John Simkin

It was Arevalo, not Arbenz who ordered Arana’s arrest. This was as a result of Arana presenting Arevalo “with an ultimatum demanding that he surrender power to the Army and fill out the remainder of his term as a civilian figure-head for a military regime.” Arevalo was the democratically elected president of Guatemala. Did he not have some sort of right to try and protect his government by ordering the arrest of Arana? Sure George Bush would have had the right to order the arrest John Kerry if he had attempted a military coup before the last election. But as far as I can tell he did not do that. So your point is irrelevant. You say the death of Arana provides evidence that Guatemala was not a “democracy”. Was Eisenhower’s ordering the CIA to overthrow the democratically elected government of Guatemala anything to do with democracy? When I asked you this question before on the Arbenz thread you said that Eisenhower was in the right because he was protecting the interests of the United States. That says everything we need to know about your views on democracy. I wonder if there are any other members of the Forum willing to defend Gratz's views on democracy?

It was Arevalo, not Arbenz who ordered Arana’s arrest. This was as a result of Arana presenting Arevalo “with an ultimatum demanding that he surrender power to the Army and fill out the remainder of his term as a civilian figure-head for a military regime.” Arevalo was the democratically elected president of Guatemala. Did he not have some sort of right to try and protect his government by ordering the arrest of Arana? Sure George Bush would have had the right to order the arrest John Kerry if he had attempted a military coup before the last election. But as far as I can tell he did not do that. So your point is irrelevant. You say the death of Arana provides evidence that Guatemala was not a “democracy”. Was Eisenhower’s ordering the CIA to overthrow the democratically elected government of Guatemala anything to do with democracy? When I asked you this question before on the Arbenz thread you said that Eisenhower was in the right because he was protecting the interests of the United States. That says everything we need to know about your views on democracy. I wonder if there are any other members of the Forum willing to defend Gratz's views on democracy?

Members might be interested in some newspaper reports on Stockdale's death: (1) The Miami Herald (2nd December, 1963) The police said Mr. Stockdale, an intimate friend of President Kennedy, had committed suicide. No notes were found, however. Mr. Stockdale was 48 years old... In a recent newspaper interview, he (Stockdale) said that he had borne heavy expenses by serving as Ambassador... When he left Ireland to return to his real estate business in July, 1962, Mr. Stockdale said, he found that the market had declined badly. He also spoke of the great expense of a large family. He had two sons and three daugthers. (2) Dom Bonafede, The New York Herald Tribune (3rd December, 1963) Miarni friends said yesterday that Mr. Stockdale, who was in the real estate and investment business, was despondent over the death of President Kennedy. He is reported to have fallen on his knees and prayed when lie heard the news... Prior to his resignation it was disclosed that he had borrowed $1,000 interest-free from Sidney Kessler, a New York and Miami builder, who was seeking an $£3,000 commitment froin the Federal Housing Administration. The petition was later approved. President Kennedy reportedly learned of the loan and demanded that Mr. Stockdale return the $5,000. In a trans-Atlantic telephone call to a Miami reporter, Mr. Stockdale reportedly commented that the President was "afraid the loan could make it look like I was finagling around with the FHA"... Mr. Stockdale's name also came up briefly as a part time associate of Eugene Hancock, a vending-machine operator, mentioned in the investigation of Bobby Baker. (3) The New York Times (3rd December, 1963) Grant Stockdale once had close business connections with vending-machine concerns that are under investigation in the Robert G. Baker inquiry... In an interview published in the Miami Herald last October, shortly after the Senate authorized a study of Mr. Baker's dealings, Mr. Stockdale said: "I hope I don't get cut up too bad, I haven't done anything wrong..." Mr. Stockdale's responses were to questions about the similarities between the Washington damage suit against Mr. Baker, which touched off the Baker case, and a 1961 damage suit against Mr. Stockdale and others in Miami. In April, 1961, just as Mr. Stockdale was leaving Miami to assume his duties as Ambassador to Ireland, he was served with papers in a $131,000 damage suit. The suit alleged that he had used "undue influence" to gain contracts for Automatic Vending Services, Inc., a Miami company in which he owned stock. Mr. Stockdale accused the complainant, the Pan-Am Tobacco Corporation, of trying to "get some publicity because I am a United States Ambassador." He denied the charges. Pan-Am contended in its suit that Mr. Stockdale had been instrumental in gaining for his company the vending service contract at Erodex, Inc., an aircraft engine maintenance company in Miami. Subsequently, Automatic Vending Services, Inc., won contracts totalling $500,000 a year at Patrick Air Force Base and the Air Force missile test center at Cape Kennedy.

Here is an article that appeared in the New York Times on February 21, 2006: U.S. Reclassifies Many Documents in Secret Review By SCOTT SHANE WASHINGTON, Feb. 20 — In a seven-year-old secret program at the National Archives, intelligence agencies have been removing from public access thousands of historical documents that were available for years, including some already published by the State Department and others photocopied years ago by private historians. The restoration of classified status to more than 55,000 previously declassified pages began in 1999, when the Central Intelligence Agency and five other agencies objected to what they saw as a hasty release of sensitive information after a 1995 declassification order signed by President Bill Clinton. It accelerated after the Bush administration took office and especially after the 2001 terrorist attacks, according to archives records. But because the reclassification program is itself shrouded in secrecy — governed by a still-classified memorandum that prohibits the National Archives even from saying which agencies are involved — it continued virtually without outside notice until December. That was when an intelligence historian, Matthew M. Aid, noticed that dozens of documents he had copied years ago had been withdrawn from the archives' open shelves. Mr. Aid was struck by what seemed to him the innocuous contents of the documents — mostly decades-old State Department reports from the Korean War and the early cold war. He found that eight reclassified documents had been previously published in the State Department's history series, "Foreign Relations of the United States." "The stuff they pulled should never have been removed," he said. "Some of it is mundane, and some of it is outright ridiculous." After Mr. Aid and other historians complained, the archives' Information Security Oversight Office, which oversees government classification, began an audit of the reclassification program, said J. William Leonard, director of the office. Mr. Leonard said he ordered the audit after reviewing 16 withdrawn documents and concluding that none should be secret. "If those sample records were removed because somebody thought they were classified, I'm shocked and disappointed," Mr. Leonard said in an interview. "It just boggles the mind." If Mr. Leonard finds that documents are being wrongly reclassified, his office could not unilaterally release them. But as the chief adviser to the White House on classification, he could urge a reversal or a revision of the reclassification program. A group of historians, including representatives of the National Coalition for History and the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, wrote to Mr. Leonard on Friday to express concern about the reclassification program, which they believe has blocked access to some material at the presidential libraries as well as at the archives. Among the 50 withdrawn documents that Mr. Aid found in his own files is a 1948 memorandum on a C.I.A. scheme to float balloons over countries behind the Iron Curtain and drop propaganda leaflets. It was reclassified in 2001 even though it had been published by the State Department in 1996. Another historian, William Burr, found a dozen documents he had copied years ago whose reclassification he considers "silly," including a 1962 telegram from George F. Kennan, then ambassador to Yugoslavia, containing an English translation of a Belgrade newspaper article on China's nuclear weapons program. Under existing guidelines, government documents are supposed to be declassified after 25 years unless there is particular reason to keep them secret. While some of the choices made by the security reviewers at the archives are baffling, others seem guided by an old bureaucratic reflex: to cover up embarrassments, even if they occurred a half-century ago. One reclassified document in Mr. Aid's files, for instance, gives the C.I.A.'s assessment on Oct. 12, 1950, that Chinese intervention in the Korean War was "not probable in 1950." Just two weeks later, on Oct. 27, some 300,000 Chinese troops crossed into Korea. Mr. Aid said he believed that because of the reclassification program, some of the contents of his 22 file cabinets might technically place him in violation of the Espionage Act, a circumstance that could be shared by scores of other historians. But no effort has been made to retrieve copies of reclassified documents, and it is not clear how they all could even be located. "It doesn't make sense to create a category of documents that are classified but that everyone already has," said Meredith Fuchs, general counsel of the National Security Archive, a research group at George Washington University. "These documents were on open shelves for years." The group plans to post Mr. Aid's reclassified documents and his account of the secret program on its Web site, www.nsarchive.org, on Tuesday. The program's critics do not question the notion that wrongly declassified material should be withdrawn. Mr. Aid said he had been dismayed to see "scary" documents in open files at the National Archives, including detailed instructions on the use of high explosives. But the historians say the program is removing material that can do no conceivable harm to national security. They say it is part of a marked trend toward greater secrecy under the Bush administration, which has increased the pace of classifying documents, slowed declassification and discouraged the release of some material under the Freedom of Information Act. Experts on government secrecy believe the C.I.A. and other spy agencies, not the White House, are the driving force behind the reclassification program. "I think it's driven by the individual agencies, which have bureaucratic sensitivities to protect," said Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists, editor of the online weekly Secrecy News. "But it was clearly encouraged by the administration's overall embrace of secrecy." National Archives officials said the program had revoked access to 9,500 documents, more than 8,000 of them since President Bush took office. About 30 reviewers — employees and contractors of the intelligence and defense agencies — are at work each weekday at the archives complex in College Park, Md., the officials said. Archives officials could not provide a cost for the program but said it was certainly in the millions of dollars, including more than $1 million to build and equip a secure room where the reviewers work. Michael J. Kurtz, assistant archivist for record services, said the National Archives sought to expand public access to documents whenever possible but had no power over the reclassifications. "The decisions agencies make are those agencies' decisions," Mr. Kurtz said. Though the National Archives are not allowed to reveal which agencies are involved in the reclassification, one archivist said on condition of anonymity that the C.I.A. and the Defense Intelligence Agency were major participants. A spokesman for the C.I.A., Paul Gimigliano, said that the agency had released 26 million pages of documents to the National Archives since 1998 and that it was "committed to the highest quality process" for deciding what should be secret. "Though the process typically works well, there will always be the anomaly, given the tremendous amount of material and multiple players involved," Mr. Gimigliano said. A spokesman for the Defense Intelligence Agency said he was unable to comment on whether his agency was involved in the program. Anna K. Nelson, a foreign policy historian at American University, said she and other researchers had been puzzled in recent years by the number of documents pulled from the archives with little explanation. "I think this is a travesty," said Dr. Nelson, who said she believed that some reclassified material was in her files. "I think the public is being deprived of what history is really about: facts." The document removals have not been reported to the Information Security Oversight Office, as the law has required for formal reclassifications since 2003. The explanation, said Mr. Leonard, the head of the office, is a bureaucratic quirk. The intelligence agencies take the position that the reclassified documents were never properly declassified, even though they were reviewed, stamped "declassified," freely given to researchers and even published, he said. Thus, the agencies argue, the documents remain classified — and pulling them from public access is not really reclassification. Mr. Leonard said he believed that while that logic might seem strained, the agencies were technically correct. But he said the complaints about the secret program, which prompted his decision to conduct an audit, showed that the government's system for deciding what should be secret is deeply flawed. "This is not a very efficient way of doing business," Mr. Leonard said. "There's got to be a better way." Freedom of information goes to the heart of democracy. How can the electorate make logical judgements about their politicians if they are allowed to keep important facts out of the public domain? It seems that on March 25, 2003, President Bush signed executive order 13292. This little-known document grants the greatest expansion of the power of the vice-president in US history. It gives the vice-president the same authority to classify intelligence as the president. Is it Cheney who has been deciding to classify released CIA documents? Lewis “Scooter” Libby is currently arguing that he leaked classified material at the behest of Cheney. It now appears that the material was not really classified because it had been declassified by Cheney. The first US vice-president, John Adams, called his position, “the most insignificant office ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived.” It seems that executive order 13292 has changed the situation. In fact, Sidney Blumenthal has claimed that this executive order was part of a coup d’etat. You can find a practical example of the reclassifying of CIA documents released by the actions of Bill Clinton here: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=5945 In 1992 the Central Intelligence Agency hired the young historian Nick Cullather to write a history (classified “secret” and for internal distribution only) of Operation PBSUCCESS, which overthrew the lawful government of Guatemala in 1954. Given full access to the Agency’s archives he produced an insider’s account, intended as a training manual for covert operators, detailing how the CIA chose targets, planned strategies, developed black propaganda campaigns, organized the mechanics of waging a secret war, etc. In 1995 President Bill Clinton ordered the declassification of CIA documents that no longer protected American security. As a result, Cullather’s account of this CIA operation was declassified in 1997. Cullather was aware that it was possible that under a more secretive president, this document might be declassified. This has of course happened under George Bush. Therefore Cullather decided to write an account of the events in Guatemala based on the CIA sources he discovered when he was doing his research. The book, Secret History: The CIA Classified Account of Operations in Guatemala 1952-1954, was published in 1999. The book makes clear why Republican presidents have worked very closely with the CIA to prevent documents being released. In the 1930s Sam Zemurray aligned United Fruit Company closely with the government of President Jorge Ubico. The company received import duty and real estate tax exemptions from Ubico. He also gave them hundreds of square miles of land. United Fruit controlled more land than any other individual or group. It also owned the railway, the electric utilities, telegraph, and the country's only port at Puerto Barrios on the Atlantic coast. In June, 1944, teachers in Guatemala went on strike for higher pay. Other professions joined the teachers in street demonstrations. Ubico sent in the army and over 200 protesters were killed. This included Maria Chinchilla, the leader of the teachers' union movement. A few days later, a group of over 300 teachers, lawyers, doctors, and businessmen handed a petition to Ubico in which demanded that the demonstrators' actions were legitimate. At this stage, the United States withdrew its support of Ubico. General Francisco Ponce became Guatemala's new dictator. In an attempt to gain public support, Ponce announced democratic elections. He selected himself as presidential candidate, while the opposition picked the former teacher, Juan Jose Arevalo, who was living in exile in Argentina. Afraid that he would lose the election, Ponce ordered Arevalo's arrest as soon as he arrived back in Guatemala. Appalled by the actions of Ponce, Jacobo Arbenz and a fellow junior officer, Major Francisco Arana, organized a military rebellion. They were quickly joined by other officers and attacked the pro-Ponce military and police forces. Ponce and Ubico were forced to abandon the country and Arbenz and Arana created a provisional junta with businessman, Jorge Toriello, and promised free and democratic elections. Arbenz and Arana introduced a new constitution. Censorship was brought to an end, men and women were declared equal before the law, racial discrimination was declared a crime, higher education was free of governmental control, private monopolies were banned, workers were assured a forty-hour week, payment in coupons was forbidden, and labour unions were legalized. Juan Jose Arevalo won the first elections and attempted to begin an age of reforms in Guatemala. Arevalo described himself as a "spiritual socialist". He implemented sweeping reforms by passing new laws that gave workers the right to form unions. This included the 40,000 Guatemalans who worked for the United Fruit Company. Sam Zemurray feared that Arevalo would also nationalize the land owned by United Fruit in Guatemala. He asked the political lobbyist Tommy Corcoran to express his fears to senior political figures in Washington. Corcoran began talks with key people in the government agencies and departments that shaped U.S. policy in Central America. He argued that the U.S. should use United Fruit as an American beachhead against communism in the region. The problem was that Arevalo was not a communist. It therefore became the policy of United Fruit and the CIA to convince the Harry Truman administration that Arevalo was a communist. It was not too difficult for Zemurray and the CIA to recruit Arana in their attempt to overthrow Arevalo. Unlike Arbenz, Arana did not support Arevalo’s social reforms. In July, 1949, with the backing of United Fruit and the CIA, Arana presented Arevalo “with an ultimatum demanding that he surrender power to the Army and fill out the remainder of his term as a civilian figure-head for a military regime.” Arevalo realized that Guatemala’s experiment with democracy was in grave danger. He therefore appealed to Arbenz, who was still committed to the democratic system, to defend his democratically elected government. Arbenz supplied Arevalo with the names of young officers who he knew to be loyal to the idea of democracy. Arevalo then ordered these officers to arrest Arana. Caught crossing a bridge, Arana resisted arrest, and during the resulting gunfight, Arana and several others were killed. Arevalo then made the mistake of not telling the country about the attempted coup. Instead he claimed that Arana had been killed by unknown assassins. The CIA immediately spread the rumour that Arevalo and Arbenz had used communists to kill Arana. This resulted in another coup attempt by army officers loyal to Arana and the United Fruit Company. However, some members of the armed forces remained loyal to Arevalo. So did the trade unions that had originally overthrown the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. Arana’s supporters were defeated and Arevalo remained in power. Once again Arbenz had become a national hero and his election to the presidency was ensured. In the spring of 1950, Corcoran went to see Thomas C. Mann, the director of the State Department’s Office of Inter-American Affairs. Corcoran asked Mann if he had any plans to prevent Arbenz from being elected. Mann replied: “That is for the people of that country to decide.” Unhappy with this reply, Corcoran paid a call on the Allen Dulles, the deputy director of the CIA. Dulles, who represented United Fruit in the 1930s, was far more interested in Corcoran’s ideas. “During their meeting Dulles explained to Corcoran that while the CIA was sympathetic to United Fruit, he could not authorize any assistance without the support of the State Department. Dulles assured Corcoran, however, that whoever was elected as the next president of Guatemala would not be allowed to nationalize the operations of United Fruit.” In 1951 Arbenz defeated Manuel Ygidoras to become Guatemala's new president. Arbenz had obtained 65% of the votes cast. Harry Truman refused permission for the CIA to overthrow a democratically elected president. However, Dwight Eisenhower, did not share Truman’s views on democracy and soon after he was elected in November, 1952, he gave permission for the CIA to overthrow Arbenz. It was not the only time in his eight year reign that he used the CIA to smear political leaders as “communists”. It was a tactic that was also used by Ronald Reagan and George Bush senior.

You can find a practical example of the reclassifying of CIA documents released by the actions of Bill Clinton here: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=5945 In 1992 the Central Intelligence Agency hired the young historian Nick Cullather to write a history (classified “secret” and for internal distribution only) of Operation PBSUCCESS, which overthrew the lawful government of Guatemala in 1954. Given full access to the Agency’s archives he produced an insider’s account, intended as a training manual for covert operators, detailing how the CIA chose targets, planned strategies, developed black propaganda campaigns, organized the mechanics of waging a secret war, etc. In 1995 President Bill Clinton ordered the declassification of CIA documents that no longer protected American security. As a result, Cullather’s account of this CIA operation was declassified in 1997. Cullather was aware that it was possible that under a more secretive president, this document might be declassified. This has of course happened under George Bush. Therefore Cullather decided to write an account of the events in Guatemala based on the CIA sources he discovered when he was doing his research. The book, Secret History: The CIA Classified Account of Operations in Guatemala 1952-1954, was published in 1999. The book makes clear why Republican presidents have worked very closely with the CIA to prevent documents being released. In the 1930s Sam Zemurray aligned United Fruit Company closely with the government of President Jorge Ubico. The company received import duty and real estate tax exemptions from Ubico. He also gave them hundreds of square miles of land. United Fruit controlled more land than any other individual or group. It also owned the railway, the electric utilities, telegraph, and the country's only port at Puerto Barrios on the Atlantic coast. In June, 1944, teachers in Guatemala went on strike for higher pay. Other professions joined the teachers in street demonstrations. Ubico sent in the army and over 200 protesters were killed. This included Maria Chinchilla, the leader of the teachers' union movement. A few days later, a group of over 300 teachers, lawyers, doctors, and businessmen handed a petition to Ubico in which demanded that the demonstrators' actions were legitimate. At this stage, the United States withdrew its support of Ubico. General Francisco Ponce became Guatemala's new dictator. In an attempt to gain public support, Ponce announced democratic elections. He selected himself as presidential candidate, while the opposition picked the former teacher, Juan Jose Arevalo, who was living in exile in Argentina. Afraid that he would lose the election, Ponce ordered Arevalo's arrest as soon as he arrived back in Guatemala. Appalled by the actions of Ponce, Jacobo Arbenz and a fellow junior officer, Major Francisco Arana, organized a military rebellion. They were quickly joined by other officers and attacked the pro-Ponce military and police forces. Ponce and Ubico were forced to abandon the country and Arbenz and Arana created a provisional junta with businessman, Jorge Toriello, and promised free and democratic elections. Arbenz and Arana introduced a new constitution. Censorship was brought to an end, men and women were declared equal before the law, racial discrimination was declared a crime, higher education was free of governmental control, private monopolies were banned, workers were assured a forty-hour week, payment in coupons was forbidden, and labour unions were legalized. Juan Jose Arevalo won the first elections and attempted to begin an age of reforms in Guatemala. Arevalo described himself as a "spiritual socialist". He implemented sweeping reforms by passing new laws that gave workers the right to form unions. This included the 40,000 Guatemalans who worked for the United Fruit Company. Sam Zemurray feared that Arevalo would also nationalize the land owned by United Fruit in Guatemala. He asked the political lobbyist Tommy Corcoran to express his fears to senior political figures in Washington. Corcoran began talks with key people in the government agencies and departments that shaped U.S. policy in Central America. He argued that the U.S. should use United Fruit as an American beachhead against communism in the region. The problem was that Arevalo was not a communist. It therefore became the policy of United Fruit and the CIA to convince the Harry Truman administration that Arevalo was a communist. It was not too difficult for Zemurray and the CIA to recruit Arana in their attempt to overthrow Arevalo. Unlike Arbenz, Arana did not support Arevalo’s social reforms. In July, 1949, with the backing of United Fruit and the CIA, Arana presented Arevalo “with an ultimatum demanding that he surrender power to the Army and fill out the remainder of his term as a civilian figure-head for a military regime.” Arevalo realized that Guatemala’s experiment with democracy was in grave danger. He therefore appealed to Arbenz, who was still committed to the democratic system, to defend his democratically elected government. Arbenz supplied Arevalo with the names of young officers who he knew to be loyal to the idea of democracy. Arevalo then ordered these officers to arrest Arana. Caught crossing a bridge, Arana resisted arrest, and during the resulting gunfight, Arana and several others were killed. Arevalo then made the mistake of not telling the country about the attempted coup. Instead he claimed that Arana had been killed by unknown assassins. The CIA immediately spread the rumour that Arevalo and Arbenz had used communists to kill Arana. This resulted in another coup attempt by army officers loyal to Arana and the United Fruit Company. However, some members of the armed forces remained loyal to Arevalo. So did the trade unions that had originally overthrown the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. Arana’s supporters were defeated and Arevalo remained in power. Once again Arbenz had become a national hero and his election to the presidency was ensured. In the spring of 1950, Corcoran went to see Thomas C. Mann, the director of the State Department’s Office of Inter-American Affairs. Corcoran asked Mann if he had any plans to prevent Arbenz from being elected. Mann replied: “That is for the people of that country to decide.” Unhappy with this reply, Corcoran paid a call on the Allen Dulles, the deputy director of the CIA. Dulles, who represented United Fruit in the 1930s, was far more interested in Corcoran’s ideas. “During their meeting Dulles explained to Corcoran that while the CIA was sympathetic to United Fruit, he could not authorize any assistance without the support of the State Department. Dulles assured Corcoran, however, that whoever was elected as the next president of Guatemala would not be allowed to nationalize the operations of United Fruit.” In 1951 Arbenz defeated Manuel Ygidoras to become Guatemala's new president. Arbenz had obtained 65% of the votes cast. Harry Truman refused permission for the CIA to overthrow a democratically elected president. However, Dwight Eisenhower, did not share Truman’s views on democracy and soon after he was elected in November, 1952, he gave permission for the CIA to overthrow Arbenz. It was not the only time in his eight year reign that he used the CIA to smear political leaders as “communists”. It was a tactic that was also used by Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George Bush senior. Maybe this is what this is really about. Bush and Cheney are covering-up for former Republican administrations.

I suppose this posting will end up with Tim Gratz making his usually point that he does not accept my sources (he is of course very keen to accept the claims made by CIA’s black propaganda campaigns). The documents that I requested when Gratz’s originally made the claims that I had failed to tell Forum members that the communists had murdered Carlos Arana, arrived this morning. This story has two parts: (1) CIA and Guatemala In 1992 the Central Intelligence Agency hired the young historian Nick Cullather to write a history (classified “secret” and for internal distribution only) of Operation PBSUCCESS, which overthrew the lawful government of Guatemala in 1954. Given full access to the Agency’s archives he produced an insider’s account, intended as a training manual for covert operators, detailing how the CIA chose targets, planned strategies, developed black propaganda campaigns, organized the mechanics of waging a secret war, etc. In 1995 President Bill Clinton ordered the declassification of CIA documents that no longer protected American security. As a result, Cullather’s account of this CIA operation was declassified in 1997. Cullather was aware that it was possible that under a more secretive president, this document might be classified once again. This has of course happened under George Bush. See the following thread: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=6187 Therefore Cullather decided to write an account of the events in Guatemala based on the CIA sources he discovered when he was doing his research. The book, Secret History: The CIA Classified Account of Operations in Guatemala 1952-1954, was published in 1999. The book however is very difficult to obtain and it took me sometime to track down a copy. He of course explains the role of the CIA in the “Carlos Arana” story. (2) Background to the Death of Carlos Arana In the 1930s Sam Zemurray aligned United Fruit Company closely with the government of President Jorge Ubico. The company received import duty and real estate tax exemptions from Ubico. He also gave them hundreds of square miles of land. United Fruit controlled more land than any other individual or group. It also owned the railway, the electric utilities, telegraph, and the country's only port at Puerto Barrios on the Atlantic coast. In June, 1944, teachers in Guatemala went on strike for higher pay. Other professions joined the teachers in street demonstrations. Ubico sent in the army and over 200 protesters were killed. This included Maria Chinchilla, the leader of the teachers' union movement. A few days later, a group of over 300 teachers, lawyers, doctors, and businessmen handed a petition to Ubico in which insisted that the demonstrators' actions were legitimate. At this stage, the United States withdrew its support of Ubico. General Francisco Ponce became Guatemala's new dictator. In an attempt to gain public support, Ponce announced democratic elections. He selected himself as presidential candidate, while the opposition picked the former teacher, Juan Jose Arevalo, who was living in exile in Argentina. Afraid that he would lose the election, Ponce ordered Arevalo's arrest as soon as he arrived back in Guatemala. Appalled by the actions of Ponce, Jacobo Arbenz and a fellow junior officer, Major Francisco Arana, organized a military rebellion. They were quickly joined by other officers and attacked the pro-Ponce military and police forces. Ponce and Ubico were forced to abandon the country and Arbenz and Arana created a provisional junta with businessman, Jorge Toriello, and promised free and democratic elections. Arbenz and Arana introduced a new constitution. Censorship was brought to an end, men and women were declared equal before the law, racial discrimination was declared a crime, higher education was free of governmental control, private monopolies were banned, workers were assured a forty-hour week, payment in coupons was forbidden, and labour unions were legalized. Juan Jose Arevalo won the first elections and attempted to begin an age of reforms in Guatemala. Arevalo described himself as a "spiritual socialist". He implemented sweeping reforms by passing new laws that gave workers the right to form unions. This included the 40,000 Guatemalans who worked for the United Fruit Company. Sam Zemurray feared that Arevalo would also nationalize the land owned by United Fruit in Guatemala. He asked the political lobbyist Tommy Corcoran to express his fears to senior political figures in Washington. Corcoran began talks with key people in the government agencies and departments that shaped U.S. policy in Central America. He argued that the U.S. should use United Fruit as an American beachhead against communism in the region. The problem was that Arevalo was not a communist. It therefore became the policy of United Fruit and the CIA to convince the Harry Truman administration that Arevalo was a communist. It was not too difficult for Zemurray and the CIA to recruit Arana in their attempt to overthrow Arevalo. Unlike Arbenz, Arana no longer supported Arevalo’s social reforms. In July, 1949, with the backing of United Fruit and the CIA, Arana presented Arevalo “with an ultimatum demanding that he surrender power to the Army and fill out the remainder of his term as a civilian figure-head for a military regime.” (page 11 of the Secret History) Arevalo realized that Guatemala’s experiment with democracy was in grave danger. He therefore appealed to Arbenz, who was still committed to the democratic system, to defend his elected government. Arbenz supplied Arevalo with the names of young officers who he knew to be loyal to the idea of democracy. Arevalo then ordered these officers to arrest Arana. Caught crossing a bridge, Arana resisted arrest, and during the resulting gunfight, Arana and several others were killed. Arevalo then made the mistake of not telling the country about the attempted coup. Instead he claimed that Arana had been killed by unknown assassins. The CIA immediately spread the rumour that Arevalo and Arbenz had used communists to kill Arana. This resulted in another coup attempt by army officers loyal to Arana and the United Fruit Company. However, some members of the armed forces remained loyal to Arevalo. So did the trade unions that had originally overthrown the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. Arana’s supporters were defeated and Arevalo remained in power. Once again Arbenz had become a national hero and his election to the presidency was ensured. In the spring of 1950, Corcoran went to see Thomas C. Mann, the director of the State Department’s Office of Inter-American Affairs. Corcoran asked Mann if he had any plans to prevent Arbenz from being elected. Mann replied: “That is for the people of that country to decide.” Unhappy with this reply, Corcoran paid a call on the Allen Dulles, the deputy director of the CIA. Dulles, who represented United Fruit in the 1930s, was far more interested in Corcoran’s ideas. “During their meeting Dulles explained to Corcoran that while the CIA was sympathetic to United Fruit, he could not authorize any assistance without the support of the State Department. Dulles assured Corcoran, however, that whoever was elected as the next president of Guatemala would not be allowed to nationalize the operations of United Fruit.” In 1951 Arbenz defeated Manuel Ygidoras to become Guatemala's new president. Arbenz had obtained 65% of the votes cast. Harry Truman refused permission for the CIA to overthrow a democratically elected president. However, Dwight Eisenhower, did not share Truman’s views on democracy and soon after he was elected in November, 1952, he gave permission for the CIA to overthrow Arbenz. It is of course that the information that Tim Gratz, that loyal Republican, has been trying to conceal. It was not the only time in Eisenhower's eight year reign that he used the CIA to smear foreign political leaders as “communists”. It was a tactic that was also used by Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George Bush senior.

You will also find the economy grew rapidly during the Second World War (much more of a factor than the New Deal) and the Vietnam War. The same is happening during the Iraq War. It is called the Military-Industrial Complex. The problem with war spending is that it creates a budget defecit. Maybe you should post details of the rising American debt. If I was an American I would be very concerned with this development. Especially when you end up owing such large sums to China and Arab states in the Middle East.

It seems the NeoCons have lost another supporter. Francis Fukuyama is the famous NeoCon philosopher and the man who claimed that with the defeat of communism in Eastern Europe we had reached the "end of history" (what about China?). However, in his new book, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads, his philosophy appears to have changed. What do you make of this Tim? You can find an extract from his book here: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=6205

Francis Fukuyama is the famous NeoCon philosopher and the man who claimed that with the defeat of communism in Eastern Europe we had reached the "end of history". However, in his new book, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads, his philosophy appears to have changed. This is an extract from his book: As we approach the third anniversary of the onset of the Iraq war, it seems unlikely that history will judge the intervention or the ideas animating it kindly. More than any other group, it was the neoconservatives inside and outside the Bush administration who pushed for democratising Iraq and the Middle East. They are widely credited (or blamed) for being the decisive voices promoting regime change in Iraq, and yet it is their idealistic agenda that, in the coming months and years, will be the most directly threatened. Were the US to retreat from the world stage, following a drawdown in Iraq, it would be a huge tragedy, because American power and influence have been critical to the maintenance of an open and increasingly democratic order around the world. The problem with neoconservatism's agenda lies not in its ends, but in the overmilitarised means by which it has sought to accomplish them. What US foreign policy needs is not a return to a narrow and cynical realism, but rather the formulation of a "realistic Wilsonianism" that better matches means to ends. How did the neoconservatives end up overreaching to such an extent that they risk undermining their own goals? How did a group with such a pedigree come to decide that the "root cause" of terrorism lay in the Middle East's lack of democracy, that the US had the wisdom and the ability to fix this problem, and that democracy would come quickly and painlessly to Iraq? Neoconservatives would not have taken this turn but for the peculiar way the cold war ended. The way it ended shaped the thinking of supporters of the Iraq war in two ways. First, it seems to have created an expectation that all totalitarian regimes were hollow and would crumble with a small push from outside. This helps explain the Bush administration's failure to plan adequately for the insurgency that emerged. The war's supporters seemed to think that democracy was a default condition to which societies reverted once coercive regime change occurred, rather than a long-term process of institution-building and reform. Neoconservatism, as a political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something I can no longer support. The administration and its neoconservative supporters also misunderstood the way the world would react to the use of American power. Of course, the cold war was replete with instances wherein Washington acted first and sought legitimacy and support from its allies only after the fact. But in the post-cold-war period, world politics changed in ways that made this kind of exercise of power much more problematic in the eyes of allies. After the fall of the Soviet Union, various neoconservative authors suggested that the US would use its margin of power to exert a kind of "benevolent hegemony" over the rest of the world, fixing problems such as rogue states with WMD as they came up. The idea that the US is a hegemon more benevolent than most isn't absurd, but there were warning signs that things had changed in America's relationship to the world long before the start of the Iraq war. The imbalance in global power had grown enormous. The US surpassed the rest of the world in every dimension of power by an unprecedented margin. There were other reasons why the world did not accept American benevolent hegemony. In the first place, it was premised on the idea that America could use its power in instances where others could not because it was more virtuous than other countries. Another problem with benevolent hegemony was domestic. Although most Americans want to do what is necessary to make the rebuilding of Iraq succeed, the aftermath of the invasion did not increase the public appetite for further costly interventions. Americans are not, at heart, an imperial people. Finally, benevolent hegemony presumed the hegemon was not only well intentioned but competent. Much of the criticism of the Iraq intervention from Europeans and others was not based on a normative case that the US was not getting authorisation from the UN security council, but on the belief that it had not made an adequate case for invading and didn't know what it was doing in trying to democratise Iraq. The critics were, unfortunately, quite prescient. The most basic misjudgment was an overestimation of the threat facing the US from radical Islamism. Although the ominous possibility of undeterrable terrorists armed with WMD did present itself, advocates of the war wrongly conflated this with the threat presented by Iraq and with the rogue state/proliferation problem. Now that the neoconservative moment appears to have passed, the US needs to reconceptualise its foreign policy. First, we need to demilitarise what we have been calling the global war on terrorism and shift to other policy instruments. We are fighting counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and against the international jihadist movement, wars in which we need to prevail. But "war" is the wrong metaphor for the broader struggle. Meeting the jihadist challenge needs not a military campaign but a political contest for the hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims around the world. As recent events in France and Denmark suggest, Europe will be a central battleground. The US needs to come up with something better than "coalitions of the willing" to legitimate its dealings with other countries. The world lacks effective international institutions to confer legitimacy on collective action. The conservative critique of the UN is all too cogent: while useful for some peacekeeping and nation-building operations, it lacks democratic legitimacy and effectiveness in dealing with serious security issues. The solution is to promote a "multi-multilateral world" of overlapping and occasionally competing international institutions organised on regional or functional lines. The final area that needs rethinking is the place of democracy promotion in American foreign policy. The worst legacy from the Iraq war would be an anti-neoconservative backlash that coupled a sharp turn toward isolation with a cynical realist policy aligning the US with friendly authoritarians. A Wilsonian policy that pays attention to how rulers treat their citizens is therefore right, but it needs to be informed by a certain realism that was missing from the thinking of the Bush administration in its first term and of its neoconservative allies. Promoting democracy and modernisation in the Middle East is not a solution to jihadist terrorism. Radical Islamism arises from the loss of identity that accompanies the transition to a modern, pluralist society. More democracy will mean more alienation, radicalisation and terrorism. But greater political participation by Islamist groups is likely to occur whatever we do, and it will be the only way that the poison of radical Islamism can work its way through the body politic of Muslim communities. The age is long gone when friendly authoritarians could rule over passive populations. The Bush administration has been walking away from the legacy of its first term, as evidenced by the cautious multilateral approach it has taken toward the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. But the legacy of the first-term foreign policy and its neoconservative supporters has been so polarising that it is going to be hard to have a reasoned debate about how to appropriately balance US ideals and interests. What we need are new ideas for how America is to relate to the world - ideas that retain the neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but without its illusions about the efficacy of US power and hegemony to bring these ends about.

It is interesting how Tim always tries to turn stories about the CIA or George Bush into some sort of joke. In a democratic society the classifying of documents revealing government corruption is a serious matter. Freedom of information goes to the heart of democracy. How can the electorate make logical judgements about their politicians if they are allowed to keep important facts out of the public domain? It seems that on March 25, 2003, President Bush signed executive order 13292. This little-known document grants the greatest expansion of the power of the vice-president in US history. It gives the vice-president the same authority to classify intelligence as the president. Is it Cheney who has been deciding to classify released CIA documents? Lewis “Scooter” Libby is currently arguing that he leaked classified material at the behest of Cheney. It now appears that the material was not really classified because it had been declassified by Cheney. The first US vice-president, John Adams, called his position, “the most insignificant office ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived.” It seems that executive order 13292 has changed the situation. In fact, Sidney Blumenthal has claimed that this executive order was part of a coup d’etat.

One of the things that has always puzzled me is that if Lyndon Johnson was behind the plot to kill Kennedy, there are probably some FBI or CIA documents around that provides evidence to back this up. Therefore, why have Republican administrations not ordered the release of these documents? Under existing guidelines, government documents are supposed to be declassified after 25 years unless there is particular reason to keep them secret. See: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=6187 However, a large number of documents that relate to the JFK assassination remain classified. Could it be that these documents implicate both political parties in the assassination? This is definitely the case if one goes for the “oil industry theory”

It seems that Clinton wanted to expose these lies but Bush wants to cover them up. I wonder if it has anything to do with daddy?

The summary that now appears in our application form: The Teaching Citizenship in a Globalized Europe Using ICT Project will attempt to provide educators with strategies and resources to teach citizenship. To facilitate this we will provide a website, online forum and a residential course. The core material on the website will be available in the following languages: English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Swedish and Hungarian. Teaching Citizenship is designed as a three year, three-phase project: Phase 1 will mainly involve producing an overview of how the subject is taught in different countries and a database of case-studies. These will be published in English and the language of the author. The project team will also create an online forum and website to ensure dissemination of our work. Phase 2 will mainly involve identifying and evaluating existing good practice in Europe. We will also explore the way citizenship is taught in countries outside Europe. There will eventually be on our website overviews and case studies of how citizenship is taught in England, Wales, Scotland, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, Finland, Norway, Czech Republic, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Russia, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Croatia, Poland and the Ukraine. Phase 3 will mainly involve preparing the first in a series of residential conferences designed to bring European educators together to learn the skills to use ICT in teaching citizenship.

Sorry.

No problem.

Are you implying that I am a fascist as well? Robert and Mark have already dealt with your attempt at smear tactics. Go back to protecting George Bush and the CIA. It is more dignified than your pathetic attempts to show you are a liberal on civil rights. Where were you when it mattered? A supporter of the status quo and defender of CIA and Republican illegal actions. As you are now.

The tactic of far-right Americans calling liberals "American-hating Communists" has a long tradition. In fact, some right-wingers do it on this Forum.

Members might find this website interesting: http://www.wanttoknow.info/index.shtml

He is definitely missing something!

Workplan: Phase 3 Planning Phase 3 (August – October, 2008) Video Conference Meetings in September 2008 – March 2009 (all members 6 days) Forum discussion on Paris Meeting (members 3 days) Forum Discussion on Residential Conference (members 3 days) Checking translations of material to be updated to website (David, Caterina, Juan Carlos, Vicente, Janos – 15 days) Preparation of Paris meeting: (Vicente 5 days) Developing the website (Janos 10 days) Administration of Project: Varndean (10 days) Total days Pedro (9) John (25) Caterina (30) David (30) Christiane (3) Vicente (35) Juan Carlos (30) Janos (40) Andy (15) Varndean (10) Phase 2: Meeting 7 in Paris, March, 2009 Presentation of case-studies by invited speakers Discussion on the development of the website and forum Developing links with countries outside Europe Presentation of special projects External Dissemination of Citizenship Project Discussion of online modules Planning of the 2009 residential course Time Input: Andy (4 days) Pedro (4 days) John (4 days) Caterina (4 days) David (4 days) Vicente (4 days) Christiane (4 days) Juan Carlos (4 days) Janos (4 days) Planning Phase 3 (November, 2007 – July, 2009) Video Conference Meetings in November-June (members 5 days) Forum discussion on Brighton Meeting (members 5 days) Preparation of Brighton Meeting: (John and Andy 12 days) Developing the website (Janos 17 days) Citizenship Special Project for website (Juan Carlos 25 days) Citizenship Special Project for website (Vicente 23 days) Citizenship Special Project for website (David 14 days) Administration of Project: Varndean (17 days) Total days Pedro (1) John (22) Caterina (10) David (24) Vicente (33) Christiane (3) Juan Carlos (35) Janos (27) Andy (22) Varndean (27) Phase 3: Meeting 8 in Brighton, July, 2009 Residential Course Time Input: Andy (6 days) Pedro (6 days) John (6 days) Caterina (6 days) David (6 days) Vicente (6 days) Christiane (6 days) Juan Carlos (6 days) Janos (6 days) Total days for 3rd stage of the Project Pedro (20) John (57) Caterina (50) David (64) Vicente (78) Christiane (16) Juan Carlos (75) Janos (77) Andy (37) Varndean (27)

Workplan: Phase 2 Planning Phase 2 (August – October, 2007) Video Conference Meetings in September and October (all members, 2 days) Forum discussion on Udine Meeting (all members 3 days) Preparation of Udine meeting: (Caterina 5 days) Developing the website (Janos 6 days) Administration of Project: Andy (5 days), Varndean (10 days) Total days Pedro (5) John (5) Caterina (10) David (5) Vicente (5) Christiane (3) Juan Carlos (5) Janos (11) Andy (10) Varndean (10) Phase 2: Meeting 4 in Udine, October, 2007 Presentation of case-studies by two invited speakers Discussion on the development of the website and forum Evaluation of the first Phase of the Project Planning of the 2009 residential course Time Input: Andy (4 days) Pedro (4 days) John (4 days) Caterina (4 days) David (4 days) Vicente (4 days) Christiane (4 days) Juan Carlos (4 days) Janos (4 days) Planning Phase 2 (November, 2007 – March, 2008) Video Conference Meetings in November, December, January, February (members 4 days) Forum discussion on Nagykanizsa Meeting (members 3 days) Preparation of Nagykanizsa Meeting: (Janos 5 days) Developing the website (Janos 5 days) Individual Citizenship Themed Projects: (John, Juan Carlos, David, Vicente – 15 days) Individual Citizenship Themed Projects: (Caterina and Pedro – 10 days) Administration of Project: Andy (15 days), Varndean (5 days) Arranging and checking translation of case-studies. (Pedro, Caterina, David, Vicente, Juan Carlos, Janos – 3 days) Translation of case-studies into Swedish (David, 20 days) Total days Pedro (20) John (22) Caterina (20) David (45) Vicente (25) Christiane (3) Juan Carlos (25) Janos (20) Andy (22) Varndean (10) Phase 2: Meeting 5 in Nagykanizsa, March, 2008 Presentation of case-studies by two invited speakers Discussion on the development of the website and forum Planning of the 2009 residential course Individual Citizenship Themed Projects Progress Report on Case-Studies Dissemination Update Time Input: Andy (4 days) Pedro (4 days) John (4 days) Caterina (4 days) David (4 days) Vicente (4 days) Christiane (4 days) Juan Carlos (4 days) Janos (4 days) Planning Phase 2 (April, 2008 – June, 2008) Video Conference Meetings in April, May and June (members 3 days) Forum discussion on Kamar Meeting (members 3 days) Forum Debate: Planning of the 2009 residential course (members 3 days) Preparation of Kamar Meeting: (David 5 days) Developing the website (Janos 10 days) Individual Citizenship Themed Projects Forum Seminars: (members 20 days) Preparation of Papers by Juan Carlos, Vicente and Caterina (20 days) Preparation of Paper: Citizenship Teaching outside of Europe (John 15 days) Administration of Project: Andy (10 days), Varndean (5 days) Total days Pedro (29) John (44) Caterina (49) David (34) Vicente (49) Christiane (3) Juan Carlos (49) Janos (39) Andy (39) Varndean (10) Phase 2: Meeting 6 in Kamar, June, 2008 Presentation of case-studies by invited speakers Discussion on the development of the website and forum Planning of the 2009 residential course Citizenship Teaching outside of Europe Progress Report on Case-Studies Dissemination Update Evaluation of Phase 2 of Citizen Project Time Input: Andy (4 days) Pedro (4 days) John (4 days) Caterina (4 days) David (4 days) Vicente (4 days) Christiane (4 days) Juan Carlos (4 days) Janos (4 days) End of the second stage of Project: Total days in second stage Pedro (66) John (83) Caterina (91) David (97) Vicente (93) Christiane (21) Juan Carlos (91) Janos (82) Andy (93) Varndean (30)

Revised: Workplan: Phase 1 Planning Phase 1 (August – October, 2006) Creating structure of website (Janos 6 days) Forum debate on the look and content of the website (members 3 days) The creation of a data-base of citizenship websites in the English language. These to be added to the citizenship website. (John 8 days) Production of an overview of how citizenship issues are dealt with in different countries (approximately 1,000 words): Juan Carlos (Spain), Pedro (Portugal), John (England), David (Sweden), Vicente (France), Christiane (Belgium), Janos (Hungary) and Caterina (Italy). Five days for each person creating an overview. Finding someone to do a translation of your material into English. (14 days) Preparing Madrid meeting: (Juan Carlos 5 days) Administration of Project: Andy (5 days), Varndean (10 days) Time Input: Andy (8 days) Pedro (10 days) John (16 days) Caterina (10 days) David (10 days) Vicente (10 days) Christiane (3 days) Juan Carlos (15 days) Janos (16 days) Varndean (10 days) Total: 108 days Launch Phase 1: Meeting in Madrid (October-November, 2006) Eight seminars based on the written work done by members. Uploading member’s material to the citizenship website. Members report back on the translation issue. John reports back on current citizenship websites in English. Discussion on the commissioning of overviews and case-studies. Time Input: Andy (4 days) Pedro (4 days) John (4 days) Caterina (4 days) David (4 days) Vicente (4 days) Christiane (4 days) Juan Carlos (4 days) Janos (4 days) Total: 28 days Phase 1: Continued (November, 2006 – March, 2006) Forum debate on the commissioning of overviews and case-studies (members 3 days) Forum debate on dissemination of the Citizen Project (members 3 days) Writing one case-study of citizenship teaching in your own country (all members 5 days) Forum seminars and discussions of posted case-studies (members 12 days) Arranging and checking translation of your overview. (Pedro, Caterina, David, Vicente, Juan Carlos, Caterina, Christiane – 3 days) Translating material into Swedish (David 10 days) Preparation of Brighton meeting: (John and Andy 5 days each) Developing the website (Janos 10 days) Administration of Project: Andy (10 days), Varndean (10 days) Arranging the buying of the equipment for the project: computers, camcorders, etc. (Andy and John 3 days each) Andy (51 days) Pedro (26 days) John (41 days) Caterina (26 days) David (36 days) Vicente (26 days) Christiane (4 days) Juan Carlos (26 days) Janos (36 days) Varndean (10 days) Total: 276 days Phase 1: Meeting 2 in Brighton, March, 2007 Presentation of case-studies by members and two invited local speakers. Discussion on the development of the website. Workshop session on project hardware. Discussion on the format of the 2009 residential course. Time Input: Andy (4 days) Pedro (4 days) John (4 days) Caterina (4 days) David (4 days) Vicente (4 days) Christiane (4 days) Juan Carlos (4 days) Janos (4 days) Total: 28 days Phase 1: Continued Video Conference Meetings in April and May (members 2 days) Forum debate on the format of the 2009 residential course. (members 3 days) Forum debate on an “ideal” citizenship courses. (members, 3 days) Forum seminars led by our two invited speakers to Lisbon (members 3 days) Preparation of seminar on overview of how Citizenship is taught in Europe (John, 10 days) Preparation of Lisbon meeting: (Pedro 5 days) Developing the website (Janos 6 days) Administration of Project: Andy (10 days), Varndean (10 days) Andy (21 days) Pedro (16 days) John (21 days) Caterina (11 days) David (11 days) Vicente (11 days) Christiane (5 days) Juan Carlos (11 days) Janos (17 days) Varndean (10 days) Total: 134 days Phase 1: Meeting 3 in Lisbon, June, 2007 Presentation of case-studies by two invited speakers. Discussion on the development of the website and forum. Discussion on the format of the 2009 residential course. Discussion on an “ideal” citizenship courses Seminar on overview of how Citizenship is taught in Europe (John) Commissioning of the 15 European overviews and case-studies. Time Input: Andy (4 days) Pedro (4 days) John (4 days) Caterina (4 days) David (4 days) Vicente (4 days) Christiane (4 days) Juan Carlos (4 days) Janos (4 days) Total: 28 days End of the first stage of Project: Total days in first stage Pedro (64) John (90) Caterina (59) David (69) Vincente (59) Christiane (23) Juan Carlos (64) Janos (81) Andy (90)

I have now added this to the Workplan.

I agree but we can only do this after members receive their computers, headsets, etc. in March, 2007.

We have money to do this. However, if you do it yourself, this can be taken from the total number of days for you and we can use the money to invite more speakers.