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Thank you Larry. I may have to buy another copy of SWHT - my books are all still in boxes from a recent move. Also Tipping Point is next up. 

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16 hours ago, Paul Brancato said:

Thanks for that Larry.... Was he just a public relations face of OAS, or something more? did he participate in the attempts on DeGaulle, who stated, according to David Talbot, that he believed the same guys who tried to kill him killed JFK?

 

Paul,

I know you asked this of Larry Hancock, but if I could just butt in here for a sec...

You might be interested in this CIA doc, especially pages 3 and 4.

http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=64993&relPageId=3

CIA document date April 26, 1963 concerning the establishment of the National Council of Resistance.

At the beginning of November of 1962 at a meeting in Lisbon, Algerian refugees who were members of the OAS joined the CNR . Members of the Executive Committee traveled around Western Europe using false identities. "Until recently" Souetre was is Spain.

image.png.491d70f174b800390887b728ec5471bf.png

Organization of OAS

http://self.gutenberg.org/article/whebn0000062191/organisation de l

 

 

CHAIN OF COMMAND

The secret army was a three-part organisation, each segment having its own action commando squads.

Section (Divisions)

Role

Director

Squads

ODM
Organisation-Des-Masses
Mass Organisation

OAS recruitment

Colonel Jean Gardes
Michel Leroy

none

APP
Action-Psychologique-Propagande
Psychological Warfare & Propaganda

OAS propaganda

Jean-Jacques Susini

-Commandos Z
(Z for Jean-Marcel Zagamé, founder)

ORO
Organisation-Renseignement-Opération
Organisation, Intelligence & Planning
-BCR Intelligence Central Bureau
-BAO Operational Action Bureau

OAS field ops planning

Jean-Claude Perez
Jean Lalanne (BCR)
Albert Dovecar (Delta 1)

-Commandos Delta
(D for Roger Degueldre, founder)
Delta 1
Delta 2
Delta 3

FRENCH ALGERIAN BRANCH

ORANIE DISTRICT

  • General Edmond Jouhaud

Commander Pierre Guillaume
aide
  • Charles Micheletti

civilian
  • Colonel Dufour

replacing Gen. Jouhaud
  • General Gardy

Capitaine Pierre Sergent
Revolutionary Directory member
Christian Léger
Revolutionary Directory member
Jean-Marie Curutchet
Revolutionary Directory member
Denis Baille
Revolutionary Directory member
Jean-René Souètre
Revolutionary Directory member

Following the arrest of Pierre Guillaume, Souetre replaced him as second in command of the ORO Division.

"Renseignement" means Intelligence.

 

The L'Aurore of 8/25/1962 has a picture of Souetre on its front page

AURORE (L') du 25/08/1962 - LE SPORT FRANCAIS SE REVEILLE - LE CAPITAINE SOUETRE - LE FAUX MURAT. [Magazine]

(Capitaine Souetre – the false, or fake Murat) – this would be right after the attack at Petit-Clamart

 

http://www.journaux-collection.com/fiche.php?id=219677

 

image.thumb.png.29b84374e8cd3140f0d3d167e047bec1.png

 

The French press and police felt that Souetre had a hand in the attack, but I personally don't believe he did. Bastien-Thierry had been rejected by the OAS, and they disavowed any responsibility for the August, 1962 attack.

In a one-page article located on page 16 of their Saturday and Sunday, January 5 – 6, 1963 issue, http://doc.rero.ch/record/193022/files/1963-01-05.pdf , the Nouvelliste du Rhône reported from Paris that on January 4th, the regional services of the police judiciary of Orléans, Marseilles, Angers and Bordeaux, pursuant to their anti-OAS activity went to arrest eleven members of an OAS commando unit. The accusation revealed that the commando unit had formed a terrorist group in Valladolid (Spain) last July, especially present were ex-General Gardy and ex-Captain Souetre, and who were especially on a mission to assassinate M. Alexandre Sanguinetti who was at that moment on a mission in the office of the cabinet of M. Roger Frey. (Valladolid is a city in Spain and the de facto capital of the autonomous region of Castile and Leon. It has a population of 309,714 people, making it Spain's 13th most populous municipality and northwestern Spain's biggest city.

 

Steve Thomas

 

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Paul, here is my answer to the other part of your question:

My  discussion in SWHT covers the points that in 1963 Souetre was indeed visible to elements of the U.S. government, we have CIA documents showing that in May he presented himself as the OAS coordinator for external affairs and in June offered the CIA a list of Communist penetrations in the de Gaulle government, both attempts to turn the US against the de Gaulle regime.  The CIA held a personality file on him as of March, a 201 file with no date and a memo records commentary on his associates, finances and travel as of July.  We also have a memo from Angier Biddle Duke regarding his request for Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities dated June 1963.  FBI memoranda on him in April and May come from their New York office, apparently related to his possible travel to NYC – there is some sign that they placed an international mail trace on him out of that office…which would likely have been the source of the later mail trace which located mail from him to the Dr. Lawrence Alderson in Houston.

Of course the reason we even have those records is that they come out of the background information from the 1964 request from the French who contacted the FBI liaison in Paris in regard to the press coverage of Souetre in the French newspaper – relating him to the JFK assassination.

So to your questions, Souetre was certainly known to both the CIA and FBI in 1963, due to his own outreach and to the possibility that he might travel to the US legally, either to NYC or Washington D.C. representing the OAS.  However, I find no evidence the FBI had knowledge of him inside the U.S. or in Dallas, only that they investigated – at French request – their suspicion that Souetre he might indeed have been in the country and in Dallas.

I covered the details of that inquiry in a separate blog post here:

https://larryhancock.wordpress.com/2018/12/10/jean-souetre/


 

Given the above and the two blog posts I have referenced, I find no evidence that the FBI had any information that Souetre had been in Dallas or anywhere else in the U.S.  They simply investigated a story that had initially been confused and confabulated and informed the French security service of their negative findings.   Obviously, that does not prove Souetre was not in the U.S. but it does deal with one of the longest standing points which has been cited as proof he was, and was in Dallas – at least it deals with it for me.

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3 hours ago, Steve Thomas said:

Paul,

I know you asked this of Larry Hancock, but if I could just butt in here for a sec...

You might be interested in this CIA doc, especially pages 3 and 4.

http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=64993&relPageId=3

CIA document date April 26, 1963 concerning the establishment of the National Council of Resistance.

At the beginning of November of 1962 at a meeting in Lisbon, Algerian refugees who were members of the OAS joined the CNR . Members of the Executive Committee traveled around Western Europe using false identities. "Until recently" Souetre was is Spain.

image.png.491d70f174b800390887b728ec5471bf.png

Organization of OAS

http://self.gutenberg.org/article/whebn0000062191/organisation de l

 

 

CHAIN OF COMMAND

The secret army was a three-part organisation, each segment having its own action commando squads.

Section (Divisions)

Role

Director

Squads

ODM
Organisation-Des-Masses
Mass Organisation

OAS recruitment

Colonel Jean Gardes
Michel Leroy

none

APP
Action-Psychologique-Propagande
Psychological Warfare & Propaganda

OAS propaganda

Jean-Jacques Susini

-Commandos Z
(Z for Jean-Marcel Zagamé, founder)

ORO
Organisation-Renseignement-Opération
Organisation, Intelligence & Planning
-BCR Intelligence Central Bureau
-BAO Operational Action Bureau

OAS field ops planning

Jean-Claude Perez
Jean Lalanne (BCR)
Albert Dovecar (Delta 1)

-Commandos Delta
(D for Roger Degueldre, founder)
Delta 1
Delta 2
Delta 3

FRENCH ALGERIAN BRANCH

ORANIE DISTRICT

  • General Edmond Jouhaud

Commander Pierre Guillaume
aide
  • Charles Micheletti

civilian
  • Colonel Dufour

replacing Gen. Jouhaud
  • General Gardy

Capitaine Pierre Sergent
Revolutionary Directory member
Christian Léger
Revolutionary Directory member
Jean-Marie Curutchet
Revolutionary Directory member
Denis Baille
Revolutionary Directory member
Jean-René Souètre
Revolutionary Directory member

Following the arrest of Pierre Guillaume, Souetre replaced him as second in command of the ORO Division.

"Renseignement" means Intelligence.

 

The L'Aurore of 8/25/1962 has a picture of Souetre on its front page

AURORE (L') du 25/08/1962 - LE SPORT FRANCAIS SE REVEILLE - LE CAPITAINE SOUETRE - LE FAUX MURAT. [Magazine]

(Capitaine Souetre – the false, or fake Murat) – this would be right after the attack at Petit-Clamart

 

http://www.journaux-collection.com/fiche.php?id=219677

 

image.thumb.png.29b84374e8cd3140f0d3d167e047bec1.png

 

The French press and police felt that Souetre had a hand in the attack, but I personally don't believe he did. Bastien-Thierry had been rejected by the OAS, and they disavowed any responsibility for the August, 1962 attack.

In a one-page article located on page 16 of their Saturday and Sunday, January 5 – 6, 1963 issue, http://doc.rero.ch/record/193022/files/1963-01-05.pdf , the Nouvelliste du Rhône reported from Paris that on January 4th, the regional services of the police judiciary of Orléans, Marseilles, Angers and Bordeaux, pursuant to their anti-OAS activity went to arrest eleven members of an OAS commando unit. The accusation revealed that the commando unit had formed a terrorist group in Valladolid (Spain) last July, especially present were ex-General Gardy and ex-Captain Souetre, and who were especially on a mission to assassinate M. Alexandre Sanguinetti who was at that moment on a mission in the office of the cabinet of M. Roger Frey. (Valladolid is a city in Spain and the de facto capital of the autonomous region of Castile and Leon. It has a population of 309,714 people, making it Spain's 13th most populous municipality and northwestern Spain's biggest city.

 

Steve Thomas

 

Hi Steve - I know we’ve been back and forth on Souetre over the years. It seems like once again you are saying that Souetre wasn’t operational in the OAS, but rather Intelligence. Well, the document says something like that, but it’s just a document. It also states that OAS was operational in Spain. If Skorzeny was connected, you wouldn’t expect such a document to name him, or any CIA agent or US military operation by name would you? So much of what actually goes on is beneath the surface. We are, in my opinion, looking for clues. You and I couldn’t prove that Dinkins was being truthful, but we did discover an omission in his record which suggested that someone in CIA wanted to diminish his credibility. It was you who discovered that, and I would like to think it would make your more skeptical of the factual nature of official documents. 

 

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1 hour ago, Larry Hancock said:

Paul, here is my answer to the other part of your question:

 

My  discussion in SWHT covers the points that in 1963 Souetre was indeed visible to elements of the U.S. government, we have CIA documents showing that in May he presented himself as the OAS coordinator for external affairs and in June offered the CIA a list of Communist penetrations in the de Gaulle government, both attempts to turn the US against the de Gaulle regime.  The CIA held a personality file on him as of March, a 201 file with no date and a memo records commentary on his associates, finances and travel as of July.  We also have a memo from Angier Biddle Duke regarding his request for Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities dated June 1963.  FBI memoranda on him in April and May come from their New York office, apparently related to his possible travel to NYC – there is some sign that they placed an international mail trace on him out of that office…which would likely have been the source of the later mail trace which located mail from him to the Dr. Lawrence Alderson in Houston.

Of course the reason we even have those records is that they come out of the background information from the 1964 request from the French who contacted the FBI liaison in Paris in regard to the press coverage of Souetre in the French newspaper – relating him to the JFK assassination.

So to your questions, Souetre was certainly known to both the CIA and FBI in 1963, due to his own outreach and to the possibility that he might travel to the US legally, either to NYC or Washington D.C. representing the OAS.  However, I find no evidence the FBI had knowledge of him inside the U.S. or in Dallas, only that they investigated – at French request – their suspicion that Souetre he might indeed have been in the country and in Dallas.

I covered the details of that inquiry in a separate blog post here:

https://larryhancock.wordpress.com/2018/12/10/jean-souetre/

 


 

Given the above and the two blog posts I have referenced, I find no evidence that the FBI had any information that Souetre had been in Dallas or anywhere else in the U.S.  They simply investigated a story that had initially been confused and confabulated and informed the French security service of their negative findings.   Obviously, that does not prove Souetre was not in the U.S. but it does deal with one of the longest standing points which has been cited as proof he was, and was in Dallas – at least it deals with it for me.

Thanks for all this. I recall that CIA released documents saying that QJWIN was Mankel, but you have unearthed others that make it clear it was more than an individual, and no one yet has provided any documentation about Mankel that does not originate with CIA, which is still withholding and blacking out documents, including many in one of your links on Souetre. To me it’s what documents don’t say that is interesting, sometimes more than what they do. You point out that Fensterwald and Shaw never provided the links, no doubt confidential, that caused them to continue to dig into OAS and Souetre. So do you weigh official CIA and FBI documents above confidential sources? If confidential sources have hidden agendas, as I’m sure many do, so do CIA FBI etc. Do you agree? If you were Alderson, and the FBI came to your door in 1963 or 64 asking about Souetre how would you react? Is it any less believable when years later he tells a researcher that Souetre was involved? Maybe he was less afraid. Maybe the researcher made it up. I don’t know, and if your basis for concluding that the latter day statements of Alderson is less believable than the first one that you believe the FBI document more than the later researcher, or think that Alderson decided to make something up years later, well, I find that a bit confusing. Sure we need to dig into documents, and researchers like yourself have done us all a huge service by taking the time to do so. But you are asking me to believe the FBI when they say that their assurances to the SDECE were taken at face value by the French, and ended their interest in Souetre. Is there a corresponding French document? 
I am reminded of a debate I witnessed in NYC in ‘64 or ‘65 between Mark Lane and Melvin Belli. As things got more heated, and Lane presented eye witness accounts that contradicted official FBI reports - they were debating the Warren Commission report - Belli finally threw up his hands and said ‘if you can’t trust the FBI, who can you trust’? Then he unceremoniously left Lane alone on stage while the crowd cheered. 

 

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I wish we would all read the book cover to cover before getting in too deep in the conversation. We all come at this from different angles. Let’s give Hank Albarelli a thorough vetting. I’m 200 pages in, and find it well written and fascinating. I’m going to continue until I’m finished. Then I’m going to read Hancock’s latest. I’ll leave Newman out for now - the writing is too dense. And I’m going to watch JFK through the looking glass. Friends of mine, otherwise not well versed in JFK conspiracy research, have found it fascinating and convincing. Now if I could just get my girlfriend to watch with me ….

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2 hours ago, Paul Brancato said:

I wish we would all read the book cover to cover before getting in too deep in the conversation. We all come at this from different angles. Let’s give Hank Albarelli a thorough vetting. I’m 200 pages in, and find it well written and fascinating. I’m going to continue until I’m finished. Then I’m going to read Hancock’s latest. I’ll leave Newman out for now - the writing is too dense. And I’m going to watch JFK through the looking glass. Friends of mine, otherwise not well versed in JFK conspiracy research, have found it fascinating and convincing. Now if I could just get my girlfriend to watch with me ….

Slip her a Mickey, she'll be fascinated.  Though I guess that's immoral.  

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17 hours ago, Steve Thomas said:

Paul,

I know you asked this of Larry Hancock, but if I could just butt in here for a sec...

You might be interested in this CIA doc, especially pages 3 and 4.

http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=64993&relPageId=3

CIA document date April 26, 1963 concerning the establishment of the National Council of Resistance.

At the beginning of November of 1962 at a meeting in Lisbon, Algerian refugees who were members of the OAS joined the CNR . Members of the Executive Committee traveled around Western Europe using false identities. "Until recently" Souetre was is Spain.

image.png.491d70f174b800390887b728ec5471bf.png

 

 

d. Bastien-Thierry had been rejected by the OAS, and they disavowed any responsibility for the August, 1962 attack.

Steve Thomas

 

I guess II was wrong about this last.

Le Monde February 2, 1963

https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1963/02/02/le-general-de-gaulle-avait-ete-condamne-a-mort-par-les-chefs-activistes_2230161_1819218.html?xtmc=c_n_r&xtcr=3

Le général de Gaulle avait été " condamné à mort " par les chefs activistes

Dans un recueil groupant divers documents " officiels " que le " C.N.R. ", dirigé par Georges Bidault, a fait parvenir à plusieurs journaux, on retrouve un texte, déjà publié par " le Monde " le 10 octobre 1962, où il est dit que " le général de Gaulle a été condamné à mort par contumace pour le crime de haute trahison par un jugement du tribunal militaire, le 3 juillet 1962 ".

C'est dans ce document que le " C.N.R. " a revendiqué la responsabilité de l'attentat du Petit-Clamart. " Le 22 août 1962, à 20 h. 30, y lit-on, un commando du 1er régiment d'opérations spéciales a attaqué au F.M. et au P.M. le convoi du président de la République sur la nationale 309, à proximité du carrefour dit du Petit-Clamart. Cette opération a été effectuée sur ordre du haut commandement militaire en métropole, en application des directives de la commission exécutive du C.N.R. "

- Google Translation -

"In a collection grouping together various "official" documents that the "CNR", directed by Georges Bidault, sent to several newspapers, we find a text, already published by "Le Monde" on October 10, 1962, where it is said that " General de Gaulle was sentenced to death in absentia for the crime of high treason by a judgment of the military tribunal on July 3, 1962 ".

It is in this document that the "C.N.R." claimed responsibility for the Petit-Clamart attack. "On August 22, 1962, at 8:30 p.m., it says, a commando of the 1st Special Operations Regiment attacked the FM and PM the President of the Republic's convoy on route 309, near the so-called crossroads. du Petit-Clamart. This operation was carried out by order of the military high command in metropolitan France, in application of the directives of the CNR executive commission "

And it is spelled Bastien-Thiry.

Steve Thomas

 

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37 minutes ago, Steve Thomas said:

I guess II was wrong about this last.

Le Monde February 2, 1963

https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1963/02/02/le-general-de-gaulle-avait-ete-condamne-a-mort-par-les-chefs-activistes_2230161_1819218.html?xtmc=c_n_r&xtcr=3

Le général de Gaulle avait été " condamné à mort " par les chefs activistes

Dans un recueil groupant divers documents " officiels " que le " C.N.R. ", dirigé par Georges Bidault, a fait parvenir à plusieurs journaux, on retrouve un texte, déjà publié par " le Monde " le 10 octobre 1962, où il est dit que " le général de Gaulle a été condamné à mort par contumace pour le crime de haute trahison par un jugement du tribunal militaire, le 3 juillet 1962 ".

C'est dans ce document que le " C.N.R. " a revendiqué la responsabilité de l'attentat du Petit-Clamart. " Le 22 août 1962, à 20 h. 30, y lit-on, un commando du 1er régiment d'opérations spéciales a attaqué au F.M. et au P.M. le convoi du président de la République sur la nationale 309, à proximité du carrefour dit du Petit-Clamart. Cette opération a été effectuée sur ordre du haut commandement militaire en métropole, en application des directives de la commission exécutive du C.N.R. "

- Google Translation -

"In a collection grouping together various "official" documents that the "CNR", directed by Georges Bidault, sent to several newspapers, we find a text, already published by "Le Monde" on October 10, 1962, where it is said that " General de Gaulle was sentenced to death in absentia for the crime of high treason by a judgment of the military tribunal on July 3, 1962 ".

It is in this document that the "C.N.R." claimed responsibility for the Petit-Clamart attack. "On August 22, 1962, at 8:30 p.m., it says, a commando of the 1st Special Operations Regiment attacked the FM and PM the President of the Republic's convoy on route 309, near the so-called crossroads. du Petit-Clamart. This operation was carried out by order of the military high command in metropolitan France, in application of the directives of the CNR executive commission "

And it is spelled Bastien-Thiry.

Steve Thomas

 

I was going to say, Boy they get really emotional in France and overshare.  But look at the black-bordered "Wanted For Treason" advertisement in Dallas.  Yet, is the connection between the Dallas ad and the Dallas action looser than between this document and Bastien-Thiry?

And, how tight is the Paris connection?  Could the document be an aftermarket fake by an intelligence service?  Would Bastien-Thiry sign such a thing, making his culpability much greater than Bernard Weissmann's?

Last thought: How did Bastien-Thiry's Vieil État-Major organization imagine the OAS could retain any seized power in the public eye after a machine-gun massacre of DeGaulle and anyone else in the Citroen, with no single patsy to blame?  Circles back to the "overemotional" estimation.

Edited by David Andrews
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27 minutes ago, David Andrews said:

I was going to say, Boy they get really emotional in France and overshare.  But look at the black-bordered "Wanted For Treason" advertisement in Dallas.  Yet, is the connection between the Dallas ad and the Dallas action looser than between this document and Bastien-Thiry?

And, how tight is the Paris connection?  Could the document be an aftermarket fake by an intelligence service?  Would Bastien-Thiry sign such a thing, making his culpability much greater than Bernard Weissmann's?

Last thought: How did Bastien-Thiry's Vieil État-Major organization imagine the OAS could retain any seized power in the public eye after a machine-gun massacre of DeGaulle and anyone else in the Citroen, with no single patsy to blame?  Circles back to the "overemotional" estimation.

David,

I have found in my studies, that the French are prone to "Grand Announcements", or as you put it, "really emotional".

I have previously read that the the OAS had considered Bastien-Thiry to be a hothead and that he had jumped the gun. I know they didn't come to his defense much during his trial. This may be a reflection of the struggle between the action wing in Metropolitan France (the Deltas) and the more political people in the CNR hierarchy in Spain.

Steve Thomas

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26 minutes ago, Steve Thomas said:

David,

I have found in my studies, that the French are prone to "Grand Announcements", or as you put it, "really emotional".

 

And that's why they'd get finicky about the phonic difference between the names Soutre and Souetre.

Please be assured that "get really emotional" was comedy.  But the Soutre/Souetre thing is not.

Edited by David Andrews
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David,

I didn't follow the discussions relating to Soutre/Souetre all that closely, but you are right.

Souetre would be pronounced, Sooo (like in the girl Sue) etre, with the final "e" falling off almost to the point of being almost inaudible.

Soutre would be pronounced Sow tre, with the final e being a little more distinct.

The difference is noticeable.

As a last note on the CNR/OAS struggle, I have this:

Le Monde October 5, 1962

https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1962/10/05/i-le-grand-desordre-du-c-n-r_2357008_1819218.html

I. - Le grand désordre du " C. N. R. "

L'attentat contre le général de Gaulle et l'arrestation du commando de Bastien-Thiry, les opérations de police en Belgique et l'information ouverte contre Jacques Soustelle ont mis en lumière de nouveaux aspects de l'agitation activiste et, plus particulièrement, le rôle du " C.N.R. ".On n'a pas en effet assez souligné qu'en se réclamant du " C.N.R. " l'organisateur de l'attentat du Petit-Clamart a fait de la fusillade du 22 août la première action terroriste d'envergure de " l'organisme " dirigé par Georges Bidault. Jusque-là ce " conseil " s'était surtout manifesté, sous le double voile de l'exil et de la clandestinité, par sa propagande et ses pamphlets. On savait que, successeur de l'O.A.S., il tentait de rassembler et de coordonner les groupes qu'elle avait constitués et que certains de ceux-ci échappaient, volontairement ou par la force des choses, à son autorité. Il était en somme, et selon les renseignements que l'on pouvait recueillir, en période d'attente et d'organisation.Mais la conjuration du Petit-Clamart a semblé modifier cette impression en montrant que les hommes du " C.N.R. " étaient prêts à agir et qu'ils s'efforçaient de s'adapter aux conditions nouvelles, car c'est bien au nom du " C.N.R. " que l'attentat le plus grave et le plus spectaculaire, mais aussi le mieux conçu et le mieux préparé, a été commis en métropole depuis le début du terrorisme activiste. D'autre part, lorsqu'il a en quelque sorte renié l'O.A.S. pour son échec en Algérie, Bastien-Thiry n'a pas seulement fait une profession de foi personnelle, mais a souligné une réalité : la mutation qui s'est produite dans les milieux subversifs depuis l'indépendance de l'Algérie et dont le " C.N.R. " veut être l'expression.

- Google Translation -

I. - The great disorder of "C. N. R."

The attack against General de Gaulle and the arrest of the Bastien-Thiry commando, the police operations in Belgium and the open information against Jacques Soustelle have brought to light new aspects of activist agitation and, more particularly, the role of the "CNR". In fact, it has not been emphasized enough that by claiming to be the "CNR" the organizer of the Petit-Clamart attack made the shooting of August 22 the first terrorist action of scope of the "organism" directed by Georges Bidault. Until then, this "advice" had mainly manifested itself, under the double veil of exile and clandestinity, by its propaganda and its pamphlets.

We knew that, as the successor of the O.A.S., he was trying to bring together and coordinate the groups it had formed and that some of these escaped, voluntarily or by force of circumstances, its authority. It was in short, and according to the information that could be gathered, in a period of waiting and organization. But the conspiracy of Petit-Clamart seemed to modify this impression by showing that the men of the "CNR" were ready to fight. act and that they endeavored to adapt to the new conditions, because it is indeed in the name of the "CNR" that the most serious and the most spectacular attack, but also the best conceived and the best prepared, has been committed in metropolitan France since the beginning of activist terrorism. On the other hand, when he sort of denied the O.A.S. for his failure in Algeria, Bastien-Thiry not only made a personal profession of faith, but underlined a reality: the mutation which has occurred in subversive circles since the independence of Algeria and of which the " CNR "wants to be the expression.

Le Monde October 6, 1962

https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1962/10/06/ii-les-desesperados-et-les-reseaux-de-soutien_2359499_1819218.html

II. - Les " desesperados " et les réseaux de soutien

Par K. CHRISTITCH

Publié le 06 octobre 1962 à 00h00 - Mis à jour le 06 octobre 1962 à 00h00

En France, où il devait à la fois relancer le mouvement activiste sur le plan politique et l'organiser, rien n'indique que le " C.N.R. " ait réussi à implanter des réseaux structurés (1). Lorsqu'il fut fonde, ceux de l'O.A.S. en métropole étaient en pleine déroute. Jusque-là grâce à la mission II de Sergent et à la mission III de Canal, l'O.A.S. avait disposé de réseaux plus ou moins bien organisés, qui tinrent un certain temps en échec les forces de l'ordre. Mais jamais elle ne parvint à leur donner une direction unique. Ce fut d'ailleurs là l'objet principal de la rivalité Sergent-Canal.

Quand Argoud en prit la tête le mouvement activiste en métropole était déjà dans un état presque moribond : les réseaux étaient défaits ou s'étaient fractionnés en petits groupes qui avaient même perdu le contact entre eux ; d'autre part, la plupart des milieux (étudiants, poujadistes, pieds-noirs, anciens militaires) où avaient été recrutés les activistes avaient été repérés par la police, qui avait réussi à y placer de nombreuses antennes.

Argoud n'est pas parvenu à redresser la situation. Il dispose de groupes multiples mais épars qui n'entretiennent que périodiquement des relations avec lui ou entre eux. Pour ses troupes de choc, l'ancien colonel compte sur les fameux commandos Delta qui se sont repliés en métropole ou à l'étranger et sur ce qui reste des réseaux activistes. Mais il est difficile d'estimer l'effectif de l'ensemble. Si ces hommes sont bien armés et expérimentés, leur moral n'est pas bon, à en croire les déclarations de vingt-trois membres des commandos Delta 14, 15 et 23 arrêtés dans le Midi.

Démunis d'argent, vivant en hommes traqués, beaucoup de ces pieds-noirs gardent encore le maquis afin d'éviter d'être poursuivis pour les délits commis en Algérie ou par crainte de représailles Leurs chefs - des déserteurs de la légion. - exercent en effet souvent sur eux une véritable terreur. Les membres de Delta 15 ont raconté comment Claude Peintre, l'un des assassins de Me Popie, faisait agir ses hommes sous la menace de ses armes. En outre, beaucoup d'entre eux estiment que l'indépendance de l'Algérie leur a retiré toutes raisons de combattre, et ils ne se sentent guère mobilisés par les nouveaux slogans.

- Google Translation -

In France, where he had to revive and organize the activist movement politically, there is no indication that the "C.N.R." has succeeded in establishing structured networks (1). When it was founded, those of the O.A.S. in the metropolis were in full swing. Until then, thanks to Sergent Mission II and Canal Mission III, (my note: that would be Pierre Sergent and Andre Canal) the O.A.S. had more or less well-organized networks, which kept law enforcement in check for some time. But she never managed to give them a single direction. This was the main object of the Sergeant-Canal rivalry.

When Argoud took the lead, the activist movement in metropolitan France was already in an almost moribund state: the networks were broken up or had broken up into small groups which had even lost contact between them; on the other hand, most of the circles (students, Poujadists, Pieds-Noirs, former soldiers) where the activists had been recruited had been spotted by the police, who had succeeded in setting up numerous branches there.

Argoud has failed to redress the situation. He has multiple but scattered groups that only periodically maintain relations with him or between them. For his shock troops, the former colonel is counting on the famous Delta commandos who have withdrawn in France or abroad and on what remains of the activist networks. But it is difficult to estimate the size of the whole. If these men are well armed and experienced, their morale is not good, according to the statements of twenty-three members of the Delta 14, 15 and 23 commandos arrested in the South.

Deprived of money, living like hunted men, many of these Pieds-Noirs still keep the maquis in order to avoid being prosecuted for crimes committed in Algeria or for fear of reprisals. Their leaders - deserters from the legion. - indeed often exert on them a real terror. The members of Delta 15 recounted how Claude Peintre, one of Me Popie's assassins, made his men act under the threat of his weapons. In addition, many of them believe that the independence of Algeria has deprived them of all reason to fight, and they hardly feel mobilized by the new slogans.”

 

Steve Thomas

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On 11/29/2021 at 10:49 AM, Steve Thomas said:

David,

I didn't follow the discussions relating to Soutre/Souetre all that closely, but you are right.

Souetre would be pronounced, Sooo (like in the girl Sue) etre, with the final "e" falling off almost to the point of being almost inaudible.

Soutre would be pronounced Sow tre, with the final e being a little more distinct.

The difference is noticeable.

As a last note on the CNR/OAS struggle, I have this:

Le Monde October 5, 1962

https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1962/10/05/i-le-grand-desordre-du-c-n-r_2357008_1819218.html

I. - Le grand désordre du " C. N. R. "

L'attentat contre le général de Gaulle et l'arrestation du commando de Bastien-Thiry, les opérations de police en Belgique et l'information ouverte contre Jacques Soustelle ont mis en lumière de nouveaux aspects de l'agitation activiste et, plus particulièrement, le rôle du " C.N.R. ".On n'a pas en effet assez souligné qu'en se réclamant du " C.N.R. " l'organisateur de l'attentat du Petit-Clamart a fait de la fusillade du 22 août la première action terroriste d'envergure de " l'organisme " dirigé par Georges Bidault. Jusque-là ce " conseil " s'était surtout manifesté, sous le double voile de l'exil et de la clandestinité, par sa propagande et ses pamphlets. On savait que, successeur de l'O.A.S., il tentait de rassembler et de coordonner les groupes qu'elle avait constitués et que certains de ceux-ci échappaient, volontairement ou par la force des choses, à son autorité. Il était en somme, et selon les renseignements que l'on pouvait recueillir, en période d'attente et d'organisation.Mais la conjuration du Petit-Clamart a semblé modifier cette impression en montrant que les hommes du " C.N.R. " étaient prêts à agir et qu'ils s'efforçaient de s'adapter aux conditions nouvelles, car c'est bien au nom du " C.N.R. " que l'attentat le plus grave et le plus spectaculaire, mais aussi le mieux conçu et le mieux préparé, a été commis en métropole depuis le début du terrorisme activiste. D'autre part, lorsqu'il a en quelque sorte renié l'O.A.S. pour son échec en Algérie, Bastien-Thiry n'a pas seulement fait une profession de foi personnelle, mais a souligné une réalité : la mutation qui s'est produite dans les milieux subversifs depuis l'indépendance de l'Algérie et dont le " C.N.R. " veut être l'expression.

- Google Translation -

I. - The great disorder of "C. N. R."

The attack against General de Gaulle and the arrest of the Bastien-Thiry commando, the police operations in Belgium and the open information against Jacques Soustelle have brought to light new aspects of activist agitation and, more particularly, the role of the "CNR". In fact, it has not been emphasized enough that by claiming to be the "CNR" the organizer of the Petit-Clamart attack made the shooting of August 22 the first terrorist action of scope of the "organism" directed by Georges Bidault. Until then, this "advice" had mainly manifested itself, under the double veil of exile and clandestinity, by its propaganda and its pamphlets.

We knew that, as the successor of the O.A.S., he was trying to bring together and coordinate the groups it had formed and that some of these escaped, voluntarily or by force of circumstances, its authority. It was in short, and according to the information that could be gathered, in a period of waiting and organization. But the conspiracy of Petit-Clamart seemed to modify this impression by showing that the men of the "CNR" were ready to fight. act and that they endeavored to adapt to the new conditions, because it is indeed in the name of the "CNR" that the most serious and the most spectacular attack, but also the best conceived and the best prepared, has been committed in metropolitan France since the beginning of activist terrorism. On the other hand, when he sort of denied the O.A.S. for his failure in Algeria, Bastien-Thiry not only made a personal profession of faith, but underlined a reality: the mutation which has occurred in subversive circles since the independence of Algeria and of which the " CNR "wants to be the expression.

Le Monde October 6, 1962

https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1962/10/06/ii-les-desesperados-et-les-reseaux-de-soutien_2359499_1819218.html

II. - Les " desesperados " et les réseaux de soutien

Par K. CHRISTITCH

Publié le 06 octobre 1962 à 00h00 - Mis à jour le 06 octobre 1962 à 00h00

En France, où il devait à la fois relancer le mouvement activiste sur le plan politique et l'organiser, rien n'indique que le " C.N.R. " ait réussi à implanter des réseaux structurés (1). Lorsqu'il fut fonde, ceux de l'O.A.S. en métropole étaient en pleine déroute. Jusque-là grâce à la mission II de Sergent et à la mission III de Canal, l'O.A.S. avait disposé de réseaux plus ou moins bien organisés, qui tinrent un certain temps en échec les forces de l'ordre. Mais jamais elle ne parvint à leur donner une direction unique. Ce fut d'ailleurs là l'objet principal de la rivalité Sergent-Canal.

Quand Argoud en prit la tête le mouvement activiste en métropole était déjà dans un état presque moribond : les réseaux étaient défaits ou s'étaient fractionnés en petits groupes qui avaient même perdu le contact entre eux ; d'autre part, la plupart des milieux (étudiants, poujadistes, pieds-noirs, anciens militaires) où avaient été recrutés les activistes avaient été repérés par la police, qui avait réussi à y placer de nombreuses antennes.

Argoud n'est pas parvenu à redresser la situation. Il dispose de groupes multiples mais épars qui n'entretiennent que périodiquement des relations avec lui ou entre eux. Pour ses troupes de choc, l'ancien colonel compte sur les fameux commandos Delta qui se sont repliés en métropole ou à l'étranger et sur ce qui reste des réseaux activistes. Mais il est difficile d'estimer l'effectif de l'ensemble. Si ces hommes sont bien armés et expérimentés, leur moral n'est pas bon, à en croire les déclarations de vingt-trois membres des commandos Delta 14, 15 et 23 arrêtés dans le Midi.

Démunis d'argent, vivant en hommes traqués, beaucoup de ces pieds-noirs gardent encore le maquis afin d'éviter d'être poursuivis pour les délits commis en Algérie ou par crainte de représailles Leurs chefs - des déserteurs de la légion. - exercent en effet souvent sur eux une véritable terreur. Les membres de Delta 15 ont raconté comment Claude Peintre, l'un des assassins de Me Popie, faisait agir ses hommes sous la menace de ses armes. En outre, beaucoup d'entre eux estiment que l'indépendance de l'Algérie leur a retiré toutes raisons de combattre, et ils ne se sentent guère mobilisés par les nouveaux slogans.

- Google Translation -

In France, where he had to revive and organize the activist movement politically, there is no indication that the "C.N.R." has succeeded in establishing structured networks (1). When it was founded, those of the O.A.S. in the metropolis were in full swing. Until then, thanks to Sergent Mission II and Canal Mission III, (my note: that would be Pierre Sergent and Andre Canal) the O.A.S. had more or less well-organized networks, which kept law enforcement in check for some time. But she never managed to give them a single direction. This was the main object of the Sergeant-Canal rivalry.

When Argoud took the lead, the activist movement in metropolitan France was already in an almost moribund state: the networks were broken up or had broken up into small groups which had even lost contact between them; on the other hand, most of the circles (students, Poujadists, Pieds-Noirs, former soldiers) where the activists had been recruited had been spotted by the police, who had succeeded in setting up numerous branches there.

Argoud has failed to redress the situation. He has multiple but scattered groups that only periodically maintain relations with him or between them. For his shock troops, the former colonel is counting on the famous Delta commandos who have withdrawn in France or abroad and on what remains of the activist networks. But it is difficult to estimate the size of the whole. If these men are well armed and experienced, their morale is not good, according to the statements of twenty-three members of the Delta 14, 15 and 23 commandos arrested in the South.

Deprived of money, living like hunted men, many of these Pieds-Noirs still keep the maquis in order to avoid being prosecuted for crimes committed in Algeria or for fear of reprisals. Their leaders - deserters from the legion. - indeed often exert on them a real terror. The members of Delta 15 recounted how Claude Peintre, one of Me Popie's assassins, made his men act under the threat of his weapons. In addition, many of them believe that the independence of Algeria has deprived them of all reason to fight, and they hardly feel mobilized by the new slogans.”

 

Steve Thomas

Deprived of money, living like hunted men, maybe open to a big payday.

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  • 3 weeks later...

For me, the thing that is causing me to suspect forgery and/or fraud is the number of names that are dropped.  This document could be used to support anybody's pet theory, Mafia, CIA, oil men, Cubans, anybody.  It could be be that it dropped into Albarelli's hands and it suggested Nazis to him.  If had fallen into my hands, I'd go with the CIA.  It's a one-stop shop.

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