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Winston Churchill and the death of Prince George, Duke of Kent


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Much of what Winston Churchill did was indefensible and monstrous, yet Colby likes him I guess. ,GAAL

Compared to Stalin and Hitler he was a saint. Give us the non-Spam and Holocaust denier run down of his horrible crimes.

WHO ??> ARE YOU SAYING YOU COLBY ARE A HOLOCAUST DINIER ?? REALLY DIDNT KNOW THAT

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PLEASE READ AT LEAST SOME OF THE THREAD BEFORE POSTING ,YOU HAVE EMBARRASSED YOURSELF , gaal

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see post # 323

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The author of the 1st article is an artist not a historian or journalist, he didn't cite sources and his version of events was at variance with accepted history. Churchill was hardly saint. His role in trying to maintain the colonies is quite dirty but the Mau Mau rebellion was a dirty affair. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mau_Mau_Uprising#War_crimes

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CHURCHILL
for
DUMMIES

chrchill.jpg A Study in Failure

churchill.jpg

  • 1874 - Born Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill
  • 1895 - "Whiney" struggled in school but eventually graduated from the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. This explains much of his personality because he was a military genius in his own mind. He also had a speech impediment that made him unpleasant to listen to that he overcame by hard work.
  • Norwich North MP Dr Ian Gibson says Churchill himself acknowledged his depressive periods: "He does record that he has bad days and that he was in a straitjacket,"...
    Churchill told Lord Moran:"When I was young the light faded out of the picture. I did my work. I sat in the House of Commons, but black depression settled on me." His nickname for his recurring depression he called "Black Dog."
    Brendan Bracken said of Churchill in the years before WWII "he kept saying 'I am finished.' He said that about twice a day...Why, he told me he prays for death every day."
  • 1896-1899 - Churchill was a military observer in India and participated as war correspondent in the second Anglo-Boer war between Britain and Afrikaners in South Africa.
  • 1900 - Elected MP in the House of Commons which he continued in from 1900 to 1922 and from 1924 to 1964. Churchill was a political opportunist with no moral compass or principles. Thus he was distrusted and disliked by almost every British politician up to 1939. In spite of all his patriotic appeals for national unity, Churchill was the most truculent and bitter political swashbuckler of his day.
  • 1908-1910 - Appointed President of the Board of Trade he pursued radical socialist reforms in conjunction with David Lloyd George, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer. Lloyd George was the man responsible for turning Britain into a floating Albania with a wrecked socialist economy and Marxist politics.
  • The Spectator on Churchill in 1911: "We cannot detect in his career any principles or even any constant outlook upon public affairs; his ear is always to the ground; he is the true demagogue." Lloyd George in this period compared Churchill to "a chauffeur who apparently is perfectly sane and drives with great skill for months, then suddenly takes you over a precipice."
  • 1911 - Churchill appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, a post he held into WWI when he earned the title "Butcher of Gallipoli" for being the architect of the disastrous Gallipoli campaign on the Dardanelles. This was his major achievement in WWI and demonstrates his abysmal stupidity. This disgrace lead to his being eventually dropped from the government. In 1915 he engineered the U-boat sinking of the Lusitania by packing it illegally with munitions and removing its escort at a critical moment. He hoped this would lure the U.S. into the war but that also failed. This was a secret project and the truth did not come out until well after Churchill's death so he avoided responsibility.
  • After the war concerning uprisings in the British mandated territories of the former Ottoman Empire, Churchill wrote:
    I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes.
  • Based on a 1920 Churchill essay "Zionism versus Bolshevism": "Churchill ranted that Jews were behind world revolutions everywhere. Jews [were] denizens of the underworld of the great cities of Europe and America." ("Churchill for Dummies," by Michael Lind, The Spectator, 24 April 2004.) Churchill wrote, "And it may well be that this same astounding race may at the present time be in the actual process of producing another system of morals and philosophy, as malevolent as Christianity was benevolent, which, if not arrested would shatter irretrievably all that Christianity has rendered possible. It would almost seem as if the gospel of Christ and the gospel of Antichrist were destined to originate among the same people..."
  • 1926 - During the General Strike of 1926, Churchill was reported to have suggested that machine guns be used on the striking miners.
  • Between the wars he changed parties yet again, as he said: "Anyone can rat [change parties], but it takes a certain ingenuity to re-rat." He had started as a Conservative, went Liberal and then back to Conservative as opportunities changed.
  • "It is not possible to form a just judgment of a public figure who has attained the enormous dimensions of Adolf Hitler until his life work as a whole is before us. Although no subsequent political action can condone wrong deeds, history is replete with examples of men who have risen to power by employing stern, grim, and even frightful methods, but who, nevertheless, when their life is revealed as a whole, have been regarded as great figures whose lives have enriched the story of mankind. So may it be with Hitler. It is enough to say that both possibilities are open at the present moment. ("Great Contemporaries," a Churchill essay which first appeared in The Strand magazine in November 1935)"
  • "One may dislike Hitler's system and yet admire his patriotic achievement. If our country were defeated, I hope we should find a champion as indomitable to restore our courage and lead us back to our place among the nations."
  • 1938 Churchill said, "It would be a dangerous folly for the British people to underrate the enduring position in world history which Mussolini will hold; or the amazing qualities of courage, comprehension, self-control and perseverance which he exemplifies."
  • Late 1930s - Churchill had hated the Germans in WWI and now he found the meaning of his life - to hate Germans! Opposing Prime Minister Chamberlain's appeasement eventually lead to Churchill taking over 10 May 1940.
  • 1943 - Churchill was at best indifferent and perhaps complicit in the Great Bengal famine of 1943 which took the lives of at least 2.5 million Bengalis.
  • 1940-1945 "ARE WE BEASTS?", Churchill asked. Yes, he was. Mass Murderer The RAF at Churchill's direction under the policy of "area bombing" murdered one million German civilians - a bestiality and violation of the customs of war never before or after matched.
  • 1945 - After the war, Mass Murderer at Yalta, Churchill agreed to round up 2 million Russian nationals in Germany, Italy and France to be forcibly deported to Russia for execution (See OPERATION KEELHAUL by Julius Epstein, 1973; THE SECRET BETRAYAL by N. Tolstoy, 1978; THE LAST SECRET by N. Bethall, 1974). Among other things, this was a violation of the Geneva Convention.
  • 1945, July 27 - After the end of the war in Europe, actually during the Potsdam Conference, Churchill was heavily defeated at election by Clement Attlee who became the Prime Minister.
  • 1948-1952 Churchill published his histories of WWII which rather surprisingly demonstrated that he had won the war all by himself.
  • Churchill again became ineffective Prime Minister 1951-1955.
  • 1965 - Death.
  • Because he had no principles, Churchill leaves no message and no vision for the future. Churchill had no vision for the future, only a tenacious defense of the past which he failed.
  • Boothby relates how some years after the war Churchill said that the final verdict of history would take into account the political results of his actions during the war and added, "Judged by this standard, I am not sure that I shall be held to have done very well."
  • The conclusion of the book BRITISH BULLDOG by Emrys Hughes - "Churchill's public career is actually and very colorfully epitomized in the title of the last volume of his war memoirs Triumph and Tragedy (1953). It is scarcely an exaggeration to state that every political triumph of Winston Churchill has been a tragedy for his country, the world, or both. And the greatest tragedy was, of course, that which followed his greatest triumph, after he had induced the British people to make unbelievable sacrifices and to indulge in heroic feats of valor fighting a war that, Captain Grenfell and others hold, Britain should never have entered. That, after a victory over Fascism and Nazism, mankind should now be facing a much more menacing conflict, which will be fought with far more horrible instruments of destruction, is tragedy indeed for the world. That Britain, always wooed by Hitler and allowed by him to escape total destruction at Dunkirk and after, should now be facing literal extermination at the hands of Soviet leaders armed with hydrogen bombs is surely tragedy for Britain."
Edited by Steven Gaal
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That's an extremely biased look at Churchill, and not accurate in places.

For example, the concept of area bombing was in place with the Air Staff well before Churchill; it was only with the bombing of Coventry and similar that Churchill supported the Air Staff request to employ area bombing. Daylight precision bombing was too costly in terms of crew killed and aircraft lost, and night precision bombing was not practical until the advent of improved navigation aids and techniques such as Gee, the Pathfinders, etc.

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That's an extremely biased look at Churchill, and not accurate in places.

For example, the concept of area bombing was in place with the Air Staff well before Churchill; it was only with the bombing of Coventry and similar that Churchill supported the Air Staff request to employ area bombing. Daylight precision bombing was too costly in terms of crew killed and aircraft lost, and night precision bombing was not practical until the advent of improved navigation aids and techniques such as Gee, the Pathfinders, etc.

Note: Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, the man responsible for implementing the RAF's area bombing policy, and also the man who has been criticized most for it, stated of this Churchill quote: "It was the origin of the idea of bombing the enemy out of the war. I should have been proud of it, but it originated with Winston." -- Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VI: Finest Hour, 1939-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1983), p. 656.

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"The Prime Minister said that we hoped to shatter twenty German cities as we had shattered Cologne, Lubeck, Dusseldorf, and so on. More and more aeroplanes and bigger and bigger bombs. M. Stalin had heard of 2-ton bombs. We had now begun to use 4-ton bombs, and this would be continued throughout the winter. If need be, as the war went on, we hoped to shatter almost every dwelling in almost every German city. " (Official transcript of the meeting at the Kremlin between Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin on Wednesday, August 12, 1942, at 7 P.M.)

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see

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/war.crimes/World.war.2/Bombing.htm

Hitler didn't start indiscriminate bombings — Churchill did

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Bombing in Europe was never a winning strategy, says Richard Overy in The Bombing War
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26 October 2013
Hamburg.jpg

The ruins of Hamburg after Allied bombing, July 1943

The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 Richard Overy

Allen Lane, pp.821, £30, ISBN: 9780713995619

‘I cannot describe to you what a curious note of brutality a bomb has,’ said one woman who lived through the initial German raids on London during the second world war. This woman’s ambivalent reaction to having a bomb rip through her bedroom typified the shocking reality of a different type of war to any that had ever been fought before.

For as Richard Overy makes eminently clear in his extraordinary and far-reaching history of Europe’s bombing war, this was the first time civilians actually became a part of the front line. The cause of this was the advent of aerial bombardment, which, Overy says, exposed ‘the democratic nature of total war, which insisted that all citizens had a part to play.’

The idea that bombing could demoralise a population and cause a government crisis had been a topic of hot discussion during the interwar years. In a lengthy preamble Overy, who has written numerous histories of the second world war, focuses on Bulgaria as a microcosm of the issues which defined the wider ‘strategic’ bombing war in Europe:

The bombing of Bulgaria was Churchill’s idea, and he remained the driving force behind the argument that air raids would provide a quick and relatively cheap way of forcing the country to change sides.

Fine in theory, but in practice things worked rather differently. The ‘political dividend’ Churchill sought to achieve in the early months of 1944 was offset by a high level of civilian casualties ‘which undermined the prestige of both the United States and Britain in the eyes of the Bulgarian people’. Overy notes that while bombing contributed to the collapse of any pro-German consensus and strengthened the hand of opposition political parties it did not result in a change of government until September 1944 when the Soviets introduced an administration dominated by the Bulgarian communist party.

Martialling his facts with dexterity Overy argues that bombing in Europe was never a war-winning strategy and invariably caused more harm than good. In what is the first full narrative of the bombing war in Europe Overy’s scope is incredibly broad and well-researched, also highly readable. He tackles not only the wider conflict with Germany but little-known bombing wars in France and Italy, which in both cases resulted in civilian casualties the equal of the Blitz.

He has also had access to ‘two new sources’ from the former Soviet archives, which include German air force documents covering the Blitz and others which throw new light on Germany’s bombings of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad — an area which up until now has had very little coverage.

Overy traces the origins of the bombing war back to 10 May 1940, the same day that Germany began its attack on the West and Churchill replaced Chamberlain as British prime minister. ‘Chamberlain had always opposed the use of bombing against urban targets,’ writes Overy, ‘but Churchill had no conscientious or legal objections.’ Indeed, already as Minister of Munitions in 1917, Churchill had been in favour of an independent air force and a policy of long-range bombing against German industrial targets.

Up until Churchill’s appointment as prime minister both Germany and Britain had stuck to a pledge not to attack targets in each other’s cities where civilians were at risk. Overy dismisses the long-held belief ‘firmly rooted in the British public mind’ that Hitler initiated the trend for indiscriminate bombings. Instead, he says, the decision to take the gloves off was Churchill’s, ‘because of the crisis in the Battle of France, not because of German air raids [over Britain].’

Ethical restraints which had been imposed at the start of the war became slowly eroded as a result of Britain’s decision to initiate ‘unrestricted’ bombing of targets located in Germany’s urban areas. In a fascinating chapter entitled ‘The Sorcerer’s Apprentice’ Overy suggests that Britain’s Bomber Command developed its tactics for concentrated ‘area bombing’ and the wide use of incendiary bombs by observing the destruction Germany wrought on London during the Blitz.

The RAF altered its strategy of focusing on precise targets when it saw how effectively the German air force attacked clusters of targets in industrial and commercial areas. However, Overy says that under Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris’s stewardship Bomber Command took things a grisly step further by deliberately targeting German workers to reduce industrial output.

For much of the war, combined British, Commonwealth and American forces lacked the necessary technology to develop the long-range heavy bombers they needed to launch attacks on Germany’s main industrial hubs. The bombing war only really escalated in 1943 when Harris finally felt ready to launch three major offensives: the Ruhr-Rhineland in late spring and summer, Hamburg in July and Berlin in the autumn.

It was the second of these, codenamed ‘Operation Gomorrah’, that resulted in the single largest loss of civilian life in one city throughout the European war. Some 37,000 people died and over 60 per cent of Hamburg’s houses and apartments were destroyed by a blaze of incendiary bombs. Overy cites a German doctor who says he had to estimate the number of dead by measuring the ash left on the floor.

It was only near the end of the war, and the bombing of Dresden which killed approximately 25,000 people in a few hours, that there was any kind of outcry against Allied strategy, which incidentally had failed in any way to stem Germany’s production of armaments (there was a three-fold increase between 1941 and 1944). Yet after the war the British Bombing Survey Unit’s assessment was positively damning and criticised almost ‘all phases of Bomber Command’s activities except the final phase against oil and communications targets [in Germany].’

Though he is never quick to judge Overy does not disagree with postwar interpretations which saw ‘the final flourish of bombing against a weakened enemy, with overwhelming force, as merely punitive, neither necessary, nor, as a result, morally justified’. Looking desperately among the historical rubble for a positive response to a campaign which saw roughly 50 per cent of bomber pilots lose their lives during airborne sorties, Overy, suggests that

bombing was at its most significant as a political gambit in the earlier part of the war when the British government used the RAF as a means to win support among the occupied populations and from the US by showing that Britain was capable of fighting back.

It is small consolation for what the esteemed Canadian economist John Kenneth Galbraith described as ‘one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest, miscalculation of the war.

Edited by Steven Gaal
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Sorry Stephen but it was even around during World War I. See:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aerial_bombing_of_cities

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carpet_bombing

Also worth reading is (as used in a previous post by Steven) "Are we beasts?" by Christopher C. Harmon

https://www.winstonchurchill.org/images/pdfs/for_educators/Harmon__Are%20We%20Beasts___np1[1].pdf

See pages 4 and 5.

Also from that same reference (page 9):

Making what may have been his earliest remarks on bombing policy as a member of the War Cabinet, Churchill, the new First Lord of the Admiralty, argued on 14 September 1939 for the "fullest possible use of the offensive power of the air force" in attacks on "strictly military objectives... vital to (Germany's) prosecution of the war and which, at the same time, were isolated from the civilian population."
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https://www.winstonc...ts___np1[1].pdf justifies EVIL , gaal

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The Myths Behind the Allied Bombing Campaigns of WWII

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John Glaser, March 25, 2014

In the New York Times, Ben Macintyre reviews the new book by Richard Overy The Bombers and the Bombed. Macintyre gives a summary of Overy’s myth-busting about the Allied bombing of Germany. Indiscriminate bombing of civilians, instead of sticking to military targets, is usually defended as (1) a response to similarly indiscriminate bombing campaigns by the Germans, like in the Blitz, and (2) the only way to completely bring down the Nazi regime.

Lancaster_I_NG128_Dropping_Blockbuster_-“Overy demonstrates, however, that the tactic of bombing urban areas had been put into action by the British before the Blitz,” Macintyre reports. And as for the second justification:

[T]hough the devastation left ordinary Germans demoralized, exhausted and frightened, the bombs did not provoke internal collapse or social implosion; the German people were not bombed into revolution. In the cruellest irony, the hardship and terror may even have solidified the Nazis’ grip on the populace: “The effect of the bombing was not, in the end, as the Allies hoped, to drive a wedge between people and regime, but the opposite, to increase dependence on the state and the party.”

Of course, this is by no means to say that the Allies were in the wrong while Nazi Germany was somehow better behaved. WWII was a massive conglomeration of evil acts of mass murder on all sides, and Nazi Germany was the epitome of that evil. But there is a valuable lesson in reviewing Allied war policy critically in this fashion.

The staying power of Allied propaganda has proven remarkably durable. Most people nowadays think back to WWI and frame it as a needless conflagration in which millions were used as cannon fodder for the small-minded and narrow self-interests of competing European states. Very little moral compulsion remains attached to the war effort on any side in that conflict.

WWII, however, is different. Most people still consider the Allied war effort a saintly battle for the freedom of the world. Political and military leaders of the time are still revered as heroes. Purging Europe of Nazis and fascists was, uncontroversially, a welcome result. But this shouldn’t delude us into framing the conflict as a purely Manichean, good vs. evil dichotomy, as it is so often framed in the public.

As U.S. General Curtis LeMay, commander of the Tokyo fire bombing operation, admitted, there were war criminals on all sides. “I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal,” he said. “Fortunately, we were on the winning side.”

If Overy’s scholarship on this is right, and the two main moral and strategic justifications for Allied indiscriminate bombing of civilians don’t hold up to scrutiny, it may represent the beginnings of a broader understanding of WWII that is closer to the one we have about WWI, or closer to LeMay’s characterization. And that is for the better.

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see chapter one

https://books.google.com/books?id=CbymE2fULXgC&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=carpet+bombing+evil&source=bl&ots=DO5zcqgLDN&sig=z3BrelboRPL0Lat605ScdKP7fK4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CEIQ6AEwBjgKahUKEwjriIH07fTGAhUG2T4KHenrCPI#v=onepage&q=carpet%20bombing%20evil&f=false

Edited by Steven Gaal
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I see your usual tricks: if it supports what you say then it is truth; if it disputes what you say then it is evil or lies. Not a good practice to adopt, Steven.

Anyway, I think that sometimes people are confusing Churchill's support of aerial bombing with that of bombing civilian targets. Shortly after air power became available to the military, it was seen as not much more than a reconnaissance tool. The bomber, though present, was pretty much under-utilised.

A number of people saw how it could be used far more effectively in many theatres of combat. Have a read about Billy Mitchell, one of your own countrymen. He saw the coming of air power and the bomber but was court-martialled for trying to prove it.

Anyway, the use of the bomber was seen as something that could destroy the enemy's ability to wage war. Its use on civilian targets is something else.

Another example is from the book you linked to above: "Noble Cause Corruption, The Banality of Evil, and The Threat to American Democracy 1950-2008" (John Di Joseph, 2010 University Press of America). It says on page 4 of chapter 1:

Initially, Churchill was not an enthusiastic supporter of bombing the cities. His attitude had been of " interest and relative indifference". In 1932, Churchill recommended at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the British Government propose rules to restrict aerial bombardment to military targets.

So, Churchill was not as bad as people make out. Yes, he turned to area bombing because he saw it as a way to win the war; he already had said that the British people could no longer afford to fight the war with the scruples which began it. The system of area bombing was not invented by him and was tried even during WWI. There were many people in the Air Ministry and the War Cabinet who believed there was no choice.

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Anyway, the use of the bomber was seen as something that could destroy the enemy's ability to wage war. Its use on civilian targets is something else.// Burton

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If need be, as the war went on, we hoped to shatter almost every dwelling in almost every German city. " (Official transcript of the meeting at the Kremlin between Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin on Wednesday, August 12, 1942, at 7 P.M.)

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yes something else,evil, gaal

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