Michael Griffith

The liberal-run Congress even refused to honor our promise in the Paris Peace Accords to resupply South Vietnam with military equipment on a one-for-one basis, i.e., one helicopter for one helicopter lost, 20 aircraft spare parts for 20 aircraft spare parts expended, one tank for one tank lost, 100 rounds of ammo for 100 rounds of ammo expended, etc.

Not only did Congress refuse to honor the one-for-one replacement provision, but Congress cut our military aid to South Vietnam from $2.2 billion in 1973, to $1.1 billion in 1974, and then to $700 million in 1975, even while North Vietnam's attacks on South Vietnam were becoming larger and deadlier. The devastating impact of these cuts is discussed in an official history of the Vietnam War published by the U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division:

During Fiscal Years (FY) 1974 and 1975, the U.S. Congress slashed budget line items providing military aid to South Vietnam. Although not cut entirely, the funding equaled only 50 percent of the administration's recommended level. During FY 1973 the United States spent approximately $2.2 billion in military aid to South Vietnam. In FY 1974, the total dropped to $1.1 billion. Finally, in FY 1975, the figure fell to $700 million, a trend that was not misread in Hanoi. As General Dung very candidly phrased it, "Thieu [President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam] was forced to fight a poor man's war."

Perhaps more distressing, as far as the recipients of the military aid were concerned, was the fact that by 1975 the dollars spent for certain items were buying only half as many goods as they had in 1973. For example, POL costs were up by 100 percent, the cost of one round of 105mm ammunition had increased from 18 to 35 dollars, and the cost of providing 13.5 million individual rations exceeded 22 million dollars. Considering the steady reduction in funding and the almost universal increase in prices, the South Vietnamese in 1975 could buy only about an eighth as much defense for the dollar as they had in 1973.

In June 1974, just before the start of FY 1975, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Lukeman replaced Lieutenant Colonel Strickland as Chief, VNMC LSB. Almost immediately he began to notice the effects of the reduced funding, less than a third the size of the 1973 budget. In September, in a letter to HQMC, he penned his concerns:

"Briefly, the current level means grounding a significant part of the VNAF [South Vietnamese Air Force], cutting back on the capabilities of the VNN [South Vietnamese Navy], and running unacceptable risks in the stock levels of ammunition, POL, and medical supplies. I am concerned it will mean, in the long run, decreased morale, because replacement of uniforms and individual equipment will start to suffer about a year from now, and the dollars spent on meat supplements to the basic rice diet will be cut way back. At this point, the planners have concentrated (understandably) most of their attention on shoot, move, and communicate but have lost in the buzz words a feel for the man who will be doing those things."

The South Vietnamese attempted to adjust to the decreased funding and rising costs, but each of these adjustments had the effect of placing them in a more disadvantageous position relative to the strengthened North Vietnamese forces. The tempo of operations of all services, most particularly the Air Force, was cut back to conserve fuel. The expenditure rate of munitions also dropped. Interdiction fire was all but halted. The decreased financial support forced the South Vietnamese to consider cutting costs in all areas of defense, including the abandonment of outposts and fire bases in outlying regions.

The overall impact of the budget reduction on the allocation of military monies was readily apparent. In FY 1975 at the $700 million level all of the funded appropriations were spent on consumables. There was nothing left over for procurement of equipment to replace combat and operational losses on the one-for-one basis permitted by the Paris Accords. (https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20in%20Vietnam_The%20Bitter%20End%201973-1975%20%20PCN%201900310900_1.pdf)

Of course, North Vietnam had no such worries. When North Vietnam’s economy was on the verge of collapse in 1973 and 1974, it was kept afloat by massive Soviet financial aid. Nor did North Vietnam have to worry about drastic reductions in military aid from its allies.

As a result, South Vietnam fell. The bloody, horrible brutality that the Communists imposed on South Vietnam after the war has been well documented, especially from recent research done by Asian/Australian scholars among the hundreds of thousands of former Vietnamese refugees in Australia. Decades later, Vietnam’s Communist rulers finally implemented some economic reforms that improved living conditions. They also slightly eased their political oppression, releasing the last of the prisoners from the concentration camps that were established in 1975. Yet, even today, according to groups that monitor human rights around the world, including Human Rights Watch, Vietnam remains one of the most repressive regimes on the planet.

20 hours ago, Douglas Caddy said:

David Talbot wrote on Facebook today:

McNamara, who became a Vietnam hawk under President Johnson

In reality, McNamara was anything but a Vietnam hawk under Johnson. In public, McNamara voiced support for the war effort, but he did everything he could to undermine the war effort in private, just as he had done with JFK. He talked LBJ into insane, suicidal restrictions on our bombing raids and ground operations, placing entire crucial areas and vital targets off limits and giving the NVA sanctuary areas to which their troops could retreat and mobilize without fear of attack.

In public, McNamara supported the bombing, but in private he told anyone who would listen that the bombing was ineffective. In one case, McNamara was caught markedly misrepresenting the views of Admiral Sharp, the CINCPAC (Commander in Chief Pacific), to make it appear that Sharp supported McNamara's restrictions. McNamara did all he could to isolate LBJ from the Joint Chiefs. McNamara exercised unprecedented micromanagement over the war effort, usurping the rightful authority and judgment of the commanders on the ground, with negative results over and over again.

At least as early as 1967, McNamara began telling LBJ that the war was "unwinnable," an outrageous and galling claim coming from the guy who had handcuffed our military and had enabled the North Vietnamese to enjoy protections that no competent leader would have allowed, protections that most Americans would have found shocking, if not treasonous, in World War II and in the Korean War.

The first six or seven iterations of the Rolling Thunder bombing operations were so limited and restricted that they were largely worthless and ineffective. Under pressure from Congressional conservatives, the JCS, and senior officers just below the JCS, LBJ, over McNamara's objections, finally lifted a few of the insane restrictions for the last five Rolling Thunder raids. Those raids did, at best, only moderate damage and still left dozens of key (and entirely valid) targets untouched. Yet, we know from North Vietnamese sources that the last five raids did enough damage to cause some consternation in Hanoi and to hinder some NVA operations. 

In late 1967, McNamara announced his intention to resign, and he left office in February 1968, soon after the 1968 Tet Offensive, an offensive that would have been impossible without his disastrous handling of the war effort. 

McNamara was never a "Vietnam hawk." And if Vietnam was one of the plotters' main motives and concerns, they surely did not show it. A plot run by powerful people who viewed Vietnam as a vital issue never would have allowed LBJ to so horribly mismanage and hamstring the war effort.

I agree with RFK Jr. about many things, but I disagree with him about JFK's handling of Laos. Says RFK Jr.,

"The next confrontation with the defense and intelligence establishments had already begun as JFK resisted pressure from Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs and the CIA to prop up the CIA’s puppet government in Laos against the communist Pathet Lao guerrillas. The military wanted 140,000 ground troops, with some officials advocating for nuclear weapons. . . . JFK instead signed a neutrality agreement the following year and was joined by 13 nations, including the Soviet Union."

In actuality, JFK's decision to agree to a coalition government was a costly blunder.  The coalition government ended up essentially being a tool of the Communists, and North Vietnam quickly occupied eastern Laos (and then eastern Cambodia). JFK then compounded his mistake by failing to challenge North Vietnam's occupation of eastern Laos, which was a violation of the neutrality agreement.

Because of JFK's failure to make any kind of a stand in Laos, the North Vietnamese were able to build the Ho Chi Minh trail through eastern Laos and Cambodia, which vastly improved their ability to move weapons, supplies, and troops into South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese also established large bases and depots in eastern Laos and Cambodia. Those two regions became a huge staging area and a valuable sanctuary for North Vietnamese forces. This made our task of protecting South Vietnam a lot harder, partly because it gave the North Vietnamese a 640-mile frontier bordering South Vietnam instead of just the 40-mile frontier at the DMZ. 

If the North Vietnamese had been unable to occupy eastern Laos, it would have been virtually impossible for them to have occupied eastern Cambodia.

Without the supply routes and sanctuaries in eastern Laos and Cambodia, North Vietnam's ability to move weapons, supplies, and troops into South Vietnam would have been drastically curtailed, and many thousands of American lives and tens of thousands of South Vietnamese lives would have been saved. 

On 9/18/2022 at 8:12 AM, David Lifton said:

This post to the London Education Forum describes a discovery that I made —several years ago— which may hold the answer to an important question:  When (and how) did Oswald learn Russian?

Let’s start with a recap of this interesting historical puzzle.

The Puzzle

The Warren Commission report does not offer a satisfactory answer to this question.  The Report basically implies that somehow —and the stress is on “somehow” —he taught himself Russian by the end of December 1958, at which time he had returned from his overseas tour, where he served at Atsugi Naval Air Station, which was the basis for U-2 flights over the USSR.

True, one can develop —and learn — a basic vocabulary by memorizing some 100 key words that appear in a Russian -English dictionary; but studying a dictionary will not provide fluency —the ability to actually speak the language.  To achieve that, one must have a “dialogue partner” —i.e., language instruction.

However, there is no evidence that Oswald received any language instruction while in Japan. Also, after his return to the U.S. (Dec. 1958), and during his time at El Toro Marine Base (which is in Southern California, in the vicinity of Santa Ana), there is no indication that he received any language instruction at Defense Language Institute (“DLI”) —which, by the way, is several hundred miles north, in Monterey, California.  DLI is where people were sent to benefit from various “full immersion” language instruction programs, in language courses of various lengths of time (20 week program, 64 week program, etc.).  Had Oswald attended DLI, that would have provided the answer to the puzzle; but the evidence seems clear that he did not attend DLI.

So the issue of “how” Oswald attained Russian language proficiency persists. I believe I have what may be the answer to the question, but let’s first recap Oswald’s basic chronology.

The Oswald Chronology — The Basics

Oswald defected to the USSR after his exit from the USMC in late August/early Sept., 1959.  After a brief visit with his mother, and brother in Ft. Worth —his hometown— he departed for New Orleans.  He traveled by bus to New Orleans, and purchased a ticket aboard a freighter. (He had told his mother and brother that he would be seeking work on a freighter, bound for Europe). In fact, Oswald went to New Orleans and booked space on a freighter (the Marion Lykes) heading for Le Havre, France.   After arriving there, he took the boat-train from Le Havre to London.  He then made a beeline for Moscow (flying to Helsinki, then traveling by train to Moscow.)

Again here was Oswald’s itinerary: he flew from London to Helsinki, Finland; and then followed a path that led to the Soviet Union, where he arrived (by train) in early October.  He went to the American Embassy, and said he wanted to defect.   He said he was a devout Marxist, that the USSR was a superior society than the U.S.; and that he wanted to spend the rest of his life in the U.S.S.R.  The Americans basically ignored him, but —particularly after he made a shallow cut in his wrist, faking a suicide attempt, and ending up in a hospital —  the Soviets arranged for him to be sent to Minsk (500 miles from Moscow) where he was provided a job in a factory, and a monthly stipend.  Oswald remained there for about 15 months, at which point he indicated he was tired of that experience, and wanted to return to the U.S.  In March 1961, Oswald went to a dance and met Marina (who was quite beautiful —and still is, BTW).  Within a month she was pregnant (which I personally believe was intentional) and that paved the way for Marina to get what is known as a “243(g) waiver” -- see Sylvia Meagher's book, "Oswald and the State Dept." for details; which then paved the way for the couple’s  expeditious return to the U.S. in mid-June 1962.

So much for the basic “recap.”  In asking the question —when (and how) did Oswald learn Russian? —  it is important to understand the “Oswald time line” and to ignore what happened after LHO had lived in the USSR for some 37 months.  (Obviously his fluency markedly improved after he was in the USSR for over two-and-a half years).  The focus here, in this writing, is not his fluency after he lived in the USSR — that is not the issue; rather my focus here is in the last nine months before he left the Marines, i.e., Dec. 1958 - Sept. 1959.

Here’s a brief recap, one purpose being to attempt to pinpoint the time when he may have received covert language instruction. Is there such a period?

The Oswald Chronology

Lee Oswald was born on 10/18/39.  His dream, from the time he was about age 12, was to join the Marines at the earliest possible time,  which he did on his 17th birthday: 10/18/56.   What followed was basic training, specialized training as a radar operator, and then came a tour of duty in the Far East.  Specifically: Atsugi, Japan.  Finally, in December 1958, he returned from Japan, and began his final “U.S.” period: about 10 months at El Toro Marine Base, in Southern California.

The Warren Commission divided his life into four periods, which it labeled as follows:

Youth  (1939 - 10/17/56)

Marine Period  (10/17/56 - 9/11/59)

Russian Period  (Oct 1959 - 6/62)

O-Post Russian  (6/62 - 11/24/63)

Let’s review this “basic chronology” once again.

LHO entered the Marines at the earliest time possible: his 17th birthday.  After basic training, he served overseas (in Japan); and returned to the U.S., and was assigned to El Toro Marine Base (near Santa Ana, in Southern California) in the last week of December 1958.

The question being posed here — “When (and how) did Oswald learn Russian?”— applies to his competence in the Russian language after he returned from his overseas tour in Japan, and returned to El Toro Marine Base in late December 1958.  Oswald would remain at El Toro until he departed the Marines in early September 1959, at which point —after a brief visit with his mother and brother in Ft. Worth —he took a freighter to France, and then—after arriving in Le Havre—proceeded by boat train  to London, and then made a beeline for Russia.

The basic question (once again) is this:  Where (and how) did Oswald learn Russian?  Obviously, after spending 37 months in Russia, it would not be surprising to learn that Oswald had serious competency in Russian (although an interesting factoid is that he spoke it with a detectable Polish accent).  The question I am posing here is not his competence in Russian after he lived in Russia for 37 months.  The question I am posing is this: what was the source of his competence in Russian after his overseas tour in Japan, and before he left for Russia?   Specifically, I ask the reader to focus on this period:  between December 1958 (when he arrived back in the U.S. and was serving at El Toro Marine Base) and the spring (and summer) of 1959.  How did his facility in Russian increase so markedly in this period? 

We know that his Russian fluency bloomed during this period because by June 1959, when he was fixed up on a date with Pan Am stewardess Rosaleen Quinn (who was training in Russian. using the Berlitz method), his language skills far exceeded hers. (See FBI reports, Quinn WC deposition, etc).

Again, the question: what happened at El Toro, in the spring of 1959, that his Russian language skills bloomed?

Was it DLI?

The ordinary answer would be: he must have attended a language course AT DLI (in Monterey, California): unfortunately, the record indicates no such attendance.  Furthermore, there is another reason for rejecting such a hypothesis.  Had Oswald been a student at DLI (in the Spring of 1959), then there surely would have been a significant reaction (in late October/early November 1959) when his well-publicized defection to the USSR occurred.  Think about it: there would have been numerous students (from his class at  DLI) who would have reacted to the LHO defection (in October 1959)  by saying: “Hey, what’s going on here? That guy Oswald, who just defected to the USSR — he was in our class here at DLI!  He’s no Communist! What’s he now doing in Moscow?!”

My conclusion: IMHO, the DLI hypothesis does not work.

However, there must be an answer to this seemingly intractable puzzle, and I believe I know what it is. There’s other information —another hypothesis, if you will —that does provide the answer to LHO’s sudden increase in Russian language competence in the spring of 1959.

Specifically: some years ago, I learned of another way Oswald may have learned Russian — Russian with a distinct Polish accent (which Marina agrees he had) — and it has nothing to do with DLI.

Read on, to "Part 2"

Part 2

DSL Note:  In order to avoiding a situation in which a number of people are subject to a numerous inquiries from various students of this case, I have changed the key names in the account which follows.

Some years ago, I learned that in the Spring of 1959 (and in the vicinity of Santa Ana, California), there was a Polish  woman who worked in the same hospital as the mother of a friend of mine.  For the purpose of this memo, I will call my friend “Joe,” and I will call the woman Amy Balinowski.

My friend’s mother and Amy Balinowski worked in the same convalescant hospital; and (through the son)  that is how I came by the following conclusion(s):

Oswald was very likely tutored in Russian by a Polish woman who worked in the area of Santa Ana, California.  I have changed her first name to “Amy” and her last name to “Balinowski.’

THE DETAILS

Amy Balinowski was originally from Poland, and worked in a hospital in Santa Ana, California.  The mother of a friend of mine —call him Joe —worked in that same hospital, and got to know Amy quite well.  Some years ago, when conversing about the JFK case, my friend shared with me important information which came from conversations with his mother.

The gist of it is simply this: in order to earn extra money, this woman (Amy Balinowski) tutored a number of GI’s and others in Russian.  Of course, because Amy was originally from Poland, her Russian —as she spoke it (and taught it)— would have a Polish accent.

How does this bear on the Oswald situation?

My Own Tentative Conclusion

It is my belief that rather than subscribe to a hypothesis that involves Oswald attending DLI, hundreds of miles away, it is more logical and simpler to believe that when Oswald left the base (which he often did) and traveled to Santa Ana to receive tutoring in Russian, he received such language  instruction from the Polish Russian-speaking woman, Amy Balinowski.

Restating my belief: Oswald was one of the GI’s that the “friend of my friend’s mother”  tutored. If so, this is why (a) Oswald would have been able to learn to speak Russian from someone located near El Toro Marine Base in Santa Ana; and (b) it is also why, if such a person was his teacher, that his Russian would have a Polish accent.

Look at it this way: the Polish accent (in LHO's spoken Russian) is surely an important key (or clue) as to who his "language teacher" must have been.

Recapping:

We know from the existing record that Oswald regularly left the base —and went somewhere.  if the Russian instructor—who had a Polish accent — was located near Santa Ana, he would not have had to travel very far to receive such language instruction.

I have been aware of this situation for several years.  I have another — older —computer which contains the original memos that I wrote on this situation some years go.  When time permits, I will attempt to retrieve the original memos that I wrote, and quote from them directly.

THE END

Appendix A:  Defense Language Institute (from Wikipedia)

The Defense Language Institute (DLI) is a United States Department of Defense (DoD) educational and research institution consisting of two separate entities which provide linguistic and cultural instruction to the Department of Defense, other federal agencies and numerous customers around the world. The Defense Language Institute is responsible for the Defense Language Program, and the bulk of the Defense Language Institute's activities involve educating DoD members in assigned languages, and international personnel in English. Other functions include planning, curriculum development, and research in second-language acquisition.  (END OF DOCUMENT)

I thought Marina said that Oswald spoke Russian with an Estonian or Latvian or Lithuanian accent? I can't remember what accent she identified, but I don't think it was a Polish accent. 

Anyway, I can shed some light about DLI. I was a signals intelligence linguist in the Army and attended DLI twice. Nobody, but nobody, goes to DLI unless they have orders that authorize them to attend, and 99% of the people who are sent to DLI work in some kind of classified field. When Rankin let slip that Oswald had attended DLI, he revealed a great deal. 

If the liberals of the 1960s and 1970s had been adults during the early 1950s, we would have lost the Korean War, and the entire Korean Peninsula would be controlled by North Korea's barbaric regime.

Those liberals could have made the same immoral one-sided arguments against South Korea that they made against South Vietnam. After all, South Korea's government during and long after the war was a military dictatorship. Of course, honest, rational people would have pointed out that South Korea's government was not nearly as bad as North Korea's government.

But '60s and '70s liberals would have ignored this vital fact and would have demonized South Korea's government, would have whitewashed North Korea’s government, and would have demanded that we "stop propping up a despotic regime" (just as they demonized South Vietnam's government and whitewashed North Vietnam's government).

Indeed, South Korea was ruled by a series of military-run authoritarian governments until the late 1980s. Yet, thankfully, virtually everyone recognized that South Korea, for all its faults, was less repressive than North Korea, and that South Koreans enjoyed more freedoms and a higher standard of living than did North Koreans.

And just look at the economic and democratic miracle that South Korea became and still is. South Vietnam would be another South Korea today, another beacon of democracy and prosperity in Asia, if American liberals had not betrayed her after the 1973 Paris Peace Accords.

Instead, thanks to the American “anti-war” movement, our liberal news media, and the Democrat-controlled U.S. Congress from 1972 to 1975, we failed to keep our promises to South Vietnam and allowed that fledgling nation to fall to communist tyranny. Even today Communist-run Vietnam remains one of the most repressive regimes on the planet.

A few follow-up points:

-- It is beyond me how anyone can cite McNamara’s claims, given his record of deception and manipulation, not to mention his disastrous incompetence. Even H. R. McMaster, in his highly acclaimed book Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, scorches McNamara for his dishonesty and ineptitude, even though McMaster is also harshly critical of the Joint Chiefs.

-- When Ho Chi Minh declared the creation of the “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” (DRV), he did not even control all of the northern part of Vietnam, much less all of Vietnam. Furthermore, literally thousands of pages of scholarship document the fact that the Vietminh and then North Vietnam would have quickly ceased to exist had it not been for prolonged massive aid from the Soviet Union and Red China.

-- Regarding the Geneva Accords and the holding of elections in 1956, the New York Times editorial page noted at the time,

The plain fact is that neither the truce commission nor the signatories to the Geneva Agreement have as yet established in North Vietnam the essential conditions provided by the agreement for a “free expression of the national will”. . . . In these circumstances, Mr. Diem . . . is duty-bound to reject the proposed elections until the necessary conditions for freedom have been established in the North.” (April 6, 1956)

Bingo. Remember that during the Geneva Accords-mandated “free flow” period in 1954-1955, the Vietminh forcefully prevented some 2 million North Vietnamese from going to South Vietnam, as I discussed in a previous reply. Liberals simply ignore this gross violation of the Geneva Accords and then attack Diem and the U.S. for believing that the Vietminh would not hold honest elections in the North.

-- Perhaps the best response to Nick Turse’s book Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam, is the 37-page critical review written by Vietnam War scholars Gary Kulik and Peter Zinoman. Here’s a brief excerpt from their review:

Turse’s slipshod approach to the existing scholarship highlights more general problems with his research methods. “Only by combining veterans’ testimonies, contemporaneous press coverage, Vietnamese eye-witness accounts, long classified official-studies, and the military’s own formal investigations into the many hundreds of atrocity cases that it knew about,” he writes, “can one begin to grasp what the Vietnam War really entailed” (258). But Turse’s sloppy and tendentious use of sources represents the book’s most serious problem. A perusal of the notes indicates that he relies on an indiscriminate mix of credible and unreliable sources and that his agenda-driven selection and presentation of evidence frequently misleads. Gary Kulik’s “War Stories” (2009) uses the same military documents to examine the first American atrocity discussed at length in Turse’s book: the so-called Trieu Ai massacre. Comparison with Kulik’s much longer and more detailed account reveals a working method on the part of Turse marked by the cherry picking of data and the partisan framing of evidence. Eyewitness accounts of the incident that Turse collected in Vietnam in 2006 and 2008 raise more questions than they answer and point to problems with his use of this complicated source. Americans killed civilians at Triệu Ái, but Turse jumps to false conclusions about the circumstances that led to the killings, and he offers unqualified speculation about this episode as emphatic truth. As historians, we argue that Turse’s opposition to war atrocities does not excuse these mistakes. (https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/e-journal/articles/zinoman_kulik.pdf)

Vietnam veteran Tom Equels, who was personally slandered in Turse's book, had this to say about Turse’s work:

I was personally defamed by Turse's disregard for truth. It is ironic that he talks about overkill and then with careless disregard for the truth trashes the reputations of honorable soldiers, having zero factual basis. Journalistic overkill at its worst. He interviewed no one regarding the incident and obviously did not even read the record he so liberally cites. I had to gather the official documents, gather witness statements, and then prove I was not within a hundred miles of the alleged incident to get a retraction/correction! (https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-12/zinoman-and-kulik)

To read more about Turse’s irresponsible handling of evidence regarding Tom Equels, see Agreement Reached to Retract Story that Decorated Vietnam War Hero Participated in Civilian Massacre -- Equels Law Firm | PRLog. Turse and his publisher were eventually forced to issue a formal retraction of his false claims about Equels.

-- I have presented some of the evidence regarding the “reign of terror” (quoting former VC official Tang’s words) that the North Vietnamese army (NVA) imposed on the South after Saigon fell, which terror included executing tens of thousands of South Vietnamese and sending 1-2 million others to brutal “reeducation” camps, where thousands more died from forced labor, starvation, neglect.

Along this line, mention should be made of the fact that during the NVA’s final invasion of South Vietnam in March and April in 1975, the NVA killed thousands of civilians by shelling highways that were clogged with fleeing civilians.

The NVA did the same thing in 1972 when they shelled Highway 1 during their Easter Offensive. I quote from an article on the subject titled “Appeasing the Spirits Along the Highway of Horror,” published on a website maintained by Vietnamese refugees:

In contrast, the RVN government [South Vietnam’s government] (before it was defeated in 1975) claimed that the PAVN [another acronym for the North Vietnamese army] intentionally targeted civilians.[22] Bolstering the RVN’s assertion was the confession of PAVN Private Lê Xuân Thủy, who was serving as a radio operator for the 4th Battalion, 324th Division, when he defected on 31 July 1972.[23] At an RVN government-organized press conference on 8 September, Thủy revealed that his unit had been ordered to “maintain an ambush position along Route 1” for six days to allow other PAVN troops to capture Quảng Trị city.[24] Thủy’s commander had instructed his unit to shoot into the column of people fleeing Quảng Trị, even though it was clear that many civilians were present. The troops were told that the refugees were the enemy because they were opting to leave rather than stay. Troops were commanded to shoot at all vehicles, including civilian cars, buses, and bicycles. According to Thủy, this event shook his faith in the DRV [North Vietnam] and led to his defection.

The testimony of one defector in state custody does not make for credible evidence. His assertion that the PAVN fired on civilians, however, corresponds with other contemporary reports and eyewitness accounts. Many observers reported that civilian presence on the road was clearly discernable during the attack. . . .

The full extent of the attack was known only in July, after the ARVN [South Vietnam’s army] regained the southern parts of Quảng Trị province. As mentioned above, the two reporters who broke the story for Sóng Thần, Ngy Thanh and Đoàn Kế Tường, were among the first to return to the highway. Being members of the military force themselves, both reporters arrived with the troops on 1 July.[40] As the airborne headed toward Quảng Trị city on the western side of Highway One and the marines on the eastern side, the two reporters went on their own and found a way across the Bến Đá Bridge, which had been destroyed in late April. Because they arrived before the ARVN troops, Ngy Thanh and Tường were able to witness the scene before soldiers cleared the highway of vehicles and bodies to make it passable.

According to Ngy Thanh and Đoàn Kế Tường’s article, published on 3 July, the 10-km stretch of highway southeast of Quảng Trị city was a scene of mass destruction. The road was obstructed by damaged tanks, buses, cars, and Red Cross vehicles with stretchers still inside. Motorcycles were abandoned with keys in the ignition. Strewn around and in these wrecks were hundreds of bodies; some were soldiers but most were civilians, including women and children.[41] Many more bodies could be found in the sandy banks along both sides of the highway, the soft sand acting as their grave. The reporters noted that because the corpses had been there since the end of April, a significant number had already begun to decompose.

Other Vietnamese journalists reported equally horrifying sights along the highway when they returned in July.[44] War correspondents Vũ Thanh Thủy and Dương Phục recorded in their joint memoir the eerie and surreal sight that they encountered along this stretch of highway.[45] According to them, there were so many corpses that it was difficult for journalists to walk along the shoulders of the highway. They had to use walking sticks to help avoid stepping on corpses.[46] (Appeasing the Spirits Along the 'Highway of Horror' - DVAN)

The NVA also used South Vietnamese civilians as human shields during the Easter Offensive by surrounding some of their positions with captured South Vietnamese refugees.

-- Former Army Green Beret and veterans rights activist Ted Sampley discussed North Vietnamese war crimes in a 1997 article in U.S. Veteran Dispatch:

North Vietnamese Army Regulars, on orders from Vietnam's infamous "war hero" General Vo Nguyen Giap, rounded up and marched the civilians to a dry river bed and summarily executed them with bullets, bayonets and clubs. Some were buried alive with their hands tied behind their backs. Their only crime — they believed in democracy or they were Christians. . . .

The record is absolutely clear. Beginning in the 1950s and continuing until the fall of Saigon in 1975, communist leaders orchestrated as official policy the use of terror as a weapon targeted directly at the non-communist population of Vietnam. Communist terrorists blew up churches, schools and bridges, and murdered thousands of South Vietnamese civilian officials. In some cases, the communists murdered the wives, children, and even livestock and pets of the officials. . . .

After North Vietnam violated the Paris Peace Agreements and took over South Vietnam by bloody military force, they murdered thousands more civilians. Those that were not executed were taken from their homes and jailed for years in forced labor concentration camps. Some are still being held today.

There is no question about the intentional deprivation, beatings, torture and murder that U.S. and South Vietnamese prisoners of war were subjected to by the communist Vietnamese during the war. Many of the torturers are easily found today. They are still running the Vietnamese government. (Atrocities Committed by Vietcong (11thcavnam.com)

And what did the likes of John Kerry and Bella Abzug have to say about these atrocities? Nothing. How about all the misguided, duped college students who had staged numerous angry protests when we attacked NVA positions in Laos and Cambodia? Surely they protested these war crimes, right? Nope. They had nothing to say either, not one word, not one protest, not one poster, nothing.

These people were not really “anti-war.” Rather, they were "anti-" any U.S. military action against the NVA or the Vietcong. They said nothing when North Vietnam launched another full-scale invasion of South Vietnam in late 1974—not one peep of protest. Nor did they say anything about the Communists’ mass executions and their internment of 1-2 million people in brutal concentration camps after Saigon fell—not one word.

Okay, let’s review NSAM 263 and JFK’s last statements on the Vietnam War. Here is what JFK was going to say about Vietnam in his speech at the International Trade Mart on 11/22/1963, the speech he was going to give soon after driving through Dealey Plaza: 

About 70 percent of our military assistance goes to nine key countries located on or near the borders of the Communist bloc – nine countries confronted directly or indirectly with the threat of Communist aggression – Viet-Nam, Free China, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. No one of these countries possesses on its own the resources to maintain the forces which our own Chiefs of Staff think needed in the common interest. Reducing our efforts to train, equip, and assist their armies can only encourage Communist penetration and require in time the increased overseas deployment of American combat forces. And reducing the economic help needed to bolster these nations that undertake to help defend freedom can have the same disastrous result. 

This is literally the last statement we have from JFK himself, and, clearly, there is no hint of any intention to totally disengage from South Vietnam, but rather a clear intent to “train, equip, and assist” South Vietnam’s armed forces.

And here is what JFK said about standing by South Vietnam and other allies earlier in the day on 11/22/1963 when he addressed the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce:

In the past 3 years we have increased the defense budget of the United States by over 20 percent; increased the program of acquisition for Polaris submarines from 24 to 41; increased our Minuteman missile purchase program by more than 75 percent; doubled the number of strategic bombers and missiles on alert; doubled the number of nuclear weapons available in the strategic alert forces; increased the tactical nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe by over 60 percent; added five combat ready divisions to the Army of the United States, and five tactical fighter wings to the Air Force of the United States; increased our strategic airlift capability by 75 percent; and increased our special counter-insurgency forces which are engaged now in South Viet-Nam by 600 percent. I hope those who want a stronger America and place it on some signs will also place those figures next to it.

This is not an easy effort. This requires sacrifice by the people of the United States. But this is a very dangerous and uncertain world. As I said earlier, on three occasions in the last three years the United States has had a direct confrontation. No one can say when it will come again. No one expects that our life will be easy, certainly not in this decade, and perhaps not in this century. But we should realize what a burden and responsibility the people of the United States have borne for so many years. . . .

Without the United States, South Viet-Nam would collapse overnight. Without the United States, the SEATO alliance would collapse overnight. Without the United States the CENTO alliance would collapse overnight. Without the United States there would be no NATO. And gradually Europe would drift into neutralism and indifference. Without the efforts of the United States in the Alliance for Progress, the Communist advance onto the mainland of South America would long ago have taken place.

So this country, which desires only to be free, which desires to be secure, which desired to live at peace for 18 years under three different administrations, has borne more than its share of the burden, has stood watch for more than its number of years. I don't think we are fatigued or tired. We would like to live as we once lived. But history will not permit it. The Communist balance of power is still strong. The balance of power is still on the side of freedom. We are still the keystone in the arch of freedom, and I think we will continue to do as we have done in our past, our duty, and the people of Texas will be in the lead.

I don’t see any hint of an intention to abandon South Vietnam, do you? Now let’s look at NSAM 263 again:

At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.

The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section I B (1 -3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.

After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report, the President approved the instruction to Ambassador Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon.

What were the recommendations in Section 1 B (1-3) of the McNamara-Taylor report? And what was contained in the instruction sent to Ambassador Lodge? Below is Section 1 B (1-3) from the McNamara-Taylor report. Notice the intention to increase the size of South Vietnam’s army and to increase the pace of military operations, and notice the terms “should,” “the bulk of U.S. personnel,” and “without impairment of the war effort”: 

1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as:

a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps).

b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended.

c. Emphasis on “clear and hold operations” instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.

d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength.

e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.

f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced.

2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.

3. In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.

So, clearly, NSAM 263 was not an unalterable, no-matter-what order for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, and it certainly did not even remotely suggest any intention to totally disengage from South Vietnam. Rather, if things went according to plan, it “should” be possible to withdraw “the bulk” of U.S. forces from Vietnam “without impairment of the war effort.”

This is why the movie JFK's interpretation of NSAM 263 came under such heavy fire from so many scholars: NSAM 263 obviously and undeniably did not call for an unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Vietnam. Only by ignoring the document's plain wording can one misinterpret it to say such a thing.

Now let’s look at the instruction sent to Lodge. I won’t quote the whole telegram because it’s several pages long. But, here are key parts of the instruction that clearly contradict the idea that JFK intended to abandon South Vietnam—and note the repeated emphasis on winning the war: 

The recommendations on negotiations are concerned with what US is after, i.e., GVN [South Vietnam’s government] action to increase effectiveness of its military effort; to ensure popular support to win war; and to eliminate strains on US Government and public confidence. The negotiating posture is designed not to lay down specific hard and fast demands or to set a deadline, but to produce movement in Vietnamese Government along these lines. In this way we can test and probe effectiveness of any actions the GVN actually takes and, at same time, maintain sufficient flexibility to permit US to resume full support of Diem regime at any time US Government deems it appropriate. . . . 

Test of adequacy of these actions should be whether, in combination, they improve effectiveness of GVN effort to point where we can carry on in confident expectation that war effort will progress satisfactorily. Since we cannot now foresee interlocking impact of possible actions both in GVN and here, we obviously do not expect that GVN will or even can perform on entire list and for this reason this is in no sense a package of demands. 

12. If, as we hope, Diem seeks clarification of US policies and actions, you should present an exposition of how our actions are related to our fundamental objective of victory. . . . 

Although we cannot at this time in complete confidence predict the exact point in this complex of actions at which we will be sure war effort will proceed to successful conclusion, it seems probable its achievement will require some restriction of role of Nhus. 

22. At President’s next press conference, he expects to repeat his basic statement that what furthers the war effort we support, and what interferes with the war effort we oppose.  

6 minutes ago, James DiEugenio said:

 

I am relying largely on McNamara's belated claims? You don't have to read the rest of Mike's boilerplate.  That is really representative of his argument.

First of all, I did not say you are "largely" relying on McNamara's belated claims. I said you are "partly" relying on McNamara's hearsay. Go back and read that part of my reply. Or, here, let me quote it:

You are simply ignoring the bulk of the record and are partly relying on McNamara’s belated hearsay claims. See my previous replies about NSAM 263. The conditional goal was to have all advisors withdrawn by the end of 1965, but, again, it was a conditional goal—it depended on the situation on the ground.

And I would note that you still have not answered my points about the clear wording of NSAM 263 and its supporting documents. You are still ignoring them. 

My "boilerplate"??! You have done little else but repeat your talking points over and over and over again and have ignored most of my counter arguments. 

I fail to see how being 1 of 19 witnesses qualifies as being the center of my argument. If you turn that into a percentage, its about 5 per cent.  But somehow, some way, Mike wants to make the other 95 per cent disappear. 

No, the problem is that you have misrepresented what I said, as I document above. I did not argue that McNamara is the "center" of your argument, nor did I say that you are "largely" relying on him. 

Come hell or high water he will do it. Therefore, somehow, Newman, Pearson, O'Neill, Mansfield, Morse, O'Donnell and Powers, Shoup, etc etc, all these witnesses do not really exist.  Mike throws them up into the ether. Bye Bye.

You could have spared yourself from typing all these erroneous arguments if you had not misread my statement. See above.

But let us use McNamara to see how Mike handles evidence about this issue.  He says McNamara only came to this belatedly about Kennedy and Vietnam his book In Retrospect from 1995.  Let us examine the contemporaneous record to see if Mike is informed and/or honest.

Let us use McNamara to see how you handle evidence about this issue. Not one word of what you say below addresses the fact that the policy in question, the policy that JFK wanted to be supported, was not the policy that you claim it was but was a conditional policy that could be altered based on the situation on the ground. 

On November 27, 1961 there was a meeting at the White House. Some of the attendees were Taylor, Dulles, Lansdale, David Bell, Bundy, Rostow, Rusk, McNamara.  Kennedy got there late, so the early discussion was about how poorly Diem was performing. When Kennedy got there he took over the meeting.  It was very clear now why it was called.  Kennedy was quite disappointed at the struggle he had to go through block combat troops at the mid November meeting. And also at the resistance to that decision. And he could hardly have made it more clear: "When policy is decided on, people on the spot must support it or get out." He then asked for whole hearted support of his decision and wanted to know who at Defense was going to carry out his Vietnam policy. McNamara said it would be him. (Memorandum of Southeast Asia meeting by Max Taylor, 11/27/61)

None of this helps your case because you continue to ignore the fact that NSAM 263 did not order an unconditional, unalterable withdrawal by the end of 1965. Numerous scholars have discussed this, and I have documented this fact in previous replies. The policy that Kennedy wanted to see supported was not the policy that you keep assuming it was. That's the main problem here. 

At this time, Kennedy had send Galbraith to Vietnam, also as a result of those prior meetings and his disappointment in them. He knew Galbraith was anything but a hawk and would give him a different recommendation on what to do.  Which he did.  When Galbraith was in town again in April, Kennedy told him to deliver his report to McNamara, which he did. Galbraith then told Kennedy that he talked to the Defense Secretary and he understood.  A mini battle took place over this. Since the Pentagon looked at the memo as beginning a withdrawal. (Pentagon Papers, Book 12, pp. 464-65, David Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 133) But McNamara got the message, as his deputy Roz GIlpatric said that McNamara told him that JFK had given him instructions to start to unwind this thing. (James Blight, VIrtual JFK, p.371). Recall, this is 1961-62.

Here, too, you keep assuming that the policy in question was an unconditional, unalterable withdrawal by the end of 1965, but the text of NSAM 263 and its supporting documents clearly, undeniably refute that view, as I've documented in my two replies on the NSAM. 

Let's quote liberal historian Stanley Karnow:

Early in 1963, South Vietnam's rigid President Ngo Dinh Diem was cracking down on internal dissidents, throwing the country into chaos. Fearing that the turmoil would benefit the Communist insurgents, Kennedy conceived of bringing home one thousand of the sixteen thousand American military advisers as a way of prodding Diem into behaving more leniently. Kennedy's decision was codified in National Security Action Memorandum, or NSAM 263. Its aim was to "indicate our displeasure" with Diem and "create significant uncertainty" in him "as to the future intentions of the United States." Kennedy hoped the scheme, which also scheduled a reduction of the U.S. forces over the next two years, would give the South Vietnamese the chance to strengthen themselves. (Karnow, "JFK," in Mark C. Carnes, editor, Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies, 1995, p. 272)

When you get on a public forum and make such ludicrous claims as your claim that North Vietnam did not invade South Vietnam, you indicate that you are too emotionally and ideologically committed to your position to be objective. That argument originated with the North Vietnamese communists. No one except a small cadre of communist and far-left authors takes it seriously. Go on any of the major boards where the Vietnam War is discussed and see what happens when you make that argument. Even Karnow utterly rejects it. North Vietnam signed a formal agreement with the government of South Vietnam that promised that North Vietnamese attacks and incursions against South Vietnam would cease--that agreement is known as the Paris Peace Accords.

To even begin to make this argument, one must accept the communist version of history, a version that ignores Ho Chi Minh's brutal tactics to consolidate his control of the North, that ignores the long-standing and recognized differences between the northern and southern regions, that ignores Ho's use of violence and intimidation to keep some 2 million northern Vietnamese from moving to South Vietnam, and that ignores the fact that Ho's vicious regime would have collapsed early on without massive Soviet and Chinese aid. 

2 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

 

1. Please, you have 19 people saying that Kennedy was getting out the last of the advisors, since that was all there was.  He even said the helicopter pilots.  He said he did not even want generals visiting Saigon for God's sakes. At McNamara's Sec/Def meeting, he demanded schedules from Pentagon, CIA and State. So who was going to be left to fight?

You are simply ignoring the bulk of the record and are partly relying on McNamara’s belated hearsay claims. See my previous replies about NSAM 263. The conditional goal was to have all advisors withdrawn by the end of 1965, but, again, it was a conditional goal—it depended on the situation on the ground.

2. Dean Rusk?  Everyone knows that Rusk supported the war all the way through Johnson. What do you expect him to say?  He was involved with Rolling Thunder.  He was one of the very few Kennedy guys who stayed in.  Salinger, O'Donnell, Powers, Bundy, Ball , Hilsman, McNamara all got out.

So you’ll believe a lying snake like McNamara but refuse to believe Rusk???

3. I consider saying Hanoi invaded the south as an oxymoron.

I’m sorry, but this is downright bizarre. Good grief, if you can’t admit that North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam, you have no credible basis for discussing the subject.

Mansfield said above that we had created a civil war. BTW, that is exactly what Podhoretz used and Draper called him on it, its s civil war in one country. We fabricated South Vietnam. And about five months after we left, it fell.

More bizarre material. If we “fabricated” South Vietnam, then Russia and China fabricated North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh would have remained a minor figure without Soviet and Chinese training and support. Even Ho Chi Minh was willing to have Vietnam partitioned—he just wanted the partition line to be at the 13th parallel instead of the 17th parallel. Both sections had functioning governments. The northern section invaded the southern section. The northern section is commonly known as North Vietnam, and the southern section is commonly known as South Vietnam. The fact that the northern government invaded the region controlled by the southern government is a matter of indisputable historical fact.

But you can’t even admit this historical fact because, when push came to shove, your party sided with the communists and betrayed the anti-communists. Your party demonized the Saigon government but whitewashed the far more brutal Hanoi government. After 1968, your party got upset when we did anything that gave us a better chance of forcing North Vietnam to stop attacking South Vietnam. After the Paris Peace Accords, your party ignored North Vietnam’s increasingly egregious violations, slashed our aid to South Vietnam by over 60%, and refused to honor our promise to provide air support if North Vietnam invaded again.

4. The USA orally agreed to the Accords.  It then broke them by deliberately cancelling the unification elections and creating a new country which had not existed and installing a new leader, DIem.

You can repeat this far-left spin a thousand times, but that won’t make it come true. “Orally agreed”? We made it clear that we objected to provisions of the accords, which is why we refused to sign. We agreed to help implement the Geneva Accords but made it clear that we would not do anything to endanger South Vietnam. That was the extent of our oral agreement.

Also, we were not the ones who cancelled the election. Diem, for very good reasons, was the one who cancelled the election by refusing to have the South take part in it. I notice you ignored what JFK said about the election. To repeat, JFK opposed holding the election, given the circumstances at the time.

I also notice you said nothing about Hanoi’s refusal to hold a nationwide election in 1973, even though Thieu called for such an election three times that year.

We did this by not letting Bao Dai run and having Lansdale rig Diem's election. Lansdale had more people voting in certain districts than who lived there. This is building democracy?

And how would you compare this to Ho Chi Minh’s bloody consolidation of power in the North? Why do you suppose that nearly 1 million people moved from the North to the South but that only about 100,000 moved from the South to the North? And what about the fact that the Vietminh forcefully prevented some 2 million people from moving from the North to the South?

And I again point out that during the 1968 Tet Offensive, when the people of South Vietnam had every opportunity to desert the Saigon government and support the communists, they overwhelmingly chose to stand by their government, much to the shock and embarrassment of Hanoi’s leaders.

5.  When you say the statements were made later, are you trying to say all these people are lying? That is some conspiracy you got going there isn't it?  19 people cooperated on a plot?  Mike please.  What is so compelling about the statements is they jibe with what JFK was doing. The documentary record: from Galbraith's journey to Saigon, his visit to McNamara, McNamara's orders to Harkins,  the  May 1963 Sec/Def schedules which are all in writing and convinced the NY TImes Kennedy was getting out, NSAM 263 and Kennedy's insistence the withdrawal plan be kept in the McNamara Taylor Report, the announcement by McNamara to the press., and the McNamara. Taylor report which says the withdrawal will be complete by 1965. And I could add, the evacuation order requested by Kennedy in November of 1963.  The written record matches the statements.

How can you seriously claim that your version of the written record matches JFK’s public statements? How? In his public statements, JFK made it clear that he had no intention of abandoning South Vietnam to communist tyranny.

So are you saying that RFK, Rusk, Bundy, Rostow, Schlesinger, and Sorenson were lying or covering-up? You are ignoring the clear evidence from NSAM 263 and the supporting documents, which makes it clear that the withdrawal was a conditional plan that could be altered based on the situation on the ground.

Your position amounts to saying “If JFK had lived, he would have handed over South Vietnam to communist tyranny in 1965, and this would have been a very noble and honorable deed. It’s just too bad that the communists weren’t able to impose their tyranny on South Vietnam in 1965.”

6. Bobby later said that JFK would have never sent combat troops into Vietnam, "He was determined not to send troops.  If the South Vietnamese could not do it, the Unites States could not win it for them." (Mathews, pp. 304-05) And this coincides with what he said in 1961 in the November debates as recorded by David Kaiser: that there would be no combat troops in VIetnam.  At the University of Kansas, in 1968 RFK more or less demanded the USA get out of Vietnam (Mathews, p. 322)

Here we go again. Once more, an intention not to send in regular combat troops is not the same thing as an intention to totally disengage. I think I’ve made it as clear as possible that, yes, certainly, JFK was determined not to send in regular combat troops, but this was not an unalterable, no-matter-what position, as Bobby himself made clear in his April 1964 interview. JFK did not want to send in regular ground troops. He was strongly opposed to doing so. But, he did not categorically rule it out, unless you want to accuse Bobby of making false statements.

7. The invasions of Laos and Cambodia ripped America apart even further.  I mean please Mike, you do remember Kent State and Jackson State don't you?  You remember the cover of Life and the six kids who died on the campuses due to their protests of the further expansion of the war.  And I certainly hope you read Shawcross' Sideshow.  How on earth was that invasion and bombing campaign somehow worth what happened in Cambodia, since it directly caused the transfer from Sihanouk to Lon Nol to Pol Pot. And Laos ended up looking like the surface of the moon.

Holy cow. This stuff is just about identical to the propaganda that North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Red China were putting out at the time.

First off, our bombing in Laos and Cambodia was limited to the eastern edge of those nations, where the NVA camps and depots were located and where the Ho Chi Minh Trail passed through those nations. Laos did not “end up looking like the surface of the moon.” That is sheer fantasy.

Second, the fact that some college students got so upset over Nixon’s justified and badly needed incursions into Laos and Cambodia only proves that they were terribly misguided and duped into siding with North Vietnam. If they had had a grip on reality and a sound concept of right and wrong, they would have been cheering those incursions and grateful that the incursions did great damage to the NVA’s forces and weapons supplies.

Why didn’t those students protest when North Vietnam began violating the Paris Peace Accords, or when North Vietnam launched its full-scale invasion of South Vietnam in December 1974, or when North Vietnam imposed a reign of terror on the South Vietnamese after Saigon fell, a terror that included the execution of at least 60,000 people, the sending of at least 1 million people to brutal detention camps (where a bare minimum of 5,000 more people died), and the flight of at least another 1 million people from the country? Why didn’t those students feel any “moral outrage” over those evil actions and crimes?

8. Finally, you bring up the old MSM shibboleth about JFK's public statements vs the internal record and what he said privately. . . . [SNIP]

It’s not a shibboleth. Your argument is based on your acceptance of the debatable claim that JFK said one thing in private but something totally different in public on this issue. The point that I have made, and made with evidence, and the point that so many scholars have made, is that there really was no difference between what JFK said in private and what he said in public on this matter, that his own brother and several other members of his administration said that he indicated to them that he was not going to completely withdraw from South Vietnam and certainly had no intention of abandoning South Vietnam.

As per Selverstone, send me his book. Will probably review it.

Uh, you can buy his book and review it. You could start by viewing his 2016 video on JFK’s withdrawal plans.

2 hours ago, Miles Massicotte said:

Michael, I have been reading your arguments very carefully. Are you implying that countries such as the United States have a duty to intervene militarily in countries it deems communist tyrannies?

(This is putting aside the arguments specifically about North Vietnam; I'm trying to see where you come from on a foreign policy standpoint).

Miles,

Generally speaking, no, I don't believe we have a duty to militarily intervene in countries with brutal, repressive regimes, whether they be communist or non-communist.

Of course, in the case of South Vietnam, we intervened to prevent South Vietnam from being conquered by North Vietnam. We were not trying to take over North Vietnam but were trying to force North Vietnam to stop attacking South Vietnam. 

South Vietnam was not a model democratic nation, but it was far less oppressive and much freer than North Vietnam. The people in South Vietnam enjoyed many more freedoms than did the people in North Vietnam. Similarly, during the Korean War and for many years afterward, South Korea was hardly an exemplary democratic nation, but it was far better than North Korea.

What is so tragic and shameful about the conduct of the majority party in Congress after the Paris Peace Accords is that the 1972 Easter Offensive proved beyond any doubt that South Vietnam could defend itself without American ground troops as long as we provided air support and adequate military supplies. In fact, in his book Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-1975, military historian George Veith makes a good case that South Vietnam could have defended itself without American air power but just with sufficient military supplies and financial aid.

What is especially tragic and shameful about Congress's betrayal of South Vietnam is that we know from North Vietnamese sources that Hanoi's leaders would not have launched another invasion after the Paris Peace Accords if we had made it clear that we would respond with vigorous air attacks if North Vietnam invaded again. 

We know from North Vietnamese sources that Hanoi's leaders, both civilian and military, were literally terrified of American air power after the American air raids during the 1972 Easter Offensive and especially after the Operation Linebacker II air raids on North Vietnam in December 1972. 

15 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

Now, I could go on in this manner.  I once did so and came up with about 18 credible witnesses. Above I have listed and described 11 of them.

My point is: why ignore them?  Why dump them all out and say they do not matter? Along with say Max Taylor who said Kennedy was never committing combat troops to Vietnam.  Or McGeorge Bundy who said the same thing to Gordon Goldstein his biographer. Or also ignore McNamara's debriefing, which Oliver Stone used in the long version of his film. Where he said Kennedy and he had decided to leave and it did not matter if we were losing or winning. Because America could not fight the war for the ARVN.  

Why ignore all of this and say: only Bobby Kennedy matters.   When, in fact, Bobby Kennedy, on at least two occasions, later contradicted what he said?

This is not scholarship.  It is cherry picking I believe.  What Kennedy was going to do is what Nixon eventually did do.  Except Kennedy was going to save about 5.8 million lives and seven million tons of bombing. Plus the nutty invasions of Laos and Cambodia.

Why we, and he, should be made to feel ashamed of that is really beyond me.

A few points in reply:

-- Apparently you still have not viewed the video of Dr. Selverstone's 2016 interview on JFK's Vietnam policy, which I've linked in a previous reply.

-- You, once again, for about the umpteenth time, make the false assumption that withdrawing American troops also meant totally abandoning South Vietnam. This erroneous assumption is not only clearly contradicted in NSAM 263 and in other 1963 documents, it is also refuted by Bobby's April 1964 insistence that JFK was determined to keep South Vietnam free, that JFK was going to continue to aid South Vietnam, and that JFK was willing to carry out air strikes to help defend South Vietnam. 

-- Bobby never retracted or contradicted the above statements, and he never said JFK was going to completely disengage from South Vietnam, not even after he turned strongly against LBJ's handling of the war. What Bobby did later say was that JFK was determined to avoid sending regular combat troops to South Vietnam, which does not contradict anything he said in his 1964 oral interview.

-- The hearsay statements that you quote about JFK saying he was going to withdraw all American troops from South Vietnam after the 1965 election were made many years later. Bobby's statements were made in April 1964 and are supported by every 1963 document that we have. Bobby's statements also agree with everything that JFK himself said on the subject in TV interviews and speeches in 1963.

-- Speaking of which, I notice that you said nothing, not one word, about JFK's many 1963 statements, many of which I've quoted, about his determination to help South Vietnam resist communist aggression. You keep ignoring them.

-- Not one of the later hearsay statements that you quote actually says that JFK was not going to continue to provide aid to South Vietnam. They all claim that he said he would bring all U.S. troops home after the election, but they do not quote him as saying that he was going to cut off all aid to South Vietnam or that he would not provide air support. This is another key point that you keep ignoring. 

-- Bobby's April 1964 oral history interview is not the only evidence against the later claims made by Powers, O'Donnell, Mansfield, etc. Sorenson's and Schlesinger's 1965 memoirs likewise contradict those claims. Even when Schlesinger reviewed Newman's 1992 book JFK and Vietnam, he did not claim that JFK intended to completely disengage from South Vietnam, and I would note that Schlesinger's review was mostly positive.

-- After the movie JFK was released, Kennedy's former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, adamantly insisted that JFK had no plans for a complete withdrawal. JFK administration officials Walt Rostow and William Bundy said the same thing (Fred Logevall, Choosing War, 1999, pp. 69-72). Logevall also notes the fact that JFK rejected French proposals for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam (pp. 72-74).

-- You keep quoting this or that official that the war was unwinnable, but you keep ignoring the evidence I've presented that the war was entirely winnable. And I would note that the evidence I've presented is only a rather small part of the evidence that could be presented. You have yet to explain how anyone can rationally claim that the war was unwinnable when our military was forced to operate under suicidal, absurd restrictions for all but a few weeks of the war, and given the fact that we brought North Vietnam to the verge of collapse by lifting most of those restrictions for less than two weeks in 1972. One of the most thorough refutations of the "unwinnable" myth is Dr. Dale Walton's book The Myth of Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam. If you ever do decide to read or view anything that challenges your version of the war, I would recommend that you start with Walton's book.

-- The "nutty invasions of Laos and Cambodia"??? What on earth was "nutty" about them? We know from North Vietnamese sources that those invasions were badly needed and did enormous damage to North Vietnamese military operations. The incursions into Laos and Cambodia followed universally recognized, long-established military doctrine. The NVA had huge supply depots and bases in eastern Laos and Cambodia. Attacking those depots and bases was an entirely rational, sensible action--and it was an action that should have been done years earlier.

-- "Except Kennedy was going to save about 5.8 million lives and seven million tons of bombing." In making this surreal argument, you once again sweep aside huge chunks of inconvenient history that you don't like. You keep ignoring the fact that there would have been no war if North Vietnam had not repeatedly invaded South Vietnam. It almost seems like you think that communist tyranny is a good thing or at least not a very bad thing. 

You repeat debunked communist-inspired lies and exaggerations about American military war crimes in Vietnam, yet you steadfastly ignore the documented, widespread NVA and VC war crimes. You also keep ignoring the murderous, brutal nature of the North Vietnamese regime, dating back to when Ho Chi Minh carried out large-scale bloody purges and oppression to maintain his power in the North. And you keep downplaying the horrible brutality that the NVA imposed on the South Vietnamese after Saigon fell. It almost seems like you think that South Vietnam was better off under communist rule.

You keep bringing up the fact that Diem refused to take part in a national election in 1956, even though JFK himself opposed holding that election, and you say nothing about the fact that when President Thieu three times called for a national election in 1973, North Vietnam refused. Hanoi's leaders were well aware that by 1973, the brutal, vicious nature of communist rule was much more obvious than it was in 1956.

Finally, you've repeatedly claimed that the U.S. violated the Geneva Accords, even though the U.S. was not a signatory to those accords--nor was South Vietnam, and you keep ignoring the fact that North Vietnam flagrantly violated the accords. 

20 hours ago, Kirk Gallaway said:

Michael, It's not clear to me

You think JFK was assassinated as result of a conspiracy

You believe there was and is? a deep state?

But you don't think JFK's foreign policy including Vietnam was really a departure from the established MIC direction.

Why was JFK assassinated?

So you think that the only reason JFK was killed was Vietnam??? I think the evidence clearly indicates that the plotters had a number of motives for wanting Kennedy dead: the Bay of Pigs, JFK’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, JFK’s willingness to let developing nations control/seize/limit U.S. corporate property and operations within their borders, JFK’s ongoing effort to neuter the CIA, JFK’s firing of Dulles and Lemnitzer, JFK’s move to strip the Federal Reserve of its control over our currency and to return that function to the Treasury Department, and JFK’s war on the Mafia. I’m not even sure that Vietnam was one of the plotters’ top three motives.

If Vietnam was one of the plotters’ motives, it was because they knew that JFK was strongly against a large-scale Korea-like intervention in Vietnam. However, even this theory can be credibly challenged. Why? Because Eisenhower was also doggedly against any sizable intervention in Vietnam and because Eisenhower squandered a golden opportunity to wipe out the vast majority of Ho Chi Minh’s forces when he refused to authorize bombing raids at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Ho Chi Minh committed virtually the entire Vietminh army to take Dien Bien Phu. U.S. air raids on Dien Bien Phu could have wiped out most of the Vietminh army and crushed Ho’s chances of winning the war for many years to come, if not permanently. Yet, Eisenhower wasn’t assassinated but stayed in office for seven more years.

Nevertheless, I do believe that some of the plotters were indeed deeply angered by JFK’s determined opposition to deploying regular combat troops in Vietnam. I would bet a good chunk of money that JFK never, ever would have agreed to the kind of massive intervention that LBJ authorized. I think the evidence indicates that JFK would have provided South Vietnam with ample weapons, supplies, and financial aid, and I think he would have authorized air raids to defend South Vietnam, but I don’t think he would have gone very far beyond those measures.

Also, even if JFK had eventually determined that he needed to authorize a sizable deployment of regular combat troops (and remember that RFK indicated that this was not totally off the table), I have to believe that JFK would not have made the catastrophic blunder of choosing General Westmoreland to command our forces in South Vietnam.

LBJ made a horrendous mistake when he chose Westmoreland. What is especially baffling about the selection is that the Pentagon submitted four candidates for the job, including General Abrams, who had far better credentials than Westmoreland. Yet, somehow, someway, LBJ chose the blockheaded Westmoreland, who had no command combat experience above the brigade level and had little formal training in strategy and tactics.

To give you some idea of how incompetent Westmoreland was, shortly before the battle of Khe Sanh heated up, he asked an aide to study how the French had lost at Dien Bien Phu and to report back to him! Holy cow! The guy chosen to command U.S. forces in South Vietnam did not know how the French had lost at Dien Bien Phu?!

Yes, Westmoreland did make a few smart moves in South Vietnam, but he made many more inexcusably bad ones. He practically ignored the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) and showed little interest in pacification. In contrast, when General Abrams took over in mid-1968, he immediately made training and equipping ARVN a top priority and abandoned Westmoreland’s attrition strategy in favor of pacification.

4 hours ago, Robbie Robertson said:

Lol hey I just posted this

 

Out Of The Blank #1211 - Greg Poulgrain
https://youtu.be/imY8QvGQ2a4

 

Great minds think alike!

4 hours ago, Pete Mellor said:

Great book Michael.  I first came across Poulgrain's work some years back when a friend sent me 'The Incubus of Intervention: Conflicting Indonesia Strategies of John F. Kennedy and Allen Dulles'. Published in 2015.   I read it and wanted my own copy, unfortunately the price on Amazon was in the hundreds of £'s!!

Thankfully Mr Poulgrain wrote 'JFK vs Allen Dulles' which is an updated 'Incubus' which I had to snap up.  Everybody interested in JFK's assassination MUST get this book, it is essential reading.

Poulgrain also published 'The Genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia' in 2014.

Jim DiEugenio has reviewed this work here=Review of Greg Poulgrain’s JFK vs Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia (kennedysandking.com)

It's a great read. Fascinating. Very important research. 

A few weeks ago, I stumbled across a fascinating recent book titled JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia (Skyhorse Publishing, 2020), written by Greg Poulgrain. The book documents another motive that Dulles had for wanting JFK out of the way. This is from the publisher's summary of the book:

In 1936, an Allen Dulles-established company discovered the world's largest gold deposit in remote Netherlands New Guinea. In 1962, President Kennedy intervened, and Netherlands New Guinea was added to President Sukarno's Indonesia. Neither Sukarno nor JFK was aware of the gold, since Dulles had not informed Kennedy. Dulles planned a complicated and ruthless CIA regime-change strategy to seize control not only of Indonesia itself, but also of its vast resources, including the gold. This strategy included a push to start Malaysian Confrontation. Yet Kennedy's plan to visit Jakarta in early 1964 would have sunk Dulles' master plan, which included the destruction of the Indonesian communist party as a wedge to split Moscow and Beijing. Only an assassin's bullet put an end to Kennedy’s plan of peace. Did Allen Dulles arrange for JFK to be killed to save his plan and his gold? Was his coup for gold successful with JFK out of the picture?

Using archival records as a basis, Greg Poulgrain adds word-of-mouth evidence from those people who were directly involved - such as Dean Rusk and others who worked with President Kennedy and Allen Dulles at the time; or the person who was with Michael Rockefeller when he mysteriously disappeared in West New Guinea during this whole affair.

In previous replies, I’ve mentioned some of the evidence that has emerged from North Vietnamese sources. I’ve also mentioned that liberal scholars on the Vietnam War ignore this evidence because it has proved highly embarrassing and problematic for the liberal version of the war. In contrast, conservative scholars on the war, including Mark Moyar, George Veith, Geoffrey Shaw, and Dale Walton, have made extensive use of this important evidence. Let us take a closer look at what this evidence has revealed. 

First off, where does this evidence come from? Some of it comes from the numerous volumes of internal North Vietnamese government documents that the government of Vietnam released in 2005 to mark the 30th anniversary of the communist victory. These documents include memos between the leaders in Hanoi and North Vietnamese army (NVA) commanders. Another part of this evidence comes from memoirs written by North Vietnamese civilian officials, NVA officers, and Vietcong (VC) officers and officials. Many of these memoirs were not available in English until the 1990s and early 2000s. 

Here is some of what we have learned from North Vietnamese sources: 

-- Hanoi’s leaders were pleasantly surprised that the American anti-war movement and news media would uncritically repeat communist propaganda, such as North Vietnam’s false claims that the Thieu government was holding 200,000 political prisoners and that the South Vietnamese army (ARVN—read as “Ar-vin”) was engaging in widespread abuse of NVA and VC POWs. 

-- When President Thieu released 37,000 NVA/VC POWs, they were generally healthy, unlike most of the ARVN POWs who were released by the NVA. In fact, the NVA/VC POWs were in such good condition that the NVA quickly put them back into active service. 

-- The Hanoi regime did all they could to covertly support and encourage the American and European anti-war movements. (We know from released Soviet records and disclosures that the KGB did the same thing.) 

-- Hanoi’s leaders viewed Ngo Dinh Diem as a mortal enemy because he enjoyed considerable support from the general public in the South and because even a sizable portion of the North’s general public viewed him favorably. 

-- North Vietnamese agents infiltrated the Buddhist community in South Vietnam and led some Buddhists to engage in agitation against the Diem government. The Buddhists who burned themselves alive in public did so at the behest of communist agents in an effort to damage Diem’s credibility. 

-- Hanoi believed it was important to infiltrate the Buddhist community in the South because Diem was actually reaching out to Buddhists and was even allocating funds to rebuild Buddhist places of worship. 

-- North Vietnamese agents regularly fed propaganda stories to American journalists in Saigon, including Neil Sheehan and David Halberstam, and those journalists usually repeated them (they didn’t realize that their sources were communist agents). Some of those false stories involved the treatment of the Buddhists, the nature of the Buddhist protest movement, ARVN, and South Vietnam’s government. 

-- None other than General Giap himself opposed the 1968 Tet Offensive and the 1972 Spring Offensive (aka the Easter Offensive). He opposed both offensives because he felt it was a grave mistake to engage the Americans in a large set-piece battle. 

-- Hanoi’s leaders were astounded that the American news media was describing the Tet Offensive as an American defeat. After the catastrophic losses that the NVA and the VC suffered during Tet, Hanoi’s leaders admitted among themselves that the offensive had been a military disaster, but they were greatly encouraged by the American news media’s coverage of the offensive and by the impact that this coverage had in the U.S. 

-- Hanoi’s leaders were shocked and dismayed when most South Vietnamese stood by the Saigon government and refused to support the communists during the Tet Offensive, especially during the initial phase of the offensive when the communists were able to capture a number of cities. Hanoi’s leaders had truly believed that most of South Vietnam’s population would rise up in revolt against Saigon once the NVA and the VC launched the Tet Offensive. 

-- The NVA hoped to capture the American base at Khe Sanh. They hoped that the fall of Khe Sanh would have the same devastating impact on the American government that the fall of Dien Bien Phu had had on the French government. (As it turned out, Giap’s forces at Khe Sanh suffered severe losses, were never able to shut down the airfield, were never able to take any of the high ground around the base, were chronically low on food because most of their supply lines were cut, and were forced to flee in desperation by the surprise American counterattack.) 

-- Hanoi’s leaders were puzzled and pleasantly surprised by the Johnson administration’s halting “gradual escalation” bombing strategy. This strategy (which even the level-headed and temperate Colin Powell later called “a disaster”) left numerous crucial targets and entire areas untouched, literally untouched. Hanoi’s leaders were downright puzzled by the strategy. They were only too happy to take full advantage of the strategy by placing airfields, weapons depots, and bases in the areas that they quickly realized were “prohibited areas” for American air raids. 

-- The VC were entirely controlled by the NVA. COSVN was nothing more than an extension of the NVA command structure. 

-- The Hanoi regime hoped that George McGovern would win the 1972 presidential election. 

-- The Hanoi regime wanted a coalition government because they intended to use it to take full control and planned on destroying the coalition government once they had seized power in the South. (Similarly, after Saigon fell, the Hanoi regime broke its repeated promises to the NLF and the PRG about power-sharing and imposed communist rule on the South led by North Vietnamese communists.) 

-- Although Hanoi’s propaganda machine portrayed ARVN as an inept, unwilling army of stooges, the NVA knew that, on balance, ARVN was actually a formidable fighting force. 

-- Soviet and Chinese military aid, especially Soviet aid, was absolutely crucial. Without that aid, North Vietnam would not and could not have won. 

-- The NVA suffered such heavy losses in manpower, armor, and artillery during the 1972 Spring Offensive that massive Soviet military aid was required before the NVA could launch another large-scale operation. 

-- The December 1972 Operation Linebacker II air raids “overwhelmed” Hanoi’s air defenses. The damage and losses that the North Vietnamese were suffering from Linebacker II were “unsustainable.” During periods of the operation, the NVA actually ran out of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). (Without SAMs, Hanoi was defenseless against B-52 attacks. B-52s flew too high to be hit by anti-aircraft guns. The only way to shoot down B-52s was with SAMs.) Linebacker II caused panic and desperation among Hanoi’s leaders, which is why they were so worried about the return of American air power after the Paris Peace Accords. 

-- Hanoi’s leaders decided they could safely brazenly violate the Paris Peace Accords once they realized that the U.S. Congress would not allow Nixon/Ford to intervene to defend South Vietnam. However, before they came to this realization, given the devastating effects of the Operation Linebacker II bombing raids, Hanoi’s leaders were deathly afraid of doing anything that would provoke the U.S. to carry out more air raids like Linebacker II. 

-- After the NVA conquered South Vietnam, the communists imposed a reign of terror on the South Vietnamese that included executing tens of thousands of “traitors” and “collaborators” and sending 1-2 million people to brutal “reeducation” camps. 

-- Ho Chi Minh had no intention of abiding by the Geneva Accords and began violating them soon after they were signed. He viewed the accords as a temporary necessity forced on him by the Soviets and the Chinese and as a step toward imposing communist rule on South Vietnam. 

-- Ho Chi Minh was an ardent, hardcore communist and a long-time tool of the Soviet government. His early overtures to the U.S. during and right after WW II were deception operations designed to buy time. He had no intention of ever being a U.S. ally. He deeply admired the Soviet Union and later Maoist China and firmly intended to remain in the communist orbit. Ho was trained in the Soviet Union. The Soviets tasked Ho in 1924 to organize Vietnamese emigrants and other Asians in Canton into revolutionaries. In 1939, the Soviets sent Ho to Hong Kong to combine two factions of Vietnamese communists into a single group. 

-- Shortly before the battle of Dien Bien Phu, Ho Chi Minh told the Chinese government that the Vietminh cause was hopeless without large-scale Chinese intervention.

Well, here goes: On the off chance that anyone wants to read some conservative articles about the January 6 riot and the January 6 committee, see below. These articles debunk the major myths that most news outlets have been repeating about the riot and the committee--I've seen the same myths repeated several times in this thread and in others.

https://spectator.org/jan-6-seven-democrat-lies/

https://imprimis.hillsdale.edu/january-6-insurrection-hoax/

https://100percentfedup.com/the-six-biggest-lies-about-january-6th/

https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-truth-happened-jan-6-unknown

https://www.nationandstate.com/2022/08/08/sperry-lies-damned-lies-the-january-6-committee/

When it comes to the JFK case, I simply do not care what someone thinks about the 1/6 issue. I see no point is discussing the issue in a JFK forum, (1) because it has nothing to do with the case, and (2) because people who are interested in the JFK case do not all hold the same views on the 1/6 matter. 

I learned long ago that very intelligent persons can be severely wrong on one issue but rock solid on another issue. Sometimes it boils down to a matter of interpretation, to the fact that individuals can interpret the same body of facts very differently. 

I can agree to disagree with someone on non-JFK-related issues and still value their views on the JFK case. For example, I think Mark Lane's book on the Vietnam War is total garbage (even the very anti-war Neil Sheehan savaged the book in the New York Times Book Review). But, I think Lane did outstanding work on the JFK case. I think the interviews he did for his 1967 documentary were historic and crucial; in fact, I include a link to the documentary on my JFK site. Yet, I would not touch his Vietnam War stuff with a 10-foot poll.

The three books that changed my mind and opened my eyes about an MK-ULTRA role in the JFK and RFK cases are Lisa Pease's 2018 book A Lie Too Big Too Fail: The Real History of the Assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, Tim Tate and Brad Johnson's 2020 book The Assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, and Patrick Nolan's 2013 book CIA Rogues and the Killing of the Kennedys.

21 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

But since Diem was a Catholic, and there was a period of free flow in Vietnam before the scheduled elections, Lansdale created a huge operation in which he used black propaganda techniques to get about a million Catholics to go south to help prop up Diem.  Buckley used to use this to say: well see the refugees went south.  Leaving out the fact that Lansdale had used terror and death threats to get them to flee, since there were so few Catholics in the south for Diem to lead. 

So Lansdale's "black propaganda" was the reason that some 3 million North Vietnamese tried to flee to the South, not the thousands of executions, the jailing of dissidents, and the repression of basic rights carried out by Ho's brutal regime??? And how do you explain the fact that so few people in the South moved to the North?

And how do you explain the fact that during the Tet Offensive, contrary to what the communists believed would happen, the vast majority of the South Vietnamese people did not side with the communists but remained loyal to South Vietnam's government? (Some NVA and VC soldiers were so infuriated by this that they took out their anger on South Vietnamese civilians, e.g., the massacre at Hue.)

Speaking of that "period of free flow," which was mandated by the Geneva Accords, apparently none of the sources you’ve read mentioned that the Vietminh openly and severely violated this provision of the accords. The Vietminh prevented as many as 2 million North Vietnamese from moving to South Vietnam (Robert F. Turner, Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development. Hoover Institution Publications. 1975, pp. 100–105; Ronald Frankum, Operation Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954–55, Texas Tech University Press, 2007, pp. 158-167). 

The communists used a variety of methods to try to prevent people from going south. They prohibited water traffic in key areas of the Red River Delta to prevent people from getting to the port of Haiphong. This forced many refugees to flee to the nearest unguarded coastal point, where they would wait for emigrant ships heading south. However, the Vietminh put mortars at some of these points to prevent refugees from boarding those ships. 

The communists sent battalion- and brigade-sized forces into rural areas to intercept groups of refugees, beating and even killing some of them to force them to turn around. They did this because the French and the Americans controlled the larger cities, including Haiphong, but had no presence in rural areas. The Vietminh attacked units of the anti-communist Vietnamese National Army to prevent them from helping refugees who were trying to go south. 

One last thing: Regarding the “decent interval” argument, here, too, liberals have distorted, or perhaps in some cases honestly misread, the evidence. Historian Larry Berman, whom no one would accuse of being a Nixon admirer, wrote an entire book on this subject: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (Free Press, 2001). Using previously unavailable/classified sources, Berman shows that Nixon intended to use the Paris Peace Accords as a justification for resuming air attacks if North Vietnam launched another invasion. Nixon had no intention of allowing South Vietnam to collapse after a “decent interval.” 

Nixon did say privately that he believed South Vietnam would only survive for a year or two after the Paris Peace Accords, if they received no assistance. This is the context that most liberal scholars ignore. He was not predicting South Vietnam’s collapse. He was saying that if the communists invaded again, and if South Vietnam received no assistance, South Vietnam would collapse in a year or two. But, again, as Berman shows, Nixon had no intention of allowing that to happen. Says Berman, 

The record shows that the United States expected that the signed treaty would be immediately violated and that this would trigger a brutal military response. Permanent war (air war, not ground operations) at acceptable cost was what Nixon and Kissinger anticipated from the so-called peace agreement. They believed that the only way the American public would accept it was if there was a signed agreement. . . . Just as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution provided a pretext for an American engagement in South Vietnam, the Paris Accords were intended to fulfill a similar role for remaining permanently engaged in Vietnam. Watergate derailed that plan. (p. 9)

Berman harshly condemns Nixon for his plan, even calling it a betrayal, but I do not. Nixon hoped that if North Vietnam violated the Peace Accords by launching another invasion, Congressional Democrats—and perhaps even the news media and the anti-war movement—would support renewed air attacks and supply operations to help South Vietnam as long as no ground troops were used.

Nixon never would have felt compelled to resort to such a stratagem if Congressional Democrats, the news media, and the anti-war movement had not smeared the war effort, whitewashed North Vietnam, and demonized South Vietnam. Nixon’s opponents seemed determined to let South Vietnam fall to communist tyranny. They parroted communist talking points and screamed bloody murder every time Nixon took rational steps to win the war. Every stray American bomb or shell was a war crime, but communist atrocities went unreported.

And let us remember that Nixon lobbied furiously against the Case-Church Amendment, correctly noting that it would give North Vietnam a green light to invade South Vietnam again.

3 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

Now Mike is saying that VIetnam was really not one country?

This is one of the things that Draper went after Podhoretz about.  

The USA had created a civil war by taking over for the French and Bao Dai in the British occupied zone.  And they were now going to prop up Diem and have him, with Lansdale's encouragement: 1.). Vote out Bao Dai by not letting him run a campaign, and 2.) Diem would refuse to participate in the national elections.

By accomplishing these two objectives, South Vietnam became a creation of the USA. And the reason it was created was simple: Ike knew that Ho Chi Minh would win any national election. (I should add, the French commander there, Ely, was another voice who had  strong reservations about America coming in to essentially occupy Vietnam. That now makes three: Ely, Heath and Wilson.)

But since DIem was a Catholic, and there was a period of free flow in Vietnam before the scheduled elections, Lansdale created a huge operation in which he used black propaganda techniques to get about a million Catholics to go south to help prop up DIem.  Buckley used to use this to say: well see the refugees went south.  Leaving out the fact that Lansdale had used terror and death threats to get them to flee, since there were so few Catholics in the south for DIem to lead. 

BTW, even after this operation, the population in South Vietnam was 70 % Buddhist.

You still haven't bothered to watch any of the videos I've linked, including the Buckley-Vaughn debate where this issue came up, have you? You just keep repeating these very old left-wing/communist talking points. If you could gather up the courage and objectivity to examine the other side of the story, you would realize how soundly these talking points have been refuted.

Now, as you can confirm by reading any serious study of Vietnamese history, from the early 16th century to the early 19th century, there was no nation of Vietnam but two, three, or more ruling entities that controlled various regions. For about 70 years of that period, there were two nations, one in the north and the other in the south. The southern Vietnamese nation was the Le dynasty. The northern Vietnamese nation was the Mac dynasty. For long stretches of Vietnamese history, there were three ruling entities, one in the north, another in the central region, and another in the south. 

When Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the founding of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" in 1945, at best he had tenuous control over 2/3 of the country. In the National Assembly election of 1946, the Vietminh lost in the southern third of the country, and it was clear that many Vietnamese in the central and northern regions did not support Ho's government either.

Certainly, most Vietnamese wanted a unified, single nation, but only if the rights of the two major regions would be respected and only if both regions had a fair voice and influence in the government. 

For heaven's sake, at least go read Tang's memoir A Vietcong Memoir. I provided a summary of his memoir in a previous reply. Tang was a dedicated and high-ranking Vietcong and the minister of justice in the PRG. He also strongly believed in socialism at the time. Go read his book and you'll find ample evidence of the fact that Vietnamese in the South felt a strong bond and identity with their region and considered themselves "southerners," while at the same time they were willing to support a unified Vietnam that justly represented all Vietnamese.

On 9/5/2022 at 4:39 PM, Joseph McBride said:

Someone who tries to overthrow the government

and kill the vice-president and the speaker of the House

while attacking the Congress while it is in session

to determine the outcome of a presidential election is not a conservative.

Sigh. . . .  Just sigh. . . .  I'm sorry, but that is downright crazy talk. That is not what happened. I utterly and totally condemn the riot, but to describe it the way you do is erroneous, harmful, and hyper-partisan. 

And what in the world does any of this have to do with the JFK assassination? 

37 minutes ago, Douglas Caddy said:

Michael: You joined the forum on July 25 of this year. You have made 141 posts. You have been awarded zero status to date.

I joined the forum on Jan. 9, 2006 -- 16 years ago. I have made 8770 posts and have Mentor Status.

I have spoken at the annual JFK Assassination Conferences held in November in Dallas.

So here you arrive in the forum less than two months ago and you are already casting negative information. Your action speaks volume.

Well, I can just tell you, as someone who has been active in JFK assassination research for 30 years, that it makes the case for conspiracy look nutty to the average person when they see the claim that JFK was killed because he was going to expose the existence of UFOs.

Yes, I am relatively new to this forum, but I've been discussing the JFK case online since the early 1990s, starting in the old CompuServe JFK assassination forum. I've also written two books on the case and have maintained a popular website on the case for many years. In the 1990s, I was interviewed about the JFK case on BBC Canada Radio, and I have taught classes on the case. I mention these things just to show that I have some credentials myself. 

On 9/2/2022 at 5:30 PM, Michael Griffith said:

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that Tang was a genuinely moderate member of the National Liberation Front (NFL) and of the PRG. He admired Marx and Lenin, but he was not a hardcore communist. He believed Hanoi’s promises that under communist rule, the southern part of Vietnam would be allowed to form its own regional government that would be part of a national unity government, and that the southern region would have a genuine voice and influence on national policy. It is surprising how many times in his book Tang tacitly and overtly acknowledges that there were significant long-standing differences between northern Vietnam and southern Vietnam. 

This is an important point that I didn't fully develop because the reply was already rather long. One of the North Vietnamese/Communist Bloc talking points was that South Vietnam was an illegitimate artificial state created out of nothing at the insistence of Western powers, that the division of Vietnam into North and South was a baseless action done because of Western pressure. In point of fact, there were numerous well-known and important differences between the northern and southern regions of Vietnam that had existed long before the 1950s. As Tang's memoir reveals repeatedly, Vietnamese who lived in the southern region felt a strong bond with their region and as "southerners." 

When William F. Buckley ran circles around actor Robert Vaughn in their televised Vietnam War debate in 1967, this was one of the numerous communist talking points that Vaughn repeated. That debate is worth watching. Click here to watch it.

Another video worth watching is Dr. Andrew Wiest's 2010 lecture "Vietnam's Forgotten Army," which summarizes his 2009 book Vietnam's Forgotten Army. Anyone who holds the mistaken belief that South Vietnam's army (ARVN) was an unwilling, incompetent force should watch this video. Dr. Wiest destroys this myth, and in the process gives an informative overview of the Vietnam War as a whole. Among other things, he discusses the Tet Offensive, the origins of ARVN, ARVN's actual combat record (not the erroneous one falsified by liberal authors), the Vietcong, Hamburger Hill, and whether or not the war was winnable. Click here to watch it.

On 9/10/2022 at 2:44 PM, Douglas Caddy said:

Note the date.

National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 271, Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space Matters | JFK Library

I think the suggestion that JFK was killed to prevent him from ending the UFO cover-up strikes most people as wild speculation and tends to discredit the research community. I think E. Howard Hunt was spreading disinformation to do just that. Of all the motives that have been suggested for the plotters, I think this one is the least plausible and the most damaging.

Belief in the existence of UFOs was already widespread in America and Europe in 1963. It's hard to fathom why any of JFK's enemies would have plotted to kill him to keep him from confirming the existence of UFOs, even if that confirmation included admitting the facts about the Roswell incident. I just don't see it. And other than E. Howard Hunt's alleged comment, there's no evidence for it.