Evan Burton

"However, because the airplane was not equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), because of the approximate nature of the airspeed calculations, and because abrupt airplane maneuvering or even small amounts of ice accumulation can defeat the airplane’s stall warning system, the Safety Board was not able to determine when or if the stall warning horn activated before the onset of the stall."

Also: "However, stall warnings do not always provide flight crews with timely notification of developing hazardous low-airspeed conditions. For example, abrupt maneuvering can increase angle-of-attack so rapidly that a stall could occur nearly simultaneously with the stall warning, and ice accumulation, which raises the stall speed, could degrade the stall warning margin to the point at which little or no stall warning is provided."

Now, looking at the safety recommendations, the first thing I notice is: "These discrepancies included the following: Aviation Charter was not operating in accordance with its weight and balance load manifest procedures, it did not have adequate stall recovery guidance, it did not have consistent deicer boot operational guidance, it did not have an in-range checklist, it was not adequately making its pilots aware of its standard operating procedures (SOPs), and it was not training its pilots on CRM in accordance with its FAA-approved training module."

"The Saab 340B’s autopilot was in the altitude-hold mode and the engines were producing near-flight-idle power during a circling approach. The stall-warning system did not activate before the aircraft stalled. The flight crew recovered control of the aircraft 112 feet above the ground." "The flight crew of the Ilyushin IL-76TD freighter conducted two approaches based on a user-defined global positioning system waypoint that incorrectly depicted the location of the runway threshold. The first approach led to a go-around. The second approach was not stabilized; the descent rate was high when the airplane struck rising terrain." "Improper Response to Stall Warning Cited in A310 CFIT off Ivory Coast - The pilot flying applied forward pressure on the control column but did not increase power when the stall-warning system activated during takeoff. The airplane descended into water soon thereafter. The controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT) accident occurred on a dark night with limited external visual references available for the flight crew." "Investigators said that published procedures were not followed when the repair was performed more than 20 years before a structural failure occurred and the aircraft broke apart during flight." "Noncompliance With Instrument Approach Procedures Cited in King Air CFIT Accident in Australia - The report said that dark night conditions during the emergency medical services positioning flight also were a significant factor in the fatal controlled-flight-into-terrain accident." "During the approach, the crew was unaware of 40-knot winds that led to the controlled-flight-into-terrain accident during instrument meteorological conditions. At the time of the accident, no emergency locator transmitter was required on the turbojet; the accident site was not located until nearly three years after the aircraft was reported missing." "Pilot Becomes Spatially Disoriented, Aircraft Breaks Apart During Descent - A Raytheon Super King Air 200 was transporting members of a collegiate basketball team in instrument meteorological conditions when the alternating-current electrical system malfunctioned. The report said that the pilot became spatially disoriented. The pilot’s control inputs placed a large aerodynamic load on the aircraft and caused it to break apart at low altitude." "Pilot Incapacitation by Hypoxia Cited in Fatal Five-hour Flight of Beech King Air - The report said that the pilot apparently was unable physically to respond to air traffic control radio transmissions after the aircraft ascended above the assigned altitude, 25,000 feet. The aircraft likely continued flying on autopilot, with no input from the pilot, for several hours before it struck terrain." "The crew of a Raytheon Beech 1900D used self-programmed global positioning system (GPS) waypoints for navigation during a night approach to a Canadian airport with weather conditions below minimums for the published nonprecision instrument approach." "The Boeing 747 was configured for a dry-runway landing when heavy rain occurred on final approach to Bangkok, Thailand. The captain told the first officer (the pilot flying) to go around but then retarded the throttle levers when the main landing gear touched the runway. The airplane was substantially damaged. None of the occupants was injured seriously during the approach-and-landing accident, but the delay in evacuation of the aircraft focused attention on improving training for emergencies." "Investigators concluded that a flammable mixture of fuel and air in the center-wing fuel tank likely was ignited by voltage from an external short circuit that was conducted into the tank by electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system." TWA 800 "Investigators said that the controlled-flight-into-terrain accident resulted from the flight crew’s failure to properly plan for a night departure from an unfamiliar airport. The crew of the U.S. Air Force C-130H did not follow published instrument departure procedures." "The accident report said that the corporate pilot selected an incorrect source of distance-measuring equipment information and did not fly the proper descent profile for the instrument landing system approach. Airspeed decreased rapidly during the final segment of the approach before the Beech Super King Air 200 stalled and struck the ground." "Investigators concluded that the airplane had a blocked pitot tube and that, during departure, the flight crew became confused by false indications of increasing airspeed and did not respond to a stall warning. All the occupants were killed when the airplane struck the Caribbean Sea off the northern coast of the Dominican Republic." "Deviations from standard operating procedures, deficient crew resource management and crew distraction were cited as factors in a controlled-flight-into-terrain accident that caused substantial airplane damage but no injuries" "The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said that the absence of adequate aircraft-certification standards and operating procedures for flight in icing conditions was a probable cause of the accident, and that the flight crew’s acceptance of a relatively low airspeed restriction while operating in icing conditions was a contributing factor." http://www.flightsafety.org Aviation can be a hazardous business.

Low-airspeed systems recommended by NTSB by Gordon Gilbert The NTSB believes currently required stall-warning systems are not adequate to cover all critically low-airspeed conditions and has recommended that the FAA require the installation of so-called “low-airspeed alert” systems on all airplanes used in FAR Parts 121 and 135 commercial operations. The Safety Board's recommendation stems from its investigation into several Part 121 and Part 135 accidents since 1982 (most recently the crash of a King Air that killed the two pilots and six passengers, including Sen. Paul Wellstone [D-Minn.]) in which “a stall or failure to maintain airspeed during the approach or landing phases was cited as a causal or contributing factor and in which icing was not cited as a factor.” In the Wellstone accident, the NTSB determined that the airplane was being flown below the “recommended approach speed for about the last 50 seconds of the flight.” Current systems provide a warning at a speed that is at least five knots higher than the stall speed. But the NTSB doesn’t believe this is adequate for all situations. “Stall warnings do not always provide flight crews with timely notification of developing hazardous low-airspeed conditions. For example, abrupt maneuvering can increase angle of attack so rapidly that a stall could occur nearly simultaneously with the stall warning, and ice accumulation, which raises the stall speed, could degrade the stall-warning margin to the point at which little or no stall-warning is provided.” Because the King Air carrying Wellstone did not have a cockpit voice recorder, because of the approximate nature of the airspeed calculations and because abrupt maneuvering or even small amounts of ice accumulation can defeat the airplane’s stall-warning system, the Safety Board was not able to determine “when or if the stall-warning horn activated before the onset of the stall.” Regardless of when or whether the stall-warning horn activated, it is clear that the pilots “failed to maintain airspeed during the approach,” the NTSB said. A 1996 FAA/industry report titled “The Interfaces Between Flight Crews and Modern Flight Deck Systems” expressed concern about the history of Part 121 and 135 accidents involving lack of low-airspeed awareness in the context of flight crews’ monitoring automated systems. This report states: “Flight crews may not be provided adequate awareness of airplane energy state, particularly when approaching or trending toward a low-energy state…Transport-category airplanes are required to have adequate warnings of an impending stall, but at this point the airplane may already be in a potentially hazardous low-energy state. Better awareness is needed of energy state trends such that flight crews are alerted prior to reaching a potentially hazardous low-energy state.” Low-airspeed Warnings Proposed for New Airplanes Regulatory action toward requiring a low-airspeed warning system when using autopilots is already under way as a result of a Jan. 9, 1997 accident involving a Comair Brasilia that crashed near Monroe, Mich., during a rapid descent after an uncommanded roll excursion in icing. Also considered was the March 19, 2001 incident involving another Comair Brasilia, whose crew lost control during cruise and descended 10,000 feet after the airplane encountered icing. A low-airspeed alert system was developed for the Brasilia, and installation is mandated by an AD. An FAA/industry aviation rulemaking advisory committee has proposed a change to FAR 25.1329 (automatic pilot systems) that would require low-airspeed protection and alerting during autopilot operations for newly certified transport-category airplanes. But the ARAC recommendation has yet to be turned into an FAA notice of proposed rulemaking. The requirement for speed protection is based on the premise that reliance on flight-crew attentiveness to airspeed indications alone during autopilot operation “is not adequate to avoid unacceptable speed excursions outside the speed range of the normal flight envelope…Standard stall warning and high-speed alerts are not always timely enough for the flight crew to intervene to prevent unacceptable speed excursions during [autopilot] operation,” the NTSB said. For example, a low-speed alert and a transition to the speed-protection mode at approximately 1.2 Vs or an equivalent speed defined in terms of Vsr (reference stall speed) for the landing flap configuration has been found to be acceptable. If a low-airspeed alert activates when the airspeed drops below 1.2 Vs, pilots would receive several seconds advance notice before reaching the airplane’s estimated stall speed. In addition, if the pilots maintain an airspeed at or above the threshold set by such an early low-airspeed alert the additional airspeed could prevent an accelerated stall initiated by an abrupt last-second maneuver or provide an improved speed margin above a premature stall caused by ice accumulation on the wings. The Board said it recognizes “that there are unresolved technical, operational and human-factors issues that will need to be carefully evaluated and addressed in connection with the design and implementation of a low-airspeed alert system.” Some of the issues that should be addressed include defining the target speed at which the alert system would activate; effectively integrating such a system with other aircraft systems; preventing nuisance alarms and flight-crew over-reliance on such a system; differentiating such an alert from other kinds of cockpit alert and warning; and developing flight-crew procedures and training for the use of such systems. “Despite these unresolved issues, the Safety Board concludes that the development of and requirement for the installation of low-airspeed alert systems could substantially reduce the number of accidents and incidents involving flight-crew failure to maintain airspeed.” At press time the FAA had not responded to the recommendation. http://www.ainonline.com/issues/01_04/01_0...irspeedp32.html

"TWA 800 and Electromagnetic Interference: Work Already Completed and Work that Still Needs to be Done By Elaine Scarry" Now this reference is completely ridiculous. The causes of TWA800's explosion were very well documented. People tried to claim it was a USN missile, that it was a bomb, etc - it was a combination of events. In regard to aviation accidents, people should look up 'the Reason model' and the Boeing 'chain of events'.

"Ask yourself why three Ph.D.s--one also an Ed.D.--are committing themselves to the thesis that Paul Wellstone was taken out for political reasons." No offense to those people, but they (apparently) have no expertise in aviation and are not aware of the pitfalls. They do not necessarily have the expertise to determine the conditions of flight and how events may have affected a pilot. They are not aware of the skills required for IFR, UA, or other flight regimes.

"The kind of incidents those who want to make a case against him use are incidents where the plane was falling at the rate of 1,000 ft. per minute, for example, which took place for a few seconds, rather like when you drift to the left and your wife reminds you to keep looking ahead. This is insignificant, but those who want to blame the pilots exaggerate to create misleading impressions." Yes, but those moments of distraction can kill you. It does NOT mean that is what killed him, but you must understand that aviation is a very unforgiving business. A moments inattention can cost you your life.

"...the NTSB's simulations, using a simulator with a weaker enginer thant the King Air A-100 and flying at abnormally slow speeds, were unable to bring it down,..." In that case, the simulator was wrong - plain and simple. Low speed aerodynamics is very well understood. If an aircraft reaches stall speed - it will stall. "...Then the bluish-white smoke instead of coarse black smoke,..." Indicative of an oil fire, but not conclusive in any way. "Most Americans, by the way, do not even know that the NTSB cannot investigation a crash scene as the scene of a crime unless the Attorney General so declares it,..." Yes, but the NTSB is still there to investigate what CAUSED the crash. I quote: "In cases of suspected criminal activity, other agencies may participate in the investigation. The Safety Board does not investigate criminal activity; in the past, once it has been established that a transportation tragedy is, in fact, a criminal act, the FBI becomes the lead federal investigative body, with the NTSB providing any requested support. " "Once a major report is adopted at a Board Meeting, an abstract of that report - containing the Board's conclusions, probable cause and safety recommendations - is placed on the Board's web site..."

BTW, sorry for the late start. I'm just reading through the threads and asking questions as I read through it. If this hasn't already been asked: Was the aircraft conducting a GPS approach, a VOR / DME approach, an ILS approach, an ILS / DME approach, a VOR approach, an NDB approach, a DME letdown or what?

"...the latest being evidence that GPS data may have been manipulated to bring the plane into the "kill zone"..." Can you explain, exactly, how the GPS stream was 'manipulated'? Did the Senator's aircraft have Selective Availability?

1. Advanced amateur. I got interested in school and took courses there, mainly using B+W 35mm film, as well as learning how to develop the film. Being an aircraft nut, photography seemed a logical extension for me - so much so I even gave serious consideration to joining the Air Force as a photographer. I got further training in photography and analysis techniques with the military, and was the ship's photographer on the ships I served on. I've continued on this 'advanced amateur' stage for some time now, having a small number of my images published in Defence publications or aviation books / magazines. 2. Started at school about 1976. Been snapping away ever since. See above. 3. Previously used 35mm but now have moved to digital for convenience. 4. Always carry-on. 5. Nikon D-1X, Fuji Finepix S5000, Fuji Finepix F601. (Edited to expand on Q1)

The claims seem to vary; some say it is some type of biological weapon; some say it is a weather control device which is having adverse effects on the population. I don't know. Do a google search for "chemtrails" and have a read of the claims for yourself.

I've started this thread so we don't hijack the original levee thread. In that thread, Jack raised the issue of 'chemtrails'. Now, as I said in the other thread, I want to make something clear: it's basically impossible to prove that 'chemtrails' do not exist. That is because: 1. There are aircraft capable of making them; 2. There have been instances of their use; and 3. Each sighting has to be individually checked in order for it to be dismissed as a 'chemtrail'. This inability is probably why it is a favourite of conspiracy theorists. That being said, IMO most - if not all - reports of 'chemtrails' are in actual fact contrails, the visible condensation left behind aircraft. Some are produced by standard propellor-driven aircraft (reciprocating and turbo-prop) and some are produced by the exhaust of jet turbine aircraft. Under very common atmospheric conditions, contrails are seen around the world every day. That's no surprise because most of us are ignorant of the huge network of airways that exist above our heads. Jack raised the issue of an article claiming that "Air Traffic Controllers concerned over chemtrails". That article cannot be used as any serious basis for the existance of 'chemtrails' for several reasons: - It was pointed out (in a link I provided in the previous thread) that the article contained many flaws / misquotes about the formation and persistance of contrails; - It said that " First confirmed by Airport Authority Terry Stewart at the Victoria International Airport on Dec. 8, 2000 as a 'joint Canada-U.S. military operation' and stridently denied by senior officers at Canadian Forces Base (where Stewart later told the Vancouver Courier he had received his information) - these multi-plane missions were verified in March, 2001 by the Air Traffic Control (ATC) manager for the northeastern seaboard of the United States." What it did NOT mention was that Terry Stewart was the Environmental Manager of the airport, not an ATCO. It did NOT mention that Mr Stewart was responding to a call about the increase of air traffic in the area. What it did NOT mention was that Mr Steward rang the Tower Controller for his information, not the military authorities. It did say that he was told the increased air activity was due to a military exercise. It inaccurately reported that the authorities denied any exercise; the exercise was published and NOTAMs warned of it. The military authorities freely admitted the exercise (please note also: exercise, not operation. There is a distinct difference in military terms). - It referred to: " ... three taped interviews with this reporter and veteran radio journalist S.T. Brendt, our 'Deep Sky' source said that he had been ordered to divert incoming commercial flights away from USAF tankers spraying s substance that showed up on ATC radars as a 'haze'." yet later the same source said "...were being ordered to route airliners beneath formations of Air Force tanker planes spraying something that regularly clouds their screens." Which was it? Under or away? - A 'source' who claims to be an ATCO seems to be the only one talking about this strange deviation of procedure; no other ATCO has come forward to verify the claim. - If aircraft are being deviated from a standard air route, they'd ask why. It might be for traffic avoidance, weather avoidance (which would normally be taken by the aircraft's initiation, not ATC, as the aircraft radar is designed to see weather whereas the ATC is designed to see through it), or it might be for sequencing (the 'flow' of traffic). If such a large number of deviations were occuring, it would be questioned. If it happened, there would be evidence: radar tapes and ATCO voice tapes. These are kept and accessible in case of accidents, incidents, or claims of ATCO / aircrew dispute. The article is nothing more than ill-informed and inaccurate speculation, written by an author who had (surprise!) written a book about 'chemtrails'. If you want to see what a pilot thinks about 'chemtrails', read this: http://www.pufoin.com/pufoin_perspective/chemtrails.php

Pat, I understand your feeling but what am I supposed to do? I've asked questions which receive no reply. A poster asked for my work and I have (albeit with some snideness) pointed to it. I'm happy for people to point out where I may have made mistakes, and discuss them. Is it so unreasonable for Jack to do the same?

I do find it so funny how those who feel threatened react so predictibly: if you are not with me, you are against me. The friend of my enemy is MY enemy. It'd be so sad if it weren't so pathetically repetative. In regards to my own work, once again if you had BOTHERED TO LOOK you'd find an entire thread of thirteen pages on this very forum, under this very topic heading, devoted to showing where Jack has gone wrong. I understand you are a little slow so, as you requested, here is the URL: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=3589 I'd welcome discussion about any errors you (or anyone else) believe I have made.

Yeah, there was a time when us double agents had it cushie, Brown envelopes stuffed with the green, left at drop points, Affairs with busty female Russian agents, called Tania (there was one called Boris who I was very suspicious of) Fast Cars with ejector seats, very handy for boring hitch-hikers or the Mother in Law. Long lunches with "Q" in his London club, with the obligatory high class call girl for afters. now what do I get? a clapped out Ford Fiesta with starship mileage, £5-50 a day in expenses, and a court child support order from one of the Tania's. boy has this espionague business gone down the crapper....Turner, Steve Turner.. <{POST_SNAPBACK}> LOL! But OH&S has made things better, surely?

I KNEW IT! I KNEW IT!

Hmmm. Why did you say that? Did someone tell you to say that? Who told you to say that - the Government?

Wild surf claimed the life of Harold Holt and equally wild rumours about the former prime minister's disappearance may have been avoided if a public inquiry had been held at the time, the Victorian coroner found today. State Coroner Graeme Johnstone found that the then prime minister drowned while swimming in the surf off Cheviot Beach on Victoria's Mornington Peninsula on December 17, 1967. Coroners were previously unable to investigate deaths where a body was never found but the Coroner's Act of 1985 changed the law, enabling findings to be made. Handing down his finding today, Mr Johnstone said fanciful theories surrounding Mr Holt's disappearance ranged from him being taken by a Chinese submarine to committing suicide. "Unfortunately, there was no open inquiry at the time so this detailed material did not become general public knowledge," he said. "Perhaps, in hindsight, there should have been an inquiry as it may have avoided the development of some of the unsubstantiated rumours and unusual theories." Mr Johnstone said his investigation had analysed all of the available investigative and historical material and found the theories were fanciful. "It is sad that, over the years, all of these fanciful or unusual theories about Mr Holt's disappearance should receive public ventilation, overshadow his life and require an explanation," the coroner said. "A simple reading of the original investigative material provides the real and credible explanation." http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/holt-i...5302722026.html

Jack, Question, are either of these two guys 'offical NASA spokespersons', capable of speaking to and of NASA photo library? I'm not sure about Evan, hell he may be a pilot or a baggage handler, who knows -- this Heagney from San Mateo (a nice place, I lived there for 10 years, grew up 10 miles north of there) he collects and sells hubcaps, I expect he's a amateur photg at best - I'd questioning anyone sanity that cruises Hwy 101 looking for hubcaps -- so my question is: why bother with them? They certainly don't know the difference between EVIDENCE and a STUDY... For what its worth I wouldn't bother answering ANYTHING from those camps... <{POST_SNAPBACK}> In other words, you can't answer the questions either. If there were problems with my refuting of Jack's work, it would be an easy matter to highlight them and show where I am wrong. If the problem lay in my "analysis" of an image, then it would be an easy matter for Jack or yourself to show the errors I might have made. But Jack doesn't. He can't because he knows that opening discussion on his work means that he risks being proven wrong - and he cannot accept that. He has already stated in this forum, quite clearly, that he will not accept ANY evidence that contradicts his work. And you David - you just like posting in the forum. You don't seem to add anything to the topic being discussed, and you never take a position on any of the points questioned.

Like David, I'm simply try to get a straight answer to a straight question: That is not an "ill-informed and abusive" question. It's a very relevent question, actually. You use Photoshop in a lot of your analysis. I'm asking: if the makers of Photoshop, who are third-party, have no axe to grind, and are the subject matter experts (Photoshop) say they believe that some of your analysis is incorrect because of misuse of Photoshop, would you then agree that your claims - based on the use of Photoshop - were incorrect? To say 'yes' means that the makers of Photoshop would then have to offer an opinion before more could be said about your use of Photoshop. To say 'no' would indicate that you believe you know more about Photoshop than the creators of it, or have some other yet unstated reason for disagreeing with the statement. There is nothing abusive or ill-informed about that. It is NOT a personal attack. It is something I would ask you face-to-face if I had the opportunity to meet you. It is a fair question, directly related to an issue which you raised (the wrecker).

I think it's highly unlikely. The inquest has been re-opened because of a change in the laws here in Australia. Holt was declared dead to allow processing of probate, but a change to the legislation has meant that the case MUST be reviewed. Holt was pretty happy with his decision to support the US in Vietnam. Although under some pressure, he did declare 'all the way with LBJ'. The suggestion that he was a Chinese spy borders on the ludicious. He was getting on in years, and took a swim at a beach without a security detail (which he often did). Any Australian is aware of the rips that can occur at beaches, so it is quite reasonable to believe that he could have got into trouble. The beach was unpatrolled. It's a good event to place a mystery on, but I am sure there was nothing sinister about it. If nothing else, it was a tragic loss.

From: http://www1.nasa.gov/pdf/55583main_vision_...xploration2.pdf The fundamental goal of this vision is to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program. In support of this goal, the United States will: • Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond; • Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations; • Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and • Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests. The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will be responsible for the plans, programs, and activities required to implement this vision, in coordination with other agencies, as deemed appropriate. The Administrator will plan and implement an integrated, long-term robotic and human exploration program structured with measurable milestones and executed on the basis of available resources, accumulated experience, and technology readiness. To implement this vision, the Administrator will conduct the following activities and take other actions as required: A. Exploration Activities in Low Earth Orbit Space Shuttle • Return the Space Shuttle to flight as soon as practical, based on the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board; • Focus use of the Space Shuttle to complete assembly of the International Space Station; and • Retire the Space Shuttle as soon as assembly of the International Space Station is completed, planned for the end of this decade; International Space Station • Complete assembly of the International Space Station, including the U.S. components that support U.S. space exploration goals and those provided by foreign partners, planned for the end of this decade; • Focus U.S. research and use of the International Space Station on supporting space exploration goals, with emphasis on understanding how the space environment affects astronaut health and capabilities and developing countermeasures; and • Conduct International Space Station activities in a manner consistent with U.S. obligations contained in the agreements between the United States and other partners in the International Space Station. B. Space Exploration Beyond Low Earth Orbit The Moon • Undertake lunar exploration activities to enable sustained human and robotic exploration of Mars and more distant destinations in the solar system; • Starting no later than 2008, initiate a series of robotic missions to the Moon to prepare for and support future human exploration activities; • Conduct the first extended human expedition to the lunar surface as early as 2015, but no later than the year 2020; and • Use lunar exploration activities to further science, and to develop and test new approaches, technologies, and systems, including use of lunar and other space resources, to support sustained human space exploration to Mars and other destinations. Mars and Other Destinations • Conduct robotic exploration of Mars to search for evidence of life, to understand the history of the solar system, and to prepare for future human exploration; • Conduct robotic exploration across the solar system for scientific purposes and to support human exploration. In particular, explore Jupiter’s moons, asteroids and other bodies to search for evidence of life, to understand the history of the solar system, and to search for resources; • Conduct advanced telescope searches for Earth-like planets and habitable environments around other stars; • Develop and demonstrate power generation, propulsion, life support, and other key capabilities required to support more distant, more capable, and/or longer duration human and robotic exploration of Mars and other destinations; and • Conduct human expeditions to Mars after acquiring adequate knowledge about the planet using robotic missions and after successfully demonstrating sustained human exploration missions to the Moon. C. Space Transportation Capabilities Supporting Exploration • Develop a new crew exploration vehicle to provide crew transportation for missions beyond low Earth orbit; « Conduct the initial test flight before the end of this decade in order to provide an operational capability to support human exploration missions no later than 2014; • Separate to the maximum practical extent crew from cargo transportation to the International Space Station and for launching exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit; « Acquire cargo transportation as soon as practical and affordable to support missions to and from the International Space Station; and « Acquire crew transportation to and from the International Space Station, as required, after the Space Shuttle is retired from service. D. International and Commercial Participation • Pursue opportunities for international participation to support U.S. space exploration goals; and • Pursue commercial opportunities for providing transportation and other services supporting the International Space Station and exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit.

Terry, No problems. You might not necessarily accept it, but you listen with good graces. I'd love to be able to refute what you said about job creation, but there are two problems for me: 1. I'm Australian, and don't know about the situation in the US. 2. We have the Indian call-centres as well. Perhaps a more global-centric approach is needed. I am a strong supporter of of manned space programmes and to be frank, don't really mind who does it - as long as we advance. I believe the abandoment of the US manned lunar landing programme was a terrible mistake. I would have thought that we could, by this time, have had a viable lunar settlement in operation. I believe the science and technology is there, but the political will is not. We are just too concerned with engaging in local concerns rather than taking the longer view. That being said, there were indeed many benefits from the space programme. Apart from those directly employed in NASA and associated aerospace industry, the "space race" gave us much. The launch of satellites gave us global communications, weather forecasting, geophysical assessment, etc. The implementation of GPS / GLONASS means improved safety in navigation. The exploration of the moon has given us greater understanding of how we came to be here. A lot of the NASA-initiated research was subsequently used in aviation 9both civil and military. There have been a lot of benefits. Were they worth the cost? I don't know - what price is knowledge?