Steven Gaal Posted June 5, 2011 Author Share Posted June 5, 2011 (edited) The above has nothing to do with your previous post and did not produce any above Frasca was involved. as for the Phoenix memo, the student the agent was suspicious about was not linked to AQ. I will go into more depth in my next post on this thread. #######################oooooooo#######################ooooooooo ))))))))))))00000000))))))))))))))))))))00000000))))))))))))))) SAY what BRO ????? SAY WHAT ??? COLBY KING OF THE NIT-PIC DISTRACTION,its almost as if he is part "OF" a coverup. COLBY SEEMS to work 24/7 on these disinformative to understanding posts,WHY ??? .... NOW !!!! ++ MEMO IN QUESTION ++ It is subtitled: “Osama bin Laden and Al-Muhjiroun supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in Arizona.” [Fortune, 5/22/2002; Arizona Republic, 7/24/2003] from Historycommons website 911 timeline -------------------------------------oooo-----------------------------oooo----- July 10, 2001: FBI Agent Sends Memo Warning that Unusual Number of Muslim Extremists Are Learning to Fly in Arizona FBI agent Ken Williams. [source: FBI]Phoenix, Arizona, FBI agent Ken Williams sends a memorandum warning about suspicious activities involving a group of Middle Eastern men taking flight training lessons in Arizona. The memo is titled: “Zakaria Mustapha Soubra; IT-OTHER (Islamic Army of the Caucasus),” because it focuses on Zakaria Soubra, a Lebanese flight student in Prescott, Arizona, and his connection with a terror group in Chechnya that has ties to al-Qaeda. It is subtitled: “Osama bin Laden and Al-Muhjiroun supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in Arizona.” [Fortune, 5/22/2002; Arizona Republic, 7/24/2003] Williams’ memo is based on an investigation of Sorba that Williams had begun in 2000 (see April 2000), but he had trouble pursuing because of the low priority the Arizona FBI office gave terror investigations (see April 2000-June 2001). Additionally, Williams had been alerted to suspicions about radical militants and aircraft at least three other times (see October 1996; 1998; November 1999-August 2001). In the memo, Williams does the following: Names nine other suspect students from Pakistan, India, Kenya, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] Hijacker Hani Hanjour, attending flight school in Arizona in early 2001 and probably continuing into the summer of 2001 (see Summer 2001), is not one of the students, but, as explained below, it seems two of the students know him. [uS Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ; Washington Post, 7/25/2003] Notes that he interviewed some of these students, and heard some of them make hostile comments about the US. Additionally, he noticed that they were suspiciously well informed about security measures at US airports. [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] Notes an increasing, “inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest” taking flight lessons in Arizona. [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] Suspects that some of the ten people he has investigated are connected to al-Qaeda. [uS Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] One person on the list, Ghassan al Sharbi, will be arrested in Pakistan in March 2002 with al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002). Al Sharbi attended a flight school in Prescott, Arizona. He also apparently attended the training camps in Afghanistan and swore loyalty to bin Laden in the summer of 2001. He apparently knows Hani Hanjour in Arizona (see October 1996-Late April 1999). He also is the roommate of Soubra, the main target of the memo. [Los Angeles Times, 1/24/2003; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 521] Discovers that one of them was communicating through an intermediary with Abu Zubaida. This apparently is a reference to Hamed al Sulami, who had been telephoning a Saudi imam known to be Zubaida’s spiritual advisor. Al Sulami is an acquaintance of Hanjour in Arizona (see October 1996-Late April 1999). [Mercury News (San Jose), 5/23/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 520-521, 529] Discusses connections between several of the students and a radical group called Al-Muhajiroun. [Mercury News (San Jose), 5/23/2002] This group supported bin Laden, and issued a fatwa, or call to arms, that included airports on a list of acceptable terror targets. [Associated Press, 5/22/2002] Soubra, the main focus of the memo, is a member of Al-Muhajiroun and an outspoken radical. He met with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed, the leader of Al-Muhajiroun in Britain, and started an Arizona chapter of the organization. After 9/11, some US officials will suspect that Soubra has ties to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. He will be held two years, then deported to Lebanon in 2004. [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/2001; Los Angeles Times, 1/24/2003; Arizona Republic, 5/2/2004; Arizona Monthly, 11/2004] Though Williams doesn’t include it in his memo, in the summer of 1998, Bakri publicized a fax sent by bin Laden to him that listed al-Qaeda’s four objectives in fighting the US. The first objective was “bring down their airliners.” (see Summer 1998). [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/2001] Warns of a possible “effort by Osama bin Laden to send students to the US to attend civil aviation universities and colleges” [Fortune, 5/22/2002] , so they can later hijack aircraft. [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] Recommends that the “FBI should accumulate a listing of civil aviation universities and colleges around the country. FBI field offices with these types of schools in their area should establish appropriate liaison. FBI [headquarters] should discuss this matter with other elements of the US intelligence community and task the community for any information that supports Phoenix’s suspicions.” [Arizona Republic, 7/24/2003] (The FBI has already done this, but because of poor FBI communications, Williams is not aware of the report.) Recommends that the FBI ask the State Department to provide visa data on flight school students from Middle Eastern countries, which will facilitate FBI tracking efforts. [New York Times, 5/4/2002] The memo is addressed to the following FBI Agents: Dave Frasca, chief of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters; Elizabeth Harvey Matson, Mark Connor and Fred Stremmel, Intelligence Operations Specialists in the RFU; Rod Middleton, acting chief of the Usama bin Laden Unit (UBLU); Jennifer Maitner, an Intelligence Operations Specialist in the UBLU; Jack Cloonan, an agent on the New York FBI’s bin Laden unit, the I-49 squad; (see January 1996 and Spring 2000). Michael S. Butsch, an agent on another New York FBI squad dealing with other Sunni terrorists. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 7/10/2001 ; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] However, the memo is not uploaded into the FBI’s information system until the end of the month and is apparently not received by all these people (see July 27, 2001 and after). Williams also shares some concerns with the CIA (see (July 27, 2001)). [Mercury News (San Jose), 5/23/2002] One anonymous government official who has seen the memo says, “This was as actionable a memo as could have been written by anyone.” [insight, 5/27/2002] However, the memo is merely marked “routine,” rather than “urgent.” It is generally ignored, not shared with other FBI offices, and the recommendations are not taken. One colleague in New York replies at the time that the memo is “speculative and not very significant.” [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] Williams is unaware of many FBI investigations and leads that could have given weight to his memo. Authorities later claim that Williams was only pursuing a hunch, but one familiar with classified information says, “This was not a vague hunch. He was doing a case on these guys.” [Mercury News (San Jose), 5/23/2002] Entity Tags: Jennifer Maitner, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fred Stremmel, Ghassan al Sharbi, Hani Hanjour, I-49, Jack Cloonan, Elizabeth Matson, Islamic Army of the Caucasus, David Frasca, Michael Butsch, Al-Muhajiroun, Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed, Zakaria Mustapha Soubra, Al-Qaeda, Rod Middleton, Osama bin Laden, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Mark Connor, Ken Williams, Abu Zubaida ---------------------------------------------oooo-------------------------------------------oooo-----------------------------------------oooo------------------------- ++ FROM Historycommons Ghassan al Sharbi.,Ghassan al Sharbi.,Ghassan al Sharbi.,Ghassan al Sharbi.= AQ ----------------------------ooo---------------------------------------------------- Harry Ellen, a businessman who converted to Islam, has high credibility with Muslims in Arizona because of his work on behalf of the Palestinian cause. He has had important meetings with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. In 1994, he began working as an FBI informant. Ken Williams, the Phoenix FBI agent who will later write the July 2001 “Phoenix memo”(see July 10, 2001), is his handler. In October 1996, Ellen tells Williams that he has suspicions about an Algerian pilot who is training other Middle Eastern men to fly. He later recalls, “My comment to Williams was that it would be pitiful if the bad guys were able to gain this kind of access to airplanes, flight training and crop dusters. I said, ‘You really ought to look at this, it’s an interesting mix of people.’” Ellen had previously begun spying on a man known as Abu Sief, which apparently is his alias. Sief had come to Arizona from New Jersey in 1993, and bragged about having close ties with al-Qaeda figures Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman and Ramzi Yousef (when Yousef’s computer is seized in the Philippines in 1995, there is a mention of a contact in Tucson, Arizona, but it is unknown if this is a reference to Sief or someone else (see January 7-11, 1995)). Sief attended a New Jersey mosque that many of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers also attended. Ellen soon sees the unnamed Algerian pilot meeting with Abu Sief. He tells this to Williams and later will claim, “I told him to be very concerned about air schools.” However, Ellen will claim that Williams responds by telling him to “leave it alone.” So he does. Ellen later believes that Williams should have sent the gist of his Phoenix memo at this time, instead of four and a half years later. Hani Hanjour is living in Phoenix by this time and taking flight training nearby (see October 1996-Late April 1999). Ellen later will say he did not know Hanjour directly, but he knew some of his friends and relatives. Ellen and Williams will have a falling out in late 1998 on an unrelated manner, and Ellen’s flow of information will stop. [Washington Post, 5/24/2002; New York Times, 5/24/2002; Lance, 2003, pp. 211, 352-355, inset 21] Entity Tags: Ramzi Yousef, Harry Ellen, Ken Williams, Abu Sief, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Omar Abdul-Rahman -------------------------------ooo----------------------00------------------------oooo----------------------------------------------- October 1996-Late April 1999: Hani Hanjour Associates with FBI Suspects On several occasion between 1996 and 1999, future 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour attends flight schools in Arizona (see October 1996-December 1997 and 1998). The 9/11 Commission will later note, “It is clear that when Hanjour lived in Arizona in the 1990s, he associated with several individuals who have been the subject of counterterrorism investigations.” Some of the time, he is accompanied by two friends, Bandar Al Hazmi and Rayed Abdullah. Al Hazmi and Abdullah have been friends with each other in high school in Saudi Arabia, but it is not known if either knew Hanjour before moving to the US. Al Hazmi and Hanjour are roommates for a time. Al Hazmi will finish his training and leave the US for the last time in January 2000 (he apparently will be interviewed overseas in 2004). Abdullah becomes a leader of a Phoenix mosque where he reportedly gives extremist speeches. He will continue to train with Hanjour occasionally through the summer of 2001. The FBI apparently will investigate him in May 2001. He will repeatedly be questioned by authorities after 9/11, then move to Qatar. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission will report that the FBI remains suspicious of Al Hazmi and Abdullah, but neither man is charged with any crime. The 9/11 Commission will also imply that another of Hanjour’s Arizona associates is al-Qaeda operative Ghassan al Sharbi. Al Sharbi will be arrested in Pakistan in March 2002 with al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002). He apparently is a target of Ken Williams’s “Phoenix memo”(see July 10, 2001). Another associate of Hanjour’s, Hamed al Sulami, is in telephone contact with a radical Saudi imam who is said to be the spiritual advisor to al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida. This imam may have a role in recruiting some of the 9/11 hijackers. Abdulaziz Alomari, for instance, was a student of this imam. It seems that al Sulami is also a target of Williams’s memo. [Washington Post, 9/10/2002; US Congress, 9/26/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 233, 520-521, 529] ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^####################^^^^^^^^^^^^ SAY WHAT BRO ???? GOLLY I ask how high can u pile it ???? Only Colby and his PAL Frasca know for sure. PLEASE DEAR READER DONT LET COLBY FOOL YOU , for THE JULY 10 memo was a AQ MEMO .... CASE CLOSED. see below ...... #######################0000################### Not only did Dave Frasca not share the information about Moussaoui to other appropriate intelligence/law enforcement authorities, he also, according to Rowley "never disclosed to the Minneapolis agents that the Phoenix Division had, only three weeks earlier, warned of Al Qaeda operatives in flight schools seeking flight training for terrorists purposes!" (Rowley's memo to FBI, May 21, 2002 p. 3) It is of course impossible to believe that Dave Frasca on his own, is just sitting on this information and not doing anything with it, unless ordered to do so.(Historycommons site) Edited June 5, 2011 by Steven Gaal Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Len Colby Posted June 5, 2011 Share Posted June 5, 2011 (edited) The above has nothing to do with your previous post and did not produce any above Frasca was involved. as for the Phoenix memo, the student the agent was suspicious about was not linked to AQ. I will go into more depth in my next post on this thread. #######################oooooooo#######################ooooooooo ))))))))))))00000000))))))))))))))))))))00000000))))))))))))))) SAY what BRO ????? SAY WHAT ??? COLBY KING OF THE NIT-PIC DISTRACTION, Not a nit pic, you claimed that Bush ordered the FBI to “back off” its investigation of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, a radical Muslim group based in Virginia tied to bin-Laden , but the investigation was called off in Sept . 1996, over 4 years before he was elected. The Phoenix Memo was a totally separate issue. its almost as if he is part "OF" a coverup. COLBY SEEMS to work 24/7 on these disinformative to understanding posts,WHY ??? .... NOW !!!! ++ MEMO IN QUESTION ++ It is subtitled: “Osama bin Laden and Al-Muhjiroun supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in Arizona.” [Fortune, 5/22/2002; Arizona Republic, 7/24/2003] from Historycommons website 911 timeline -------------------------------------oooo-----------------------------oooo----- July 10, 2001: FBI Agent Sends Memo Warning that Unusual Number of Muslim Extremists Are Learning to Fly in Arizona FBI agent Ken Williams. [source: FBI]Phoenix, Arizona, FBI agent Ken Williams sends a memorandum warning about suspicious activities involving a group of Middle Eastern men taking flight training lessons in Arizona. The memo is titled: “Zakaria Mustapha Soubra; IT-OTHER (Islamic Army of the Caucasus),” because it focuses on Zakaria Soubra, a Lebanese flight student in Prescott, Arizona, and his connection with a terror group in Chechnya that has ties to al-Qaeda. It is subtitled: “Osama bin Laden and Al-Muhjiroun supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in Arizona.” [Fortune, 5/22/2002; Arizona Republic, 7/24/2003] Williams’ memo is based on an investigation of Sorba that Williams had begun in 2000 (see April 2000), but he had trouble pursuing because of the low priority the Arizona FBI office gave terror investigations (see April 2000-June 2001). Additionally, Williams had been alerted to suspicions about radical militants and aircraft at least three other times (see October 1996; 1998; November 1999-August 2001). In the memo, Williams does the following: Names nine other suspect students from Pakistan, India, Kenya, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] I know of no evidence Zakaria Mustapha Soubra or any of the other flight students named in the memo were ever tied to the attacks or the hijacker or were members AQ. The closest is that one of them was arrested with a AQ member in 2002. Hijacker Hani Hanjour, attending flight school in Arizona in early 2001 and probably continuing into the summer of 2001 (see Summer 2001), is not one of the students, but, as explained below, it seems two of the students know him. [uS Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ; Washington Post, 7/25/2003] The evidence Hanjour the only hijacker to train Arizona was there in the Summer of 2001 is scant, apparently he name turned up as having signed up for simulator time on June 23, but there was no record of payment and seemingly “no more evidence that Mr. Hanjour had been in Phoenix at all [in the] summer [of 2001]. The students mentioned in the memo “seem to have known Mr. Hanjour only in passing.” http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/25/us/traces-terror-flight-schools-despite-fbi-memo-students-phoenix-went-unchecked.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm Rather it seems Hanjour was continuing his flight training in NJ in the Summer of 2001 while al-Shehhi did so in Florida, Atta and Jarrah had essentially finished theirs well before but the former flew a few check rides in Georgia in March and the latter did so in Philadelphia in June. So even if the FBI had acted on the Phoenix memo it is unclear they could have prevented the attacks, there were (and still are) thousands of flight schools in the US* and large numbers of Arabs/Muslims study at them would any of the schools the hijack pilots trained at reported them? Based on my reading Hanjour was the only one to raise suspicion, two schools in Arizona, Williams jurisdiction, thought something was not right with him, so are we to assume that Guadalupe Gonzalez, the Special Agent in Charge of the Phoenix office, since 1998 was in on it? So are we to assume she and the various agents in the DC HQ and the NY Anti-Terrorism office, including it head John O’Neill**, were all “in on it”? Let’s not forget most truthers (including you) think O'Niell was set-up, if not to die in the collapse of the WTC, at least over the missing brief case, so if the senior agent most preoccupied with AQ was not spurred to action by the memo how can other bureau officials be considered so negligent that their failures to act is considered evidence of an "inside job"? * http://www.faaflightschools.com/ ** http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/21/us/traces-of-terror-the-fbi-memo-ashcroft-learned-of-agent-s-alert-just-after-9-11.html?pagewanted=3&src=pm Edited June 5, 2011 by Len Colby Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Steven Gaal Posted June 5, 2011 Author Share Posted June 5, 2011 (edited) START COLBY QUOTE + Let’s not forget most truthers (including you) think O'Niell was set-up, if not to die in the collapse of the WTC, at least over the missing brief case, so if the senior agent most preoccupied with AQ was not spurred to action by the memo how can other bureau officials be considered so negligent that their failures to act is considered evidence of an "inside job"? END COLBY QUOTE + ################################ OOOOO ########################## Sorry COLBY -YOU "IS" WRONG again. (Im trying out Palanism) READ BELOW ABOUT "the wall" ,this is how the secret team of USA intell assets helped along 911 ,AKA the GREAT TREASON. AT the very bottom is a very good article IMHO. COLBY'S points are weak.Four parts below to counter COLBY and then great article at bottom. SG ###############################################OOOOOOOO#####################################################++++ While most evidence places 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour on the East Coast in the summer of 2001, he may undergo some flight training in Phoenix, Arizona. Hanjour had trained at the Sawyer School of Aviation previously (see 1998), and there is some evidence he returns there. One school document records Hanjour’s name for use of a flight simulator on June 23, 2001, though his name does not appear on payment records. Faisal al-Salmi, Rayed Abdullah, and Lotfi Raissi also use the flight simulator that day. Al-Salmi will later be convicted of lying about his associations with Hanjour (see February 15, 2002). Abdullah had moved with Hanjour from Florida in 1997, and is known for giving extremist speeches at a Phoenix mosque (see October 1996-Late April 1999). Raissi will later be suspected of involvement in the 9/11 plot, then cleared (see September 21, 2001). There are also indications that Hanjour signs up to use a flight simulator in August with three other Muslim men, including al-Salmi. One Sawyer employee is fairly certain she sees Hanjour during the summer. Another witness sees Hanjour with al-Salmi elsewhere in Phoenix. The 9/11 Commission will note that the evidence of Hanjour training in Phoenix during the summer is not definitive, but “the FBI’s Phoenix office believes it is plausible that Hanjour return to Arizona for additional training.” On July 10, 2001, Phoenix FBI agent Ken Williams sends a memorandum to FBI headquarters urging a nationwide check on Middle Eastern students at flight schools (see July 10, 2001). Yet he does not seem to conduct any kind of check on Phoenix flight schools at this time. Phoenix flight school managers will later claim that the FBI did not ask them for tips on suspicious students before 9/11. A Sawyer School manager apparently had suspicions about some of his students (though he does not mention Hanjour specifically). He later will say that had he known the FBI was concerned that some students might be Islamic militants, “I would have called someone.” Another flight school manager claims he has a good relationship with the FBI and is surprised he is not asked about Williams’ concerns. He will complain, “Should flight schools be clairvoyant?” [New York Times, 5/24/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 529] (Historycommons) ###############################################OOOOO##################################################++++ SCREW THE Commission,"The 9/11 Commission will note that the evidence of Hanjour training in Phoenix during the summer is not definitive", GOLLY didnt have FAA data ?? see below January-February 2001: Flight School’s Repeated Warnings About Hijacker Hanjour Ignored by FAA In January 2001, the Arizona flight school JetTech alerts the FAA about hijacker Hani Hanjour. No one at the school suspects Hanjour of terrorist intent, but they tell the FAA he lacks both the English and flying skills necessary for the commercial pilot’s license he has already obtained. For instance, he had taken classes at the University of Arizona but failed his English classes with a 0.26 grade point average. A JetTech flight school manager “couldn’t believe he had a commercial license of any kind with the skills that he had.” A former employee says, “I’m still to this day amazed that he could have flown into the Pentagon. He could not fly at all.” They also note he is an exceptionally poor student who does not seem to care about passing his courses. [New York Times, 5/4/2002; CBS News, 5/10/2002] An FAA official named John Anthony actually sits next to Hanjour in class and observes his skills. He suggests the use of a translator to help Hanjour pass, but the flight school points out that goes “against the rules that require a pilot to be able to write and speak English fluently before they even get their license.” [Associated Press, 5/10/2002] The FAA verifies that Hanjour’s 1999 pilot’s license is legitimate (see April 15, 1999), but takes no other action. However, his license should have been rejected because it had already expired in late 1999 when he failed to take a manadatory medical test. [Associated Press, 9/15/2001; CBS News, 5/10/2002] An Arizona FAA inspector later says, “There should have been a stop right then and there.” He will claim that federal law would have required Hanjour to be re-examined. [Associated Press, 6/13/2002] In February, Hanjour begins advanced simulator training, “a far more complicated task than he had faced in earning a commercial license.” [New York Times, 6/19/2002] The flight school again alerts the FAA about this and gives a total of five alerts about Hanjour, but no further action on him is taken. The FBI is not told about Hanjour. [CBS News, 5/10/2002] Ironically, in July 2001, Arizona FBI agent Ken Williams will recommend in a memo that the FBI liaison with local flight schools and keep track of suspicious activity by Middle Eastern students (see July 10, 2001). (Historycommons) ####################################OOOOOOOO##############################################++++ AQ = MEMO also MEMO NOT UPLOADED INTO FBI SYSTEM (??) also FBI O’Neill seems not on MEMO list. In the memo, Williams does the following: Names nine other suspect students from Pakistan, India, Kenya, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] Hijacker Hani Hanjour, attending flight school in Arizona in early 2001 and probably continuing into the summer of 2001 (see Summer 2001), is not one of the students, but, as explained below, it seems two of the students know him. [uS Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ; Washington Post, 7/25/2003] Notes that he interviewed some of these students, and heard some of them make hostile comments about the US. Additionally, he noticed that they were suspiciously well informed about security measures at US airports. [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] Notes an increasing, “inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest” taking flight lessons in Arizona. [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] Suspects that some of the ten people he has investigated are connected to al-Qaeda. [uS Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] One person on the list, Ghassan al Sharbi, will be arrested in Pakistan in March 2002 with al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002). Al Sharbi attended a flight school in Prescott, Arizona. He also apparently attended the training camps in Afghanistan and swore loyalty to bin Laden in the summer of 2001. He apparently knows Hani Hanjour in Arizona (see October 1996-Late April 1999). He also is the roommate of Soubra, the main target of the memo. [Los Angeles Times, 1/24/2003; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 521] Discovers that one of them was communicating through an intermediary with Abu Zubaida. This apparently is a reference to Hamed al Sulami, who had been telephoning a Saudi imam known to be Zubaida’s spiritual advisor. Al Sulami is an acquaintance of Hanjour in Arizona (see October 1996-Late April 1999). [Mercury News (San Jose), 5/23/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 520-521, 529] Discusses connections between several of the students and a radical group called Al-Muhajiroun. [Mercury News (San Jose), 5/23/2002] This group supported bin Laden, and issued a fatwa, or call to arms, that included airports on a list of acceptable terror targets. [Associated Press, 5/22/2002] Soubra, the main focus of the memo, is a member of Al-Muhajiroun and an outspoken radical. He met with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed, the leader of Al-Muhajiroun in Britain, and started an Arizona chapter of the organization. After 9/11, some US officials will suspect that Soubra has ties to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. He will be held two years, then deported to Lebanon in 2004. [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/2001; Los Angeles Times, 1/24/2003; Arizona Republic, 5/2/2004; Arizona Monthly, 11/2004] Though Williams doesn’t include it in his memo, in the summer of 1998, Bakri publicized a fax sent by bin Laden to him that listed al-Qaeda’s four objectives in fighting the US. The first objective was “bring down their airliners.” (see Summer 1998). [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/2001] Warns of a possible “effort by Osama bin Laden to send students to the US to attend civil aviation universities and colleges” [Fortune, 5/22/2002] , so they can later hijack aircraft. [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] Recommends that the “FBI should accumulate a listing of civil aviation universities and colleges around the country. FBI field offices with these types of schools in their area should establish appropriate liaison. FBI [headquarters] should discuss this matter with other elements of the US intelligence community and task the community for any information that supports Phoenix’s suspicions.” [Arizona Republic, 7/24/2003] (The FBI has already done this, but because of poor FBI communications, Williams is not aware of the report.) Recommends that the FBI ask the State Department to provide visa data on flight school students from Middle Eastern countries, which will facilitate FBI tracking efforts. [New York Times, 5/4/2002] The memo is addressed to the following FBI Agents: Dave Frasca, chief of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters; Elizabeth Harvey Matson, Mark Connor and Fred Stremmel, Intelligence Operations Specialists in the RFU; Rod Middleton, acting chief of the Usama bin Laden Unit (UBLU); Jennifer Maitner, an Intelligence Operations Specialist in the UBLU; Jack Cloonan, an agent on the New York FBI’s bin Laden unit, the I-49 squad; (see January 1996 and Spring 2000). Michael S. Butsch, an agent on another New York FBI squad dealing with other Sunni terrorists. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 7/10/2001 ; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] However, the memo is not uploaded into the FBI’s information system until the end of the month and is apparently not received by all these people (see July 27, 2001 and after). Williams also shares some concerns with the CIA (see (July 27, 2001)). [Mercury News (San Jose), 5/23/2002] One anonymous government official who has seen the memo says, “This was as actionable a memo as could have been written by anyone.” [insight, 5/27/2002] However, the memo is merely marked “routine,” rather than “urgent.” It is generally ignored, not shared with other FBI offices, and the recommendations are not taken. One colleague in New York replies at the time that the memo is “speculative and not very significant.” [Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] Williams is unaware of many FBI investigations and leads that could have given weight to his memo. Authorities later claim that Williams was only pursuing a hunch, but one familiar with classified information says, “This was not a vague hunch. He was doing a case on these guys.” [Mercury News (San Jose), 5/23/2002](Historycommons) ##########################################OOOOOOOO###################################################++++ More than 20 years before 911 the term SECRET TEAM was used RE CT ideas. AN ONI inside ONI,a CIA inside CIA and OH YES ,a FBI inside the FBI. FRASCA not only only coverup artist,lets add SABOL. Kevin Fenton 3/19/2008 Sherry Sabol is not a name known to most of those who have examined the events of 9/11, let alone the general public, but the import of what she told investigators after the attacks cannot be overstated. Sabol was an attorney with the FBI’s National Security Law Unit (NSLU) who was consulted in late August 2001 about an application for a warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings and the search for Khalid Almihdhar. Both these investigations had the potential to prevent 9/11, but both failed to do so. Sabol gave advice that turned out to be wrong in both cases – she said that the FBI did not have enough evidence to get a search warrant for Moussaoui’s belongings and that the search for Almihdhar should be an intelligence investigation. However, in both cases the blame can be placed on the FBI agents who asked for the consultations, Rita Flack and Michael Maltbie in the Moussaoui case, and Dina Corsi in the search for Almihdhar, who failed to provide Sabol with the relevant information and documentation. Had Sabol been given the relevant facts, she may well have given better advice and the attacks have been prevented. What’s more, Sabol later claimed that Corsi misrepresented her advice to an FBI agent investigating the USS Cole bombing. If Sabol is right, that means Corsi intentionally sabotaged the search for Almihdhar. Zacarias Moussaoui and Rita Flack Sabol was consulted about the Moussaoui case on August 27 by Maltbie and Flack of the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit. This consultation was broadly similar to those with another three attorneys also asked about the case: Sabol received an oral briefing about Moussaoui, but not the relevant documentation from the Minneapolis field office, even though Maltbie brought it to the meeting. Instead of supporting the application for a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the two RFU agents were negative about its chances and downplayed Moussaoui’s terrorism connection. The Justice Department’s inspector general later found that Minneapolis had gathered sufficient information for a warrant to be issued and that the withholding of the documentation from Sabol and other attorneys was a key factor in the failure to get a search warrant and prevent 9/11. According to testimony by FBI agent Aaron Zebley at Moussaoui’s 2006 trial, the evidence in Moussaoui’s belongings that the Minneapolis field office wanted to search linked Moussaoui to no less than eleven of the 9/11 hijackers. However, what is really noteworthy about the consultation with Sabol is that, in Sabol’s version, one of the questions she asked was whether anybody was sending people to the US for flight training. Although this is a perfectly logical question to ask, Maltbie later claimed not to recall it, and Flack said Sabol never asked whether Middle Easterners were training at US flight schools. That’s what they told the Justice Department’s inspector general and that’s what it says in a substitution for testimony at Moussaoui’s trial. Ken Williams and the Phoenix Memo At this point, at least one agent in the bureau correctly suspected that bin Laden was sending pilots to train in the US – Ken Williams of the FBI’s Phoenix office. The previous month Williams had written the “Phoenix Memo,” a communication that hypothesised radical Islamists were learning to fly in the US and suggested that the bureau investigate this. The memo, which reached FBI headquarters in late July, was only seen by a few people, but, as luck was have it, one of them was Flack. Although she later claimed not to recall reading it at all, the FBI’s computer records show that she not only accessed it, but also printed it out. The connection between the Phoenix Memo and the Moussaoui investigation is abundantly clear – the memo theorised radical Islamists were coming to the US to learn to fly, and look! here is one of those radical Islamists. However, Flack claims that she failed to appreciate this and that she did not discuss the memo with anyone. Clearly, she should have shown it to Maltbie, their boss at the RFU Dave Frasca, to whom the Phoenix memo was actually addressed, the Minneapolis field office and Sabol. It is hard to resolve the dispute between Sabol and Flack – it is basically Flack’s word against Sabol’s – but the same cannot be said for the second case Sabol was involved in, the search for Khalid Almihdhar. Khalid Almihdhar and Dina Corsi Sabol was consulted about the search for Khalid Almihdhar the next day, August 28, but a deal of background is required to understand the ins and outs. The consultation was the result of a dispute between Steve Bongardt, a FBI New York field office agent working on the Cole bombing investigation, and two FBI headquarters employees, Dina Corsi of the Usama bin Laden unit and Tom Wilshire, a CIA manager on loan to the FBI who was a consultant to the boss of Corsi’s boss. Wilshire also figured in the Moussaoui case, where he was the most senior official at FBI headquarters who was seriously involved in the case. The CIA had known Khalid Almihdhar, who is said to have died aboard Flight 77 when it hit the Pentagon, had a US visa as far back as January 2000, but a series of bizarre coincidences had allegedly frustrated its attempts to notify the FBI of this. However, on August 22 an analyst on loan from the FBI to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, found out about the visa, checked with the INS to determine whether Almihdhar was still in the US, and then called Corsi at the FBI without asking her superior’s permission to do so (this is the obstacle on which one of the previous attempts to notify the FBI in January 2000 had floundered). Corsi was initially shocked by the news, as she was aware that Almihdhar played some sort of role in the Cole bombing, and called the New York field office, saying that it would conduct a search for Almihdhar so he could be interviewed about that attack. Corsi also told the news to Wilshire, the CIA manager who had blocked the previous notification in January 2000. Wilshire was aware al-Qaeda was planning a big attack on US interests and that Almihdhar would likely be involved in the attack, so the fact Almihdhar had arrived in New York must have been highly significant to him. However, neither he nor Rich B, his old boss at Alec Station who also knew this, seems to have taken the trouble to point this out to anyone. Steve Bongardt and the “Wall” This is where the “wall” comes in. Corsi told the New York field office that the search for Almihdhar should be an intelligence investigation. Bongardt and some other New York agents protested, saying (correctly, as it turned out) that it should be done as a part of the criminal investigation into the Cole bombing. They also said it would be easier to find Almihdhar within a criminal investigation because of the better tools available to criminal investigators. Corsi claimed that the “wall” prevented the information being shared with criminal agents, as it was intelligence information (note: this is nonsense, the “wall” did not prevent anything being shared with anyone, it merely required that the passage of some, not all types of intelligence information be approved before it could be shared with prosecutors. In some cases, arguably including the search for Almihdhar, the “wall” actually mandated that intelligence information be passed to prosecutors). Bongardt, a criminal agent, requested that Corsi get an opinion from an FBI lawyer, and Corsi approached Sabol. According to Corsi, Sabol was asked two questions (1) should the search for Almihdhar be an intelligence or criminal investigation, and (2) if the search were an intelligence investigation, could a criminal investigator be present at an interview of Almihdhar. Corsi consulted Sabol and then wrote back to Bongardt saying that Sabol had told her the search should be an intelligence investigation and that a criminal investigator could not be present at an interview of Almihdhar, if he were located. Bongardt, stymied, was stood down. The problem for Corsi is what happened when internal investigators asked Sabol for her account of the consultation. Sabol agreed that she had recommended the search be an intelligence investigation. However, Corsi had not given her all the relevant facts, for example Sabol was not informed that Almihdhar had lied on his visa application form, a criminal offence. What’s more, Sabol said that she never told Corsi a criminal investigator could not be present at an interview and that she would not have said that (note: the “wall” did not prevent a criminal investigator from being present at such interview). Sherry Sabol or Dina Corsi The choice here is stark, either Sabol is telling the truth or Corsi is. The import of Sabol’s claim is that Corsi deliberately misrepresented her advice to Bongardt, ensuring that less resources were devoted to the search for Almihdhar. In the event, the search was assigned to a single rookie agent, the only intelligence agent available in New York, who already had an urgent case to deal with. Unsurprisingly, the rookie failed to locate Almihdhar before 9/11. After the attacks, Bongardt turned up information about him within hours. How to resolve the conflict between Sabol and Corsi? Well, one cannot help but note, as the 9/11 Commission did, that Corsi’s e-mail that allegedly misrepresented Sabol’s advice was not copied to Sabol, so she had no opportunity to correct Corsi. However, other actions by Corsi over the summer cast light on her intentions. For example, Corsi, who was assigned to support the Cole investigation, was aware that a key figure in the investigation, al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash, had attended an important al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000, but she withheld this from the Cole investigators. In addition, the passage to the Cole investigators of some of the intelligence information that Bongardt needed to search for Almihdhar under a criminal investigation was approved by the NSA’s general counsel on August 28 at Corsi’s request, but Corsi still continued to insist to Bongardt that day and the next that he could not search for Almihdhar within a criminal investigation as he could not have the information whose passage to him had just been approved by the NSA at her request! What clearer proof of malfeasance could one want? Let us hope that, at some point in the not too distant future, the investigation into 9/11 will be reopened and that, in the great tradition of the FBI, both Dina Corsi and the ubiquitous Tom Wilshire will be polygraphed and asked what the hell they were doing. August 20, 2001 and After: Key Justice Department Unit Not Consulted about Moussaoui Warrant Request A key Justice Department unit, the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review (OIPR), is not consulted about a request to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings. Although it is this office that would submit an application for a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the legal aspects of the application are discussed only with the National Security Law Unit, which is beneath the OIPR (see August 22-28, 2001). FBI officials discuss what they think the OIPR will want in a warrant application, but do not ask it directly. Sherry Sabol, an attorney in the lower National Security Law Unit, will later say that she would have contacted the OIPR to discuss a possible warrant application, if FBI headquarters agents had not withheld information from her (see August 22-28, 2001). When shown the relevant documentation for the Moussaoui case after 9/11, the OIPR’s general counsel will say he would have considered the application and, if submitted, he “would have tied bells and whistles” to a comment by Moussaoui’s imam that Moussaoui and an associate wanted to “go on jihad” (see August 17, 2001). [uS Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 132-166, 182-4, 201 pdf file] However, a memo from Attorney General John Ashcroft issued in May to improve the efficiency of the FISA process recommended communications between field offices, FBI headquarters, and the OIPR. In addition, the OIPR and the FBI should hold regular monthly meetings to discuss FISA warrants. It is unclear if such a meeting is held in the three weeks between Moussaoui’s arrest and 9/11. However, one of the people supposed to attend such meetings is Spike Bowman, chief of the National Security Law Unit, who is involved in the Moussaoui case (see August 28, 2001). [uS Department of Justice, 5/18/2001 pdf file] August 22-28, 2001: Phoenix Memo Withheld from FISA Attorneys in Moussaoui Case The FBI’s Minneapolis field office drafts an application for a FISA warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings and sends it to the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters. From there, the application is sent to four attorneys at the FBI’s National Security Law Unit, as it needs to be legally cleared by them before being submitted to the FISA Court. All four attorneys are doubtful that the application contains enough evidence to secure a warrant. Although they are aware that Moussaoui is connected to Chechen rebels, they do not believe the FISA court will consider the Chechen rebels to be a foreign power. Moreover, they do not think the connection between the Chechens and bin Laden is strong enough to make Moussaoui an agent of al-Qaeda. However, the attorneys are not given the relevant documentation. For example, they are not informed that the FBI was warned in April that the Chechen rebel leader and Osama bin Laden were planning an attack against the US (see Before April 13, 2001). Nor are they provided with a copy of the Phoenix Memo, in which Arizona FBI agent Ken Williams correctly theorized that bin Laden was sending agents to the US to train in flight schools (see July 10, 2001). Attorney Sherry Sabol will later say that she asked RFU agents Mike Maltbie and Rita Flack whether there was any evidence of people being sent to the US for flight training. Flack, who read the Phoenix memo five days before (see August 22, 2001), said no. Maltbie will later say he does not recall this and Flack will deny it. [uS Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 139-160 pdf file; US Department of Justice, 3/1/2006 pdf file; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 pdf file] The Department of Justice’s Office of Inspector General will later criticize Flack for failing to inform the attorneys of the memo. [uS Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 208 pdf file] Sabol and two of the other attorneys will say that they would have taken actions to support the application if they had known about the Phoenix Memo. However, they do not believe that material from the Phoenix memo would have been enough to secure the FISA warrant. [uS Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 146-8, 158-160, 208 pdf file] August 28-29, 2001: FBI Headquarters Allegedly Misrepresents Attorney’s Advice, Ensuring Search for Hijacker Almihdhar Is Intelligence Investigation FBI headquarters agents Dina Corsi and Rod Middleton contact Justice Department lawyer Sherry Sabol to ask her opinion on the search for hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, but Sabol will later say that Corsi misrepresents her advice to other agents. Corsi contacts Sabol, an attorney at the National Security Law Unit, to ask her about legal restrictions on the search for Khalid Almihdhar, because of an argument she has had with New York agent Steve Bongardt about whether the search should be an intelligence or criminal investigation (see August 28, 2001 and August 28, 2001). Corsi will later tell Bongardt that Sabol told her that the information needed for the investigation cannot be passed on to criminal agents at the FBI, only intelligence agents, and that if Almihdhar is located a criminal agent cannot be present at an interview. [uS Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 307-8 pdf file] Corsi’s understanding of the issue is wrong and the “wall”, which restricted the passage of some intelligence information to criminal agents at the FBI, does not prevent the information in question being shared with criminal agents (see August 29, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will comment that Corsi “appears to have misunderstood the complex rules that could apply to the situation.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 271] In addition, Sabol will later insist that her advice was very different than what Corsi claims it is. She will deny saying a criminal agent could not interview Almihdhar, arguing that she would not have given such inaccurate advice. She will also say the caveat on the intelligence information from the NSA would not have stopped criminal agents getting involved and, in any case, the NSA would have waived the caveat, if asked (note: the NSA did so at Corsi’s request just one day earlier (see August 27-28, 2001), but presumably Corsi does not tell Sabol this). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 271] Further, Corsi apparently does not tell Sabol that Almihdhar is in the US illegally. The illegal entry is a crime and means criminal FBI agents can search for him (see August 29, 2001). ########################################OOOOOOOO#########################################++++ http://www.truth-out.org/report-intelligence-unit-told-911-stop-tracking-bin-laden/1306159803 -------------- Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden Monday 23 May 2011 by: Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout --------------ooo-------------- Smoke billows from the World Trade Center in New York, on September 11, 2001. (Photo: Ruth Fremson / The New York Times) A great deal of controversy has arisen about what was known about the movements and location of Osama bin Laden in the wake of his killing by US Special Forces on May 2 in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Questions about what intelligence agencies knew or didn't know about al-Qaeda activities go back some years, most prominently in the controversy over the existence of a joint US Special Forces Command and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data mining effort known as "Able Danger." What hasn't been discussed is a September 2008 Department of Defense (DoD) inspector general (IG)report, summarizing an investigation made in response to an accusation by a Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) whistleblower, which indicated that a senior JFIC commander had halted actions tracking Osama bin Laden prior to 9/11. JFIC is tasked with an intelligence mission in support of United States Joint Force Command (USJFCOM). The report, titled "Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission," was declassified last year, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from Steven Aftergood at the Federation of American Scientists. The whistleblower, who the IG report identified as a former JFIC employee represented only by his codename "IRON MAN," claimed in letters written to both the DoD inspector general in May 2006 and, lacking any apparent action by the IG, to the Office of the National Director of Intelligence (ODNI) in October 2007, that JFIC had withheld operational information about al-Qaeda when queried in March 2002 about its activities by the DIA and higher command officials on behalf of the 9/11 Commission. The ODNI passed the complaint back to the IG, who then opened an investigation under the auspices of the deputy inspector general for intelligence. In a November 27, 2007,letterfrom Edward Maguire at the ODNI to Gen. Claude Kicklighter at the DoD's IG office, Maquire identifies the whistleblower as "a DIA employee in the Defense HUMINT Management Office, Policy and Plans Division," who was "personally involved in JFIC intelligence activities related to al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 attacks and had first hand knowledge of circumstances surrounding that alleged false reporting to the Secretary of Defense and Congress." Maguire also offered to send classified material to the DoD IG that was in possession of the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI) inspector general. He also told Kicklighter that the DNI had not performed even a preliminary inquiry on the allegations. The IG report, which does not explain the 18-month delay in opening an investigation, cleared JFIC of any wrongdoing and declared that the intelligence agency had "provided a timely and accurate reply in response to the 9/11 Commission." In evident response, IRON MAN indicated to the IG investigating staff that "he had never seen the 9/11 Commission questions or JFIC's response, but that Congress should have asked for files concerning the tracking of Usama Bin Ladin." According to the IG report, the 9/11 Commission "had not requested the direct submission of any files or requested information regarding the tracking of Usama Bin Ladin." The report said the commission questions "were very specific," and asked what the JFIC knew about "imminent attack" or "hijackers involved" in the 9/11 terrorist attack. Tracking Bin Laden had been undertaken by a secret unit within the JFIC, the Asymmetric Threats Division, formed in 1999 "to take a non-traditional approach to analysis." Known by its DoD acronym, DO5, it was tasked with providing "current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the USJFCOM Intelligence staff [J2]." Almost no public source material exists on DO5 activities, except what is in the IG report. The IG report does not deny the tracking of Bin Laden, but notes that the JFIC was to provide general and direct intelligence support to USJFCOM and subordinate joint forces commands and that it did not have a mission to track Osama bin Laden or predict imminent targets of terrorism on US soil. Nevertheless, DO5 was involved in intelligence concerns domestically. It provided assistance to the Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS), which, like DO5, was formed in 1999 and based out of Fort Monroe, Virginia. The JTF-CS was tasked with assisting the DoD response to domestic terror incidents,including"managing the consequences of a domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) situation." At one point, DO5 assisted the JTF-CS by "establishing fictional terrorist organizations that would mimic real world terrorist groups" that were utilized as part of JTF-CS "exercises." The obscurity of DO5's mission was summed up by a former JFIC deputy director of intelligence, who told investigators that DO5 had "no theater specific mission." According to the answers the JFIC provided to the 9/11 Commission, the JFIC received over 2,200 messages daily "from other agencies, JFCOM components, or services." It did "not conduct any unilateral collection" of any intelligence domestically. According to the narrative in the IG report, a previous JFIC deputy director of intelligence said that the JFIC commander, identified elsewhere in the report as Capt. Janice Dundas, US Navy, "directed him to stop tracking Usama Bin Ladin. The Commanding Officer stated that the tracking of Usama Bin Ladin did not fall within JFIC's mission." At the same time, JFIC analysis of purported Afghanistan "terrorist training camps" was also curtailed, with an explanation that such activities were outside the agency's Area of Operations and "that the issues where [sic] not in JFIC's swim lane." According to the report, the Asymmetric Threats Division was "realigned" in summer 2001 under the "Intelligence Watch Center." The Intelligence Watch Center may be the Combined Intelligence Watch Centerassociatedwith NORAD, which is an "indications and warning center for worldwide threats from space, missile and strategic air activity, as well as geopolitical unrest that could affect North America and US forces/interests abroad." This would be consistent with the work DO5 did with the JTF-CS. The order to stop tracking Bin Laden, therefore, came sometime between the origin of DO5 in 1999 and its realignment just prior to, or right after 9/11. In 2005, the JFIC itself was renamed the Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence, still subordinate to and serving USJFCOM. Other Allegations According to the IG report, IRON MAN claimed that the JFIC had "original material created by DO5 relevant to al-Qa'ida," and that the JFIC had constructed "numerous original reports." But the IG investigators found that interviews with other JFIC personnel and a review of historical DO5 briefings did not support these allegations. They claimed that DO5, which "recruited JFIC personnel from the command based upon their counterintelligence and counterterrorism expertise," merely "monitored and compiled intelligence reporting" from other agencies. IRON MAN told IG investigators that he believed that his agency, JFIC, would deny the existence of the Asymmetric Threat Division and its analyses. But the IG report authors claimed, "JFIC correctly identified the DO5 in its response to question 8" from the 9/11 Commission and explained, in addition, that the JFIC noted that "D05's emphasis was on force protection for the USJFCOM components." But in the reply to question 8 reproduced in the IG report, there is no mention of either DO5 or the Asymmetric Threat Division. The answer states, "JFIC's Counter-terrorism focus has changed over the years," and that from fall 1999 until September 11, 2001, the JFIC's counterterrorism focus switched to "Asymmetric Threats OCONUS [outside the continental US] to include terrorism and CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear] issues," with the aforementioned emphasis on USJFCOM force protection. Nowhere does it indicate the existence of DO5 and there is no reason to believe that 9/11 Commission members were ever aware of its existence. The JFIC was never mentioned in the subsequent 9/11 Commission report. In addition, IRON MAN's allegations also included charges that the JFIC and specifically DO5, had developed information that the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were the most likely domestic targets of an al-Qaeda attack. The IG report disputes this and claims, with less than definitive assurance, "Evidence indicated that the JFIC did not have knowledge regarding imminent domestic targets prior to 9/11 or specific 9/11 hijacker operations." The IG report indicated that IG investigators spoke with a number of key ranking JFIC personnel, as well as the previous USJFCOM director of intelligence, the JFIC Commanding Officer and personnel from the Asymmetric Threat Division. Earlier this year, a blogger, Susie Dow, who has beenfollowingthe story of Kirk von Ackermann , a US Army contractor in Iraq who disappeared on the road between Tikrit and Kirkuk in October 2003, asserted that von Ackermann had earlier belonged to JFIC's Asymmetric Threat Division. Von Ackermann's vehicle was found by the side of the road with a computer and a briefcase containing $40,000 in cash. An Army Criminal Investigative Division investigation later concluded that he was the victim of a probable kidnapping, while rumors persisted that he was possibly going to blow the whistle on DoD corruption. An associate of von Ackermann, Ryan Manelick, a former Air Force Intelligence officer, was shot and killed outside a US military base near Baghdad two months later. Manelick had earlier told various people that he was in fear for his life. Both von Ackermann and Manelick worked for the contractor Ultra Services, based in Turkey. No particular link between von Ackermann or Manelick and the IRON MAN allegations has ever been proposed. Dow has written on the two contractors for the website e Pluribus Media. In a May 6 posting at her own web site, "The Missing Man," Dow noted the IG report's conclusion: "The analysis completed by the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division, was not applicable to the questions asked by the 9/11 Commission." "Which leads me to believe the 9/11 Commission did not ask the correct questions," Dow said. Edited June 6, 2011 by Steven Gaal Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Len Colby Posted June 6, 2011 Share Posted June 6, 2011 (edited) Sorry COLBY -YOU "IS" WRONG again. (Im trying out Palanism) READ BELOW ABOUT "the wall" ,this is how the secret team of USA intell assets helped along 911 ,AKA the GREAT TREASON. The “wall” was long standing policy dating back to the 70’s and is based on two principles: 1) It is easier to get surveillance warrants for intel investigations then criminal ones. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A20786-2004Apr17?language=printer 2) Intel agents don’t like to share info with criminal ones because they are afraid it could compromise their sources. This was extensively discussed in Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower http://www.salon.com/books/review/2006/08/30/looming_tower AT the very bottom is a very good article IMHO. COLBY'S points are weak.Four parts below to counter COLBY and then great article at bottom. SG What exactly the points you were trying to make in each part wasn’t always clear but I tried by best to figure out what you were driving at: 1a] While most evidence places 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour on the East Coast in the summer of 2001, he may undergo some flight training in Phoenix, Arizona. Hanjour had trained at the Sawyer School of Aviation previously (see 1998), and there is some evidence he returns there. Exactly the evidence indicating he was in NJ is much stronger the evidence he was in AZ. 1b] On July 10, 2001, Phoenix FBI agent Ken Williams sends a memorandum to FBI headquarters urging a nationwide check on Middle Eastern students at flight schools (see July 10, 2001). Yet he does not seem to conduct any kind of check on Phoenix flight schools at this time. Phoenix flight school managers will later claim that the FBI did not ask them for tips on suspicious students before 9/11. I hadn’t noticed that the Timeline made this point, I made a similar one in an earlier post. Apparently not even Williams followed his own advice, he marked the memo ‘routine’ as opposed to ‘urgent’ (thanks for bringing that to my attention!), maybe be was ‘in on it’ too! 2] SCREW THE Commission,"The 9/11 Commission will note that the evidence of Hanjour training in Phoenix during the summer is not definitive", GOLLY didnt have FAA data ?? see below January-February 2001: Flight School’s Repeated Warnings About Hijacker Hanjour Ignored by FAA In January 2001, the Arizona flight school JetTech alerts the FAA about hijacker Hani Hanjour. No one at the school suspects Hanjour of terrorist intent, but they tell the FAA he lacks both the English and flying skills necessary for the commercial pilot’s license he has already obtained. 1) Nothing there supports the notion he was in AZ during the SUMMER of 2001 2) “No one at the school suspects Hanjour of terrorist intent”, thus there was no reason for the FAA to have done so or passed info about him to the FBI or other agencies. Perhaps the Phoenix FAA office was ‘in on it’ as well. 3] AQ = MEMO also MEMO NOT UPLOADED INTO FBI SYSTEM (??) also FBI O’Neill seems not on MEMO list. 1) Try reading for comprehension “However, the memo is not uploaded into the FBI’s information system UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH and is apparently not received by all these people (see JULY 27, 2001 and after)” 2) “However, the memo is merely marked “routine,” rather than “urgent.”” , thanks again for bringing this to my attention, Williams whose hunch seems to have been dumb luck (since no one has ties the 10 men he suspected to terrorist plots) marked his memo “routine” 3) O’Neill was on vacation when the memo was sent* and he was still in charge of the anti-terror unit till he retired ** so there is no reason to doubt he saw the memo (upon his return) as stated by the NYT. * (Looming Tower, p. 395) http://kikoshouse.blogspot.com/2006/08/terrorism-i-sad-fate-of-john-oneill.html ** (op. cit., p. 397) http://www.lawrencewright.com/WrightSoufan.pdf PDF pg 71 “O’Neill’s last act as an F.B.I. agent was to sign the paperwork that would send Soufan’s team back into the country” 4] Sabol gave advice that turned out to be wrong in both cases – she said that the FBI did not have enough evidence to get a search warrant for Moussaoui’s belongings and that the search for Almihdhar should be an intelligence investigation. However, in both cases the blame can be placed on the FBI agents who asked for the consultations, Rita Flack and Michael Maltbie in the Moussaoui case, and Dina Corsi in the search for Almihdhar, who failed to provide Sabol with the relevant information and documentation. Had Sabol been given the relevant facts, she may well have given better advice and the attacks have been prevented. What’s more, Sabol later claimed that Corsi misrepresented her advice to an FBI agent investigating the USS Cole bombing. If Sabol is right, that means Corsi intentionally sabotaged the search for Almihdhar. Your source failed to produce evidence Sabol’s decisions were “wrong” and who told who what is largely a case of ‘he said, she said’. 5) “Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden Monday 23 May 2011 by: Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout” Even if your source’s claims were correct , this was a military unit tracking OBL physical location, not a unit tracking his operatives in the US. I guess this would be in case the POTUS wanted to kill or capture him. AFAIK his base of operations (the Tarnak Farms, Kandahar) had been public knowledge since 1997*. How could knowing his exact location have led to foiling the attacks? * http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=Kandahar+%22bin+laden%22&sa=N&tbs=nws:1,ar:1#q=Kandahar+%22bin+laden%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=09PsTa6LO8HYgAfK4YXZCQ&ved=0CBUQpwUoCA&source=lnt&tbs=cdr:1%2Ccd_min%3A%2Ccd_max%3A1997&tbm=nws&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.&fp=79442dcab0ef0c23&biw=1345&bih=458 Edited June 6, 2011 by Len Colby Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Steven Gaal Posted June 6, 2011 Author Share Posted June 6, 2011 (edited) COLBY QUOTE ++ 1) Nothing there supports the notion he was in AZ during the SUMMER of 2001 2) “No one at the school suspects Hanjour of terrorist intent”, thus there was no reason for the FAA to have done so or passed info about him to the FBI or other agencies. Perhaps the Phoenix FAA office was ‘in on it’ as well. ++ END COLBY QUOTE #############################################OOOOOOOO################################++++(Historycommons below,except where noted)) If one was helping along a plane flase flag attack,I would have Secret Team members at the FAA. Said conclusion comes from the the logic of the premise and FACTS. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------oooooooo--------------------------------------++++ The FAA verifies that Hanjour’s 1999 pilot’s license is legitimate (see April 15, 1999), but takes no other action. However, his license should have been rejected because it had already expired in late 1999 when he failed to take a manadatory medical test. [Associated Press, 9/15/2001; CBS News, 5/10/2002] An Arizona FAA inspector later says, “There should have been a stop right then and there.” He will claim that federal law would have required Hanjour to be re-examined. [Associated Press, 6/13/2002] ++ Why was he not stopped ?? Shoulda,woulda,,911 coulda. Secret Team ++ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------ooooooooo------------------------------------------------------------+++++ July 2001 - Armed pilots banned 2 months before 9/11 Killtown's oddity 911 page "A 40-year-old Federal Aviation Administration rule that allowed commercial airline pilots to be armed was inexplicably rescinded two months before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, leading aviation security experts to lay at least some of the blame for the tragedy at the feet of airlines, none of which took advantage of the privilege while it was in effect. But in July 2001 – just two months prior to the Sept. 11 attacks – the rule was rescinded." - WorldNetDaily (05/16/02 ##########################OOOOOOOO####################+++ (Historycommons) April 1, 2001-September 10, 2001: Nearly Half of FAA’s Daily Intelligence Summaries Mention Bin Laden or Al-Qaeda; No Action is Taken ------------------ooo------------------ In 2005 (see February 10, 2005), it will be revealed that of the FAA’s 105 daily intelligence summaries between these dates, 52 mention bin Laden, al-Qaeda, or both. Most of the mentions are “in regard to overseas threats.” None of the warnings specifically predict something similar to the 9/11 attacks, but five of them mention al-Qaeda’s training for hijackings and two reports concern suicide operations unconnected to aviation. [Associated Press, 2/11/2005] One of the warnings mentions air defense measures being taken in Genoa, Italy, for the July 2001 G-8 summit to protect from a possible air attack by terrorists (see July 20-22, 2001). However, the New Jersey Star-Ledger is virtually the only newspaper in the US to report this fact. [New Jersey Star-Ledger, 2/11/2005] Despite all these warnings, the FAA fails to take any extra security measures. They do not expand the use of in-flight air marshals or tighten airport screening for weapons. A proposed rule to improve passenger screening and other security measures ordered by Congress in 1996 has held up and is still not in effect by 9/11. The 9/11 Commission’s report on these FAA warnings released in 2005 (see February 10, 2005) will conclude that FAA officials were more concerned with reducing airline congestion, lessening delays, and easing air carriers’ financial problems than preventing a hijacking. [Associated Press, 2/11/2005] The FAA also makes no effort to expand its list of terror suspects, which includes only a dozen names by 9/11 (see April 24, 2000). The former head of the FAA’s civil aviation security branch later says he wasn’t even aware of TIPOFF, the government’s main watch list, which included the names of two 9/11 hijackers before 9/11. Nor is there any evidence that a senior FAA working group responsible for security ever meets in 2001 to discuss “the high threat period that summer.” [New York Times, 2/10/2005] _______________++++++++_________________________________OOOO AND SECRET TEAM MEMBERS IN THE State Department http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a092500hanigetsvisa#a092500hanigetsvisa #############################################OOOOOOOO##################################++++ OOOOOOOO########OOOOOO ################################################ Sorry, Hanjour was in AZ in the SUMMER 2001. He had payed for ,I recall ,34 hours of simulator,but took only 21 hours,so this would explain not being on payment records,they owed him 13 hours. .---------------------------------------------------oooo--------------------------------------------++++ One school document records Hanjour’s name for use of a flight simulator on June 23, 2001, though his name does not appear on payment records. Faisal al-Salmi, Rayed Abdullah, and Lotfi Raissi also use the flight simulator that day. Al-Salmi will later be convicted of lying about his associations with Hanjour (see February 15, 2002). Abdullah had moved with Hanjour from Florida in 1997, and is known for giving extremist speeches at a Phoenix mosque (see October 1996-Late April 1999). Raissi will later be suspected of involvement in the 9/11 plot, then cleared (see September 21, 2001). There are also indications that Hanjour signs up to use a flight simulator in August with three other Muslim men, including al-Salmi. One Sawyer employee is fairly certain she sees Hanjour during the summer. Another witness sees Hanjour with al-Salmi elsewhere in Phoenix. The 9/11 Commission will note that the evidence of Hanjour training in Phoenix during the summer is not definitive, but “the FBI’s Phoenix office believes it is plausible that Hanjour return to Arizona for additional training.” On July 10, 2001, Phoenix FBI . Edited June 6, 2011 by Steven Gaal Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Steven Gaal Posted June 6, 2011 Author Share Posted June 6, 2011 COLBY QUOTE ++ Even if your source’s claims were correct , this was a military unit tracking OBL physical location, not a unit tracking his operatives in the US. I guess this would be in case the POTUS wanted to kill or capture him. AFAIK his base of operations (the Tarnak Farms, Kandahar) had been public knowledge since 1997*. How could knowing his exact location have led to foiling the attacks? END COLBY QUOTE ############################ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ++++ TO KILL HIM. +++++++ (Historycommons below) January 10-25, 2001: Rice Rejects Resuming Use of Surveillance Drone to Track Bin Laden Even before President Bush’s official inauguration, Clinton holdover counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke pushes National Security Adviser Rice and other incoming Bush officials to resume Predator drone flights over Afghanistan (originally carried out in September and October 2000) in an attempt to find and assassinate bin Laden. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002; CBS News, 6/25/2003] On January 10, Rice is shown a video clip of bin Laden filmed by a Predator drone the year before. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002] Aware of an Air Force plan to arm the Predator, when Clarke outlines a series of steps to take against al-Qaeda on January 25 (see January 25, 2001), one suggestion is to go forward with new Predator drone reconnaissance missions in the spring and use an armed version when it is ready. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] The original Air Force development plan calls for three years of Predator testing, but Clarke pushes so hard that a Hellfire missile is successfully test fired from a Predator on February 16, 2001. The armed Predator will be fully ready by early June 2001 (see Early June-September 10, 2001). [CBS News, 6/25/2003; New Yorker, 7/28/2003] However, Rice apparently approves the use of the Predator but only as part of a broader strategy against al-Qaeda. Since that strategy will still not be ready before 9/11, the Predator will not be put into use before 9/11. [Associated Press, 6/22/2003] ######################OOOOOOO########################++++ Early June-September 10, 2001: Armed Drone Ready to Hit Bin Laden, but Bureacratic Concerns Prevent Its Use An armed version of the Predator drone successfully passes a test showing it is ready for use in Afghanistan. The Predator had been used successfully in 2000 to spot bin Laden (see September 7-October 2000), but it was not used in early 2001 while an armed version was prepared (see January 10-25, 2001). A Hellfire missile was successfully test fired from a Predator on February 16, 2001. [CBS News, 6/25/2003] In early June 2001, a duplicate of the brick house where bin Laden is believed to be living in Kandahar, Afghanistan, is built in Nevada, and destroyed by a Predator missile. The test shows that the missile fired from miles away would have killed anyone in the building, and one participant calls this the long sought after “holy grail” that could kill bin Laden within minutes of finding him. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002] But National Security Adviser Rice reportedly wants to use the Predator only after an overall strategy for confronting al-Qaeda is worked out, and no such plan is close to being ready. [Associated Press, 6/22/2003] She and her deputy Steve Hadley decide to delay reconnaissance flights until all the arrangements for using the armed version can be worked out. In July 2001, Hadley directs the military to have armed Predators ready to deploy no later than September 1. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] The main hold up seems to be bureaucratic. Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke repeatedly advocates using the Predator, armed or unarmed. However, infighting between the CIA and the Air Force over who would pay for it and take responsibility delays its use. Clarke later says, “Every time we were ready to use it, the CIA would change its mind.” [New Yorker, 7/28/2003] The issue comes to a head in early September 2001, but even then, a decision to use the Predator is delayed (see September 4, 2001). [New Yorker, 7/28/2003] The armed Predator will finally be used in Afghanistan just days after 9/11. [Associated Press, 6/25/2003] ############################OOOOOOOO################################++++ April 30, 2001: Wolfowitz in Deputy Secretary Meeting: Who Cares About [bin Laden]? ########################### OOOOOOOO################################++++ September 4, 2001: Debate Heats Up Over Using Armed Predator Drone Against Bin Laden; Decision Again Delayed ##########################OOOOOOOO##################################++++ Early October-Mid-November, 2001: Air Force Is Repeatedly Denied Permission to Bomb Top al-Qaeda and Taliban Leaders #########################OOOOOOOO#####################################++++ GOLLY, DOES THE DRONE WORK ???? YUP, but only after 911........... November 15, 2001: Al-Qaeda Leader Reported Killed in Bombing Raid Mohammed Atef. [source: FBI]Al-Qaeda leader Mohammed Atef (a.k.a. Abu Hafs) is believed to have been killed in Gardez, near Kabul, Afghanistan. Atef is considered al-Qaeda’s military commander, and one of its top leaders. Initial reports claim he was killed by a US bombing raid, but later reports will reveal he was hit by Hellfire missile fired from a Predator drone. [uS Department of State, 11/16/2001; ABC News, 11/17/2001; Newsweek, 11/11/2002] CIA Director George Tenet will later indicate that Atef was “a key player in the 9/11 attacks,” but the exact nature of his role has not been revealed. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 187] Documents and videotapes are discovered by US forces in the rubble after the raid. Details on two upcoming al-Qaeda attacks are discovered. Investigators examining the videotapes find images of about 50 al-Qaeda operatives (see November 15-Late December 2001). [suskind, 2006, pp. 57] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Steven Gaal Posted June 6, 2011 Author Share Posted June 6, 2011 (edited) COLBY QUOTE +Your source failed to produce evidence Sabols decisions were wrong and who told who what is largely a case of he said, she said. + END COLBY QUOTE #################################OOOOOOIOO###################################++++ (below Historycommons) So is it CORSI the Secret Team member ???? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- How to resolve the conflict between Sabol and Corsi? Well, one cannot help but note, as the 9/11 Commission did, that Corsis e-mail that allegedly misrepresented Sabols advice was not copied to Sabol, so she had no opportunity to correct Corsi. However, other actions by Corsi over the summer cast light on her intentions. For example, Corsi, who was assigned to support the Cole investigation, was aware that a key figure in the investigation, al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash, had attended an important al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000, but she withheld this from the Cole investigators. In addition, the passage to the Cole investigators of some of the intelligence information that Bongardt needed to search for Almihdhar under a criminal investigation was approved by the NSAs general counsel on August 28 at Corsis request, but Corsi still continued to insist to Bongardt that day and the next that he could not search for Almihdhar within a criminal investigation as he could not have the information whose passage to him had just been approved by the NSA at her request! What clearer proof of malfeasance could one want? Let us hope that, at some point in the not too distant future, the investigation into 9/11 will be reopened and that, in the great tradition of the FBI, both Dina Corsi and the ubiquitous Tom Wilshire will be polygraphed and asked what the hell they were doing ---------------------------------------------------------(########)-----------.****** GOLY, somebody is not telling the truth, WHY ?? Its the biggest USA event on its soil since ..since.....PEARL Harbor..... Sooo ,soo ,so important,yet no truth,WHY ? Edited June 6, 2011 by Steven Gaal Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Steven Gaal Posted June 6, 2011 Author Share Posted June 6, 2011 (edited) COLBY QUOTE + 1) Try reading for comprehension However, the memo is not uploaded into the FBIs information system UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH and is apparently not received by all these people (see JULY 27, 2001 and after) 2) However, the memo is merely marked routine, rather than urgent. , thanks again for bringing this to my attention, Williams whose hunch seems to have been dumb luck (since no one has ties the 10 men he suspected to terrorist plots) marked his memo routine 3) ONeill was on vacation when the memo was sent* and he was still in charge of the anti-terror unit till he retired ** so there is no reason to doubt he saw the memo (upon his return) as stated by the NYT. + END COLBY QUOTE #################################################################################################### John O'Neill saw memo.....but parts of MEDIA SECRET TEAM dont record/find his reaction. COLBY SHOWN A,B,blank,D > says," golly we will never know whats between letter B and letter D." Our web Hoster ,Mr. Simkin, has provide great material on the media. After reading the said media material,one can say,"The elite media does not have the truth in them when deep politics/operations are shown some partial light." I think Mr. Simkin would agree. sg PHOENIX MEMO WENT TO FRUSTRATED NYC PATRIOT-MARTYR MediaWhoresOnline.com May 22, 2002 John O'Neill, FBI Hero, Got Word in July, Was Rebuffed, "Retired" In Anger NY Times, Incredibly, Reports And Then Blows Huge Story A Crucial Piece Of The Bush Scandal Puzzle? In a stunning revelation, the New York Times has reported that among the two FBI office counterterrorism chiefs who received the now famously neglected Phoenix memorandum last July was none other than John O'Neill -- then the top counterterrorist officer in the FBI's New York City's office, and the FBI's leading expert on Osama bin Laden. O'Neill knew perfectly well what Al Qaeda was up to, and had been knocking on doors (and, at times, heads) for years to get his colleagues and superiors to understand what he did. The last straw came in July 2001, when (as he told the French authors Guillaume Dasquié and Jean-Charles Brisard in an interview), O'Neill became fully aware that the Bush administration, anxious over negotiations for a Caspian Sea oil pipe line, had decided to back off of tracking bin Laden and opposing the Taliban, lest it risk alienating powerful Saudi families. Instead of going after the Taliban and bin Laden, the Bush Administration decided to negotiate and try to buy off the Taliban and bin Laden. Unfortunately for the Administration, the pipe-line negotiations broke down in August. And on September 11, bin Laden struck. What no one has known until now is that at the very moment that O'Neill was finally giving up, in July, he was being apprised of the Phoenix memorandum -- a memo, it seems, that practically nobody inside the Bush Administration was willing to treat seriously other than himself. At the end of August, in disgust, O'Neill left the FBI to take what he somewhat ruefully regarded as his "retirement" job --as head of security at the World Trade Center. There, on September 11, John O'Neill died at the hands of his arch-enemy bin Laden's fiendish followers. Connect the dots? Well, duh! O'Neill got the Phoenix message. No one would listen. No one. The Bushies had backed off bin Laden. So O'Neill changed jobs -- and went on to die a martyr's death. While all the people who ignored him, on up the chain to the Oval Office, live on -- ghoulishly making political hay out of his sacrifice and their own incompetence -- and, in a sense, their own perfidy. But here's the really amazing thing -- having unearthed this blockbuster, the New York Times reporters David Johnston and Don Van Natta, Jr., simply bury it in their story. They report, incredibly, that O'Neill simply "retired" back in August -- ignoring the well-known background, leaving the dots unconnected!! What did O'Neill know back in July? Whom did he try to warn? What happened when he did so? What did his "retirement" -- and its tragic consequences -- have to do with his frustrated efforts to get Bush's people to listen to him about the Phoenix memo, and/or about everything else he knew about Osama bin Laden's clear and present danger to American lives? Here are some questions that the Bush people don't want asked, by the New York Times, by a National Board of Investigation, or by anyone else. Who among ye Whores will have the guts to ask them -- and then have the additional guts to find the answers? If you can't be stirred by common decency or by human justice or by old-fashioned professionalism, listen to this -- there's a Pulitzer Prize here for someone with enough guts. Just connect the dots -- and do some intelligent reporting. In death, the hero John O'Neill may just turn out to be the central clue to solving the Bush 9/11 scandal. Which will still be cruel -- but at least might lead to justice. Edited June 6, 2011 by Steven Gaal Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Len Colby Posted June 7, 2011 Share Posted June 7, 2011 Two days ago Gaal wrote, “COLBY SEEMS to work 24/7 on these disinformative to understanding posts”, over the next 37 hours he started 2 new threads and posted 5 other messages on this one for a whopping total of almost 13,000 words, by contrast Dean Heartwell’s “book”, which I assume he worked on for several months came to about 15,000 words. So who “SEEMS to work 24/7”? I’ll try to post my reply within 24 hours. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Steven Gaal Posted June 7, 2011 Author Share Posted June 7, 2011 (edited) Two days ago Gaal wrote, “COLBY SEEMS to work 24/7 on these disinformative to understanding posts”, over the next 37 hours he started 2 new threads and posted 5 other messages on this one for a whopping total of almost 13,000 words, by contrast Dean Heartwell’s “book”, which I assume he worked on for several months came to about 15,000 words. So who “SEEMS to work 24/7”? I’ll try to post my reply within 24 hours. ######################OOOOOOOO################################++++_ Sorry to see limited thinking again of COLBY. You need a word of the day again.You see I have in my research numerous files on a number of subjects.. I have a full quiver. QUIVER WORD OF DAY FOR COLBY. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quiver ##############ooooooooooooo############===== VIDEO of the day for COLBY. You see COLBY=KHAN. Colby and Khan only think in 2D not 3D. see video Edited June 7, 2011 by Steven Gaal Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Len Colby Posted June 8, 2011 Share Posted June 8, 2011 COLBY QUOTE + 1) Try reading for comprehension “However, the memo is not uploaded into the FBI’s information system UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH and is apparently not received by all these people (see JULY 27, 2001 and after)” 2) “However, the memo is merely marked “routine,” rather than “urgent.”” , thanks again for bringing this to my attention, Williams whose hunch seems to have been dumb luck (since no one has ties the 10 men he suspected to terrorist plots) marked his memo “routine” 3) O’Neill was on vacation when the memo was sent* and he was still in charge of the anti-terror unit till he retired ** so there is no reason to doubt he saw the memo (upon his return) as stated by the NYT. + END COLBY QUOTE #################################################################################################### John O'Neill saw memo.....but parts of MEDIA SECRET TEAM dont record/find his reaction. COLBY SHOWN A,B,blank,D > says," golly we will never know whats between letter B and letter D." Our web Hoster ,Mr. Simkin, has provide great material on the media. After reading the said media material,one can say,"The elite media does not have the truth in them when deep politics/operations are shown some partial light." I think Mr. Simkin would agree. sg Presumably his reaction was similar to those who worked under him, it wasn’t especially alarming and they didn’t have the man power to do what Williams suggested. There had been a similar memo in 1998 which had been “much ado about nothing.” http://wackyiraqi.com/fow/fbi_knew.htm http://kikoshouse.blogspot.com/2006/08/terrorism-i-sad-fate-of-john-oneill.html http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/crime/flight-school-warning-1998-fbi-memo PHOENIX MEMO WENT TO FRUSTRATED NYC PATRIOT-MARTYRMediaWhoresOnline.com May 22, 2002 John O'Neill, FBI Hero, Got Word in July, Was Rebuffed, "Retired" In Anger NY Times, Incredibly, Reports And Then Blows Huge Story A Crucial Piece Of The Bush Scandal Puzzle? In a stunning revelation, the New York Times has reported that among the two FBI office counterterrorism chiefs who received the now famously neglected Phoenix memorandum last July was none other than John O'Neill -- then the top counterterrorist officer in the FBI's New York City's office, and the FBI's leading expert on Osama bin Laden. O'Neill knew perfectly well what Al Qaeda was up to, and had been knocking on doors (and, at times, heads) for years to get his colleagues and superiors to understand what he did. The last straw came in July 2001, when (as he told the French authors Guillaume Dasquié and Jean-Charles Brisard in an interview), O'Neill became fully aware that the Bush administration, anxious over negotiations for a Caspian Sea oil pipe line, had decided to back off of tracking bin Laden and opposing the Taliban, lest it risk alienating powerful Saudi families. Instead of going after the Taliban and bin Laden, the Bush Administration decided to negotiate and try to buy off the Taliban and bin Laden. Unfortunately for the Administration, the pipe-line negotiations broke down in August. And on September 11, bin Laden struck. What no one has known until now is that at the very moment that O'Neill was finally giving up, in July, he was being apprised of the Phoenix memorandum -- a memo, it seems, that practically nobody inside the Bush Administration was willing to treat seriously other than himself. At the end of August, in disgust, O'Neill left the FBI to take what he somewhat ruefully regarded as his "retirement" job --as head of security at the World Trade Center. There, on September 11, John O'Neill died at the hands of his arch-enemy bin Laden's fiendish followers. Connect the dots? Well, duh! O'Neill got the Phoenix message. No one would listen. No one. The Bushies had backed off bin Laden. So O'Neill changed jobs -- and went on to die a martyr's death. While all the people who ignored him, on up the chain to the Oval Office, live on -- ghoulishly making political hay out of his sacrifice and their own incompetence -- and, in a sense, their own perfidy. But here's the really amazing thing -- having unearthed this blockbuster, the New York Times reporters David Johnston and Don Van Natta, Jr., simply bury it in their story. They report, incredibly, that O'Neill simply "retired" back in August -- ignoring the well-known background, leaving the dots unconnected!! What did O'Neill know back in July? Whom did he try to warn? What happened when he did so? What did his "retirement" -- and its tragic consequences -- have to do with his frustrated efforts to get Bush's people to listen to him about the Phoenix memo, and/or about everything else he knew about Osama bin Laden's clear and present danger to American lives? Here are some questions that the Bush people don't want asked, by the New York Times, by a National Board of Investigation, or by anyone else. Who among ye Whores will have the guts to ask them -- and then have the additional guts to find the answers? If you can't be stirred by common decency or by human justice or by old-fashioned professionalism, listen to this -- there's a Pulitzer Prize here for someone with enough guts. Just connect the dots -- and do some intelligent reporting. In death, the hero John O'Neill may just turn out to be the central clue to solving the Bush 9/11 scandal. Which will still be cruel -- but at least might lead to justice. LOL only toofers think O’Neill getting the memo was a bombshell As for “the last straw” bit here’s what the original source said: But if you lean to the left, like the French authors Guillaume Dasquié and Jean-Charles Brisard, who feature a July interview with O'Neill in their new book, Ben Laden, La Vérité Interdite, you've outed O'Neill as a sort of smoking gun -- a man who they say all but confirmed in his final months that George W. Bush's oil-industry-bred administration was so worried about alienating Saudi Arabia that it decided to negotiate with the Taliban rather than go after it. Before September 11, they argue, the United States' primary goal was to build a pipeline in Central Asia -- tapping oilfields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/sept11/features/5513/index2.html Get back to us when you find a transcript or tape of the applicable part of the interview. Apparently the French authors didn't release either but merely claimed that a dead man 'all but confirmed' something. The New York Magazine article said nothing about when he made the decision to retire. In any case based on the article and The Looming Tower, O’Neill had been leaning towards retirement for a while, he had passed the 20 year mark allowing him to retire on full pension and had been told he would never get the promotion he wanted, he seems to have already made the decision when he was on vacation in Spain before memo was sent. And to be honest I’m not sure he saw it, the Times said “one copy went to John O'Neill, then the top counterterrorism agent in the F.B.I.'s New York office” but since then a less redacted version of the memo has been released and his name wasn’t on it, he was on vacation. Wright didn’t make it clear if he’d seen it, but people he trusted had and they didn’t think implementing it was practical or called for. There seems to be no record of him or anyone in his team acting or wanting to act on it. Hindsight is 20/20 of course. On a separate note, a pre-9/11 that the FBI was targeting Arabs and Muslims for special scrutiny would have led to international and domestic outrage. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Len Colby Posted June 8, 2011 Share Posted June 8, 2011 COLBY QUOTE ++ Even if your source’s claims were correct , this was a military unit tracking OBL physical location, not a unit tracking his operatives in the US. I guess this would be in case the POTUS wanted to kill or capture him. AFAIK his base of operations (the Tarnak Farms, Kandahar) had been public knowledge since 1997*. How could knowing his exact location have led to foiling the attacks? END COLBY QUOTE ############################ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ++++ TO KILL HIM. +++++++ (Historycommons below) How would killing him have prevented the attacks? The plans were already made, the hijackers in the US, the pilots trained. He didn’t even the op. KSM did. In any case noted above his HQ had been known for years, this should hav presented several oppurtunities. As your source noted they decide to stop tracking him because it was not part of their mandate, the FBI and CIA already had OBL units. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Len Colby Posted June 8, 2011 Share Posted June 8, 2011 (edited) COLBY QUOTE ++ 1) Nothing there supports the notion he was in AZ during the SUMMER of 2001 2) “No one at the school suspects Hanjour of terrorist intent”, thus there was no reason for the FAA to have done so or passed info about him to the FBI or other agencies. Perhaps the Phoenix FAA office was ‘in on it’ as well. ++ END COLBY QUOTE #############################################OOOOOOOO################################++++(Historycommons below,except where noted)) If one was helping along a plane flase flag attack,I would have Secret Team members at the FAA. Said conclusion comes from the the logic of the premise and FACTS. Everyone, no matter how lunatic their theories, believes their “conclusion comes from the the [sic] logic of the premise and FACTS”. The number of conspirators per your theory would have to be prohibitively large. You still haven’t explained why the FAA inspectors – who only had limited contact with Hanjour - should have suspected him if the people at the flight school - who had many hours of contact with him - didn’t. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------oooooooo--------------------------------------++++ The FAA verifies that Hanjour’s 1999 pilot’s license is legitimate (see April 15, 1999), but takes no other action. However, his license should have been rejected because it had already expired in late 1999 when he failed to take a manadatory medical test. [Associated Press, 9/15/2001; CBS News, 5/10/2002] An Arizona FAA inspector later says, “There should have been a stop right then and there.” He will claim that federal law would have required Hanjour to be re-examined. [Associated Press, 6/13/2002] ++ Why was he not stopped ?? Shoulda,woulda,,911 coulda. Secret Team ++ How would forcing Hanjour to re-take his commercial pilot’s exam have thwarted the “plot”? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------ooooooooo------------------------------------------------------------+++++ July 2001 - Armed pilots banned 2 months before 9/11 Killtown's oddity 911 page "A 40-year-old Federal Aviation Administration rule that allowed commercial airline pilots to be armed was inexplicably rescinded two months before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, leading aviation security experts to lay at least some of the blame for the tragedy at the feet of airlines, none of which took advantage of the privilege while it was in effect. But in July 2001 – just two months prior to the Sept. 11 attacks – the rule was rescinded." - WorldNetDaily (05/16/02 From the cited article: According to FAA officials, the rule required airlines to apply to the agency for their pilots to carry guns in cockpits and for the airlines to put pilots through an agency-approved firearms training course. The aviation agency said, however, that throughout the life of the rule not a single U.S. air carrier took advantage of it, effectively rendering it "moot," according to one agency official. Why am I not surprised you failed to provide the link? http://web.archive.org/web/20080222215004/http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=27647 _______________++++++++_________________________________OOOO AND SECRET TEAM MEMBERS IN THE State Department http://www.historyco...500hanigetsvisa Yawn, 15 of the hijackers were from Saudi Arabia and most (14 IIRC) were from the southwest of the country thus closer to Jeddah than to Riyadh. According one of the cited sources s her boss “was on home leave, so [she] was working alone” and she apparently did little more than rubber stamp the “400 – 500 cases a day” and “issued about 20,000 visas during her tenure at Jeddah”, no wonder over a year later she was fuzzy on the details and it hardly seem odd she issued 10 (not 11 or 12) of the visas. - But you want to string her up. http://www.scribd.com/doc/18074438/Memo-of-State-Department-IG-Interview-of-Consular-Officer-Who-Issued-11-Visas-to-911-Hijackers Get back to us when you have evidence any of the visas she issued clearly should have been denied. The only questionable one was Hanjour’s but she previously declined him. “More than 60,000 Saudi applicants obtained visas for the year ending September 30 [2001], either in Saudi Arabia or other countries, according to State Department figures”. http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/terror/articles/visa011212.htm #############################################OOOOOOOO##################################++++ Sorry, Hanjour was in AZ in the SUMMER 2001. He had payed for ,I recall ,34 hours of simulator,but took only 21 hours,so this would explain not being on payment records,they owed him 13 hours. Get back to us when you have a source. But even if he was, it would only reinforce the evidence Williams did not follow his own advice. Edited June 8, 2011 by Len Colby Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Steven Gaal Posted June 8, 2011 Author Share Posted June 8, 2011 (edited) #################################OOOOOOOO###########################++++ Hanjour license ----------------- COLBY QUOTE + How would forcing Hanjour to re-take his commercial pilot’s exam have thwarted the “plot”? + END Colby No license ,no "real" simulator time,no jet training.Hanjour’s new license allows him to begin passenger jet training at other flight schools, despite having limited flying skills. #################################OOOOOOOO##############################++++ FAA SOURCE COLBY +The aviation agency said, however, that throughout the life of the rule not a single U.S. air carrier took advantage of it, effectively rendering it "moot," according to one agency official. End COLBY SOURCE ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some security experts speculate that had airlines taken advantage of the rule, it likely would not have been rescinded by the FAA. And if it had been implemented by the airlines, they say, the Sept. 11 hijackings ? which led to the deaths of nearly 3,000 people in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. ? may never have occurred. ( from WND) Golly better be sure about 911 even if policy (pilots with guns) not being used. (COLBY 2D thinking) (Golly wasnt "W" pro GUN ??) Is it possible Colby cant think "AS" a conspirator ?? -------------------------------------------------------------------++++ Airlines /FAA say pilots carrying guns maybe woundnt have stop 911.....its CYA (cant figure out CYA. .. lawsuits ...COLBY 2D thinking) ################################OOOOOOOO##################################++++ Hanjour in AZ in summer 2001 ANSWER PART one and part two Colby + Everyone, no matter how lunatic their theories, believes their “conclusion comes from the the [sic] logic of the premise and FACTS”. The number of conspirators per your theory would have to be prohibitively large. You still haven’t explained why the FAA inspectors – who only had limited contact with Hanjour - should have suspected him if the people at the flight school - who had many hours of contact with him - didn’t. +end Colby ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- part one ANSWER ANSWER THE MOLA ?????? MONEY . Really Mr. Colby your posts show weak 2D thinking. (Historycommons) When Hani Hanjour attended flight schools between 1996 and 1998 he was found to be a “weak student” who “was wasting our resources” (see October 1996-December 1997), and when he tried using a flight simulator, “He had only the barest understanding what the instruments were there to do.” (see 1998) Yet, on this day, he is certified as a multi-engine commercial pilot by Daryl Strong in Tempe, Arizona. Strong is one of many private examiners independently contracted with the FAA. A spokesperson for the FAA’s workers union will later complain that contractors like Strong “receive between $200 and $300 for each flight check. If they get a reputation for being tough, they won’t get any business.” Hanjour’s new license allows him to begin passenger jet training at other flight schools, despite having limited flying skills and an extremely poor grasp of English If they get a reputation for being tough, they won’t get any business. = $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ maybe Colby should be called 2D ?? OH,BTW FLIGHT SCHOOL Soooooo upset with Hanjour they DO !! contact FAA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! even if this effects the $$$$$$$ money !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (see below) The flight school again alerts the FAA about this and gives a total of five alerts about Hanjour, but no further action on him is taken. The FBI is not told about Hanjour. [CBS News, 5/10/2002] Ironically, in July ___________________________________________________________part two Sorry, Hanjour was in AZ in the SUMMER 2001. He had payed for ,I recall ,34 hours of simulator,but took only 21 hours,so this would explain not being on payment records,they owed him 13 hours. COLBY + Get back to us when you have a source. But even if he was, it would only reinforce the evidence Williams did not follow his own advice.+ END COLBY -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Historycommons is source Mr. 2D ugh Colby. Hani Hanjour practices on a Boeing 737-200 simulator for a total of 21 hours at the JetTech International flight school in Phoenix, Arizona. Hanjour also attends ground school and pays just under $7,500 for the training. Despite only completing 21 of his originally scheduled 34 hours of simulator training, according to the FBI this is the best-trained of the four hijacker pilots (see Spring-Summer 2001). However, an instructor comments: “Student made numerous errors during performance… including a lack of understanding of some basic concepts… Some of the concepts involved in large jet systems cannot be fully comprehended by someone with only small prop plane experience.” [uS District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia; Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ] The school contacts the FAA to warn it of Hanjour’s poor English and flying skills (see January-February 2001). Hanjour was in AZ SEE BELOW HIS NAME IS ON SCHOOL DOCUMENT June 23,2001 for flight simulator. (WAKE UP ALL 2D PEOPLE !!! )) Now FBI thinks Hanjour in AZ in summer 2001 (see last info) Hanjour had trained at the Sawyer School of Aviation previously (see 1998), and there is some evidence he returns there. One school document records Hanjour’s name for use of a flight simulator on June 23, 2001, though his name does not appear on payment records. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------++++ There are also indications that Hanjour signs up to use a flight simulator in August with three other Muslim men, including al-Salmi. One Sawyer employee is fairly certain she sees Hanjour during the summer. Another witness sees Hanjour with al-Salmi elsewhere in Phoenix. The 9/11 Commission will note that the evidence of Hanjour training in Phoenix during the summer is not definitive, but “the FBI’s Phoenix office believes it is plausible that Hanjour return to Arizona for additional training.” ############################################OOOOOOO#################################################### Secret Team at work in State Department -------------------------------------ooo++++ 1998: Diplomatic Passports Help Stifle FBI Investigation into Bin Laden Family Michael Scheuer, the head of the CIA Counter Terrorism Center’s special unit focusing on bin Laden from 1996 to 1999 (see February 1996), later will claim that before 9/11 members of the bin Laden family in the US are nearly completely off limits to US law enforcement. Author Douglas Farah, a former longtime Washington Post reporter, later will write that “All the bin Ladens living in the United States were granted Saudi diplomatic passports in 1996.… In 1998, when the FBI’s New York office actually sought to investigate some of the bin Laden family’s activities in this country because of suspicions of ties to terrorism, the State Department forced them to shut down the entire operation. Because the bin Laden’s were ‘diplomats’ and as such enjoyed diplomatic immunity, making such investigations illegal.” Scheuer will comment about the 1998 investigation, “My counterparts at the FBI questioned one of the bin Ladens. But then the State Department received a complaint from a law firm, and there was a huge uproar. We were shocked to find out that the bin Ladens in the United States had diplomatic passports, and that we weren’t allowed to talk to them.” Scheuer believes that these unusual diplomatic privileges may help explain how the bin Ladens will be able to depart so quickly just after 9/11 (see September 13, 2001; September 14-19, 2001). Farah later says he interviewed Scheuer about this and claims to have found a second source to verify the information. [Farah, 12/5/2004; Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 6/6/2005] The issue of diplomatic passports for the bin Laden family has generally not been reported in the US media, although a 2005 New Yorker article will mention in passing that in 1996, “the State Department stymied a joint effort by the CIA and the FBI to question one of bin Laden’s cousins in America, because he had a diplomatic passport, which protects the holder from US law enforcement.” [New Yorker, 2/8/2005] This is a probable reference to the 1996 investigation of Abdullah Awad bin Laden (although he is bin Laden’s nephew, not cousin (see February-September 11, 1996)). It is unclear what connection there may be, if any, between that investigation and this 1998 investigation. ------------------------------------------------- SEEMS Steinger cant keep story straight.....WHY ????? Steinger will later give a series of conflicting explanations about why she reversed her decision and issued the visa (see August 1, 2002, January 20, 2003, and December 30, 2003). After 9/11, a former consular official named Michael Springmann will say that while serving in Jeddah during the Soviet-Afghan War he was sometimes pressured to reverse denials of visa applications by the CIA for apparent mujaheddin (see September 1987-March 1989). .........................................................................(more detail) The application is dealt with by consular officer Shayna Steinger, who issues a total of 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers (see July 1, 2000) and who rejected Hanjour’s previous application. [9/11 Commission, 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State), 1/30/2003] Hanjour apparently applies for a student visa, not a tourist visa, as he had done previously, saying he wishes to attend a language school in California. Steinger will later recall that Hanjour, or someone acting on his behalf, submits an I-20 INS school enrollment form, the documentation required for the visa. She will say: “It came to me, you know, at the end of the day to look at it. I saw he had an I-20 and it [his visa] was issued.” This apparently allows Hanjour to overcome his previous rejection, as the two applications are treated as one case. The INS had approved a change of status for Hanjour to attend the same school in 1996, but Steinger does not know of this. She will later say that, if she had known, she might have denied the visa. Although a photocopy of a student visa in Hanjour’s passport will later be made public, Steinger now enters the visa in the State Department’s records as a business/tourist visa. (Note: the visa in Hanjour’s passport may be changed upon his entry to the US (see December 8, 2000).) [9/11 Commission, 12/30/2002, pp. 13-14, 38] Steinger will later give conflicting accounts of her issuance of this visa. She will first falsely claim to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that she issued the visa under the Visa Express program and that Hanjour was not even present during the first application on September 10 (see August 1, 2002), but will later change her story for the State Department’s inspector general (see January 20, 2003) and the 9/11 Commission (see December 30, 2003). ############################################ OOOOOOO##############++#####################################++++++++++++++++++++oooo The Secret Team at work..IN TWO PARTS .....no investigation...(FBI inside FBI) part one, CIA lies to 911 Commission (CIA inside CIA) part,two. oooooooooooooOOOOooooooooooo Below for the 2D thinkers..... ############################################OOOOOOO########################################### PART one June 16, 1993: Ali Mohamed Detained in Vancouver; FBI Tells Canadian Authorities He Is an FBI Informant Essam Marzouk. [source: FBI]US-al-Qaeda double agent Ali Mohamed is detained by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in Vancouver, British Columbia, after attempting to pick up a man named Essam Marzouk, who is carrying numerous false passports. They identify Mohamed as a top al-Qaeda operative. Mohamed admits to them that he traveled to Vancouver to help Marzouk sneak into the US and admits working closely with bin Laden. [san Francisco Chronicle, 11/4/2001; Globe and Mail, 11/22/2001; Wall Street Journal, 11/26/2001] After many hours of questioning, Mohamed tells the Canadian officials to call John Zent, his handler at the FBI. Zent confirms that Mohamed works for the FBI and asks them to release him. They do. [Lance, 2006, pp. 124] Mohamed is accompanied by fellow al-Qaeda operative Khaled Abu el-Dahab (see 1987-1998), who brings $3,000 sent by bin Laden to pay for Marzouk’s bail. Marzouk had run one of bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan and was an active member of the al-Qaeda allied group Islamic Jihad at the time. However, Canadian intelligence apparently is not aware of his past. Marzouk will spend almost a year in detention. But then, again with the help of another visit to Canada by Mohamed, Marzouk will be released and allowed to live in Canada (see June 16, 1993-February 1998). He later will help train the bombers of the 1998 African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [Globe and Mail, 11/22/2001; National Post, 11/26/2005] Jack Cloonan, an FBI agent who later investigates Mohamed, will later say, “I don’t think you have to be an agent who has worked terrorism all your life to realize something is terribly amiss here. What was the follow up? It just sort of seems like [this incident] dies.” [Lance, 2006, pp. 125 ##########################################OOOOOOOO############################# PART two January 14, 2004: 9/11 Commission First Learns of Clinton Order to Assassinate Bin Laden The 9/11 Commission first learns that the US had a program to assassinate Osama bin Laden before 9/11 (see December 24, 1998). The program, which is disclosed to the commission’s staff by former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, was a response to the African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). The commission was not previously aware of the order and when Berger tells them about it they are confused, because the CIA has been telling them there was no such order for months. When the commission tells Berger what the CIA has said, he assures them that there is an explicit document, a memorandum of notification concerning Afghanistan, that gives the CIA the authority to kill bin Laden, not just capture him. It is unclear why CIA managers repeatedly told the commission there was no such order (see Before January 14, 2004). [shenon, 2008, pp. 253-254] _____________________________________ Why would the CIA lie ???? WHY ??? Edited June 8, 2011 by Steven Gaal Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Len Colby Posted June 10, 2011 Share Posted June 10, 2011 #################################OOOOOOOO###########################++++ Hanjour license ----------------- COLBY QUOTE + How would forcing Hanjour to re-take his commercial pilot’s exam have thwarted the “plot”? + END Colby No license ,no "real" simulator time,no jet training.Hanjour’s new license allows him to begin passenger jet training at other flight schools, despite having limited flying skills. He still had his private license, present evidence he couldn’t have rented simulator time without a commercial one. Even IF that would have been a problem as you so helpfully pointed out the system was subject to abuse because private examiners have a financial incentive to pass as many candidates as possible. All Hanjour had to do was go back to the same guy or find another who was equally lenient. #################################OOOOOOOO##############################++++FAA SOURCE COLBY +The aviation agency said, however, that throughout the life of the rule not a single U.S. air carrier took advantage of it, effectively rendering it "moot," according to one agency official. End COLBY SOURCE ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some security experts speculate that had airlines taken advantage of the rule, it likely would not have been rescinded by the FAA. And if it had been implemented by the airlines, they say, the Sept. 11 hijackings ? which led to the deaths of nearly 3,000 people in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. ? may never have occurred. ( from WND) Golly better be sure about 911 even if policy (pilots with guns) not being used. (COLBY 2D thinking) (Golly wasnt "W" pro GUN ??) Is it possible Colby cant think "AS" a conspirator ?? -------------------------------------------------------------------++++ Lets try and think logically Gaal, perhaps you can do so if you really try. No airlines expressed interest in arming pilots for 40 years (480 months) the odds then that one would happen to ask to do so over the next 2 months are 1:240, actually less because if they wanted to do so they would have do so when the rule was introduced or when hijackings became common again in the 1970s and the head of a pilots association said ‘the entire airline industry, has "historically been against arming pilots"”, so 1:1000 is being very generous. But it probably would have taken a least a month to arm pilots “According to FAA officials, the rule required airlines to apply to the agency for their pilots to carry guns in cockpits and for the airlines to put pilots through an agency-approved firearms training course.” So were down to less than 1:2000.But even these long odds are for any 1 particular airline doing so. If we calculate for 20 airlines we’re down under 1:20,000 for either UA or AA doing so and 1:400,000,000 for both. But that’s for any pilots of those companies being armed. Even if I’m very generous and assume they could have trained 1 in 10 pilots before 9/11 you’re down to less than 1:100,000 that any of the pilots would have had guns. But since they would have taken by surprise, strapped into their seats with their backs to the door the odds that an armed pilot could have killed the hijackers were very slim. But that’s not the end of your fallacy before 9/11 air crews were trained to cooperate with hijackers because historically very few passengers or crew members were killed during hijackings and it was believed a struggle in the air would be far more risky. Also see if you can find any independent confirmation that there had been such rule and it was changed in July 2001. The story is very sketchy it did not include: -the rule # - the date it was issued -the exact date it was rescinded - exact quotes of the rule or the declaration annulling it. - the names of the supposed experts. Airlines /FAA say pilots carrying guns maybe woundnt have stop 911.....its CYA (cant figure out CYA. .. lawsuits ...COLBY 2D thinking)################################OOOOOOOO##################################++++ Hanjour in AZ in summer 2001 ANSWER PART one and part two Colby + Everyone, no matter how lunatic their theories, believes their “conclusion comes from the the [sic] logic of the premise and FACTS”. The number of conspirators per your theory would have to be prohibitively large. You still haven’t explained why the FAA inspectors – who only had limited contact with Hanjour - should have suspected him if the people at the flight school - who had many hours of contact with him - didn’t. +end Colby ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- part one ANSWER ANSWER THE MOLA ?????? MONEY . Really Mr. Colby your posts show weak 2D thinking. (Historycommons) When Hani Hanjour attended flight schools between 1996 and 1998 he was found to be a “weak student” who “was wasting our resources” (see October 1996-December 1997), and when he tried using a flight simulator, “He had only the barest understanding what the instruments were there to do.” (see 1998) Yet, on this day, he is certified as a multi-engine commercial pilot by Daryl Strong in Tempe, Arizona. Strong is one of many private examiners independently contracted with the FAA. A spokesperson for the FAA’s workers union will later complain that contractors like Strong “receive between $200 and $300 for each flight check. If they get a reputation for being tough, they won’t get any business.” Hanjour’s new license allows him to begin passenger jet training at other flight schools, despite having limited flying skills and an extremely poor grasp of English If they get a reputation for being tough, they won’t get any business. = $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ maybe Colby should be called 2D ?? OH,BTW FLIGHT SCHOOL Soooooo upset with Hanjour they DO !! contact FAA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! even if this effects the $$$$$$$ money !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (see below) You conflated flight schools with flight examiners. So my question remains unanswered, why should the FAA have suspected him of being anything worse that an incompetent pilot? The folks at the school didn’t suspect “Hani” let alone report him to the FBI. The flight school again alerts the FAA about this and gives a total of five alerts about Hanjour, but no further action on him is taken. The FBI is not told about Hanjour. [CBS News, 5/10/2002] Ironically, in July___________________________________________________________part two Sorry, Hanjour was in AZ in the SUMMER 2001. He had payed for ,I recall ,34 hours of simulator,but took only 21 hours,so this would explain not being on payment records,they owed him 13 hours. COLBY + Get back to us when you have a source. But even if he was, it would only reinforce the evidence Williams did not follow his own advice.+ END COLBY -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Historycommons is source Mr. 2D ugh Colby. Hani Hanjour practices on a Boeing 737-200 simulator for a total of 21 hours at the JetTech International flight school in Phoenix, Arizona. Hanjour also attends ground school and pays just under $7,500 for the training. Despite only completing 21 of his originally scheduled 34 hours of simulator training, according to the FBI this is the best-trained of the four hijacker pilots (see Spring-Summer 2001). However, an instructor comments: “Student made numerous errors during performance… including a lack of understanding of some basic concepts… Some of the concepts involved in large jet systems cannot be fully comprehended by someone with only small prop plane experience.” [uS District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia; Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ] The school contacts the FAA to warn it of Hanjour’s poor English and flying skills (see January-February 2001). Hanjour was in AZ SEE BELOW HIS NAME IS ON SCHOOL DOCUMENT June 23,2001 for flight simulator. (WAKE UP ALL 2D PEOPLE !!! )) Here’s the 9/11 Timeline’s cited source, tell which of the 50 pages supports the claim he (emphasis added), “had [sic] PAYED [sic] for…,34 hours of simulator,but took only 21”, even the Timeline only said he was “scheduled” for that much time. The only invoice or bill I found indicated as the Timeline noted he paid “just under $7,500” but only shows him paying for 12 hours (pages 20 -23, in quadruplicate) http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/exhibits/prosecution/PX00021.pdf Now FBI thinks Hanjour in AZ in summer 2001 (see last info)Hanjour had trained at the Sawyer School of Aviation previously (see 1998), and there is some evidence he returns there. One school document records Hanjour’s name for use of a flight simulator on June 23, 2001, though his name does not appear on payment records. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------++++ There are also indications that Hanjour signs up to use a flight simulator in August with three other Muslim men, including al-Salmi. One Sawyer employee is fairly certain she sees Hanjour during the summer. Another witness sees Hanjour with al-Salmi elsewhere in Phoenix. The 9/11 Commission will note that the evidence of Hanjour training in Phoenix during the summer is not definitive, but “the FBI’s Phoenix office believes it is plausible that Hanjour return to Arizona for additional training.” LOL - Look in a dictionary to find the difference between ‘plausible’ and ‘probable’ ############################################OOOOOOO#################################################### Secret Team at work in State Department -------------------------------------ooo++++ 1998: Diplomatic Passports Help Stifle FBI Investigation into Bin Laden Family Michael Scheuer, the head of the CIA Counter Terrorism Center’s special unit focusing on bin Laden from 1996 to 1999 (see February 1996), later will claim that before 9/11 members of the bin Laden family in the US are nearly completely off limits to US law enforcement. Author Douglas Farah, a former longtime Washington Post reporter, later will write that “All the bin Ladens living in the United States were granted Saudi diplomatic passports in 1996.… In 1998, when the FBI’s New York office actually sought to investigate some of the bin Laden family’s activities in this country because of suspicions of ties to terrorism, the State Department forced them to shut down the entire operation. Because the bin Laden’s were ‘diplomats’ and as such enjoyed diplomatic immunity, making such investigations illegal.” Scheuer will comment about the 1998 investigation, “My counterparts at the FBI questioned one of the bin Ladens. But then the State Department received a complaint from a law firm, and there was a huge uproar. We were shocked to find out that the bin Ladens in the United States had diplomatic passports, and that we weren’t allowed to talk to them.” Scheuer believes that these unusual diplomatic privileges may help explain how the bin Ladens will be able to depart so quickly just after 9/11 (see September 13, 2001; September 14-19, 2001). Farah later says he interviewed Scheuer about this and claims to have found a second source to verify the information. [Farah, 12/5/2004; Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 6/6/2005] The issue of diplomatic passports for the bin Laden family has generally not been reported in the US media, although a 2005 New Yorker article will mention in passing that in 1996, “the State Department stymied a joint effort by the CIA and the FBI to question one of bin Laden’s cousins in America, because he had a diplomatic passport, which protects the holder from US law enforcement.” [New Yorker, 2/8/2005] This is a probable reference to the 1996 investigation of Abdullah Awad bin Laden (although he is bin Laden’s nephew, not cousin (see February-September 11, 1996)). It is unclear what connection there may be, if any, between that investigation and this 1998 investigation. • Is English NOT your native language, the Bin Ladens’ diplomatic passports were issued by the Saudi not the US government. • Provide evidence any of the ones in the US were involved in 9/11 ------------------------------------------------- SEEMS Steinger cant keep story straight.....WHY ????? Perhaps because she issued hundreds of visas a day and about 20,000 when she was in Jeddah. Only a kook would think it odd that under those circumstances someone’s recall of the details would be fuzzy years later. ############################################ OOOOOOO##############++#####################################++++++++++++++++++++oooo The Secret Team at work..IN TWO PARTS .....no investigation...(FBI inside FBI) part one, CIA lies to 911 Commission (CIA inside CIA) part,two. oooooooooooooOOOOooooooooooo Below for the 2D thinkers..... ############################################OOOOOOO########################################### PART one June 16, 1993: Ali Mohamed Detained in Vancouver; FBI Tells Canadian Authorities He Is an FBI Informant Essam Marzouk. [source: FBI]US-al-Qaeda double agent Ali Mohamed is detained by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in Vancouver, British Columbia, after attempting to pick up a man named Essam Marzouk, who is carrying numerous false passports. They identify Mohamed as a top al-Qaeda operative. Mohamed admits to them that he traveled to Vancouver to help Marzouk sneak into the US and admits working closely with bin Laden. [san Francisco Chronicle, 11/4/2001; Globe and Mail, 11/22/2001; Wall Street Journal, 11/26/2001] After many hours of questioning, Mohamed tells the Canadian officials to call John Zent, his handler at the FBI. Zent confirms that Mohamed works for the FBI and asks them to release him. They do. [Lance, 2006, pp. 124] Mohamed is accompanied by fellow al-Qaeda operative Khaled Abu el-Dahab (see 1987-1998), who brings $3,000 sent by bin Laden to pay for Marzouk’s bail. Marzouk had run one of bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan and was an active member of the al-Qaeda allied group Islamic Jihad at the time. However, Canadian intelligence apparently is not aware of his past. Marzouk will spend almost a year in detention. But then, again with the help of another visit to Canada by Mohamed, Marzouk will be released and allowed to live in Canada (see June 16, 1993-February 1998). He later will help train the bombers of the 1998 African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [Globe and Mail, 11/22/2001; National Post, 11/26/2005] Jack Cloonan, an FBI agent who later investigates Mohamed, will later say, “I don’t think you have to be an agent who has worked terrorism all your life to realize something is terribly amiss here. What was the follow up? It just sort of seems like [this incident] dies.” [Lance, 2006, pp. 125 Read Lance’s book Mohamed pretended to be an FBI informant while actually being an AQ loyalist. ##########################################OOOOOOOO############################# PART two January 14, 2004: 9/11 Commission First Learns of Clinton Order to Assassinate Bin Laden The 9/11 Commission first learns that the US had a program to assassinate Osama bin Laden before 9/11 (see December 24, 1998). The program, which is disclosed to the commission’s staff by former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, was a response to the African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). The commission was not previously aware of the order and when Berger tells them about it they are confused, because the CIA has been telling them there was no such order for months. When the commission tells Berger what the CIA has said, he assures them that there is an explicit document, a memorandum of notification concerning Afghanistan, that gives the CIA the authority to kill bin Laden, not just capture him. It is unclear why CIA managers repeatedly told the commission there was no such order (see Before January 14, 2004). [shenon, 2008, pp. 253-254] _____________________________________ Why would the CIA lie ???? WHY ??? OMG the CIA lied about a top secret program! What a surprise! Why lie about it? Off the top of my head; 1) They did not know it had been declassified 2) Berger divulged classified information 3) It was declassified after the Agency last spoke to them 4) CYA for their failure to get the job done. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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