The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing: Decoys, Aliases and NeoConspiracy Theories

[Len Colby]

Huh? Originally you wrote:

Now the story is that she (McNanmara ,above ) was demoted to NSA England !!!

WHAT !! ??!!! BULL PUCKY...A breaucrate stuck in an ugly building for over twenty years in Maryland gets to go live= shop = tour ENGLAND !! LET THE TERROR ATTACK BEGIN !!!!!!!!!!!!!•DEMOTED ??? BALONEY !!!!!!!!!

Then just over 24 hours later you completely reversed your position:

==============

Barbara A. McNamara was the NSA's Deputy Director from October 1997 until June 2000, prior to becoming NSA's Senior U.S. Liaison Officer in London, ...

Deputy Director to Liaison Officer ???? DEMOTION/PROMOTION

ANSWER DEMOTION

oh yeah but they gave her a metal .....

[…]

BUT GAAL THE BALTIMORE SUN SAYS PROMOTION

BUT COLBY THE SUN IS IN THE NSA'S POCKET

http://articles.balt...deputy-director

============

read second article here

http://cryptome.org/nsa-wars.htm

============== NOW IF READ RE McNAMARA above link AND

NOW IF YOUR BRAIN IS DEAD YOU BELIEVE PROMOTION.

So do you believe...?

1. 
   the "offical story" is that she was demoted and that you'd have to stupid to believe that because she obviously was promated
   OR THAT
   

2) the "official story" is that she was promoted and that you'd have to stupid to believe that because she obviously was demoted.

[Steven Gaal]

2) the "official story" is that she was promoted and that you'd have to stupid to believe that because she obviously was demoted.

BUT NOT DEMOTED TO HER ( AS A MIDDLE AGED PROFESSIONAL WOMAN HAVING THE ENGLAND EXPERIENCE) AND IT KEPT HER OUTTA TOWN FOR MOST INQUIRIES (OFFICIAL/UNOFFICIAL)

YOUR 2) BELIEVE THIS ?? THIS IS THE TRUTH.

Wayne Madsen in an audio I heard stated that she was demoted. Madsen gets leaked info both true and false. I 'believe' he puts both out to keep contact with his former intel community (and also the amount of info he processes allows him to continue operations $$ to garner more info. A complex situation). With a deep background in CT true/false can be judged. IS IT SPINNING OR REAL INFO ? THIS TAKES THOUGHT. (MORE THOUGHT THAN JUST SWALLOWING WASHPO/NYT WHOLE HOG)

Edited March 16, 2013 by Steven Gaal

[Steven Gaal]

THE CIA INSIDE THE CIA

Posted 29 August 2011 - 07:50 PM

Blee helped early and late (just before 911) by hiding/delaying/disinforming on AQ/911 people.

Blee part of a Secret Team ??? You see just after planning 911 the plotters had to be protected. Blee helps them flee.

*******************************oooooooo*******************************************

Link below shows numerous attempts by CIA to stop investigations.

link http://www.historyco...malaysia_summit

--------------------oooooooo------------------------------+

samples of link datum

(1)

January 12, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Chief Falsely Claims Malaysia Surveillance Is Continuing

Richard Blee, head of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, gives an incorrect briefing to his CIA superiors about surveillance of al-Qaeda operatives in Southeast Asia. He claims that Malaysian authorities and the CIA are continuing to monitor al-Qaeda operatives who gathered for a summit in Kuala Lumpur (see January 5-8, 2000). In actual fact, three of the summit’s attendees, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Khallad bin Attash, have already left Kuala Lumpur for Bangkok and have disappeared there (see January 8, 2000). The 9/11 Commission will say that Blee is “unaware at first even that the Arabs had left Kuala Lumpur, let alone that their trail had been lost in Thailand” and that he “may not have known that in fact Almihdhar and his companions had dispersed and the tracking was falling apart.” These statements will be sourced to an interview with Blee in December 2003 and contemporary CIA documents. However, Alec Station is well aware of the departure of the three men, as it was notified of this and sent a follow-up cable on January 9 telling the CIA station in Bangkok to find them there (see January 9, 2000). It is unclear why Blee gives such an inaccurate briefing, but he gives a similar one two days later (see January 14, 2000), after Alec Station is again reminded that the three radicals are in Thailand, not Malaysia (see January 13, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181, 354, 502

ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo********ooooooooooooooooooooooooo+

(2)

January 14, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Chief Again Falsely Claims Malaysia Surveillance Is Continuing

Richard Blee, head of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, again wrongly informs his CIA superiors about surveillance of al-Qaeda operatives in Southeast Asia. Repeating a claim made in a briefing two days previously (see January 12, 2000), he says that Malaysian authorities and the CIA are continuing to monitor al-Qaeda operatives who gathered for a summit in Kuala Lumpur (see January 5-8, 2000). In actual fact, three of the summit’s attendees, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Khallad bin Attash, have already left Kuala Lumpur for Bangkok (see January 8, 2000). Alec Station is well aware of the departure of the three men, as it was notified of their departure and sent a follow-up cable on January 9 telling the CIA station in Bangkok to find them there (see January 9, 2000). In addition, one day before this briefing the CIA station in Bangkok sent Alec Station a cable saying it was unable to locate the men in Thailand (see January 13, 2000). The 9/11 Commission will also point out that “there is no evidence of any tracking efforts actually being undertaken by anyone after the Arabs disappeared into Bangkok.” It is unclear why Blee gives such an inaccurate briefing. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181, 354]

Edited March 17, 2013 by Steven Gaal

[Len Colby]

2) the "official story" is that she was promoted and that you'd have to stupid to believe that because she obviously was demoted.

BUT NOT DEMOTED TO HER ( AS A MIDDLE AGED PROFESSIONAL WOMAN HAVING THE ENGLAND EXPERIENCE) AND IT KEPT HER OUTTA TOWN FOR MOST INQUIRIES (OFFICIAL/UNOFFICIAL)

YOUR 2) BELIEVE THIS ?? THIS IS THE TRUTH.

Wayne Madsen in an audio I heard stated that she was demoted. Madsen gets leaked info both true and false. I 'believe' he puts both out to keep contact with his former intel community (and also the amount of info he processes allows him to continue operations $$ to garner more info. A complex situation). With a deep background in CT true/false can be judged. IS IT SPINNING OR REAL INFO ? THIS TAKES THOUGHT. (MORE THOUGHT THAN JUST SWALLOWING WASHPO/NYT WHOLE HOG)

OK so:

- You had an undocumented claim from a source even you acknowledge is unreliable and reported it as fact without any indication that it was of questionable reliability and you wish that to be taken seriously?

- When you thought the official story was that she was demoted you thought was absurd and when a day later you saw a newspaper article saying she was promoted you immediate reversed your view and decided that was absurd, and you wish that to be taken seriously?

From Wikipedia

“Barbara A. McNamara was the NSA's Deputy Director from October 1997 until June 2000, prior to becoming NSA's Senior U.S. Liaison Officer in London, England (a post traditionally awarded to NSA Deputy Directors before they retire.)”

“In August 2006, [William B.] Black [NSA Deputy Director 2000 - 6]was replaced by John C. Inglis, and offered to take over the position as liaison officer to NSA's British intelligence counterpart."

From your favorite paper:

The National Security Agency's second-highest official is being forced out by the agency's director, who is moving to install his own leadership team nine months into his tenure, current and former government officials said yesterday.

Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the NSA's director, announced in a memo to agency employees last week that Deputy Director William B. Black Jr. would be taking a new position in mid-August as the NSA's liaison officer to its British intelligence counterpart, the officials said.

[...]

It is not uncommon for top officials in positions such as Black's to seek overseas assignments in their final years at the agency, said Ira Winkler, a former NSA analyst.

Such assignments pay 25 percent more than those in the United States, he said, and retirement pay is based on an employee's salary for the last three years of his career.

http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-05-31/news/0605310010_1_alexander-black-spy-agency

So she got a 25% pay bump which resulted in a 25% increase in her retirement pay and as you put it went from being “stuck in an ugly building for over twenty years in Maryland...to go live= shop = tour ENGLAND” but held a less critical position.

IT KEPT HER OUTTA TOWN FOR MOST INQUIRIES (OFFICIAL/UNOFFICIAL)

Don't you read the stuff you copy n' paste? She left her post as Deputy Director in June 2000.According to her NSA bio she “retired in 2003” presumably in June thus shortly after the 9/11 Commission began its hearings, and there are currently at least 7 London – Washington flights a day that take about 8 1/2 hours. Also the Dec. 1999 article YOU cited which cited Hersh indicated she was going to be pushed out because see was identified as “the main roadblock” to reforms new director Michael Hayden wanted to implement. Don't you read your own stuff?

[Len Colby]

THE CIA INSIDE THE CIA

Posted 29 August 2011 - 07:50 PM

Blee helped early and late (just before 911) by hiding/delaying/disinforming on AQ/911 people.

Blee part of a Secret Team ??? You see just after planning 911 the plotters had to be protected. Blee helps them flee.

*******************************oooooooo*******************************************

We are getting increasingly off topic and we already have discussed the whole Blee business. The stuff from the Timeline is more indicative of problems at midlevel than at the top of the CIA

[Steven Gaal]

When you thought the official story was that she was demoted // end Colby NO I KNEW MADSEN HAD SAID SO

and I knew from my MOM, going to England for a middle age female after a desk job is a JOY. Thus I never thought it was demotion and when I found the Baltimore Sun article I LOLed,saying to myself seems something off here.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

From this thread we see:

Lets see McNamara (NSA) blocks info, Blee (CIA) blocks info, CIA blocks Morgenthau DA. I see a pattern. Pattern ? Pattern ?? see below

====================================================

The CIA Deliberately Misspells Terrorists' Names and Bypasses TSA to Let Terrorists Fly

By / January 13th, 2010

==========

The CIA Misspells Al Qaeda Terrorists Names and Bypasses TSA to Let Terrorists Fly – A DCBureau.org Exclusive

11 Jan 2010

DCBureau.org

Press Release

WASHINGTON – (Business Wire) One of the 9/11 hijackers appeared on the no-fly list with a deliberately misspelled name. The CIA supplied that name just like they did Umar Farouk Abulmutallab’s. DCBureau is publishing the page from the 2006 no-fly list with the misspelled 9/11 hijacker’s name.

Veteran investigative reporters Susan and Joseph Trento, who first obtained and exposed the flaws in the no-fly list in 2006, have completed a new investigation of the CIA’s role in airline security. It reveals that the CIA is bypassing other government agencies and following terrorists on airplanes without telling TSA or the airlines involved. It shows how terrorists and nuclear proliferators have been allowed to fly because the CIA has refused to add their correct names or aliases to the no-fly list.

Part I of their two-part investigation –“The No Fly List”– is posted on the DCBureau.org Web site. The two part investigation reveals:

The CIA deliberately misspells names and does not provide aliases of suspected terrorists and criminals who are being targeted for recruitment or have relationships with the agency when it passes names on to the National Counterterrorism Center to be integrated in the Terrorism Identity Datamart Environment (TIDE), Selectee, and no-fly lists.

Khalid al-Mihdhar was known to the CIA as one of two men who had attended a meeting of Al Qaeda officials in Malaysia before coming to the United States. That hijacker was also a Saudi Arabian intelligence agent with the General Intelligence Directorate, the Saudi agency that works closely with the CIA. Al-Mihdhar was on the no-fly list as “al-Midham.” Al-Mihdhar helped fly American Airline Flight 77 into the Pentagon on 9/11. Fourteen other 9/11 hijackers appeared on the list five years after they had supposedly died in the attacks. The report also discloses the CIA refused to share language software that would vastly ease problems in matching Arab names to other government agency lists.

DCBureau reveals that the CIA in 2006 deliberately allowed a flight school associate of the 9/11 hijackers to fly to New Zealand and lost track of him only to have New Zealand authorities learn that he had signed up for airline training.

DCBureau reports that Issa Abdullah (Cleven Holt) is not on the no-fly list even though he was a suspect in the Beirut Marine Barracks bombing and was suspected of planning attacks on US troops in Bosnia during a visit by President Clinton. Holt visited the United States last fall and had no trouble flying into the country.

All articles published by DCBureau.org can be reprinted for free with attribution by any outlet.

DCBureau.org

Joseph Trento, 202-466-4310

mobile: 202-255-2441

http://www.earthtime...a,1114977.shtml

Edited March 17, 2013 by Steven Gaal

[Len Colby]

When you thought the official story was that she was demoted // end Colby NO I KNEW MADSEN HAD SAID SO

and I knew from my MOM, going to England for a middle age female after a desk job is a JOY. Thus I never thought it was demotion and when I found the Baltimore Sun article I LOLed,saying to myself seems something off here.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

LOL classic example of your thinking you are so allergic to what the MSM says that when you read something that agrees with a previously held position you decide to reverse it 180 degrees. It is had to classify it as a promotion or demotion, she was forced out from the #2 spot but this seems to be a traditional move for top level NSA officials nearing retirement, her pay and pension were bumped 25% and she went from working at a military base between DC & Baltimore to London.

But none of this relevant because there no evidence her ouster was related to 9/11, let alone the WTC bombing.

From this thread we see:

Lets see McNamara (NSA) blocks info, Blee (CIA) blocks info, CIA blocks Morgenthau DA. I see a pattern. Pattern ? Pattern ?? see below

====================================================

Shermer, who is well known for his skepticism and criticism of 9/11 conspiracy theorists, and conspiracy theorists in general, is actually somewhat kind to them, in much of the same way that Jonathan Kay was in his book, pointing out that people who hold these fringe beliefs are not idiots, but may actually be fairly smart, it is just their brains are hardwired to act this way. Shermer's thesis is essentially that the brain is built around recognizing patterns (see Jeff Hawkin's excellent On Intelligence for an in-depth examination of this) and "conspiracies" are the ultimate patterns.

The problem, Shermer argues, is that we have to recognize patterns to survive, he uses the famous example of a caveman recognizing the rustle of grass made by an approaching predator, but we are extremely bad at detecting fake patterns. And, as he points out, this is worse among certain people, especially when they are stressed or feeling insecure, which is something that has been proven through experimentation. For example when made to feel stressed test subjects are more likely to recognize objects in a completely random pattern of dots than control subjects.

http://screwloosecha...arch?q=patterns

The CIA Misspells Al Qaeda Terrorists Names and Bypasses TSA to Let Terrorists Fly – A DCBureau.org Exclusive

11 Jan 2010

DCBureau.org

Press Release

WASHINGTON – (Business Wire) One of the 9/11 hijackers appeared on the no-fly list with a deliberately misspelled name. The CIA supplied that name just like they did Umar Farouk Abulmutallab’s. DCBureau is publishing the page from the 2006 no-fly list with the misspelled 9/11 hijacker’s name.

Veteran investigative reporters Susan and Joseph Trento, who first obtained and exposed the flaws in the no-fly list in 2006, have completed a new investigation of the CIA’s role in airline security. It reveals that the CIA is bypassing other government agencies and following terrorists on airplanes without telling TSA or the airlines involved. It shows how terrorists and nuclear proliferators have been allowed to fly because the CIA has refused to add their correct names or aliases to the no-fly list.

Get back to us with the evidence this was deliberate, Arabic names are written in the Arabic alphabet and thus need to be transliterated.

Edited March 17, 2013 by Len Colby

[Steven Gaal]

PATTERN PATTERN PATTERN. CT PEOPLE CALL THE PEOPLE OF willful unbelief in Conspiracy,

COINCIDENSE KOOKS (CK). I predict a CK will respond with another weak response.

PLEASE NOTE WHEN THE CIA/NSA/FBI ARE HAVING, "supposed faulty investigations" that aid the terrorists, there is additional parallel activity of warnings,State Department passport approval ,foreknowledge and military exercises that help the terror attack of 911.

Willful unbelief is the only explanation (or being paid to have a false position) for non-belief in 911 false flag. Belief in 911 false flag is the only intelligent Gordian knot cutting of the known datum.

######################################

The Warning from Mossad

The Mossad’s emblem. The motto states, “By way of deception, thou shalt do war”

At the same time that the FBI was getting close to investigating Alhazmi and Almihdhar, the Mossad, Israel’s feared secret service, gave the US an urgent warning, according to recent reports from Germany. These reports say that on August 23, 2001, the Mossad gave the CIA a list of terrorists living in the US and said that they appeared to be planning to carry out an attack in the near future. The list of terrorists contained 19 names. It is unknown if these are the same exact 19 names as the actual hijackers or if the number is a coincidence. However, four names on the list are known and were names of the 9/11 hijackers: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. It appears that a spy ring run by the Mossad had been closely following these terrorists for many months. In December 2000, Mossad agents rented an apartment in Hollywood, Florida, close to where Atta and Alshehhi were staying and attending flight school. They were closely spied upon until at least April 2001, when many of the Israeli agents were thrown out of the country. [Die Zeit, 10/1/02, Der Spiegel, 10/1/02, BBC, 10/2/02, Haaretz, 10/3/02] It has not been stated how the Mossad knew of Alhazmi and Almihdhar, but a Drug Enforcement Administration report on the Israeli spy ring internally released in June 2001 (and leaked after 9/11) noted the presence of Israeli spies in San Diego, California and Phoenix, Arizona at times when Alhazmi and Almihdhar would have been in those cities. [DEA Report, 6/01] Yet, apparently this warning and list were not treated as particularly urgent by the CIA and also not passed on to the FBI. [Der Spiegel, 10/1/02]

The Israeli Ambassador to the US reacted to these reports by denying there were any Mossad agents in the US, [Haaretz, 10/3/02] despite widespread reports saying there were (see for instance, [Fox News, 12/12/01, Le Monde, 3/5/02, Reuters, 3/5/02, Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 3/15/02,Forward, 3/15/02, Salon, 5/7/02, ABC News, 6/21/02]). Die Zeit, however, claims that the Congressional inquiry on 9/11 has learned about these Mossad agents and warnings, and presumably will discuss them in a future session about warnings from foreign governments. [Die Zeit, 10/1/02] Up until now, the inquiry claims no evidence has surfaced that any US intelligence agency knew the names of any of the hijackers before 9/11, except for Alhazmi, Almihdhar and Salem Alhazmi, Nawaf’s brother. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02]

The “All-Points Bulletin”

On August 23, 2001, perhaps goaded by the Mossad warning given on the same day, the CIA sent out what Newsweek later called an “all-points bulletin” to the State Department, Customs, INS and FBI, instructing them to put Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar on the terrorist watch list “due to their confirmed links to Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives and suspicious activities while traveling in East Asia.” [Newsweek, 6/2/02, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] If the Mossad warning is true, it is very curious that Atta and Alshehhi’s names were not also added to the watch list at the same time, especially given media reports that Atta was already under surveillance in Germany in early 2001. [Observer, 9/30/01, Berliner Zeitung, 9/24/01]

Strangely, the FAA and the airlines were not notified about anyone at this time, even though procedures were in place for law enforcement agencies to share watch list information with the airlines and airports and despite the fact that such sharing was commonplace.[Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01]As a result, two days later, no flags were raised when Almihdhar booked a reservation in his real name over the American Airlines web site for his 9/11 flight. [Washington Post, 9/16/01] On September 27, two days after that, Alhazmi purchased two airline tickets with his credit card, also using his real name.[Newsweek, 6/2/02, MSNBC, 12/11/01] An official later stated, “Had we had information that those two individuals presented a threat to aviation or posed a great danger, we would have put them on the list and they should have been picked up in the reservation process.” [Washington Post, 10/2/02]

The CIA claimed the bulletin was labeled “immediate,” the second most urgent category. An intelligence official told the Los Angeles Times that the label meant, “It’s an emergency,” adding, “It’s rare you would get a cable anything higher. This is the upper end of the scale.” [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/01] But the FBI denied that the warning was marked “immediate.” Nor did Congress’s Joint Inquiry Staff report indicate that the label had been used either. In fact, it seems that most agencies treated the alert as a routine matter. [Los Angeles Times, 10/18/01, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02]

The bulletin also requested that Khallad bin Atash be added to the watch list—eight months after he was determined to have been the main planner of the Cole bombing. One other person from the Malaysian meeting was also included, but that name remains confidential (could it be Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11?). [New York Times, 9/21/02]

Interestingly, the CIA’s warning to the FBI came exactly one day after John O’Neill had been forced out of the FBI. Because he had fallen out of favor a few months earlier, he was never told about Ken Williams’s flight school memo, nor the internal conflict over Zacarias Moussaoui. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/02] Nor was he at a meeting in June when the CIA revealed some of what they knew about Alhazmi and Almihdhar. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/02] One can only wonder what the government’s “most committed tracker of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network of terrorists” would have done with the watch list warning. [New Yorker, 1/14/02]

A Halfhearted Search Gets Blocked

At the time the bulletin was issued, the CIA believed that Almihdhar was probably already in the US. While the inclusion of his name on the watch list would have prevented him from leaving the country, it couldn’t help find him inside the US. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] So a search for them was needed. But, as the Wall Street Journal explained, the search “consisted of little more than entering their names in a nationwide law enforcement database that would have triggered red flags if they were taken into custody for some other reason.” [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] It apparently did little good—not even a speeding ticket that had been issued to Alhazmi the previous April was detected. [Daily Oklahoman, 1/20/02] Nor was a recorded interaction between Alhazmi and local police in Fairfax, Virginia in May that could have led investigators to Alhazmi’s East Coast apartment. [san Diego Union-Tribune,9/27/02]

Despite the presumed urgency of the alert, the FBI field offices in Southern California were not notified of the status of the two men on the watch list, even though the two had entered the US through the Los Angeles International Airport. [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] The Los Angeles Times pointed out that the FBIs “aggressive action” did not even include checking California drivers license records or VISA card records (the VISA cards were used to buy 9/11 tickets), both of which contained the names of Almihdhar and Alhazmi. [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/01]

FBI and CIA officials talk about the Alhazmi and Almihdhar case behind screens to shield their identities from the general public. [New York Times]

On August 28, a report was sent to the FBI’s New York office recommending that an investigation be launched “to determine if Almihdhar is still in the United States.” The New York office tried to convince FBI headquarters to open a criminal investigation, but they were immediately turned down, the reason being that Almihdhar could not be tied to the Cole investigation without the inclusion of sensitive intelligence information. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] The reason for this had to do with the barrier, or so-called “wall,” that allowed the CIA to withhold information from its domestic counterpart when the former had cause to believe that a criminal investigation could disclose the “methods” and “sources” of its intelligence.

Instead of a criminal case, the New York office was forced to open an “intelligence case,” thus excluding all the “criminal case” investigators from the manhunt for Almihdhar and Alhazmi. As such, all “criminal case” agents were prohibited from taking part in the search for the two Saudis. [FBI Agent Testimony, 9/20/02]

Expressing his frustration at the impasse, one FBI agent wrote in an e-mail on August 29, “Whatever has happened to this—someday someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’ Let’s hope the [FBI’s] National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL [usama bin Laden], is getting the most ‘protection.’” [New York Times, 9/21/02, FBI Agent Testimony, 9/20/02]

On August 28, the FBI contacted both the State Department and INS in an effort to determine where Almihdhar had entered the US. However, neither agency was asked “to assist in locating the individuals, nor was any other information provided [that] would have indicated either a high priority or imminent danger,” explained the Joint Inquiry Staff report. Even more disturbing was the revelation that the INS felt that “if it had been asked to locate the two suspected terrorists, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, in late August on an urgent, emergency basis, it would have been able to run those names through its extensive database system and might have been able to locate them.” Similarly, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the State Department said, “that it ha[d] extensive means of locating individuals who are involved in visa fraud or visa violations and also contend[ed] that it might have been able to locate the two suspected terrorists if it had been asked to do so.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02]

The next day, August 29, the FBI learned that when Almihdhar arrived in the US on July 4, 2001, he had indicated that he would be staying at a Marriott hotel in New York City. But by September 5, the records of all New York area Marriott hotels had been investigated and not one contained any reference to the wanted Saudi. Then on September 10, the FBI New York office asked the FBI Los Angeles office to check registration records for all Sheraton Hotels in Los Angeles (where Almihdhar said he would be staying when he had entered the country in January 2000). [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] The Los Angeles office did not receive the request until shortly after the attacks. [senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02] The search was conducted after 9/11 with negative results. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] The San Diego office wasn’t notified about the two Saudis wanted status until September 12, and even then they were only provided with “sketchy” information. [Los Angeles Times, 9/16/01]

To the dismay of several distraught investigators, after 9/11 it was discovered that Alhazmi and Almihdhar had actually lived remarkably open lives—so open in fact that had the FBI searched the public records in San Diego, they would have quickly come across their names. Alhazmi’s name in particular was quite visible. It was everywhere—he had used it to register a car, get a drivers’ license, a credit card, [south Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01] open a bank account- it was even in the phone book. [Newsweek, 6/2/02] It is even possible that the FBI—had they located these records—would have found them at their official residences. According to some accounts, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, were living in San Diego until the very week of the attacks.

On the morning of 9/11, Alhazmi and Almihdhar raised no special alarms or special security screening when they arrived at Dulles Airport before the scheduled 8:10 a.m. departure of the flight they would help hijack. [Cox News, 10/21/01]

Two Places at Once?

The current historical record provides a very ambiguous and problematic account of Hani Hanjour, Alhamzi and Almihdhar’s whereabouts and activities in the days and weeks preceding 9/11.

The official story has them on the East Coast during all of August and September. The Wall Street Journal reported that on August 1, Almihdhar, along with Hanjour, was in Falls Church, Virginia, using an illegal scheme to obtain Virginia driver’s licenses. [Wall Street Journal, 10/16/01] On August 10, Alhazmi and Hanjour, and perhaps others, flew to Las Vegas. [New York Times, 11/6/01] where they met with Atta and other hijackers until August 14. They then returned to Baltimore [New York Times, 11/6/01] and on August 20, Alhazmi and Hanjour rented a car in New Jersey for the next ten days. [CNN, 9/26/01, New York Times, 9/21/01, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01] On September 1, Alhazmi stayed at the Pin-Del hotel in Laurel, Maryland [Newsday, 9/23/01] and then joined others at another hotel in Valencia, Maryland where they stayed until 9/11. [st. Petersburg Times, 9/27/01, Newsday, 9/23/01] During this time, from September 2 through 6, Almihdhar and Alhazmi, as well as Salem Alhazmi, Majed Moqed, and Hani Hanjour, were all seen working out at Gold’s Gym in Greenbelt, Maryland. [AP, 9/21/01, Newsday, 9/23/01] Credit card receipts revealed that Nawaf Alhazmi shopped at a Macy’s and a Champs store at a mall in Wayne, New Jersey on September 9. [CNN, 9/26/01]

However, neighbors at the Parkwood Apartments in San Diego were clear in their assertions that Alhazmi, Almihdhar and even Hanjour had all stayed in San Diego until days before 9/11. One report suggested they left Parkwood Apartments around September 1. [san Diego Union-Tribune, 9/16/01] But most other accounts placed their departure later. One report stated, “Authorities believe Almihdhar, Hanjour and Alhazmi… moved out a couple of days before the East Coast attacks.” [san Diego Channel 10, 11/1/01] Ed Murray, a resident at the complex, said that all three “started moving out Saturday night—- and Sunday [september 9] they were gone.” (This is the same day that Alhazmi was shopping in New Jersey!)[san Diego Channel 10, 9/14/01, San Diego Channel 10, 9/20/01] These accounts corroborate a neighbor’s recollection of seeing them get into a limousine late one night only a few days before 9/11. These neighbors had seen them on other occasions in previous months, and gave no indications to suggest they’d been gone for long stretches of time. [Time, 9/24/01] Yet supposedly, Alhazmi and Hanjour leased an apartment in Paterson, New Jersey during the six-month period preceding the attacks. [ABC News, 9/23/01]

One might argue that they had multiple addresses and that these inconsistencies can be explained by frequent cross-country flights and inaccurate eyewitness testimonies. This may be. However, one should also allow for the possibility that there were multiple people using the same names at the same time. Could one set of hijackers using the names of Almihdhar, Alhazmi and possibly Hanjour have been living in San Diego, while another set with the same names were living on the East Coast?

The media has shown these three pictures of Almihdhar. Could the man in the far right picture be the “other” Khalid Almihdhar?

The Truth Must Come Out

The recent Congressional Intelligence Committee report on who knew what and when about Alhazmi and Almihdhar resembles more a whitewash than a true investigation. The FBI, CIA and others are taken at their word, even though they are known to have lied about this very issue in the past.

For instance, up until June 2002, the CIA maintained that it had not learned of Almihdhar’s connections to al-Qaeda or his visits to the US until August 2001. [New York Times, 6/3/02] But as is well-known now, these links had been established by US intelligence before the January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. If it had not been for leaks and the diligent work of investigative journalists, this information would never have made it to the public. Another example of their tendency to misrepresent the truth was made apparent when the FBI claimed it had begun “an aggressive, ‘full field’ investigation” immediately after the August 23 bulletin. But to the embarrassment of the FBI, it was discovered that the agency did not conduct even the simplest and most basic of searches, neglecting to check national databases of bank records, credit card records, and so on. [Newsweek, 6/2/02] The CIA and FBI’s inability to concur on whether or not the August 23 warning was labeled “immediate” is another case in point.

Another curious inconsistency is that the Congressional inquiry failed to mention that both Alhazmi and Almihdhar lived in California with FBI informant Abdussattar Shaikh from September until December 2000. The Congressional report stated that while Alhazmi had lived in the informant’s home until December, “official records have Almihdhar leaving the US on June 10, 2000, and not returning until July 4, 2001.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] But this is in complete contradiction to all previous media reports, the accounts from neighbors, and quotes from Abdussattar Shaikh himself! [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01, Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01, San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/16/01, Newsweek, 9/9/02] There is a similar unwillingness to admit that Hanjour was in the US in the year 2000 before December, again because that would contradict immigration records. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] With actions like this, the investigation is further obscuring the truth, not uncovering it.

The Congressional committee, the mainstream media, and major US officials have all repeatedly stated that there was no “smoking gun”—no single thing they could have done differently to stop the attacks. For instance, on June 7, 2002, President Bush purported, “Based on everything I’ve seen, I do not believe anyone could have prevented the horror of September the 11th.” [sydney Morning Herald, 6/8/02] This is clearly wrong. Alhazmi and Almihdhar were the smoking gun—many times over. The Wall Street Journal claimed that even if the FBI knew the two had entered the US early on, “more-vigilant law enforcement is unlikely to have caught all of them.” Then they alleged, “it’s difficult to imagine how to prevent [terrorists] from operating here in the future without making the nation less free, less open and less tolerant of outsiders.” [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] But with what we now know of the connections between Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the other hijackers, it is clear all of them could have been caught, as FBI agents themselves have conceded. The gross failures and even crimes of intelligence officials should not be used as an excuse to destroy our freedoms.

Questions, Questions

The most serious questions have not even been asked by the Congressional committee. What does FBI informant Abdussattar Shaikh really know? Why does he contradict neighbors’ claims that Mohamed Atta was a frequent visitor to his house? Who do phone records show Alhazmi and Almihdhar called so frequently? Was there a deliberate sabotage of John O’Neill’s investigation in Yemen? Why did the CIA fail to share information on Alhazmi and Almihdhar? Why were even well known, top level terrorists like Khallad bin Atash not put on watch lists, much less investigated? Could the meetings in late night limousines have been the communication link between the hijackers and some group outside of al-Qaeda? Do we really know the true identities of the hijackers? Why can’t we see the video footage of them passing through airport security? Why does the FBI still use a photo of an innocent man for Salem Alhazmi? Is there any reason to believe Khalid Almihdhar is still alive?

Most importantly, at what point do incompetence and bureaucratic barriers cease to be reasonable explanations for so many failures surrounding Alhazmi and Almihdhar? Could the US government have been protecting these two for some reason? When will investigators and the media start asking these difficult questions?

Edited March 18, 2013 by Steven Gaal

[Len Colby]

PATTERN PATTERN PATTERN. CT PEOPLE CALL THE PEOPLE OF willful unbelief in Conspiracy,

COINCIDENSE KOOKS (CK). I predict a CK will respond with another weak response.

PLEASE NOTE WHEN THE CIA/NSA/FBI ARE HAVING, "supposed faulty investigations" that aid the terrorists, there is additional parallel activity of warnings,State Department passport approval ,foreknowledge and military exercises that help the terror attack of 911.

Willful unbelief is the only explanation (or being paid to have a false position) for non-belief in 911 false flag. Belief in 911 false flag is the only intelligent Gordian knot cutting of the known datum.

I guess Scientific American must be "in on it". And you should have used the word 'data' not 'datum'.

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=patternicity-finding-meaningful-patterns

######################################

The Warning from Mossad

The Mossad’s emblem. The motto states, “By way of deception, thou shalt do war”

LOL I would have expected a bible thumping fanatic to have know the motto was from Proverbs 24:6, the King James translation is “For by wise counsel thou shalt make thy war”

http://bible.cc/proverbs/24-6.htm

At the same time that the FBI was getting close to investigating Alhazmi and Almihdhar, the Mossad, Israel’s feared secret service, gave the US an urgent warning, according to recent reports from Germany. These reports say that on August 23, 2001, the Mossad gave the CIA a list of terrorists living in the US and said that they appeared to be planning to carry out an attack in the near future.

Doesn't this debunk the notion the Mossad was behind the attacks?

If you'd bothered to check you'd have noticed that none of the links work, thus its difficult to verify the claims. But since you routinely post stuff you haven't bothered to read or watch expecting you to have checked the links is unrealistic.

It appears that a spy ring run by the Mossad had been closely following these terrorists for many months. In December 2000, Mossad agents rented an apartment in Hollywood, Florida, close to where Atta and Alshehhi were staying and attending flight school.

LOL the long ago debunked Israeli art student carp, are we back in 2006?

http://911myths.com/index.php/Israeli_Art_Students

[Steven Gaal]

Datum is not a favored usage (but language is determined by the people ,not elites). HOWEVER IT IS A SINGULAR FORM OF DATA !!! AND THATS MY POINT !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! THE DATA TAKEN AS : A WHOLE<ONE PIECE< A GESTALT < UNITY give the conclusion of FALSE FLAG 911. DATUM IS SIGULAR AND BESTS SUITS MY VIEW THAT I WANT TO EXPRESS.

==============================

Mossad had been closely following these terrorists for many months

================================================

GOLLY NO ONE EVER SAID MOSSAD DID 911 ,but they might have had foreknowledge.see below

================================================

History Commons opinion piece

They Tried to Warn Us: Foreign Intelligence Warnings Before 9/11

By Paul Thompson

View the printer friendly view

The Congressional Joint Inquiry into 9-11 is now finished, but the findings that have been released fail to mention any warnings from foreign governments. The US mainstream media also has paid little attention to warnings from foreign governments.

Yet there were so many warnings—from both our friends and enemies alike—often specifically suggesting the targets or method of attack. In at least one case, the warnings actually mentioned hijackers by name. This type of communication between intelligence agencies normally occurs in secret, so one can only wonder what additional warnings or details were provided to us that have never been made public.

No US publication has ever put all the various foreign government warnings in one place; even Internet skeptics of Bush have paid scant attention to this issue. Here, for the first time, is such a list of warnings.

First, General Warnings

• In late 2000, British investigators teamed up with their counterparts in the Cayman Islands and began a yearlong probe of three Afghan men who had entered the Cayman Islands illegally. [Miami Herald, 9/20/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01] In June 2001, the Afghan men were overheard discussing hijacking attacks in New York City, and were promptly taken into custody. This information was forwarded to US intelligence [Fox News, 5/17/02]. In late August 2001, shortly before the attacks, an anonymous letter to a Cayman radio station alleged these same men were al-Qaeda agents “organizing a major terrorist act against the US via an airline or airlines.” [Miami Herald, 9/20/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, MSNBC, 9/23/01]
  

1. In late July 2001, Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil learned that Osama bin Laden was planning a “huge attack” on targets inside America. The attack was imminent, and would kill thousands, he learned from the leader of the rebel Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which was closely allied with al-Qaeda at the time. Muttawakil sent an emissary to pass this information on to the US Consul General, and another US official, “possibly from the intelligence services.” Sources confirmed that this message was received, but supposedly not taken very seriously, because of “warning fatigue” arising from too many terror warnings. [Independent, 9/7/02, Reuters, 9/7/02]
   
2. Also in late July 2001, the US was given a “concrete warning” from Argentina’s Jewish community. “An attack of major proportions” was planned against either the US, Argentina, or France. The information came from an unidentified intelligence agency. [Forward, 5/31/02]
   
3. An undercover agent from Morocco successfully penetrated al-Qaeda. He learned that bin Laden was “very disappointed” that the 1993 bombing had not toppled the World Trade Center, and was planning “large scale operations in New York in the summer or fall of 2001.” He provided this information to the US in August 2001. [Agence France Presse, 11/22/01, International Herald Tribune, 5/21/02, London Times, 6/12/02]
   
4. Hasni Mubarak, President of Egypt, maintains that in the beginning of September 2001 Egyptian intelligence warned American officials that al-Qaeda was in the advanced stages of executing a significant operation against an American target, probably within the US. [AP, 12/7/01, New York Times, 6/4/02] He learned this information from an agent working inside al-Qaeda. [ABC News, 6/4/02]
   

Warnings the Attack Will Come from the Air

Many warnings specifically mentioned a threat coming from the air.

1. In 1999, British intelligence gave a secret report to the US embassy. The report stated that al-Qaeda had plans to use “commercial aircraft” in “unconventional ways,”“possibly as flying bombs.” [Sunday Times, 6/9/02] On July 16, 2001, British intelligence passed a message to the US that al-Qaeda was in “the final stages” of preparing a terrorist attack in Western countries. [London Times, 6/14/02] In early August, the British gave another warning, telling the US to expect multiple airline hijackings from al-Qaeda. This warning was included in Bush’s briefing on August 6, 2001. [Sunday Herald, 5/19/02]
   
2. In June 2001, German intelligence warned the US, Britain, and Israel that Middle Eastern terrorists were planning to hijack commercial aircraft and use them as weapons to attack “American and Israeli symbols which stand out.” Within the American intelligence community, “the warnings were taken seriously and surveillance intensified” but “there was disagreement on how such terrorist attacks could be prevented.” This warning came from Echelon, a spy satellite network that is partly based in Germany. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9/11/01, Washington Post, 9/14/01]
   
3. In late July 2001, Egyptian intelligence received a report from an undercover agent in Afghanistan that “20 al-Qaeda members had slipped into the US and four of them had received flight training on Cessnas.” To the Egyptians, pilots of small planes didn’t sound terribly alarming, but they passed on the message to the CIA anyway, fully expecting Washington to request information. “The request never came.” [CBS, 10/9/02] Given that there were 19 hijackers and four pilots (who trained on Cessnas) in the 9/11 plot, one might think this would now be a big news item. But in fact, the information has only appeared as an aside in a CBS “60 Minutes” show about a different topic.
   
4. In late summer 2001, Jordan intelligence intercepted a message stating that a major attack was being planned inside the US and that aircraft would be used. The code name of the operation was Big Wedding, which did in fact turn out to be the codename of the 9/11 plot. The message was passed to US intelligence through several channels. [International Herald Tribune, 5/21/02, Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/02]
   
5. Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly stated that he ordered his intelligence agencies to alert the US in the summer of 2001 that suicide pilots were training for attacks on US targets. [Fox News, 5/17/02] The head of Russian intelligence also stated, “We had clearly warned them” on several occasions, but they “did not pay the necessary attention.” [Agence France-Presse, 9/16/01] The Russian newspaper Izvestia claimed that Russian intelligence agents knew the participants in the attacks, and: “More than that, Moscow warned Washington about preparation for these actions a couple of weeks before they happened.” [Izvestia, 9/12/02]
   
6. Five days before 9/11, the priest Jean-Marie Benjamin was told by a Muslim at an Italian wedding of a plot to attack the US and Britain using hijacked airplanes as weapons. He wasn’t told time or place specifics. He immediately passed what he knew on to a judge and several politicians in Italy. Presumably this Muslim confided in him because Benjamin has done considerable charity work in Muslim countries and is considered “one of the West’s most knowledgeable experts on the Muslim world.” [Zenit, 9/16/01] Benjamin has not revealed who told him this information, but it could have come from a member of the al-Qaeda cell in Milan, Italy. This cell supplied forged documents for other al-Qaeda operations, and wiretaps show members of the cell were aware of the 9/11 plot. [Los Angeles Times, 5/29/02, Guardian, 5/30/02, Boston Globe, 8/4/02] For instance, in August 2000, one terrorist in Milan was recorded saying to another: “I’m studying airplanes. I hope, God willing, that I can bring you a window or a piece of an airplane the next time we see each other.” The comment was followed by laughter [Washington Post, 5/31/02]. In another case in January 2001, a terrorist asked if certain forged documents were for “the brothers going to the United States,” and was angrily rebuked by another who told him not to talk about that “very, very secret” plan. [Los Angeles Times, 5/29/02] In March 2001, the Italian government gave the US a warning based on these wiretaps. [Fox News, 5/17/02]
   

What Did Israel Know?

But the most remarkable warnings of all come from Israel. The issue of Israeli foreknowledge of 9/11 is highly controversial. The story is too complicated to go into detail here, but a number of respected publications (for instance, Fox News, 12/12/01, Forward, 3/15/02, ABC News, 6/21/02, Salon, 5/7/02, Ha’aretz, 5/14/02, Le Monde, 3/5/02, Reuters, 3/5/02, AP, 3/5/02, AP, 3/9/02, Cox News, 3/5/02, Guardian, 3/6/02, Independent, 3/6/02, New York Post, 3/6/02, Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 3/15/02) have written about an Israeli “art student” spy ring operating in the US for several years before 9/11. The name “art student” is used because most of these scores of spies were posing as college art students. There have been suggestions that some of these Israeli spies lived close to some of the 9/11 hijackers. For instance, a US Drug Enforcement Administration report from before 9/11 noted that Israeli spies were living in the retirement community of Hollywood, Florida at 4220 Sheridan Street, which turned out to be only a few hundred feet from lead hijacker Mohamed Atta’s residence at 3389 Sheridan Street (see the DEA report, 6/01). Israeli spies appear to have been close to at least ten of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers. [Salon, 5/7/02] In fact, Forward, the most widely circulated publication in the US targeting the Jewish audience, has admitted the spy ring existed, and that its purpose was to track Muslim terrorists operating in the US. [Forward, 3/15/02]

Some have claimed that the existence of this spy ring shows that Israel was behind the 9/11 attacks, an argument that is beyond the scope of this essay. But if the mainstream media is to be believed, Israel gave the US several specific warnings of the 9/11 attacks. In the second week of August 2001, two high-ranking agents from the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, came to Washington and warned the CIA and FBI that 50 to 200 al-Qaeda terrorists had slipped into the US and were planning an imminent “major assault on the US” aimed at a “large scale target” [Telegraph, 9/16/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, Ottawa Citizen, 9/17/01 Fox News, 5/17/02]. Near the end of August, France also gave a warning that was an “echo” of Israel’s. [Fox News, 5/17/02]

In October 2002, the story broke in Europe and Israel that on August 23, 2001, the Mossad had given the CIA a list of 19 terrorists living in the US. The Mossad had said that the terrorists appeared to be planning to carry out an attack in the near future. It is unknown if these are the same 19 names as the actual hijackers, or if the number is a coincidence. However, the four names on the list that are known are names of the 9/11 hijackers: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. [Die Zeit, 10/1/02, Der Spiegel, 10/1/02, BBC, 10/2/02, Ha’aretz, 10/3/02] These are also probably the four most important of the hijackers (and two of the pilots). From them, there were many connections to the others. The CIA had already been monitoring three of them overseas the year before, and two, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, were put on a watch list the same day the Mossad gave this warning. [AFP, 9/22/01, Berliner Zeitung, 9/24/01, Observer, 9/30/01, New York Times, 9/21/02]

Such detailed warnings of exact names fit in well with the reports that Israeli spies were tracking the hijackers for months before 9/11. Yet, as Jane’s Intelligence Digest put it, “It is rather strange that the US media seems to be ignoring what may well be the most explosive story since the 11 September attacks…” [Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 3/13/02] The spy ring story did get a little coverage in the US, but more recent stories claiming that Israel knew the exact names of at least some of the hijackers hasn’t been reported here at all. Perhaps the story is too controversial for the US media to touch?

Conspicuous in Their Absence

So many countries warned the US: Afghanistan, Argentina, Britain, Cayman Islands, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, and Russia. Yet the two countries in the best position to know about the 9/11 plot—Saudi Arabia and Pakistan—apparently didn’t give any warning at all.

The ties between wealthy Saudi figures and al-Qaeda are many, and too complicated to go into here. But it is interesting to notice that, while discussing the resignation of Prince Turki al-Faisal, the head of the Saudi intelligence agency, the Wall Street Journal has speculated that the Saudi Arabian government may have had foreknowledge of 9/11: “The timing of Turki’s removal—August 31—and his Taliban connection raise the question: Did the Saudi regime know that bin Laden was planning his attack against the US? The current view among Saudi-watchers is that this is doubtful, but that the House of Saud might have heard rumors that something was planned, though they did not know what or when.”

An interesting and possibly significant detail is that Prince Sultan, the defense minister, was due to visit Japan in early September, but canceled his trip for no apparent reason two days before his planned departure. [Wall Street Journal, 10/22/01] In fact, that same Prince Sultan appears to have rejected a chance to warn the US. In August 2001, a military associate of a Middle Eastern prince passed information to former CIA agent Robert Baer about a “spectacular terrorist operation” to take place shortly. He also gave Baer a computer record of around 600 secret al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. But when Baer tried to give this information to Prince Sultan, he was rebuffed. Baer gave the information to the CIA as well, making this apparently yet another ignored warning. [Financial Times, 1/12/02, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism,Robert Baer, 2/02, pp. 270-271, Breakdown: How America’s Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, Bill Gertz, pp. 55-58]

The story of Pakistan’s direct involvement in 9/11 is another topic beyond the scope of this essay. One example will suffice. The Wall Street Journal reported in October 2001 that Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, head of the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence, ordered $100,000 be given to Mohamed Atta in the US. The Journal further noted that the FBI had confirmed this information. [Wall Street Journal, 10/10/01] So perhaps it’s not surprising that Pakistan wouldn’t warn the US what its intelligence chief was up to. But again, this information did reach the US through other means. On July 14, 1999, Randy Glass, a thief turned government informant, was wiretapping a meeting in New York City in which he was trying to sell military equipment to some Pakistanis as part of a sting operation. During the meeting, a Pakistani intelligence agent pointed to the World Trade Center and said to Glass, “Those towers are coming down.” Glass recorded this on tape, and passed this and other disturbing evidence to his local congressperson, senator, and others. Senator Bob Graham has admitted his office received such a warning from Glass before 9/11. [Palm Beach Post, 10/17/02]

What Defenses?

From this list, one can see there were many warnings specifying the type of attack, a general timeframe, and the location as either New York City or the World Trade Center. And this list only includes warnings from foreign governments, and excludes warnings from the US itself: its own communications intercepts, individuals with foreknowledge, suggestions from similar attacks, and the knowledge of American intelligence agents on the track of al-Qaeda. We know that US intelligence was suffering “warning fatigue” from so many notifications of an upcoming al-Qaeda attack. One would think that, based on these warnings, the US would have dramatically increased its security. One would be wrong.

But in fact, while the US recently had over 100 fighters defending the US, the number was reduced in 1997 to save money. By 9/11 there were supposedly only 14 fighters protecting the entire US, and most of those were focused on drug interdiction. Of the 14, only four were in the greater vicinity of New York or Washington. Supposedly, on 9/11 there was not a single plane on alert within 100 miles of either city. With so many warnings suggesting an imminent attack would come from the air and/or target important, symbolic buildings, why weren’t New York, Washington and other probable target areas defended with fighters or antiaircraft batteries? There was an antiaircraft battery permanently stationed on top of the White House, but inexplicably it wasn’t used to shoot down Flight 77, which flew low over the White House before making a sharp turn and hitting the Pentagon. [Dallas Morning News, 9/16/01, Newsday, 9/23/01] The US government has not claimed it improved ground security before 9/11 at places like the Pentagon and World Trade Center either.

In case there was a failure of imagination, Italy had just set an example two months before 9/11 on how to respond to a terrorist threat: After receiving a warning that a summit of world leaders in the city of Genoa would be targeted by al-Qaeda, they conspicuously defended the city with increased police, antiaircraft batteries, and constantly flying fighter jets. Apparently the press coverage of the defenses caused al-Qaeda to cancel the attack. President Bush could hardly have failed to notice, since he took the unusual step of sleeping on board a US aircraft carrier during the summit. [BBC, 7/18/01, CNN, 7/18/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01]

Conclusion

One single warning should have been enough to take precautions, but with so many warnings coming in, how can inaction be explained as mere incompetence? Yes, it is often difficult to know which terrorist threats are real, and what information to trust. But if the US couldn’t take seriously warnings from close allies like Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and so on, then what were they waiting for? What would they have taken seriously? And where is the outrage, the investigation? As can be seen with the recent Congressional inquiry, the typical US government response has been to ignore these foreign government warnings altogether, or to say they were lies. On October 17, 2002, CIA Director Tenet claimed that the only warnings “where there was a geographic context, either explicit or implicit, appeared to point abroad, especially to the Middle East.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] On May 16, 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated to the press: “I don’t think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, take another one and slam it into the Pentagon, that they would try to use an airplane as a missile.” She added that “even in retrospect” there was “nothing” to suggest that. [White House, 5/16/02] On June 7, 2002, President Bush stated, “Based on everything I’ve seen, I do not believe anyone could have prevented the horror of September the 11th.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 6/8/02]

Either the Bush Administration is lying, or most of America’s close allies are. So why hasn’t Congress investigated these foreign intelligence claims? Why hasn’t a single mainstream media article connected all these dots, or given these warnings the coverage they deserve? Either some people within the US government knew the 9/11 attack would happen and did nothing, or some people within the US government failed to heed advice from a dozen foreign governments and properly defend the US from attack. Perhaps both. These people should be removed from office on the grounds of gross incompetence, or face the legal consequences of aiding and abetting terrorism. It seems clear that there are people who fear an investigation, and that that is why these dots are left unconnected.

Ultimately, we are all in grave danger if these same officials continue to be in charge of protecting us from terrorist attacks.

[Len Colby]

Datum is not a favored usage (but language is determined by the people ,not elites).

And 'datum' is very rarely used by “the people” it is most popular among pseudo-intellectuals

HOWEVER IT IS A SINGULAR FORM OF DATA !!! AND THATS MY POINT !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! THE DATA TAKEN AS : A WHOLE<ONE PIECE< A GESTALT < UNITY give the conclusion of FALSE FLAG 911. DATUM IS SIGULAR AND BESTS SUITS MY VIEW THAT I WANT TO EXPRESS.

You are demonstrating your customary confusion , datum is a single did of information (data), data is the plural thus the collective. This is like using 'person' to express the unity of humanity. I won't go any further in this idiotic semantic discussion.

==============================

Mossad had been closely following these terrorists for many months

Not true as spelled out in my previous post, but since you don't look at your own links one can't you to have look at those posted by others.

================================================

GOLLY NO ONE EVER SAID MOSSAD DID 911 ,

Really? No one ever said that? Do you really believe that?

but they might have had foreknowledge.see below

The only known evidence of their supposed foreknowledge is there supposed warning.

GAAL : "History Commons opinion piece"

Once again no working links, didn't you even bother to check this time? Many of the supposed sources seem unlikely "Argentina’s Jewish community", British cops in the Cayman Islands, a French priest in Milan etc.

[Steven Gaal]

Many of the supposed sources seem unlikely // end COLBY

THESE GOVERNMENTS WITH INTEL SERVICES : So many countries warned the US: Afghanistan, Argentina, Britain, Cayman Islands, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, and Russia.

Colby's education as intelligence analyst came from .........no one, OOPS !!!! Mr. Colby can take up 911 warnings with the analysts of : Afghanistan, Argentina, Britain, Cayman Islands, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, and Russia.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

DEAR READER PLEASE READ POST # 55 above since after my reading of Colby post # 56 , it "seem unlikely " (Colbyism) he read post # 55 this thread.

[Len Colby]

Get back to us with working links to authoritative sources.

[Steven Gaal]

• Once again no working links, didn't you even bother to check this time? Many of the supposed sources seem unlikely "Argentina’s Jewish community", British cops in the Cayman Islands, a French priest in Milan etc.
  //end Colby
  
• +++++++++++++++++++++++
  SOURCES CITED ARE CORRECT.
  
• http://www.historyco...eytriedtowarnus
  

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++

911 Pre-Warnings

By Jessica Froiland

Paul Thompson’s Terror Timeline, as well as his updated version of the 9/11 timeline located at www.cooperativeresearch.org, was the key reference material used. For further information regarding the information presented, see original articles used in Thompson’s research, mentioned throughout.

In a press conference on April 13, 2004, President Bush stated, “We knew he [Osama bin Laden] had designs on us, we knew he hated us. But there was nobody in our government, and I don’t think [in] the prior government, that could envision flying airplanes into buildings on such a massive scale.” [Guardian, 4/15/04] He also said, “Had I any inkling whatsoever that the people were going to fly airplanes into buildings, we would have moved heaven and earth to save the country.” [White House, 4/13/04; New York Times, 4/18/04 ©] This statement is in direct conflict with a May 15, 2002, statement wherein the White House admitted that Bush was warned about bin Laden’s desire to attack the U.S. by hijacking aircraft in August 2001. [New York Times, 5/16/02, Washington Post, 5/16/02, Guardian, 5/19/02]. There is a massive and growing body of evidence that asserts that the United States government was not only aware of the possibility of the specific scenario of a terrorist air strike/suicide attack, but that it had also received dozens of credible warnings from both international and domestic sources.

Many countries warned the US of imminent terrorist attacks: Afghanistan, Argentina, Britain, Cayman Islands, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, and Russia. Warnings also came from within the United States. Information from our own communications intercepts regarding particular individuals with foreknowledge, previous similarly attempted attacks, and from our own intelligence agents in charge of the investigations of al-Qaeda.

While many of these warning have been covered in the world media a collective analysis and summary context has been avoided by the US corporate media.

The Actual 9/11 Pre-Warnings

1993: An expert panel commissioned by the Pentagon raised the possibility that an airplane could be used to bomb national landmarks. [Washington Post, 10/2/01]

1994: Two attacks took place that involved using hijacked planes to crash into buildings, including one by an Islamic militant group. In a third attack, a lone pilot crashed a plane at the White House. [New York Times, 10/3/01]

1996-1999: The CIA officer in charge of operations against Al Qaeda from Washington writes, “I speak with firsthand experience (and for several score of CIA officers) when I state categorically that during this time senior White House officials repeatedly refused to act on sound intelligence that provided multiple chances to eliminate Osama bin Laden.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/5/04]

1996-2001: Federal authorities had known that suspected terrorists with ties to bin Laden were receiving flight training at schools in the US and abroad. An Oklahoma City FBI agent sent a memo warning that “large numbers of Middle Eastern males” were getting flight training and could have been planning terrorist attacks. [CBS, 5/30/02] One convicted terrorist confessed that his planned role in a terror attack was to crash a plane into CIA headquarters. [Washington Post, 9/23/01]

Dec 1998: A Time magazine cover story entitled “The Hunt for Osama,” reported that bin Laden may be planning his boldest move yet—a strike on Washington or possibly New York City. [Time, 12/21/98]

February 7, 2001: CIA Director Tenet warned Congress in open testimony that “the threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving.” He said bin Laden and his global network remained “the most immediate and serious threat” to US interests. “Since 1998 bin Laden has declared that all US citizens are legitimate targets,” he said, adding that bin Laden “is capable of planning multiple attacks with little or no warning.” [Associated Press, 2/7/01; Sunday Herald, 9/23/01]

In June of 2001, German intelligence warned the CIA, Britain’s intelligence agency, and Israel’s Mossad that Middle Eastern terrorists were planning to hijack commercial aircraft and use them as weapons to attack “American and Israeli symbols which stand out.” A later article quoted unnamed German intelligence sources, stating that the information was coming from Echelon surveillance technology, and that British intelligence had access to the same warnings. However, there were other informational sources, including specific information and hints given to, but not reported by, Western and Near Eastern news media six months before 9/11. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9/11/01; Washington Post, 9/14/01; Fox News, 5/17/02]

June 28, 2001: George Tenet wrote an intelligence summary to Condeleezza Rice stating: “It is highly likely that a significant al-Qaeda attack is in the near future, within several weeks” [Washington Post, 2/17/02]. This warning was shared with “senior Bush administration officials” in early July. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/18/02]

July 5, 2001: Richard Clark gave a direct warning to the FAA, to increase their security measures. The FAA refused to take such action. [New Yorker, 1/14/02; www.cooperativeresearch.org].

June-July 2001: President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and national security aides were given briefs with headlines such as “Bin Laden Threats Are Real” and “Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks.” The exact contents of these briefings remain classified, but according to the 9/11 Commission, they consistently predicted upcoming attacks that would occur “on a catastrophic level, indicating that they would cause the world to be in turmoil, consisting of possible multiple—but not necessarily simultaneous—attacks.” CIA Director Tenet later recalled that by late July, he felt that President Bush and other officials grasped the urgency of what they were being told. [9/11 Commission Report, 4/13/04 ( ] But Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin, later stated that he felt a great tension, peaking within these months, between the Bush administration’s apparent misunderstanding of terrorism issues and his sense of great urgency. McLaughlin and others were frustrated when inexperienced Bush officials questioned the validity of certain intelligence findings. Two unnamed, veteran Counter Terrorism Center officers deeply involved in bin Laden issues, were so worried about an impending disaster, that they considered resigning and going public with their concerns. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 ©] Dale Watson, head of counter terrorism at the FBI, wished he had “500 analysts looking at Osama bin Laden threat information instead of two.” [9/11 Commission Report, 4/13/04 ( ]

July 5, 2001: At issue is a July 5, 2001 meeting between Ashcroft and acting FBI Director Tom Pickard. That month, the threat of an al-Qaida attack was so high; the White House summoned the FBI and domestic agencies and warned them to be on alert. Yet, Pickard testified to the 9/11 commission that when he tried to brief Ashcroft just a week later, on July 12, about the terror threat inside the United States, he got the “brush-off. “[MSNBC, 6/22/04]

July 10, 2001: A Phoenix FBI agent sent a memorandum warning of Middle Eastern men taking flight lessons. He suspected bin Laden’s followers and recommended a national program to check visas of suspicious flight-school students. The memo was sent to two FBI counter-terrorism offices, but no action was taken. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] Vice President Cheney said in May 2002, that he was opposed to releasing this memo to congressional leaders or to the media and public. [CNN, 5/20/02]

July 16, 2001: British spy agencies sent a report to British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other top officials warning that al-Qaeda was in “the final stages” of preparing a terrorist attack in the West. The prediction was “based on intelligence gleaned not just from [british intelligence] but also from US agencies, including the CIA and the National Security Agency”. The report stated that there was “an acute awareness” that an attack was “a very serious threat.” [Times of London, 6/14/02]

In July of 2001: President Bush took the unusual step of sleeping on board an aircraft carrier off the coast of Italy after receiving a warning from the Egyptian government that the summit of world leaders in the city of Genoa would be targeted by al Qaeda. [New York Times, 9/26/01] The Italians meanwhile highly publicized their heightened security measures of increased police presence, antiaircraft batteries, and flying fighter jets. Apparently the press coverage of defenses caused al-Qaeda to cancel the attack. [BBC, 7/18/01, CNN, 7/18/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01]

On July 26, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft stopped flying commercial airlines due to a threat assessment. [CBS, 7/26/01] The report of this warning was omitted from the 9/11 Commission Report [Griffin 5/22/05].

Late July 2001: CBS reported, “Just days after [Mohamed] Atta return to the U.S. from Spain, Egyptian intelligence in Cairo says it received a report from one of its operatives in Afghanistan that 20 al-Qaeda members had slipped into the US and four of them had received flight training on Cessnas.” Egypt passed on the message to the CIA but never received a request for further information. [CBS News, 10/9/02]

Late July 2001: Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil was given information regarding a large attack on targets inside America, from the leader of the rebel Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Tahir Yildash. Muttawakil relayed this information to the U.S. consul general, yet wasn’t taken seriously. One source blamed this on the administration’s “warning fatigue.” [Independent, 9/7/02; Reuters, 9/7/02]

Aug 6, 2001: President Bush received a classified intelligence briefing at his Crawford, Texas ranch, warning that bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. The memo was titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”. The entire memo focused on the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the US and specifically mentioned the World Trade Center. Yet Bush later stated that the briefing “said nothing about an attack on America.” [Newsweek, 5/27/02;New York Times, 5/15/02,Washington Post, 4/11/04,White House, 4/11/04,Intelligence Briefing, 8/6/01].

Early August 2001: Britain gave the US another warning about an al-Qaeda attack. The previous British warning on July 16, 2001, was vague as to method, but this warning specified multiple airplane hijackings. This warning was said to have reached President Bush. [Sunday Herald, 5/19/02]

August, 2001: Russian President Vladimir Putin warned the US that suicide pilots were training for attacks on US targets. [Fox News, 5/17/02] The head of Russian intelligence also later stated, “We had clearly warned them” on several occasions, but they “did not pay the necessary attention.” [Agence France-Presse, 9/16/01]

Late Summer, 2001: Jordanian intelligence (the GID) made a communications intercept and relayed it to Washington. The message stated that a major attack, code-named “The Big Wedding,” had been planned inside the US and that aircraft would be used. “When it became clear that the information was embarrassing to Bush administration officials and congressmen who at first denied that there had been any such warnings before September 11, senior Jordanian officials backed away from their earlier confirmations.” [International Herald Tribune, 5/21/02; Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/02]

On September 10, 2001, a group of top Pentagon officials received an urgent warning which prompted them to cancel their flight plans for the following morning. [Newsweek, 9/17/01] The 9/11 Commission Report omitted this report. [Griffin, 5/22/05]

Given all the pre-warnings and information available before 9/11 it seems unconscionable that on May 16, 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice could still claim to the press: “I don’t think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, take another one and slam it into the Pentagon, that they would try to use an airplane as a missile.” She added that “even in retrospect” there was “nothing” to suggest that. [White House, 5/16/02] On June 7, 2002, President Bush stated, “Based on everything I’ve seen, I do not believe anyone could have prevented the horror of September the 11^th.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 6/8/02]

With so many warnings, it is difficult to explain inaction as mere incompetence. The existence of all of these warnings suggests, at least, that people within the US government knew the attacks were coming and deliberately allowed them to happen. This evidence would, however, be consistent with an even more frightening scenario— that the attacks were orchestrated by, or with the help of, people within our government.

Additional Sources:

Paul Thompson, “The Terror Timeline: Year by Year, Day by Day, Minute by Minute: A Comprehensive Chronicle of the Road to 9/11—and America’s Response,” Regan Books, September 1, 2004.

Jim Marrs, “Inside Job: Unmasking the Conspiracies of 9/11,” Origin Press, June 2004.

The 9/11 Commissioners, “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States,” W.W Norton & Company, Inc.

Griffin, David Ray, “The 9/11 Commission Report: A 571-page lie,”

Edited March 22, 2013 by Steven Gaal