Michael Hogan

Deleted

Carroll has shown himself to be all talk and no trousers.

Lee Farley has shown himself to be a pragmatist. And even pragmatists may sound pessimistic from time to time. Charles Sanders Peirce wrote: "Where hope is unchecked by any experience, it is likely that our optimism is extravagant." Carroll giving his preconditions for sound reasoning is not unlike a panhandler giving stock tips.

Harry Dean thought that Oswald was recruited by the FBI in 1962. He claimed that Oswald was an "intelligence gatherer" and an "operative" for the FBI. He agreed that Oswald was a "top notch agent." Harry Dean said that General Walker told him Marina Oswald was a terrible xxxx. Dean also said (Marina Oswald) "had been briefed by the agencies to low tone things and to keep things in the light of a continuing investigation, she sort of made statements that perhaps agent Oswald, perhaps for his own security, had made to her to keep her off his back during these operations. It is very difficult, often times sad situation to do that job. You have so many possibilities of personal dangers and it was necessary for him to make certain statements to her, and to certainly keep secret from her and everyone, to keep a tight mouth position. He knew. We were always warned of the dangers involved, from being beaten to a pulp, hit by a car, being shot or whatever the occasion calls for." Harry Dean played on both sides of the fence. He said: "At times, I appeared to be a minuteman, or a member of the John Birch Society, or I was an officer in the Fair Play For Cuba Committee, a member of the Castro espionage work in the United States with the 20th of July Movement. And you may end up suddenly changing the right to the left for intelligence reasons, you see." Harry Dean called Oswald a "brilliant person." (The Harry Dean attributions come from his appearance (as Mr. X) on NBC's June 9, 1975 Tomorrow show with Tom Snyder)

Thank you, Michael for the promising start. Yet that statement is ambiguous -- it can be interpreted as saying that there are no good Americans in the ADA, and maybe one good American in the KKK. It isn't really a ringing praise of the KKK. I'm hoping to find something Edwin Walker said that reminds us of George Wallace's famous rally cry: "segregation today; segregation tomorrow; segregation forever!" (and the crowd goes wild). When I can find examples of ex-General Edwin Walker saying something like that, something that directly expresses opposition to the advancement of colored Americans, I'll be satisfied. Best regards, --Paul Trejo I agree, a statement out of context like that one can be quite ambiguous. But given the occasion and Walker's audience I would not favor that offered interpretation. If Walker ever gave verifiable ringing praise to the Ku Klux Klan, odds are you would have read about it by now. That Ebony magazine article reported that "Lester Maddox received the largest ovation of all from the Northern audience when he said: "We need George Wallace in the White House." Certainly that convention was a newsworthy event. Since Welch was a featured speaker, there may be accounts in JBS (or other) literature. Since overtly racist statements by Walker have been so elusive for you, it might be productive see if anything else exists on the record about that gathering. Walker apparently was a speaker; it's probably hoping too much that a transcript exists. If it did, historians would have seized on it long ago. Certainly, the convention seemed to have a racist bent. Medford Evans, "the Citizens' Council resident PHD," gave a speech titled Civil Rights Myths and Communist Realities. http://books.google.... walker&f=false Paul, I know you are familiar with Evans and his associations with Walker: Oddly enough, In 1967 Evans presented a conservative view of conspiracy in the Kennedy Assassination in an article for American Opinion titled Coup d'Etat. The entire article is fascinating reading. I'm certain you've seen it. Evans wrote; "I do know this: that General Walker told me personally by long-distance telephone in June of 1967 that evidence is available to establish that Oswald was picked up between 9:00 P.M. and midnight, April 10, 1963 (the shooting occurred that night at 9:00) and was released. I have known General Walker six years. I worked for the Federal Government six years. I have never known General Walker to lie. I cannot say the same for the Government. http://karws.gso.uri...Coup_dEtat.html

Paul, I don't see the words Castro or Cuba in any of the excerpts you furnished. And in any event, those excerpts are not fears that DePugh "continually conveyed to Jones." Quotes from pamphlets are not fears conveyed to Jones. None of those quotes substantiate this statement that you used to summarize Jones' book: "Robert DePugh continually conveyed to Jones his constant fear -- his paranoia IMHO -- that Castro's Cubans were going to invade the USA because the White House allowed this to happen." That statement of yours was made in the context of this one: "Jones interviewed Robert DePugh at length....." (Which he did) Come on Paul. Michael, in chapter two of The Minutemen (1968), J.H. Jones describes his interviews with Robert Bolivar DePugh, founder of the Minutemen of the 1960's. When the group started, they collected ideas from, among many sources, including the John Birch Society, which proclaimed that all the Presidents of the USA since FDR were Communist affiliated. That's the original anxiety that underlies all of DePugh's later ideas -- DePugh always takes this orientation for granted. Still in chapter 2, on page 50, Jones cited as "the first real Minuteman fear" the threat of nuclear attack, and cites this as the reason that DePugh moved his home and business from Independence, MO (so close to the major center of Kansas City) way out to Norborne. Then, Jones adds on page 51: "The fear of nuclear attack was only short-lived, soon to be replaced by fear of alien troops hitting America's beaches or dropping out of the skies." To combat this new fear, DePugh offered a new solution -- guerrilla warfare. DePugh, as it turned out, had been duly impressed by Che Guevara's 1960 manual entitled, Guerrilla Warfare, which had gone into some detail. DePugh, allegedly, used this same manual as a model for his own manual, which he sold to his Minutemen. These initial images are reinforced in page after page. Jones provided this excerpt from a Minuteman training pamphlet (page 57): "The Communists already have such complete control over the Amerian news media and political processes...that a life-and-death struggle is waging right now between the forces of freedom and the advocates of world slavery...that if the American people expect to be saved from slavery they are going to have to do so themselves...that the Minutemen are the most experienced, most dedicated and best disciplined organization that is involved in this fight at a grass-roots level." On page 72, DePugh is quoted as saying: "...The true guerrilla...can fight on for years, even generations. Guerrilla bands can fight in the city, country, forests, deserts or mountains. They are everywhere and yet nowhere. They strike without warning and vanish without a trace. They take with them the arms, food and ammunition they will need to fight again another day..." This, obviously, is the language of resisting an invasion. DePugh regularly "couched his language in terms of a future take-over by the Communists," said Jones. For example, here's another snappy DePugh message from page 92: "...We have studied your Comunist Smersh, Mao, Che, Bucharin. We have learned our lessons well and have added a few Yankee tricks of our own...These patriots are not going to let you take their freedoms away from them. They have learned the silent knife, the strangler's cord, the target rifle that hits sparrows at 200 yards. Only their leaders restrain them..." And on and on. This context of invasion and take-over continues to color all of DePugh's bizarre opinions. Regards, --Paul Trejo

Chris, the Mary Frances Odom in that report was not the wife of Lee Odom. At least that's what I got from reading it. It's on the last page of that folder you linked to.

Yes, Michael, I read The Minutemen (1968) by J. Harry Jones Jr. last year while studying the Cold War under Dr. H.W. Brands at UT Austin. As a side-note, it was republished in 1969 under the title, A Private Army. .......Robert DePugh continually conveyed to Jones his constant fear -- his paranoia IMHO -- that Castro's Cubans were going to invade the USA because the White House allowed this to happen. Paul, I have Jones' book and I have searched in vain for corroboration that DePugh continually conveyed this constant fear to Jones. Of course Cuba is mentioned several times in the book, but not in the context you describe. Maybe you can show me something I missed.

In April, 1965 a "congress of conservatives" convened at the Sheraton-Chicago hotel. At a dinner on Friday night, Robert Welch was honored in memory of the late Joseph McCarthy. Welch gave a speech that touched upon "Communist plans to set up a Soviet Negro republic in the Dixie states." According to an article Ebony Magazine on White Hate Groups, Edwin Walker was also at that "congress." Although many of the sessions were closed, Walker "told the conventioneers that 'there are more good Americans in the Ku Klux Klan' than in the Americans for Democratic Action." According to the Chicago Tribune, Walker got into an altercation and slapped an ex-GI that was in the audience. http://news.google.c...J&pg=7351,52221 http://books.google.... walker&f=false http://pqasb.pqarchi...el&pqatl=google

Michael, this quotation from Jones', The Minutemen (1968) would be useful in making a case that the Minutemen would take no part in the assassination of JFK. In fact, it would have been contrary to their wishes to have JFK eliminated, claimed DePugh, because JFK was useful to them as a "whipping boy." Just to be clear, I was not trying to make any case with my post; that is why it was posted with no comment. Each reader can make of it what they will. Paul, have you read Jones' book? Edited to add:

The year, 1963, closed on a somber note nationally, with the impact of President Kennedy's assassination still fresh in America's consciousness. In many ways the assassination was to have particularly harmful effects on the Minutemen. Suddenly a political oriented organization that placed cross hairs in the "O" of their official newsletter's masthead did not seem quite as quaint as it had before November 22. To the Minutemen themselves, however, the immediate effect of the assassination seemed more of a nuisance than anything else. Looking back at it three years later, DePugh observed: "Here you had a man you could say anything about and get away with it, and he's suddenly turned into a national hero that you don't dare say anything about without people taking offense at, " DePugh said. "We were really zeroing in on Kennedy at the time he was assassinated. He was our number one whipping boy, so to speak....." "It took a while before Johnson maneuvered himself into a postition where he became a legitimate target for adverse publicity. For quite a long while he rode along on John Kennedy's halo." "So that (the assassination) was kind of a setback for us so far as our psy-war was concerned. All of our recruiting literature was written up and based on the Communist infiltration of the Kennedy administration, and suddenly, the literature was of no value." From J Harry Jones' seminal 1968 book The Minutemen.

Of course the comic book as a medium for conspiracy in the Kennedy murder is not without precedent. In 1977 Jay Kinney and Paul Mavrides produced Cover-Up Lowdown: http://www.flickr.co...N00/4530951489/ http://www.flickr.co...xel/4200758920/ (Revised URL for Dan Goldman's Flickr page): http://www.flickr.co...157632315044962

Those are among the most horrific and disturbing images I have ever seen. Even after all these years I cannot view them dispassionately. Dr. Robert McClelland's talk at the 2012 TCSS conference (approximately one hour):

From a 1969 oral history interview (LBJ Library) Rostow (page 14): In any case, I had brooded a long time about this question of infiltration and guerrilla warfare. I was one of the few people who had worked seriously on the problem of guerrilla warfare in the 1950s. That's one of the reasons that President Kennedy assigned me to Laos and Vietnam. He knew about it. Rostow (page 16): Through 1964-1965 I had nothing whatsoever to do with the decisions made on Vietnam..... Rostow (page 41): I know as well as any single man, I suspect, the cast of President Kennedy's mind about Southeast Asia and Vietnam in general as he made his fundamental decision, which was the decision in 1961. He made several decisions in 1961. I cannot vouch for his exact frame of mind in 1962 and 1963--although I think I know something of that--simply because I was not in the White House then working on Vietnam. But the decisions he made in 1961 he regarded as fundamental, and those I believe I do understand. It starts--so far as Vietnam is concerned--when he took office. He was briefed by President Eisenhower on the nineteenth of January, 1961, on the major issues. We have three sets of notes on that meeting. There's a [Clark?] Clifford set and a Chris [Christian] Herter set and a McNamara set. It's clear from all of them that President Eisenhower told President Kennedy that the situation in Laos was militarily and politically disintegrating and it was possible that he would have to face the issue of putting troops into Laos. So he came in with that foreshadowed as a burden....(more on Vietnam follows) http://www.lbjlib.ut...tow/rostow1.pdf From The Guerrilla Warfare Problem; Revolutionary War and the Kennedy Administration Response 1961-1963 by Frank L Jones (Chapter 27) For Walt Rostow, Kennedy’s deputy special assistant to the President for national security affairs (deputy national security advisor), Khrushchev’s message was also deeply significant, and as one of the leading proponents of economic development theory and nation-building he was shaping Kennedy’s response. Since the 1950s, the former MIT professor had immersed himself in formulating policy recommendations urging the United States to act more vigorously in providing economic and military assistance to the Third World, especially nations confronting communist- led insurgencies. The culmination of his thinking appeared in his 1960 book, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. As the historian and Kennedy advisor Arthur M. Schlesinger would later write, “Guerrillas were also an old preoccupation of Walt Rostow’s.” In his book, Rostow constructed economic development models and concluded that the main sphere of U.S.-Soviet rivalry would be in the underdeveloped world. Specifically, he posited that all societies proceed through five comparatively similar stages of economic development. Of these, the second stage, the transformation to modernity (that he titled “Pre-conditions for Take Off”), was the most destabilizing, as traditional values and institutions collided with ones that were more modern, producing disorder and conflict in every aspect of the society’s political, social, and economic life. Rapid population growth, urbanization, and technological change complicated the transition, as did the contending forces of colonialism, nationalism, and regionalism. He ar- gued that a “revolution of rising expectations” existed that if remained unfulfilled, could persuade people in underdeveloped societies to embrace Communism as an expeditious path to moderniza- tion. In his estimation, Communism flourished during the transitional stage, manipulating and undermining the aspirations of the masses for ends antithetical to the ambitions of these peoples. He further believed that practitioners of the social sciences—politics, economics, and sociology— could crush Communism by implementing programs that would induce these transitional societ- ies to “take off” toward attaining Western-style democratic capitalism. Ultimately, for Rostow, Khrushchev’s declaration provided the policy impetus for, as one critic noted, the “wide-spread liberal-social scientist fascination with ‘counter-insurgency’ and ‘nation-building’.” Rostow was soon spending considerable energy on the “guerrilla warfare problem,” as Robert Komer, a member of the National Security Council staff, called it. Rostow was not alone; by mid- 1961, the Kennedy administration was in full throttle, expanding and amplifying the President’s directions regarding the importance of counterinsurgency. In May 1961, the Planning Group, co- chaired by Kennedy’s national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy and George C. McGhee, direc- tor of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, ordered the addition of counter-subversion and deterrence of guerrilla warfare to the list of urgent planning problems, emphasizing that the topic cover both the doctrine and a range of program actions required to forestall or deal with rural and urban dissidence. In mid-June, Rostow sought Komer’s advice when he provided him a copy of the draft of a speech Rostow planned to give as an address to the graduating class at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, a few weeks later. The speech, in essence, would be a further articulation of the administration’s response to Khrushchev. Komer thought it “a damn fine draft” but then made numerous comments and suggestions in the margin. Refining Rostow’s policy pronouncement, Komer argued that two major themes deserved more attention than Ros- tow gave them. First, he reminded Rostow that guerrilla warfare required more than military mea- sures and that the military had to understand this form of warfare to be a broad problem. Second, U.S. military guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations required “mobility, dash, and imagination quite different from normal military operations. Almost all of your great guerrilla leaders (e.g., Wingate, Marion, T. E. Lawrence) were atypical men.” The U.S. military did not cultivate such leaders, therefore, it was imperative to search for such leaders in the military, leaders who could immerse themselves in the local culture and environment as well as develop training regimens that would build up a distinct esprit and provide special qualifications. Rostow incorporated Komer’s views and on June 28 delivered his remarks at the graduation ceremony. After explaining the concept of modernization and its effects on traditional societies as well as the Communist exploitation of this transitional stage, Rostow outlined the “American pur- pose and the American strategy.” The United States, he declared, “is dedicated to the proposition that this revolutionary process of modernization shall be permitted to go toward independence, with increasing degrees of human freedom.” The United States sought two outcomes: “first, that truly independent nations shall emerge on the world scene, and, second that each nation will be permitted to fashion, out of its own culture and its own ambitions, the kind of modern society it wants.” To achieve victory in this arena required “many years and decades of hard work and dedication—by many peoples—to bring about.” U.S. national interests required such dedication: “It will permit American society to continue to develop along the old humane lines which go back to our birth as a nation. . . .” Nonetheless, Rostow cautioned that while the United States and other like minded nations could assist the developing nations, the primary responsibility for dealing with guerrilla warfare was theirs; it must be undertaken by the society under threat. These nascent governments under attack must not only thwart this peril, but must “build, and protect what it is building.” Thus, as Rostow’s speech makes clear, the significant features of U.S. coun- terinsurgency policy at this point consisted of three broad propositions: insurgency was a crucial international danger, that it resulted from Communist manipulation of powerful worldwide social forces captured by the term “modernization,” and that the United States was both capable and unwavering in its intent to meet this menace by the suitable use of its national resources. While Komer credited Rostow with formulating the fundamental doctrine based on the ideas the latter raised in his Fort Bragg address, he also continued to express concern to Rostow that the focus was primarily on the military instrument and not on “preventive medicine.” In Komer’s view, Communist subversion succeeded because the situation was “ripe,” that is, there had been a long period of preparing for covert intervention. Stressing precautionary measures in the initial preemptive phase would be less expensive in the end, minimize the risk of upheaval, and reduce the need for draconian measures to save the imperiled nation. Even such measures were not al- ways successful since the critical issue was implementation..... https://docs.google....K_6jJpy0cMLDELg

Yes! In fact, I think he's got one more book due in his Kennedy trilogy, along with AMERICAN TABLOID and THE COLD SIX THOUSAND. I don't exactly buy Ellroy's Mob/KKKer/Rogue-CIA version of the JFK assassination, but the treachery his characters betray is spot on, imo. http://www.cinemablend.com/new/James-Franco-Wants-Direct-Star-James-Ellroy-American-Tabloid-35245.html

Again, I'm not debating Groden's qualifications. I just wanted to see Paul's source. http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/groden1.htm To tell the truth, discussions about this stuff no longer interest me very much. It's been beaten to death.

Ok, but I still don't understand what would motivate her to say she took the pictures (thereby confirming their authenticity and implicating her husband) if she didn't. The Warren Commission had difficulty in understanding her motivations on a lot of issues. http://books.google....d nixon&f=false http://books.google....ly lied&f=false I'm not offering an opinion as to Groden's qualifications or lack thereof. I would just like to see Paul Baker's source for Groden's alleged admission. It's probably in Bugliosi's book somewhere. From Groden's sworn testimony for the Simpson trial: Q: Now, as a result of your experience as you've described it, your actual work experience and also your work with the committee, and also the independent work you have done over the years, have you come to be knowledgeable about the various methods there are to alter photographs? A: Yes. Q: Have you come to be knowledgeable about the indications or signs in examining the photograph, as to whether or not it has been altered? A: Yes.

Martin, the distinction is this: If RFK made those remarks to an audience of students at SFS College, it would have been recorded and widely reported, which it was not. That is the basis for much of DSL's argument. If instead the alleged remark was made to "several students," it is much less likely that an audio recording was made or that the remark would have been widely reported. I don't think anyone is disputing that the remark is likely apocryphal. But at the very least, it would be interesting to know the provenance of the allegation. That might be where Tom Miller comes in. On the third anniversary of President Kennedy's death, it was reported that Arthur Schlesinger Jr called for a new and "very intensive" Congressional investigation into President Kennedy's murder. Schlesinger had not read the Warren Report. http://news.google.c...stigation&hl=en Someone must have had his ear.

I think most of the posters on this thread are simply trying to track down the original source of what David Lifton refers to as an "urban legend." Certainly it was not John Davis, as DSL's 1994 Compuserve message implied. Lifton quoted Davis as writing in 1984 that those remarks were told to "an audience of students at San Fernando State College on June 3, 1968." Tom Miller's 1977 book stated that RFK made the exact same remarks "to several students at San Fernando State College, June 3, 1968." There is a subtle difference in the two claims. As Jim suggested and I noted, it could be a simple matter to contact Tom Miller and ask him the source of the RFK quote that he included in The Assassination Please Almanac. I don't know who David thinks is claiming that Robert Kennedy actually made that comment "before any crowd in any public place" or "in a public forum -- anywhere." Certainly, I don't believe that.

http://www.tommillerbooks.com/ His research files for The Assassination Please Almanac have been archived. See Subseries 3: http://www.azarchive...=;brand=default Edited to add: I've been thinking about this since I looked at Tom Miller's book, but I hesitate in posting it because my memory is so vague. I really believe that I read a more detailed account of the student(s) that approached Robert Kennedy after he gave his speech. They had cornered RFK privately, because they were incredulous that he still supported the Warren Commission. It was written first person by the student that was there. For the life of me I can't remember where I read it, or even be positive that I did. Maybe my mind is playing tricks, but I really think that I have read the back story on that a long time ago. It might have been in a tabloid or an underground newspaper. In any event, since Miller apparently archived his research, the answer might be attainable by someone that cares enough to track it down.

In my opinion, John Davis' book is just a useless distraction, unless he gave a source. I do not own Davis' book and although a lot of The Kennedys is reproduced at Google Books, the key page is missing. Maybe he did what a lot of authors do: Take something they read in another book and put it in theirs, using that book as their source, rather than going to the primary source. As was noted in another post, Tom Miller's The Assassination Please Almanac contained the exact quote. Miller's book was published in 1977. So that quote had been around for sixteen years before Davis' book. Miller does not give a source, but he writes that Robert Kennedy made those comments "to several students at San Fernando Valley State College., June 3, 1968." In other words, RFK did not make those comments during his speech, according to that account. I looked carefully for that quote in Farewell America (1968), but could not find it. It certainly isn't on page 16. Oddly, Hepburn's book starts with page 13, not page 1.

February 11, 1961 Memorandum from Schlesinger to President Kennedy: As you know, there is great pressure within the government in favor of a drastic decision with regard to Cuba. There is, it seems to me, a plausible argument for this decision if one excludes everything but Cuba itself and looks only at the pace of military consolidation within Cuba and the mounting impatience of the armed exiles. However, as soon as one begins to broaden the focus beyond Cuba to include the hemisphere and the rest of the world, the arguments against this decision begin to gain force. However well disguised any action might be, it will be ascribed to the United States. The result would be a wave of massive protest, agitation and sabotage throughout Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa (not to speak of Canada and of certain quarters in the United States). Worst of all, this would be your first dramatic foreign policy initiative. At one stroke, it would dissipate all the extraordinary good will which has been rising toward the new Administration through the world. It would fix a malevolent image of the new Administration in the minds of millions. It may be that on balance the drastic decision may have to be made. If so, every care must be taken to protect ourselves against the inevitable political and diplomatic fall-out. 1. Would it not be possible to induce Castro to take offensive action first? He has already launched expeditions against Panama and against the Dominican Republic. One can conceive a black operation in, say, Haiti which might in time lure Castro into sending a few boatloads of men on to a Haitian beach in what could be portrayed as an effort to overthrow the Haitian regime. If only Castro could be induced to commit an offensive act, then the moral issue would be clouded, and the anti-US campaign would be hobbled from the start. 2. Should you not consider at some point addressing a speech to the whole hemisphere setting forth in eloquent terms your own conception of inter-American progress toward individual freedom and social justice? Such a speech would identify our Latin American policy with the aspirations of the plain people of the hemisphere. As part of this speech, you could point out the threats raised against the inter-American system by dictatorial states, and especially by dictatorial states under the control of non-hemisphere governments or ideologies. If this were done properly, action against Castro could be seen as in the interests of the hemisphere and not just of American corporations. 3. Could we not bring down Castro and Trujillo at the same time? If the fall of the Castro regime could be accompanied or preceded by the fall of the Trujillo regime, it would show that we have a principled concern for human freedom and do not object only to left-wing dictators. If the drastic decision proves necessary in the end, I hope that steps of this sort can do something to mitigate the effects. And, if we do take the drastic decision, it must be made clear that we have done so, not lightly, but only after we had exhausted every conceivable alternative. http://history.state...s1961-63v10/d43

Robert, I know it was just a typo on your part; The first DIA Director was Joseph Carroll, not James. As you know, James was the son. Joseph Carroll's New York Times obituary: http://www.nytimes.c...nce-agency.html Excerpt: General Carroll, an Air Force officer who was involved in national security affairs for 30 years, headed the Defense Intelligence Agency from its creation in 1961 until he retired in 1969. The agency was intended as a special unit to coordinate the intelligence activities of the separate services. Before that, he was inspector general of the Air Force and conducted investigations of suspected security violations, including the 1960 defection to the Soviet Union of two employees of the National Security Agency.

What about David Lifton's disclaimer?

http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/rfkclaim.txt