Nuke transportation story has explosive implications

[Evan Burton]

• How experienced pilots could fly from North Dakota to Louisiana allegedly without knowing they were carrying live nuclear weapons – despite onboard systems designed to alert the flight crew to the presence of same, and altered flight characteristics caused by the unique nuclear loads.

Charles, could you take me through this one please?

- Onboard systems: how does this work or more properly, how does it indicate to the crew they are carrying a nuke?

- Altered flight characteristics: how? Crews need to train with the AGM-129, whether it be with dummy (stores only) versions so they get used to the aircraft with such loads, or training versions fitted with a dummy warhead for range qualification, etc. If the warhead itself is replaced, the inert load would be about the same weight. The shape of the AGM-129 would not have altered, and the weight would not have changed substantially. How would the crews have noticed different flight characteristics?

Thanks.

[Steve Ulman]

We know that:

• Barksdale Air Force Base is being used as a jumping off point for Middle East operations.

So are many other bases. It is not evidence of anything. Barksdale is also home to the 2nd maintenance group, 2nd medical group, 2nd operations group, etc.

• Multiple officers are routinely involved in the transportation and loading of nuclear weapons to prevent the kind of “error” that allegedly resulted in this “accident.”

Multiple Officers / NCO’s screwed up and have been disciplined / relieved. It appears that the proper procedures were ignored and the missiles were misidentified(see link in my previous post).

How experienced pilots could fly from North Dakota to Louisiana allegedly without knowing they were carrying live nuclear weapons – despite onboard systems designed to alert the flight crew to the presence of same, and altered flight characteristics caused by the unique nuclear loads.

See Evan’s post.

Why the individual(s) in charge permitted the multi-stage incident to occur in violation of storage, handling, and weapons release protocols and procedures.

Colonel in command of 5th Bomb group has been relieved of command for his failures (see link in my previous post).

What reason was given for the release of live nuclear weapons that, because of redundant, sophisticated security systems, could not be mistaken for what they were – and what they certainly were not, including inert nukes or conventional or CBR devices

How do you know that that missiles armed with nuclear warheads could not be mistaken for unarmed ones.

{edit to add - See William Kelly's response in the post that follows this one}

The release of the missiles was intentional, as was the loading of the weapons onto the B-52 and their transport to Minot.

You have provided zero evidence that it was intentional – this statement is mere speculation on your part.

I have interviewed an active duty military officer of flag rank who routinely is engaged in matters directly related to nuclear weapon storage, handling, and deployment. This person reports that, in essence, to believe the recent event was accidental in nature is to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald killed President Kennedy.

Please identify said Officer. Second comment is irrelevant – see below.

Or that Bin Laden lucked out on 9-11 vis a vis the “coincidental” security stripping exercises.

Completely irrelevant and an attempt to derail the discussion –you accused me of being a xxxxx – look in the mirror.

{edit to add note about BK's info}

Edited October 20, 2007 by Steve Ulman

[William Kelly]

• How experienced pilots could fly from North Dakota to Louisiana allegedly without knowing they were carrying live nuclear weapons – despite onboard systems designed to alert the flight crew to the presence of same, and altered flight characteristics caused by the unique nuclear loads.

Charles, could you take me through this one please?

- Onboard systems: how does this work or more properly, how does it indicate to the crew they are carrying a nuke?

- Altered flight characteristics: how? Crews need to train with the AGM-129, whether it be with dummy (stores only) versions so they get used to the aircraft with such loads, or training versions fitted with a dummy warhead for range qualification, etc. If the warhead itself is replaced, the inert load would be about the same weight. The shape of the AGM-129 would not have altered, and the weight would not have changed substantially. How would the crews have noticed different flight characteristics?

Thanks.

There is a tag: NUKE WARHEAD.

From a Washington Post report a few weeks ago, there were six cruise missles mounted on each wing of the B-52, each taken from a bunker that housed both regular cruise missles and nuke warhead cruise missiles. The airman with the clipboard checked the closest six missles, not tagged: NUKE WARHEAD, and assumed the other six were the same.

The pilot did not check invitory or manifest as he should, and when they landed in La. the Nuke Warhead tags on the six missiles on the one wing were not checked or recognized for a few hours after landing. That airman, when he got around to getting ready to unload the missiles, and noticed the NUKE WARHEAD tag on the missiles, set off the first alarm.

Which is still sounding and is yet to stop echo.......

My take, thus far, and has nothing to do with Cheney & Co., but rather, SNAFU.

I stand to be corrected.

BK

BK

[Steve Ulman]

Bill

Thanks for the info - I had missed that.

You know - there's a part of me that almost wishes it was intentional - that's almost less frightening than the fact that all it takes is some yahoo not paying attention that allows nukes to be misplaced.

[Evan Burton]

• How experienced pilots could fly from North Dakota to Louisiana allegedly without knowing they were carrying live nuclear weapons – despite onboard systems designed to alert the flight crew to the presence of same, and altered flight characteristics caused by the unique nuclear loads.

Charles, could you take me through this one please?

- Onboard systems: how does this work or more properly, how does it indicate to the crew they are carrying a nuke?

- Altered flight characteristics: how? Crews need to train with the AGM-129, whether it be with dummy (stores only) versions so they get used to the aircraft with such loads, or training versions fitted with a dummy warhead for range qualification, etc. If the warhead itself is replaced, the inert load would be about the same weight. The shape of the AGM-129 would not have altered, and the weight would not have changed substantially. How would the crews have noticed different flight characteristics?

Thanks.

There is a tag: NUKE WARHEAD.

From a Washington Post report a few weeks ago, there were six cruise missles mounted on each wing of the B-52, each taken from a bunker that housed both regular cruise missles and nuke warhead cruise missiles. The airman with the clipboard checked the closest six missles, not tagged: NUKE WARHEAD, and assumed the other six were the same.

The pilot did not check invitory or manifest as he should, and when they landed in La. the Nuke Warhead tags on the six missiles on the one wing were not checked or recognized for a few hours after landing. That airman, when he got around to getting ready to unload the missiles, and noticed the NUKE WARHEAD tag on the missiles, set off the first alarm.

Which is still sounding and is yet to stop echo.......

My take, thus far, and has nothing to do with Cheney & Co., but rather, SNAFU.

I stand to be corrected.

BK

BK

Bill,

Okay, thanks. So what we have here is a case where because a preflight check of the stores on the pylon was not carried out (which I presume is a preflight check to be made by at least one of the designated crews), no-one aboard the aircraft knew that the AGM-129s were actually carrying a warhead. That is a little different case to "onboard systems" alerting the crew. Sure, the pylon is onboard the aircraft, and is part of the aircraft system, but the impression I originally gained was that there was some type of light or indicating panel within the cockpit telling the crew the stores were nuclear-armed.

I know in some multi-crew aircraft there is a "Nuclear Consent" switch. Essentially it is a polling switch. All or designated crew members must agree they have a valid reason to launch an armed nuclear weapon. If one station does not agree, then the weapon cannot be armed / launched. This switch does not indicate they have a nuke; it is just used when deploying such a weapons.

[Matthew Lewis]

I don't see it as a coincidence that only involved this one day in question. Rather I see it as a culmination of people getting lazy, not following complete and correct procedures, and not following checklists. This is not to say that nukes were inadvertantly transported before this but the practices which led to the transportation were likely happening for a long time.

[Evan Burton]

I don't see it as a coincidence that only involved this one day in question. Rather I see it as a culmination of people getting lazy, not following complete and correct procedures, and not following checklists. This is not to say that nukes were inadvertantly transported before this but the practices which led to the transportation were likely happening for a long time.

Matt - agreed. There are literally thousands of documented incidents in military aviation alone where complacency, inattention or omission are active factors.

I still think, though, that storing conventional and special weapons in the same room was just asking for trouble. How people could have not seen that coming, I don't know.

[Matthew Lewis]

Were they intentionally stored in the same room or was that another problem of inattention?

[Evan Burton]

Were they intentionally stored in the same room or was that another problem of inattention?

Good question. We'd have to see what the SOPs (both local and Command) for Special Weapons Handling & Storage were... and we ain't gonna see that publicly, fer sure.

[Steve Ulman]

Were they intentionally stored in the same room or was that another problem of inattention?

My guess is that they were stored together intentionally, confident in the fact that other safeguards would forstall any problems.

This relates to a program I saw about air disasters - rairly is a single event to blame - usually a chain of mistakes/events are to blame - each one taken alone, no big deal, sequence them together ...

[Evan Burton]

Were they intentionally stored in the same room or was that another problem of inattention?

My guess is that they were stored together intentionally, confident in the fact that other safeguards would forstall any problems.

This relates to a program I saw about air disasters - rairly is a single event to blame - usually a chain of mistakes/events are to blame - each one taken alone, no big deal, sequence them together ...

Steve,

That's another of the aviation accident cause theories.

I think I have previously mentioned the Reason Model, where you have slices of Swiss cheese. The slices are our defences against an accident but we have holes in them (human errors, inattention, etc). Sometimes all the holes line up and ..... accident.

The one you refer to is the Boeing 'Chain of Events' model. Every accident has a chain of events leading up to it, normally about 7 to 10 events. Stop one of those events and you stop the accident (break the chain).

The two 747s on the ground at Tenerife is an example of this. If the terrorist bomb threat had not happened, the aircraft would not have been diverted there. If the airfield had been bigger, there would have been no delays in refuelling and no need to backtrack down the runway. If it hadn't of been that time of year, then the afternoon fog would not have been there. If the PanAm crew had understood the taxy instructions, they would not have missed the first exit. If the KLM crew had not been so mismatched (senior Check Captain, junior flappy & engines), then the flappy would have been more forceful in checking the takeoff clearance. If the two aircraft had not transmitted at the same time, then the tower and the PanAm crew would have heard the rolling call from the KLM aircraft.

Lots of things, any one of which if removed would have prevented the accident.

[William Kelly]

• How experienced pilots could fly from North Dakota to Louisiana allegedly without knowing they were carrying live nuclear weapons – despite onboard systems designed to alert the flight crew to the presence of same, and altered flight characteristics caused by the unique nuclear loads.

Charles, could you take me through this one please?

- Onboard systems: how does this work or more properly, how does it indicate to the crew they are carrying a nuke?

- Altered flight characteristics: how? Crews need to train with the AGM-129, whether it be with dummy (stores only) versions so they get used to the aircraft with such loads, or training versions fitted with a dummy warhead for range qualification, etc. If the warhead itself is replaced, the inert load would be about the same weight. The shape of the AGM-129 would not have altered, and the weight would not have changed substantially. How would the crews have noticed different flight characteristics?

Thanks.

There is a tag: NUKE WARHEAD.

From a Washington Post report a few weeks ago, there were six cruise missles mounted on each wing of the B-52, each taken from a bunker that housed both regular cruise missles and nuke warhead cruise missiles. The airman with the clipboard checked the closest six missles, not tagged: NUKE WARHEAD, and assumed the other six were the same.

The pilot did not check invitory or manifest as he should, and when they landed in La. the Nuke Warhead tags on the six missiles on the one wing were not checked or recognized for a few hours after landing. That airman, when he got around to getting ready to unload the missiles, and noticed the NUKE WARHEAD tag on the missiles, set off the first alarm.

Which is still sounding and is yet to stop echo.......

My take, thus far, and has nothing to do with Cheney & Co., but rather, SNAFU.

I stand to be corrected.

BK

BK

Bill,

Okay, thanks. So what we have here is a case where because a preflight check of the stores on the pylon was not carried out (which I presume is a preflight check to be made by at least one of the designated crews), no-one aboard the aircraft knew that the AGM-129s were actually carrying a warhead. That is a little different case to "onboard systems" alerting the crew. Sure, the pylon is onboard the aircraft, and is part of the aircraft system, but the impression I originally gained was that there was some type of light or indicating panel within the cockpit telling the crew the stores were nuclear-armed.

I know in some multi-crew aircraft there is a "Nuclear Consent" switch. Essentially it is a polling switch. All or designated crew members must agree they have a valid reason to launch an armed nuclear weapon. If one station does not agree, then the weapon cannot be armed / launched. This switch does not indicate they have a nuke; it is just used when deploying such a weapons.

Correct, no one on board knew they were flying nuke armed warheads.

BK

[Charles Drago]

Charles, could you take me through this one please?

- Onboard systems: how does this work or more properly, how does it indicate to the crew they are carrying a nuke?

- Altered flight characteristics: how? Crews need to train with the AGM-129, whether it be with dummy (stores only) versions so they get used to the aircraft with such loads, or training versions fitted with a dummy warhead for range qualification, etc. If the warhead itself is replaced, the inert load would be about the same weight. The shape of the AGM-129 would not have altered, and the weight would not have changed substantially. How would the crews have noticed different flight characteristics?

Thanks.

Evan,

I base my "onboard systems" and "flight characteristics" comments on what I have been told by the previously referenced officer, who is in a position to know. This person would not be more forthcoming, and as I have decided to take his/her word, I suppose you can either take or leave mine.

I have inferred that the issue of weight of load is critical here.

As for the probability of accident v. design: I must fall back on the complexity of safeguards and the unlikelihood that all would break down at essentially the same time.

Charles

[Evan Burton]

Charles,

That's okay. I have never been inside a B-52H so am unfamiliar with the display systems and if they do have some type of visual warning system inside. Happy to accept your source's statement on this for the while.

The flight characteristics section though, well, I think they are wrong - for the reasons I mentioned in my initial post. I'll see if I can locate any B-52 pilots who have flown with the AGM-129 and see what they say.

Thanks for the clarification.

[William Kelly]

More from Dr. Michael Salla:

http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_mi...cident__96_.htm

Salla and Wayne Madson won't give up on the idea that Lon Cheney's covert crew were going to use the six nukes in a pre-emptive strike against Iran, without telling anybody else about it.

Most Broken Arrow and Bent Spear incidents are just screwups and that's what this one seems to be.

Wayne's also got a military intel background (NSA maybe), but if his "investigation" shows Cheney was moving nukes around for tactical considerations, then we're really in deep xxxx. I don't believe it.

These guys just shot themselves in the foot, Cheney didn't shoot them.

BK