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Miami newspapers and the CIA


John Simkin
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Guest Tom Scully

No sure way to tell, but it looks like David Corn did not have access to the memoes we've seen, IDing Bohning as AMCARBON-3 or of his 1967 DDP approved

security clearance when Corn interviewed Al Burt in 1994....and Corn certainly could not have had this to influence his conclusions....the additional documents

and Don Bohning\s "agitprop" description of John Simkin make me suspect he was just what Shackley envisioned in his dispatch to Des Fitzgerald:

http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y02/dec02/13e5.htm

CIA spy master Ted Shackley dies at 75

By Carol Rosenberg. Crosenberg@herald.com. Posted on Fri, Dec. 13, 2002 in The Miami Herald.

......LAST DETAILS

He cited this example of Shackley\'s micromanagement style:

After receiving last rites on Sunday, he had his wife summoned a funeral director to their suburban Washington home and he picked out a casket, negotiated the fee and asked to be buried in West Palm Beach, where he was raised and educated before going to the University of Maryland. He died Monday.

http://books.google.com/books?q=des+FitzGe...nG=Search+Books

Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA\'s crusades‎ - Page 113

by David Corn - Political Science - 1994 - 509 pages

"...On April 2, 1964, Shackley sent a report to Des FitzGerald to boast of an

accomplishment: he had bagged Al Burt, the influential Latin America editor of

The Miami Herald In a long dispatch, Shackley described how he had succeeded.

In the fall of 1962, his station began contacting representatives of the local

news media in an attempt to ensure reporters did not disclose the activities

of KUBARK — the Agency\'s code name for itself. And Shackley

noted, \"when a relationship was established with [a Herald employee], it was

carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE might be able to use this contact

at the [Herald] as a means [to] give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which

could be used for surfacing certain select propaganda items.\"

A Herald representative, according to Shackley, offered to notify

Shackley\'s stationif his reporters uncovered any negative information

about the Agency\'s anti-Cuba program.

In return, the Herald expected to receive tips to hot stories.

Eventually, the point man for Shackley at the Herald became Burt, code-named

AMCARBON, who, Shackley reported, cooperated with the station in several ways.

Burt, according to the dispatch, withheld news coverage of exiles disliked by

the CIA. He located an expatriate for Shackley. He informed Shackley when his

paper chased stories of inter-

-114

est to the CIA. He wrote,

He wrote, at Shackley\'s urging, a series on an Agency- favored Cuban defector.

He assigned articles on the basis of suggestions from Shackley. Burt, Shackley noted,

even shared with the CIA chief his conversations with exile leaders, politiciansm

and other journalists and identified his sources. This operation violated the proscription

against CIA domestic activity.

Agency propaganda efforts were supposed to be aimed at foreign targets, not American

newspapers. But since Shackley\'s massive JMWAVE program entailed wide-ranging domestic

actions, it was not odd he showed no qualms about mucking about with American-based

journalists. To FitzGerald, Shackley enthusiastically recommended AMCARBON \"be developed and

harnessed for exploitation, bearing in mind that he does have long-term

potential\" as \"one of the leading Latin American specialists in US journalistic circles.\"

Shackley\'s account of the AMCARBON operation smacked of hyperbole-and might have bordered

on fabrication. Years later, Burt offered an utterly different recollection of the matter, one

suggestive of Graham Greene\'s classic spy novel Our Man in Havana, in

which a British intelligence officer fills his agent list with the names of

of prominent locals with whom he has no contact. The Heralds relationship with Shackley,

according to Burt, began one day in late 1962 when George Beebe, the paper\'s managing editor,

was lunching with William Pawley. Across the room in the restaurant was Shackley.

See that man over there? Pawley asked. You should know him; he\'s the CIA chief in Miami

and the fellow who fed information on the missiles to Hal Hendrix. Before the Cuban missile crisis,

Hendrix, a reporter for The Miami News, had written a number of articles on the presence of

Soviet missiles in Cuba — scoops that would win him the Pulitzer Prize. Beebe was eager to meet

Hendrix\'s source, and Pawley introduced the newsman to

the chief of station. Shortly after that, Beebe passed Shackley to Burt. Burt thought his relationship

with Shackley was nothing unusual. They met for lunch. He occasionally called the CIA man for information.

\"You never felt like you knew him very much,\" he recalled. \"This was a normal news contact.\"

If Shackley ever asked him a question, Burt claimed he answered it courteously,

without compromising himself or a source. In no way did Burt consider himself a Shackley asset.

And he wrote a number of articles for the Herald that detailed Artime\'s

paramilitary operation and the Agency connection to the project — subjects

wanted under wraps. \"Calling me a propaganda outlet was bureaucratic boasting on his part,\"

asserted Burt, who left the Latin American beat in 1965 and never lived up to the to the

potential touted in touted in Shackley\'s memo.

-115

No one in Langley was in a position

to challenge Shackley\'s description of Burt as a hard-won and influential propaganda asset.

His superiors had no way to tell if Shackley was misportraying his contact with

the reporter. Only Shackley and Burt knew the truth about their relationship.

If Shackley wanted to exploit an ordinary contact to score points with the brass,

not much could stop him. In his line of work, there often were opportunities to claim successes

that did not exist. Shackley\'s own boom-and-bang program was over.

But Johnson\'s cease-and-desist order — whether he knew — whether he knew it or not — did not stop

the exile groups supported by the Miami station. In the spring of 1964,

the JMWAVE-backed JURE tried to infiltrate Manuel Ray and a band of commandos into Cuba.

The mission was a nightmare. Ray and his JURE comrades spent days at sea ducking

bad weather and Castro\'s patrols. The exiles landed at Anguilla Cays, forty miles away from Cuba...

http://books.google.com/books?id=lBVDOQxEg...bureaucratic+++

"Brothers" by David Talbot page 423 - footnote 118

Edited by Tom Scully
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  • 11 months later...
... Someone with the crypt Reuteman made the introduction for AMCARBON-2 to JMWAVE, can't tell if he was a Harald employee or not., sounds like it though.

This document is probably our best insight to reveal the extent to which JMWAVE had working relationships with several personnel at the Harald and that Hendrix probably fits one of the CARBON crypts.

Larry, according to Jefferson Morley, Andrew K. Reuteman was an alias for Theodore G. Shackley, close friend of Hal Hendrix.

See Sixth Declaration of Jefferson Morley, Morley v. CIA, C.A. No. 03-2545, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, July 2009, page 3.

Linked at http://thefoiablog.typepad.com/files/sixth...declaration.pdf

and

http://thefoiablog.typepad.com/the_foia_bl...st-the-cia.html

- Steve

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