NSA/Pentagon and the Assassination of JFK

[Al Carrier]

GPH,

Nice to see that you are keeping in touch with Tim from Key West! I can tell by your ignorant slanderous remarks in the same wording that he used before he was booted. Are you going to send my chief an e-mail also taking my postings out of context and demanding he discipline me?

You have some here on the forum believing in your wanna-be history, but I would hope that most have realized you for what you have been.

You originally attacked me in this thread. I fired back and you return with your dribble that you are noted for.

If you are so convinced that I am a fraud, then instead of running internet searches where you will find nothing realistic, check with your inside contacts (if you have any), to find out.

I began an open discussion with an individual involved in some of the ops also and he went away from here and another forum, not wanting to get into it. How about doing a search on that that might enlighten you. Of Course, you would have to be able to follow it and understand it.

No, I have not personnally went myself to the archives, but have sent others who were willing to get what I wanted. I instead used my time and efforts going out and tracking down the persons who could answer my questions and lead me to where and who I was going to.

By your exchange, you have only verified my take on you. BTW, you would be an excellent guest on Ollie's BS show!

From the cornfields,

Al

[Al Carrier]

At least Lt. Al hesitates to make "accusations' of murder that might affect the surviving family members of these men, much less destroy their reputations by innuendo and gross fantasizing.  Let us get real, and take a little time to first learn some of the "tradecraft"; and then one might go for the "15-seconds-of-fame" Sherlock Holmes/Dickless Tracy routine.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Once again you are speaking without understanding the content or the researcher. I possess a copy of the file on our "Major Lopez" and have tracked down the family the deceased man. I also hold three photos of him at various times in his career. I keep quiet about his identity and do not release the file info out of respect to his family and consideration that he acted out of duty and in reality likely had no choice.

You can ramble on about your supposed escapades all you want and demean others who you know nothing of, but if you would look into my background, you will find that I am not a dupe SOF or wanna-be, but have lived it and have an understanding of how mechanics are inserted, and eventually eliminated.

I have a trail of Conein to Siragusa to eventually Fernandez and Hull that intertwines with our topic and me in a roundabout way. That is my motivation and you can spout all you want about your supposed past.

The ball is in your court!

Al

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Hi Al,

Out of curiosity: how did you obtain the file?

-Stu

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Stu,

Nice to hear from you again. It's been awhile.

I was sidetracked several times through various alias and after two trips to North Carolina, I was finally able to hook up with the right lead and then get the file through a contact in registry.

Al

[Dawn Meredith]

I have never suggested that Conein was part of the JFK murder team, despite insider knowledge of his failing to prevent the killing of Madame Nhu's husband and his brother Diem -- which he was ordered to do by RFK as a part of the coup in Saigon.

Later,

GPH

______________________________-

Gee, is there an echo here? Sounds to me like the little "trio" is engaged in a whole lot more than "hangin out".

Gerry before you begin your disinfo tirade against RFK cite your damn proof.

Or, will be like your buddy Gratz and just cite Russo as proof of every lie you post here in the name of your freaking "first amendment freedom"???

Interesting that the prolific Mr. Gratz has taken a little vacation from posting and suddenly YOU show up....hmmmm...I must have read too many conspiracy books in my life.

Dan Sheehan is also a great hero of mine. His dedication to truth and justice is something I have not ever heard said of you.

Hey the trio SHOULD do a guest spot on Ollie North's show. Or "Felon North" as my husband calls him, tho I perfer his "drug-running" , Contra-gate name "John Cathey". (cite: Terry Reed and John Cummings "Compromised")

Dawn

[Gerry Hemming]

I have never suggested that Conein was part of the JFK murder team, despite insider knowledge of his failing to prevent the killing of Madame Nhu's husband and his brother Diem -- which he was ordered to do by RFK as a part of the coup in Saigon.

Later,

GPH

______________________________-

Gee, is there an echo here? Sounds to me like the little "trio" is engaged in a whole lot more than "hangin out".

Gerry before you begin your disinfo tirade against RFK cite your damn proof.

Or, will be like your buddy Gratz and just cite Russo as proof of every lie you post here in the name of your freaking "first amendment freedom"???

Interesting that the prolific Mr. Gratz has taken a little vacation from posting and suddenly YOU show up....hmmmm...I must have read too many conspiracy books in my life.

Dan Sheehan is also a great hero of mine. His dedication to truth and justice is something I have not ever heard said of you.

Hey the trio SHOULD do a guest spot on Ollie North's show. Or "Felon North" as my husband calls him, tho I perfer his "drug-running" , Contra-gate name "John Cathey". (cite: Terry Reed and John Cummings "Compromised")

Dawn

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

-----------------------------

First off, when read in plain English, my statement is that RFK ordered Conein to PROTECT the lives of Diem and Nhu, and if there was ANY risk to their safety, he [along with Polgar, Aderholt, Magruder, et al.] were to force an abort of the coup.

No "Theater Commander", Ambassador, or Chief of Station ever had the authority to carry out a coup -- it comes only from the "National Authority" -- The White House !!

My RFK sources are direct from those who lived with him, and protected him. Maybe after Joan's book comes out you will finally have a little stronger grasp on what was the reality we lived during those years. Moreover, some of what Russo writes comes from my introducinng him to those very same close associates of RFK.

Cummings & Reed. I was introduced to Cummings at John Martino's house during 1963. I supplied him with the inside scoop on the African Swine Fever vectors introduced into Cuba during the mid-1970s by Cuban Exile rogues. After he did the story for Newsday, the Boston Globe picked it up.

I provided John with a little assist for "The Heist" story [$8 Million Lufthansa grab at JFK Int'l AP]. During 1990, while he was busy with Reed, he asked me to give a legal assist to Larry Nichols [Conway, Arkansas] in the redrafting of both the State and Federal lawsuits against Gov. Clinton -- which I did, and both courts then recativated them. [it seems that the "Law Professor??" who drafted the originals lacked elementary skills !!]

During mid-1991 [after finishing the JFK project] Larry called and stated that Clinton wanted him to drop both suits in order that he might announce his candidacy for Prez. I advised Nichols to go ahead and ascertain what the deal was. He called back two days later and said that Clinton made a handsome offer, and what should he do ?? I advised him that Clinton would probably win over Bush in an election -- that Bush was no big gain for the country, and that when he met with Clinton at "Slick Willy's" girlfriend's apartment -- to make sure that he had somebody with a camera, and that he was wired for sound.

Mission accomplished, I assured Larry that should things go sour, the recorded evidence might assist in Clinton's removal from office should he continue with some of his rogue ops. Cummings has been pissed off about that ever since.

More so when I repeatedly stated that evidence existed to show that Clinton was operating correctly in a drug interdiction operation, including all that involved mena airport, etc. !! In other words, Cummings was pissed that somehow Clinton could come out looking like a hero.

At the same time I was assisting Pete Brewton with leads while he was doing the Houston Post series on "Poppy" Bush. As with other newspaper reporters over the years, I advised that he most likely would not be employed with the Post much longer, and moreover, in order to grasp most of the courthouse documents -- he should get some legal training, and that he might just have to fall back on that when his day job faded. The first lead I gave him was hernandez Cartaya and World Finance [Coral Gables]; and after that it was a roller coaster.

Have you read "out of Control" or any of the other books that Sheehan plagiarized to prepare his Christic affidavits. A lawyer doesn't use books and newspaper fiction to present his legal pleadings, but might be permitted that the court would take "legal notice of same" -- but only as exhibits, not the "case-in-Main" !!

Swoop out of idolation in "La-La-Land" and get real Lady Dawn. Check out the real World.

And by the way, for those who dream that LBJ shut down 2nd naval Guerrilla early on -- Google the Spanish merchant ship "Sierra Aranzazu" [and the mistaken attack and murder of the Captain and 2 crew members by CIA raiders who mistook it for the S.S. Sierra Maestra. You will get a ton of US, Cuban, and Spanish hits, plus a ton of F.R.U.S./LBJ documents that show that only after late 1966 did he shut down the raiders.

LBJ wanted to use the SR-71 "Blackbird" at mach-3 [blowing out windows from one end of Cuba to the other -- taking low level imagery pics -- still looking for the Soviet nukes that were left behind after the Missile Crisis.

It's all there in Gov't docs.

Respectfully,

GPH

_________________________________

[Pat Speer]

I have never suggested that Conein was part of the JFK murder team, despite insider knowledge of his failing to prevent the killing of Madame Nhu's husband and his brother Diem -- which he was ordered to do by RFK as a part of the coup in Saigon.

Later,

GPH

______________________________-

Gerry before you begin your disinfo tirade against RFK cite your damn proof.

Dawn

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

-----------------------------

First off, when read in plain English, my statement is that RFK ordered Conein to PROTECT the lives of Diem and Nhu, and if there was ANY risk to their safety, he [along with Polgar, Aderholt, Magruder, et al.] were to force an abort of the coup.

GPH

_________________________________

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Thanks Gerry, for clearing that up. The proper understanding of your words is that Conein was ordered to protect their lives, and failed to do so, NOT that Conein was ordered to fail to protect their lives, as Dawn and I misunderstood you. This makes sense.

Gerry, while some here may criticize you for your often brash style, I find your posts intriguing and interesting. I encourage you to write a book. I'd certainly buy it. I'm not saying I'd believe every word you said, but I don't believe every word I read in any book. I think your insights into a number of controversial characters, i.e. Hall, Sturgis, Lorenz, Rorke--not to mention yourself--would make any book by you a valuable resource for historians, who are trying to make sense of the anti-Castro movement's connection to the JFK assassination. Keep posting.

Edited August 8, 2005 by Pat Speer

[Dawn Meredith]

.

LBJ wanted to use the SR-71 "Blackbird" at mach-3 [blowing out windows from one end of Cuba to the other -- taking low level imagery pics -- still looking for the Soviet nukes that were left behind after the Missile Crisis.

It's all there in Gov't docs.

Respectfully,

GPH

_________________________________

It's my understanding that the SR-71 was not even operational until late 68, by that time LBJ was nearly out of office, announcing his decision not to seek re-election just days prior to the muder of MLK., March 68. (MLK asassinated 4/4/68)

Further, it is my understanding that the "Blackbird" did not do ANY imagery until 1970- Vietnam, and never flew over Cuba.

I doubt by 1968 LBJ was thinking of anything to do with Cuba, concentrating instead on the mess the US was making in Nam.

Dawn

[Gerry Hemming]

.

LBJ wanted to use the SR-71 "Blackbird" at mach-3 [blowing out windows from one end of Cuba to the other -- taking low level imagery pics -- still looking for the Soviet nukes that were left behind after the Missile Crisis.

It's all there in Gov't docs.

Respectfully,

GPH

_________________________________

It's my understanding that the SR-71 was not even operational until late 68, by that time LBJ was nearly out of office, announcing his decision not to seek re-election just days prior to the muder of MLK., March 68. (MLK asassinated  4/4/68)

Further, it is my understanding that the "Blackbird" did not do ANY imagery until 1970- Vietnam, and never flew over Cuba.

I doubt by 1968 LBJ was thinking of anything to do with Cuba,  concentrating instead on the mess the US was making in Nam.

Dawn

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

-----------------------------

Lady Dawn, Esq.:

I presume that you just don't have available the tedious 2 or 3 hours required to search through the relevant F.R.U.S. documents ??!! Once again, as I stated on this thread -- LBJ queried as to the use of the SR-71 so as to avoid the compromising of the U2 ECM ["Electronic Countermeasures"] !!

If I can do the research, why must I then once engage in tutoring that which any capable "researcher" might do on their own time??

GPH

--------------------------------------------------

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxii/44657.htm

RE: SR-71 " Blackbird"

265. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, May 2, 1964.

/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, May 1964, Box 6, Folder 8. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on May 4. According to the President’s Daily Diary the President joined the meeting in progress in the Cabinet Room at 10:40 a.m. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT

Discussion at National Security Council meeting Saturday—2 May 1964 Note: the initial part of the meeting the President did not attend

PRESENT

The President, Rusk, Ball, Johnson, McNamara, Vance, LeMay (representing JCS), Bundy, Dillon, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Thompson Note: Several White House Staff members were present

1. McCone opened the meeting by discussing pages 1 through 3 of the attached May 1st memorandum reviewing actions taken by USIB/2/ on the recommendation of COMOR on the 2nd of April and in the past few days, reaffirming the need for overflights but on a reduced scale and indicating that, except for a most unusual circumstance, two to three flights per week would meet COMOR requirements.

/2/ Attached but not printed, this memorandum noted that there were continuing reports of offensive missiles in Cuba and that most of these reports had been disproved through the examination of concurrent photography. It noted that the vulnerable U–2 aircraft could be made less so if electronic countermeasures (ECM) were used, but that the "continued use of ECM would, in the opinion of experts, permit the early development of counter countermeasures and hence the value of the ECM equipment would rapidly deteriorate." Peripheral photographic reconnaissance "will not provide needed intelligence." The USIB stated that drones "would produce useful photography though not as good as the U–2," but that they were "vulnerable, more so than the U–2." The new CIA-developed high-altitude, high-speed Oxcart reconnaissance aircraft, later known as the SR–71 Blackbird, would "not be operational at the design speed of 3.2 Mach and 85,000 to 90,000 feet for another few months." The CORONA satellite system was judged to be "not sufficient to give us useful photography."

2. Thompson stated that his analysis of recent statements by Khrushchev and Castro indicated that there was a strain between the Soviets and Castro. It appeared to him that Castro is concerned that the relaxed tensions between the U.S. and the USSR exposed Cuba to actions by the U.S. which would not be seriously challenged by Khrushchev.

3. Rusk stated that he felt that the threat was not immediate.

4. McCone contributed the SNIE /3/ which was read carefully and all agreed with the conclusions.

--------------------------------------------------------

/4/ May 4.

c. He called a meeting for 12:00 o’clock noon Tuesday to make a final decision on the use of ECM equipment.

15. During the meeting there was considerable discussion of the use of the Oxcart. I stated that it was my opinion (though I had not checked it out with our operators) that it could be used in a matter of weeks at about 2.2 Mach, 75,000 feet and several months later at 3.2 Mach and 85,000 or 90,000 feet, that its presence would be known because it would appear on the radar and the sonic boom would be audible, it would be more disturbing to people in Cuba than U–2’s because they could not see the U–2 but they would hear the Oxcart, that because of the absence of the Tall King search radar I felt the SAMs with their Fan Song would not be effective on the U–2 because of their short reaction time. I pointed out the use of the Oxcart would compromise it as a reconnaissance vehicle. No decision was reached.

16. McNamara stated that if ECM equipment was used, he felt there would be a 95% or more possibility that the first U–2 that was attacked would survive and come home. He pointed and, and I confirmed, that this would create a new situation as it would demonstrate Castro’s true intentions which were now only a matter of conjecture. McNamara asked that the Contingency Plan be amended to discuss courses of action under such a situation. Cuba 639

17. McNamara then stated that while he does not agree with the Joint Chiefs on the seriousness of the compromise of ECM equipment, he is against using it now, suggests it be kept in readiness, and the question be reviewed from week to week.

18. The actions are as follows:

a. Study the operational capabilities of the Oxcart.

b. Study the vulnerability of the Oxcart. Note: Both of the above to be discussed with JCS Monday afternoon in preparation for Tuesday’s meeting.

c. Develop in detail the Agency position on ECM which varies from the SAG–JCS position.

d. Prepare to supply CIA planes equipped with ECM on short notice until the SAC planes are fully modified.

Note: In this discussion McNamara stated that ECM equipment similar to Systems 13–15 was aboard the Powers’ plane and therefore known to the Soviets.

Action: I would like this explored because this question did not arise in the Powers’ Hearings. /5/ I was very much surprised to hear that Powers had ECM equipment aboard and raised the question in my mind as to why he did not turn it on when he had received the warning. Also I raised the question as to why this matter, if true, was not brought out in the very extensive Hearings with Powers upon his return.

/5/ Francis Gary Powers’ U–2 aircraft was shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. After his release from captivity by the Soviets, he spoke about the U–2 incident at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 6, 1962.

-----------------------------------------------------

) Oxcart. This plane is not ready to fly at its peak capacity and will not be for several months. It is now able to fly mach 2.2 at 75 thousand feet. It could not be shot down but its presence would be detected. The propaganda difficulty would not be relieved because the plane makes a loud sonic boom which would be heard by many people on the ground. Secretary Rusk commented that we might use the Oxcart with its sonic boom and then ask Castro if he preferred that we go back to the silent U–2. This might be something to talk about.

(5) Satellites. Mr. McCone said the camera resolution is not good enough for our purposes. The weather is often difficult and cloud cover is a problem. As to specific targets, it is not possible to synchronize Cuba 643 the satellite so that specific targets would be covered by plan not by coincidence. There is the difficulty of the north and south orbit of present satellites. Only 5% of the island would be covered in a four-day orbit. There is a possibility of an east-west satellite orbit, but it would take at least nine months to establish tracking stations to make such an orbit possible. The expanse of an east-west orbit system would be considerable. In summary, there is no satisfactory alternative to the U–2.

In answer to a question, General LeMay said the B-58 could not do the job even with ECM. The plane is capable of a supersonic burst and the first mission would get through, but following missions would have great difficulty.

---------------------------------------------------

Secretary Rusk concluded by saying that inevitably we must continue the U–2 flights. We should look again, perhaps at a later date, at the possibility of using Oxcart.

The President entered the meeting at 10:45. Secretary Rusk summarized the earlier discussion and Secretary McNamara summarized the conclusions, pro and con, of the use of ECM.

Mr. Bundy said that everyone agrees that overflights are necessary.

Secretary McNamara said the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the use of ECM on U–2s overflying Cuba because of the risk of reducing the effective implementation of our Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). He said that he personally felt we could use the ECM and would have a 95% survival chance of escaping on the first shot if the U–2 immediately aborted. He did not recommend the use of ECM now because he did not think the Cubans were ready to attempt a shoot-down. He recommended that the use of ECM be reconsidered on the basis of a review each week of the risk of a Cuban effort to shoot down a U–2.

In response to a question, both Mr. McCone and General LeMay said that the ECM equipment could be put on the U–2 a very few hours after a decision to do so is made.

Secretary Rusk raised again the feasibility of using the A–11. Mr. McCone described the sonic boom problem with the A–11 which the U–2 does not have. When the A–11 is flying at maximum altitude and maximum speed, it is dubious whether the SAM missile could hit it. It might not even be seen by Cuban radar.

The President said we had no choice but to continue our overflights. However, we should take every precaution to avoid a U–2 being shot down. He asked that we explore again the use of ECM. He asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review their position and to weigh the use of the ECM against the possibility of a U–2 shoot-down and what would flow from that action. We will meet again Tuesday to discuss the matter further. A careful study of the use of the A–11 as an alternative would be available then. We must provide the required intelligence, but we must make every effort to increase the security of the overflight planes. We should get our information in a most secure way and make the overflights as secure as possible. In the meantime, we should continue our present program.

Secretary Rusk said we might consider a mix of overflight instruments such as U–2s, interspersed with the A–11.

Secretary McNamara, referring to the contingency plan in the event a U–2 is shot down, commented that the plan did not discuss what we would do if an ECM-equipped U–2 were shot at but not shot down.

Mr. Bundy said the contingency plan was available for the President’s reading. It provided for military reaction under certain circumstances.

The President expressed an interest in the contingency plan, particularly in view of the fact that he had read in the press all about what Cuba 645 it was supposed to contain. He expressed his irritation that war plans leak to the press. He had gotten almost to a point where he hated to meet with Foreign Ministers because he read in the press the following day everything he had said to the Minister and some things he hadn’t said. Only four people were present at a recent meeting, but reports of what went on appeared in the press. (This apparently referred to a conversation with Foreign Minister Butler.) We must tighten up security and put an end to such press leaks.

Bromley Smith /5/

/5/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

-----------------------------------------------------

6. We then turned to a discussion of the Oxcart. I stated that it was coming along well, giving the figures on the number of flights and the speeds but that all of our operational people, without exception, felt that we must not attempt to use it until it is completely debugged and this would take several months. Furthermore I said that at 2.2 Mach the Oxcart would possibly be vulnerable to SAMs though this was uncertain.

7. Secretary Dillon then asked what the ultimate value of the Oxcart was. I stated that when fully operational it probably would be quite invulnerable except under miraculous circumstances.

------------------------------------------------------

Secretary Rusk asked what was the status of the proposal to use the A–11 plane. Mr. McCone replied that the A–11 was not ready for use. It has been operated successfully but not yet at the maximum speed it is apparently able to reach. It is coming along very well, indeed, but it would be most dangerous to use the A–11 now. The A–11 is vulnerable to flameout and to other operational difficulties. Several additional months are needed for testing to ensure that the plane is fully operational. For example, he said the early versions of the A–11 had to come down to 35,000 feet in order to relight their engines after a flameout. A way around this limitation had been found, but each plane had to be modified to include the new equipment making possible the relighting of the engines without the descent. He said we are on the very far frontier of knowledge and there are many problems remaining. Those who had operated the planes were unanimous in agreeing that it would be reckless to use them over Cuba without further testing. Secretary Mc- Namara said everyone was unanimous in opposing the use of the A–11 for at least several months. Secretary Rusk said that if the Cubans learned an A–11 was flying over they would make every effort to shoot it down.

With respect to the vulnerability of the A–11, Mr. McCone said the plane would be much less vulnerable when it was fully ready. There were many imponderables in trying to decide whether the plane could be shot down. He concluded that it was theoretically possible to shoot down an A–11 if everything used against it worked perfectly, i.e., a perfectly trained crew and a perfect SAM site operation. He reminded the group that although the A–11 cannot be seen, its sonic boom can be heard clearly. Therefore, from Castro’s point of view, the use of the A–11 would be more objectionable than the U–2.

---------------------------------------------------

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

CUBA

We continue to receive reports and rumors of missiles in Cuba and these we disprove by U–2 photography. I would expect a continuation of such rumors and also a continuation of statements by individuals or members of the Congress similar to those we have witnessed in the last two years. I have depended heavily on U–2 photography to dispel these rumors.

While satellite photography will make some input into our intelligence on Cuba, it will not be conclusive because of the resolution of KH–4 and the small area coverage of KH–7. Also we expect disappointments from satellite photography because of uncertain weather conditions encountered in Cuba and the impossibility of synchronizing satellite missions with Cuban weather. It should be noted that every mission targeted against Cuba will involve sacrifices of intelligence gathering capabilities on the Soviet Union and Communist China.

An east-west orbit would be useful but expensive and KH–4 or KH–7 missions in such an orbit, while covering Cuba more satisfactorily than the present north-south orbit, would not produce intelligence of particular interest in other parts of the world.

U–2’s can be flown in the safe corridors and a satellite 112–B camera can be mounted in a U–2 on an angle and thus photography of the defended areas of Cuba as well as the undefended areas can be had with photographic resolution of about 5 feet which will be useful in my opinion and better and cheaper than satellite photography with KH–4 because of resolution and KH–7 because of area coverage. This however would continue the political problem. /3/

/3/ A notation written by McCone following this paragraph reads: "Rusk discussed Cuba with Dobrynin—who says Castro has quit [subversion] against LA and will probably not attempt shoot down flights against missiles or main targets. This might be done by mix of means." A memorandum of this conversation on November 18 is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Document 72.

------------------------------------------------------

_______________________________________________________________________