Trump and the Unspeakable?

[Thomas Graves]

44 minutes ago, Michael Clark said:

TOP SECRET

13 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: BAGELY, Tennant, Harrington

#386 38

1) On Wednesday, 7 October 1970 I briefed Colonel L. K. White, Executive  Director-Controller on certain reservations I have concerning the proposed promotion of subject to a supergrade position.

2)  I was very careful to explain to Colonel White at the outset that my reservations had nothing whatsoever to do with Bagely's security status. I explained that it was my conviction that Bagely was almost exclusively responsible for the manner in which the Nosenko case had been handled by our SR division. I said I considered that Bagely lacked objectivity and that he had displayed extremely poor judgment over a two year period in the handling of this case. Specifically as one example of Bagely's extreme prejudice I pointed out that the SR division had neglected to follow up several leads provided by Nosenko which subsequently had been followed up by this office (Bruce Solie) and that this lead us to individuals who have confess their recruitment and use by the Soviets over an extensive period of time.

3)  I explained further that Bagely displayed extremely poor judgment in the actions he took during that time that the Nosenko was incarcerated at ISOLATION. On many occasions, as the individual responsible for Nosenko's care, I refuse to condone subjects instructions to my people who are guarding him. In one instance Bagely insisted that and Nosenko's food ration be reduced to black bread and water three times daily. After I had briefed Colonel White, he indicated that he would refresh the Director's memory on Bagely's role in the Nosenko case at the time he reviews supergrade promotions. 

 

Howard J. Osborn

Director of Security

 

Yeah, Michael, I got that. 

Written in 1970, three years after (possible mole?) Richard Kovich and the Leonard McCoy - John Hart clutch had deviously subverted and controverted the true and accurate work and conclusions of Bagley, Scotty Miler, JJA, et al., regarding false defector Yuri Nosenko.

BFD  (Bunk Finely Disseminated)

You are aware, aren't you, that former Army Intelligence analyst John Newman, author of Oswald and the CIA, has read Bagley's works and is sufficiently impressed by them to have given some presentations based on Spy Wars and Spymaster (the latter co-written with former KGB general, Sergei Kondrashev), and has even been able to convince the Venerable Bede, himself -- Peter Dale Scott -- that Nosenko was a false defector?

 

In retrospect, then, given the situation that Bagley, Miler, and JJA, et al., were in vis-a-vis a possibly "programmed" Nosenko (who almost "broke" once btw), one could reasonably and humanely say that their subjecting him to a rather austere living environment, and ... gasp ... questioning him over and over again on certain points, and maybe even ... gasp ... doing so at all hours of the night and day, ... was justified, yes?

 

I'll try to find and post here Bagley's detailed refutation of the "torture" claims, so in the meantime, why don't you just take an extra dose of that Gas-Ex , Michael?

Because in my humble opinion, you're really starting to stink the place up.

 

--  T.G.

 

 

 

Edited May 13, 2018 by Thomas Graves

[Paul Brancato]

Another example of baiting. 

 

[Michael Clark]

3 minutes ago, Thomas Graves said:

Yeah, Michael, I got that. .....

............

 

........so why don't you take that Gas-Ex in the meantime, Michael?

Because in my humble opinion, you're really starting to stink the place up.

 

--  T.G.

 

 

 

Noted and reported...

Edited May 13, 2018 by Michael Clark

[Thomas Graves]

11 minutes ago, Michael Clark said:

Noted and reported...

 

Good on you, Michael!

 

By the way, are you still counting the number of my edits?

(Talk about a full-time job!)

I feel badly about "baiting" you unto doing that, but hey, that's what The Agency told me to do ...

 

--  T.G.

 

Edited May 13, 2018 by Thomas Graves

[James DiEugenio]

What does any of this have to do with (admittedly corrupt, but hey what do you expect after 70 years of institutionalized cronyism?) Yeltsin's retaining a couple of American political advisers in 1996 to help to help him spiff up his image and improve the palatability of his message in an election campaign?

This reflects the fact that you either are being deliberately obtuse, or you really did not understand my post above.  I have a real hard time thinking the latter.

I quoted the one of the founding fathers of the MSM about what happened in Russia and I detailed several instances of what I objected to with our backing of Yeltsin e.g. that is the killing of hundreds of innocent people through the bombing of the Russian Parliament; the hijacking of the country's internal processes and the overturning of a judicial decision; and the meltdown of tens of billions of a nation's wealth to the benefit of a very select few, including George Soros.

I then paralleled that pattern with other instances.  To show why I object to this kind of intervention. Since it is a part of a pernicious American pattern.

And then you say "Your buddy Stalin".

Good Bye TG.  What you are doing here and why is something that is not worth pondering.  It certainly has nothing to do with what happened to Kennedy. 

Edited May 13, 2018 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

8 hours ago, Paz Marverde said:

Thank you very much for these words 

You are welcome Paz.

This was my point.  The idea that the Dulles brothers had, which was such a dangerous and wildly overstated concept, was that somehow if you were not with the USA, you were automatically against the USA.  This was what the whole non aligned movement was about, as started by Sukarno and Nehru and Nasser in 1955 at the Bandung Conference. Those three leaders, and many other Third World leaders, despised the Dulles brothers, especially Foster Dulles since he was the public face for what came to be called The Ugly American. In fact, Foster Dulles was so opposed to this non aligned concept that when Nasser refused to join the Baghdad Pact and recognized China, Dulles dumped our support for the Aswan Dam.  This gave Nasser no choice but to go to the Russians for the aid.

Kennedy thought that was really stupid.  Because not only did we force a major leader of the Middle East into the arms of the Russians, but Dulles now began to cozy up to King Saud the monarch of Saudi Arabia as a counterweight to Nasser.  Kennedy did not understand this at all.  Which is why on the eve of the Democratic convention in 1960 he told Harris Wofford words to the effect: We have to win this thing.  If we don't and its either Johnson or Symington, it will just be more of the Dulles/Acheson Cold War foreign policy all over again. Or as George Ball said: the Kennedy Doctrine challenged the status quo in the Third World. And it countered the Soviets by placing the USA on the side of revolutionary nationalism.

Lumumba was not a communist, so how he could  export something he was not into neighboring countries?  Sukarno was not a communist either.  Neither was Nasser.  Neither was Nehru.  So what Kennedy wanted to do was to keep these men in our camp.  And as he said, this was a conscious choice on his part to break with what had come before him.

 

Edited May 13, 2018 by James DiEugenio

[Cliff Varnell]

22 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

As per Varnell, the CIA redid the plan at JFK's request in mid March.  He thought it looked too much like a World War II operation.  This information is contained in the declassified Kirkpatrick Report. Which is still the best compendium of information on the Bay of Pigs that I know of. (See Peter Kornbluh, Bay of Pigs Declassified, pp 125-27)

From the Bay of Pigs Chronology:

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//bayofpigs/chron.html

(quote on, emphasis added)

MAR 11, 1961: At a White House meeting between 10:05 a.m. and 12:15 p.m., Richard Bissell presents the CIA's Proposed Operation Against Cuba to President Kennedy. The paper provides four alternative courses of action involving the commitment of the paramilitary force being readied by the U.S. These include the course of action favored by the CIA -- the Trinidad Plan that involves "an amphibious/airborne assault .... to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations," with a landing of the "provisional government ...as soon as the beachhead had been secured." The invading force is expected to repulse attacks by Castro militia with substantial losses to the attacking forces followed by defections from the armed forces and widespread rebellion. If the actions are unsuccessful in detonating a major revolt, the assault force would retreat to the contiguous mountain area and continue operations as a powerful guerrilla force. The assault, combined with a diversionary landing, according to the CIA plan, has the potential for administering a demoralizing shock that could lead to the prompt overthrow of the Castro regime. If not, guerrilla action could be continued on a sizable scale in favorable terrain.

The President rejects the Trinidad Plan as too spectacular, too much like a World War II invasion. He prefers a quiet landing, preferably at night, with no basis for American military intervention. No decision comes from the March 11 meeting and the President states his view that "the best possible plan... has not yet been presented, and new proposals are to be concerted promptly."

The same day Bundy signs National Security Action Memorandum 31 noting that "the President expects to authorize U.S. support for an appropriate number of patriotic Cubans to return to their homeland." Kennedy wants a plan to be prepared that would be less spectacular in execution, and therefore more plausible as an essentially Cuban operation. CIA officials, directed by Bissell, scramble to come up with a new plan in less than three days. (CIA, Proposed Operation Against Cuba, 11 March 1961, pp.1-12; Wyden, pp.99-101; and Gleijeses, p.34)

(quote off)

Kennedy rejected the "CIA re-do" in the face of constant complaints from Dean Rusk -- " the proper criticisms and cautions of the Department of State." as McGeorge Bundy put it.

ibid:

(quote on)

EARLY APRIL 1961: The State and Defense departments and CIA reach a compromise on the air plan for the invasion. Limited air strikes will be made on D-2 (two days prior to the invasion) at the time of a diversionary landing of 160 men in eastern Cuba. These strikes will give the impression of being the action of Cuban pilots defecting from the Cuban air force and thus supporting the fiction that air support for the invasion force is coming from within Cuba. 

(quote off)

Bundy's plan carried the day.  And when the false flag attacks on D-Day-2 failed to take out the Cuban air force, Rusk and Bundy said nothing when Kennedy gave the green-light to an operation that was already doomed to failure.

ibid:

(quote on, emphasis added)

APR 8, 1961: Jacob Esterline and Jack Hawkins, the two CIA subcommanders most directly in charge of the invasion planning, go to Bissell's house in Northwest Washington D.C. and inform him that they want to resign. Their primary concerns are the changes that the White House has ordered in the operation making it far less likely to succeed; "by pruning away at the operation [the politicians] were making it technically impossible to win," they reportedly tell Bissell. Bissell asks them to stay on, arguing that the invasion will go forward with or without them. Reluctantly they agree to his request. (Wyden, p. 160; Thomas, p. 252)

(quote off)

Gleijeses = Piero Gleijeses. "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs." Journal of Latin American Studies, Feb. 1995, pp. 1?42.

Thomas = Evan Thomas. The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.

Wyden = Peter Wyden. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.

 

What was the primary consequence of the failed Bay of Pigs operation?

The removal of Allen Dulles, Charles Cabell, Richard Bissell -- and the promotion of Richard Helms as chief of clandestine operations.

Why assume that the primary consequences of an intelligence operation were not the intended results?

After all, Rusk and Bundy owed their jobs to Robert Lovett, a long-time Dulles opponent.

Edited May 13, 2018 by Cliff Varnell

[Michael Clark]

6 hours ago, Cliff Varnell said:

What was the primary consequence of the failed Bay of Pigs operation?

The removal of Allen Dulles, Charles Cabell, Richard Bissell -- and the promotion of Richard Helms as chief of clandestine operations.

Why assume that the primary consequences of an intelligence operation were not the intended results?

After all, Rusk and Bundy owed their jobs to Robert Lovett, a long-time Dulles opponent.

Cliff, that is excellent. It is always my approach. I can't say that I am immediately in agreement, after having just now read your argument, but I do appreciate your putting it forth. To be sure it is difficult for me to so quickly move to a conclusion where Kennedy deliberately wanted the operation to fail.

[Cliff Varnell]

2 hours ago, Michael Clark said:

Cliff, that is excellent. It is always my approach. I can't say that I am immediately in agreement, after having just now read your argument, but I do appreciate your putting it forth. To be sure it is difficult for me to so quickly move to a conclusion where Kennedy deliberately wanted the operation to fail.

No, I'm not arguing that John F. Kennedy wanted the operation to fail.

Robert Lovett and Joe Kennedy wanted the operation to fail using Rusk and Bundy as their tools -- or so I speculate.

Either that or the BOP was a five-way clusterfk involving failures of the President, the NSC, the State Dept, the Pentagon and the CIA.

Joe Kennedy on Dulles and the top level of the CIA post-BOP --"It's a lucky thing they were found out early."

I wonder if luck played any role in it.

Edited May 14, 2018 by Cliff Varnell

[Kirk Gallaway]

On 5/12/2018 at 4:40 PM, Cliff Varnell said:

Uh...okay...Go Warriors!🏀

Kind of crazy. We wrapped up round 2 on Wednesday the 9th, and by a week from today we will have played only 2 games in 11 days!  But I think that works to our advantage because we can prepare more than a team that depends so much on isos. I think tomorrow will be all out for both teams. We win and we can probably take it in 5, ok maybe 6 at the worst!

 

"Drive west on Sunset to the sea---Turn that jungle music down!---Just until we're out of town."

DF+WB(RIP)=SD

Edited May 14, 2018 by Kirk Gallaway

[Robert Harper]

On 5/12/2018 at 3:52 PM, Robert Harper said:

an understanding of Smith's earlier work - The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) where he projects the "invisible spectator" as a judge of all moral actions

I have corrected this post reference. Smith used the word impartial with spectator (in the moral sentiments) and invisible with hand (in the wealth of nations).It's a thoughtful distinction on his part since his imaginary limb operates without a  brain while his imaginary spectator needs one.

 

[Robert Harper]

from a recent letter to the editor of the latimes: (my bold)

To the editor: One letter writer's assertion that "it was not for the CIA and certainly not for Haspel to question the legality of the government's directive" strikes me as morally empty as Adolf Eichmann's assertion that he was merely upholding the rule of law in facilitating rail transfers to the death camps.Every individual entrusted with power over others holds the ability to think. This is Haspel's key problem. She either refused — and continues to refuse — to grapple with her actions, or she actually agrees with them.The United States is bound by the Convention Against Torture and the Geneva Conventions. Destroying videotapes to avoid accountability for potential wrongdoing is obstruction of justice. It strains credulity that an individual nominated to serve as CIA director would be ignorant of these facts.Haspel's past actions demonstrate she is unfit to serve.

Charles Kohorst, Glendora

[James DiEugenio]

CV: Robert Lovett and Joe Kennedy wanted the operation to fail using Rusk and Bundy as their tools -- or so I speculate.

As Dwight McDonald once wrote about the auteur theory of cinema, no one can each more inane conclusions that a dyed in the wool theorist.  Varnell is so dedicated to theory that he only ignores the fact that of all the people who have written at length about Zapata, both inside and outside the research community, no one and I mean NO ONE agrees with him.

But that is fine.  Let him continue. Pretty soon he will be posting segments of The Matrix. And the ice bullet and flechette.

No one can hijack a thread like this guy can.

[Cory Santos]

14 hours ago, Kirk Gallaway said:

Kind of crazy. We wrapped up round 2 on Wednesday the 9th, and by a week from today we will have played only 2 games in 11 days!  But I think that works to our advantage because we can prepare more than a team that depends so much on isos. I think tomorrow will be all out for both teams. We win and we can probably take it in 5, ok maybe 6 at the worst!

 

"Drive west on Sunset to the sea---Turn that jungle music down!---Just until we're out of town."

DF+WB(RIP)=SD

Kirk, are you with the Warriors or a fan?

[Kirk Gallaway]

Corey, with the Warriors? Well I'm currently alone in my room. But yes, that is my hometown team for many bleak years, and I am a very happy fan now.