentrated assault and Eisenhower preferring a broad front; the Americans, as senior partners, got their way. Military relations were even worse in the Far East, where General Joseph (Vinegar Joe) Stilwell described his British allies as "pig-xxxxers."

As we see British power leaking away at the conferences of the Big Three, another myth starts to crack - that of Churchill as a brilliant war leader. In one crucial sense, of course, he was precisely that; no one could reach or rival his inspirational power during the bleakest days of the war. But the diaries on which Clarke draws demonstrate that Churchill drove his senior advisers to distraction. Close up, he appeared long on style and short on substance; his cabinet ministers frequently complained that he was "talking damned nonsense," that he was "confused" about military strategy, and that he winged his way through important meetings without reading his briefing notes.

The most damning assessment came from Alan Brooke, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, who worked with Churchill on virtually a daily basis: "He knows no details, has only got half the picture in his mind, talks absurdities and makes my blood boil to listen to his nonsense." Yet even Brooke felt the magnetic attraction of Churchill's character. At their last official meeting, just before Churchill left office, Brooke was close to tears, and subsequently thanked God that "such supermen exist on this Earth."

If most Britons believed, rightly or wrongly, that Churchill was the right man for the war, a majority believed that he was the wrong man for the peace. After Churchill came Clement Attlee's Labour government, which presided over an economically exhausted country. The war left Britain strapped for cash, deeply in debt and increasingly unable to meet its international and imperial commitments.

In Palestine, Britain decided to hand over its mandate to the United Nations, rather than incur the continuing hostility of U.S.-led Zionists and such terrorist organizations as Menachem Begin's Irgun. In India, the strategic and economic imperatives of British imperialism no longer applied; the strongest case for staying was the moral one that withdrawal would culminate in an ethno-religious bloodbath.

Stafford Cripps, the chancellor of the exchequer, worked long and hard to bring Hindus and Muslims to an agreement, without success. Clarke's description of the negotiations is one of the most riveting parts of the book. It is also one of the most controversial; Clarke makes a strong case that Gandhi bore much of the responsibility for the failure to reach an accommodation between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. Independence was coming anyway; the British cabinet had decided upon that. But by putting his high-minded principles over potential consequences, Clarke argues, Gandhi inadvertently helped to ensure that independence would be accompanied by civil war and partition.

Getting out of the Middle East was one thing; getting out of India was another altogether. With India gone, with the Soviet Union dominating eastern Europe and with the United States on the rise, Britain's days as an imperial power were effectively over, in Clarke's view; disengagement from Africa and elsewhere was the drawn-out coda to a melody that had already been played out - hence the "last thousand days" title of the book.

It is, however, a title that misleads. In this respect, to borrow one of Clarke's own metaphors, he overplays his hand. The British Empire, after all, was about much more than India and Palestine, and it took much longer than 1,000 days to fall - as Clarke himself admits in the preface. A thousand, of course, has a nice millennial ring to it, and is good for marketing; the publishers are doubtless hoping for a replay of Paris 1919, and it's no coincidence that Margaret MacMillan wrote the blurb on the back. Academics might wince and critics might carp, but I rather hope that the strategy works. This is a damn fine book, and deserves to be widely read, as long as its limitations are kept in mind.

David A. Wilson is a professor of history and Celtic studies at the University of Toronto.

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I believe that a close study of the life of Donald Ewen Cameron raises doubts about the official story of MKULTRA. According to the CIA documents released in 1977, MKULTRA operated between 1957-64. However, Cameron was carrying out experiments into sensory deprivation and memory as early as 1938.

In 1943 he went to Canada and established the psychiatry department at Montreal's McGill University and became director of the newly-created Allan Memorial Institute that was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. At the same time he also did work for the OSS. It is almost certain that the US intelligence services were providing at least some of the money for his research during the war.

We know by 1947 he was using the “depatterning” technique to wipe out patients memories of the past. Cameron believed that after inducing complete amnesia in a patient, he could then selectively recover their memory in such a way as to change their behaviour unrecognisably." In other words, Cameron was giving them a new past. Is it possible that Cameron and the OSS was doing this during the Second World War. Was the OSS creating a new type of secret agent?

We know that Allen Dulles sent Cameron to assess Rudolf Hess in Nuremberg in November, 1945. Is it possible that the real reason for Cameron’s visit was that he wanted to assess the treatment he had been giving Hess since 1943? That Hess was one of Cameron’s guinea pigs.

If I am right about Hess knowing about Churchill’s peace negotiations in 1941, there were only two options available. The obvious solution and make it look like an accident or suicide. The second solution was for Hess to be treated by Cameron, who could use “depatterning” to wipe his memory clean. Then he could be brainwashed to believe that he was acting on his own instincts by travelling to Scotland in order to seek out the Duke of Hamilton. Is this what the son of the Duke of Hamilton meant when he said he was “set-up” over the Hess affair in order to protect people at the very top?

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKcameronDE.htm

John,

This is fascinating.

And very well presented.

Sorry if I missed it but I'm confused about something.

Who was the 15th person killed in the S-25 Sunderland Mk III crash that killed the Duke of Kent if not Hess?

And why wasn't Hess on board if the purpose of the trip was to negotiate with him?

Do you think Churchill wanted Hess to be killed in the crash?

Also, did they use the flying boat because they had to land at the lake to pick up passengers?

I'm unclear on why all those skilled navigators would agree to fly the craft over land given that it was unsuitable for that purpose.

Do you know how the aircraft was sabotaged?

Thanks.

Hi John,

I still have the same questions:

Who was the 15th person killed in the S-25 Sunderland Mk III crash that killed the Duke of Kent if not Hess?

And why wasn't Hess on board if the purpose of the trip was to negotiate with him?

Do you think Churchill wanted Hess to be killed in the crash?

Also, did they use the flying boat because they had to land at the lake to pick up passengers?

I'm unclear on why all those skilled navigators would agree to fly the craft over land given that it was unsuitable for that purpose.

Do you know how the aircraft was sabotaged?

Interesting stuff.

Thanks.

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Who was the 15th person killed in the S-25 Sunderland Mk III crash that killed the Duke of Kent if not Hess?

And why wasn't Hess on board if the purpose of the trip was to negotiate with him?

Do you think Churchill wanted Hess to be killed in the crash?

Also, did they use the flying boat because they had to land at the lake to pick up passengers?

I'm unclear on why all those skilled navigators would agree to fly the craft over land given that it was unsuitable for that purpose.

Do you know how the aircraft was sabotaged?

There are three possible theories: (1) Hess was killed with the Prince of Wales and that someone else impersonated Hess until his murder/suicide. (2) Hess remained alive but was brainwashed by Dr. Donald Ewen Cameron. (3) Hess really did lose his memory and told the truth at Nuremberg.

Personally, I favour the second theory.

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Guest David Guyatt

Apologies for the long delay in getting round to posting this:

John Simkin wrote (post #258):

Quote:

We know by 1947 he was using the “depatterning” technique to wipe out patients memories of the past. Cameron believed that after inducing complete amnesia in a patient, he could then selectively recover their memory in such a way as to change their behaviour unrecognisably." In other words, Cameron was giving them a new past. Is it possible that Cameron and the OSS was doing this during the Second World War. Was the OSS creating a new type of secret agent?

Unquote

I think that is very likely. The US granddaddy of warfare-based hypnosis was George Eastabrooks. I remember reading his book which was hard to come by (and sorry, I’ve forgotten the title) in which I seem to recall him speaking openly about the OSS use of hypnosis during WWII. In terms of the success achieved, he said it was child’s play.

Also, I’ve found a link [http://pub36.bravenet.com/forum/3021042527/fetch/65278/ ] that discusses Eastabrooks and “the use of hypnosis during the war to elicit multiple personality disorder in military test subjects. In this article, G.H Eastabrooks, a hypnotist and mind control pioneer, detailed covert operations conducted in a fog of induced amnesia”.

It is also worth noting that the nazi doctors like the abominable Mengele, engaged in similar hynoisis and narco-hypnosis experimental studies at Dachau and Aushwitz using mescaline, barbiturates and morphine derivatives on inmates. How many of them ended up the US under the Project Paperclip programme, but one who did was Hubertos Strughold.

I would also underline, again, Hess’s extensive involvement in the occult, a fact that is regularly ignored by all and sundry, but which is of considerable significance when it comes to matters dealing with manipulations of the human mind. However, I do appreciate that this is a very difficult subject to research due to its inherent nature of secrecy. Not to mention the current clime of political correctness that now attaches itself to the subject, making it even more remote and inaccessible to study.

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What do the esteemed members here make of the following, a recent review contained in Canada's newspaper of record, The Globe & Mail? Has anyone yet had the chance to read the book being reviewed?

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/sto...1%2C000+days%22

HISTORY

When Britannia ruled no more

DAVID A. WILSON

September 15, 2007

THE LAST THOUSAND DAYS

OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

By Peter Clarke

Penguin/Allen Lane

'Here we are, in a damp little island that once ruled the world," a friend of mine remarked recently as we landed at Heathrow Airport. Well, not quite the whole world, but a fair chunk of it. In this stimulating book, University of Cambridge historian Peter Clarke (now living on Pender Island, B.C.) places the microscope on what he sees as the pivotal period in Britain's transition from imperial power to damp little island.

It begins during the Second World War, with Winston Churchill making stirring, morale-boosting speeches about fighting for the British Empire and Commonwealth, and about "victory at all costs." And it ends in August, 1947, with Clement Attlee's Labour government implementing its exit strategies for Palestine and for India, and with the United States well on the way to becoming the world's most powerful empire, even as it pretended that it wasn't an empire at all.

How did this happen? For Britain, Clarke argues, the cost of victory was the loss of its empire. British survival during the war depended on U.S. intervention. But this was anything but an alliance of equals. The United States was the senior economic and military partner, and although Americans had a vested interest in helping Britain to defeat Hitler, they were not fighting to save the British Empire.

And as the conflict continued, Britain's impressive relative contribution was dwarfed by the absolute scale of the American and Russian war effort. At the Teheran conference in 1943, a Soviet officer asked a member of the British delegation how many German divisions had fought at El Alamein, one of the great British victories in the war. Fifteen, came the exaggerated reply. "In the Soviet army, we do not call that a battle," he was told. "To us, that is a skirmish."

Britain was in no position to challenge the Soviet Union after the war, even though Churchill toyed with the idea in his Operation Unthinkable. Having gone to war ostensibly to protect Poland from Nazi aggression, Britain could do nothing to save it from Soviet aggression; ironically, those who had opposed appeasement in 1939 were vulnerable to the same charge in 1945-46, as it became clear that Stalin was turning Poland into a satellite state.

But the book's main focus is on Anglo-American relations, with the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt taking centre stage. And here, Clarke really gets into his myth-busting stride. Despite all the talk about the unity of the English-speaking peoples, the "special relationship" and the Lend-Lease program as "the most unsordid act in history," there were severe strains in the Anglo-American alliance. Lend-Lease had more to do with enlightened U.S. self-interest than any sentimental attachment to fellow English-speakers. U.S. politicians wanted to curtail British influence in the Mediterranean.

And there were deep divisions between Britain and the United States over military strategy in Europe, with Montgomery wanting a concentrated assault and Eisenhower preferring a broad front; the Americans, as senior partners, got their way. Military relations were even worse in the Far East, where General Joseph (Vinegar Joe) Stilwell described his British allies as "pig-xxxxers."

As we see British power leaking away at the conferences of the Big Three, another myth starts to crack - that of Churchill as a brilliant war leader. In one crucial sense, of course, he was precisely that; no one could reach or rival his inspirational power during the bleakest days of the war. But the diaries on which Clarke draws demonstrate that Churchill drove his senior advisers to distraction. Close up, he appeared long on style and short on substance; his cabinet ministers frequently complained that he was "talking damned nonsense," that he was "confused" about military strategy, and that he winged his way through important meetings without reading his briefing notes.

The most damning assessment came from Alan Brooke, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, who worked with Churchill on virtually a daily basis: "He knows no details, has only got half the picture in his mind, talks absurdities and makes my blood boil to listen to his nonsense." Yet even Brooke felt the magnetic attraction of Churchill's character. At their last official meeting, just before Churchill left office, Brooke was close to tears, and subsequently thanked God that "such supermen exist on this Earth."

If most Britons believed, rightly or wrongly, that Churchill was the right man for the war, a majority believed that he was the wrong man for the peace. After Churchill came Clement Attlee's Labour government, which presided over an economically exhausted country. The war left Britain strapped for cash, deeply in debt and increasingly unable to meet its international and imperial commitments.

In Palestine, Britain decided to hand over its mandate to the United Nations, rather than incur the continuing hostility of U.S.-led Zionists and such terrorist organizations as Menachem Begin's Irgun. In India, the strategic and economic imperatives of British imperialism no longer applied; the strongest case for staying was the moral one that withdrawal would culminate in an ethno-religious bloodbath.

Stafford Cripps, the chancellor of the exchequer, worked long and hard to bring Hindus and Muslims to an agreement, without success. Clarke's description of the negotiations is one of the most riveting parts of the book. It is also one of the most controversial; Clarke makes a strong case that Gandhi bore much of the responsibility for the failure to reach an accommodation between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. Independence was coming anyway; the British cabinet had decided upon that. But by putting his high-minded principles over potential consequences, Clarke argues, Gandhi inadvertently helped to ensure that independence would be accompanied by civil war and partition.

Getting out of the Middle East was one thing; getting out of India was another altogether. With India gone, with the Soviet Union dominating eastern Europe and with the United States on the rise, Britain's days as an imperial power were effectively over, in Clarke's view; disengagement from Africa and elsewhere was the drawn-out coda to a melody that had already been played out - hence the "last thousand days" title of the book.

It is, however, a title that misleads. In this respect, to borrow one of Clarke's own metaphors, he overplays his hand. The British Empire, after all, was about much more than India and Palestine, and it took much longer than 1,000 days to fall - as Clarke himself admits in the preface. A thousand, of course, has a nice millennial ring to it, and is good for marketing; the publishers are doubtless hoping for a replay of Paris 1919, and it's no coincidence that Margaret MacMillan wrote the blurb on the back. Academics might wince and critics might carp, but I rather hope that the strategy works. This is a damn fine book, and deserves to be widely read, as long as its limitations are kept in mind.

David A. Wilson is a professor of history and Celtic studies at the University of Toronto.

I have a copy of General Alan Brooke, Chief of Imperial General Staff unexpurgated war daries (published for the first time in 2001). This is what he says about Churchill on 12th April 1945: "We had to consider this morning one of Winston's worst minutes I have ever seen. I can only believe that he must have been quite tight when he dictated it. My God! How little the world at large knows what his failings and defects are!"

In another entry he says: "He (Churchill) knows no details, has only got half the picture in his mind, talks absurdities and makes my blood boil to listen to his nonsense.... And the wonderful thing is that 75% of the population of the world imagine Winston Churchill is one of the great Strategists of History".

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