Douglas Caddy

Who is Woodward Anyway? DailyKos.Com Wed Nov 16, 2005 http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/11/17/165620/-Who-IS-Woodward-anyway-Untangling-the-skein-of-his-intelligence-connections#

Thanks, Chris, for correcting this. I found the link featured today on coasttocoastam.com

SOVIET-BLOC DEFECTOR SHEDS LIGHT ON NEW JFK DOCUMENT CIA releases presidential briefing on Oswald's visit to embassy Published: September 20, 2015 WorldNetDaily.Com http://www.wnd.com/2015/09/soviet-bloc-defector-sheds-light-on-new-jfk-document/#pGIcpBaKP3bghWGU.99

Poster's note: This is a helpful tool for forum members but it did not appear to deserve its own separate topic: Six easy ways to tell if that viral story is a hoax September 18, 2015 TheConversation.com https://theconversation.com/six-easy-ways-to-tell-if-that-viral-story-is-a-hoax-47673

WHO MURDERED THE CIA CHIEF? William E. Colby: A Highly Suspicious Death By Zalin Grant http://web.archive.org/web/20110429054414/http://www.pythiapress.com/wartales/colby.htm

Watergate dominates 1973 tapes of Nixon White House Posted: 12:00 a.m. Saturday, Sept. 19, 2015 By Charles Ealy – Austin American-Statesman Staff Central Texas historians Douglas Brinkley and Luke A. Nichter wrap up their monumental effort to transcribe and annotate the tapes made by President Richard Nixon in “The Nixon Tapes: 1973,” and it’s astonishing to see how much time the White House devoted in 1973 to the previous year’s Watergate break-in. The new book takes up where their previous book, “The Nixon Tapes: 1971-72,” ended. Nixon installed the elaborate taping devices in the White House in 1971 because he thought the tapes “would help set his administration’s record straight and allow him to maintain the upper hand on history.” The recordings, of course, turned out to be his downfall. “When listening to the Nixon tapes of 1973, it’s impossible not to hear growing paranoia in the president’s voice,” Brinkley and Nichter write. But they note that much is still unclear about 1973, mainly because a large number of the remaining Nixon tapes are currently restricted from public access. Among the remaining mysteries, they note, are: “Who ordered the Watergate break-in? What were the burglars looking for? Why did so many have FBI or CIA backgrounds?” Whatever the answers, much of the blame for Nixon’s downfall can be placed on his aides — former Attorney General John Mitchell, White House Chief of Staff H.R. “Bob” Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, assistant to the president for domestic affairs. “One of the great tragedies revealed in this book is the refusal of Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman to level honestly with Nixon following the break-in when the crisis was still manageable,” Brinkley and Nichter write. “The White House staff’s instinct was to keep details from Nixon in order to protect him, but they ended up fatally wounding his presidency. Nixon should have put his advisors in a White House conference room and told them to reveal the complete story of the Watergate break-in. Instead, as is made clear in this book, the first time Nixon did this was March 22, 1973, and by then everyone was turning on each other. By April, every major White House figure had a defense attorney, and many were cooperating with prosecutors.” That was especially true for John Dean, the counsel to the president, who came to recognize two points by March 21 — that both he and the administration “were in the midst of a truly massive crisis” and that “the president had a shockingly poor grasp of the facts of Watergate.” Dean decided that he had to tell Nixon what he knew and when he knew it. He also expressed his fears that E. Howard Hunt, who was a member of the Plumbers unit and among those arrested in January for the Watergate break-in, would implicate other people. That’s when Nixon “pressed the idea of payments in the form of hush money: up to $1 million. Within one day, Hunt had his first payment of $75,000. That constituted obstruction of justice and was the beginning of the end of the Nixon presidency.” In the same meeting with Nixon, Dean tried to make Nixon understand how serious the situation had become. “I think there’s no doubt about the seriousness of the problem we’re — we’ve got,” he said. “We have a cancer — within — close to the presidency, that’s growing. It’s growing daily. It’s compounding. It grows geometrically now, because it compounds itself. That’ll be clear as I explain, you know, some of the details of why it is.” But within weeks, Dean, knowing that he was in legal trouble, began cooperating with Watergate investigators, much to the White House’s dismay. By April 30, Nixon was preparing to give a speech to the nation on Watergate, where he was to announce the departure of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, “although even in their last days on the White staff they weren’t certain how they’d leave or even if they would,” Brinkley and Nichter write. Ehrlichman had been asking for a private meeting with Nixon, “probably to campaign one last time for his job,” the authors write. “It was all to no avail. Nixon also had to deal with the problem of John Dean, who appeared to be out of options in seeking immunity from prosecutors.” Brinkley, an Austin resident and professor at Rice University in Houston, and Nichter, an associate professor of history at Texas A&M-Central Texas, have done a great service by transcribing and annotating the available records. But they acknowledge that much more information is still not available. One intriguing note, mentioned more than 650 pages into the book, is this: “On May 14, 1973, John Dean turned over a secret cache of intelligence records to Judge John Sirica, effectively a shot across the Nixon White House bow. … Among the documents were the White House copy of the Huston Plan, a program of surveillance and illicit activities aimed at American citizens, and related correspondence. The CIA, NSA, and DIA worked intensely to make sure the records, which included details of government domestic intelligence, electronic eavesdropping, and even break-ins, were not linked to the Watergate wiretapping and break-in. In the end, they cut a deal with Sirica, and the records have remained in the custody of the District Court for the District of Columbia ever since.” ________________________________________ The Nixon Tapes: 1973 Douglas Brinkley and Luke A. Nichter, editors Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, $35

One minor correction to the above account about Barker. Virgilio Gonzalez was the burglar assigned to lock picking as he was by profession a locksmith. It was not Eugenio Martinez, another burglar.

Danny Vasquez, who appears to have an inexhaustible collection of JFK assassination photographs and documents, wrote on Facebook today: Dallas County deputy constable Seymour Weitzman also ran toward the top of the grassy knoll – where he found a man carrying Secret Service identification. Weitzman later identified this man as Bernard Barker, a CIA asset and the future Watergate burglar who would lead the four-man contingent of Cuban–born Watergate burglars from the Miami area. Barker was an expert at surreptitious entries, planting bugs and photographing documents. He was a close associate of Florida Mafia godfather Santos Trafficante, and of Mob-connected Key Biscayne banker Bebe Rebozo – Richard Nixon's bosom buddy. Barker was a veteran CIA asset. Along with JFK assassination suspects Howard Hunt, Frank Sturgis and David Ferrie, he had helped plan the unsuccessful 1961 CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba, a mission fathered by Vice President Richard Nixon. The actual invasion was finally carried out at the Bay of Pigs under President Kennedy. The CIA recruited the Mafia to kill Cuban President Fidel Castro at about the same time the exile invaders waded ashore. Barker's day job was a real estate agent on Key Biscayne. And he was a close friend and neighbor of fellow CIA asset Eugenio Martinez – the Watergate lock-picker. Martinez's real estate firm had extensive dealings with Bebe Rebozo, and had brokered Nixon's purchase of a house on Biscayne Bay. In the immediate aftermath of the Watergate arrests, President Nixon was anxious about his pal Rebozo's vulnerabilities. On White House tapes released many years later, after hearing that Howard Hunt's name turned up in two of the burglars' address books, Nixon had a question for his chief of staff, Bob Haldeman: "Is Rebozo's name in anyone's address book?" Haldeman answers, "No … he (Rebozo) told me he doesn't know any of these guys." Sounding rather dumbfounded, the president responds: "He doesn't know them?" If Weitzman was correct in fingering Barker, the CIA man would have had no trouble obtaining Secret Service credentials. CIA operatives have a way of coming up with badges and other items to suit their various goals (As a Nixon White House spy, Howard Hunt once wore a speech alteration device and a red wig to a secret encounter.) Barker wasn't the only future Watergate conspirator to reportedly show up in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963. Under oath, CIA operative Morita Lorenz placed CIA agents Hunt and Frank Sturgis at the assassination scene. This claim was bolstered by two other local law enforcement officers who reported encountering men on the grassy knoll who identified themselves as Secret Service agents – yet the Secret Service maintained that none of its agents were in Dealey Plaza right after the shooting. For the record: Deputy Constable Weitzman told the Warren Commission he encountered "other officers, Secret Service as well" on the grassy knoll. In 1975, he told reporter Michael Canfield the man he saw produced credentials and told him everything was under control. He said the man had dark hair, was of medium height, and was wearing a light windbreaker. When shown photos of Frank Sturgis and Bernard Barker, Weitzman immediately pointed at Barker, saying, "Yes that's him." Just to make sure, Canfield asked, "Was this the man who produced the Secret Service credentials?" Weitzman responded, "Yes, that's the same man." Dallas patrolman J. M. Smith also ran up the grassy knoll. At the top, he smelled gunpowder. Encountering a man, he pulled his pistol from his holster. "Just as I did, he showed me he was a Secret Service agent … he saw me coming with my pistol and right away he showed me who he was." In the mid-70s, Dallas police sergeant David Harkness told a House committee, "There were some Secret Service agents there – on the grassy knoll – but I did not get them identified. They told me they were Secret Service." According to a Secret Service report in the National Archives, "All the Secret Service agents assigned to the motorcade stayed with the motorcade all the way to the hospital, none remained at the scene of the shooting."

David Talbot writes on Facebook today: With the publication of my new book, "The Devil's Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA and the Rise of America's Secret Government," less than a month away, I want to shamelessly tease you all with some tidbits from the book. So here's the first one: Among the more despicable things that Allen Dulles, America's most legendary spymaster, did was to collaborate with prominent Nazis before, during and after World War II. One of the worst war criminals with whom Dulles consorted was Reinhard Gehlen, Hitler's intelligence chief on the bloodlands of the Eastern Front. After the war, Dulles helped install Gehlen as West Germany's powerful intelligence chief. The two men maintained a chatty, cozy relationship throughout the rest of their lives, exchanging Christmas cards, gifts etc. Dulles brought Gehlen to America for periodic visits -- on one such trip, the CIA even treated Gehlen to seats at Yankee Stadium for the final game of the epic 1951 "subway World Series" that pit the Yankees' aging legend Joe DiMaggio and rookie star Mickey Mantle against another future Hall of Famer, the NY Giants' Willie Mays. As DiMaggio played in the final game of his career (with the Yankees winning the close game and taking the series), Gehlen watched Joltin' Joe trot off into the sunset -- instead of facing a war crimes tribunal, as he should have.

Mr. Current Intelligence An Interview with Richard Lehman By Richard Kovar . Lehman played a key role in supervising the Agency.s current inteffigence support for the White House, including its briefmgs of presidential candidates. Editor.s Note: Dick Lehman devel oped the President.s Intelligence Check List, or PICL (pronounced .~pickle.9 for President Kennedy in June 1961. The Kennedy White House had become overwhelmed with publicationsfrom the intelli gence community, many of which were duplicative in nature, and important pieces of information were beginning to fall between the cracks. The President and his advis ers wanted one concise summary of important issues that they could rely on, and Lehman provided that sum mary in theform of the PICL. Kennedy.s enthusiastic response to the PICL ensured that it became an Agency institution. Former Deputy Directorfor Intelligence R. Jack Smith writes in his memoir, The Unknown CIA, that the President engaged in an .. . . exchange ofcom ments with its producers, sometimes praising an account, sometimes criticizing a commenl~ once object ing to the word .boondocks. as not an accepted word. For current intel ligencepeople~ this was heaven on earth!. (The PICL was renamed The President.s Daily BriefPDB] in the Johnson administration.) For many years thereafter, Lehman played a key role in supervising the Agency.s current intelligence sup portfor the White House, including its briefings ofPresidential candi dates. Former Deputy Directorfor Intelligence (DDI) Ray Cline in his book The CIA Under Reagan, Bush, and Casey, calls him .the longtime genius of the President.s special daily intelligence report.. Dick Lehman joined the Agency in 1949 and servedfor 33 years before retiring. As a jun~or analysl he worked in the Ge~.ieral Division of the Office ofReports and Estimates (ORE) using SIGIJVT to puzzle out the organization and output of var ious Soviet industrial ministries. He then spent much ~fhis career in the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), eventually serving as its Director from 1970 to 1975. Lehman also served as Director of the Office of Strategic Research from 1975 to 1976, as Deputy 1~o the DCIfor National Intellige~.zcefrom 1976 to 1977, and as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 1979 to 1981. In the interview excerpts thatfol low, Lehman recalls the challenges associated with briefing DCI Allen Dulles, recounts how the PICL was born, summarizes how the Agency got to know Presidents-elect Rich ard Nixon, fimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, and gives his can did assessment of thefamous A Team/B Team exercise conducted in 1976 on Soviet intentions and capabilities. This interview was conducted 28 February 1998 as apart of the CIA History Staffs oral history program. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no3/pdf/v44i3a05p.pdf

Quoting from above: "Promoting this is par for the course for Caddy." I am not promoting the conference. I am merely posting information about it on the forum. I have never met Judyth Baker or corresponded with her. A few persons have biased and pre-disposed ideas about what can and cannot be posted on the forum. As I have said here many times in the past, I primarily make postings for informational purposes, leaving it up to the reader to evaluate. Some of my postings may not even reflect what I personally believe but having knowledge of their content may still have value. A minute minority apparently would prefer not to even be aware that there will be an Oswald Conference in New Orleans next month so that they can continue to live in their own self-contained bubble, unaware of the reality of events take place in society today. Such a head-in-the-sand position is to be pitied.

http://www.politico.com/story/2015/09/cia-presidential-intelligence-briefings-213661#ixzz3lyQkew9a

New Orleans Conference schedule as announced: http://oswaldconference.com/?page_id=246

http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/09/15/director-jfk-library-step-down-amid-discord/c9OVdZUs6xaVIXkbURDucI/story.html?s_campaign=email_BG_TodaysHeadline&s_campaign

Lyn Colodny on Facebook today posted this: It was Woodward who twice in May and July of 1973 recommended that the Watergate Committee call Butterfield. I discussed this with Butterfield in this interview in March of 1987. BUTTERFIELD/COLODNY INTERVIEW EXCERPT RE: WOODWARD 3/25/87 COLODNY: So that raised a question. In your case the question is why did Bob Woodward bring you to the Watergate Committee's attention, that's one of the things that we feel a great, do a great deal on in the book. BUTTERFIELD: Huh, huh. COLODNY: Were you aware that he was the driving force before you, about you being called? BUTTERFIELD: Well, but, ah, no except that it made sense, yeah, I guess I was. He was a good friend of, ah, I forget that . . . COLODNY: Scott Armstrong's. BUTTERFIELD: . . .Armstrong. COLODNY: Scott Armstrong. BUTTERFIELD: Scott Armstrong and Scott was the chief briefer or the debriefer and they were pals and I, you know, I had, I had a, you know, I was not a functionary although, uh, Haldeman and Nixon both would like to pretend I was. I was on the senior staff and, and I was, uh, you know, on the senior staff meetings in the morning. My office did adjoin the Oval Office. I was, I was in and out more times every day than anyone. I was the first guy to see the President every morning and the last guy to see him at night. But it's not unusual in, on the face of it, see. COLODNY: So Woodward, Woodward. . . BUTTERFIELD: I was in charge, but I was in charge of all administration. COLODNY: Right. BUTTERFIELD: So, so I was in a position to know relationships of one aide to the other and each aide to the President as well as anyone, save Haldeman. COLODNY: Like. . BUTTERFIELD: Maybe, and maybe Steve Bull. COLODNY: Did you know about the Woodward - Armstrong relationship on the day you went to the, to the Hill? BUTTERFIELD: No, I did not. COLODNY: No, and you did not know and you, when Armstrong was questioning you with Don Sanders,. . . BUTTERFIELD: Oh no, I did not know that, uh, uh. COLODNY: You, you had no idea there was a relationship there? BUTTERFIELD: No, no. COLODNY: The boy, they were boyhood friends and so on. Woodward. . . BUTTERFIELD: Sure, but, but, but I'm saying that may well be but on the other hand it could be that, you know, have we really talked to everybody over there, how about this guy Butterfield, what the hell is that? COLODNY: Yeah, but that isn't, that isn't what happened. And, and that's, that's a, that's the problem. Woodward did something that a good investigative reporter wouldn't have done. You don't go turn your sources over to a committee. You try and get the story yourself. And Woodward. . . BUTTERFIELD: Your witness, your witness. . . COLODNY: . . .and that, that, that waves a big red flag to our readers saying wait a minute what is this guy on May 17th and it wasn't like he showed up late, he was there the first day the Committee met publicly to recommend you be called. And he says why he, he uh, recommended you because he believed that you had something to do with internal security. BUTTERFIELD: Yeah, I did. COLODNY: Well but he interpreted that to mean . . . BUTTERFIELD: Yes. COLODNY: . . .that you were involved in wire tapping as . . . BUTTERFIELD: Huh, huh. COLODNY: . . .that, that's his version. BUTTERFIELD: I see. COLODNY: It had something to do, cause he knew that Mardian, who was in charge of internal security at the Justice Department, was handling the wire taps. BUTTERFIELD: Yeah, I see. COLODNY: In other words it wasn't cause you sat outside the President's door that Woodward was interested in you, he says you're, himself, that he put two and two together. BUTTERFIELD: Yeah. COLODNY: You follow me? BUTTERFIELD: Yeah, sure I follow you.

http://www.c-span.org/video/?20346-1/book-discussion-silent-coup-removal-president

http://www.amazon.com/Kennedys-Last-Stand-Eisenhower-Assassination/dp/0982290268/ctoc

Nixon Legacy Series: Evan Thomas Richard Nixon Foundation Published Sept. 10, 2015

Announcement: http://campaign.r20.constantcontact.com/render?ca=37b2b9bd-7669-4dea-a450-95a54f8b1727&c=898619d0-a166-11e3-8242-d4ae528eaba9&ch=898a1170-a166-11e3-8242-d4ae528eaba9

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=G41XRl40RL0

September 11, 2015 Counterpunch.org Creating a Crime: How the CIA Commandeered the DEA by Douglas Valentine From the article: ….In 1960, when the CIA asked him to recruit assassins from his stable of underworld contacts, Siragusa again claimed to have refused. But drug traffickers, including, most prominently, Santo Trafficante Jr, were soon participating in CIA attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. As the dominant partner in the relationship, the CIA exploited its affinity with the FBN. “Like the CIA,” FBN Agent Robert DeFauw explained, “narcotic agents mount covert operations. We pose as members of the narcotics trade. The big difference is that we were in foreign countries legally, and through our police and intelligence sources, we could check out just about anyone or anything. Not only that, we were operational. So the CIA jumped in our stirrups.” Jumping in the FBN’s stirrups afforded the CIA deniability, which is turn affords it impunity. To ensure that the CIA’s criminal activities are not revealed, narcotic agents are organized militarily within an inviolable chain of command. Highly indoctrinated, they blindly obey based on a “need to know.” This institutionalized ignorance sustains the illusion of righteousness, in the name of national security, upon which their motivation depends. ……… Indeed, as John Evans noted above, and as the government was aware, the CIA for years had sanctioned the heroin traffic from the Golden Triangle region of Burma, Thailand and Laos into South Vietnam as a way of rewarding top foreign officials for advancing U.S. policies. This reality presented the Nixon White House with a dilemma, given that addiction among U.S. troops in Vietnam was soaring, and that massive amounts of Southeast Asian heroin were being smuggled into the U.S., for use by middle-class white kids on the verge of revolution. Nixon’s response was to make drug law enforcement part of the CIA’s mission. Although reluctant to betray the CIA’s clients in South Vietnam, Helms told Ludlum: “We’re going to break their rice bowls.” This betrayal occurred incrementally. Fred Dick, the BNDD agent assigned to Saigon, passed the names of the complicit military officers and politicians to the White House. But, as Dick recalled, “Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker called a meeting in Saigon at which CIA Station Chief Ted Shackley appeared and explained that there was ‘a delicate balance.’ What he said, in effect, was that no one was willing to do anything.” Meanwhile, to protect its global network of drug trafficking assets, the CIA began infiltrating the BNDD and commandeering its internal security, intelligence, and foreign operations branches. This massive reorganization required the placement of CIA officers in influential positions in every federal agency concerned with drug law enforcement. http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/09/11/creating-a-crime-how-the-cia-commandeered-the-dea/

Announcement by David Talbot, Publisher, Hotbooks http://hotbookspress.com/

President Kennedy dictates notes regarding Vietnam (November 4, 1963)

I do not know why the link is not working. When I posted it, I tested the link and it worked. Now the same link posted by Debra on Facebook this morning has ceased to work. Here is a related message posted by Debra on Facebook this morning: "Please email me right away if you are joining our Dallas Conference Partners. Send your site name and web address and you will be listed on JFK Lancer's site today!! Thanks so much, Debra debraconway@jfklancer.com" I just typed in JFK Lancer on google and it brought up the missing conference home page right away.

http://www.amazon.com/Last-Presidents-Men-Bob-Woodward/dp/1501116444/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1441900537&sr=1-1&keywords=Last+of+the+President%27s+Men