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Cecil B. Currey carried out a series of interviews with Edward Lansdale in 1984. This resulted in his book, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet America (1988).

There is an interesting passage in the book about the assassination plots against Fidel Castro:

In August 1962, SGA brought intelligence collection to an end. On 10 August, members of SGA met in the office of Dean Rusk, the secretary of state. Others who gathered that day included McNamara, John A. McCone, CIA; Edward R. Murrow, director of USIA; McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser; Edward Lansdale; and others. They met to decide on the next phase of Mongoose. Lansdale suggested they now enter Course B, a plan to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." Lansdale told his fellow SGA members, "We want boom and bang on the island."

Those present that day also discussed assassinating Castro. Given the Kennedys' fixation on getting rid of him and the activities of Harvey's Task Force W, it is difficult to believe that no such conversations occurred earlier. But that day is the first for which specific evidence exists. John McCone later recalled that it was one of the topics, although he claimed that he personally opposed any such action. He thought it may have been McNamara who brought it up, although the secretary of defense later claimed he could not recall any talk of assassination. Walter Elder, McCone's executive assistant, was in his boss's office when McCone telephoned McNamara shortly after the meeting broke up. Elder remembered that McCone told McNamara that "the subject you just brought up. I think it is highly improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It is not an action that should ever be condoned. It is not proper for us to discuss and I intend to have it expunged from the record."

Not knowing McCone's reluctance to have anything left on paper, Lansdale prepared an action memorandum, dated 13 August, which called for the preparation of contingency plans for "Intelligence, Political (including liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited deception) and Paramilitary. " He sent copies to William Harvey, to the State Department's Robert Hurwith, to General Benjamin Harris of the Defense Department, and to Donald Wilson, USIA.

Thirteen years later, the Church Committee of the United States Senate gave a long, hard look at allegations that the government of this country had been involved in various assassination attempts on leaders in other nations. The principals who were involved in Mongoose were called upon to give testimony. There was suddenly a veritable implosion of recall and memory. Few could remember anything pertinent, and those who did could do so only vaguely and with uncertainty.

William Harvey had died by that time so it was acceptable to remember his efforts at planning Castro's assassination. When asked if Harvey kept him advised of what he was doing - the CIA man mounted at least eight different attempts on Castro's life - Lansdale insisted he never knew any details. "It would," he recalled, "have been highly unusual for me to know." Lansdale testified before the Church Committee that "I had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order or permission for such a thing and I was given no information at all that such a thing was going on by people who I have now learned were involved with it."

As a matter of fact, it would have been "highly unusual" had he not known what was planned, given his grasp of detail, his tight control over Task Force W, and his insistence on staying on top of current activity. Yet when grilled by the Church Committee, Lansdale insisted that when the subject was raised on 10 August, "the consensus was ... hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction."

If that was the decision at the 10 August meeting, why then had Lansdale gone ahead to call for "liquidation" of Cuban leaders? He testified that "I thought it would be a possibility someplace down the road in which there would be some possible need to take action such as that [assassination]." His position was simple and straightforward. Every means should be explored for removing the threat posed by Fidel Castro. For that reason he instructed Harvey to develop contingency plans in order to learn if the United States had the capability for "wet" actions.

Why had he circulated his memorandum? Lansdale waffled. "I don't recall that thoroughly. I don't remember the reasons why I would." Was it not his understanding that assassination efforts had already been vetoed at the 10 August meeting? "I guess it is, yes," the general replied. "The way you put it to me now has me baffled about why I did it. I don't know." Lansdale added another disclaimer in his plea of innocence. Although he "had doubts" that assassination was a "useful action, and [was] one I had never employed in the past, during work in coping with revolutions, and I had considerable doubts as to its utility ... I was trying to be very pragmatic." As a good soldier, he admitted that any responsibility must have been his own. General Benjamin Harris was a little more open. He testified that such activities are "not out of the ordinary in terms of contingency planning ... it's one of the things you look at."

Harris was correct. It was not shameful for the Special Group Augmented to look into the possibility of assassination. In a committee composed of members of the highest level of government, it would rather be shameful had they not explored the subject, assigned as they were to promote the destabilization of Cuba. Whether destabilization itself was a proper subject for American attention is an altogether different question that could be fruitfully considered. That was not, however, the assignment given those men during 1962 by the American president!

When Harvey received Lansdale's memorandum, his first thought was of the danger of leaving such records for future investigative committees. He immediately called Lansdale's office and pointed out "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such documents." He further added that CIA "would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it." On 14 August, Harvey wrote Helms stating that although Secretary McNamara had brought up the topic of assassination and Lansdale had written a memorandum about it, liquidation of foreign leaders was not an appropriate subject for inclusion in official records and he further insisted the offending words be deleted from both Lansdale's memorandum and any minutes of the meeting.

Lansdale later recalled only one additional contact with Harvey. He had one brief conversation with the CIA agent after the 10 August meeting. At that time Harvey stated "he would look into it [the assassination of Castro and] see about developing some plans." That, Lansdale insisted, was the last he ever heard about assassinations.

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Cecil B. Currey carried out a series of interviews with Edward Lansdale in 1984. This resulted in his book, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet America (1988).

There is an interesting passage in the book about the assassination plots against Fidel Castro:

In August 1962, SGA brought intelligence collection to an end. On 10 August, members of SGA met in the office of Dean Rusk, the secretary of state. Others who gathered that day included McNamara, John A. McCone, CIA; Edward R. Murrow, director of USIA; McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser; Edward Lansdale; and others. They met to decide on the next phase of Mongoose. Lansdale suggested they now enter Course B, a plan to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." Lansdale told his fellow SGA members, "We want boom and bang on the island."

Those present that day also discussed assassinating Castro. Given the Kennedys' fixation on getting rid of him and the activities of Harvey's Task Force W, it is difficult to believe that no such conversations occurred earlier. But that day is the first for which specific evidence exists. John McCone later recalled that it was one of the topics, although he claimed that he personally opposed any such action. He thought it may have been McNamara who brought it up, although the secretary of defense later claimed he could not recall any talk of assassination. Walter Elder, McCone's executive assistant, was in his boss's office when McCone telephoned McNamara shortly after the meeting broke up. Elder remembered that McCone told McNamara that "the subject you just brought up. I think it is highly improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It is not an action that should ever be condoned. It is not proper for us to discuss and I intend to have it expunged from the record."

Not knowing McCone's reluctance to have anything left on paper, Lansdale prepared an action memorandum, dated 13 August, which called for the preparation of contingency plans for "Intelligence, Political (including liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited deception) and Paramilitary. " He sent copies to William Harvey, to the State Department's Robert Hurwith, to General Benjamin Harris of the Defense Department, and to Donald Wilson, USIA.

Thirteen years later, the Church Committee of the United States Senate gave a long, hard look at allegations that the government of this country had been involved in various assassination attempts on leaders in other nations. The principals who were involved in Mongoose were called upon to give testimony. There was suddenly a veritable implosion of recall and memory. Few could remember anything pertinent, and those who did could do so only vaguely and with uncertainty.

William Harvey had died by that time so it was acceptable to remember his efforts at planning Castro's assassination. When asked if Harvey kept him advised of what he was doing - the CIA man mounted at least eight different attempts on Castro's life - Lansdale insisted he never knew any details. "It would," he recalled, "have been highly unusual for me to know." Lansdale testified before the Church Committee that "I had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order or permission for such a thing and I was given no information at all that such a thing was going on by people who I have now learned were involved with it."

As a matter of fact, it would have been "highly unusual" had he not known what was planned, given his grasp of detail, his tight control over Task Force W, and his insistence on staying on top of current activity. Yet when grilled by the Church Committee, Lansdale insisted that when the subject was raised on 10 August, "the consensus was ... hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction."

If that was the decision at the 10 August meeting, why then had Lansdale gone ahead to call for "liquidation" of Cuban leaders? He testified that "I thought it would be a possibility someplace down the road in which there would be some possible need to take action such as that [assassination]." His position was simple and straightforward. Every means should be explored for removing the threat posed by Fidel Castro. For that reason he instructed Harvey to develop contingency plans in order to learn if the United States had the capability for "wet" actions.

Why had he circulated his memorandum? Lansdale waffled. "I don't recall that thoroughly. I don't remember the reasons why I would." Was it not his understanding that assassination efforts had already been vetoed at the 10 August meeting? "I guess it is, yes," the general replied. "The way you put it to me now has me baffled about why I did it. I don't know." Lansdale added another disclaimer in his plea of innocence. Although he "had doubts" that assassination was a "useful action, and [was] one I had never employed in the past, during work in coping with revolutions, and I had considerable doubts as to its utility ... I was trying to be very pragmatic." As a good soldier, he admitted that any responsibility must have been his own. General Benjamin Harris was a little more open. He testified that such activities are "not out of the ordinary in terms of contingency planning ... it's one of the things you look at."

Harris was correct. It was not shameful for the Special Group Augmented to look into the possibility of assassination. In a committee composed of members of the highest level of government, it would rather be shameful had they not explored the subject, assigned as they were to promote the destabilization of Cuba. Whether destabilization itself was a proper subject for American attention is an altogether different question that could be fruitfully considered. That was not, however, the assignment given those men during 1962 by the American president!

When Harvey received Lansdale's memorandum, his first thought was of the danger of leaving such records for future investigative committees. He immediately called Lansdale's office and pointed out "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such documents." He further added that CIA "would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it." On 14 August, Harvey wrote Helms stating that although Secretary McNamara had brought up the topic of assassination and Lansdale had written a memorandum about it, liquidation of foreign leaders was not an appropriate subject for inclusion in official records and he further insisted the offending words be deleted from both Lansdale's memorandum and any minutes of the meeting.

Lansdale later recalled only one additional contact with Harvey. He had one brief conversation with the CIA agent after the 10 August meeting. At that time Harvey stated "he would look into it [the assassination of Castro and] see about developing some plans." That, Lansdale insisted, was the last he ever heard about assassinations.

I have read Bayard Stockton's biography of Bill Harvey, and I found it fairly interesting. However, Stockton was a protege and contemporary of Harvey's, so the book may be a puff piece.

But, there was nothing in it whcih would imply that Bill Harvey would pursue something as unpatriotic as assassinating a sitting US President.

One of the leaps of belief that one has to take, for example, in accepting St. John Hunt's version of events, which I find compelling (I might add), is the notion that Bill Harvey participated in the JFK assassination.

Did Harvey suffer from intense bitterness about essentially being canned by RFK from the Castro assassination plot (or at least the "official" CIA plot) to a degree which could cause him to participate in the JFK assassination? I don't know, and there isn't much written about Harvey.

And I don't think that simply maintaining his friendship with John Rosselli after he was warned by his superiors to terminate the relationship equates with having the character to assassinate the President.

However, the timing of Rosselli's and Giancana's deaths (in relationship to the HSCA hearings) lead me to conclude that they may have well been actively or peripherally involved in the assassination.

As a result, Harvey's continued relationship with Rosselli may be more sinister than meets the eye.

I would like to know a lot more about Harvey.

He is an interesting figure - I wish that I had known him.

Edited by Christopher Hall
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The CIA meets the mob

Operation Mongoose was a ill conceived operation, an operation between

organized crime and the CIA to actually simply kill Castro, and they had

some various memo's, as a matter of fact I have a few memo's how I ended

up, how they were talking about what they were going to do and so forth...

VO: Here are some of the memo's Chauncey refers to (picture of memo's).

These men participated in a meeting held at a small airport between Palm

Springs and Indio California, the name: Bermuda Dunes.

That meeting......Peter Licavoli and I flew in from Arizona. Sam

Giancana and Johnny Roselli came in from Chicago (pictures of Giancana and

Roselli). William King Harvey came in from Langley. William King Harvey was a

legend in the CIA. He was the only member, he was the only CIA-member

there, but of course he was the one that was laying out the plans.

VO: Who was William King Harvey? (picture of William King Harvey)

Chauncey was well aware of his involvement in other CIA operations.

William King Harvey was the head of Taskforce W. That has been

renamed, originally, that was a part of ZR/Rifle, an Operation called ZR/Rifle, ZR/Rifle was nothing more than an assasination group, that went around the world assasinating people, and

Harvey happened to be the head of ZR-Rifle.

VO: On December 14th 1961 top echelon leaders of the CIA and the mafia

met at Bermuda Dunes airport in Palm Springs to discuss groundrules for

operation Mongoose (picture memo's). Chaunceys memo's of that meeting

show an executive action was planned, executive action means

assasination. The target: The Beard, Castro. The ground rules: CIA only,

maximum security, non attributability, plausible denial, need to know

basis. Harvey set the tone of the meeting at the Bermuda Dunes airport.

They were going to eliminate the Beard and how was going to be done and

just starting as to what personel they were going to hire.

First of all they were trying to decide what cryptonym they were

going to use, because they had decided that they would assign a cryptonym

to end up in the official CIA-files. AM, normally, operations involving Cuba had an AM-start to their cryptonym. So well, we don't wanna use AM, all we anted to do is to start looking down the vest, and MO was some cryptonym for some secure place way out in the Pacific somewhere. So everyone says: Hey, why don't we use the MO and so I said “Well, what (word) is going to go with, what goes with MO, so that it flows, you know? And somebody said: Hey, how about Mongoose? You know, the Mongoose never looses, you know, so that's a good one, you know? So everybody said, everybody agreed: Hey, we call it Operation Mongoose.

VO: (picture of William King Harvey) It is also decided any further

discussions about operation Mongoose would be face to face, nothing in

writing. The CIA's William King Harvey was clearly in charge.

It was a very short meeting because of the fact that, 20 minutes to an hour, it didn't take very long, I mean, he layed it out in precise terms, but these these guys wanted to get out, you know, and take off and uh.....guys like Giancana and Roselli, they were reluctant to get together, and Licavoli too, these high-ranking mobsters

don't like to meet with each other and they rarely do that, so we kept it

short and sweet and that was it.

VO: (picture of CIA-memo) an August 14th 1962 inter office CIA-memo from

William King Harvey to the Director of Clandestine Operations says in part:

Our contract agents in Miami and in Los Angeles have been assured by me

that no reference to this operation appears in our central files.

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Cecil B. Currey carried out a series of interviews with Edward Lansdale in 1984. This resulted in his book, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet America (1988).

There is an interesting passage in the book about the assassination plots against Fidel Castro:

In August 1962, SGA brought intelligence collection to an end. On 10 August, members of SGA met in the office of Dean Rusk, the secretary of state. Others who gathered that day included McNamara, John A. McCone, CIA; Edward R. Murrow, director of USIA; McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser; Edward Lansdale; and others. They met to decide on the next phase of Mongoose. Lansdale suggested they now enter Course B, a plan to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." Lansdale told his fellow SGA members, "We want boom and bang on the island."

Those present that day also discussed assassinating Castro. Given the Kennedys' fixation on getting rid of him and the activities of Harvey's Task Force W, it is difficult to believe that no such conversations occurred earlier. But that day is the first for which specific evidence exists. John McCone later recalled that it was one of the topics, although he claimed that he personally opposed any such action. He thought it may have been McNamara who brought it up, although the secretary of defense later claimed he could not recall any talk of assassination. Walter Elder, McCone's executive assistant, was in his boss's office when McCone telephoned McNamara shortly after the meeting broke up. Elder remembered that McCone told McNamara that "the subject you just brought up. I think it is highly improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It is not an action that should ever be condoned. It is not proper for us to discuss and I intend to have it expunged from the record."

Not knowing McCone's reluctance to have anything left on paper, Lansdale prepared an action memorandum, dated 13 August, which called for the preparation of contingency plans for "Intelligence, Political (including liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited deception) and Paramilitary. " He sent copies to William Harvey, to the State Department's Robert Hurwith, to General Benjamin Harris of the Defense Department, and to Donald Wilson, USIA.

Thirteen years later, the Church Committee of the United States Senate gave a long, hard look at allegations that the government of this country had been involved in various assassination attempts on leaders in other nations. The principals who were involved in Mongoose were called upon to give testimony. There was suddenly a veritable implosion of recall and memory. Few could remember anything pertinent, and those who did could do so only vaguely and with uncertainty.

William Harvey had died by that time so it was acceptable to remember his efforts at planning Castro's assassination. When asked if Harvey kept him advised of what he was doing - the CIA man mounted at least eight different attempts on Castro's life - Lansdale insisted he never knew any details. "It would," he recalled, "have been highly unusual for me to know." Lansdale testified before the Church Committee that "I had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order or permission for such a thing and I was given no information at all that such a thing was going on by people who I have now learned were involved with it."

As a matter of fact, it would have been "highly unusual" had he not known what was planned, given his grasp of detail, his tight control over Task Force W, and his insistence on staying on top of current activity. Yet when grilled by the Church Committee, Lansdale insisted that when the subject was raised on 10 August, "the consensus was ... hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction."

If that was the decision at the 10 August meeting, why then had Lansdale gone ahead to call for "liquidation" of Cuban leaders? He testified that "I thought it would be a possibility someplace down the road in which there would be some possible need to take action such as that [assassination]." His position was simple and straightforward. Every means should be explored for removing the threat posed by Fidel Castro. For that reason he instructed Harvey to develop contingency plans in order to learn if the United States had the capability for "wet" actions.

Why had he circulated his memorandum? Lansdale waffled. "I don't recall that thoroughly. I don't remember the reasons why I would." Was it not his understanding that assassination efforts had already been vetoed at the 10 August meeting? "I guess it is, yes," the general replied. "The way you put it to me now has me baffled about why I did it. I don't know." Lansdale added another disclaimer in his plea of innocence. Although he "had doubts" that assassination was a "useful action, and [was] one I had never employed in the past, during work in coping with revolutions, and I had considerable doubts as to its utility ... I was trying to be very pragmatic." As a good soldier, he admitted that any responsibility must have been his own. General Benjamin Harris was a little more open. He testified that such activities are "not out of the ordinary in terms of contingency planning ... it's one of the things you look at."

Harris was correct. It was not shameful for the Special Group Augmented to look into the possibility of assassination. In a committee composed of members of the highest level of government, it would rather be shameful had they not explored the subject, assigned as they were to promote the destabilization of Cuba. Whether destabilization itself was a proper subject for American attention is an altogether different question that could be fruitfully considered. That was not, however, the assignment given those men during 1962 by the American president!

When Harvey received Lansdale's memorandum, his first thought was of the danger of leaving such records for future investigative committees. He immediately called Lansdale's office and pointed out "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such documents." He further added that CIA "would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it." On 14 August, Harvey wrote Helms stating that although Secretary McNamara had brought up the topic of assassination and Lansdale had written a memorandum about it, liquidation of foreign leaders was not an appropriate subject for inclusion in official records and he further insisted the offending words be deleted from both Lansdale's memorandum and any minutes of the meeting.

Lansdale later recalled only one additional contact with Harvey. He had one brief conversation with the CIA agent after the 10 August meeting. At that time Harvey stated "he would look into it [the assassination of Castro and] see about developing some plans." That, Lansdale insisted, was the last he ever heard about assassinations.

Interesting. So many intelligence volk seem to have excellent and highly selective memories [publicly]. So many of the books about intelligence operatives were written by friends of theirs and tell the 'story' so as not to tell the full story - leaving out or twisting the 'darker' parts. Prouty and others feel quite certain Lansdale was in Dallas and seen passing the 'tramps' - if so; and if [as I and many others think] Harvey had a lot to do with setting-up and then making 'disappear' the (real) shooters - then the above takes on a new dimension. Add to that what the Seagraves have found-out about Lansdale at a different time and place. Spooky [in all senses of that term]!

I thought that Bill Harvey was in Italy on November 22, 1963.

Perhaps he was in Italy to the same extent that EHH was in D.C. on that date.

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Cecil B. Currey carried out a series of interviews with Edward Lansdale in 1984. This resulted in his book, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet America (1988).

There is an interesting passage in the book about the assassination plots against Fidel Castro:

In August 1962, SGA brought intelligence collection to an end. On 10 August, members of SGA met in the office of Dean Rusk, the secretary of state. Others who gathered that day included McNamara, John A. McCone, CIA; Edward R. Murrow, director of USIA; McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser; Edward Lansdale; and others. They met to decide on the next phase of Mongoose. Lansdale suggested they now enter Course B, a plan to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." Lansdale told his fellow SGA members, "We want boom and bang on the island."

Those present that day also discussed assassinating Castro. Given the Kennedys' fixation on getting rid of him and the activities of Harvey's Task Force W, it is difficult to believe that no such conversations occurred earlier. But that day is the first for which specific evidence exists. John McCone later recalled that it was one of the topics, although he claimed that he personally opposed any such action. He thought it may have been McNamara who brought it up, although the secretary of defense later claimed he could not recall any talk of assassination. Walter Elder, McCone's executive assistant, was in his boss's office when McCone telephoned McNamara shortly after the meeting broke up. Elder remembered that McCone told McNamara that "the subject you just brought up. I think it is highly improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It is not an action that should ever be condoned. It is not proper for us to discuss and I intend to have it expunged from the record."

Not knowing McCone's reluctance to have anything left on paper, Lansdale prepared an action memorandum, dated 13 August, which called for the preparation of contingency plans for "Intelligence, Political (including liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited deception) and Paramilitary. " He sent copies to William Harvey, to the State Department's Robert Hurwith, to General Benjamin Harris of the Defense Department, and to Donald Wilson, USIA.

Thirteen years later, the Church Committee of the United States Senate gave a long, hard look at allegations that the government of this country had been involved in various assassination attempts on leaders in other nations. The principals who were involved in Mongoose were called upon to give testimony. There was suddenly a veritable implosion of recall and memory. Few could remember anything pertinent, and those who did could do so only vaguely and with uncertainty.

William Harvey had died by that time so it was acceptable to remember his efforts at planning Castro's assassination. When asked if Harvey kept him advised of what he was doing - the CIA man mounted at least eight different attempts on Castro's life - Lansdale insisted he never knew any details. "It would," he recalled, "have been highly unusual for me to know." Lansdale testified before the Church Committee that "I had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order or permission for such a thing and I was given no information at all that such a thing was going on by people who I have now learned were involved with it."

As a matter of fact, it would have been "highly unusual" had he not known what was planned, given his grasp of detail, his tight control over Task Force W, and his insistence on staying on top of current activity. Yet when grilled by the Church Committee, Lansdale insisted that when the subject was raised on 10 August, "the consensus was ... hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction."

If that was the decision at the 10 August meeting, why then had Lansdale gone ahead to call for "liquidation" of Cuban leaders? He testified that "I thought it would be a possibility someplace down the road in which there would be some possible need to take action such as that [assassination]." His position was simple and straightforward. Every means should be explored for removing the threat posed by Fidel Castro. For that reason he instructed Harvey to develop contingency plans in order to learn if the United States had the capability for "wet" actions.

Why had he circulated his memorandum? Lansdale waffled. "I don't recall that thoroughly. I don't remember the reasons why I would." Was it not his understanding that assassination efforts had already been vetoed at the 10 August meeting? "I guess it is, yes," the general replied. "The way you put it to me now has me baffled about why I did it. I don't know." Lansdale added another disclaimer in his plea of innocence. Although he "had doubts" that assassination was a "useful action, and [was] one I had never employed in the past, during work in coping with revolutions, and I had considerable doubts as to its utility ... I was trying to be very pragmatic." As a good soldier, he admitted that any responsibility must have been his own. General Benjamin Harris was a little more open. He testified that such activities are "not out of the ordinary in terms of contingency planning ... it's one of the things you look at."

Harris was correct. It was not shameful for the Special Group Augmented to look into the possibility of assassination. In a committee composed of members of the highest level of government, it would rather be shameful had they not explored the subject, assigned as they were to promote the destabilization of Cuba. Whether destabilization itself was a proper subject for American attention is an altogether different question that could be fruitfully considered. That was not, however, the assignment given those men during 1962 by the American president!

When Harvey received Lansdale's memorandum, his first thought was of the danger of leaving such records for future investigative committees. He immediately called Lansdale's office and pointed out "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such documents." He further added that CIA "would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it." On 14 August, Harvey wrote Helms stating that although Secretary McNamara had brought up the topic of assassination and Lansdale had written a memorandum about it, liquidation of foreign leaders was not an appropriate subject for inclusion in official records and he further insisted the offending words be deleted from both Lansdale's memorandum and any minutes of the meeting.

Lansdale later recalled only one additional contact with Harvey. He had one brief conversation with the CIA agent after the 10 August meeting. At that time Harvey stated "he would look into it [the assassination of Castro and] see about developing some plans." That, Lansdale insisted, was the last he ever heard about assassinations.

Interesting. So many intelligence volk seem to have excellent and highly selective memories [publicly]. So many of the books about intelligence operatives were written by friends of theirs and tell the 'story' so as not to tell the full story - leaving out or twisting the 'darker' parts. Prouty and others feel quite certain Lansdale was in Dallas and seen passing the 'tramps' - if so; and if [as I and many others think] Harvey had a lot to do with setting-up and then making 'disappear' the (real) shooters - then the above takes on a new dimension. Add to that what the Seagraves have found-out about Lansdale at a different time and place. Spooky [in all senses of that term]!

I thought that Bill Harvey was in Italy on November 22, 1963.

Perhaps he was in Italy to the same extent that EHH was in D.C. on that date.

I am kind of surprised that there has been such sparse activity on this thread since Bayard Stockton's Flawed Patriot was released. The book is and will probably remain, barring some profound turn of events, the definitive book on William Harvey.

There is one flaw, in this book as far as I am concerned, and that is Stockton's consistent mention of how......upset, shocked, scandalized various CIA personnel were at the very idea that someone of the stature of William Harvey, or David A Phillips for that matter, would be considered as being involved in the assassination of JFK.......

It reminds me of the scene in Casablanca, where Captain Renault, [Claude Rains] character closes down Rick's stating "I am shocked, shocked to discover gambling is taking place in this establishment."

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WikiLeaks 1976

Bill Harvey's Old Pals: Don't Call or Write Us - Even if Dave Phillips Sent You

David Sanchez Morales was upset.

A feared man of mercurial temperament, the retired Agency operative phoned from Arizona his old friend and boss Theodore G. Shackley at home in Virginia on a Friday in June 1977.

Dave Morales had previously served as Ted Shackley's faithful chief of operations when Shackley was chief of station in Miami. Morales was calling Shackley with a heads-up: Morales had received a letter from Washington journalist David C. Martin asking for his help with a book Martin was writing about William King Harvey.

Harvey, a rotund former FBI man who was marginalized by J. Edgar Hoover for his maverick style and drinking bouts, was Morales and Shackley's colleague in the CIA's Secret War against Cuba. Code-named Operation Mongoose and run out of CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, Mongoose and its associated covert programs were the tip of the Agency's spear pointed at Cuba, and emanating from the CIA's Miami station known as JM/WAVE.

The content of the Martin letter made Morales believe that their compatriot and propaganda expert David Atlee Phillips (now head of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers) had indiscretly passed Morales's name to David Martin as someone to contact for stories about Bill Harvey. The thought that Phillips would do so angered Morales, who told Shackley that he would not respond to Martin's letter.

Shackley, then in 1977 at the peak of his career as the Agency's Associate Deputy Director for Operations, was not surprised to hear from Morales, a now heavy drinker and legendary covert warrior at the CIA. He had been called by David Martin about Bill Harvey in September 1976. It is unknown if Shackley assisted Martin. However, David C. Martin's article about Bill Harvey, The CIA's 'Loaded Gun' (and subtitled The Life and Hard Times Of 'America's James Bond,' William King Harvey) was published in the Washington Post on October 10, 1976. Notes 1 & 2.

The following Tuesday, June 27, 1977, Shackley notes his conversation with Morales in an internal memo and makes it clear for the record, the Offices of Security and General Counsel, and the office of the Director that he would not help Martin out on a book about the "real or imagined" exploits of Harvey.

The next evening, June 28, former Berlin operating base chief David E. Murphy (who worked with Shackley and Morales in Berlin) called Dave Phillips about a letter he had just received from David Martin. The letter mentioned Dave Phillips as a reference for Martin's bona fides and asked for Murphy's help with Martin's proposed Harvey book. During the phone call, Dave Phillips praised David Martin and tried to convince Murphy of Martin's discretion and reliability. Murphy had none of it. He told Phillips he would not to discuss covert operations with Martin, nor would he reply to Martin's letter. His wife was recuperating from cancer and he didn't want people calling his house.

The next day, June 29, Murphy told Bruce L. Solie, Chief of the Security Analysis Group, about the Martin letter. The SAG speculated in a memo regarding Morales's call to Shackley that Dave Phillips was collaborating with David Martin on his Bill Harvey book by providing Martin with the names and addresses of former Agency employees that knew Harvey.

The SAG memo circulated among top brass: Dave Phillips's problematic conduct in releasing to a journalist the names of CIA covert operators linked to Bill Harvey had to be contained.

The situation was sensitive. Phillips had retired in 1975 and formed the ARIO to champion, lobby, and promote the cause of intelligence. He had a good rapport with many at the Agency. The Office of Security wanted General Counsel to contact Phillips; others wanted Shackley, a former close covert co-worker, to call him. In the end, Director of Security Robert W. Gambino had John K. Greaney, a lawyer in the General Counsel office, call Phillips sometime around July 20, 1977.

During the call, Dave Phillips told Jack Greaney that David Martin gave Phillips a list of names that Martin wanted to speak to, and Phillips would contact those persons on Martin's behalf. Phillips told Greaney that he never gave contact information to Martin unless the former employees were willing to meet with Martin and give Phillips permission to release their information first. Phillips told Greaney that this is precisely what happened with Dave Morales and two others.

In other words, according to Dave Phillips's explanation as recorded by Jack Greaney, Phillips contacted Dave Morales on Martin's behalf, Morales expressed a willingness to meet with Martin, and Morales gave Phillips permission to release his contact information to David Martin. Only then (according to Phillips' version) did Martin write to Morales asking about Bill Harvey.

If Dave Phillips is to be believed in what he told Jack Greaney, then Dave Morales was not being truthful to Ted Shackley when Morales implied that Dave Phillips had surreptitiously released Morales' name to David Martin.

If Dave Morales is to be believed in what he implied to Ted Shackley, then Dave Phillips was not forthcoming with the Office of General Counsel in stating that Morales had given Phillips consent to release Morales' name and address to David Martin.

Gaeton Fonzi, investigator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, discusses in his book The Last Investigation how Dave Phillips appeared before the Assassination Committee in August 1978 for an informal session of off-the-record questioning about Dave Phillips' actions in Mexico City when Lee Harvey Oswald was there. At the end of the session, Fonzi asked Phillips: "By the way, do you know what happened to Dave Morales"?

Phillips answered: "No, not really. Last I heard he was down in the Southwest, I don't know where. I think maybe New Mexico." Note 3.

When questioned by the HSCA in 1978, apparently - after a year - Dave Phillips didn't recall his own claims to the Agency in 1977 (1) that he wrote or spoke to Dave Morales in Arizona the summer before; (2) that Morales expressed to him a willingness to meet Martin; (3) that Morales gave him permission to release his name and address to Martin; (4) that he had subsequently given Morales' name and Arizona contact information to writer David Martin for a book about Bill Harvey; and (5) that the above events became such a problem for the Agency that they had to call him about it and ask him to stop leaking names and addresses.

Was Dave Phillips of a forgetful mind when it came to his contacts with and memory of his former action man and paramilitary expert David S. Morales, or was he intentionally dissembling in front of the HSCA? Note 4.

Was Dave Phillips improperly passing protected identities from the ARIO roster to a journalist, or was he merely fulfilling his role as the head of the ARIO in promoting intelligence officers and their history by permissively feeding David Martin some leads?

Was Dave Phillips lying to his former employer when called on the carpet about his actions, or was he merely acting with the consent of Dave Morales and others, who wanted to share a few memories about Bill Harvey for David Martin's book?

There always seems to be a few sides to the story with David A. Phillips.

---

The leak was plugged, and David Martin's book about Bill Harvey and James Angleton, the well-reviewed Wilderness of Mirrors, was eventually completed and published in 1980.

Today, David C. Martin barely recalls Phillips's involvment in helping him obtain contacts for his research about Bill Harvey. Martin did not know about the flap it caused at Langley. Note 5.

-- Steve Rosen

If the hyperlinks don't work, the first linked document is located in several places, including: http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...amp;relPageId=2

NARA Record Number: 104-10121-10116

Other references, as well as a version of the first document attempting to censor Morales' name (except in one perhaps mistaken spot) are located in Dave Phillips's OS/SAG HSCA files:

http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...mp;relPageId=50 (and other pages from 45 to 55).

NARA Record Number: 1993.07.21.16:11:16:210280

Note 1: David C. Martin, The CIA's 'Loaded Gun', The Washington Post, October 10, 1976, p. 33. An excerpt from the archives of www.washingtonpost.com:

"THERE SHOULD have been more people there when they buried Bill Harvey last June. In a way, when the most controversial clandestine operator in CIA history died of a heart attack at 60, it was the end of an era. Twelve months before his death, William King Harvey had been a key witness in the Senate intelligence committee's investigation of the CIA's futile efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro. "

Note 2: David C. Martin's article, The CIA's 'Loaded Gun', is posted on The Harold Weisberg Archive at Hood College, found at http://jfk.hood.edu/. The article is linked at:

http://jfk.hood.edu/Collection/Weisberg%20Subject%20Index%20Files/C%20Disk/CIA%20Harvey%20William%20King/Item%2002.pdf

Any copyrights are those of the original copyright owners.

Note 3: Gaeton Fonzi, The Last Investigation (New York: Thunder's Mouth, 1993), p. 368.

Note 4: Dave Phillips had reason to be circumspect about David Morales. According to Phillips's autobiography, The Nightwatch, he had worked with Morales, who he called "El Indio", in 1954 to overthrow Jacob Arbenz in Guatemala, and in other operations. "El Indio" was a paramilitary expert and back-alley man. David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1977), p. 49. There was apparently a close working relationship between the two men that remains nearly completely in shadow. Dave Morales was the sword to Dave Phillips's pen.

Note 5: Telephone interview with David C. Martin by Steve Rosen, June 28, 2011.

---

Robin Finn, many thanks for posting part of one of the documents already.

Edited by Steve Rosen
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Cecil B. Currey carried out a series of interviews with Edward Lansdale in 1984. This resulted in his book, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet America (1988).

There is an interesting passage in the book about the assassination plots against Fidel Castro:

In August 1962, SGA brought intelligence collection to an end. On 10 August, members of SGA met in the office of Dean Rusk, the secretary of state. Others who gathered that day included McNamara, John A. McCone, CIA; Edward R. Murrow, director of USIA; McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser; Edward Lansdale; and others. They met to decide on the next phase of Mongoose. Lansdale suggested they now enter Course B, a plan to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." Lansdale told his fellow SGA members, "We want boom and bang on the island."

Those present that day also discussed assassinating Castro. Given the Kennedys' fixation on getting rid of him and the activities of Harvey's Task Force W, it is difficult to believe that no such conversations occurred earlier. But that day is the first for which specific evidence exists. John McCone later recalled that it was one of the topics, although he claimed that he personally opposed any such action. He thought it may have been McNamara who brought it up, although the secretary of defense later claimed he could not recall any talk of assassination. Walter Elder, McCone's executive assistant, was in his boss's office when McCone telephoned McNamara shortly after the meeting broke up. Elder remembered that McCone told McNamara that "the subject you just brought up. I think it is highly improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It is not an action that should ever be condoned. It is not proper for us to discuss and I intend to have it expunged from the record."

Not knowing McCone's reluctance to have anything left on paper, Lansdale prepared an action memorandum, dated 13 August, which called for the preparation of contingency plans for "Intelligence, Political (including liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited deception) and Paramilitary. " He sent copies to William Harvey, to the State Department's Robert Hurwith, to General Benjamin Harris of the Defense Department, and to Donald Wilson, USIA.

Thirteen years later, the Church Committee of the United States Senate gave a long, hard look at allegations that the government of this country had been involved in various assassination attempts on leaders in other nations. The principals who were involved in Mongoose were called upon to give testimony. There was suddenly a veritable implosion of recall and memory. Few could remember anything pertinent, and those who did could do so only vaguely and with uncertainty.

William Harvey had died by that time so it was acceptable to remember his efforts at planning Castro's assassination. When asked if Harvey kept him advised of what he was doing - the CIA man mounted at least eight different attempts on Castro's life - Lansdale insisted he never knew any details. "It would," he recalled, "have been highly unusual for me to know." Lansdale testified before the Church Committee that "I had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order or permission for such a thing and I was given no information at all that such a thing was going on by people who I have now learned were involved with it."

As a matter of fact, it would have been "highly unusual" had he not known what was planned, given his grasp of detail, his tight control over Task Force W, and his insistence on staying on top of current activity. Yet when grilled by the Church Committee, Lansdale insisted that when the subject was raised on 10 August, "the consensus was ... hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction."

If that was the decision at the 10 August meeting, why then had Lansdale gone ahead to call for "liquidation" of Cuban leaders? He testified that "I thought it would be a possibility someplace down the road in which there would be some possible need to take action such as that [assassination]." His position was simple and straightforward. Every means should be explored for removing the threat posed by Fidel Castro. For that reason he instructed Harvey to develop contingency plans in order to learn if the United States had the capability for "wet" actions.

Why had he circulated his memorandum? Lansdale waffled. "I don't recall that thoroughly. I don't remember the reasons why I would." Was it not his understanding that assassination efforts had already been vetoed at the 10 August meeting? "I guess it is, yes," the general replied. "The way you put it to me now has me baffled about why I did it. I don't know." Lansdale added another disclaimer in his plea of innocence. Although he "had doubts" that assassination was a "useful action, and [was] one I had never employed in the past, during work in coping with revolutions, and I had considerable doubts as to its utility ... I was trying to be very pragmatic." As a good soldier, he admitted that any responsibility must have been his own. General Benjamin Harris was a little more open. He testified that such activities are "not out of the ordinary in terms of contingency planning ... it's one of the things you look at."

Harris was correct. It was not shameful for the Special Group Augmented to look into the possibility of assassination. In a committee composed of members of the highest level of government, it would rather be shameful had they not explored the subject, assigned as they were to promote the destabilization of Cuba. Whether destabilization itself was a proper subject for American attention is an altogether different question that could be fruitfully considered. That was not, however, the assignment given those men during 1962 by the American president!

When Harvey received Lansdale's memorandum, his first thought was of the danger of leaving such records for future investigative committees. He immediately called Lansdale's office and pointed out "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such documents." He further added that CIA "would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it." On 14 August, Harvey wrote Helms stating that although Secretary McNamara had brought up the topic of assassination and Lansdale had written a memorandum about it, liquidation of foreign leaders was not an appropriate subject for inclusion in official records and he further insisted the offending words be deleted from both Lansdale's memorandum and any minutes of the meeting.

Lansdale later recalled only one additional contact with Harvey. He had one brief conversation with the CIA agent after the 10 August meeting. At that time Harvey stated "he would look into it [the assassination of Castro and] see about developing some plans." That, Lansdale insisted, was the last he ever heard about assassinations.

Interesting. So many intelligence volk seem to have excellent and highly selective memories [publicly]. So many of the books about intelligence operatives were written by friends of theirs and tell the 'story' so as not to tell the full story - leaving out or twisting the 'darker' parts. Prouty and others feel quite certain Lansdale was in Dallas and seen passing the 'tramps' - if so; and if [as I and many others think] Harvey had a lot to do with setting-up and then making 'disappear' the (real) shooters - then the above takes on a new dimension. Add to that what the Seagraves have found-out about Lansdale at a different time and place. Spooky [in all senses of that term]!

I thought that Bill Harvey was in Italy on November 22, 1963.

Perhaps he was in Italy to the same extent that EHH was in D.C. on that date.

I am kind of surprised that there has been such sparse activity on this thread since Bayard Stockton's Flawed Patriot was released. The book is and will probably remain, barring some profound turn of events, the definitive book on William Harvey.

There is one flaw, in this book as far as I am concerned, and that is Stockton's consistent mention of how......upset, shocked, scandalized various CIA personnel were at the very idea that someone of the stature of William Harvey, or David A Phillips for that matter, would be considered as being involved in the assassination of JFK.......

It reminds me of the scene in Casablanca, where Captain Renault, [Claude Rains] character closes down Rick's stating "I am shocked, shocked to discover gambling is taking place in this establishment."

I agree with Peter that some books are written by friends, and Bayard Stockton was, by Stockton's admission, a friend and admirer of Bill Harvey.

As a result, it may be a puff piece book.

I wish that a more objective author would write a book on Harvey.

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  • 2 years later...

Jesse Ventura was on Piers Morgan on April 4, 2011 promoting his new book 63 Documents the Government Doesn't Want You to Read.

Morgan asked: John F. Kennedy's assassination ... who did that?

Ventura: It was done by William Harvey, who was the head of the CIA's assassination unit at that time. David Morales was directly involved in it. He likewise is the man, the gentleman who killed Che Guevara, down in Bolivia in '67, when they put him up against the firing wall and killed him, and shot and killed him, Morales was part of that.

Ventura bases this on E. Howard Hunt's somewhat dubious deathbed confession.

Still, it was interesting to hear these names mentioned on prime-time CNN.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MYKHT2nTUXY&feature=related

Check out the four part interview (the above is part 2 beginning with the JFK part).

It's good, even though Morgan uses a number of straw-man arguments, like (paraphrased) "You believe in every conspiracy!"

Edited by Steve Rosen
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And on CNN's American Morning on April 5, 2011:

Kiran Chetry: "63" for when Kennedy was shot, right? Why'd you write the book?

Jesse Ventura: Because Dick Russell and I felt 63 was a great number. That was the year Jack Kennedy was killed ... [On the show Conspiracy Theory] We had a confession. E. Howard Hunt confessed to his son St. John Hunt on his deathbed. He said it was called the "Big Event". He was on the fringes of it. He named who it was. It was William Harvey, who at that time was head of the CIA's assassination team, and David Sanchez Morales. And he is also famous for something else, you know what? He killed Che Guevara, in Bolivia, in 1967, when they put Che against the wall and executed him. Sanchez used to wear Guevara's Rolex as a trophy ... What does it matter today? Because if you can kill our President and get away with it, then what can't you do? I challenge you that.

Again, very interesting to hear these shadowy names bandied about on a brightly-lit morning talk show.

The link is here (about 40 seconds in):

http://amfix.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/05/jesse-ventura-talks-conspiracy-theory-2012-presidential-race/

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  • 1 year later...
Guest Tom Scully
I do have this image but as a 5 X 7 hard copy. My scanner hasn't been working for some time so I have not copied it. The version I have shows the image flipped to the one John posted. I asked my contact who gave me the print originally to send me an electronic version.

My comments were based on the photographs of William Harvey on your Photo-Archive website. According to Gus Russo, the photograph came from his second wife, Clara Follich.

The best book on William Harvey is David C. Martin's Wilderness of Mirrors (1980). It is a dual biography of William Harvey and James Angleton. As one can expect, Harvey hated Angleton and suspected him of being a Soviet mole. Harvey never forgave Angleton for stopping the arrest of Philby when his mates, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, fled to the Soviet Union in May 1951.

(quote name='Tim Gratz' post='47008' date='Dec 2 2005, 11:19 AM']Debra's timeline is very helpful in understanding the sequence of events. I've looked at it many times.

I really recommend Norman Mailer's book "Harlot's Ghost." It is a great read and has a hilarious rendition of the last meeting between Harvey and Rosselli.(/quote)

Thanks Tim. I plan on updating it with more documents and source notes this year. Anyone like to assist let me know.

A few years ago Gus Russo told me he knew a fellow that was writing a biography of Harvey and that Harvey's wife was assisting him. I later heard he couldn't get a publisher. If anyone knows the writer's name, I'd like to contact him and see if he has material he would share with us. Russo also had Harvey's personal copy of the Church committee Vol 5 with Harvey's marginalia. He published a few pages in his book (stacked on top of each other) and sent me copies of the complete pages. I'll see where I've filed them and post them here if you folks are interested.

Best,

Debra

Clara Grace Harvey, 86, had distinguished Army, CIA career

Indianapolis Star - Oct 3, 2000

While in the CIA, Mrs. Harvey set up "safe houses" for Communist defectors and helped transfer funds to agents during the height of the Cold War. She retired ...

http://archiver.root...3-01/1043443332

http://boards.ancest...rw/Zh.2ADI/1824

Message Board Post:

I am not related to the below lady and have no further information. (But she

sounds like a fascinating individual.)

Indianapolis News/Indianapolis Star, Tuesday, October 3, 2000, B4

Clara Grace Harvey, 86, had distinguished Army, CIA career

Memorial services for Clara Grace "C.G." Follick Harvey, 86, Indianapolis, a

former member of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army, will be at

1:30 p.m. Oct. 5 in Pleasantview Lutheran Church, of which she was a member.

There will be no calling.

Burial will be in Danville (Ind.) South Cemetery.

She died Oct. 1.

While in the CIA, Mrs. Harvey set up "safe houses" for Communist defectors

and helped transfer funds to agents during the height of the Cold War. She

retired after 25 years of service.

According to an article published in The Indianapolis Star in March 1999, she

was on secret flights accompanying families of German scientists brought here

for rocket research, including the family of Werner von Braun.

In 1942, she graduated with the first Women's Army Corps officers class and

was sent to Washington to serve with the Army adjutant general's office,

eventually attaining the rank of major.

Mrs. Harvey accompanied Eleanor Roosevelt as liaison when the first lady

inspected training camps.

She also was the first Women's Army Corps adjutant to Gen. George C. Marshall

during World War II.

Mrs. Harvey also was adjutant to Gen. Lucian K. Truscott II, who was the

first CIA station chief in postwar Germany.

Previously, she taught international studies at Indiana University and the

University of Michigan.

She is listed in Who's Who of Distinguished American Women.

Mrs. Harvey was a member of the Riviera Club, American Contract Bridge

League, Central Intelligence Retirees Association, Association of Former

Intelligence Officers and the Heritage Foundation.

A graduate of Ohio University, she was a member of Pi Lambda Theta and Alpha Delta Pi sororities.

Memorial contributions may be made to the church or American Heart Association.

She was the widow of William King Harvey.

Survivors: children Sally Harvey-Koelpin, James Drenan Harvey; three grandchildren.

Flanner & Buchanan Broad Ripple Mortuary is handling arrangements.

Flawed Patriot: The Rise And Fall of CIA Legend Bill Harvey - Google Books Result

books.google.com/books?isbn=1574889907...Bayard Stockton - 2006 - Biography & Autobiography - 357 pages

... than pure business, but CG's jealousy may well have been about business because Rita knew all the secrets, including the tunnel, which were denied to CG.

...........................................................................................................

CIA backed Eugene McCarthy in '68 v. RFK

Started by Paul Rigby, May 28 2007

(quote name='Tom Scully' timestamp='1298251484' post='219925')

Len,

In addition to Finney, ex-CIA Tom McCoy was hired and Herzog, who you cited in your post, seems kind of biased....

(quote)http://www.google.co...d42d5ed5aa1eb1e

McCarthy's National Field Director Quits

Pay-Per-View - Los Angeles Times - May 19, 1968

Also appointed to assist McCarthy in his West Coast campaign Saturdaywas Tom McCoy 50 an other former CIA official Ile will travel with the sr in Oregon and ...

http://news.google.c...ney mccoy&hl=en

Inside Report ..Mccarthy Amateur Aides! Downgraded For New...

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette - Jun 29, 1968

Moreover, Arthur Herzog, instant rapport with Finney," boycotted the Chicago meet and was ... Finney's men— official Tom mccoy and Herzog— will be upgraded. ... (/quote)

Nathaniel, nice surprise to read a new post from you, you're contributions have been missed around here.

(/quote)

Flawed Patriot: The Rise And Fall of CIA Legend Bill Harvey - Page 100

books.google.comBayard Stockton - 2006 - 357 pages - Google eBook - Preview

Dave and Star Murphy mention Rita Chappiwicki, who was Harvey's BOB secretary after Maggie Crane.1 Star once happened upon CG “shrieking” at Rita at a Berlin party. Maybe, indeed, there was more to Harvey's relationship with his ..

http://www.nytimes.c...dead-at-50.html

Rosalynn Carter's Secretary, Rita R. Merthan, Dead at 50

AP

Published: December 5, 1981

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4— Rita Regina Merthan, who worked as Rosalynn Carter's personal secretary, died today at Georgetown University Hospital.

She had been admitted to the intensive care unit Thursday suffering from cardiac arrest. Mrs. Carter issued a statement from her home in Plains, Ga., saying that she and former President Carter were ''sho cked by Rita Merthan's untimely death.''

''Rita was a highly qualified professional assistant who brought loyalty, competence and sound judgment to her work in the White House,'' Mrs. Carter said. ''She was also a close friend.''

The 50-year-old Mrs. Merthan, who was recording secretary at the National Women's Democratic Club, had also been employed as an executive secretary at the Central Intelligence Agency.

She is survived by her husband, Lawrence C. Merthan, a lawyer in Washington, a daughter, Mollie, 15, and by her mother, Mary Chapowicki of Worcester, Mass.

The funeral will be held Monday.

Was Secretary To Mrs. Carter In White House

The Washington Post Dec 5, 1981 - pg. B5

.....A native of Worcester, Mass., Mrs. Merthan attended Boston University and the University of Maryland pro- gram in Frankfurt, Germany. before joining Mrs. Carter's staff, she worked for the Central Intelligence Agency for 14 years and was an ex- ecutive secretary there....

Eugene McCarthy & the Shadows of Time; A Maverick's Memories: The Ex-Senator Holds Forth Eugene McCarthy

By Jim Naughton Washington Post Staff Writer. Jun 2, 1987. p. C1

.....McCarthy confronted the great what's next without Abigail, his wife of 24 years. The couple seperated in August 1969, but never divorced.

Friends say they grew apart during the campaign as McCarthy enjoyed his celebrity. larry Merthan, McCarthy's lawyer and first legislative aide, says McCarthy became impatient with his wife's perfectionism. "He'd come into the office in the morning, 'Call Jesse Unruh to wish him Happy Birthday'. His whole day was mapped out and he got tired of it. Mind you, she was a good politician, he says........

http://www.nytimes.c...-c-merthan.html

LAWRENCE C. MERTHAN

Published: October 04, 1987

Lawrence C. Merthan, a lawyer and public relations specialist, died of cancer Wednesday at his home in Washington. He was 69 years old.

Mr. Merthan, a native of St. Paul, received his law degree from the University of Minnesota in 1949. His Washington career, spanning 28 years, included the job of legislative counsel to Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota. His last position was that of government relations counselor for Hill & Knowlton, the public relations concern.

He is survived by his wife, Claudia; a daughter,.....

Washington Post - October 2, 1987 pg. 48

.....Mr. Merthan practice law in St. Paul ....in 1958 and 1959, he was in Germany as a member of the U.S. Education Commission.........

Edited by Tom Scully
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Guest Tom Scully

Was it just another of these series of coincidences against a million to one odds, we researchers into this tangled web so commonly encounter, or did the CIA have three consecutive U.S. Presidents of the democratic party under close surveillance throught the "services" of two sisters, Elizabeth Chapowicki Shedlick and Rita Chapowicki Merthan? Elizabeth's husband is descirbed as, "first as a consultant to President Lyndon B. Johnson on federally funded education programs..." and

".....He joined the Department of Commerce in the early 1970s. From 1979 to 1990, he was director of the International Congress Office of the Travel and Tourism Administration with the U.S. Embassy in Paris. His primary duty was to promote international tourism and trade.

Returning to Washington, he wrote speeches for the president, the secretary of commerce, U.S. ambassadors and other government officials."

Did it ever occur to a U.S. president or his closest aides, to instruct the Secret Service to look for and to screen out from intimate contact inside the White House, persons closely associated with key CIA officials, their aides and assets, and those closely associated with same? I would have thought it would be an obvious directive issued by JFK, certainly by LBJ, and even by Secret Service managers, acting on their own initiative. If for no other reason, and certainly there are many, because it was and is illegal for the CIA to operate domestically. Hoover must have had some awareness..... Was it a bug or a feature, on the part of the SS, FBI, and ONI that the sister of William King Harvey's executive secretary in Frankfurt was installed in the White House to care for JFK and LBJ whenever they were ailing, an installation of Navy Nurses into the White House that coincided almost exactly with the election of JFK? Hmmmmm......

RitaMerthanRosalynnCarter.jpg

http://www.camplejeuneglobe.com/carolina_living/article_9bf3f5cb-1732-56e3-adb9-a96d5d98311a.html

Navy Nurses Celebrate 100 Years of Dedicated Service

....In February 1961, Navy Nurses LTJG Elizabeth Chapowicki and LTJG Dolores Cornelius are assigned to the White House Medical Unit (WHMU). Although, Navy Nurses attended to the medical care of the president as far back as the Woodrow Wilson administration, these two nurses are the first military nurses to serve in the WHMU. They also assisted with Hurricane Relief that same year on the Texas coast following the hurricane”Carla” and in Honduras following the devastating Hurricane “Hattie”

In 1962 the Nurse Corps Anesthesia Program was established at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD....

Youngstown Vindicator - Jun 22, 1961

He Is being attended by a Navy nurse, Lt. Elizabeth Chapowiclci, ... They had . sought news conferences several times since the President continued

RitaMerthanSisterNurseJFK.jpg

Us

‎Virgin Islands Daily News - Oct 15, 1965

...The President is tended in his suite by Lieut. Elizabeth Chapowicki, a Navy nurse who cared for. him during the January-virus at- . He is surrounded by familiar items brought from his White . House office ...

Worcester Telegram Gazette - Sep 19, 2007

... is also featured, as well as former White House nurse Elizabeth Chapowicki, who is shown in a picture treating a hospitalized President Lyndon B. Johnson. .........................................................................................................................................................

Worcester Telegram Gazette - Dec 19, 2004

FREDERICK, MD Mr. Edward F. Shedlick, 76, of Frederick, died on Thursday, December 16, 2004 at ... He was the husband of Elizabeth Chapowicki Shedlick. .....

The Washington Post

December 21, 2004 Tuesday

Final Edition

SECTION: Metro; B06

HEADLINE: Edward Shedlick; Commerce Official, Former Priest

Edward F. Shedlick, 76, a Catholic priest for more than a decade in the Washington area who, after leaving the priesthood, entered government service, died of a stroke Dec. 16 at his home in Frederick. He worked for the Department of Commerce for nearly 30 years.

Mr. Shedlick was born in Brooklyn, N.Y., and graduated from Bishop Loughlin High School in Brooklyn, where he was class president and a member of the baseball and track teams. At Madison Square Garden in 1946, he set the New York high school high jump record on his final jump. He also competed as a high jumper in the Penn Relays.

He attended Manhattan College in Riverdale, N.Y., on a track scholarship and graduated from St. Francis College in Brooklyn in 1950 with a bachelor's degree in philosophy. He entered the Immaculate Conception Seminary in Huntington, N.Y., in 1950 and completed his training for the priesthood at the Regina Cleri Seminar in Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada, in 1955, with graduate studies in philosophy, theology and history. He studied at Catholic University from 1960 to 1962, with an emphasis on psychology and counseling.

Mr. Shedlick was ordained a priest in 1955 by then-Archbishop Patrick O'Boyle at the Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception. He served as associate pastor and canonical administrator of the Church of the Annunciation in the District from 1955 to 1964 and as first assistant pastor of the Church of St. Martin of Tours in the District from 1964 to 1967. He served as ordinary confessor to the Sisters at the Convent of the Little Flower before receiving a papal dispensation from Pope Paul VI in 1967, which officially allowed him to return to lay service.

He took his skills as an administrator and in dealing with people into government service, first as a consultant to President Lyndon B. Johnson on federally funded education programs and then, in 1969, as a founding member of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise.

He joined the Department of Commerce in the early 1970s. From 1979 to 1990, he was director of the International Congress Office of the Travel and Tourism Administration with the U.S. Embassy in Paris. His primary duty was to promote international tourism and trade.

Returning to Washington, he wrote speeches for the president, the secretary of commerce, U.S. ambassadors and other government officials.

He retired from the International Trade Administration in the Commerce Department in 1998.

He resided in Montgomery Village from 1969 to 2001, when he moved to Frederick.

Survivors include his wife of 37 years, Elizabeth A. Shedlick of Frederick; three children, .......... a brother, Thomas J. Shedlick of Alexandria; a twin sister, Mary Hickson of Durham, N.C.; and two grandchildren.

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If the person standing in the back of the OR where Dr. Crenshaw and Doctor Shires were working on a dying Lee Harvey Oswald the afternoon of 11,24,1963 and whom Dr. Crenshaw described as looking like Oliver Hardy was truly Harvey, any speculations about the purpose of Harvey's presence there and right at that time?

Was Harvey there to make sure Oswald didn't talk? Too perhaps help Oswald into the afterlife if Ruby's close up blast didn't do this?

Or if Oswald did talk, to make sure whatever he said would not be passed on by Crenshaw and whoever else was present in that room and who may have heard Oswald speak?

Edited by Joe Bauer
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