Duke Lane

when you write "Memorandum of the Honolulu COnference' what are you referring to?

I don' t have that particular volume in my personal library.

The memorandum is the same document that Monk's been referring to: Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume IV, Section 4, Document 321, pp608 et seq. It's online at MFF and History-Matters.com, as well in PDF on a State Department site I found somewhere. I think MFF & H-M have PDFs there too. I don't have a hard copy either.

According to the ARRB, they could not find any memorandum for the conference, in the way of minutes.

I think you'd pointed that out in an earlier post, and/or that John Newman hadn't found any notes, or anyone who remembered anyone taking notes. (I don't have his book, btw.)

To be frank, that's not (so far) a great concern for a number of reasons, many of which I think you'll agree with (and not to suggest you think it is a great concern):

First, while "we can't know" that the memorandum reflects the actual events of the conference, apparently nobody who was there says that they're not reflective of the actual events, so if they're undisputed, there's no reason to think that they're not.

Second, even if there were minutes or notes, there's no guarantee that they would be accurate either, nor absent active dispute, any reason to think they'd be inaccurate. For that matter, even if they were accurate, it doesn't mean there wouldn't be a dispute (real or simply provocative).

Third, FBI agents (in particular Hosty, Silbert and O'Neill) have testified that, once they'd reduced their handwritten notes to "writing" (i.e., a typed report), they destroyed them. When I first read this, I checked with some local and federal law enforcement types I know, and they agree that's a common practice even still. If it's good enough for law enforcement purposes (i.e., for production in a court of law), then the practice of doing the same thing for a conference - which may or may not have been as important absent JFK's murder - does not strike me as critical. (Are there notes extant of the SecDef Honolulu conference in July? All of the rest of them? State Dept conferences? I'm asking....)

Fourth, there were apparently quite a few people at the November 20 conference, most of whom probably weren't known personally by most people there. While participants contacted by Newman, et al., didn't remember (40 years later) anyone taking notes, it may have been someone they didn't know, and I'm not certain that anyone out of a large crowd who was taking notes would have stood out: mightn't lots of people have been? Weren't they probably? Would it have been apparent if nobody was taking any notes? (This memo came from CINCPAC Felt: would an "orderly" - an aide, adjutant, secretary, etc. - from his staff recording the proceedings on paper or on tape even been noticed?)

Fifth, from the sound of it, the "conference" was more of a series of presentations than an actual discussion or exchange of ideas. There are a couple of notations about this from both before and after the conference, quoting Forrestal and Bundy's memos.

There are probably a couple others that I was thinking of, but remembering five of them is okay for now.

When I said that "I've looked where it purportedly is and it is extremely inadequate" -- I am again referring to the FRUS Volume, where it "should" have been memorialized, IMO--but, what is there, is extremely inadequate. I was also throwing in some self denigrating sarcasm.

Indulge me a little preamble:

A researcher friend of mine told me about 20 years ago or so that "the difference between a buff and a researcher is that a buff raises questions and a researcher finds answers." I won't go so far as to say I've learned at his feet, but certainly he gave me good insight into the kinds of criticisms from the "research community" and how best to avoid it. He says "extraordinary claims require extraordinary proofs," which I've taken to mean "if you state a fact, be prepared to back it up" (or as those who consider me verbose have found, I'm generally not just prepared to, but generally just do it). If you can't state something is a fact and back it up, then it should be qualified as a deduction, an opinion, a consensus, or whatever else it may be if it's not a provable fact.

A minor (some might say extreme) example is when I wrote "The Cowtown Connection" back in '92, when I said that David Atlee Phillips was deceased - fairly common knowledge at the time - I gave a citation to his obituary. Likewise, I felt extremely chagrined and embarrassed when I just plain ol' couldn't remember Paul Groody's name in time for a deadline and I decided that he'd "remain nameless to protect the inane" or some such thing. (Oddly, nobody ever called me on that one!)

My point to this is that, from what little I've gathered, you've got a good reputation as a researcher, and not as a buff. (Buffs often call themselves researchers because they appear frequently on TV and radio (or simply because they're interested in the topic and find things they consider "strange" every so often), so I'm not counting those as "researcher credentials.") So that's why I asked this question.

As for the resemblance between the CABLE and the text from the FRUS, you can research the verbiage yourself, but suffice to say, it is verbatim, in a couple spots.

That's what I expect a researcher to have done for me rather than merely raise a question or state an opinion, and then tell me to go get the answer if I really want to know (and I'm not saying that you're saying that, only that you've given me the words to make this example). The problem with that is that sometimes someone can research the answer and find that it differs with what the first guy (or girl) said. They, naturally, doesn't want to hear about how their unresearched opinion is wrong and continues to state their opinion as fact, and sometimes get their a$$ kicked (so to speak) when the real deal comes out.

(Let me blow my own trumpet and suggest that nobody says that David Atlee Phillips was under arrest in Fort Worth Texas on November 22 1963 "and here's a picture to prove it." Or even say "wow, it's pretty strange that someone who looks just like David Atlee Phillips was under arrest in Fort Worth, what do you make of that!?!" anymore. OTOH, people do still think (however erroneously!) that Richard Carr, Dickie Worrell and Ed Hoffman were actual witnesses that day, so it just goes to show you that not everybody believes hard fact over tantalizing fiction.)

As for the verbiage itself, note that this is what is said in the CABLE of 13 November:

(2) MILITARY, INCLUDING REPORT ON PROGRESS IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF TASKS ASSIGNED AS A RESULT OF THE MCNAMARA, TAYLOR MISSION, AND OUTLINING PLANS FOR CONTROL OF INFILTRATION AND SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DELTA CAMPAIGN.

And that this is what is said on page 618 of the FRUS:

Item B 2--Prospects and measures proposed by Country Team for improved prosecution of the war under the new government (Military, including a report on progress in accomplishment of tasks assigned as a result of the McNamara-Taylor Mission, and outlining plans for control of infiltration and special requirements for the Delta Campaign)

In the CABLE it says:

D. OUTLINE IN TERMS OF FORCES, TIMING, AND NUMBER INVOLVED, THE PROJECTED PROGRAM FOR REDUCTION OF US MILITARY FORCES BY END OF CY 1965.

And on page 624 of the FRUS, it says:

Here follows discussions of Item C 1, "Revision of Military Comprehensive Plan;" Item C 2, "Status Report of FY 64 MAP;" Item D, "Outline in terms of forces, timing and numbers involved, the projected program for reduction U.S. military forces by end FY 65;" and Item E, "Country Team suggestions for revision of current reports to develop a consolidated country team reporting system."

And that brings us to the heart of the matter.

When you look at the McNamara-Taylor report, which is Item #167 in FRUS IV, it appears on page 336 and ends at page 346, a total of 11 pages. This is a 52-page document in its original form. At the top of page 340, it reads:

These sections do not appear in the text of FRUS IV, but it clearly doesn't mean that they don't exist, or weren't included in the M-T report, or that this is exactly what was written in the report (I've included that below just for the sake of showing how much was omitted in FRUS).

The notation, in brackets (usually connoting an editorial comment, not a verbatim inclusion), "[Here follows ...]" appears a lot in FRUS, which is an edited compilation of documents, in such contexts as "[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam]" which thinking person realizes doesn't mean that someone put those words in the minutes of a meeting or whatever: "here follows" means that "in this place would be" (whatever) if the editor of FRUS (generally Leslie Belb) had decided to edit it out.

That's how a 52-page document fits on 11 pages.

So when the memorandum of the Honolulu conference (Item #321 starting on page 608) notes on page 624, "[Here follows discussion of Item C 1, "Revision of Military Comprehensive Plan;" Item C 2, "Status Report on FY 64 MAP;" Item D, "Outline in terms of forces, timing and numbers involved, the projected program for reduction U.S. military forces by end FY65;" and Item E, "Country Team suggestions for revision of current reports to develop a consolidated country team reporting system."]," it does not mean that this is all that was said about it, it means that it was edited out.

I'm sure you know that, don't you?

What was it edited out of? According to the first footnoted annotation of this document (bottom of page 608) we're told that the cited document is "RG 334, MAC/V Files: FRC 69 A 702, 204-58 Policy and Precedent Files (1963), [then classified as] Secret," found at the Washington National Records Center, which is now in Suiteland, MD. This document will contain the full text of everything that's in this memorandum, including the stuff that "here follows" on page 624.

But you say (as you did at about 1:03:48 on BOR) that "there was no further discussion! That's as far as it went. It just stops there," that there were (after 1:01:50) "16 pages [in FRUS] on the Honolulu conference, but only three small pagagraphs about what they were supposed to be doing at the conference!" (your emphasis), when that is true only in FRUS, an edited compendium.

Later (1:04:50) you said, "Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe the information is somewhere else and I'm just a lousy researcher and I haven't uncovered it yet. I'm not sure, maybe it's someplace," yet you've said here that you've only looked in FRUS IV, which even told you where to look for the original document. The annotation I quoted above also tells you a little further on (still at the bottom of page 324) that "Another copy of this memorandum is ibid., RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, 350, Honolulu Conference."

So how is it you "haven't uncovered it yet?" Are you suggesting that your reputation is undeserved?

Here is what "[Here follows ...]" from the McNamara-Taylor report that enabled it, in part, to be condensed in FRUS from its original 52 pages to just 11:

II. MILITARY SITUATION AND TRENDS

A. THE STANDARDS OF MEASURE

The test of the military situation is whether the GVN is succeeding in widening its area of effective control of the population and the countryside. This is difficult to measure, and cannot be stated simply in terms of the number of stragetic hamlets built or the number of roads that can now be travelled without escort. Nor can the overall situation be gauged solely in terms of the extent of GVN offensive action, relative weapon losses and defections, VC strength figures, or other measures of military performance. All of these factors are important and must be taken into account; however, a great deal of judgment is required in their interpretation.

We have looked at these factors carefully, but we have also given great weight to the evidence of the men on the spot-the U.S. military advisors and the USOM field representatives--as to whether government control is in fact extending and becoming more accepted and solid in the various areas. We have been greatly impressed with the variation of the situation from area to area and from province to province; there is a different war in each area and province, and an example can be found somewhere to support any attitude toward the state of the counterinsurgency campaign. Our task has been to observe the situation as broadly as possible to avoid giving exaggerated importance to any single angle of observation.

B. OVERALL PROGRESS

With allowance for all uncertainties, it is our firm conclusion that the GVN military program has made great progress in the last year and a half, and that this progress has continued at a fairly steady rate in the past six months even through the period of greatest political unrest in Saigon. The tactics and techniques employed by the Vietnamese under U.S. monitorship are sound and give promise of ultimate victory.

Specifically, progress is most clear in the northern areas (I and II Corps); especially noteworthy work has been done in key coastal provinces where VC strength once threatened to cut the country in half but has now been substantially reduced. In the central area and the highlands (III Corps), progress has been steady though slower, and the situation remains difficult in the provinces to the west and north of Saigon itself. [Material Missing] Throughout the northern two-thirds of the country the strategic hamlet program has matured effectively and freedom of rural movement has grown steadily.

The Delta remains the toughest area of all, and now requires top priority in both GVN and U.S. efforts. Approximately 40% of the people live there; the area is rich and has traditionally resisted central authority; it is the center of Viet Cong strength-over one-third of the "hard core" are found there; and the maritime nature of the terrain renders it much the most difficult region to pacify.

A first step has just been taken by the move of a third division to the Delta, but further major actions are needed. They include priority decisions by the GVN in the use of its resources, the consolidation rather than further spread of strategic hamlets in many areas, the elimination of many fixed outposts, better

hamlet defenses and more trained hamlet militia. Regular army units should be reserved for use in mobile actions and for clear and hold operations in support of the strategic hamlet program. Though there are unresolved problems in several key provinces close to Saigon, as well as in the southernmost parts where the VC are strongly established, it is clear that the Delta situation has generally improved over the past year, even with the limited resources allocated to it. Despite recent evidences of greater VC effort and better weapons, the Delta campaign can continue to go forward if the essential priority is assigned to Delta requirements.

C. MILITARY INDICATORS

From a more strictly military standpoint, it should be noted that this overall progress is being achieved against a Viet Cong effort that has not yet been seriously reduced in the aggregate, and that is putting up a formidable fight notably in the Delta and key provinces near Saigon. The military indicators are mixed, reflecting greater and more effective GVN effort but also the continued toughness of the fight.

[The following is in table format in the original]

June July August September (estimated) Mo. Ave. Year ago No. of government initiated:

Small operations 851 781 733 906 490

Large operations 125 163 166 141 71

Viet Cong Killed 1896 1918 1685 2034 2000

GVN Killed 413 521 410 525 431

GVN Weapons Lost 590 780 720 802 390

VC Weapons Captured 390 375 430 400 450

Viet Cong Military Defectors 420 310 220 519 90

Viet Cong Initiated Incidents of all Types 1310 1380 1375 1675 1660

Viet Cong Attacks 410 410 385 467 410

Estimated Viet Cong Strength

HardCore 21000 21000 21000 21000 22000

Irregular 85000 82000 76000 70000 98000

Recent days have been characterized by reports of greater Viet Cong activity, countrywide, coupled with evidence of improved weaponry in their hands. Some U.S. advisors, as well as some Vietnamese, view this increased activity as a logical reaction to the steadily growing strategic hamlet program, which they believe is progressively separating the Viet Cong from the rural population and from their sources of food and reinforcements. Others view it as a delayed effort to capitalize upon the political trouble. All agree that it reflects a continuing capability for offensive action.

D. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM

In this generally favorable military picture, two main factors have been the strategic hamlet program and the effectiveness of the U.S. advisory and support effort.

We found unanimous agreement that the strategic hamlet program is sound in concept, and generally effective in execution although it has been overextended in some areas of the Delta. The teamwork of U.S. military men and civilians is generally excellent, and on the GVN side a number of the province chiefs who handled the program poorly in its initial phases have been replaced by men who appear to have a better grasp of the central purpose of the program- to bring people under clear GVN control, in a way that really solidifies their support of their government and opposition to the VC. The economic and civic action element of the program (schools, medicine, fertilizer, etc.) has been carried forward on the U.S. side with considerable effectiveness, but has necessarily lagged behind the physical completion of hamlets and in insecure areas has made little progress. Without this element, coupled with effective hamlet defense measures, what are called "strategic hamlets" may be only nominally under GVN control. We were particularly struck by some evidence that a hamlet's readiness to defend itself often bears a direct relation to whether the Province Chief, with U.S. help, has managed to make a convincing start in civic action.

E. THE U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY AND SUPPORT EFFORT

We may all be proud of the effectiveness of the U.S. military advisory and support effort. With few exceptions, U.S. advisors report excellent relations with their Vietnamese counterparts, whom they characterize as proud and willing soldiers. The stiffening and exemplary effect of U.S. behavior and attitudes has had an impact which is not confined to the war effort, but which extends deeply into the whole Vietnamese way of doing things.

The U.S. advisory effort, however, cannot assure ultimate success. This is a Vietnamese war and the country and the war must, in the end, be run solely by the Vietnamese. It will impair their independence and the development of their initiative if we leave our advisors in place beyond the time they are really needed. In some areas reductions in the U.S. effort and transfer of U.S. responsibilities to the Vietnamese can now be carried out without material impairment of the total war effort. As a start, we believe that a reduction of about 1000 U.S. personnel (for which plans have been in preparation since the spring) can be carried out before the end of 1963. No further reductions should be made until the requirements of the 1964 campaign become firm.

F. CONCLUSION

Acknowledging the progress achieved to date, there still remains the question of when the final military victory can be attained. If, by victory, we mean the reduction of the insurgency to something little more than sporadic banditry in outlying districts, it is the view of the vast majority of military commanders consulted that success may be achieved in the I, II and III Corps area by the end of CY 1964. Victory in the IV Corps will take longer-at least well into 1965. These estimates necessarily assume that the political situation does not significantly impede the effort.

III. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND TRENDS

The current economic situation in South Vietnam is, in the main, satisfactory. The internal price level is reasonably stable. Commercial inventories are high and national bank reserves of foreign exchange stand at approximately $160 million which equals approximately 11 to 12 months. Imports at current rate ($240 million imports less $75 to $80 million exports). The effective rate of exchange of the piastre to the dollar is within the range of reasonable economic value.

Trends are difficult to discuss but the business community was optimistic before the present crises. Rice exports for the current calendar year are projected at approximately $80 million against $8.75 million last year. Total exports are anticipated at $70 million as against $55 million last year. Banking circles point to one bearish factor in the export picture. Rubber, which represents more than half in value of all exports, faces a situation of declining world market prices and some plantations may curtail operations in the next year.

On the domestic side South Vietnam is almost self-sufficient in cotton textiles and is on its way to satisfying its own fertilizer and cement requirements by 1966. At the beginning of the current year banking circles noted a healthy increase in local investments in small enterprises which reflects, in their judgment an increase of confidence in the future that is unusual for recent years. The prospects for next year, under normal circumstances, appear reasonably good. If the Government encourages diversification in agriculture, exports of such products together with the increasing availability of rice should offset the decline in foreign exchange earnings from rubber.

The projected GVN budget for CY 1964 totals P27 billion: tax revenues are estimated at P11 billion, leaving an internal budget deficit of P16 billion. External resources (resulting from U.S. operations but requiring also use of foreign exchange reserves) are estimated to generate an additional P9.5 billion, leaving a P6.5 billion estimated deficit. This deficit might be somewhat reduced by additional tax revenues. To meet the remaining deficit, borrowings from the National Bank would still be required with a resulting increase in the money supply.

The money supply has been increasing rather sharply in the last nine months, although the inflationary effect has been dampened by the recent arrival of large shipments under USOM's commodity import program. This has been accompanied by an increase in import licensing brought about principally by the GVN's adoption at the beginning of this year of an open general licensing system for certain manufactured goods such as trucks, automobiles, fabricated steel and some industrial raw materials. The banks estimate that the open general licensing system will result in a $10 million increase in GVN-financed imports in CY 1963.

In short, while the general economic situation is good, the prospects for holding the line on inflation and the balance of payments do not appear bright for CY 1964 unless the GVN can be persuaded to impose severe restraints.

Effect of the Political Crisis on the Economic Situation

At the present time the current political problems have not had a significant effect on the internal economic situation. French banking sources report a slight increase in the rate of withdrawals from private Vietnamese bank deposits over the last two months; but this increase has only been on the order of 1 to 2 percent.

Commercial inventory stocks seem to be increasing, but this can be explained by the recent increase in arrivals of foreign goods. In any case prices have remained stable with exception of a slight increase in the cost of cement, automobiles and certain industrial equipment.

The value of the piastre has fallen 10% on the Hong Kong market in the last month. Virtually no abnormal flight of capital has yet been observed in banking circles.

The most apparent effect of the crisis of the past several weeks is a slowdown in investment decisions, both in industry and in the limited capital market. Inventors and industrialists are worried about a reduction in U.S aid. They are aware of the suspension in the issuances of procurement authorizations and are therefore concerned about the availability of imported raw materials and spare parts.

Since the Saigon business community has lived through some violent times before this, they have not reacted to events with as much panic as might have been expected. If the U.S. should long suspend import commitments, however, it should be apparent that the private sector of the economy will react in an inflationary manner.

IV. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS

Although our observations of the political situation were necessarily less extensive than of the military picture, they were ample to confirm that the existing situation is one of high tension. We reviewed the situation carefully with the relevant U.S. officials and were also impressed by frank interviews with GVN officials and with third country representatives.

In essence, discontent with the Diem/Nhu regime, which had been widespread just below the surface during recent years, has now become a seething problem. The Buddhist and student crises have precipitated these discontents and given them specific issues. But the problem goes deeply into the personalities, objectives, and methods of operation of Diem and Nhu over a long period.

The evidence appears overwhelming that Diem and Nhu operate in close collaboration, and that each needs the other. They undoubtedly regard themselves as carrying out a social and political revolution for the good of their country, using all means-including the strategic hamlet program-to build up a secure base of political strength in the rural areas.

At the same time, the positive and educative sides of their actions, aimed primanly at the countryside, but with extensive countrywide educational efforts as well, have been increasingly matched by negative and repressive measures of control against the urban population. The urban elite or "Establishment"--which includes intellectuals, civilian officials at all levels, and a high proportion of military officers--has never been trusted by Diem and Nhu. Always sensitive to signs of opposition--with some justification from events in 1954-55 and the attempted coups of 1960 and 1962--the regime has turned increasingly to police methods, particularly secret arrests, that have almost all the bad effects of outright totalitarianism even though a good deal of freedom to criticize still remains.

Concurrently, the palace has always manipulated and controlled the government structure to ensure its own control. The degree to which centralized control and intervention have been carried, and the often quixotic nature of its use, have had a steadily growing adverse effect on efficiency and morale.

Both of these adverse characteristics of the regime, and the resentment of them, focus more and more on Nhu. Not merely is he the hatchet man, but his statements on "personalism" and his building up with Madame Nhu of a wide personal apparatus have smacked more and more of outright totalitarianism. A further disturbing feature of Nhu is his flirtation with the idea of negotiating with North Vietnam, whether or not he is serious in this at present. This deeply disturbs responsible Vietnamese and, more basically, suggests a possible basic incompatibility with U.S. objectives.

Nhu's role and scope of action have increased, and he may well have the designs imputed to him of succeeding his brother in due course. Diem is still quite a long way from being a figurehead, and his personal prestige in the country has survived remarkably well. But Diem does depend heavily on Nhu, their central ideas are very close if not identical, and it would be remarkable if Diem dropped Nhu from a commanding position.

Until the Buddhist and student crises, it was probably true that the alienation between Diem and the elite was more a matter of basically divergent views of the right social structure and of Diem and Nhu's handling of individuals in the government than it was a matter of reaction to repressions. However, the crises have now brought the repressions so directly into the lives of many of the elite that more orderly methods, which might previously have kept the loyalty of the needed amount of talent, now probably cannot do so without a convincing degree of restoration of personal security. Yet both more orderly methods and a restoration of personal security cut diametrically across the grain of Diem's and especially Nhu's view of what is necessary to maintain their power and move toward their idea of social revolution.

Thus, the discontent of the elite--reflected chiefly in the progressive loss of responsible men--has now reached the point where it is uncertain that Diem can keep or enlist talent to run the war. The loss of such men as Mau and Tuyen, and the deeply disturbed attitude of such a crucial figure as Thuan, are the strongest evidences of the seriousness of the situation.

This is not to discount groups other than the elite. However, the Buddhists and students cannot in themselves either threaten the regime or do more than focus issues--although of course they seriously damage the regime's standing in the U.S. and elsewhere, with uninhibited press reactions that contribute further to the persecution complex that drives Diem and Nhu into repression. The business community in a passive factor only. Urban labor is simply trying to hold its position, being anti-regime but not to the point of being an independent source of trouble. The rural peasantry appear little affected even by the Buddhist issue. If these groups can be kept even in an acquiescent state the war could go forward.

As matters stand, political tension in the urban centers is so high that it could boil over at any time into another cycle of riots, repressions, and resignations. This tension would disappear in a very short time if Nhu were removed. Whether it could be reduced to acceptable proportions by measures short of this is a very doubtful question, but it is clear that such measures would have to include both more moderate control methods and a better government climate particularly for civilian officials.

V. EFFECT OF POLITICAL TENSION

A. ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

So far this has not significantly affected countryside operations in any area. U.S. personnel in the field testified that a few officer or civilian counterparts showed concern over the Buddhist and student issues, but not to the extent, as yet, of materially affecting their doing their jobs. The rural population has been almost untouched. The pace of GVN operations was sharply cut for a short period at the end of August by transfers of units and general uncertainty, but has now largely renewed its previous intensity. The Delta particularly has been so concerned with the war that it has been virtually unaffected.

Basically, the unifying factors embodied in the hatred of the military for Communism remain very sharp. This hatred is real and pervasive. It transcends domestic policies in the minds of most officers.

However, there are disturbing elements that could change this picture greatly unless the political tension can be reduced. Certain high officers have been heavily preoccupied with coup possibilities. Those who have had relatives directly involved in the regime's repressions are deeply disturbed though not necessarily ready to act against Diem.* Resentment of Nhu exists in top military circles and probably to some extent at middle levels. The fact that the great bulk of military officers--and Province Chiefs--come from urban areas (simply because of educational requirements in many cases) clearly does open up the possibility of progressive loss of morale and effectiveness, as well as coup participation, if the regime does not cease its oppressions against Buddhists, students, and real or supposed opposition individuals.

B. ON CIVILIAN OFFICIALS

On the civilian official side, which is also relevant to the war effort, the reaction to the regime's actions has been sharper. The Embassy and USOM report unanimously that their normal counterparts have become afraid of associating too closely with Americans, and that there is a general atmosphere of watch-and-wait, just going through the motions of the job but failing to exert what limited initiative and imagination they had previously been ready to exert in face of the constant and power-directed interventions of Nhu. The decline in the contribution of these officials is less serious than any similar decline among the military and province chiefs, but is nonetheless a potentially significant and growing factor if tension persists because these officials play a substantial role in the strategic hamlet program.

In summary, the political tension has not yet significantly affected progress in the field, nor does it seem likely to have major effects in the near future. Beyond that, however, the prognosis must be considered uncertain if political tension persists or mounts.

Did you read any more of FRUS IV? Did you get to the part (Document 305, dated November 7, a memo from Michael Forrestal to McGeorge Bundy, at FRUS IV page 581) where it's said that "we have added a gloss to the [McNamara-Taylor] formula and implied (in the NSC statement of last month) that we would also withdraw the bulk of our personnel as soon as the South Vietnamese were able to cope for themselves. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor," Forrestal wrote, "estimated that this might occur in 1965."

Gloss. Freaking gloss added by an NSC staffer to the NSAM that he wrote at Bundy's order to "issue an appropriate NSAM" to "have something more official" than the New York Times article of November 3 for government agencies to have as a record!

"Gloss" is how the NSC staffer who issued "an appropriate NSAM" to inform the military of the content of the M-T report (and who signed his name just "Mike" in his memorandum to Bundy) described JFK's "firm," "unambigous" "policy."

"We have added gloss to the formula."

It was editorial bullspit by an assistant to an aide.

EDIT: I don't know what's up with all those lines in the long quote: I couldn't get rid of them, or maybe I'm the only one who sees them.

The interview took place last night ([Jan.] the 13th). It was archived at this link: Burnham on BOR

It was an interesting and insightful discussion.

One item that I thought might bear some further discussion or clarification is your point about the "three small paragraphs" relating to the issues to have been discussed at the Honolulu conference, particularly those identified as C 1 and C 2 in the State/Defense cable setting forth the proposed agenda for the conference. You said (somewhere around 1:01:50) that it seemed as if the author of the after-action memo had "almost cut and pasted" the verbiage from the cable to the memo.

What you said is actually contained in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume IV (or FRUS IV) is a notation about "here follows discussion about" these items, which is indeed quite so. Paraphrasing somewhat, you go on to note that

I'm not clear from this whether the information was somewhere else or not. Did they "not keep notes" of the discussion, or does it exist and it's just "extremely inadequate?"

FWIW I wasn't suggesting that Oswald was the sixth floor shooter - I don't believe he was - just noting a curiosity.

I didn't think you were. It's interesting, tho', how nobody's glommed onto what I described over the years, and how few responses there have ever been to it. Is it some sort of stumper or something?

I have decided that, after encountering something of a dead end on ascertaining this person's identity to see if anyone else knows who this person was.

Dallas Officers Seize Weapons, Nazi Material;

December 4, 1967

Dallas county sheriff's deputies

rifles, pistols, Nazi literature, racist posters,

thousands of rounds of ammunition

32-year old Dallas man

investigation of theft of rifles, pistols and ammunition.

600 block of Melba

on a peace bond filed Saturday night

Justice of the Peace W. E. Richburg's court.

Making the arrest at 1 a.m. were Tom Barker and A. D. McCurley.

The deputies said they obtained a search warrant from Judge Richburg.

hearing on the peace bond scheduled for 10 a.m. Tuesday

If I find myself with a bit of time the next time I'm in Dallas, I'll see if I can't track some of this information down through the Sheriff's Department and/or County Records. It may also be possible to determine which JP court was Judge Richburg's, and it's possible that the arresting deputies are still around (have you looked into that? I'm imagining so).

A preliminary step that you can take - if you haven't already - is to try to determine some of that information through the County Records Department's general phone number 214-653-7011, which should at least be able to steer you in an appropriate direction and give you some direct-dial numbers.

I'm imagining, perhaps incorrectly, that Dallas County will have the same sort of records available as the Fort Worth Police Department does and did when I looked into the "David Atlee Phillips under arrest in Fort Worth 11/22/63" thing back in '91 or '92, many of them possibly online now. (It never hurts to dress nicely and flash an award-winning smile either!)

December 4 was a Monday, I'm presuming (also possibly erroneously) that the "1 a.m." is that time on the same Monday morning since the article didn't mention a different day, so the Tuesday in question would either be the 5th or the 12th.

What have you done so I don't needlessly duplicate your efforts?

... Besides, there is also the fact that on Houston, all eyes that followed JFK would be looking directly at the TSBD whereas down the road a bit all eyes on JFK makes it less likely that a 6th floor sniper would be seen or identified other than what might be considered "plants"... 30, 5'10", 165 lbs...

... If he can't be placed at the window, and he can't, what does it matter what he MIGHT have done or SHOULD have done.

The real assasins, who were in place and ready to fire from about 12:10 on (just about when JFK was supposed to pass by) waited until JFK was in the kill zone with the knowledge that a shooter would be no more than 20-40 yards away for the last 3-5 seconds of the DP trip. ...

... This leaves three shots from the sixth floor, one of which may have hit JFK in the back of the head at Z-327 (I'm not convinced), one that hit Connally at Z-224 and the one that missed and hit the street behind the limo at Z-175. With two, possibly all three of his shots missing their intended target, it seems to me that the sixth floor shooter was the only poor marksman.

Which curiously enough fits with what we know about Oswald's abilities.

It doesn't matter how bad the shots from a particular location were, or how much we might be able to equate them with an individual's abilities, you still have to put that individual in the place where the shots were fired from.

I'll submit to y'all for your consideration the following:

After Bill Shelley let the flooring crew break early for lunch, the boys had an "elevator race" and went to the lavatory to wash up. Bonnie Ray Williams was among them, but oddly enough, by the time he'd emerged from "washing up," everybody had already gone outside to watch the parade. This entailed a significant number of people having eaten their lunches including Shelley, Junior Jarman, Hank Norman and Billy Lovelady, among others. They're the ones I'm recalling off the top of my head; there may have been others as well (Danny Arce, Bill Shelley, et al.). Each of them described their actions prior to going outside, encompassing several minutes.

When Bonnie Ray came out of the wash room, they were already done and outside, meaning that he was "occupied" there long enough for everyone else to have their lunch. Since none of them were around when he got out and they'd discussed earlier going upstairs to watch the parade, he figured they'd gone upstairs, so up he went. As we know, he didn't find any of the guys he'd expected to on the fifth floor, went up to the sixth - likewise vacant - and ate his lunch there. Later, he went downstairs and met up with Hank and Junior on the fifth floor where they all watched the parade and the shooting.

Here's where it gets interesting.

Both Junior and Hank said that they'd gone upstairs after they'd heard that the motorcade was on Main Street. The first mention on police radios of the motorcade being on Main Street was at 12:26. They walked around the building, went in the back door, and rode the freight elevator up to the fifth floor, then went to the window. According to two out of three of them (Hank said he wasn't sure), Bonnie Ray came to the fifth floor and the window after the other two had already gotten there.

This means that Bonnie Ray was on the sixth floor as late as 12:28.

If he was there, he was within 20 unobstructed feet of the "sniper's nest" window (unobstructed, that is, from where he'd said he was sitting, where the hand truck was "parked": in police photos of the scene, you can see all the way along the wall from the southwest to the southeast corners, and the hand truck was almost right next to the wall). He claimed he heard and saw nobody, yet he was within ear- and eye-shot of where Oswald supposedly was.

Likewise, Jack Dougherty was supposedly working on both the fifth and sixth floors during this part of the lunch break, "getting stock" to fill orders, (one would think) a fairly noisy operation, yet none of these three men saw or heard him at any time. Bonnie Ray said it was deadly silent, and testimony would suggest that it was so if, in fact, the three men could hear the sound of empty cartidges hitting the floor above them. (They also did not hear the sound of "Oswald running" or stowing the rifle despite the silence and his supposedly being directly above them.)

At the time of the shooting, Jack said that he was ten feet from the west elevator when he thought he heard a "backfire." This put him directly in the path of a fleeing Oswald, yet Jack neither saw nor heard anything of the sort. He was apparently still there when Roy Truly looked up the elevator shaft and saw the bottoms of both elevators at the fifth floor (Bonnie Ray had ridden the east elevator up to six and down to five, and it couldn't be moved except by someone inside the cab) as he and Marrion Baker were beginning their trek up to the top floors. But the west elevator was gone by the time they arrived at the fifth floor. They didn't see Jack or any of the three black men while they were on the fifth floor and walked across the elevator area to the east elevator, which they rode past six and up to seven.

Truly actually conceded that the elevator "might have been" used by Jack as he and Baker were going upward, but any further questions that might have reasonably arisen were left unasked and unexplored.

So why didn't Bonnie Ray just come out and say that he'd been on the sixth floor until Oswald got there, and why didn't Jack mention seeing or at least hearing Oswald on his flight back down?

The actual car that Kennedy was in at the time of the assassination had an overhead bow that the bubble roof would have attached to. In the straight on shot the shooter would have had the view of the windshield and this metal piece obstructing the shot. In the reenactments that were done the car did not have this added piece of hardware and many people have seen that reenactment and thought the same as you. Add the piece and it is a major obstruction.

There's no doubt in my mind that the cross-bar would've been an obstruction at an acute angle - i.e., while the vehicle was farther away and the angle low to the target - but the closer it got, the less of an obstruction it became as the angle to the target increased, i.e., became more of an "overhead" view.

This seems like something of a "throwaway" answer, Jim; something that sounds sensible but doesn't mean a thing. You been reading Posner lately? (grin)

I think I finally agree with you Tony! You are wasting your time if you are attempting to convince me that you are more astute on this subject than was Fletcher Prouty.

You are wasting your time if you believe that "double-think and double-speak" will cause me to abandon critical thinking.

You are wasting time if you really believe that the evidence demonstrating that JFK was committed to withdrawal is insufficient to bring into question the content of the DRAFT of NSAM 273.

Indeed, if it weren't a violation of forum policy, I might suggest that you are a waste of my time. However, you are using precisely the same strategy as JFK was using. He was declaring victory (when clearly none was in sight) prior to withdrawing.

Oh. Okay. I'm finally catching on. These guys will believe what they want to believe, decide what is "evidence" and what isn't, tout the things that support their beliefs and dismiss those that don't, and deride those who don't agree with their special insights. There really are monsters under the bed, whether anyone else can see them or not, cuz they've seen 'em themselves. QED.

The line "if it weren't a violation of forum policy" takes the cake, too. Wow. Pretty slick how Monk did that, violated it without violating it, eh?

Gosh, I wish I had that kind of audacity!

First we've got Monk telling us that "there is nothing ambiguous" about 263, that it's "JFK's firm policy," and that Bundy is clearly a traitor for drafting something that's so antithetical to it while JFK was still alive, showing that he somehow "knew" there would be another president in office by the time anyone read his draft. The plot was unfolding right there in the Oval Office!

Then when something earlier and just as antithetical is brought to the fore, it's dismissed out of hand like it doesn't exist because "JFK was against unilateral American involvement in Indochina from before the days of the French defeat," and "there is no evidence that his personal position on the matter changed once he became president." There are even a couple of quotes to support it.

So how does this square with the idea of NSAMs being so incredibly important, "clear indicators" of "presidential policy" that it's supposedly a "serious crime" to circumvent or subvert, that NSAM-111 - very clearly antithetical to NSAM-263 - is somehow NOT as clear an indicator of presidential policy?

Oh, they're important alright. Just not NSAM-111. It wasn't. It's not "evidence that his personal position on the matter changed once he became president" precisely because it is evidence that he changed his personal position on the matter once he became president.

But, really, that's because "he was politically astute enough to realize the difference between his 'public position' and his actual position," the former apparently being elucidated in a **TOP SECRET** NSAM and in all of his public utterances, and the latter being shared, sotto voce, with his closest compatriots (excluding, of course, his brother Bobby, who was his closest confidant in everything except this, the one thing so important it "got him killed;" on that, JFK misled his brother, didn't tell him what was really on his mind so that Bobby believed, after JFK's death, that Jack wasn't going to pull out, despite there being "no evidence" that he'd changed his mind from the '50s and clearly "always intended" to). A wily one, that Jack!

So, NSAM-111 not being "evidence that his personal position on the matter changed," what was it if not the same "unambiguous" statement of policy that Monk tells us NSAM-263 was, and all NSAMs are? "A 'National Security Action Memorandum' has 2 key concepts in it," he pointed out to me on the Education Forum. "The first is National Security, which TRUMPS all other considerations. The second is ACTION. It is not like 'passing a note' in class. Not only might it delineate policy, it is a directive intended to implement that policy: ACTION."

OK. I got it. I've been instructed.

I pulled a bunch of NSAMs off of the JFK Library site and pointed out a few that were literally nothing more than reminders, things that are almost "like 'passing a note' in class," or at the very least, not something we'd consider in the stratum of something that "TRUMPS all other considerations" as anything to do with "national security" surely does. Along with that came the four-page NSAM-111 that apparently doesn't fit that bill and isn't, apparently, what a NSAM "is," isn't "policy" even despite its clear and detailed language and instuctions. More like a long note passed in class.

We know that because "there is no evidence that (JFK's) personal position on the matter changed," and if this is and does, then, well, it's not and didn't. There's not an important distinction here, folks, so just move along, move along, there's nothing more to see.

JFK's "personal position" is actually addressed in NSAM-263, which was an "order" because, as I'd pointed out, it was written at the "suggestion" of the JCS chair, relayed via JFK's military aide, to have "something more official" on which to base government activities than the New York Times article that appeared on October 3 "announcing" the withdrawal to take place and the media's inevitable questions that might be asked - but weren't - at a forthcoming news conference that nobody on the NSC staff even knew about. Bundy told his aide Michael Forrestal to "gather together recent materials on Vietnam" and to "issue an appropriate NSAM" to support a "general line" that "was considered reeasonable by everyone at the table."

Wow, that's pretty official. JFK's "unambiguous policy." Sort of restores one's faith in government "policy," doesn't it?

And has anyone even noticed that NSAM-263 excluded approval of the items covered in the McNamara-Taylor report sections I B (4) and (5), discussion about which former was deferred for "three days" at the October 2 meeting, was discussed and approved at the October 5 meeting that NSAM-263 explicitly references and bases its "orders" on? Forrestal, who was present at the October 5 "off the record" meeting and authored the "Memorandum for the Files" of it, who was at the staff meeting on OCtober 7, must've forgotten about all about that in the interim of authoring that "appropriate NSAM" on October 11.

(In Forrestal's Memorandum of the October 5 meeting, all of the political provisions of subsection (4), actions "to impress upon Diem our disapproval of his political program," are discussed at length, yet in the end, Forrestal notes that subsection (5) - "At this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage actively a change in government. Our policy should be to seek urgently to identify and build contacts with an alternative leadership if and when it appears" - is what he writes were "approved and that appropriate instructions implementing the recommendation in this section be transmitted via CAS channels.")

That JFK: he really was some sort of genius, wasn't he, in clarifying his "unambiguous policy?" Wow. I wonder when he was going to clarify his October 5 approval of subsection (4) - and maybe (5) - if not in NSAM-263 on October 11, his "unambiguous policy" on Vietnam that's just so filled with ambiguity?

OK, I'm confusing the issue here. It's not about any of that stuff. "The only issue, or bone of contention, which should concern us," Richard Gilbride jumps in to say, "is whether 263 and 273 are similar such ACTION instructions and policy outlines."

Y'know, golly gee, he's right: it is an important question! Did NSAM-263 reflect JFK's real policy in one page, countermanding his "other" policy that was in the same sort of National-Security-that-TRUMPS-every-other-consideration ACTION-meaning-directive-intended-to-implement-my-policy-action Memorandum that's not "evidence that he changed his personal position" but rather something that those in government would have been "politically astute enough" to realize "the difference between his 'public position' and his actual position" that somebody took enough time to delineate in four detailed pages of a National Security ACTION Memorandum.

So are they? Yes or no? Richard?

"NSAMs 55 and 57, and 271, which are the other NSAMs I'm personally familiar with," he declares, "are presidential ACTION instructions and policy outlines."

Oh. OK. That clears that up. And?

No other shoe falls. That's it. There's nothing more. NSAMs 55, 57 and 271 are "presidential ACTION instructions and policy outlines," three out of 271 (actually 272). Does that mean 263 must be an ACTION memo? No response. There is nothing at all behind that curtain, folks, so move along now ....

BUT WAIT! WAIT! He's not done! Gather 'round, folks, something really important is about to happen here! Shhh ...!

Monk's "nay-sayers are ignoring an additional piece of contextual evidence," the speaker intones. "Nothing," he says, "nothing has been posted by them in regard to Daniel Patrick Moynihan's memo 'It's Over' published in his recent memoirs and also on-line at Vanity Fair!" Nothing! How can they ignore this recent evidence? Unreal!

(A voice is heard from the crowd: Phil Dragoo yells "I referenced that powerful Moynihan memo, too! Back on November 4th!" Wow, those nay-sayers really are ignorant, aren't they! TELL US! TELL US!! What did Moynihan say?!?)

"In Vanity Fair! Wherein he recounts (on the night of November 22nd, he whispers) that:"

(Pregnant pause.)

"Quote: he says, 'We went directly to the President's office which was torn apart with new carpets being put down in his office and the cabinet room... McGEORGE BUNDY appeared. ICY...'"

The room is silent.

Icy! "Is this not consistent with the demeanor of a guilty man - a participant in the coup d'etat- shunning inquisitive intruders?"

Oh.

My.

Gawd.

Could it be? The smoking gun?

In the stunned silence hanging over the audience like a thick fog rolling in from the sea, a small voice comes over the PA. "He left out the part about Bundy then calling Secretary McNamara." Oh my. "And Moynihan's impression that the new carpet made it seem 'as if a new President were to take office.'" Even more intriguing and indicative!

The crowd hangs on tautly, awaiting more. They're not disappointed: "And that Chuck Daly was there, too! And Ralph Dungan came in, smoking a pipe, 'quizzical.'" A pause. "Moynihan says 'As if ... unconcerned! And then Sorenson, too! And the troika called Secretary McNamara!"

Is there no end to the treachery?!? Do we need more proof than JFK's own personal friend telling us this? And right after that sly dog Bundy wrote that draft! At last! EVIDENCE!

But wait, there's still more.

And one really wonders how they missed it.

Cuz, yup, in the same book, if they'd looked just a little farther, just before the passage above (in which we also learn that Moynihan retired and watched tv with the pipe-smoking, "quizzical" and "unconcerned" Ralph Dungan!), we find that Moynihan had also penned his resignation.

It read:

Dear Mr. President,

As you assume the awesome responsibilities that have devolved upon you, I would like to offer my resignation as Assistant Secretary of Labor in order that you might in this respect, as in others, have the fullest freedom to organize the government in the best interests of the Administration and the Nation as you perceive them. I do so with the utmost assurance of my complete support and continued prayers.

He was very clearly writing to LBJ, not to his just-departed dear friend Jack Kennedy. The letter was dated ... November 21, 1963.

Moynihan was part of the plot, too. JFK's own very dear friend. Oh.

My.

Gawd.

How did they miss that?

(Oh. The publisher said it was an "incorrect" date, that's how! Not having been part of the plot themselves - a rarity for publishers in those days! - they clearly didn't recognize the evidence even as it stared them in the face! It was "a mistake!" It slipped by our sleuths because it wasn't in Vanity Fair.)

So let's forget about all this mumbo-jumbo, all this "double-think and double-speak," about what NSAMs were, what they meant, what JFK's "true" intentions were or weren't, who wrote what, why, and all of that meaningless talk about stuff that's not evidence of anything anyway (except about how artful JFK really was?), and let's move on to the critical thinking, the really profound examination of "the demeanor of a guilty man - a participant in the coup d'etat - shunning inquisitive intruders."

That's where the meat is, that's where the answers will be found, not lollygaggin' around 'mid the muck and the mire of those meaningless NSAMS that "TRUMP all other considerations" except, of course, what we should've been looking at all along. Uh, at least since November, that is. In a book. That'll be out soon. Excerpts on Vanity Fair, film at eleven.

(Gosh, I'm still amazed that I'd missed it! But at least I can save on the cost of the October 5 tape now that it's been shown to me!)

Like Tony had said in order to elicit that "waste of my time" "critical thinking" response, I'm done with this "debate" as well, at least there, tho' not, as Monk would have it, by "using precisely the same strategy as JFK was using ... declaring victory (when clearly none was in sight) prior to withdrawing," but rather by recognizing what Nixon ultimately did: there's nothing to be gained from fighting an enemy who "owns" the ground and doesn't want to let it go even in the face of superior armament.

The NVN at least had a defensible point there.

An earthquake in Texas.

... The problem for Deep Politics was that it did not get many page views. Unfortunately, it is very difficult for new forums to get established in search-engine rankings. As they found that forum debates was just a small group of people talking to each other they probably decided it was not worth the money or the intellectual effort involved. I was reading the other day that 95% of all blogs are abandoned within three months. People come to the conclusion that there are no point writing things if no one reads it.

Why not? I do it all the time. But then, everyone knows I just like to listen to myself talk (read myself write?)....

Oh, sorry, I lied, but only briefly:

... Like I said in my presentation, there is NO documentation that I could find to substantiate the claim that the new "central object" (Total Commitment) emerged as a result of the discussions conducted in Honolulu! In fact, the first paragraph states that: "It remains the central object..." -- Yet, as I said before, no such "Central Object" of winning the contest existed on November 21st, therefore it could not "remain" either.

Probably more propaganda, but here we go:

... 2. At the outset, let me state plainly that the central purpose of my Government in all of its relations with your country is that the Communists should be defeated in their brazen effort to capture your country by force and fraud of all varieties. What we do and do not do, whether it seems right or wrong to our friends, is always animated by this central purpose. In all that it does in its relations with your country, the United States Government gives absolute priority to the defeat of the Communists.

(ibid., page 231; emphases added)

The "hairs" are "as a result of the Honolulu discussions," and "purpose" rather than "object." Oh: and also not penned by JFK.

I've got a date; gotta go. This time I mean it.

You'll forgive me, I hope, if I'm having difficulty reconciling things like

... why would I (or anyone, not just me) "want to believe" this particular scenario? My research is conducted from a position of "WANTING TO KNOW" what happened. It does not emerge from a presupposed position of "find evidence to support what I already believe" happened, as that would be counter-productive and self delusional. I am unmarried to any theories and always open to new ideas ..."

... with other things like:

... IF we agree that NSAM 263 called for the withdrawal of the first 1,000 troops from Vietnam by the end of 1963, the withdrawal of all US "troops" by the end of 1964, and the withdrawal of the bulk of all remaining US Personnel (CIA and advisors) by the end of 1965...THEN we can talk further about this portion. However, if you reject that premise out-of-hand, you are in good company with John McAdams and those of his ilk.

... which suggests to me a predisposition toward only discussing things with people whose ideas generally agree with your own. I have no idea what position, if any, McAdams or any of his "ilk" (sort of reminds me of the difference between "aroma" and "odor" when applied to one's wife's cooking, doesn't it you?) has on this question and I really don't care, but I certainly don't think that anyone's "politics" in this matter has anything to do with the validity or veracity of their arguments: you're not "right" about this topic just because I happen to think there was a conspiracy to kill JFK, and they're not wrong just because they think Oswald did it.

In point of fact, I don't know whether I ultimately agree with you or not about this "smoking gun" business, but based on what I've seen so far, I'm inclined to think that your argument's not quite as strong as it seems at face value. For example, regarding NSAM-263:

... 8. Vietnam. Everyone is bracing for Madame Nhu's visit. Forrestal remarked Madame Nhu has great attractive powers; even Hilsman is weakening and agrees some of the things she says make sense. On Vietnam in general, Bundy commented that he was surprised that some people were taking as "Pollyanna-ish" the "McNamara-Taylor" statement that we could pull out of Vietnam in two years.' He said what struck him was that two years was really a long time, considering that by then the war would have lasted four years-or longer than most wars in US history. General Clifton said the President undoubtedly would be asked about it Wednesday at his press conference. (The conference was news to all assembled.) The general line will be that in two years the Vietnamese will be able to finish the job without US military forces on the scene-a position considered reasonable by everyone around the table.

Bundy also asked Forrestal to draw together the recent materials on Vietnam and issue an appropriate NSAM. He said that the New York Times had the only version of what was decided at a recent NSC meeting, and while he did not mind communicating with various agencies through the Times, General Taylor had suggested the need for something more official. ...

(Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol IV, Vietnam: August - December 1963, page 387 et seq., at HistoryMatters.com; emphases added)

The emphasis upon NSAM-263 being JFK's hard-and-fast, unequivocal and resolute "policy" rings a little hollow when one finds that it was "an appropriate NSAM" that was "drawn together" from "recent materials on Vietnam" in response to a "suggestion" that there would be "something more official" to support a "general line" that was "considered reasonable by everyone around the table" to use to respond to reporters' questions at an upcoming press conference that nobody at that table even knew about. (The "Wednesday" referred to was Wednesday, October 9, 1963, two days before the issuance of NSAM-263 on October 11: it seems Forrestal was a tad behind the eight-ball getting that done.)

I'm not making this stuff up, I haven't been holding it in abeyance, and nobody's been "feeding" it to me: other than what I've attributed to the book Running the World, all the stuff I've posted on this thread I'd found only in the past few days. While I grant that it's all probably "only the stuff 'they' want us to know," and certainly not "all there is to know," it fairly well demolishes the notion that these NSAMs were things that fully and accurately record exactly what JFK had firmly decided upon as if he'd spent his nights penning them himself, laboring over each word and nuance so history and his generals would get it absolutely right ... or that NSAM-273 was penned by fiendishly clever conspirators with "foreknowledge" of the impending assassination, waiting with bated breath to spring their little subterfuge of a lengthy war on an unsuspecting (or collaborating, depending on one's point of view) new president and the nation before Kennedy had even pushed up his first daisy.

That's all I've got time for right now. I'm about ready to put this on the "sensational" shelf along with the famous "there's no earthquakes in Texas" commentary from Infamous Grave Sites, but just not quite yet I don't think.

Splitting hairs will not help.

I know. I was thinking the same thing.

(Yeah: thanks for thinking!)

Edit: time of WH staff meeting

... my intent was to get people thinking about these issues again because I believe they remain important. Thanks for thinking...

Now please stop? (grin)

I haven't the time to argue these points beyond a few short lines.

1) The early implication that Fletcher Prouty was somehow "out-of-the-loop" in your first reply is absurd. He was the Chief of Special Operations which means he was all over it...perhaps even more so than many of the Generals!

2) The implication that his account was "second hand" knowledge is absurd. Prouty personally handed the leather bound "McNamara-Taylor Report" to the pilot and instructed that pilot as to how he was to brief McNamara & Taylor!

3) FYI: I spoke with Peter Dale Scott (and communicated through email) months ago when I sent my paper to him upon its completion. Other than a few minor items, he indicated that he essentially agreed with all I had written. Now, during my presentation, I acknowledge his good work. We may have differences, but we don't dismiss each other's conclusions at all.

4) A "National Security Action Memorandum" has 2 key concepts in it. The first is National Security, which TRUMPS all other considerations. The second is ACTION. It is not like "passing a note" in class. Not only might it delineate policy, it is a directive intended to implement that policy: ACTION.

My main point can be summed up in the notion that foreknowledge of the signatories to NSAM-273 (in draft or adopted form) is not the ONLY conclusion one can reach, and is indeed the one least supported by the available evidence, which includes the on-going opposition to Kennedy's "policy" of withdrawal by almost all "senior" NSC officials (Bundy, McNamara, Rusk, et al.) and the then-Vice President LBJ. It is every bit as likely - and probably more likely - that these men took advantage of Kennedy's "absence" and Johnson's new (and sole) authority to enact a policy that all of them had been advocating all along. They were no longer compelled to support the deceased president's inclinations, and very clearly did not.

There is nothing "absurd" about questioning Fletch Prouty's bona fides since the only evidence of them is his own assertions. That is not to say that he lied about what he did, but merely to say that "why would I lie" is about the only "proof" that he ever offered that they were factual. The fact that a "mere" colonel - almost a non-entity at the Pentagon level, much less the national security level - is not mentioned on the official record is not proof of his veracity or, to be more generous, his accuracy. There are no sacred cows, are there? (Silly me: of course there are! Isn't "Oswald did it alone and unaided" one of them to some people? It's just not right to question what we want to believe!)

It's my experience that it's generally fairly easy to find evidence to support a notion, or rather, easy to ignore evidence that doesn't when you've found enough that does. Most of us have this tendency, I think, and some of us don't act against it. Peter, for example, notes that "it is of course possible that NSAM 273 had already been censored before it was submitted to some or all of the authors of the Pentagon Papers," yet he doesn't seem to consider the possibility that the draft NSAM-273 that was made on November 21 was likewise "censored" (read: "destroyed"), and in any event superceded by the version which was presented to LBJ on November 24 and ratified by him?

Why in the world would we think that we have the one-and-only true and uncensored version of the "draft" that was actually made on November 21, when those at the Pentagon who made a study for and on behalf of Robert McNamara might not have had it?

Your emphasis on the concept of "ACTION" seems a little misplaced, especially in light of the Honolulu Conference's objectives. You make it sound as if what Kennedy had been contemplating and hinting at was a "directive" that everyone in government had to take immediate steps to implement: "everybody get on board and DO THESE THINGS ... NOW!" If that is indeed the case, why - again in Peter Dale Scott's own words - would Kennedy demand "a 'full-scale review' of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia" to be made in "an extraordinary all-agency Honolulu Conference of some 45 to 60 senior Administration officials" when he'd already made up his mind??

When POTUS has "made up his mind," then that seems to be the time for a "directive" for "ACTION," and not the time to "demand" a "full-scale review," wouldn't you think?

This even despite the claim that "on November 20, two days before the assassination, the Honolulu Conference secretly 'agreed that the Accelerated Plan (speed-up of force withdrawal by six months directed by McNamara in October) should be maintained.'" If that is so - it was done "secretly," after all - if everyone agreed that JFK's "planned withdrawal" was the right course for the country, then how in the world did Mac Bundy get away with drafting something so at odds with such a determination and nobody said a word about those changes, or raised a furor in the press, or even mentioned it in a footnote years later in their memoirs?

Shoot, if these guys had "foreknowledge" of the assassination, why did they bother to "secretly agree" to anything at all? And after having reached that "secret agreement," yet drafting a memorandum in direct contravention of it, what the heck were they gonna do if Kennedy had survived the weekend unscathed? It would seem at least that they'd have drafted a memo more in keeping with the "policies" "decided upon" by JFK in NSAM-263 in case they'd need it, wouldn't you? Even the best laid plans and all that, y'know? Or were they also somehow prescient of the coup's success as well?

And FWIW, a command to "action" is only to "do certain things" in support of an objective; it does not imply full-scale mobilization to implement all phases of it. Likewise - and I could be mistaken here, I'm only 52 - I don't think that "national security" became the mantra, the "be-all and end-all" that it is today that "TRUMPS all other considerations," until the Nixon era.

I guess that what I'm ultimately saying is that, as long as we stick to the facts that are presented, it's easy to draw a conclusion of foreknowledge and a coup. But if we try (without making an intense and in-depth study of it) to reconcile it with other evidence, it's not quite as convincing a conclusion, and clearly isn't the only one that there is.

The pine casket was sold to an unnamed buyer (who "might speak to the public today," Friday) on Thursday evening in Los Angeles for US$87,469. It was sold by Allen Baumgardner of Baumgardner Funeral Home of Fort Worth, who is cited as the mortician who "supervised the exhumation of Oswald's body from his grave in Rose Hill Cemetery [now Shannon Rose Hill Memorial Park] in 1981."

Baumgardner was apparently present during the exhumation (see Tracy Parnell's "The Exhumation of Lee Harvey Oswald and the Norton Report: Part II - Paul Groody") in what might be described as a "supervisory role" inasmuch as the original mortician, if available, is required to legally "supervise" an exhumation in Texas, which only really means that he was there as an observer, especially inasmuch as Groody was the mortician "of record" and Baumgardner apparently his assistant. (In 1963, the two were employees of Miller Funeral Home, the owner of which may actually have been the legally-defined mortician of record, rather than technicians employed under his license.)

Neither Baumgardner nor Groody are mentioned by name in the exhumation-autopsy pathology report; the only reference to either of them in the report is that "the mortician who closed Mr. Oswald's casket remained in the room until the casket was reopened," that is, "mortician," singular (Groody?).

Parnell's piece is pretty straightforward, and includes a link to the first article I'd written on the entire assassination mess ... which also includes my first big brain fart as well: in something of a hurry to meet print deadlines, I couldn't think of Groody's name (as I said, it wasn't mentioned in the Norton report) and decided on the spur of the moment to leave him nameless "to protect the innocent," so to speak. (I've always felt pretty dumb about that, but nobody's ever commented on in in nearly 20 years!)

Let's see what, if any, the buyer has to say, whoever s/he is.

I think one of the points being missed is that the introductory language of this draft is NOT intended as an account of what had occurred up to the point of writing it, but what was expected to have occurred up to the point of its being signed.

A draft is, by definition, a "preliminary form of any writing, subject to revision." It is no different than a "model order" that attorneys present to a judge, which they write before they've even made their argument, in the hope or expectation that the judge will concur.

This is, in other words, a preliminary version of what the writers hoped or expected would be what was finally issued. There is nothing either unusual or suspicious about that.

As unpopular a notion as it may be, I think it is incorrect to consider the contents of NSAM-263 to have been "policy" (that NSAM-273 "reversed") for several reasons. As Greg noted in his introductions,

... Consider the simplicity of NSAM 263 -- JFK, after reviewing the McNamara-Taylor Report, approved only the recommendation to WITHDRAW. Done deal. Are we really to believe that just over a month later, the central object of the US would shift from total withdrawal to total commitment? Yet, Bundy's NSAM 273 draft directs that the central object of assisting the South Vietnamese so that they will "win their contest against...the Communist conspiracy" be given precedence over all other considerations! There's only one looming problem with this scenario. No such "central object" as described by Bundy existed on November 21, 1963 as such a plan was in direct opposition to the then Commander-in-Chief's (JFK) standing order to his military to withdraw. Once again, relying on the official record serves to confirm these conclusions.

There was no such "standing order ... to withdraw," and that conclusion can only be construed if one wishes to incorrectly consider the National Security Council to be the policy arm of the president. It is not; it is merely an advisory body, and no president is under any compulsion to follow its "lead."

All that it can direct are things which the president might need to reach his own decisions, which are not necessarily those recommended by the NSC. The NSC is also not the president's "mouthpiece" for enacting or announcing his policies. That JFK did not "order" any such "withdrawal" is implicit in NSAM-263's directive to not announce such a "decision."

Underscoring the perception that a National Security Action Memorandum is not a policy statement is the fact that there are also National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM). One might reasonably expect that before a "decision" memorandum is generated, there might be "study" memoranda circulated - "look at these things and get back to us" - as well as "action" memoranda - "do these things in furtherance of the things we're doing or considering."

An "action" is not a "decision" any more than a "study" is; nothing emanating from the National Security Council - once again, an advisory body - should be construed as "policy," such statements coming directly from the White House or "the Office of the President," and not from a "committee," however lofty.

(Some might consider that splitting hairs, but it is no more so than criticizing the opening paragraph of NSAM-273 as being "deceptive" about having disussed issues with the president in advance of there having even been an opportunity to have done that.)

In support of that perception (of a committee "ordering" anything), consider the Nixon-era NSDM-242, a document that redefined the then-US policy of mutually assured destruction to a more "selective and flexible" set of targeting instructions known as "strategic sufficiency."

NSDM-242 - a "decision" memorandum - was prepared by the NSC in the fall of 1973, but was not put into practice until the newly-appointed SecDef James Schlesinger announced in January 1974 that he was implementing a "change in targeting strategy" to "develop alternatives to initiating a suicidal strike against the cities of the other side."

Nixon only signed NSDM-242 a week after Schlesinger's public announcement. Only when it was signed by the president did it become "policy." NSAMs-263 and -273 were not signed by the president (and by definition, needn't have been to take the "actions" contemplated by them), were not "decision" documents, and thus can only be considered policies that the president was then considering.

NSAM-273 is also not "suspect" inasmuch as there is more than sufficient record to show that, despite the directions Kennedy had indicated he wished to take, his advisors continued to argue against them, as well they might since that was effectively their job: to provide their advice to the president, even that counter to his intentions, at least up to the point when he had made a firm decision.

Peter Dale Scott noted that Secretary of State Dean Rusk, SecDef McNamara and national security advisor McGeorge Bundy were strong proponents of escalation, a position they had taken vociferously during an August meeting of the NSC that did not in that instance include the president, but did include VP Johnson (it is not unusual, btw, for the president not to attend meetings of his advisors: Ike attended very few on the notion that his presence when "decisions" were made might constrain his subsequent actions). In that meeting, Johnson strongly sided with the Rusk-Bundy-McNamara axis. (See - The Kennedy Assassination and the Vietnam War at History Matters.)

It should be no surprise, then, given the lack of presidential signature or any form of "decision" document, these men drafted - drafted - a document that contravened an earlier "action" memo which was not, after all, a "decision" memo, no was it signed as final by the president.

Nor, for that matter, was NSAM-273, although LBJ - also not surprisingly - took and continued to take steps that complied with and went well beyond that which NSAM-273 envisioned. As a matter of fact, it was "adopted" during a 45-minute briefing to the new president in the days immediately following the assassination that was not even an official meeting of the NSC.

According to PDS, citing Chester Cooper (a White House aide to Bundy), Lyndon Johnson's first National Security Council meeting was not convened until Thursday, December 5. If this is so, Scott writes, then "references to a National Security Council meeting of November 26 are wrong, naive deductions from NSAM-273's misleading title" (ibid).

If my interpretations are correct (based as they are on my own relative naivete, however gleaned from writings unrelated to the JFK assassination), then these national security memoranda are far from "policy statements" but rather are directives by the NSC from or in support of the president, who is looking to the NSC for advice on matters he is considering, not as "orders to comply" with decisions he has already made.

(The draft) NSAM-273 is just as likely yet another of many attempts by Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, et al., to sway JFK to following their long-advocated counsel rather than his own, based ostensibly on "new information" or "further concurrence" obtained at Honolulu, which JFK may have rejected out of hand (and hence it would not be NSAM-anything).

Instead, it was "rushed through" by its advocates taking advantage of a new and sympathetic president during a 45-minute briefing (could they even have agreed on the final changes to this document in that time, much less covered anything else?) just 48 hours after he had so suddenly attained office.

It was (it should be noted) outside the normal venue of a formal NSC meeting wherein some opposition and reminder of "JFK's wishes" (as if they really mattered any more than Bush's did when Obama took office) might well be expectd ... and since that was the public "face" LBJ put on his administration, those arguments might well have dissuaded LBJ, at least temporarily, from doing other than "steering the course" "set" (or at least preferred) by his predecessor.

It is just as likely, that is, that the draft (or its timing) indicate foreknowledge of JFK's assassination ... and perhaps equally baseless.

Maybe.

Thanks for all of that: you're right, I often tend to somehow meld the "stopover in Honolulu" and the Honolulu conference together! The first was on the way back from VN, and weren't there cabinet officials on the way TO VN after the other? (One can only juggle so many facts, I suppose!)

According to the "official record" the report was ostensibly written on the airplane from Honolulu to Washington. However, Colonel L Fletcher Prouty was there in Washington working directly under Krulak's supervision during this time. Prouty's account is exactly what I was conveying in my presentation. I have no cause to disbelieve Prouty's account. The idea that this was done on the way home seems quite a stretch, but may have gone unnoticed if we didn't have Prouty's account. With his account, we scrutinize the official story and the illusion emerges for what it is.

According to WIKI:

=======================================

"Drafting the report

After a one-day stopover in Honolulu to prepare their report, McNamara and Taylor arrived back in Washington on October 2. The report was written hurriedly on the plane trip back to Washington. Forrestal described the report as a 'mishmash of everything.' During the 27 hour flight, Bundy managed only to get two hours of sleep between his writing and later opined that 'neither their draftsmanship nor judgment is likely to be at its best under such working conditions.' They promptly met with the President and the National Security Council. Their report concluded that the 'military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress.' On the other hand, it warned that the serious political tensions in Saigon due to the Buddhist crisis and the increasing unpopularity of Diem and Nhu as a result of their anti-Buddhist activities could stoke the dissent of some ARVN officers and erode what they believed was favourable military progress. Taylor and Maxwell reported to having seen no evidence of a successful coup being prepared, and felt that American pressure would probably only further harden the Ngo family's attitudes. Nevertheless, 'unless such pressures are exerted, they [Diem-Nhu] are almost certain to continue past patterns of behavior.'"

Another researcher and I met with Fletch a number of years ago in northern Virginia. As I recall, our general impression was that it was tough to nail him down, essentially leaving him as a "second-hand" source. He was, of course, "only" a colonel, which amid a ship-pot full of generals doesn't amount to a lot. Consequently, since he wasn't among the "brass," per se, it's tough to find anything that would cite his presence other than a blanket reference to "various aides," all unnamed, at a meeting, and thus ultimately impossible to independently corroborate what he was actually a part of.

Wiki, of course, is also a problem since it's user-driven. What does it say about Oswald, or James Files, or any other controversial person or event other than what some individual contributes?

Surfing for more or different perspectives and/or accounts of the events leading up to NSAM-273, it is interesting to note in an essay by Peter Dale Scott on History Matters an account of a meeting at the State Department on August 31, 1963, including minutes taken by General Krulak:

If this is so, then LBJ was already of a mind about what to do with regard to Vietnam, and the changes from NSAM-263 to -273, while significant, can be attributed to the already-established opinion of the man even before he became president, and his reversal of Kennedy's earlier policy (and plans for a "political" rather than "military" solution), while counter to the stance he took publicly toward "continuing" JFK's policies, did not carry through to his "TOP SECRET" decisions that would not be for public consumption.

One president changing, even reversing, the policies of his predecessor is not unheard of and well within the purview of the new president, especially when this one - LBJ - was already on record as disagreeing with his boss, albeit privately and not publicly.

I'm just not sure that these changes mean as much as they're sometimes construed to make, especially when gleaned from secondary sources.

DL: The WC, of course, wasn't an open-ended judicial proceeding where facts from both perspectives compete, but a "fact-finding panel" that was not wholly unlike a grand jury except that the "true bill" found by it was not subject to further contest. In effect, Mark (and others of similar mind) are saying that an indictment is the same as a finding of guilt, and that it is ridiculous to bring it to trial: anyone who doesn't accept what the prosecutor convinced the grand jury with is clearly a fool, and the adversarial process is a stupid farce.

I disagree with this.

The WC was not a fact finding panel. It was a one sided prosecution which knew it could get away with anything since there was no adversary proceeding and no judge and no appeals process.

It was a kangaroo court in every way. ...

What it was and what it did may be two completely different things, but the WC was only chartered to "gather and report on the facts" of the assassination. Whether it did so or not, does not affect what it was.

A bit more from Running the World (pp. 99-105) about "groupthink," LBJ's use of the NSC, and his (and JFK's) chief advisers. It is a glimpse into the modus operandi of those who drove NSAM-273:

The account continues to describe actions taken by McNamara, who was by then only certain that something had happened, to keep the NSC up to date with what little he really knew. After advising the NSC to recommend a retailiatory air strike to the president, he, Risk, Bundy, Vance and DCI John McCone retired to lunch with Johnson at the White House, where the surviving record indicates that targets for the bombing were decided upon. Later that evening, at a second NSC meeting, McNamara continued to stress that attacks had occurred and were continuing to occur, relying in large part on a NSA intercept warning that was later found to refer to the earlier incident.

Half an hour later, Johson, Rusk and Wheeler met with congressional leaders and proposed what would become the Tonkin Gulf Resolution authorizing retailiation. Congessional leaders immediately supported the draft resolution, which had itself been drafted many weeks before the incidents it was itself repraising., according to Rothkopf.

Ostensibly, the decision-making error was over few participants responding to the weight of developments given to "separate and not necessarily reliable intelligence flows." More to the point, "given that Johnson's team was looking for an incident to put the aready drafted resolution before Congress when one seemed to have occurred, a reasonable effort to nail down the facts as might have been done in other circumstances likely seemed counterproductive."

"In short," he concludes, "groupthink can become powerful enough to drive leaders to twist events and intelligence to support conclusions they have already reached."

To what extent might groupthink have motivated those same advisors to take advantage of the assassination of JFK to drive forward their agenda with a new president who almost certainly did not just begin to show the characteristics described on Air Force One at Love Field. Did the "whiz kids," seeing their opening, swoop in and press their advantage even though they had no foreknowledge of the events that would lead to this "coup?"

Well done, Greg. You're a relaxed speaker with a comfortable grasp of your subject matter, witty where applicable (great ending, btw!), and unflappable ("oh, you already knew the answer to that question!"). Either that or you were nervous as hell and hid it like a pro!!

I've shown NSAM 263/273 to several people skeptical of any sort of "conspiracy" in JFK's murder, and they almost universally do at least a 90-degree turn, if not 180. But as convincing as it may seem, is it really a smoking gun? Are its apparent oddities as singularly striking as they seem to be, or is there more to it than meets the eye? I'll play devil's advocate here with some alternatives that aren't, I don't think, terribly far-fetched at all.

First, the question of printing. Much is made over a leather-bound volume being prepared of the final(?) report on which NSAM 273 is purportedly based. I've never seen the original of this, and don't recall having read any lengthy account about what, exactly, this "leather-bound volume" contained. Can you possibly expound upon that? Are we looking at multiple copies of a thick tome, or one-to-a-dozen bindings, permanent or otherwise, of a less-than-100-page report prepared specifically for the president and his advisors (NSC, 5412, etc.)?

The practice of preparing a leather-bound copy of official reports does not seem extraordinary, and we'll recall that LBJ was presented with a similar version of the Warren Report, as were a fairly large number of elected and other officials, possibly including the 26 volumes of testimony and evidence as well, at a presumably significant cost. From what I've read about different things in other contexts, this is a fairly common practice. (Sure, it's expensive, but it's not their money.)

Likewise, depending upon the depth or scope of a report, it doesn't seem as if it's unusual within governmental operations for reports or assessments or what-have-you to be prepared in advance of its presentation. I think it's fair to say that none of us really expect any of the participants of the Honolulu conference to be the people who actually wrote the report, typing it up on the plane as they flew over the Pacific, nor do I think we really envision lower-level functionaries with enough rank to justify being on such a trip doing this either.

More than likely, these being government activities (no such thing as an expense too large), advocates of different actions and policies prepared lengthy "position papers" in advance using information already at hand from favored sources, with the intention that their document be the one eventually accepted by the president or whatever authority it's intended for. So it's not necessarily unlikely that they left Washington with different versions of the "final report" already prepared for presentation, or that more than one "final report" would actually be presented as alternatives to the president.

In Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), author David Rothkopf recounts meetings of the NSC during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations - which, according to Rothkopf, were conducted very differently between those and other administrations from Truman to Bush II - during which opposing viewpoints were presented as alternatives to the presidents they served. While he quotes only brief passages from those position papers, it's clear that the quotations are but excerpts, and not the complete report made to the group or to the president.

That he quotes from reports that were not adopted as policy strongly suggests that those defeated motions survive in some form. Are there any such papers surviving from LBJ's early meetings, whether of the NSC as a formal whole or any informal subset or even individual advisors on an ad hoc basis, that suggest the process by which NSAM 273 came into being? Does any record exist beyond the final product, and if so, what does it reflect? Is there an extant position paper/report that more closely resembles NSAM 263's apparent objectives, possibly also prepared in advance and bound in leather for the president's consideration?

If any of this is so, it doesn't particularly strike me as odd that the introductory language includes that "the President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge," written in the past tense about an event that would presumably occur in the future. This is akin to a "model order" often prepared by an attorney for a judge's signature, presuming that the judge will endorse exactly the position advocated by the writer that only needs to be signed to be put into effect.

Interestingly, Rothkopf (pages 82-83, early in this 500-plus page book which does not concentrate by any means on that era) also recounts a meeting in the waning days of the Eisenhower administration during which the Cuba situation was discussed, and options for some form of action against Castro's regime, provided to him (Rothkopf) by General William Odom of the National Security Agency under Reagan and Zbigniew Brzezinski's military aide, worth reproducing at length here.

As prelude, Rothkopf discusses that portion of JFK's debates with Nixon over confronting Castro's communism, with Kennedy calling for action that he knew from briefings to be under consideration, and Nixon constrained from discussing them due to his office and part in the planning. "It is one thing to call for action as a candidate," Rothkopf writes, "but quite another to be responsible for carrying it out as president." As a political corollary to the old adage of "be careful what you wish for, you just might get it," he quotes "be careful of what you call for — as you may actually have to end up doing it." Related Odom during a 2004 interview with the author:

Rothkopf, as I've noted, earlier related instances where opposing position papers were prepared for adoption by the president, and here he is describing a position advocated by the CIA that was in direct contravention to the policy intended by then-President Eisenhower which could "take legs of its own" if Eisenhower wasn't careful. We all know the substance of how that intended policy changed under Kennedy who, having called for action in his campaign, now ended up having to do it: the CIA's plan "took legs" and turned into disaster.

The point being this: whatever Kennedy intended during his lifetime was not incumbent upon Johnson, as the new president, to act upon. What record there is, if any, of Johnson's position during Kennedy's NSC meetings, if any (the legal definition of what cabinet officers, etc., who made up the NSC has apparently evolved under each president, its legally-defined members having more or less of a role and influence as deemed necessary by successive presidents), I don't know; perhaps again, you can shed some light on that. Did Johnson actually participate in NSC proceedings during JFK's administration? Was he more "hawkish," leaning more toward direct intervention even while Kennedy was alive? Either way, is it a great surprise that any president, however he came to office, took his own counsel and made his own decisions irrespective of his predecessor's intentions, desires or policies?

In sum, is the "reversal" of Kennedy's "policy" regarding Vietnam - presumably subject to change, even as the CIA sought to influence Ike in the summer of 1960 as his presidency drew to a close and after he'd apparently made "policy" regarding Cuba - any more noteworthy or, more to the point, indicative of high-level conspiracy than if Nixon had won the election and made a full-scale invasion of Cuba in opposition to Ike's policy and beyond JFK's ultimate, more limited action? The decisions of a president are his own, right or wrong, and not necessarily reflective of his pedecessor: was NSAM-273 merely the manifestation of LBJ's long-held position, or a complete turn-around for him as well?

For the sake of saying so, the only National Security Action Memorandum that Rothkopf discusses in his book is NSAM-52, which also related to Vietnam's conflict and so is worth noting here as well. Rothkopf points out that, when Kennedy took office, there were fewer than 700 military advisors in Vietnam, and the focus of US policy up to that time had been to provide low-key assistance to the Diem government in Saigon. NSAM-52 initiated several "cautious moves" to increase the commitment of advisors to over 1000 and expand the aid available to Siagon. JFK "next," according to Rothkopf, "dispatched the deputy national security advisor Walt Rostow and General Maxwell Taylor to Vietnam on a fact-finding mission.

I this, we find that McGeorge Bundy, the signatory to the draft NSAM-273, had apparently and ostensibly been opposed to the directions Kennedy was taking with regard to Vietnam even going back to the early days of JFK's administration, along with fellow influencers (and continued Johnson appointees, reflecting the "continuity" between administrations) Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara, among potential others. Was the draft NSAM simply one of their many on-going and as-yet-unsuccessful attempts to dissuade JFK from what they perceived as a "wrong" course of action, a "model order" for him to sign if and when they were successful, and one which they succeeded in having adopted by the new president either as a reflection of his own long-standing opinions, or as a product of a fortuitous circumstance whereby they could say that "Jack would have signed this" and got the new president to heed their long-opposed counsel that Kennedy was too strong- (and "wrong-") minded to accede to?

So part of the equation necessary to show intent and foreknowledge - to show that NSAM-263/273 is, in fact, a "smoking gun" of a coup d'etat - would seem to be the absence of any other "draft" memoranda also prepared for the president's (JFK's) signature, even though ultimately not signed by LBJ. Are there any such documents, or is draft -273 the only one ever prepared? Is there any record extant that provides further insight into the discussions taking place before the Honolulu conference, Vietnam jag, and JFK's assassination and the positions taken by JFK's - subsequently LBJ's - advisors? If not, is this the only instance where the earlier "working papers" of JFK's "inner circle" (whether sitting as the NSC or something else, formally or informally) no longer exist, or is the record of other and earlier discussions also barren?

In and of itself, the disparity between the JFK-approved NSAM-263 and the Johnson-approved -273 does suggest foreknowledge of an impending change in the presidency and therefore a conspiracy to eliminate JFK as an "obstacle to foreign policy," and it is in such isolation that I can recall this ever being discussed in the research community. But has there been a tendency toward the "path of least resistence" to present these circumstances in isolation simply because it does suggest (if not actually "prove") conspiracy, and the whole record might not be so conducive to such an easy conclusion, or alternately, provide one that is counter to what may be just "popular mythology?"

Sometimes it seems that we tend to think of Kennedy's "whiz kids" to be stolid "Kennedy loyalists" who were 100% "behind" JFK, who thought exactly the same way, and who sought only to ensure that Jack's great ideas and plans were implemented according to his wishes, when in fact they were men with their own ideas and ideologies, not necessarily diametrically opposed to JFK's, but certainly not always in complete accord with them. As we saw in the summer of 1960 example of the meeting between Eisenhower and Bissell, various factions - and we might well consider everyone part of "factions" that ebb and swell according to the occasion and discussions at hand - will continue to press their own agenda at every turn, even if only because situations change and the solutions they called for yesterday are not necessarily the solutions that will work next week. There is, as far as I can see at the moment (but can certainly be convinced otherwise), no reason to think that Kennedy's advisors were any different.

Is there?

There was [sic] bullets, shells, a rifle and an eyewitness, why would you need to know the things that you ask about,they don't really matter, that is where the CT have a problem they don't know what matters and what doesn't, oh well, good luck,

Mark sort of makes a good point, but misses others.

In point of fact, if you've got the things he lists (and a few more to boot), there's a prosecutable and potentially winnable case, one which can fulfill the legal tests of sufficiency to convict and uphold a charge up to and including murder. There is enough there, in other words, to ensure a "true bill" against a suspect and turn him into a defendant, and possibly enough to turn him into a convict, maybe even enough to deny an appeal.

One of the points he fails to consider (or lend any credence to?) is that in any criminal matter, there is also a defense which is entitled not only to challenge/raise questions about the prosecution's evidence, but to offer other evidence in mitigation or rebuttal. I don't believe anyone here will have any trouble conceding that the evidence amassed against Oswald was sufficient to bring him to trial.

Whether that evidence was enough to convict him, none of us can say since we don't know what an active, effective defense might have presented. Walt Brown did a good job of portraying how a decent - not to say even very good - defense counsel may have conducted the case, and Walt's not even a lawyer. (John Grisham or David Baldacci might've done a better job, and given us a better-prepared prosecutor, but no guarantees how it would've turned out, if any differently.)

Independent researchers over the years have amassed enough direct and indirect evidence to effectively call the WC's "verdict" into question. Others, unfortunately, have raised some truly zany and ludicrous theories, and the fact that they can be disproved leads to the unsupportable conclusion that all theories other than the government's must be equally zany and ludicrous.

The WC, of course, wasn't an open-ended judicial proceeding where facts from both perspectives compete, but a "fact-finding panel" that was not wholly unlike a grand jury except that the "true bill" found by it was not subject to further contest. In effect, Mark (and others of similar mind) are saying that an indictment is the same as a finding of guilt, and that it is ridiculous to bring it to trial: anyone who doesn't accept what the prosecutor convinced the grand jury with is clearly a fool, and the adversarial process is a stupid farce.

They are the same people who were convinced by the evidence that the OJ jury was not, and who consider Simpson guilty as sin, no matter that the jury found otherwise. That LAPD hasn't found an alternative suspect against whom there is sufficient evidence to convict means not that LAPD didn't look for one, but only that there could be none. The OJ jury was made up of stupid idiots who were swayed by the "tricks" of the defense, the proof of that being that, if they hadn't been, the jurors would have agreed them and convicted him.

This kind of thinking holds that a jury is right when they convict someone based upon the evidence that was presented to them, and to that extent I can't disagree. However, it would also seemingly hold that, once convicted, a person (or any of his posthumous advocates) should not be able to develop or bring forth new evidence that might reverse that conviction. It holds that The Innocence Project should just let us hang those convicted killers: there'd be a greater respect for the law if the 164 convicts who actually were innocent were executed on schedule. Enough already of these ridiculous appeals!

And if they don't advocate that position, then why on earth do they have a problem with anyone disagreeing with the "obvious" evidence and attempting to unearth more? Do they feel that the entire appeals process is irresponsible and should not be pursued by any other than paid professionals (whose motivations, at least, can be readily discerned)?

Give them enough facts to support a point of view and they will be convinced. In Copernicus' time, they would have been among those supported the Church that branded him a heretic for thinking that the earth revolved around the sun: there was and is plenty of apparent evidence to support the geo-centric perspective; you can't see the earth move, but the sun does "travel" across the sky! And the Church knows of what it speaks.

Those who continued to explore Copernicus' theory would have been fools, just as would have been those who persisted in the notion that you could actually sail around an obviously flat earth.

As we now know, those who thought they could all fell off the edge. It can't possibly be any different with Oswald. The conventional wisdom is always right. Right?

Bump for someone (Jim DiEugenio) looking for this post some time ago on "59 witnesses said the limousine stopped" (click here if that doesn't work).

Jack White's response was erudite and enlightened as well. Rare seems to be the occasion where we trade compliments!

Outstanding presentation, Greg. I know you are a terrific writer; you might be an even better speaker.

The applause the audience gave you was well deserved.

Where to find the writing?

Speakers on this machine blew, have to wait to hear the speaking ...!

Bump.

David, control of your thread is now returned to you!

SIX THINGS MADE TO ORDER FOR LEE HARVEY OSWALD

It's time for conspiracy theorists to wake up from their lengthy slumber and realize that there's no credible evidence of anyone having shot and killed President Kennedy and Dallas Police Officer J.D. Tippit except a screwball named Lee Harvey Oswald, a 24-year-old nuthatch who was lucky enough (from his warped point-of-view) to have these six things all align themselves into perfect harmony on November 22, 1963:

That's inference; where's the evidence?

Is this how Americans perceive their justice system? "He wouldn't ever have been arrested if he hadn't done it!"

1) He yelled at his wife and didn't like her parents.

2) There were knives in the kitchen drawer, and he knew it (he even bought them!).

3) He lived in the house where she was killed.

4) It was dark when he got home that day.

5) She came home on a Friday, when she wouldn't be missed at work the next day.

6) Another small factor: nobody thought his car in the driveway was suspicious.

Because nobody said they saw another person enter the house and there were no fingerprints identified with someone else (there were some we couldn't identify and some not right next to the bed, which we're sure had nothing at all to do with this crime), the only possible conclusion, the obvious solution to the crime is that the husband did it.

Since anything the defense might offer this court is only bound to be wishful thinking and speculation, sprinkled liberally with baseless paranoia, your honor, I move we dispense with the trial and appeals and execute the perpetrator right here and now.

And lest the court feel that justice would not be served, your honor, I have affidavits here from 11 other prosecutors who all agree with me, obviating the need for a jury.

It works in other parts of the world; I can't imagine why it wouldn't work here.

Most of this general discussion is moot: people argue minutiae without any basis other than arguing against evidence that hasn't been given any foundation. Why discuss the question of whether Oswald could have run down four double-flights of stairs and into the lunchroom before Baker & Truly got there if it hasn't been proven that he was ever four flights up to run down from in the first place?

It's as ridiculous as arguing about Oswald's movements after having shot Officer Tippit after establishing that Oswald couldn't have run 9/10 of a mile in four or five minutes to shoot Tippit in the first place: if he wasn't there, then what is the point of arguing how he left?!? First, someone needs to actually put Oswald up there, and nobody has ever done that. So what's all this talk about his leaving?!?

The evidence and testimony that we're aware of leans much more toward him not being than than being there. The latter consists of "his" gun being there, and nobody else having seen him, apparently, during the crucial moments when he's alleged to have been shooting JFK; the last time he'd been seen on those upper floors was a full 35 minutes before, by which time he could have been anywhere else in or even out of Dallas. In the meantime, he was also seen downstairs at lunch time by at least one other TSBD worker, and himself saw two other co-workers exactly where they themselves had said they were.

Oh, and there's a fingerprint on a box of books. And one on a bag that's questionable at best, and probably legally inadmissible at trial at worst. And another "hidden" on a rifle that's otherwise devoid of any prints, anywhere.

So, other than enough circumstantial evidence to suggest that he was there as the shooter, all there is left to convict him is the incredulous question, "well, who else could it have been?!?" Lacking an answer to that, the "obvious" answer is that it "must" have been none other than Lee Harvey Oswald.

The evidence and testimony that exculpates him is much lengthier, and every bit as hard to refute as the question of "who else" could've done it. Among the most difficult is the question of why the four other men who were unquestionably on the fifth and sixth floors during the lead-in time to the assassination, including one within 20 feet for up until within five minutes or less of the shooting, and one who could only have been sent sprawling in the aftermath, did not see nor hear the assassin even despite a complete and utter lack of fear for identifying him.

After all, Lee Oswald was dead by the time their Warren Commission testimony was given; he wasn't about to rise from the grave to exact his revenge on them for their throwing him under the bus.

And given the fact that Oswald was dead by then, why didn't they just say that they'd seen and/or heard him? Much of this discussion wouldn't even be taking place if they had. But they didn't.

I submit that the reason that they didn't is because, whether they actually liked Oswald or not, they knew beyond any doubt he didn't do it and weren't going to lie about a man who couldn't defend himself; but on the other hand, the actual shooter(s) not being dead, they weren't about to volunteer any information that might cause them or theirs any difficulties down the road.

As equally valid a scenario as the presumed Oswald-did-it theory - it is NOT an established fact - is that either Bonnie Ray Williams stumbled upon the shooter(s) or they stumbled upon him (I tend toward the latter) while he was having his "checken-on-the-bone sandwich" and drinking his Dr Pepper; when Junior Jarman and Hank Norman arrived on the fifth floor and making noise, they effectively saved Bonnie Ray's life (one dead body by an escaping assassin is credible; three much less so), who was instead herded downstairs on the east elevator and told them about the shooter(s) upstairs, said "herding" of Williams and preventing any of them from leaving by standing in the stairwell by the elevators (where he should have heard or seen if not actually been run over by the supposedly-escaping Oswald) accomplished by the "great big husky fellow" who helped the shooter(s) into the building and upstairs, as well as down and out, Jack Dougherty.

That scenario can be constructed every bit as solidly as the Oswald-did-it scenario using the exact same reasoning and a bit more evidence, save only fingerprints (maybe), as can the escape from the upper floors, apparently undetected (apparently, but maybe not actually). Such a scenario will undoubtedly earn the scorn of the LN crowd, no more or less than is heaped upon their favorite theory, even if a bit more derisively, since only their theory bears the imprimatur of a government "investigation" and an official conclusion.

Which all rests on "well, who else could it have been?" and supported by the fact that the government always gets it right.

How and when Oswald got into the second floor lunchroom? Unless it can be proved that he came down from the sixth floor, it doesn't really much matter, does it.