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Everything posted by Paul Rigby
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Paul, certainty is indeed elusive in this case, but I couldn't resist poking a little fun at myself by saying I was "100% certain" about Harkins, after spending 7 years being "certain" it was Taylor. Minor error! I spent the better part of three decades believing I lived in a democracy. Cliff, Whether intended or not, your reply had the useful effect of making me take a closer look at any potential Starnes-Harriman link. In a March 1962 column, Starnes revisited an old foreign assignment, a reminiscence prompted by the death of Abolghassem Kashani, “a procurer of political murder, a dedicated hater of the West, and formerly right bower to ex-President Mossadegh” (“A Precious Old Cutthroat Has Departed,” The Washington Daily News, 23 March 1962, p.23). Starnes had interviewed Kashani in the course of a mid-1951 visit to Iran. In July 1951, according to Rudy Abramson’s biography, Spanning the Century (NY: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1992), Averell Harriman had visited Teheran for talks with Mossadegh, an initiative the CIA appears to have striven to wreck or curtail by the timely “discovery” of an alleged assassination plot, reportedly originating in Paris among Iranian Communists, targeting Harriman. The old bruiser appears to have treated the Agency’s concoction, delivered at some unearthly hour for heightened dramatic effect, with the contempt it deserved. The CIA had first championed Mossadegh as a useful instrument for prising British fingers from control of Iranian oil. It was no more than a bargaining move, however, the prelude to a piece of deal-cutting with MI6 that saw both collaborate on Mossadegh’s ouster. The subsequent agreement was not a restoration of the status quo ante, but instead a means of ensuring MI6/British oil interests had a stake in the new, American dispensation, and thus little incentive to engage in destabilisation work of their own. More germanely, had the visits of reporter and presidential emissary coincided or overlapped in Teheran in 1951? Did Starnes’ despatches from Iran give evidence of Harrimanian briefings? I don’t know: I lack a detailed chron of Harriman’s career; and I’ve not seen any of Dick’s journalism from that early a period. We may safely assume the CIA investigated both with maniacal thoroughness. All this duly noted, there remain compelling grounds for dismissing any notion of Starnes as a Harriman client. Starnes was touring south-east Asia, Laos included, as Harriman’s pursuit of a peace deal over Laos concluded. The reporter’s initial reaction to the Geneva settlement produced some of his most uncompromising and unprepossessing Cold War boilerplate. Four of Starnes’ July 1962 despatches dwelt upon its likely import and failings. All are from the Washington Daily News versions: “Long Shot Chance in Laos,” 18 July 1962, p.31; “Big Question in Laos,” 23 July 1962, p.19; “It Has Been a Painful Lesson in Laos,” 24 July 1962, p.15; and “A Sense of Foreboding,” 28 July 1962, p.11. The latter contained the following: “In numbed disbelief one learns that W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, has returned from Geneva proclaiming that the agreement on Laos is a “good” one – one that will work if Khrushchev keeps his word, as Mr. Harriman says he believes he will. Thus another fable is added to the dangerous mythology that is the foundation for much of what passes for American policy in Southeast Asia. The Geneva agreement on Laos is of the same sorry lineage as the accord establishing (and, mark well, “policing” with an international control commission) the boundary between North and South Vietnam. To believe, as Mr. Harriman says he believes, that the Geneva agreement is good and has a chance of working, one must ignore the history of communist conquest in Indochina, and one must forsake all logic as well.” It finished with an uncharacteristically McCarthyite/China Lobby flourish: “Is all this artful stagecraft being done so that six months or a year hence, when Laos is an overtly communist state, when South Vietnam can no longer be saved, when Thailand may herself have begun the dance of death, that our State Department can point to this place and say, ‘Who could have foreseen this? We had every reason to believe the Geneva agreement on Laos would work.’ If indeed this is the rationale for the happy-talk we now hear regarding Laos, then we are confronted with a historical conspiracy containing the seeds of unbounded mischief. For the truth is that the Geneva Pact on Laos is not a good agreement, that it can’t and won’t work, that it may well mark the turning point at which all Southeast Asia was lost to the free world.” In a column later that year, “Laos Is Lost to the Reds,” 13 October 1962, p.10, Starnes used the Cuban missile crisis as a stick with which to beat the Geneva accord: “The truth is that the Administration tried to hold Laos by running a bluff. It seems unlikely now, when it has been shown that we will not even fight to keep a Soviet base 90 miles from our shores in Cuba, but little more than a year ago there were a lot of otherwise intelligent people who believed President Kennedy would go to war to keep Laos from falling to communism. Mr. Kennedy meant that people should have believed this. ‘No one should doubt our resolution,’ he told the nation on March 23, 1961. If attacks against Laos continued, he warned, ‘those who support a truly neutral Laos will have to consider their response.’” So much for Starnes as a Harriman groupie – unless we posit an unlikely, elaborate plan of deception – or Kennedy idolater. It was this background, as Arthur Krock explicitly acknowledged, that gave “’Arrogant’ CIA Disobeys In Viet Nam” and its author such potent credibility. By the late spring of the following year, however, Starnes had accepted the deal and saw its essential (military) merit. In “We Cannot Hold Onto Laos,” The Washington Daily News, 26 April 1963, p.33, he wrote: “ Mr. Kennedy and his military advisors have digested an expensive and sobering lesson in Laotian geography and culture. The Royal Laotian Army, which we equipped and tried to train, again and again showed all the instinct for combat of a troop of septuagenarian bird-watchers. They were not a match for the hard, dedicated forces of the Pathet Lao, and likely never will be… This cheerless reality sharply reduces the options, to use a word much esteemed in the White House, available to American policy makers. Is Laos worth what it would take in American men to hold it? The answer here is a resounding and unequivocal no. Not even the most star-happy buck general in the Pentagon would choose to garrison Laos, much less to fight a war there. It is clear that present American policy in Southeast Asia is one imposed by the hard facts, and not one that is the product of wishful thinking. We cannot in any realistic sense hold Laos; we must let it go.” Military realism had reared its head in Starnes’ despatches from Vietnam in 1962. In “The Stakes Are High in Viet Nam,” Washington Daily News, 11 June 1962, p.27, we find a direct precedent for this shift in judgement. Note Starnes’ pointed refusal to join in the then, as now, fashionable sport of French baiting: “ The Viet Cong (communist guerillas control much of this country. At night they dominate all but the biggest population centers and highways. The Vee Cees, as they are universally called here, are well-trained, hardy, resourceful and dedicated communists. It is anybody’s guess how many are operating in Southern Viet Nam now, but an educated estimate might be 23,000 “hard core” troops, plus uncounted thousands of villagers who have been terrorized or otherwise persuaded into serving as porters, spies, support forces. The French, never lightly regarded as warriors, tried position warfare, tanks and fighter aircraft. They ended at Dien Bien Phu, resoundingly beaten. For the Red irregulars the war never ended. The communists went thru the motions of “agreement” at Geneva to divide Viet Nam into northern (communist) and southern (free), but they never stopped infiltrating, fighting, extending their control and influence over huge areas of south Viet Nam. No one in Saigon is foolish enough to deny that they have been tremendously successful. They have been so successful that the sounds of mortar fire are not uncommon in the outskirts of the city; so successful that the whole economy of the country is paralysed; so successful that in large areas they have set up provincial administrations and levy taxes. They have been so successful that it is by no means certain that even the tremendous United States commitment can tip the balance.” As to Seven Days In May, I think we're confronted with nothing less than a proleptic red-herring, a fictional prophecy designed to prepare a population for an event - and utterly misdirect it as to the who and the how. I mean, the Secret Service as Kennedy's loyal protector? Right, that's plausible. Knebel was a disseminator of CIA guff before the event; and zealous defender of the official whitewash after it.
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Richard Helms and W. Lloyd George
Paul Rigby replied to Ashton Gray's topic in JFK Assassination Debate
Excellent, thank you. Russell appears to have been the Scripps-Howard exec who dished out appointments and assignments at the CIA's behest, certainly in the late 50s and early 60s. -
Richard Helms and W. Lloyd George
Paul Rigby replied to Ashton Gray's topic in JFK Assassination Debate
James, 1. What was Operation Siren? 2. And any idea if a Scripps-Howard exec called Oland D. Russell was OSS? -
Paul, you are a GREAT researcher! There is no need to ask Mr. Starnes a question he cannot answer -- I think all the answers are in his article. For years I have speculated that the "very high American official...who has spent much of his life in the service of democracy" HAD to be CJCS Taylor. I was wrong. Ah, the hubris of unfounded certainty. Now I'm 100% sure it was the Boston-born Harkins. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_D._Harkins Reading Mr. Starnes original article is relevatory. HUGE. I agree with you that W. Averill Harriman was behind this leak, and I will so speculate along those lines. I posit the Boston-born Henry Cabot Lodge was one of Starnes MANY anonymous sources, along with Gen. Harkins. I think Lodge and all the other anonymous "officials" and "officers" were using the same playbook sent in by Harriman to Lodge by way of Boston-born McGeorge Bundy. The Yankees were cutting the Cowboys off at the pass. More discussion to follow. Much more. Please send my regards to Mr. Starnes -- any chance he'd join the Forum? Cliff, I wish could offer certainty on the subject of who told what to whom and when. I know precious little about Harkins, other than that he a) is much maligned; and seems to have taken the US constitution seriously. (You know, those trivial bits about the status of the Presidency and treason.) I find it impossible not to speculate that a) is a direct consequence of . The history of the period has, after all, been written by the winners. If you have anything on Harkins that might shed light on the matter, please enlighten me. As I mentioned earlier, Harriman has long seemed to me the obvious candidate because of his work on the Laos settlement in 1962. Seemingly alone of JFK's senior people, here was a hard-nosed political and bureaucratic infighter who was not afraid to take on the Agency, hitting it hard and repeatedly. In class-obsessed elite America, he had the money, social status and connections to pull rank and not fear the consequences: Angleton never made Skull and Bones, and had to rest content with smearing Harriman as a Sov agent. Did Starnes know Harriman? Highly likely, as H. was Governor of New York for a large part of the period that Starnes was managing editor of the New York World-Telegram & Sun. I've looked at six years-worth of Starnes' journalistic output, but all of the years fall outside of Harriman's tenure as Governor. Perhaps a study of the years 1955-1958 would yield clues. There are none that I've observed in the period 1960-1965, save one.
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Cliff, I follow your train of reasoning regarding the identity of Starnes' major source, and can't fault its logic. I do, however, rather prefer Harriman or a member of his circle. I have no evidence for that conclusion other than the Laotian precedent, to which I'll return at a later date. Many moons ago, when I first contacted Dick, I asked the obvious, inevitable question about the identity of his high-ranking source. His reply was polite, and to the point. I paraphrase: I promised not to, and I won't, ever. Had I been a better researcher, I might - should - have revisited the issue. But I wasn't, and I've so enjoyed the resultant friendship that I leave that task to others. I will certainly contact him for you and let you know the upshot. Nathaniel, You're right, the timidity of today's reportage is depressing and contemptible! It would interesting to see a thread that offered as much possible on the extent of Kennedy's attempts to curtail and control the CIA. I have the distinct feeling we have only scratched the surface so far.
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“The most important consequence of the Cold War remains the least discussed. How and why American democracy died lies beyond the scope of this introductory essay. It is enough to note that the CIA revolt against the presidency of John Fitzgerald Kennedy – the single event which did more than any other to hasten its end – was, quite contrary to over forty years of censorship and deceit, both publicly anticipated and publicly opposed. No American journalist worked more bravely to thwart the anticipated revolt than Scripps-Howard’s Richard Starnes. His ‘reward’ was effectively to become a non-person, not just in the work of mainstream fellow-journalists and historians, but also that of nominally oppositional Kennedy assassination writers. It could have been worse: John J. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, sought his instant dismissal; while others within the agency doubtless had more drastic punishment in mind, almost certainly of the kind meted out to CBS’ George Polk fifteen years earlier. This time, shrewder agency minds prevailed. Senator Dodd was given a speech to read by the CIA denouncing Starnes in everything but name. William F. Buckley, Jr., suddenly occupied an adjacent column. In short, Starnes was allowed to live, even as his Scripps-Howard career was put under overt and intense CIA scrutiny - and quietly, systematically, withered on the Mockingbird vine.” From “Light on a Dry Shadow,” the preface to ‘Arrogant’ CIA: The Selected Scripps-Howard Journalism of Richard T. Starnes, 1960-1965 (provisionally scheduled for self-publication in November 2006). As far as I am aware, the remarkable example below of what Claud Cockburn called “preventative journalism” has never appeared in its entirety anywhere on the internet. Instead, readers have had to make do with the next-day riposte of the NYT’s Arthur Krock. The latter, it should be noted, was a veteran CIA-mouthpiece and messenger boy. Dick Starnes was 85 on July 4, 2006. He remains, in bucolic retirement, a wonderfully fluent and witty writer; and as good a friend as any Englishman could wish for. I dedicate the despatch’s web debut to Judy Mann, in affectionate remembrance. The Washington Daily News, Wednesday, October 2, 1963, p.3 'SPOOKS' MAKE LIFE MISERABLE FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE 'Arrogant' CIA Disobeys Orders in Viet Nam SAIGON, Oct.2 - The story of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in South Viet Nam is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power. Twice the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, according to a high United States source here. In one of these instances the CIA frustrated a plan of action Mr. Lodge brought with him from Washington because the agency disagreed with it. This led to a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson, chief of the huge CIA apparatus here. Mr. Lodge failed to move Mr. Richardson, and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were unable to resolve the conflict, and the matter is now reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy. It is one of the developments expected to be covered in Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's report to Mr. Kennedy. Others Critical, Too Other American agencies here are incredibly bitter about the CIA. "If the United States ever experiences a 'Seven Days in May' it will come from the CIA, and not from the Pentagon," one U.S. official commented caustically. ("Seven Days in May" is a fictional account of an attempted military coup to take over the U.S. Government.) CIA "spooks" (a universal term for secret agents here) have penetrated every branch of the American community in Saigon, until non-spook Americans here almost seem to be suffering a CIA psychosis. An American field officer with a distinguished combat career speaks angrily about "that man at headquarters in Saigon wearing a colonel's uniform." He means the man is a CIA agent, and he can't understand what he is doing at U.S. military headquarters here, unless it is spying on other Americans. Another American officer, talking about the CIA, acidly commented: "You'd think they'd have learned something from Cuba but apparently they didn't." Few Know CIA Strength Few people other than Mr. Richardson and his close aides know the actual CIA strength here, but a widely used figure is 600. Many are clandestine agents known only to a few of their fellow spooks. Even Mr. Richardson is a man about whom it is difficult to learn much in Saigon. He is said to be a former OSS officer, and to have served with distinction in the CIA in the Philippines. A surprising number of the spooks are known to be involved in their ghostly trade and some make no secret of it. "There are a number of spooks in the U.S. Information Service, in the U.S. Operations mission, in every aspect of American official and commercial life here, " one official - presumably a non-spook - said. "They represent a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone," he added. Coupled with the ubiquitous secret police of Ngo Dinh Nhu, a surfeit of spooks has given Saigon an oppressive police state atmosphere. The Nhu-Richardson relationship is a subject of lively speculation. The CIA continues to pay the special forces which conducted brutal raids on Buddhist temples last Aug. 21, altho in fairness it should be pointed out that the CIA is paying these goons for the war against communist guerillas, not Buddhist bonzes (priests). Hand Over Millions Nevertheless, on the first of every month, the CIA dutifully hands over a quarter million American dollars to pay these special forces. Whatever else it buys, it doesn't buy any solid information on what the special forces are up to. The Aug. 21 raids caught top U.S. officials here and in Washington flat-footed. Nhu ordered the special forces to crush the Buddhist priests, but the CIA wasn't let in on the secret. (Some CIA button men now say they warned their superiors what was coming up, but in any event the warning of harsh repression was never passed to top officials here or in Washington.) Consequently, Washington reacted unsurely to the crisis. Top officials here and at home were outraged at the news the CIA was paying the temple raiders, but the CIA continued the payments. It may not be a direct subsidy for a religious war against the country's Buddhist majority, but it comes close to that. And for every State Department aide here who will tell you, "Dammit, the CIA is supposed to gather information, not make policy, but policy-making is what they're doing here," there are military officers who scream over the way the spooks dabble in military operations. A Typical Example For example, highly trained trail watchers are an important part of the effort to end Viet Cong infiltration from across the Laos and Cambodia borders. But if the trailer watchers spot incoming Viet Congs, they report it to the CIA in Saigon, and in the fullness of time, the spooks may tell the military. One very high American official here, a man who has spent much of his life in the service of democracy, likened the CIA's growth to a malignancy, and added he was not sure even the White House could control it any longer. Unquestionably Mr. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor both got an earful from people who are beginning to fear the CIA is becoming a Third Force co-equal with President Diem's regime and the U.S. Government - and answerable to neither. There is naturally the highest interest here as to whether Mr. McNamara will persuade Mr. Kennedy something ought to be done about it.
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I am 43, married, with three daughters. I live in Southport and work - for a warehousing and distribution company - in Liverpool. I am currently working on an introductory essay to a book-length selection of the journalism of Scripps-Howard's Richard T. Starnes. It should be completed by November 2008.