Tippit ballistics: is it established that Oswald's revolver was the murder weapon?

[Greg Doudna]

TIPPIT BALLISTICS

The FBI lab found that cartridge hulls turned over to the FBI identified as hulls found at the Tippit crime scene—Q74, Q75, Q76, Q77—had been fired from Oswald’s revolver to the exclusion of any other weapon (3H466). But how certain is it that those hulls were the hulls found at the Tippit crime scene?  

There are officers testifying to the Warren Commission that they marked cartridge hulls at the scene (without identifying their mark on specific evidence hulls shown to them). There is an unsigned FBI report to the Warren Commission stating that three Dallas Police officers confirmed to an FBI agent identification of their marks on evidence hulls to that FBI agent (but there are no interview reports from that FBI agent reporting that, nor document or testimony from any of those three Dallas Police officers saying that directly under their own signed name or under oath). There is an officer testifying under oath that he “believe[d]” he had put marks on evidence hulls Q74 and Q75, though the Warren Commission ultimately concluded that one of that officer’s two sworn beliefs was not true, that he never marked Q75, dismissing that officer’s sworn testimony that he believed he did--the only officer who gave sworn testimony purporting to establish chain of custody of the hulls. 

In short, there is no instance among the five Dallas police officers known to have marked the four hulls found at the Tippit crime scene, prior to those hulls turned over to the Dallas Police crime lab for safekeeping, who, under oath in testimony to the Warren Commission, or in any other setting under oath, clearly, straightforwardly, and unambiguously identified their mark on a specific evidence hull and identified that hull as the hull they received and marked at the scene of the crime. It is an odd lacuna, easily missed.

To cut to the chase

The theory of the case developed here is that there were four corruptions in Dallas Police Department handling of the ballistics evidence in the Tippit case (analysis to follow will develop the third below).

(1) (Happened.) The Dallas Police disappeared a revolver in a paper bag found near a street curb in downtown Dallas by a citizen and turned in to the Homicide and Robbery Division of the Dallas Police Department at 7:30 am Sat Nov 23, 1963. The find circumstances have the appearance of a disposal of a weapon used in a professional or gangland killing. Officer Tippit was killed in Oak Cliff with the same kind of weapon thirty hours earlier. It is not clear whether a decision to disappear the paper-bag revolver was carried out before or after the Dallas Police submitted the evidence hulls to Dallas FBI on Nov 28, received by the FBI lab in Washington, D.C. Nov 30 (3H465), and found to have been fired from Oswald's revolver. Suggested interpretation of DPD action: the paper-bag revolver threatened to disrupt the Oswald narrative and take the Tippit killing and perhaps the JFK assassination in unwanted directions toward a role of organized crime if it had been pursued.

(2) (Happened.) The Dallas Police Department, Homicide and Robbery Division, did not hand over to the FBI but withheld three of four bullets taken from Tippit's body, after being asked by both the President and the FBI to hand over all relevant physical evidence in their possession to the FBI and having informed the FBI that it had done so (https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=39#relPageId=482). Suggested interpretation of DPD action: fear that forensic examination could find a mismatch to Oswald's revolver.

(3) (Conjectured.) Four .38 Special cartridge hulls found at the scene of the crime marked by officers were replaced by four hulls from cartridges fired from Oswald's revolver. Marks were put on the substituted hulls attempting to imitate, not entirely successfully, the officers' marks on the original hulls. Following this, the newly-marked cartridge hulls fired from Oswald’s revolver were handed over to the FBI to examine whether they were fired from Oswald’s revolver. Suggested reason: fear that examination of the hulls found at the crime scene could show a mismatch to Oswald's revolver.

(4) (Conjectured.) Three live .38 Special cartridges of Winchester-Western manufacture of six taken from Oswald's revolver were replaced by three live cartridges of Remington-Peters manufacture. Reason: removal of a perceived inconsistency between bullets found in Oswald's revolver and pants pocket which may originally have been all Winchester-Westerns, whereas the gunman at the Tippit crime scene used bullets of both brand names. 

Other factors to consider for context:

• The Dallas Police ballistics evidence in the Tippit case, with the exception of the bullet slugs from Tippit's body, was in the custody of the DPD Crime Lab headed by Lieut. John C. Day, who was suspected with respect to an item of physical evidence in the JFK assassination of having forged an Oswald palm print on a rifle, by both the FBI liaison to the Dallas Police Department, FBI Special Agent Vincent Drain of Dallas, and by the Warren Commission. To repeat: the Dallas Police crime lab was suspected by the Warren Commission of fabricating physical evidence to incriminate Oswald on a different matter (compare HSCA 11, pp. 218-220, https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=83#relPageId=224). (FBI examination did subsequently confirm that Day's palm print had been lifted from the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle barrel as Day claimed, but what was not resolved was FBI Special Agent Drain's belief that the palm print had been improperly planted on the rifle barrel before the print was lifted. FBI Special Agent Drain: "All I can figure is that it [Oswald's palm print] was some sort of cushion, because they [Dallas Police] were getting a lot of heat by Sunday night [Nov 24]. You could take the print off Oswald's card and put it on the rifle. Something like that happened" [Drain, quoted Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, 107-109 at 109]).
• There is cause to suppose that fingerprints lifted from two locations on the Tippit patrol car, suspected to be from the Tippit killer, were known to be a mismatch to Oswald but that that was not disclosed, based on the ease with which a first non-DPD examination in 1994 found a non-match to Oswald not previously reported, and that a single individual left the prints at both the right front fender and under the right front passenger window where the killer had been observed. The fingerprints themselves did not appear in the Warren Commission exhibits nor had they been given to the FBI for analysis. Instead, the Dallas Police crime lab informed the Warren Commission that all the prints were too smeared to be of any value in yielding useful information, when that was found in 1994 not to have been true. 
• A Dallas Police commanding officer either lost or intentionally disappeared written names and addresses of theatre patrons in the Texas Theatre when Oswald was in that theatre on Nov 22, 1963, which had been collected by officers at the theatre, such that it was not possible to interview those witnesses.

In this reconstruction there were no substitutions in the four body bullets of Tippit, in the revolver of Oswald, or the five live shells found by officers Boyd and Sims in Oswald's pants pocket. There was no planting of cartridge hulls at the scene, planting of a revolver on Oswald's person, or suborning of witnesses to commit perjury and risk possible criminal prosecution for perjury. There was no corruption in the FBI lab with respect to analysis and reporting of its findings. There was no willingness to lie under oath with respect to the cartridge hulls on the part of the officers who reported to the Tippit crime scene that day and marked those hulls.

Method

One way to test theories is to ask: on the assumption that this theory were true, what would one expect to happen, if so?

If, for example, the reconstruction of the case here is correct, one might expect to see in the known evidence and testimony:

• Officers noticing otherwise-unidentified marks on the evidence hulls which somewhat resemble their own but look different from their own, at the same time unable to find their own marks, causing confusion and uncertainty in identifications of marks.
• Officers when asked prior to their testimony if they were prepared or willing to make a positive identification of their mark on a specific evidence hull expressing uncertainty or reluctance to do so under oath, and responsive to that, if called to testify are not questioned on that point.
• One way of dealing with an inability to obtain clear testimony under oath of officers identifying their marks on evidence hulls would be to "conceal" that by workarounds.

On the other hand, if the four cartridge hulls handed over by the Dallas Police Department crime lab to the FBI for examination were the same four hulls found at the scene of the crime as represented—a straightforward, clean handling and conveyance of those four hulls—one might expect:

• Officers who marked those hulls, in their testimony before the Warren Commission, would be shown a specific hull, asked if they could identify their mark on that hull, then asked if they could identify that hull as the one they had marked, and would do so clearly and unambiguously under oath, as part of the vast quantity of Warren Commission testimony taken under oath.
• Officers who had marked the hulls would normally be expected to be able to find and identify their own marks without difficulty, and so testify under oath.

Following is an examination of the testimonies of the five officers who marked the four cartridge hulls found at the Tippit crime scene.

Patrolman J. M. Poe

Mr. Ball. Did you put any markings on the hulls?

Mr. Poe. I couldn’t swear to it; no, sir. 

(…)

Mr. Ball. What did you do with the hulls?

Mr. Poe. I turned the hulls into the crime lab, which was at the scene.

Mr. Ball. Do you know the name of the man with the crime lab or from the crime lab?

Mr. Poe. I couldn’t swear to it. I believe Pete Barnes, but I wouldn’t swear to it.

(…)

Mr. Ball. Now, I have here a package which has been marked “Q”—FBI lab. Q-74 to Q-77. Would you look those over and see if there is any identification on there by you to indicate that those were the hulls given to you by [citizen] Benavides?

Mr. Poe. I want to say these two are mine, but I couldn’t swear to it.

Mr. Ball. Did you make a mark?

Mr. Poe. I can’t swear to it; no, sir.

Mr. Ball. But there is a mark on two of these?

Mr. Poe. There is a mark. I believe I put on them, but I couldn’t swear to it. I couldn’t make them out any more.

Mr. Ball. Now, the ones you said you made a mark on are you think it is these two? Q-77 and Q-75?

Mr. Poe. Yes, sir; those two there.

Mr. Ball. Both marked Western Special? They both are marked Western Special? How long did you stay there?

Mr. Poe. At the scene?

Mr. Ball. Uh-huh.

Comment: Poe picks two he “want[s] to say” are his, although he says he “couldn’t swear to it” (saying this while under oath). He makes a tentative identification of two of the evidence hulls after saying he couldn’t swear to it, based on he thought he had marked two out of the four, even though he cannot identify his marks. But the marks are the basis for identification in chain of custody! If Poe cannot identify the marks that he does see as his, what is his basis for tentatively identifying any hulls at all? It appears Poe was influenced by marks on two of the hulls which may have resembled his own even though they looked sufficiently different that he could not recognize them as his. The following account from Henry Hurt, Reasonable Doubt (1985), 152-55, is so jaw-dropping I can do no better than quote it at length.

“In 1984, Poe explained to the author that he was absolutely certain that he marked the shells. Indeed, he could not be certain of a single other instance during his twenty-eight years of police work when he had failed to properly mark evidence. He indicated that he became aware that he could not find his markings prior to his Warren Commission testimony ‘when the FBI came down and interviewed us … We were down in the [FBI] office, and I just could not be absolutely positive that my mark was in there.’ While Poe did not specifically say that he was pressured to ‘find’ his marks in the hulls, he volunteered this comment about his experience: ‘I wasn’t going to lie to the man and say I saw my mark when I didn’t. I still wouldn’t do that.’

“Officer Poe insisted to the author that even though he could not find his identifying marks, he felt certain that the hulls were the ones he had taken into evidence at the scene of the Tippit murder. Poe recalled one explanation that he had not mentioned to the Warren Commission two decades earlier. He stated that the reason he was not able to find his markings might have been that so many other identifying marks had been placed in the cartridge hulls, actually on top of his identifying marks, thus obscuring his markings in the thicket of marks from other officials through whose hand the evidence passed. Stated Poe: ‘When it came to [my] looking at them again, there were so many marks in there that I couldn’t find mine … In a better light, or [with] a magnifying glass, I might be able to pick it out.’

“Soon after Poe made this statement, the author examined the cartridge hulls at the National Archives with a lighted magnifying glass. Only Officer Poe can state whether his identifying mark is on the hulls, and he has stated that he cannot find it because it appears lost among so many other marks. What is readily apparent to anyone who examines the hulls is that while there are several identification marks scratched in them, in no case is a marking obliterating another marking. Moreover, in each hull at least 50 percent of the surface area around the inside rim has no marking at all, leaving ample space for even additional identifying marks. There is no conceivable reason for any marking to be placed over another marking.

“The markings in the hulls are distinctive and clearly seen—even with the naked eye. It seems impossible that if Poe’s marks were actually there, he could not find them. Confronted with this, Officer Poe flatly stated, ‘I [have] talked to you all I’m going to talk to you. You already got your mind made up about what you’re going to say. I know what the truth is.’ He then hung up the telephone, refusing to discuss the matter further.

“Dallas Police Sergeant Gerald Hill, a key figure in the arrest of Oswald, was one of the first policemen to arrive at the scene of the Tippit slaying (. . .) At the scene, Sergeant Hill inspected the cartridge hulls and ordered Officer Poe to mark them as evidence and turn them over to the crime lab.

“In 1984 the author interviewed Hill, who rose to the rank of lieutenant before his retirement from the police force (. . .) When asked if he believed the official version on Tippit’s death, he dismissed the question with bombast, stating that the cartridge hulls from the scene, proved to have been fired in Oswald’s pistol, sealed the case.

“The author referred to the grave inconsistencies concerning Poe’s identification of the hulls, suggesting the possibility that they might have been replaced by hulls not discovered at the scene and marked by Poe. The implication, of course, is that when the hulls marked by Poe were tested in the lab and were found not to have been fired from Oswald’s pistol, they were replaced by hulls that had been fired from Oswald’s pistol—after it came into the custody of the police. (. . .)

“Hill dismissed the suggestion with the following statement: ‘If they did that [replaced the cartridge hulls], they would also have forged Poe’s marks.’

“It was pointed out to Hill that, as the facts prove, it made no difference that Poe’s marks could not be found. The evidence still became the cornerstone of the case against Oswald in the killing of Tippit. Hill acknowledged that the circumstances concerning the apparent disappearance of Poe’s marks made it appear that something like this might have been done. Then, Hill added, ‘If it were any other police department in the United States, I would say that is possible. But this department is so clean that it scares me.’” 

Hill cites Dallas Police Department exceptionalism as a basis for confidence that police cooking of evidence would not have happened in the Tippit case, even though Hill, a retired officer himself, acknowledged “if it were any other police department in the United States, I would say that is possible.” 

Sergeant W. E. Barnes 

Mr. Belin. Now you mentioned out there that some cartridge cases were found, is that correct?

Mr. Barnes. That is true.

Mr. Belin. Sergeant, I will ask you to examine Commission Exhibits Nos. Q-74, Q-75, Q-76, and Q-77, and ask you to state whether or not there appears to be any identification marks on any of these exhibits that appear to show that they were examined or identified by you?

Mr. Barnes. I placed “B”, the best that I could, inside of the hull of Exhibit 74—I believe it was Q-74 and Q-75, as you have them identified.

Comment: The “I believe it was” interrupts and qualifies the uncompleted thought of the preceding phrase in which Q74 and Q75 appear about to have been spoken together. Barnes then continued the sentence, with the clarification, to include the originally intended naming of the two evidence hulls. That is, Barnes starts out saying declaratively, “I placed ‘B’… inside… Exhibit 74” and was about to continue *“and Exhibit 75” but interrupted himself mid-sentence to walk back the tone of certainty to a corrected, less certain “I believe it was Q-74” and “I believe it was… Q-75”, basically the same as saying “I think it was those two” (but don’t press me too hard because I’m really not sure).  

“I believe it was Q-74 and Q-75” suggests uncertainty. Does he not know for sure? How strong was his belief? Belin does not ask but does a common practice of Warren Commission counsels in trying to tease useful testimony out of witnesses: he circles around and returns to it again hoping for a more direct or straightforward answer. Note below that Belin asks not if Barnes could identify his mark on the exhibits, but rather how many of the exhibits Barnes could identify.

(. . .)

Mr. Belin. Now all four of these exhibits appear to be cartridge case hulls, is that correct?

Mr. Barnes. .38 caliber.

Mr. Belin. .38 caliber pistol?

Mr. Barnes. Yes. 

Mr. Belin. They are kind of silver or chrome or grey in color? You can identify it that way?

Mr. Barnes. Yes.

Mr. Belin. How many of these hulls, to the best of your recollection, did you identify out there?

Mr. Barnes. I believe that the patrolman gave me two, and Captain Doughty received the third.

Mr. Belin. The two that the patrolman gave you, were the ones that you put this identification mark on the inside of?

Mr. Barnes. Yes.

Mr. Belin. What instrument did you use to place this mark?

Mr. Barnes. I used a diamond point pen.

Mr. Belin. You put it on Q-74 and Q-75?

Mr. Barnes. It looks like there are others that put their markings in there too.

Comment: Does not answer the question. The question calls for a yes or no answer. The “too” might be parsed as implying an unspoken affirmative answer to Belin’s question but it is not straightforward and Belin does not seek to have it clarified or remove ambiguity but turns to a different topic. This was a second failed attempt of Belin to get an unqualified statement of testimony from Barnes establishing chain of custody. Belin does not make a third attempt.

In a rather stunning postscript to this, the Warren Commission itself apparently came to conclude Barnes never put any mark on Q75 despite Barnes’ testimony that he believed he had. Barnes' Warren Commission testimony was April 7, 1964. The FBI reported that on June 15, 1964, Barnes told different identifications of evidence hulls he claimed he had marked, which did not include Q75.

"On June 15, 1964, the same cartridge cases, designated as Exhibits C47-C50 [= Q74-77], were shown by Special Agent Bardwell D. Odum to Pete Barnes, an officer of the Dallas Police Department assigned to the Crime Laboratory, and he identified his marking on two of these cases, which also bear the markings 'Q74' and 'Q77'. He advised these are the same two cartridge cases which he received from Office J. M. Poe of the Dallas Police Department at Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963.” (CE2011)

That is, according to this FBI report Barnes said in June that his belief stated in his sworn testimony to the Warren Commission in April that he had marked Q75 was not true. Apparently Barnes when looking at the evidence hulls in June decided that whatever mark he formerly believed he had made on Q75 had been made by somebody else. The unidentified author of CE2011, not under oath, reports a claim from FBI Special Agent Odum, also not under oath, of an interview with Barnes for which no “302” interview report of Odum exists, in which Barnes changed his identifications.

What is going on with this? The language of “belief” becomes comprehensible if Barnes had marked hulls at the crime scene and then, like Poe, saw marks on evidence hulls which did not look like he made them, but reasons they must be his because where else could his marks be. The reactions of Poe and Barnes are in agreement with encountering forged marks on substituted hulls. The reactions of Poe and Barnes are arguably not so easily in agreement with what would be expected if the marks were genuinely theirs.

Note finally that the two evidence hulls Poe “wanted to say” (but said he could not swear to it) that he had marked (Q75, Q77); the two which Barnes under oath testified he believed he had marked (Q74, Q75); and the final third-hand report by the FBI of a different identification set from Barnes (Q74, Q77), differ from one another, even though Poe and Barnes marked the same two hulls at the scene of the crime that day. 

Captain G. M. Doughty

He received and marked the third of the four hulls found at the Tippit crime scene. He was not called to testify before the Warren Commission. No known sworn testimony or signed statement from Doughty exists with respect to identification of his mark on an evidence shell. (But see below on CE2011.) 

Detective C. N. Dhority

He marked the fourth of the four hulls found at the Tippit crime scene prior to turning that hull over to the crime lab.

Mr. Ball. Now, what did you do with the empty hull that was given to you, that Virginia gave you?

Mr. Dhority. I gave it to Lieutenant Day in the crime lab.

Mr. Ball. Do you know whether or not Virginia or Jeanette Davis found an empty shell—did she tell you she found an empty shell—Jeannette Davis?

Mr. Dhority. I don’t recall—it seems like she told me she had found one earlier and gave it to the police out there, as well as I remember.

Mr. Ball. Gave it to the police that day?

Mr. Dhority. Yes; I believe so.

Comment: That is all the questions asked by Mr. Ball about the hull that Dhority marked, as he then turned to other matters. Dhority is not asked about his, Dhority's, marking of that hull, or whether he, Dhority, is able to identify one of the evidence hulls as the one he marked. Why was Dhority not asked those questions? 

Detective C. W. Brown

Mr. Brown. Lieutenant Wells ordered my partner, G. N. Dhority, and I, to go to the Davis residence where Mrs. Barbara Davis handed my partner this spent hull at approximately 7 p.m. that evening. That was brought to the homicide and robbery bureau by myself and Detective Dhority.

Mr. Belin. Was it brought to that bureau at the time you brought the two women?

Mr. Brown. At the same time the Davis women were brought to the office for affidavits and identification.

Mr. Belin. Who did you turn that cartridge shell over to?

Mr. Brown. That went to the crime lab, Dallas Crime Lab.

Mr. Belin. Did you, yourself, turn it over?

Mr. Brown. No; Detective Dhority handled that.

Mr. Belin. Detective Dhority handled that?

Mr. Brown. We were keeping this evidence in a chain there. Mrs. Barbara Jeanette Davis handed him the spent cartridge. He gave it to the crime lab himself which was initialed by both of us.

Mr. Belin. Anything else, sir?

Comment: That is all of the questions asked of Detective Brown concerning a hull he had marked, which is to say nothing at all. Brown testifies that he marked one of the Tippit crime scene hulls, but never is asked if he can identify that mark on one of the evidence hulls. 

As with the case with Dhority, the lack of Belin asking Brown to identify his mark on one of the evidence hulls has the appearance of knowledge on the part of Belin that Brown may not have offered the straightforward identification wanted, if he were asked. Otherwise, he would have been asked.

There is the appearance that none of these officers was willing to commit perjury. There is the appearance that all five of these officers attempted to be truthful, were not willing to say marks were theirs which they doubted were from them—or in the case of the one who did risk an identification under oath he qualified it with “I believe” (Barnes). These officers almost certainly were asked prior to their testimony such that it was known how they would have answered, if asked under oath in their testimony. If their answers were not what were wanted, that simply means they might not be asked those questions in open testimony before the Commission if it could be avoided.

The simplest explanation for the Warren Commission not obtaining straightforward identifications of evidence hull markings from officers under oath is that none of the officers were willing to commit perjury.

The anonymously-authored FBI report, CE2011

“On June 12, 1964, four .38 Special cartridge cases, designated as Exhibits C47-50 [Q74-77], were shown to Captain G. M. Doughty of the Dallas Poilce Department by Special Agent Bardwell D. Odum, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Captain Doughty identified his marking on one of these cases which also bears a marking ‘Q76’. Captain Doughty stated this is the same shell which he obtained from Barbara Jeanette Davis at Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963. (. . .)

“On June 12, 1964, the same four cartridge cases, designated as Exhibits C47-C50 [Q74-77], were shown by Special Agent Bardwell D. Odum to Detective C. N. Dhority, Homicide Division Dallas Police Department. Detective Dhority identified his marking on one of these cartridge cases which also is marked ‘Q75’. He stated this is the same cartridge case which he obtained from Virginia Davis, Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963. (. . .)

“On June 12, 1964, four .38 Special cartridge cases, designated as Exhibits C47-C50 [Q74-77], were shown to Dallas Police officer J. M. Poe at his home at 1716 Cascade, Mesquite, Texas, by Special Agent Bardwell D. Odum. Officer Poe stated he had received two similar cartridge cases on November 22, 1963, from Domingo Benavides at Dallas, Texas, and had on the same date given them to Pete Barnes, Crime Laboratory, Dallas Police Department. He stated he recalled marking these cases before giving them to Barnes, but he stated after a thorough examination of the four cartridges shown to him on June 12, 1964, he cannot locate his marks: therefore, he cannot positively identify any of these cartridges as being the same ones he received from Benavides. 

“On July 6, 1964, Officer J. M. Poe, Dallas Police Department, advised Special Agent Bardwell Odum that he marked the two cartridge cases on November 22, 1963, ‘J.M.P.’

“On June 15, 1964, the same cartridge cases, designated as Exhibits C47-C50 [Q74-77], were shown by Special Agent Bardwell D. Odum to Pete Barnes, an officer of the Dallas Police Department assigned to the Crime Laboratory, and he identified his marking on two of these cases, which also bear the markings ‘Q74’ and ‘Q77’. He advised these are the same two cartridge cases which he received from officer J. M. Poe of the Dallas Police Department at Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963.” (CE2011)

Comment: CE2011 is an unusual document. Dated July 7, 1964, issued under letterhead of FBI, Dallas, anonymously authored and unsigned by any human person, conveyed to the Warren Commission, the document states its purpose is to respond to the President’s Commission’s request for tracing various items of physical evidence. Its content consists of description of what FBI agents such as Bardwell Odum, in the case of the Tippit physical evidence, reported learning from various witnesses. If any error or misrepresentation were to come to light in CE2011 it is difficult to see that there would be accountability, since information from witnesses is presented in the form of thirdhand hearsay in a report authored anonymously and (unusually) with no known supporting FBI interview-report documentation for any of the witness interviews reported in CE2011, which appears to be out of keeping with usual FBI practice. A lack of interview reports underlying any of the FBI interviews in CE2011 came to light by accident with respect to a different ballistics issue unrelated to the Tippit case involving an emphatic and robust denial from Bardwell Odum to researchers Aguilar and Thompson visiting him in his home that he, Odum, had had anything to do with conducting several of the interviews attributed to him by the anonymous author of CE2011! See Aguilar and Thompson at http://whokilledjfk.net/magic_bullet.htm. Whether that was Odum being truthful, forgetful, dissembling, or some idea of a practical joke, remains unclear.

A pattern to what is missing

In Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s story, “Silver Blaze”, Sherlock Holmes studying a case suggested attention be given to “the curious incident of the dog in the night-time”. But, he was told, the dog did nothing in the night-time. “That was the curious incident,” said Sherlock Holmes. The point is something did not happen which should have happened.

Is it not obvious what was going on? The Warren Commission was functioning like a prosecutor making a case in court. They did not suborn perjury but presented the best case based on the evidence they had. The Warren Commission hearings and exhibits have no direct testimony from four of the five officers who marked hulls found at the Tippit crime scene, identifying their marks on evidence hulls Q74-Q77, because no such testimony was obtainable from those officers. In the fifth case, Barnes, the best that Belin could obtain was Barnes “believed” he could identify his marks on evidence hulls Q74 and Q75 which Belin could not get Barnes to express unambiguously, and CE2011 later reported that Barnes gave different identifications which repudiated the claim for Q75.

With nothing substantial in the form of unambiguous sworn testimony establishing chain of custody, CE2011 was a fallback or workaround, a document without name attached and layers of deniability. CE2011 asserts unsworn thirdhand hearsay identifications of physical evidence from officers none of whom stated such directly in their own name or under oath. With no unambiguous sworn testimony from a single officer establishing chain of custody, what is left is faith-based trust in Dallas Police sayso on this matter.

The pattern of lack of clear sworn testimony from five out of five officers involved calls for explanation. The explanation which must be excluded on the basis of evidence or argument, if the argument from ballistics analysis of the hulls is to be claimed as establishing that Oswald’s revolver was the weapon of the gunman at the Tippit crime scene, is: that there was a substitution of hulls fired from Oswald’s revolver, and attempts to replicate the same officer markings on the new hulls, before handover to the FBI for examination, in keeping with what in the UK is called police “stitching someone up” with physical evidence in order to bolster a case.

As Gary Murr put it long ago in a pioneering study in 1971, The Murder of Dallas Police Officer J. T. Tippit (1971), https://drive.google.com/file/d/15957gAzFZ5wYLbefq4F7cm7sm07ACY8N/view:

“In examining the relative testimony and Exhibits, I find myself agreeing with Cunningham and Nicol. CE594 [four evidence hulls in the Tippit case] were probably fired from CE143 [Oswald revolver], to the exclusion of all other weapons. But, the big question is whether or not CE594 [evidence hulls] represents the shells actually recovered from the scene of the Tippit murder. The people who found them were unable to identify them from CE594 [evidence hulls]. The Dallas police who handled and marked them were unable to find their identifying marks therefore they too were unable to pick them from CE594 [evidence hulls]. They made a good effort, undoubtedly for the Commission's benefit, but guessed wrongly. (. . .) The possibility of a switch in empty shells is the only logical alternative. Give the FBI four empty shells knowingly fired from CE143 [Oswald revolver]. It makes the task of proving that they were fired from CE143 [Oswald revolver] ‘to the exclusion of all other weapons’ light-years easier. Then Oswald could be ‘wrapped up real tight.’ Cunningham's (or any one else's) ability to identify CE594 [evidence hulls] as the shells actually recovered from the Tippit murder site was best explained by Counsel Eisenberg to Representative Ford during an exchange in Cunningham's testimony: Mr. Eisenberg. ‘...for the record only, this witness is unable to testify as to where they (CE594 [evidence hulls]) were picked up’ (3H465).”

On that last sentence, I imagine that put into the record at Cunningham's request!

Edited September 5, 2022 by Greg Doudna

[Tom Gram]

Great stuff Greg. On CE2011, the FBI specifically ordered that the interviews not be put into report form. The excuse was that the tracing of physical evidence was requested by the WC and thus was not official FBI business, or some crap like that: 

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=59608#relPageId=39

Here’s another example of the same kind of thing from Robert Gemberling, where he mentions the FBI specifically instructing that “certain allegations” disseminated via letterhead memoranda were “not necessary” to put into report form: 

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=62366#relPageId=5

An interesting side note about this is that CE2011 describes the Bardwell Odum interviews of Tomlinson and Wright about CE399. Odum told Tink Thompson and Gary Aguilar that he didn’t remember doing those interviews, and if he had they would have been written up in 302 reports. The above is why there were no 302 reports. 

[Greg Doudna]

 

5 hours ago, Tom Gram said:

Great stuff Greg. On CE2011, the FBI specifically ordered that the interviews not be put into report form. The excuse was that the tracing of physical evidence was requested by the WC and thus was not official FBI business, or some crap like that: 

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=59608#relPageId=39

Here’s another example of the same kind of thing from Robert Gemberling, where he mentions the FBI specifically instructing that “certain allegations” disseminated via letterhead memoranda were “not necessary” to put into report form: 

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=62366#relPageId=5

An interesting side note about this is that CE2011 describes the Bardwell Odum interviews of Tomlinson and Wright about CE399. Odum told Tink Thompson and Gary Aguilar that he didn’t remember doing those interviews, and if he had they would have been written up in 302 reports. The above is why there were no 302 reports. 

Thanks Tom. As I read the second link it does not refer to 302 interview reports but rather to an explanation of why certain inputs (letterhead memoranda) are not being included in an accompanying compilation report for dissemination outside the FBI (to other agencies and/or the Commission).

The first link is a cover memo attached to CE2011 giving what reads as almost a "non-explanation" explanation for something, not sure what: "Inasmuch as this investigation [CE2011] was conducted at the specific request of the President's Commission, information contained in the letterhead memorandum [CE2011] will not be set forth in a subsequent report UACB." (I do not know what "UACB" means.) (I also do not understand the "inasmuch...[therefore]" logic, or how the reason given would logically bypass normal 302 interview documentation, if that is what that was about.)

(Also another minor detail I do not understand: the cover memo appears to be from Shanklin, "SAC Dallas" to Hoover, "Director FBI", but the stenographer's initials at the bottom read "PEW:vm", who is "PEW"?)

The Aquilar and Thompson article tell of there are no known 302 interview reports for any of the interviews in CE2011. Does that mean there never were any to begin with, or that there were but they disappeared? If the former (and the "explanation" statement alludes to that), how common or unusual would that be? I cannot think of anything comparable; do you know?

[Tom Gram]

42 minutes ago, Greg Doudna said:

 

Thanks Tom. As I read the second link it does not refer to 302 interview reports but rather to an explanation of why certain inputs (letterhead memoranda) are not being included in an accompanying compilation report for dissemination outside the FBI (to other agencies and/or the Commission).

The first link is a cover memo attached to CE2011 giving what reads as almost a "non-explanation" explanation for something, not sure what: "Inasmuch as this investigation [CE2011] was conducted at the specific request of the President's Commission, information contained in the letterhead memorandum [CE2011] will not be set forth in a subsequent report UACB." (I do not know what "UACB" means.) (I also do not understand the "inasmuch...[therefore]" logic, or how the reason given would logically bypass normal 302 interview documentation, if that is what that was about.)

(Also another minor detail I do not understand: the cover memo appears to be from Shanklin, "SAC Dallas" to Hoover, "Director FBI", but the stenographer's initials at the bottom read "PEW:vm", who is "PEW"?)

The Aquilar and Thompson article tell of there are no known 302 interview reports for any of the interviews in CE2011. Does that mean there never were any to begin with, or that there were but they disappeared? If the former (and the "explanation" statement alludes to that), how common or unusual would that be? I cannot think of anything comparable; do you know?

I forget the specific acronym but UACB is basically just unless authorized by the Bureau. I’m not sure who PEW is, but I have seen those initials on other documents. 

I know of a few other similar examples of this kind of thing. On the rifle investigation the WC sent a letter in Feb ‘64 requesting that the FBI obtain all the original paperwork tracing the rifle, so all the witnesses were reinterviewed. Neither the New York nor Philadelphia Field Offices wrote 302 reports for those interviews, but every other Field Office did. 

Another one that comes to mind is Ruth Paine was reinterviewed in Aug ‘64 for clarification on a contradictory statement she made in late July. As far as I know there is no 302 report of that interview, though it could be in the Dallas Field Office files which aren’t online.

I’m about to go fishing but I’ll dig around a bit more later today.