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Michael Clark

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LOL, I found what is apparently Paul Trejo's source, for his claim that LHO brought the rifle to work to sell the GPH.

Warning to anyone contemplating buying this book. It has no index, page notes, end notes or bibliography. Page one is page one. The last page is the last page. I did not buy it for the code stuff, some of which is easy to see, much of which is questionable. I bought it for more info on the “two sets of tramps” info discussed in http://theoswaldcode.com/ . There are two paragraphs about this in the book. The author claims there were firecrackers on the grassy knoll as a deception, Oswald was waiting in the lunchroom for Gerry Patric Hemming to pay him for the rifle, and that he himself used to sell pot to he head of the FPCC.
The info about the tramps in the grain car at 2:00 on the website is intriguing and seems to be documented, unlike the book.


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Secret – sensitive

Draft memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item


Operational plan – Cuba


A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central intelligence agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during fiscal year – 63 and for such longer as may be directed.

B. For the purpose of this plan the following  assumptions are made: 

1. National objectives with regard to Cuba are a sensually as follows:

a. Isolate Castro / Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.

b. Further discredit the Castro / Cmmunist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.

c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro / Communist regime to retard development of Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.

d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.

e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split and Cuban-Bloc relationships.

II. Mission:

Covertly support the above cited US national objectives with respect to Cuba.

III. Tasks:

A. Intelligence / counter intelligence.

1. Provide the maximum a telogen's coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.

b. Activities of Cuban G –2

c. Soviet activities in Cuba.

d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.

e. Military and militia order of battle.

f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain upon the "power centers" in the Cuban government.

g. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cuban relationships.

h. Economic.

B. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin American country support for the sentiment or overthrow of Castro.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Provide covert support to the CRG into such other Cuba political groups as appropriate.

4. Develop ********** in the "power centers" of the Cuban Government as a possible means of splitting the region.

C. Economics:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.

2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba.

3. Harass Free World to Trade with Cuba.

D. Psychological:

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the hemisphere and elsewhere.

3. Develop an exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet Bloc members.

E. Resistance:

1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnal and ********'support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

2. Be prepared to support US military against U.S. Military against Cuba.


Text here is upside down I will come back to it


amounts of equipment.

2. Maintain sufficient covert assess to meet requirements levied on CIA in approved US military contingency plans. We are internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally.

V. Support received from other agencies:   None

VI. Estimated cost to CIA:

A. Personnel 

B. Estimated budget:





Secret - sensitive

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully occurred on by DD/P.

Memorandum for: director of central intelligence

Through: Director of Plans

Subject:   Operational plan for continuing operations against Cuba.

1. Action: this memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for actions are contained in paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the re-orientation of the current effort into a long-term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. Assumptions:

A. The United States government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counterreaction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by major United States military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantánamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly per military, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D.  The Castro communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with it security in control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offense weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-Communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E.The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will severely damage the morale and motivation of air table is in Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba in the Castro communist regime.

F.  Despite the above factors, higher authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba in May even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States government and it's overt dealings with Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "track to course" of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, rates, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I.  In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve a little purpose; also they will be counterproductive sense, if undertaking, they will make the collection of intelligence or difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where in unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J.in view of the policy factors, and increased use of facilities, real estate and pacing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate cereal reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

II. Objectives:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba: 

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through Clandestina means, short of commando and gorilla tape operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of ensuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.

2. Activities of the Cuban G2 and it's other security organs.

3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.

4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.

5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.

6. The loci of power and possible stresses and strains in the power centers of the Cuban government.

7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations

8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

E.  Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible and any significant uprising, bravo, resistance, split in the region, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or Cuban/Bloc relationships .

III.  Operational plan 

A.  Espionage and intelligence collection – all feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational of activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in attachment A, which was prepared to serve as The basis for the IG's  Report on this particular matter to the Presidents Board of Comsultants on Foreign Inrelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous subheadings the intelligence coverages which have been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba 

1. Intelligence exploitation of refugees:  As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locks Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the center have been retained intact.  In order to reestablish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that pan American airways and KLM be induced to re-institute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. It should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and U.N. discussions. Coincident with this, the Opah-locks refugee interrogation center will be reestablished with the same Personel.

2.  Resident agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, reestablish communications with the 131 recruit agents the resident in Cuba. To an extent the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third country operations: The priority on recruiting agents in  third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba and through the development of additional legal travelers.

4. Redacted:  we will continue to press the redacted Who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The redacted most effectively cooperating at this point in the connection are the three lines redacted Direct approaches to several of these redacted either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation but are you to the redacted underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other redacted with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the redact problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the redact to make greater use of their redact assets, both inside and outside of Cuba, particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the redact.

5. Maritime operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through  redact we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit semen and particularly Cuban seamen to increase the 20 officers in crewmembers aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6.  Penetration of Cuban installations abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can get access and concerning whom we may have reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through redact operations and where appropriate in conjunction with redact.

7.  Audio penetrations of Cuban installation is a broad:  at the present time we have audio and or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in redact. No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and whenever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such insulation worthwhile.

8.  Communications intelligence score: We will continue our present CIA close support coverage from the KOLA station in redact at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation normalizes it should be possible for NSA to re-institute and perhaps even increase their seaborn intercept coverage of Cuban communications.

9. Communist party operations:  A complete survey has been made worldwide of all Communist Party penetration operations and were ever any such penetrations can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, in those cases were such action would result in an acceptable/prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations  to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 has some direct pertinent access to Cuban target. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are being individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

10. Illegally infiltrated agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced a substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pindar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents in teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRENT teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally residence in Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba Will be ex feel treated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal tavel channel's, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidence of stress or strain with in the resume in between the resume and other nations, but particularly, the Block. An intensive program will be continue to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the resume and any possible fashion. This is basically a long-term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and of the proposed further exploitation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interest of brevity and this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the resume, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, and the willingness of the United States government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage. On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or widescale program is contemplated.

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerilla Type Operations: Given the assumptions in paragraph I above, no widescale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive borrowing and inducing friendly US and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counter intelligence and counterespionage programs against the current Cuban G2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. Political action, propaganda, psychological warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop an exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and or overthrow of the Castro communist regime.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact in Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travelers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

H. Exploitation of exile groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuba groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine,  non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within Department of State of an office of Cuban Exiles Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups. 

IV. Organizational and procedural changes: Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, implementation of related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A: A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of task force W.

B. Consideration of the repositioning of task force W within the clandestine service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operation Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the special group of (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee and points which it is believe are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. Recommended action:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure it's concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secured from the special group of men to policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any track to concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspecs of this type of uncontrolled subsidy and support of Cuban exiles groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendation will be made to you concerning the repositioning of task force W within the DD/P.


William K. Harvey

Chief, Task Force W





























Edited by Michael Clark
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Interview Summary

Interview with:  Raymond Rocca

Interviewers: Dan Dwyer and Ed Gressing

Date: 3/15/76

Place: Arlington Virginia


Ed  Geissing and Dan Dwyer of the SSC staff interviewed Raymond Rocco, retired Chief, Counterintelligence/Research and Analysis, CIA, at his home in Arlington Virginia on March 15, 1976. The purpose of the interview was to clarify the role of the CIA in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination.

(1) The GPFLOOR (post assassination Oswald related matters) Phase.  The GPFLOOR Phase of the CIA's investigation of the assassination covered the period of November 23, 1963 until January 23, 1964. Rocha explained that Richard helms, DDP, delegated Jack Whitten, Desk Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, to direct and control the CIA's responses to information that was being reported from CIA stations around the globe. Most of the information the CIA received came from Mexico City or Oswald had contacted the Soviet think you've been diplomatic is Stabley Schomann's in late September and early October. Rocha noted that Thomas Karamessines,  Assistant DDP, was probably involved in Helms' decision to have Jack Whitten direct the GPFLOOR investigation.

(2) Warren Commission Phase. Rocca places the beginning of the Warren commission phase around January 23, 1964, when J. Lee Rankin contacted Helms and asked for CIA assistance for the commission. Hello s  delegated Rocha to be there point of contact of the CIA with the Warren commission. Rochus own counterintelligence staff involved in research matters for the commission included Tom Dooley, Paul Hartman and Thomas Hall. Other CIA personnel involved with the commission were Jack Whitten, Murphy (Chief of S.B.) J. C. King, Wigren (Chief SB Research), and Bagley (Deputy Chief SB). Rocca noted that as liaison became more informal, staff members of the Commission had direct contact with Whitten, Murphy, Wigren and Bagley, Helms maintained direct contact with Rankin.

Rocca emphasized that the Warren commission phase was not interpreted by CIA as an investigation.  Rocca said that when the Warren Commission "task force" was established, all cables and materials generated in the GPFLOOR perio from Whitten's desk were made available to the task force. Rocca added, however, that the task force made no appraisal of the GPFLOOR phase. When questioned if the Warren Commission task force reviewed Mexico city traffic to check name traces, for example, Rocca replied the material was left alone except for the allegations such as the Alvarado matter which concerned the Commission. Whitten....

..........missing page........

.....Cuba. Rocca also suggested that J. C. King might have known of some sensitive operations in general but that he would have been left out on specifics. Rocca added that "Whitten might have known about sensitive operations through osmosis" because Whitten as desk Chief, Western Hemisphere, would send out traffic to stations including traffic dealing with operations. Rocca noted that the DDP or Director could have by-passed Whitten by authoring and cabling a message themselves.

With regard to Western Hemisphere cable traffic and assassination plots, Rocca noted that in April 1975 there was an individual (name unknown) from Western Hemisphere appointed by Dave Phillips to work with the Inspector General. This individual found the memo that discussed Desmond Fitzgerald's having used Robert Kennedy's name in meeting with AMLASH, in the WH files.

(5) Miscellaneous. Rocca saw nothing strange in the FBI report on Oswald's FPCC activities being routed to SAS. He stated that SAS would've seen a reports of relevance to Cuba.

Roca could offered no explanation as to why the WAVE cable discussing anti-Castro group's public statement on the assassination was filed in the "Sensetive  Ops-Kennedy file" and later placed in the Oswald 201 file.



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Transcribing the doc below to test the feasibility of Transcribing all of the Disarmament docs that I have collected in a post on the next page. I think they would make a good collection of documents to be digested as a group of documents, and as such should be transcribed.




The Secretary of Defense WA 20301

Honorable William C. Foster

Director US Arms Control in Disarmament Agency

Department of State




Dear Bill:

I am enclosing copies of JCSM 685-63, 3 September 1963, and JCSM 773-63, 4 October 1963. These two papers present the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a militarily acceptible U.S. position on the exchange of observation post to reduce the risks of war by surprise attack or miscalculation. I believe that these two papers provide an excellent basis for the development of a U.S. position.

 And observation system, such as recommended below, would be advantageous to the United States. While such a system could not provide a guarantee against surprise attack, it could, if properly designed, provide a measure of advance warning that would make it difficult for a State or group of States to initiate a major surprise conventional offensive operation. Such A system could increase confidence, reduce tensions, test Soviet intentions and begin the process of opening up the Bloc.

 A successful policy on such an observation system can only emerge from full and open discussion in the North Atlantic Council. These discussions may be difficult but they are essential. Successful negotiation of such an agreement with the Soviet Union probably will increase existing pressures within the United States and abroad for reduction of defense expenditures. In addition, observation posts located in the US would result in some increase of Soviet knowledge of our response to crisis situations on a worldwide basis. Therefore, such posts would limit our flexibility to some extent. However, on balance it appears that negotiation of an agreement as as outlined herein would be advantageous to the US.

An agreement on observation posts is acceptable within the guidelines outlined below. However the preferred position, as outlined in the following subparagraphs includes provisions for a reduction of forces in Europe after implementation of the observation system. The preferred position includes:

          1) Ground observation post in the Warsaw Pact area established on the basis of reciprocity in rights and privileges and an equitable balance in number. Posts would cover ports, rail centers, motor highway junctions and air bases and would have adequate surfac and air mobility to be able to observe movements on the local transportation complex (see TAB A to annex A to  appendix to JCSM  773-63). Details of requirements for access to military facilities, transportation facilities and vehicles and for communications will have to be developed. Proposed restrictions on the location of Warsaw Pact posts on NATO territory are as indicated in appendix B to Appendix to JCSM 773-63, p.6.

2) Mobile observation teams assigned to an area basis to observe military activities within that area (see tab A to Annex A to Appendix to JCSM 773-63).  Again details of requirements for access to various facilities and vehicles will have to be developed. There should be provisions for advanced notification of major land movements (brigade/regimentor higher) of forces through or within areas of responsibility of observation post/teams (see appendix to JCSM 773-63, p.6.)

3)  Aerial surveillance on a 24-hour, all-weather basis, with no restriction on sensing equipment, to encompass at least the area covered by the observation post/teams (see Appendix to JCSM 773-63 p. 5) Ariel inspection of those portions of the USSR bordering Turkey and Iran would be included if the USSR insists on aerial inspection in those countries.

4. Overlapping radar coverage is indicated in the Norstad Plan.

5.  Reduction of all foreign troops in Europe to five divisions on each side contingent upon agreement on implementation of the preceding four points. We should develop a US position on the composition of these five NATO divisions. This must be done prior to bringing up the subject in the North Atlantic Council. We may want the five NATO divisions to be all US or some combination (say, 2 US, 1 UK, 1 French, 1 Benelux-Canadian) of NATO forces with US.

Soviet negotiation initiative on the observation question (or their response to a US proposal) would probably take one of the following three general lines of approach:

a. And observation post agreement, perhaps coupled to an advanced notification of military movements provision and/or other minor measure.

b. A nonaggression pact, perhaps in return for some kind of observation agreement.

c. And observation system agreement, perhaps coupled to a withdrawal of weapons of mass destruction and/or their delivery vehicles from Germany or Europe.

We should formulate our position to make possible negotiations on the basis of either the first or second possibility. However, an agreement with a NATO to withdraw or reduce nuclear weapons and/or their delivery vehicles appears impossible at this time. It is also clear that a NATO consensus on a nonaggression pact would be very difficult to obtain.

 Without a fundamental change in German attitudes and a considerable alteration of the views of other NATO members, we could only discuss a nonaggression pact as a part of a broader European settlement. However, the HAC might be willing to agree to the development of a declaration against aggression, in which case, the US could support it in return for an agreement on an observation system.

 It is recommended that the US government prepare to negotiating proposals:

a. A complete observation system consisting of the five elements listed above.

B. An observation system consisting of the same elements, except reduction of forces, a number of which could be separated from the negotiating package as detailed below. 

Illumination of overlapping radar coverage and aerial surveillance from the agreement would not make it unacceptable, however, it would illuminate consideration of a reduction of force is since surveillance capabilities would be materially reduced.

Ellumination of mobile observation teams, overlapping radar coverage and aerial surveillance would not make the agreement unacceptable. It would illuminate our willingness to except a reduction in forces, and would increase the importance of the location, number and mobility of the fixed posts and of the other annunciated arrangements which would optimize safeguards against surprise attack.

 I think that it is necessary for me to emphasize the problem of gaining a consensus in NATO. There already seems to be a consensus in the NAC on the five principles ennumerated by the Belgian representative that an agreement on observation post 1) must not compromise alliance security, 2) must not alter the East-West military balance, 3) must not prejudice the reunification of Germany, 4) must not do anything towards recognition of East Germany, and 5) must not make the Berlin situation more difficult. If we cannot achieve a genuine consensus without subjecting the alliance two major stress and strains,  then I think what the Committee of Principles would want to be exceedingly cautious in recommending to the President that we pursue such an agreement. In view of the foregoing, I recommend that when the proposed position has been formulated and discussed by our representatives, it be the subject of an early meeting of the Committee of Principles.

Sincerely, unsigned


2 enclosures

JCSM 685-63, 3 September 1963

JCSM 773-63, 4 October 1963








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Lenny Patrick; associate of Jack Ruby and Davi Yaras.



Patrick Lifts Curtain On Mob Days

September 17, 1992|By Matt O`Connor. John O`Brien contributed to this report.

Longtime gangster Lenny Patrick added a vivid chapter to Chicago`s storied mob past Wednesday, taking the witness stand in federal court to finger Gus Alex as his boss and admit to six slayings, making millions of dollars in running gambling operations and extorting payoffs from scores of business owners since the 1950s.

Patrick, 78, the highest-ranking Chicago mob official ever to turn government witness, enthralled a federal jury and crowded courtroom with a rare view inside the brutal underworld from a unique perspective of a half-century in organized crime.

Patrick admitted he was the triggerman in two killings and ordered four rival bookmakers killed in the 1940s and early 1950s.

``He wanted to take over, too,`` Patrick said of one bookmaker he had killed. ``It was either him or me. That`s the way it went.``

And in a rambling response, later stricken from the record by U.S. District Judge James Alesia, Patrick explained why he decided to cooperate when he was indicted last December on charges of heading an extortion gang.

``I don`t like to be here today to testify, but I either testify or die

(in prison),`` he said. ``If I get caught lying one time, that`s it; I get 20 or 30 years. 

I don`t want to die here, that`s all. It`s a true story, that`s all. I don`t have the guts to die here.``

Patrick pleaded guilty in April to racketeering and extortion and will likely spend no more than two years in prison because of his cooperation.

In a gruff voice that was hard to hear at times, Patrick spoke of his early days-and his first killing-saying he quit school at 15 or 16, ran a dice game with cabdrivers on West Side sidewalks and engaged in holdups.

In 1932, he got into a quarrel with Herman Glick, 21, during a dice game. ``He hit me and I went down,`` Patrick said. ``I killed him a week later. I shot him in the head.``

Patrick said he spent a month in Cook County Jail after Glick identified him as the gunman on his deathbed, but he was released when prosecutors couldn`t use Glick`s statement.

Patrick then joined a gang, robbing two banks, but he was arrested in an Indiana holdup and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Out of prison in 1940, Patrick took a job running the biggest dice game in Chicago for others, in the process meeting top syndicate members Sam Giancana, Paul Ricca and Felix Alderisio.

``I used to get $3 a day and tips,`` Patrick said. ``I stole about $30 a night.``

In 1945, after three years on the job, Patrick and his brother were fired by William Galatz, a powerful West Side gambling boss. Patrick said he 

decided to kill Galatz; his partner, David Yaras, now dead, fatally shotgunned Galatz. Patrick then took control of the mob`s West Side bookmaking business, taking bets on baseball, football and horse racing and running poker and blackjack games and even bingo.

Patrick said he controlled the mob`s bookmaking operation on the predominantly Jewish West Side from 1946 until the early 1950s, paying off undisclosed aldermen and three police captains to stay out of trouble.

When the Jewish population migrated to the North Side and gambling fell off, Patrick won the approval of a key mob leader to move to Rogers Park as well to head bookmaking. He said he continued to pay off police for protection until the late 1960s.

Patrick said he made as much as $850,000 from the sports-gambling business in one year-either because of heavy betting on the World Series won by the New York Mets or when the New York Jets upset the Baltimore Colts in the Super Bowl.

Patrick said he even leaned on his own relatives, threatening his brother Mike`s son-in-law to coerce Mike to pay off a $250,000 debt. And in the late 1980s, he extorted $187,000 from his common-law wife`s nephew, Patrick testified.

``It was my own money,`` he said without elaborating.

Patrick reacted with violence to any threat to his authority. When he learned in late 1947 that Harry Krotish, 29, another West Side bookmaker, wanted to take over, Patrick said, ``I shot him.`` Krotish died from four gunshot wounds. 

Patrick said he ordered three other bookmaking rivals killed: Edward Murphy in 1950; David Zatz in 1952; and Milton Glickman in 1953.

During a full day on the stand, the balding, bespectacled Patrick showed his age at times, repeating answers, struggling to remember long-ago dates and names and needing prodding from Assistant U.S. Atty. Chris Gair.

However, he recalled precisely how long he spent in prison for a bank robbery in 1932: ``Six years, nine months and 11 days.``

He also showed a bit of self-deprecating humor when he described how a lifelong friend scammed him by getting him to put up $165,000 to finance a non-existent bookmaking operation. The friend disappeared, and Patrick had another man he suspected of being involved in the scam severely beaten.

(Page 2 of 2)

September 17, 1992|By Matt O`Connor. John O`Brien contributed to this report.

``I went for it, and I`m supposed to be the con man,`` Patrick said to nervous laughter in the courtroom. But ``I don`t want any tag day (for me).`` Patrick also admitted extorting money from some well-known businesses and people, including the Big Bear grocery store chain, the Black Angus Restaurant, and insurance executive Allan Dorfman, who was killed in 1983.

Patrick said Yaras extorted $300,000 from Dorfman while he was nearby; he and Yaras split $75,000 and gave the rest to syndicate 

bosses, he said.

In the 1980s, Patrick said he ran a North Side ``street crew,`` or crime family, but had to go to Alex for approval for several extortions against suburban restaurateurs and car dealers.

In clandestine meetings on the sixth floor of Northwestern Memorial Hospital, the book department of Marshall Fields` flagship store or the Hamburger Hamlet restaurant, Patrick said he gave Alex one-third to one-half of the extortion profits as his share.

He testified that they chose crowded public places where they might not look suspicious.

Alex, 76, reputedly one of the top mob officials for decades who is now on trial on racketeering and extortion charges, often stared at Patrick as he testified, but Patrick avoided even glancing Alex`s way, except when he stood to identify him in court. Alex sat expressionless, clutching a cane in his hands.

Prosecutors, who have said the crew reaped nearly $400,000 from the extortions, played a tape in the courtroom on which Patrick, wearing a hidden recorder, said he handed over to Alex a $7,000 payoff from Gus Zapas, longtime secretary-treasurer of the Laundry Union Local 46, and $4,400 in ``street taxes`` from a restaurateur and a bookmaker. Zapas couldn`t be reached for comment.

Patrick said he got the idea to extort money from the owner of Father & Son Pizza after the owner`s son stopped in a pizza-delivery vehicle and helped push Patrick`s car. 


I wanted to give him a few dollars, but he wouldn`t take it,`` Patrick said.

``But you decided to take some money from him?`` asked Gair, the prosecutor.

``That`s what happened,`` Patrick said. 


Edited by Michael Clark
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Acting Madrid Chief of Station, Case Officer GROWEREY,

Relationship between QUSPORT /1  (Bichi Bernal) and ( AMLASH /1 (Rolando Cuebela).

(GROWERY is mentioned In this doc as a Psuedonym for a CO, among others ... https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10216-10246.pdf )

P. 3 of instant document indicates code names of those who kne the generalities of the assassination plan.


Similar doc...


more simililar... AMWHIP/3  (Not in MFF) Luis Manuel...


More similar. .... Luis Manuel CantilloToirac


Edited by Michael Clark
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A series of Docs from the following Archives index page

https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/release?page=614&sort=asc&order=Num Pages


 8/16/63 MEXI, BAKULIN, GERMAN TRAVEL  https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10215-10016.pdf

5-25-63  https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10215-10024.pdf

Cuebela in 1960    https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10215-10027.pdf

Cuebela undated. (Summer, 62)  Possibly prior to Helsinki WYF. Talk of defection by Cuebela . AMCONCERT https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10215-10029.pdf




Edited by Michael Clark
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