Evan Burton

I am sorry to have to say it, Evan, but you are not being straight with me. You are again abusing your position for political purposes.

No, you are not sorry. You - as normal - resort to attacking people when your position is threatened. I am posting facts with sources, which anyone can check for themselves. My "position" here has nothing to do with it. Perhaps you refer to my aviation experience, which far exceeds yours? If so, then you best find people who are neophytes in aviation and give them more credence than others.

There is nothing "political" about what I say except to correct your numerous inaccuracies. Perhaps if you bothered to read what I have said, you would know I do NOT say that it was not an assassination or similar, but simply that the facts of the incident themselves do not give weight to that notion; as I have continually said: there have been similar accidents in the past and there are sure to be similar accidents in the future.

So what was the weather at the time?

NWS surface analysis chart station models showed that at 1000 the sky was overcast, dew point depressions were less than or equal to 2° Celsius ©, surface winds ranged from calm to about 5 knots throughout most of the State of Minnesota, and surface temperatures were below freezing over most of northern Minnesota.

A TAF33 prepared by the Duluth Forecast Office for Hibbing, Minnesota (the closest TAF location to the accident site), which was valid starting at 0900 and transmitted at 0917, stated, in part, the following: Wind variable at 5 knots, visibility 3 statute miles with mist, overcast 500 feet; Temporary conditions from 1400Z to 1800Z, visibility 2 statute miles, mist, overcast 200 feet.

An area forecast (FA)35 covering northern Minnesota was issued about 0945 by the NWS Aviation Weather Center (AWC), Kansas City, Missouri, and was valid at the time of the accident. The FA stated, in part, the following:

"Northern Minnesota ... AGL... scattered at 2,000 feet, scattered to broken at 4,000 feet, tops at 6,000 feet. 1200Z ...AGL... scattered to broken at 1,500 feet, ceiling broken at 4,000 feet, broken at 7,000 feet and tops at 12,000 feet. Occasional visibility from 3 to 5 [statute] miles with mist. 1600Z ceiling broken at 1,500 to 2,500 feet, overcast at 4,000 feet. Occasional light snow."

An AIRMET prepared by the NWS AWC was issued about 0745 and covered the area surrounding the airplanes flightpath and the accident site. The AIRMET, which was valid at the times the pilot received the two preflight weather briefings, warned of occasional moderate rime or mixed icing in clouds and precipitation above freezing level to 20,000 feet. The AIRMET warned that the freezing level was from the surface to 7,000 feet over northern portions of the area and sloping to between 8,000 to 10,000 feet over southern portions of the area. According to the meteorologist responsible for issuing the next scheduled AIRMET at 0845, shortly after he issued it, he received a pilot report (PIREP) of moderate icing at 10,000 feet. He stated that, about 0905, he issued an updated AIRMET, which was valid at the time of the accident, warning of occasional moderate

rime to mixed icing in clouds and precipitation below 10,000 feet.

The 0700 upper air sounding (that is, a vertical profile of atmospheric conditions) from Chanhassen, Minnesota (160 miles south-southeast of the accident site), showed a saturated boundary layer, with a surface temperature of 3° C and an easterly wind of about 3 knots. Freezing level was approximately 2,700 feet. The 1300 upper air sounding from International Falls, Minnesota (79 miles north-northwest of the accident site), did not show a completely saturated near-surface environment. The sounding showed a surface temperature of -2° C and south-southeasterly surface winds of about 5 knots. The sounding also showed a saturated layer from about 3,400 to 7,000 feet, with southwesterly winds in this layer ranging from 10 to 23 knots. The NWS also provided Safety Board investigators with the Eta model 1000 forecasted profile for Hibbing, Minnesota, which was consistent with the upper air sounding profiles. Specifically, the profile confirmed the existence of below-freezing temperatures and verified that saturated conditions existed between about 3,000 and 7,000 feet.

Airport Weather Information

Weather observations at EVM are made by an AWOS, which is located about 2 miles northwest of the accident site at an elevation of about 1,380 feet. Observations from this station are reported every 20 minutes. At 1014 on the day of the accident, the AWOS reported that the visibility was 3 statute miles in light snow and that the sky condition was scattered clouds at 400 feet and overcast at 700 feet. At 1034, the AWOS reported that the visibility was 4 statute miles in mist and that the sky condition was overcast at 400 feet. Both AWOS reports indicated calm winds and temperatures of 1° C.

The Hibbing, Minnesota, ASOS, which is located about 16 miles west of the accident site at an elevation of 1,351 feet, provides high-resolution data that is recorded every 5 minutes. At 1005 on the day of the accident, the ASOS reported that the visibility was about 3 statute miles in mist and that the sky condition was overcast at 500 feet. At 1025, the ASOS reported that the visibility was 4 statute miles in mist and that the sky condition was overcast at 300 feet. Both ASOS reports indicated temperatures of 1° C.

Source:

NTSB Aircraft Accident Report (AAR-03/03), section 1.7

No, I am making sure people know what the report said, not what you said it said. You have inaccurately conveyed its meaning.

Edited to add:

Just so people can read what it said, here is a link to the NTSB Accident Report.

There are further omissions or inaccuracies with your claim Jim.

You say there was no problem with the weather, yet the pilots expressed concern about the weather conditions. They were warned about icing conditions. Even before the flight, upon hearing the conditions, the pilot said that he didn't think he was going to conduct the flight¹. He was obviously concerned about the reported and forecast weather. He even went so far as to try to call the company Chief Pilot, and when unable to do so, called the company charter director. He told her he was getting conflicting messages from the Senator's campaign staff and didn't feel comfortable about deciding if the flight should proceed or not². It is not unreasonable to conjecture that he felt pressured into making the flight.

When talking about the possibility that the accident was due to a loss of spatial awareness (SA), you have ignored the multitude of similar incidents I have provided where experienced and qualified crew have been responsible for perfectly serviceable aircraft flying into the ground. You ignored the NTSB tests that put similarly a qualified and experienced crew in the simulator and ran them through a variety of scenarios, including the fatal flight. The flying pilot reported that on that approach in those conditions there was a "...noticeably higher workload..." and that he felt that he was "...behind the airplane..." (i.e. he was trying to catch up with events, not anticipating them and reacting in a timely manner)³. It should be also noted that in the incident profile, a gradual significant pitch-up was required⁴. That is EXACTLY the condition that can lead to a stall.

References

1. NTSB Aircraft Accident Report (AAR-03/03), section 1.1, page 2.

2. NTSB Aircraft Accident Report (AAR-03/03), section 1.1, page 3.

3. NTSB Aircraft Accident Report (AAR-03/03), section 1.16, page 30.

4. NTSB Aircraft Accident Report (AAR-03/03), section 1.16, page 30.

The NTSB simulated the flight path and weather in a simulator with a weaker engine and, even though they had it fly at abnormally slow speeds, they could not make it stall.

No, Jim, that is not true. You are taking something that was said and rephrasing it to what you THINK it meant - not what it said. The report said that with no icing, the stall warning went off between 81 - 84 KCAS and they were able to fly out of the stall. With light to moderate icing, significantly greater engine power settings were required to fly out of the stall along with occasional use of the de-icer boots. With heavy icing, power requirements were in excess of the specified limits. That is NOT the same as "... flying at abnormally low speeds..." and being unable to "...make it stall...".

I wonder who she was phoning.

"I saw the new Chaplin flick... yeah, it was crap..."

They did appear to be talking...

Duane, the photo from your first link seems to fit what we see almost exactly (apart from what appears to be talking).

You should let the person know, pointing out that image.

Of course, we haven't determined if the film is genuine or not....

A man claims that a segment of film, taken at a 1928 film premiere, shows a woman talking on what looks like a mobile phone:

http://au.news.yahoo.com/video/featured/-/watch/22650978/time-traveller-caught-at-1928-premiere/

Won't stop him making the same claim again later, though....

And this previous post of mine sums things up.

Mr Fetzer,

You insist on 'harping' on! The FACTS are:

1. The weather WAS marginal. The reason the NTSB concludes it was not a factor was because it was still within limits. Being within limits does NOT make it 'fine'. Refer to an aviation meteorologist if you need guidance on this.

2. The aircraft requested, and was cleared for, a VOR approach to RWY 27. That is the approach they were vectored for. That is the approach they conducted.

3. If they had set up the GPS to monitor the approach, it would have been different. The GPS RWY 27 approach tracks 273 to the FAF from the COLLS intersection (see http://204.108.4.16/...9/05236G27.PDF).

4. If the GPS signal had been "manipulated" in any way, a 'GPS UNRELIABLE' or 'GPS DEGRADE' flag / warning would have appeared.

5. If they had a problem with the VOR approach, and the GPS became unreliable, and they had ANY doubt about what was happening, the CORRECT thing to do would have been to conducted a missed approach, gone around, and sorted out the problems.

6. There is NO evidence they attempted to power up the engines and fly out. This does not mean the engines or systems did not respond, it means there was no attempt to do so.

7. There is NO evidence that the communications system was inoperative.

8. There is NO evidence that any systems were damaged by any type of EMR, as would have been apparent if any systems had been subjected to sufficient EMR as to cause a malfunction.

9. It is unknown if the stall warning went off. Even so, as the reports show, the stall warning may have only sounded (IIRC) 5-7 kts above stall speed. The airspeed was bleeding off quite rapidly, so they may have only had a few seconds to react (not 'ample time'). This, combined with a preoccupation to regain the radial and get the aircraft back on the profile, may (and most likely did) lead to momentary confusion and a failure to react in time to the stall. A stall, 400-800 ft AGL when transitioning from IFR to visual, without dedicated and proper prior training, is DEADLY. More experienced and capable pilots than that flight crew have been killed in similar circumstances.

10. Pilots can and have 'worked against each other', each trying to do what they thought was right in an emergency situation. That's what CRM is all about.

Mr Fetzer, you make wild assumptions and draw conclusions from data which you are not qualified to assess.

Let's go back and look at some of Dr Fetzer's claims, and see how they stand up.

As always, I urge people to independently investigate the claims and NOT rely on what myself nor Dr Fetzer say.

Another example. The plane was headed south when it crashed, but the airport was almost due north. The plane was off course in its general direction by 8 degrees, which may not sound like much but extended over rate times time, could have put it very far from the airport.

The NTSB reports says they entered an inadvertent stall during the approach. What would be the result of such a stall?

In aviation, a spin is an aggravated stall resulting in autorotation about the spin axis wherein the aircraft follows a corkscrew path. Spins can be entered unintentionally or intentionally, from any flight attitude and from practically any airspeed—all that is required is sufficient yaw rate while an aircraft is stalled. In either case, however, a specific and often counterintuitive set of actions may be needed to effect recovery. If the aircraft exceeds published limitations regarding spins, or is loaded improperly, or if the pilot uses incorrect technique to recover, the spin can lead to a crash.

In a spin, both wings are in a stalled condition, however one wing will be in a deeper stall condition than the other. This causes the aircraft to autorotate due to the non-symmetric lift and drag. Spins are also characterized by high angle of attack, low airspeed, and high rate of descent.

http://en.wikipedia....in_%28flight%29

The bolding is mine, but you'll find similar examples amongst the internet (or better yet - flight training manuals). If people would like further explanation or more references, I am happy to provide.

Now let's have a look at more general statistics and the accident in question. The pertinent facts are that it was judged to be loss of control / pilot error (human error) during an instrument approach (landing phase). A contributory cause was weather. Dr Fetzer has said:

What a nitwit! These events, each of which is relatively improbable, are all happening at the same time. Their probability of occurring together is equal to their product. That would be a very small number, indeed. I am quite confident that all of these -- or even a substantial subset -- have never occurred together before. Some of them, like the odd meteorological phenomenon, have probably never happened before. Evan Burton appears to be pulling this right out of his ass. IF THERE EVER WAS A CASE WHERE THE SIMPLE OCCURRENCE OF A CRASH WAS NOT USED AS IF IT WERE THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF SABOTAGE, THIS IS IT! Either Burton is not reading my posts or he is grossly incompetent or he is dissembling in the extreme. There are no other alternatives.

So let's look at more worldwide statistics. The stats come from the Aircraft Crashes Record Office in Geneva.

67.57% of all aircraft accidents have human error as the primary cause.

50.39% of all aircraft accidents occur during the landing phase.

53.89% of all aircraft accidents occur less than 10 km from the airport.

5.1% of all aircraft accidents occur during a charter flight.

41.49% of all aircraft accidents have no survivors.

Now let's compare that to Dr Fetzer's belief:

0.0% of all aircraft accidents have occurred because of a directed energy weapon against the incident aircraft.

Here are more incidents with similar circumstances to that of the Wellstone accident:

So far I am only looking between about 1998 and 2004. An expanded search will highlight more examples.

13 MAR 02, Beech King Air E90, N948CC. Inadequate approach airspeed for existing conditions during instrument approach. Delayed reaction to avert stalling leading to loss of control.

6 MAR 02, Cessna 208B, N208TF. Inadvertent stall during approach.

Next we need to look at aviation accidents statistics. Since it is very important to compare apples to apples, I'll only look at US aircraft operations. US commercial aircraft operations generally fall under three Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) areas:

- FAR Part 121 (major airlines)

- FAR Part 135 Scheduled (minor airlines operating to a schedule)

- FAR Part 135 On Demand (charter airlines)

The Wellstone aircraft was operating under FAR 135 On Demand, so my stats will involve only those aircraft. The figures also refer to fixed wing operations, and not helicopters.

Firstly, let have a look at the general statistics. All data has been taken from the annual NTSB Review of Aircraft Accident Data reports, available at the NTSB website (www.ntsb.gov). I have shown:

- the total number of aircraft accidents

- the number of those accidents that involved fatalities*

- the percentage of aircraft accidents that were due to pilot error

- the number of aircraft accidents that were due to loss of control during the approach to landing phase

- the number of fatal accidents that were due to loss of control during the approach to landing phase, and

- the number of fatal accidents per million flight hours

(* The number shown is not the number of fatalities but simply the number of incidents which resulted in at least one fatality)

In 2000, the NTSB changed the way it published data, so some stats aren't available. So you can still compare 2002 to previous years data, I have copied the graphs from earlier reports:

So we can now see that experienced pilots losing SA with resultant loss of control during instrument approaches - especially during marginal weather conditions - is nothing unusual. As I said previously: it's happened before and it will happen again.

What is the probability that two B747s would collide on the ground?

Also, I'll repeat points I made in the other thread.

No, you mustn't be reading my posts. Wellstone may have had people out to get him, and may have been murdered... but the aircraft incident does not point to that. You can't use the aircraft accident itself as 'proof' because it does not specifically point to foul play. Perhaps the aircrew were slipped undetectable drugs that caused them to lose SA; if you can find such a drug then it becomes a possibility. The fact is, however, that there have been similar aviation accidents involving loss of SA during an instrument approach, unintentional stalling of the aircraft, crew actions leading to either uncontrolled or controlled flight into terrain and various combination of them. So don't use the simple occurrence of the accident as 'proof' that they were murdered, because it's not true.

The King Air comes in varying models. Overall, in excess of 3100 have been produced since 1963.

There have been 289 King Air crashes worldwide. Of those, 194 involved fatalities. Of those fatalities, 86 incidents were in the US.

If we look at just the A100, there were 157 built. Of those, 38 have been involved in aircraft accidents. Of those, 23 had fatalities. Of those 23, 19 were is the US.

So lets do the math:

24% of A100 King Airs have been involved in a crash.

60% of A100 King Air accidents have resulted in fatalities.

50% of A100 King Air accidents have occurred in the US and resulted in fatalities.

82% of all A100 King Air accidents resulting in fatalities have occurred in the US.

16 FEB 05, Cessna Citation 560, N500AT. An experienced crew conducting an ILS approach. They failed to monitor the situation and icing caused a stall, from which they did not recover. They did not make any MAYDAY call. The stall warning did not activate until after the stall had occurred.

There was a sister ship, of the same aircraft type, flying with them at the same time. It landed at the same airport in the same conditions 14 minutes later... without problems.

Let's assume for a moment that Dr Fetzer is correct about a 'high energy' weapon of some type 'luring' the aircraft off-course and completely frying all the aircraft electrics.

That would make his theory about the crash correct, wouldn't it?

Simple answer: no.

If all electrical systems are completely fried:

1. Engine power and blade pitch controls still have a mechanical linkage that would allow close to normal performance - sufficient to fly out of the stall;

2. Aircraft still has altimeter - pressure operated, no electrical power required;

3. Aircraft still has Air Speed Indicator (ASI); pressure operated from pitot tube and static port on fuselage - no electrical power required;

4. Aircraft still has Vertical Speed Indicator (VSI); operated by pressure - no electrical power required; and

5. Aircraft still has Standby Atitude Indicator (AI), sometimes called the 'artifical horizon'. Main AI runs off electrics; standby AI run off vacuum reserve specifically in case of total electrical failure. FAA standards say it must run for at least 30 mins with no power.

So you still have control of your engines to deliver power, you know your pitch / roll (AI), how fast you are going (ASI), your altitude, and how fast you are descending / climbing (VSI) - everything you need to fly out of the situation. Even if the stall warning was disabled, part of instrument flying is maintaining an instrument scan - looking at all those primary flight instruments.

EVERYTHING indicates they didn't have a proper scan going (PIC responsibility), they should have seen the airspeed bleeding off, failed to recognise the impending stall, then failed to correctly recover from the stall.

As has been pointed out before, there are many inaccuracies and with respect to the aviation matters, the facts do not support the proposition that it was deliberately brought down.

7. When the NTSB team finally carried out its own investigation, it was

unable to find either the cockpit recorder, which it assumed the plane

had had, or the black box.

That's because one was not fitted to the aircraft, nor did that class of aircraft / operation require one.

1. The plane would have stalled only if it slowed to below 70 knots,

yet it was equipped with a device that emitted a loud warning at 85

knots.

No, stall warning devices are normally designed to activate between 5-8 KIAS before the stall. The stall speed of this aircraft is normally 78 KCAS with a clean wing; stall speeds can be raised if there is any ice build up on the wings which disrupts airflow. Raytheon did some test after the crash and estimated that at the aircraft's gross weight, the stall speed would have been 77 KCAS. The radar returns from just before the crash indicate the aircraft slowed to a speed of about 76 KCAS. The same test showed that the stall warning with a clean wing occurred between 81-84 KCAS.

2. The plane was being flown by two experienced and fully certified

pilots, a fact--obfuscated in the NTSB report-that makes this kind of

pilot error very unlikely.

Some people like to "obfuscate" the fact that fully qualified, healthy and experienced aircrew make errors - sometimes fatal - all the time. Pilot error is the LEADING cause of aircraft accidents and incidents around the world. Accident databases are littered with examples of this.

3. The NTSB's theory fails to explain why, about two minutes before the

crash, all communication was abruptly terminated and the plane began

going off course.

Some people make up stuff. The last transmission from the aircraft was at 1019:20, which was the co-pilot acknowledging the ATC approval to change frequency and instructions to cancel SAR when on the ground. No further transmissions were to be expected until they were on the ground.

As usual, it's people without the requisite knowledge making faulty assumptions and drawing erroneous conclusions.

See also here.

You don't have a clue in this area and are way out of your depth, Jim, plus Jack thinks Apollo spoofs are real. If you have something that won't waste my time, please feel free to post it here. Otherwise, as the kids of today say, you've been pwned.

If such rubbish is your "proof", then I've saved you a lot of time and typing, Jim. You should be thanking me.

Just in case someone might think that Jack is serious, you should read this:

http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/hoaxes/moonhoax.asp

Jim / Jack - why don't you take quotes from Dark Side of the Moon? I mean, there is your smoking gun right there!

Number 5: Frame grabs from moon movie.

You are kidding, aren't you Jack? That's a joke from you, isn't it? You really have to put a smiley face or TIC if you are going to do stuff like that, otherwise people will think even less of your claims (if that is possible).

No3 - So? What's the point? I can post diagrammes, too... but they won't mean anything unless you explain what they are and what they mean.

ETA: I presume 3 is related to 4?

Come on then Jim - explain it. Oh - and if you believe Jack is right with his No4 image, then you should post some proof (nasty word, I know), not just conjecture or speculation.

Number 2:

Wrong. Jack demonstrates his ignorance and inability to correctly analyse images. Why does Jim use him? Anyway, see my post here, which lists numerous examples of Jack being wrong, like:

http://www.clavius.org/shad15.html

http://www.clavius.org/trrnshdow.html

http://www.lunaranom...m/fake-moon.htm

http://www.badastron...o.html#parallel

http://www3.telus.ne...nshot/index.htm

There are numerous other examples of Jack being wrong:

Other examples can be seen here, here, here, here, here, and here.

Posted at Jim's request:

Number 1

Waste of time - has been explained again and again and again. Just because you don't accept reality does not mean I have to try and explain it to you over and over again.

I'm shaking there, boss. Bring it on.