LBJ Library Memos

[David Boylan]

Starts with synopsis of documents from LJB's library - http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/2018/docid-32423484.pdf

Full memos at the end of doc.

 

12. Memo and attachment on Cuban policy from John W. Ford, FSO, to Bundy, dated 18 February 1964. The lengthy attachment appears to be a working paper on Cuba prepared for Bundy by Rostow's staff in State. The authors (Ford and Bob Johnson) write: "If we are to be realistic about our intent to get rid of the cancerous potential of Castroism, is an attack on the symptons enough? Is it not essential to get at the disease itself?" (10). And, later, " ..... if we were publicly to acknowledge /the extinction of the Castro regime! as our aim, would not a sudden blow seem a more logical way of proceeding then the application of measured pressures?" (14). The paper discusses the need for a plausible causus for action against Castro, asking the question: "would not a better bet be to provoke one?" (16). They suggest that "something like the assassination of a prominent Latin American leader" (17a) would be sufficient provocation, if blamed on Castro, to permit U.S. action.

20. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 June 1964. Chase notes that Castro has executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed two others as CIA agents. CIA admits having a connection with the executed Cubans "but that it is completely deniable." ...Execution of Anti-Castro Cubans --Attached is a ticker indicating that the Cubans have executed three anti-Castro Cubans and. jailed two others as CIA agents . . CIA tells me that we did have a connection .with the executed Cubans but that it is completely deniable. The Agency is still checking on the other two.

31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965. Chase reports a plan told to Crimmins and the CIA about an Artime plot to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be "neutralized." D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussed at an upcoming ·Special Group meeting on whether or not "to cut off Artime's water." Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation of the Artime/Cubela plot."

39. Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966. Rostow notifies the President that a CIA ex-filtration mission ran into ambush and the agents were captured. The President could expect "the noise level of Castro's charges of 'threatened Yankee aggression' may go up."

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The noise level of Castro's charges of "threatened Yankee aggression" may go up as a result of two incidents which have occurred during the past 36 hours. 1. On Saturday night a CIA exfiltration mission ran into an ambush. The two Cuban agents being exfiltrated were captured. Two members of the exfiltration team, who went in to pick them up, were killed. The Havana radio is broadcasting stories on this incident. If past performance is any guide, the captured agents will spill the full story of their involvement. Castro can be expected to relate this incident to Guantanamo as further evidence of U.S. aggressive intentions.

2. From commint we learned of action by Cuban air and naval units against unidentified surface vessels of the northwestern coast of Cuba shortly after midnight this morning. The evidence is fragmentary. The Cubans appear to have intercepted a launch, set it on fire, and picked up two of the persons aboard. CIA assures me that none of their units were involved. They speculate that the boat may have belonged to Cuban exile free-lancers. Nothing has come out publicly on this incident yet.

(Note: this most likely was the Cuesta/Diaz Garcia trip to Cuba. Cuesta believed this to be as assassination attempt.)

41. Memo, W.G. Bowdler to Rostow, 18 December 1967. The new CIA emphasis is on developing contacts within Castro's inner circle. Dave Phillips was to be in charge of the new CIA ·Cuba program. Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for accommodation or his disillusioned .lieutenants want to know where .we stand if they move to dump him."