John Simkin

There have been some interesting revelations at the Chilcot Inquiry. However, the most noticeable thing about the inquiry is the failure of the committee to ask penetrating questions. On several occasions witnesses have made fascinating comments but committee members have failed to ask follow-up questions. This is not difficult to understand when you look at the membership of the Chilcot Committee.

Sir John Chilcot, a former Whitehall mandarin who spent years at the Northern Ireland office (note the Ireland connection to all the Iraq investigations).

Sir Lawrence Freedman, an establishment historian who was a foreign policy advisor to Tony Blair (wrote most of Blair’s speech on “liberal intervention” in 1999.

Sir Martin Gilbert, Conservative historian who is the unofficial spokesman for Israel’s foreign policy. During the Iraq invasion he wrote that Blair and Bush “may well, with the passage of time and the opening of the archives, join the ranks of Roosevelt and Churchill”.

Sir Roderic Lyne, a former ambassador to Russia.

Lady Prashar, a former first civil service commissioner.

Margaret Aldred, director general of the foreign and defence policy secretariat at the Cabinet Office.

Message from Don Bohning:

Just to let you know so you stop whining, your long-winded and barely intelligible response to my earlier piece on your "distortion of history," - which you most certainly are guilty of - is in the AFIO intelligencer. It also has my response to it, suggesting you - not me - is the one using McCarthyite tactics. You can get a copy from one of your "dittoheads" since I am certainly not going to give you any aid in obtaining it.

Well, Amazing to me they published it, but I guess since they let him respond, they all wanted to further besmirch this site. It will not be so easy to get a copy. Few libraries carry it - if any do. The childish nastiness of his reply is really amazing! Says a lot about him and how much your words cut him deeply.

Maybe the local MI5 or MI6 office library will send you a copy...

I do have a good contact who will be able to get me a copy.

I get on average 2 or 3 abusive emails from Don Bohning every week. The man is clearly very disturbed. I think the main problem he has with me is that if you type in "Don Bohning" into Google, number 1 is my page on him. Although the page does include his attacks on me, it also contains the evidence that he was a CIA asset while working as a journalist. If I was him, I would be upset as well. The same goes for Carl E. Jenkins, the man I believe to have organised the assassination. That is why he and his family are so upset with me.

http://vincepalamara.blogspot.com/2009/12/...-douglas-p.html

I suggest you add the URL to your signature. It will then appear everytime you post. One of the great things about this forum is the ranking it has with search-engines like Google.

Message from Don Bohning:

Just to let you know so you stop whining, your long-winded and barely intelligible response to my earlier piece on your "distortion of history," - which you most certainly are guilty of - is in the AFIO intelligencer. It also has my response to it, suggesting you - not me - is the one using McCarthyite tactics. You can get a copy from one of your "dittoheads" since I am certainly not going to give you any aid in obtaining it.

Tom, what do you think of the President's proposed reforms?

Guy Alfred Aldred is one of my heroes. Several times in his life he made a stand for what at the time was an unpopular cause.

In January 1907, Aldred began work for The Daily Chronicle. He also ran his own small publishing company. In 1910 the courts banned The Indian Sociologist, an Indian nationalist newspaper edited by Shyamji Krishnavarma. Over the issue of free speech he printed the August edition of the journal and as a result he was sentenced to twelve months hard labour.

Aldred was a strong opponent of the First World War and publicized his views in his newspaper The Spur. Due to heavy losses at the Western Front the government decided in 1916 to introduce conscription (compulsory enrollment). The Military Service Act of January 1916 specified that single men between the ages of 18 and 41 were liable to be called-up for military service unless they were widowed with children or ministers of religion. Conscription started on 2nd March 1916.

On 14th April 1916, Aldred was arrested and charged with failing to report for Military Service. When he appeared in court he explained that he refused to fight because he was a conscientious objector. On 4th May he was fined £5 and handed him over to the military authorities. At his Court Martial on 17th May he was sentenced to six month military detention.

Aldred refused to comply with military orders and on 27th June he was sentenced to nine months hard labour. On the 4th July 1916, Aldred was moved to Winchester Prison and the following month he was transferred to the village of Dyce in the north of Scotland where a camp of tents had been erected. Over the next few months a total of sixty nine conscientious objectors died in these work camps.

Aldred escaped from the camp but was arrested in London on 1st November 1916 and sent to Wormwood Scrubs prison. On 28th March 1917, Aldred was released from prison and taken under escort to Exeter Military Camp. He was given another order but he refused and was confined to the guardroom. Two months later he was taken to Deepcot Military Camp and when he refused to parade he was once again remanded for Court Martial.

On 17th May 1917 Aldred was sentenced to 18 months hard labour and sent to Wandsworth Prison. Over the next few months there was considerable unrest and protest by the conscientious objectors. The ringleaders, which included Aldred, were sentenced to 42 days of solitary confinement with 3 days on bread and water and then 3 days off while locked in a bare unheated basement cell.

Aldred continued to refuse military orders and on 20th August 1918 he was transferred to Blackdown Barracks and was once again placed on remand for Court Martial. Throughout his terms of imprisonment Aldred managed to smuggle out several articles to Rose Witcop who published them in their paper The Spur.

The First World War ended on 11th November 1918 but he was not released on licence until 7th January 1919. He travelled to Glasgow where he addressed a large meeting in St Mungo Halls, York Street, where he spoke on "The Present Struggle for Liberty". On 10th March, 1918 Aldred was arrested while speaking on Clapham Common and was taken to Wandsworth Prison. He stated that he would not eat or work until he was released from his illegal and vindictive imprisonment. He was released after four days.

Aldred and his partner, Rose Witcop, joined the campaign for birth-control information that had began by Marie Stopes when she published a concise guide to contraception called Wise Parenthood. Her book upset the leaders of the Church of England who believed it was wrong to advocate the use of birth control. Roman Catholics were especially angry, as the Pope had made it clear that he condemned all forms of contraception. Despite this opposition, Stopes continued her campaign and in 1921 founded the Society for Constructive Birth Control. With financial help from her rich second husband, Humphrey Roe, Marie also opened the first of her birth-control clinics in Holloway on 17th March 1921.

Aldred and Witcop published several pamphlets on birth-control and in 1923 they were both arrested for distributing material written by Margaret Sanger. Although found guilty they were not sent to prison.

Sir Walter Strickland, a long-time supporter of Aldred, died on August 1938. He left Aldred £3,000 and with this money he bought some second-hand printing machinery and established The Strickland Press. Over the next 25 years Aldred published regular issues of the United Socialist Movement organ, The Word and various pamphlets on things he cared about. This included attacks on fascism, capitalism and communism.

Guy Aldred continued to promote social justice until his death on 16th October 1963. As one historian has pointed out: "Guy Alfred Aldred had worked ceaselessly at his propaganda, writing, publishing and public speaking, he took on injustices wherever he saw it. He had spoken at every May Day for 60 years except the years he spent in prison. He never once asked for a fee nor sought personal gain, throughout his 62 years of campaigning his principles never faltered."

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPaldredG.htm

During the First World War Marie Stopes began writing a book about feminism and marriage. In her book Married Love, Stopes argued that marriage should be an equal relationship between husband and wife. However, she had great difficulty finding a publisher. Walter Blackie of Blackie & Son rejected her manuscript with the words: "The theme does not please me. I think there is far too much talking and writing about these things already… Don't you think you should wait publication until after the war? There will be few enough men for the girls to marry; and a book like this would frighten off the few." Blackie objected to passages such as, "far too often, marriage puts an end to women's intellectual life. Marriage can never reach its full stature until women possess as much intellectual freedom and freedom of opportunity within it as do their partners."

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Wstopes.htm

Of the original “Who Killed Kennedy Committee” only John Arden, John Calder and Michael Foot are still alive.

In January 1937 Clem Beckett wrote to his wife from the front-line at Jarama: "I'm sure you'll realise that I should never have been satisfied had I not assisted. Only my hatred of Fascism brought me here." On the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War this leading speedway rider abandoned his successful career to fight for the International Brigades who were defending the democratically elected Popular Front government against Franco's nationalist army being supported by Hitler and Mussolini. This was a generation of men and women who had become pacifists because of the horrors of the First World War. However, with the emergence of fascists governments in Germany and Italy, they became international warriors defending democracy in Spain. They argued that if fascism was defeated in Spain, it would not be necessary to fight a Second World War. They were right, but unfortunately, governments in the rest of the western world, decided that the best policy of dealing with Hitler was appeasement. They also passed laws that made it illegal for these men and women to aid the Popular Front government. Those who survived faced persecution when they arrived back in their own countries. These men and women later became known as "premature fascists"

Bernard Knox describes what happened to him when he enlisted in the US Army when America entered the war against Germany and Japan:

The doctor noticed the scar on my throat. "It looks like a bullet wound," he said. I told him it was and he asked how I got it. "And don't tell me," he added, "that it was a hunting accident -or that you were cleaning the gun and it suddenly went off." So I told him I had fought in Spain. "What side were you on?" he asked, and I replied, indignantly, "The government side, of course. His face became a scowling mask. "You mean the Goddam Reds," he said. I made no reply, as he turned me round to find the exit scar. Then he said, "All right, go on to the next booth," and as I started he said, "They damn near got you, didn't they?"

Hank Rubin was another who joined the International Brigades. He later served with the US Army in the Pacific. As he pointed out in Spain's Cause Was Mine (1997): "We were pariahs to our government. When Brigaders volunteered for the armed forces in World War II, the official army line, at first, was that we were not to be sent outside of the continental limits, so that we would not have contact with European communists. This ruling was later successfully challenged. Even so, most of us were sent to the Pacific combat zone. But despite all of the government's fears about our politics, some of the Brigaders, because of their experience and skills, were needed for the war effort. Some, therefore, were sent across the Atlantic to assignments behind the German and Italian lines to work with the various resistance forces, which, ironically, were often communist or communist-led. More than six hundred American vets served in World War II, in addition to another three hundred more in the merchant marine. In all, about twenty-five Spanish vets gave their lives for their country in World War. Many were decorated for bravery. Between sixty and seventy, including myself, were commissioned as officers." Despite this, until a successful court-case in the early 1950s, these American International Brigadiers were denied passports and the freedom to travel abroad.

Over the next few weeks I intend to write on this thread about these men and women who gave their lives for democracy.

Clem Beckett was born in Oldham in 1906. After leaving school he became a blacksmith. He also became a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain. According to Graham Stevenson: "His trade was of a blacksmith but, faced with victimisation and depression after the late 1920s, he started riding the Dome of Death at fairgrounds. So, stunning and confident was his mastery of this feat that, in no short time he had became famous as Dare Devil Beckett, the man who rode the Wall of Death and who broke world records."

Beckett became a speedway rider for White City, a team based in London. According to David Hallam: "When speedway was first introduced to this country many greyhound stadium owners jumped on the bandwagon. Young kids were persuaded to race irrespective of their experience and many were killed or seriously injured. Clem Beckett... played a major part in setting up a trades union for riders that stopped this lethal exploitation." George Sinfield later commented: "Beneath his leather jacket beat a heart of gold. It was a heart that throbbed in rhythm with the struggle of the working people."

Jon Tait recently wrote: "Clem Beckett loved the dirty growl of his bike's engine, the smell of diesel and hot metal filling his nostrils. An enduring image for those lucky enough to see him ride was of the legendary speedway star zipping around the final corner before crossing the finish line, muck spraying up from his back tyre before he lifted his goggles, his face flecked with mud as he celebrated another win. Beckett loved the thrill of the speedway track, the rush of adrenaline as the back end of his ride slipped out, gunning the throttle and feeling the cool blast of wind in his face... The racetrack owners must have regarded Beckett as a bit of a rebel - he unionised the sport when he formed the Dirt-track Riders Association."

On 30th March 1929, Beckett joined forces with Spencer Stratton and Jimmy Hindle to establish the Sheffield Tigers. As Graham Stevenson points out: "Operating as Provincial Dirt-Tracks Ltd, the group had sunk their savings into buying land at Owlerton Meadows. Since the sport was then sweeping the country, it was perhaps not such a risky venture in retrospect but many thought not at the time. It was so new that it was only the fifth such venture in the country. Beckett now shone as the star of the new Owlerton Stadium, winning the golden helmet in front of 15,000 spectators, whereas even with a renaissance in the sport only a few thousand would now turn out."

In 1932 Clem Beckett was active in the campaign to gain access to open spaces in what is now the Peak District National Park. In 1932 he took part in what became known as the Kinder Trespass. Joseph Norman was one of those activists who worked alongside Beckett: "My first real experience of political activity was the mass trespass on Kinder Scout in Derbyshire which eventually led to the designation of the area as a National Park. Dozens of those that fought the police and landowners on that mass trespass were... men like Clem Beckett and George Brown."

On the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Clem Beckett was one of several members of the Manchester branch of the CPGB who volunteered to go to Spain to defend the Popular Front government.

Clem Beckett and his friend Christopher Caudwell, took control of a Charcot light machine-gun at Jarma. On 12th February, 1937, at what became known as Suicide Hill, the Republicans suffered heavy casualties. Hugh Thomas, the author of The Spanish Civil War (1961) has commented: "A mere two hundred and twenty-five out of the original six hundred members of the British Battalion were left at the end of the day." Beckett's friend, George Sinfield, later pointed out: "Clem and Chris were posted at a vital point. They faced innumerable odds: artillery, planes, and howling Moors throwing hand-grenades. Their section was ordered to retire. Clem and Chris kept their machine-gun trained on the advancing fascists, as a cover to the retreat. The advance was halted, but Clem and Chris... lost their lives."

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPbeckett.htm

"The Greater Game: Sporting Icons Who Fell in the Great War", studies fourteen professional sportsmen who gave their lives in that most vicious of conflicts. Their intriguing yet tragic stories are drawn from the ranks of professional footballers, international rugby stars, Wimbledon champions, Olympic gold medallists, cricketing heroes, golfing professionals, a member of the Ice Hockey Hall of Fame and a Tour de France winner of the countries fighting for the Allied cause.

Tony Blair used "deceit" to persuade parliament and the British people to support war in Iraq, Sir Ken Macdonald, the former director of public prosecutions, said today.

In an article in the Times, Macdonald attacked Blair for engaging in "alarming subterfuge", for displaying "sycophancy" towards George Bush and for refusing to accept that his decisions were wrong.

Macdonald's comments about Blair's decision to go to war are more critical than anything that has been said so far by any of the senior civil servants who worked in Whitehall when Blair was prime minister.

Macdonald was DPP from 2003 until 2008 and he now practises law from Matrix Chambers, where Blair's barrister wife, Cherie, is also based.

In his article Macdonald highlighted a remark Blair made in an interview broadcast yesterday about supporting the overthrow of Saddam Hussein regardless of whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction to explain why he thought the former prime minister was guilty of deceit.

But Macdonald also expressed concerns about the Iraq inquiry, suggesting that some of its questioning has been "unchallenging" and that Sir John Chilcot and his team will be held in "contempt" if they fail to uncover the truth about the war.

Macdonald wrote: "The degree of deceit involved in our decision to go to war on Iraq becomes steadily clearer. This was a foreign policy disgrace of epic proportions, and playing footsie on Sunday morning television does nothing to repair the damage.

"It is now very difficult to avoid the conclusion that Tony Blair engaged in an alarming subterfuge with his partner, George Bush, and went on to mislead and cajole the British people into a deadly war they had made perfectly clear they didn't want, and on a basis that it's increasingly hard to believe even he found truly credible."

Macdonald said that Blair's fundamental flaw was his "sycophancy towards power" and that he could not resist the "glamour" he attracted in Washington.

"In this sense he was weak and, as we can see, he remains so," Macdonald went on.

"Since those sorry days we have frequently heard him repeating the self-regarding mantra that 'hand on heart, I only did what I thought was right'. But this is a narcissist's defence and self-belief is no answer to misjudgment: it is certainly no answer to death."

Macdonald said that, with the exceptions of some of the interventions from Sir Roderic Lyne, the questions asked when the Chilcot inquiry has been taking evidence from witnesses have been tame.

"If this is born of a belief that it creates an atmosphere more conducive to truth, it seems naive. The truth doesn't always glide out so compliantly; sometimes it struggles to be heard," Macdonald said.

Many commentators have criticised the fact that all members of the Chilcot team are establishment figures – Chilcot himself is a former permanent secretary – and Macdonald said the inquiry needed to prove its independence.

"In British public life, loyalty and service to power can sometimes count for more to insiders than any tricky questions of wider reputation. It's the regard you are held in by your peers that really counts, so that steadfastness in the face of attack and threatened exposure brings its own rich hierarchy of honour and reward.

"Disloyalty, on the other hand, means a terrible casting out, a rocky and barren Roman exile that few have the courage to endure."

Macdonald said Chilcot and his team needed to tell the truth without fear of offending the Whitehall establishment.

"If Chilcot fails to reveal the truth without fear in this Middle Eastern story of violence and destruction, the inquiry will be held in deserved and withering contempt," Macdonald said.

Yesterday, in an interview with Fern Britton broadcast on BBC1, Blair said he would have backed an attack on Iraq even if he had known that Saddam had no WMD.

"If you had known then that there were no WMDs, would you still have gone on?" Blair was asked. He replied: "I would still have thought it right to remove him [saddam Hussein]".

Blair added: "I mean obviously you would have had to use and deploy different arguments about the nature of the threat."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/de...acdonald-deceit

The "global warming scare" is like all other scares of this type.

The first question to ask is WHO BENEFITS from the scare propaganda.

You are right that we always need to ask the question “who benefits” from any particular theory. However, that must also be applied to those who support the theory that “global warming” does not exist. We must look for the financial backers for those spokes people who argue against global warming. In virtually every case it is the oil industry that of course would lose billions if governments took effective measures against the causes of global warming.

Of course, it is true that because of the overwhelming evidence that global warming is taking place, scientists involved in this area of research would have their career prospects damaged if they argued the opposite was the case. After all, people would just think they were being paid by the oil industry to put forward this point of view.

I am not saying that all anti-global climate warming advocates are being paid by the oil industry. Some will no doubt argue that it is some sort of conspiracy. But then again, they usually do.

Is there a way to turn off the "thread view" and return to the previous "page view" of the forum? It's nice, I suppose, for some people to be able to follow a thread according to its responses, but to have to click three, four or five times to read even a short thread is counter-productive, and a real pain in the rear. I don't like it at all.

Oh, nevermind: I found it. Anyone else running across this, it can be changed using the Options button at the upper right of the topic or message. That makes the change universal.

Go to Options on the top right-hand side. Then select from the three types of "Display Modes".

To the Editor, Providence Journal

The Journal today carried the obituary of Dr. Malcolm Perry ("Malcolm Perry, tried to save JFK") written by David Stout of the New York Times. Stout comments on the controversy over the direction of the shots that struck President Kennedy, and particularly the nature of his throat wound: was it an entrance wound or an exit? Stout quotes Dr. Perry as saying to reporters that afternoon: "It could have been either."

Nowhere in the transcript of that afternoon's press conference do any such words appear. Repeat: Nowhere. Quite the contrary: Dr. Perry unequivocally described the throat wound as "an entrance wound," later, as "a wound of entrance." He even stressed the point by saying that "the bullet was coming at him," that is from the front, not from the Texas School Book Depository. Dr. Perry was highly experienced in assessing gunshot wounds.

All the Parkland doctors who assisted at JFK's treatment later were subjected to heavy government pressure to change their judgments, not only about the throat wound but also about the large, gaping wound to the rear of the President's head. This has been known for years, and meticulously documented.

Yet the New York Times continues to ignore the overwhelming evidence in this case in order to cling to the "Lee Harvey Oswald lone-nut" theory. Or to making up "evidence" like Stout's pseudo-quote of Dr. Perry. Shame!

James R Folliard

31 Valley Lane

Portsmouth RI 02871

401-683-1238

Not that they weren't doomed anyway by the "neutrality" of the western powers and the Soviet's prioritizing adherence to Stalinism over victory but the in fighting among the various Republican factions is one of the most tragic aspects of the Spanish Civil War

There is a very good article by Bernard Knox on this entitled "Premature Anti-Fascist"

http://www.english.illinois.edu/MAPS/scw/knox.htm

It's worth noting that right now, all five volumes are heavily discounted at Amazon.com, down to $16.87 each from the initial $25 price. As many are probably aware, Amazon (those cheeky buggers) go back and forth with their discounts and can pull the rug out from under you if you're not careful, so I'd recommend anyone cashed up in these trying weeks before Christmas treat themselves to as many volumes as they can get. I have to wait till Jan/Feb, doggone it, but I'm looking forward to eventually getting all of these. It may be worth waiting a few extra weeks for forum members to dig into the books before Doug pops up here to answer questions.

As an aside, FAMILY OF SECRETS is now cheaper in paperback on Amazon as well.

THANKS ANTHONY FOR TAKING THE TIME AND POSTING THIS INFORMATION FOR THE MEMBERSHIP..APPRECIATED;...B

The book/s have yet to appear on Amazon UK. I am told Amazon prices vary from day to day.

State of Play is one of the best political conspiracy films I have seen. It is a film adaptation of the critically acclaimed six-part British television serial written by Paul Abbott, which was on BBC in 2003. The plot of the six-hour serial was condensed to a fit two hour movie format, and the location changed from London to Washington, D.C. I was a great fan of the BBC serial and when I heard that Paul Abbott was not involved in writing the screenplay, I feared the worse. However, the scriptwriters, Matthew Michael Carnahan, Tony Gilroy, Peter Morgan, and Billy Ray, have done a good job in updating the story to be about Halliburton and the War on Terror. Jeff Daniels gives a great impersonation of George H. W. Bush.

You can see the reviews here:

http://uk.rottentomatoes.com/m/1193230-state_of_play/

This one is especially worth reading:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2009/apr/26...-of-play-review

Philip French highlights the main weakness of the film in his conclusion: "This intelligent, gripping film, like the small-screen version, ultimately places the greater moral blame on fallible human beings rather than larger political forces. This rather weakens the denouement."

In the early 1930s Clem Beckett was one of the best-known sportsman in the UK. As Graham Stevenson has pointed out: "His trade was of a blacksmith but, faced with victimisation and depression after the late 1920s, he started riding the Dome of Death at fairgrounds. So, stunning and confident was his mastery of this feat that, in no short time he had became famous as Dare Devil Beckett, the man who rode the Wall of Death and who broke world records."

He became a speedway rider for Belle Vue, a team based in Manchester. According to John Snowdon: "When speedway was first introduced to this country many greyhound stadium owners jumped on the bandwagon. Young kids were persuaded to race irrespective of their experience and many were killed or seriously injured. Clem Beckett... played a major part in setting up a trades union for riders that stopped this lethal exploitation." George Sinfield later commented: "Beneath his leather jacket beat a heart of gold. It was a heart that throbbed in rhythm with the struggle of the working people."

Stevenson has argued: "The then relatively new sport of speedway motorcycle racing was massively popular amongst young working class people in the 1930s. It is diffcult to imagine quite how much so; but, arguably, Clem Beckett was the David Beckham of his day. Young men aspired to his skill and daring and young women swooned over his dashing appearance!"

There was one way Stevenson was unlike Beckham. He saw himself as a representative of the working-class and was active in the campaign to gain access to open spaces in what is now the Peak District National Park. In 1932 he took part in what became known as the Kinder Trespass. Joseph Norman was one of those activists who worked alongside Beckett: "My first real experience of political activity was the mass trespass on Kinder Scout in Derbyshire which eventually led to the designation of the area as a National Park. Dozens of those that fought the police and landowners on that mass trespass were... men like Clem Beckett."

Clem Beckett also campaigned against the growth of fascism and in 1936 joined the International Brigades. Beckett wrote to his wife from the front-line at Jarama: "I'm sure you'll realise that I should never have been satisfied had I not assisted. Only my hatred of Fascism brought me here."

Clem Beckett and his friend, the poet, Christopher Caudwell, took control of a Charcot light machine-gun at the Battle of Jarma. On 12th February, 1937, at what became known as Suicide Hill, the Republicans suffered heavy casualties. Hugh Thomas, the author of The Spanish Civil War (1961) has commented: "A mere two hundred and twenty-five out of the original six hundred members of the British Battalion were left at the end of the day." Beckett's friend, George Sinfield, later pointed out: "Clem and Chris were posted at a vital point. They faced innumerable odds: artillery, planes, and howling Moors throwing hand-grenades. Their section was ordered to retire. Clem and Chris kept their machine-gun trained on the advancing fascists, as a cover to the retreat. The advance was halted, but Clem and Chris... lost their lives." He was 31 years old.

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPbeckett.htm

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPcaudwell.htm

I am waiting to find out if the poster is someone that John Simkin has given a waiver to; please wait until I get a reply. As far as their posts are concerned, I don't see anything that breaks Forum rules but am waiting to hear from other mods.

Apologies but please be patient.

I have not given John Gillespie permission to post without a photograph. (He did have a photograph that has been taken down.) I have placed him on moderation until he adds his photograph.

During the Spanish Civil War the National Confederation of Trabajo (CNT), the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI) and the Worker's Party (POUM) played an important role in running Barcelona. This brought them into conflict with other left-wing groups in the city including the Union General de Trabajadores (UGT), the Catalan Socialist Party (PSUC) and the Communist Party (PCE).

On the 3rd May 1937, Rodriguez Salas, the Chief of Police, ordered the Civil Guard and the Assault Guard to take over the Telephone Exchange, which had been operated by the CNT since the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. Members of the CNT in the Telephone Exchange were armed and refused to give up the building. Members of the CNT, FAI and POUM became convinced that this was the start of an attack on them by the UGT, PSUC and the PCE and that night barricades were built all over the city.

Fighting broke out on the 4th May. Later that day the anarchist ministers, Federica Montseny and Juan Garcia Oliver, arrived in Barcelona and attempted to negotiate a ceasefire. When this proved to be unsuccessful, Juan Negrin, Vicente Uribe and Jesus Hernández called on Francisco Largo Caballero to use government troops to takeover the city. Largo Caballero also came under pressure from Luis Companys not to take this action, fearing that this would breach Catalan autonomy.

On 6th May death squads assassinated a number of prominent anarchists in their homes. The following day over 6,000 Assault Guards arrived from Valencia and gradually took control of Barcelona. It is estimated that about 400 people were killed during what became known as the May Riots.

These events in Barcelona severely damaged the Popular Front government. Communist members of the Cabinet were highly critical of the way Francisco Largo Caballero handled the May Riots. President Manuel Azaña agreed and on 17th May he asked Juan Negrin to form a new government. Negrin was a communist sympathizer and from this date Joseph Stalin obtained more control over the policies of the Republican government

Ethel MacDonald played an important role in these events. One of nine children, she was born in Bellshill on 24th February 1909. She left home at sixteen and did a variety of jobs over the next couple of years. MacDonald joined the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and in 1931 she met Guy Aldred in Glasgow. Impressed by her revolutionary zeal he appointed her secretary of the Anti-Parliamentary Communist Federation (APCF), an organization formed by Aldred in 1921. The APCF was breakaway group from the Communist Party of Great Britain.

In June 1934 MacDonald and Aldred and were both involved in the formation of the United Socialist Movement (USM), an anarcho-communist political organisation based in Scotland. Several members of the Independent Labour Party who had lost their belief in the parliamentary road to socialism joined the party.

On the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War she travelled with Jenny Patrick, Aldred's wife, to Barcelona as a representative of the USM. Soon afterwards she was employed by the CNT-FAI's foreign language information centre. Later she gave nightly English-language political broadcasts on Radio Barcelona.

On 14th November, 1936 Buenaventura Durruti arrived in Madrid from Aragón with his Anarchist Brigade. Six days later Durruti was killed. Ethel MacDonald claimed that Durruti had been killed by a member of the Communist Party (PCE). MacDonald did what she could do investigate the killing.

MacDonald soon had a strong following for her radio broadcasts. The Glasgow Herald reported: "A prominent news editor in Hollywood says that he has received hundred of letters concerning Ethel MacDonald, stating that the writers, in all parts of the USA and Canada, enjoyed her announcements and talks from Barcelona radio, not because they agreed with what she said, but because they thought she had the finest radio speaking voice they had ever heard."

On the 3rd May 1937, Rodriguez Salas, the Chief of Police, ordered the Civil Guard and the Assault Guard to take over the Telephone Exchange, which had been operated by the CNT since the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. Members of the CNT in the Telephone Exchange were armed and refused to give up the building. Members of the CNT, FAI and POUM became convinced that this was the start of an attack on them by the UGT, PSUC and the PCE and that night barricades were built all over the city.

Fighting broke out on the 4th May. Later that day the anarchist ministers, Federica Montseny and Juan Garcia Oliver, arrived in Barcelona and attempted to negotiate a cease-fire. When this proved to be unsuccessful, Juan Negrin, Vicente Uribe and Jesus Hernández called on Francisco Largo Caballero to use government troops to takeover the city. Largo Caballero also came under pressure from Luis Companys, the leader of the PSUC, not to take this action, fearing that this would breach Catalan autonomy.

On 6th May death squads assassinated a number of prominent anarchists in their homes. The following day over 6,000 Assault Guards arrived from Valencia and gradually took control of Barcelona. It is estimated that about 400 people were killed during what became known as the May Riots. During this crackdown MacDonald assisted the escape of anarchists wanted by the Communist secret police. As a result she became known as the "Scots Scarlet Pimpernel".

On 12th June, 1937, Bob Smillie, a member of the Independent Labour Party, who had been fighting with the POUM forces, died while being held by the Valencia police. He officially died from peritonitis. However, rumours began to circulate that he had died following a beating in his prison cell. MacDonald now began writing newspaper articles and making radio broadcasts claiming that Smillie had been executed by the secret police.

Eventually she herself was arrested by the authorities. She later told the Glasgow Evening Times: "My arrest was typical of the attitude of the Communist Party... Assault Guards and officials of the Public Order entered the house in which I lived late one night. Without any explanation they commenced to go through thoroughly every room and every cupboard in the house. After having discovered that which to them was sufficient to hang me - revolutionary literature etc."

Fenner Brockway of the Independent Labour Party worked behind the scenes to obtain MacDonald's release. He argued "she is an anarchist and has no connection with our party". On 8th July 1937, Ethel MacDonald was released in prison. However, within a few days she was rearrested again and spent another 12 days in captivity. When she was freed she went into hiding in Barcelona. She wrote to Guy Aldred and told him: "I am still here and unable to leave the country legally. I am in hiding... I cannot get a visa. If I apply I shall be arrested."

Ethel MacDonald's mother received a letter from Helen Lennox saying that her daughter's was in danger because of what she knew about the Bob Smillie case: "The Secret Service operating today in Spain comes by night and its victims are never seen again. Bob Smillie they didn't dare to bump off openly, but he may have suffered more because of that. Your Ethel certainly believes his death was intended. She prophesied it before his death took place, and said he would not be allowed out of the country with the knowledge he had. What worries me more than anything is that Ethel has already been ill and would be easy prey for anyone trying to make her death appear natural."

In September 1937 MacDonald managed to escape from Spain. After leaving the country she made speeches on the way the Communist Party (PCE) had been acting in during the Spanish Civil War in Paris and Amsterdam. She returned to Glasgow in November, 1937 and in a speech to 300 people at Central Station she said: "I went to Spain full of hopes and dreams. It promised to be utopia realised. I return full of sadness, dulled by the tragedy I have seen. I have lived through scenes and events that belong to the French revolution."

MacDonald also argued that Bob Smillie had been killed by the officials of the Communist Party (PCE). According to Daniel Gray, the author of Homage to Caledonia (2008): "she did her utmost to convince the public that Bob Smillie had been murdered, alleging that the secret police had assassinated him in cold blood."

David Murray, the Independent Labour Party representative in Spain, denied this and he wrote to John McNair saying: "Ethel MacDonald has been quite a trouble and my tactics are to choke her off. Murray's story was accepted until George Orwell arrived back in London. In his book, Homage to Catalonia (1938), Orwell argued that Smillie had died "an evil and meaningless death".

Alex Smillie, Bob's father, became convinced that his son had been murdered. David Murray wrote to him arguing: "I am convinced, and this I can affirm on oath, that Bob died a natural death. All my observations and impressions lead me to this conclusion. Judgement is a human thing and liable to error, but in spite of every curious and mysterious circumstance, I am convinced that Bob was never ill-treated nor was he done to death."

Georges Kopp, Smillie's commander in Spain, also argued that Smillie had been murdered: "The doctor states that Bob Smillie had the skin and the flesh of his skin perforated by a powerful kick delivered by a foot shod in the nailed boot; the intestines were partly hanging outside. Another blow had severed the left side connection between the jaw and the skull and the former was merely hanging on the right side. Bob died about 30 minutes after reaching the hospital."

It seems that the ILP joined forces with the Communist Party to cover-up the death of Bob Smillie. The argument being that if it became widely known that the communists were killing anarchists and the followers of Trotsky, this would only help Franco and the fascists. It is time the truth was told.

You can find a video about Ethel MacDonald here:

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPmacdonaldE.htm

A full discussion of the Bob Smillie death can be found here:

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPsmillie.htm

THEORY OF CRASH OF UNITED FLIGHT 533 DECEMBER 8, 1972

By November 1972 HUNT was blackmailing the White House for $100,000. White House aide Fred LaRue gave Manuel Artime at least $21,000 to distribute to the families of the Watergate burglars.

HUNT could have implicated NIXON in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. But did HUNT have any evidence? Had HUNT entrusted it to his wife while he was in prison? NIXON may have believed DOROTHY HUNT possessed evidence that linked him to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

As stated, DOROTHY HUNT was killed in the airplane crash of United Airlines Flight 533 on December 8, 1972, at Chicago's Midway Airport. UAL 533 was on its way from Washington, D.C., to Omaha, Nebraska, with an intermediate stop at Midway Airport. There were 55 people aboard, including five children and two infants. After Charles Colson became a born-again Christian, he stated: "I don't say this to many people because they think I am nuts. I think they killed DOROTHY HUNT. I really do..." HOWARD HUNT: "When I see these repetitive allusions to my wife's death as having somehow been caused by the CIA, I think that is really enough...if my wife had been the only one killed that would have been one thing...but 40 people..."

ANALYSIS

A detailed analysis of the Aircraft Accident Report prepared by the National Transportation Safety Board on the crash indicated that the Boeing 737 crashed because of instrument sabotage that engendered pilot error. In its report, however, the NTSB attributed the cause of the crash only to pilot error. The report was unofficial. National Transportation Safety Board Chairman John Reed, "was not present and did not participate in the adoption of this report." The report went unsigned.

The National Transportation Safety Board Report blamed "the Captain's failure to exercise positive flight management during the execution of a non-precision approach, which culminated in a critical deterioration of airspeed in the stall regime..."

THE FINAL DESCENT

At 2:26 p.m. the Captain ordered the crew of United Airlines Flight 533 to do a final descent check. At 2:27 p.m., United Air Lines Flight 533 was issued a missed-approach clearance by Midway Airport control tower: "United Flight 533, execute a missed approach..." Just as the sound of word "execute" began, the sound of the stickshaker, which was a device that sent vibrations through the cockpit several seconds before an aircraft was about to go into a stall, was heard on the tapes recovered from the cockpit voice recorder. Captain Whitehouse, the pilot of United Air Lines 533, age 44, had been employed by United Airlines for almost 20 years. He had accumulated a total of 18,000 hours flying time, of which 2,435 were in a Boeing 737.

ANALYSIS

Every pilot was taught that when a stall occurs, he should point the aircraft's nose slightly downward by extending his flaps, then immediately accelerate the engines to increase thrust. HEMMING told this researcher: "When you get a stall you drop the nose. The last thing you do is add power because that will tend to raise your nose. Put you nose down first then add power, which lessens your rate of descent. Change the angle of attack of your wings which get more airflow going across the wings creating more lift. Then add power to kill the rate of descent. Your rate of descent has slackened off, but your nose is still pointing down." Most survivors reported that, just before the crash, contrary to being nose-down, the aircraft went into a very high angle of attack. HEMMING told this researcher: "Whitehouse realized he was going to crash and tried to drag his tail to cut down his speed." Some survivors believed that there was a rapid application of power before impact. An analysis of the cockpit voice recorder tapes found by the General Electric Research Corporation did not conclusively show this power increase.

The cockpit voice recorder revealed that when the stickshaker went off at what was thought to be 1000 feet because of altimeter readings, Captain Whitehouse ordered the Second Officer to release the flaps to point the airplane's nose downward and get out of the stall. The Second Officer acknowledged the Captain's last command by saying: "Flaps 15." The Second Officer then said "I'm sorry." The National Transportation Safety Board stated that when faced with a stall, the Captain had decided to reconfigure the aircraft by extending the flight flaps because, within two seconds of the onset of the stickshaker, he asked for "more flaps." The National Transportation Safety Board stated that following this order, there was a sound indicative of flap lever movement. The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that it was Captain Whitehouse's error - failing to realize the flaps were already extended to 30 degrees and ordering the additional 15-degree extension while making a non-precision landing - that caused the crash. The National Transportation Safety Board: "The 15 degrees was added to the 30 degrees of extension that was accidentally there, so the aircraft continued to stall."

Eight seconds after the Second Officer said: "I'm sorry," United Air Lines Flight 533 crashed into several houses located near Midway Airport. Forty passengers and three crew members were killed. Two persons on the ground received fatal injuries. The aircraft itself was largely destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. Ground damage "precluded any determination of the pre-impact integrity of the control system." If this was so, how did the National Transportation Safety Board arrive at it's figure of the 30 degrees of extension that was "accidentally" there.

HEMMING told this researcher: "For the pilot to say 'flaps' then '15 degrees' - they ain't supposed to be at 15 degrees that quickly. It's deadly for those flaps to come up in a hurry when you are executing a missed approach. You'll sink. You got a stickshaker and ask for more flaps - that's the last thing you do. You're gonna start milking them flaps up. You're at that altitude and you have a stall, you've got to execute a missed approach. Nose down, full power. He's telling you what it says on the instrument. You run that xxxxer to 15 degrees below 500 feet you're going to die. He said he was sorry."

ANALYSIS

There was confusion in the cockpit during crash. The cause of this confusion would have become apparent had the flight recorder functioned properly.

THE DISABLED FLIGHT RECORDER

Eighty-two minutes after takeoff (approximately 14 minutes before the accident), the Fairchild Flight Data Recorder stopped functioning: "Flight recorder examination showed that a mitre gear (part of the drive gear assembly) had slipped on its shaft, causing the recorder to stop functioning." The cockpit voice recorder, which was recovered from the wreckage, revealed that when the flight recorder went off, a light went on in the cockpit and Captain Whitehouse asked: "Recorder go off?" The second officer: "Yeah." Captain Whitehouse: "See what's wrong, will ya...sounds to me like a circuit breaker...yeah, I just meant, I thought you'd better check everything..." The cockpit voice recorder revealed the Second Officer activated the circuit breaker that fused the power going to the flight recorder and reported: "It tests...I think its okay. I think its working...it says 'Off' but the signal, the encode light comes on and it shows, indicating taping. Christ, I can't even find the circuit breaker for this (deleted) flight recorder...I don't know, I get a reaction when I pull the AC, no reaction when you pull the DC though, you want me to call maintenance?" Captain Whitehead ordered the Second Officer to immediately call it in. Double click here to see a photograph of the flight recorder. [FlightRecorder.JPEG] The recorder was installed on the day of the accident, and had last been overhauled on November 11, 1972, only two months before it malfunctioned. The Flight Recorder Group of the National Transportation Safety Board found: "No evidence of recorder malfunction in any of the parameters as determined by examining previous flights contained on this foil medium."

ANALYSIS

The mitre gear slipped because a saboteur had loosened its set screw. (The Kollsman Instrument Report asked: "if the questionable calibration arm set screws were loose...") HEMMING told this researcher: "That was very unusual. The thing is wired into the aircraft's electrical system and has its own backup battery. A power failure doesn't shut it down. I doubt if it was coincidental. How many wrecks do you have in the history of the NTSB where you could recover the flight recorder but it didn't work?"

THE TESTIMONY OF JAMES W. ANGUS BEFORE THE NTSB

Q. Will you state your full name.

A. James W. Angus.

Q. And what is your address?

A. 57 Westervelt Avenue, Baldwin, New York.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am staff engineer with Kollsman Instruments Company.

Q. Will you tell us how long you have been employed by Kollsman Instruments?

A. I have been employed with Kollsman since 1942 with the exception of a short period of a year and a half.

Q. Would you briefly describe your background and training and experience with Kollsman leading to your current position?

A. I have a bachelor of Mechanical Engineering Degree from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn. At Kollsman I have held assorted positions, starting as a tool inspector, becoming an experimental machinist and experimental technician, a designer, and finally an engineer.

Q. Would you describe your duties and responsibilities in your present position?

A. My primary duties are to develop pressure sensitive equipment. I also assist in giving technical assistance in areas where it is requested under special occasion.

SENIOR HEARING OFFICER HENDRICKS

Exhibit 9-G is identified as a report of an examination of altimeters and air data computers recovered from the Boeing 737, United Airlines Flight 553. Exhibit 9-C-1 is photographs altimeters and air data computers recovered from flight 553. Exhibit 9E, excerpts from Boeing 737 instruction manual regarding the pilot static system.

Q. Mr. Angus, I would like for you to start by describing the altimetry system that is install in Boeing 737, and you may use Exhibit 9E for referral. I would like you to point out those components furnished by Kollsman.

A. Our involvement with the 757 air data computer and the servo-automatic computers for this particular aircraft. The central air data computer is a device which accepts inputs of static pressure, total pressure, temperature and electrical power. We sense the pressure functions and by means of servo systems, compute associated outputs that are used in various positions around the airplane. The sensors, sender portion of the air data computer ,consist essentially of mechanisms somewhat similar to what is contained in altimeters and airspeed indicators. That is, capsules which are responsive to the particular air pressures being supplied. And this particular information is converted into angular motion which ultimately becomes part of a synchotel system and combined with a servo, it positions all of the necessary output devices in accordance with program established by the specification for the air data computer, the output devices are in the forms of syncros, potentiometers, decoders, and reliability signals.

Included with the air data computer is a monitor system for each loop. This monitor determines that the servo system is properly following up each of the sensed values. If, as in the case of the altimeter, the servo system were to get out of track by as much as 100 feet, it would automatically disconnect the system. The way it does this, it cuts off the reliability signals that are sent to each of the using devices. So that any device in the airplane receives not only data from the air data computer, but it receives a validity signal which indicates whether or not the information should be used. The functions that are sent out are sent to indicators on the panel, auto-pilot, the flight recorder, the cabin pressurization system, and the transponder for reporting altitude. The altimeters are what are sometimes referred to as servo pneumatic altimeters. These altimeters have two modes of operation which are selectable by the pilot. In the standby mode of operation, the instrument will operate as a normal pressure sensitive device in accordance with the requirements of FAA/T on C10 Beacon. If it is elected, the indicator my also operate as a servo-repeater from the altitude data transmitted by the central air data computer. In order to operate in this mode, the pilot must actuate a switch knob on the face of the altimeter, which puts it in corrected mode of operation. In this mode of operation, the overall accuracy is improved from approximately ½ a percent system to about 2/10 of a percent accuracy.

Q. The corrected mode would be the normal side of the operation?

A. I believe the way the airline uses the term, the corrected mode is the normal side of operation.

Q. And I am sorry if I missed it, but there are two such systems in the aircraft?

A. Yes, there are two completely different independent systems. There is a central air data computer for the captain's side with his own indicator, and there s a central air data computer for the first officers side that he has his own independent altimeter. As I understand it there are independent static systems supplying each of these units.

Q. Where does Kollsman interface with Boeing in this system?

A. In each case there is a Boeing specification which determines what the inputs are that you receive and what specification level these inputs would be provided to. In the case of pressure, they give us certain -- we have to provide certain cords on the devices that will tie up the lines in the aircraft, electrical connectors -- it is pretty much standardized, what pins are used for each function.

Q. I believed you mentioned the monitor tripout. Can you describe the monitor tripout as it effects the altimeter. Does this go into the standby mode when the CADAC trips out?

A. The air data computer will supply precise altitude information to the altimeter. If, for some reason, the altitude module in the air data computer determines that the information is unreliable, it will automatically cut off the reliability signal going to the altimeter.

Q. Is there any other protection in the event of a legitimate signal which is erroneous coming from the central air data computer?

A. The altimeter also contains its servo-monitor. There are two basic modes of servo detection in the altimeter. First would be if the servo system in the altimeter does not track that output of the air data computer. If there is a 50 foot disagreement between the altimeter and the air data computer, the altimeter will automatically revert to standby operation. That will be operating as a straight TSO altimeter. At the time this occurs, there is a flag on the dial which indicates it goes from the corrected mode to the standby mode.

Q. You said this occurs with a 50 foot --

A. Fifty foot separation, that is correct.

Now, in addition to this, we have what is known as a limiting device. People are always concerned and rightly so, for some reason that the servo might run away. If, for example, servo in the air data computer were to run away, we would provide a limited device in the altimeter and at certain pre-selected levels after the altimeter has responded to the corrected mode. It will then be limited in total correction capabilities at the point the monitor will cut the altimeter off, even though the air data computer might want to drive further.

Q. What kind of error would this generate maximum?

A. The error is a variable error with altitude, so that you can take care of increased tolerances at high altitude. At sea level this error would amount to approximately 350 feet.

Q. At what phase of the investigation into the accident of United 533 did your participation start?

A. We started when the instruments had been recovered and they were returned to United at San Francisco. We joined the committee at the United overhaul base and participated with them.

Q. You participated in the examination of both altimeters and the central air data computer, is that correct?

A. That is right, two data computers and two altimeters.

Q. And you prepared Exhibit 9-C to describe the extent of your participation and findings, is that correct.

A. That is correct.

Q. I would like you to refer to refer to Exhibit 9-C-1, answering the following, if you would please. Could you use the photographs and describe the general condition of the Captain's altimeter when it was first received by you?

A. I might mention before we go ahead that is all of these findings, the committee was present, and in general, I don't know of an area that doesn't exist, the committee in general agreed with the findings. These are not single person findings.

Q. Yes, sir.

A. The altimeter suffered primarily what appeared to be fire damage. There was some small indication of impact damage, but the primary source of the difficulty here was that the exterior of the case of the altimeter, which has an enamel paint which is baked on at the time of manufacture, this paint was actually burned off in many areas. With this burning off of the paint, all of the pressure seals in the instrument were no longer active.

The covered glass was cracked and it appeared to be intact, which gave us the impression that this was a thermostress problem, rather than breakage due to impact shock. The rear connector on the instrument was contaminated with a fire material which more than likely was the mating connector on the electrical harness supplied in the airplane. This material had to actually be dug out. It was quite solid. Then the electrical connector was cleaned off. We observed the instrument. We shook it lightly; it didn't have any particular noisiness inside which might indicate broken parts rolling around. We felt the instrument was capable of further testing.

Q. May I refer you to photograph 1-1 in your exhibit, please.

A. Yes, I am looking at that.

Q. The indicated dial is set 30.035 thereabout. Have you any reason to believe this setting had been changed since impact?

A. Yes. It is my understanding after the instruments had been recovered at the accident site, and as I understand it, notes were taken and photographs were taken of the instrument as mounted on the panel, that subsequently the barrel knob was rotated to see if the pointers were still operable and the particular setting that you see there is the setting that happened to be left on the instrument at the time that it was received in the United Shop.

Q. Could you briefly describe for me the functional test unit was subjected to?

A. This altimeter was placed in a ball jar. The reason for that was that we could not pipe pressure into the altimeter and maintain a reading due to the leakage from the various seals.

Without making any further adjustments to the altimeter, we connected this bell jar, which is a sealed chamber that you can look through and observe the altimeter inside of it, connected this chamber to a barometer and programmed pressure into the chamber, and each specific instance we brought the altimeter to an indicated value in 200 foot stops, going from 0 to 2000 feet.

At each time that we reached stabilization, we measured the pressure within the chamber by means of the barometer that was attached to it. We then computed, based upon the indicated values, pressure values, and the setting, we computed that the indicator had, in its present state, had an average error of approximately 150 feet in the minus direction.

Q. In which?

A. In the minus direction. We then took the same altimeter and just rotated the barrel knob to the 29-92 position, which is the standard position for performing tests on an instrument of this type, and then programmed corrected pressures into the instrument. And putting corrected pressures into the instrument, we then read the instrument error. Now, the instrument error in this case averages out to approximately minus 120 foot value. The reason for the disagreement in this particular case between the first test and the second test -- excuse me. Am I getting ahead? Do you want the reason now?

Q. Yes, go right ahead.

A. The reason we felt the disagreement existed was because due to the high temperature exposure of the unit, the operation of the fundamental mechanism was not as smooth as it would be in normal conditions. And operating somewhat erratically, you would not be perfectly sure exactly where the first level was when we were setting the pointer on the instrument. The second case, you program in a very specific pressure, vibrate the instrument, and then take a reading when it settled out. So using a control standard that is much more precise in the second case, the results tend to be more meaningful.

Q. And the error was still in the same direction?

A. Same direction, but much more repeatable all the way up. Used the same 2000 foot altitude test span and 200 foot increment.

Q. Okay, do you have any explanation as to how the low effect offset may have occurred?

A. Yes. The subsequent examination of the instrument after taking the case off revealed that the instrument internally, where the mechanism is located, had reached temperatures approaching 360 degrees Fahrenheit.

We have since taken an equivalent instrument of the servo pneumatic variety and subject that instrument to a basic calibration. The instrument was seasoned overnight in the normal operation that you season these instruments to, which is to expose it to plus 70 degrees. The next morning it was rechecked again and the instrument was a stable instrument. We had to ascertain this fact first.

Then we placed the instrument in an oven. Now I am saying in an oven because you are essentially placing it in air which is heated to a specific temperature level, but it is no a high circulation factor. It is something -- there is a gentle fan in there that just keeps the air moving at a slow pace. This particular instrument was placed there, kept there for one hour at 360 degrees -- excuse me, let me go back.

In the test condition, we did not expose it to 360 degrees because that happens to be coincident with the melting temperatures of the solders used in the instrument, so for the purpose of the second instrument, to keep the data valid, we operated this at 300 degrees Fahrenheit. No, under these conditions, after aligning the instrument to return to room temperature, we the retested it and we have an average minimum error of 85 to 90 feet. Now that does not appear in the report because we just finished the test Monday. I received the data by phone on Tuesday. We will give you a supplement on that.

Q. Do the results of the pressure testing this particular altimeter in this manner, reflect operation in the servo mode as well as the stand-by?

A. No. When we were finished testing the instrument as noted previously, using control pressure inputs, that was as far as we went on the testing in San Francisco. At that point we concentrated our testing on some of the central air data computer testing. We subsequently resumed testing on this back at Elmhurst in our plant with the team present.

After verifying our initial data, we took the instrument out of the case, we found that all of the electrical components had been exposed to very high temperatures, capacitors had exploded, solder had melted. But the basic pressure mechanism was intact. So we could not operate the instrument in servo mode. We tried in California but we just blew fuses. At that point we just stopped, we didn't want to damage it.

Q. Can you describe the condition of the first officer's altimeter one as described by you?

A. The first officers altimeter was in very poor condition as received. This instrument was subjected to extensive fire and impact damage. The fire damage present was at a level that actually melted the aluminum away, which means it was in the temperature band of 1100 degrees Fahrenheit. The base of the instrument was split open, and a goodly portion of it was missing. The rear mechanism in the instrument, which is the pressure sensing section, was also missing. The front end, the cover glass, and flange assembly, was missing. The display elements were still on the face of the instrument. Essentially all that we could say was present was a mechanism body with associated burned-out electrical components and the display portion of the instrument.

Q. Would you refer, please, to photograph 2-1 in Exhibit 9-C-1. Is this a photograph of the first officers altimeter?

A. Yes, that is a photograph taken at United as it was received.

Q. Can you explain the significance of the dial reading or apparent pointer positions and also the reading on the baro set on the altimeter as found?

A. The pointer positions are what are referred to in the trade as uncoordinated. The relative position of the pointers cannot exist based upon the normal reading that is present in the instrument. The baro set was approximately 30,685.

Q. Was there any indication on the dial of the instrument such as impact markings?

A. No.

Q. Anything to give you a clue as to what the altimeter may have been reading on impact.

A. No. We have very carefully examined the dial components under a binocular type microscope using lights and we could not find any signs that could be attributed to an impact mark.

Q. Would you briefly describe the significance of the photos that you have labeled 2-6, 2-7, and 2-8 in establishing the uncoordinated positions of the pointers?

A. Yes. While we were at United, United made available to the team a recently serviced altimeter in their possession of the same type. We very carefully measured reference points on each pointer of the first officers unit and then positioned the corresponding point on the sample altimeter to that value, and then photographed, the purpose being when you look at the photograph of the good instrument and the photograph of this instrument which had been damaged in the accident, it become readily apparent the pointers are discoordinated.

Q. The primary central air data computer, can you describe the coefficient of that component when you received it?

A. The air data computer received what we would consider a moderate amount of impact damage. By that I mean the cases were dented in several areas on each unit. The front face of the computer was also damaged rather significantly, and there was fire damage around various areas. Let me just check which ones -- the captain's, first the captains computer unit was not severely damaged, but the first officers unit was very badly burned to the point where even the knobs could not be rotated.

Q. Were the units, the internal portions, in operable condition?

A. Yes, they were operable.

Q. Could you describe for us, please, the tests to which these units were subjected?

A. Testing accomplished on the air data computers consisted, first, of isolating all of the output devices to obtain position data at the point of power cutoff to the computer. This was followed by a check of the altitude sensor by disconnecting it electrically from the computer, and running it strictly on a pressure function to determine the operability of the sensor, and again, there are means in there to determine the point at which power was cut off.

At this point we got both computers - we had the sensors and everything reconnected. We programmed standard pressures into the computer and measured the output of the --- find the sink rows. This was to determine if the signals going to the altimeter were within specification requirements.

In the case of the first officer's air data computer, it read approximately 3 ½ degrees low. This is roughly 45 to 50 feet. The captain's altimeter was well within spec, in general it was within approximately 7 feet. We then checked the correlation of the encoder, which is used by the transponder. This is checked by comparing the point at which you transition from one code value to the next as compared to the altitude data being transmitted to the indicator in the panel. This was in general less than one degree on both units, which is within 14 feet.

And individually we tried --- we worked the servo unit up to air data computer and ran them through the same range, 2,000 feet. The altimeter connected to the captain's air data computer generally responded to less than 10 feet. First officer's was between minus 30 feet and 50 feet. Following this, we ran what we call a coast test of the servo. This test was to determine if the computer was being driven as it would be in the case of a descent and power was cut off, would the computer continue to move, thereby destroying the validity of the original set of data we took off the output devices. This test was run at top rates of descent, 1,000 feet per minute and 2,500 feet per minute. In the case of the captain's altimeter, so-called coast effect was less than 7/10. The first officers altimeter approximately two feet. We considered this gave the original output devices reasonable values that we could accept.

Subsequent to this we performed a monitor check. This took special test equipment and this was done back in New York. What we did in this case was we isolated the modules for the air data computer and used jump cables, so that electrically they were connected even though they were set aside on some special test boxes. This allows us to, with the computer and the particular modules concerned, tied together, we can inactivate the servo, but still have power applied, and determine whether then monitors were still operating. The monitors on the both the first officer's and the captain's operated properly. This and some subsequent testing also verified not only did the monitors operate, but at the time that the monitor operates, the encoder output was cutoff automatically.

At one point in time the subject came up, were the sensors capable of performing when submitted to assorted acceleration factors, as you might have when the aircraft might pull some G's if you made a sharp pull up.

We made some special test pictures and adapted the altitude modules to a centrifuge. Units were tested individually for this. We subjected them from zero to one, back to zero; from zero to four G's, back to zero; then up to ten G's and back to zero. This was done at an altitude level of approximately 500 feet. The first officer's altitude module from the air data computer at 10 G's, the output varied 3 ½ degrees, which would be equivalent to 100 feet. The captain's module was within two degrees at 10 G's, which would put it at approximately 50 to 60 feet. There is no requirement for the 10 G's. The test was performed in any case. In further testing of the units, we became aware that when the overall air date computers were fired up for a short period of time, the reliability signal coming from the airspeed modules was in the unreliable state and then after approximately 30 seconds to a minute, reliability signal would come back on, indicating a valid state. This was an unusual condition so we decided to pull the airspeed sensor modules off and check them. This was the captain's incidentally, in case I didn't mention that. When we opened the airspeed sensor, we found there was a gear disengagement at the output stage on this particular sensor. The sensor has subsequently --- gear has been reengaged and everything operated normally.

We were concerned because when we looked at his particular sensor, the gearing is protected with stops, what we call stops in terms of functions, high and low; and also side stops so that the gears can't disengage by moving axis. All stops were in place. That particular sensor, we checked all the records, dates back to 1967.

We subsequently, as I mentioned, re-engaged the gears properly and then we took the sensor to our test laboratory and performed a shock test in the direction that was indicated as if this disengagement occurred due to shock. We felt that it would probably come in the fore and aft direction of the airplane so we checked it in that direction and levelwise what we did, we said we were not going to try to break it, the normal shock test for a unit of this type would be to expose it to 15 G's for approximately 11 millisecond pulse. In this case we first tested it at 20 G's, then we tested it at 25 G's. The instrument stayed in the sink and there was no disengagement. We stopped at this point because we felt that there may be further testing required for some other functions and it would not be conducive to break the instrument to prove one point.

The air data computers were made ready again and at the request of United, we ran what we called some computer step function tests. These tests consisted of programming pressure changes into the sensor and measuring the time that it would take the output of the air data computer to become stable at the secondary pressure. This was done for values of a thousand foot step function, 500 foot stop function, 200 feet and 100 feet. In the case of the captain's 1,000 foot function, the response of the overall system, -- this is, the air data computer, it was 5 seconds. When you get down to 100 feet, you are talking 3 or 2 ½ seconds. Subsequently we took the computers back up and in order to determine the operation of the monitors, we ran the air data computers at high velocity, and velocity chosen was that value at which point the servo would just indicate at the edge of the monitor trip. We're talking roughly 100 feet. The captain's air data computer would run at 21,400 feet per minute and the first officer's approximately 18,000 feet per minute. Now, that essentially completed the testing that was done on the air data computers.

Q. Thank you Mr. Angus. I may have misunderstood something, but I would like to refer you to page 10 in Exhibit 9-C. This test concerns the position evaluation of the sink rows with relation to the output of the central air data computer. I think I heard testimony, but you spoke of figures of 45 to 50 feet for the first officer's and 7 feet for the captain's primary unit. I would like clarification of what the 45 to 50 feet and the 7 feet are in reference to.

A. Those values don't appear on page 18. The values you are referring to come about on page 21, which is the programming correct pressure into the unit and measuring the output finding sink roll. The data on page 18 is the reading in the "as received" stats of each output module.

Q. Could you explain the page 18 figures for me again sir? I am specifically interested in trying to correlate the position of the sink rows in the "as received" condition to the known pressure altitude.

A. The sink rows that is used to drive the altimeter on the flight panel were read out, using an angle position indicator. Captain's read out, converted to feet, read out 652 feet; first officer's read out 558 feet. Now this difference here corresponds to 54 feet, but there would be some small difference depending upon the time sequence of power off, small differences in calibration, things of this nature.

Q. What barometric pressure would these figures refer to, sir?

A. These just refer to the "as received" state. They don't refer to any barometric pressure. They are measured against what we all call standard altitude. Standard altitude sometimes referred to by pilots at times as QNH altitude. This would be in the case of the altimeter, altimeter set for 29.92 power setting. If you wanted to convert these QNH values, it would be necessary to add the appropriate offset that would correspond to the local baro setting.

Q. How does the pilot produce the QNH baro set into the system?

A. He introduces it to the air data computer. He uses this in terms of his altimeter. When he program the baro setting into the altimeter it automatically puts the baro setting in whether he be using it in standby or servo mode of operation. It puts in an additive factor, adds so many feet to the display.

Q. So in order to correlate the "as received" position of the sink rows in the central air data computer to a given elevation on a given day, we would have to apply the QNH correction, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Have you done that for these figures?

A. The difference between the standard altitude and the pressure setting, as we were notified, 30.035 comes out to 120 feet. At 120 feet, each of these values, that would be the indicated value being presented to the crew at the time of power cut off.

Q. And knowing the elevation of the impact site is about 620 feet above mean sea level, that represents an error of about 150 feet, 100 feet. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Thank you. The encoders verified were correlated with the sink positions?

A. That is correct. The photo transmission point is always at the 50 feet point. The captain had a 652 foot value so that was into the next code bit, which was 700 feet.

Q. Now I would like to refer you to page 27 in this. Again it may be misunderstanding on my part, but I thought that I heard you say that the acceleration test showed an error of approximately 100 feet. And on page 27 I see a statement that all three positions maximum deviation of model sensored was one degree or 27 feet, for acceleration from zero to 10 G's.

A. When we do a test that is not a standard test for that particular equipment, we always try, particularly in the case of an accident, equipment, we always try to get an equivalent item. So in this particular case we took a sensor that was in stock and first ran the test through on the sensor. That particular sensor was within one degree on all the tests. The data for the two sensors involved is contained on the next page, and that data contains the difference values that I quoted previously.

Q. Were there any other significant findings in the evaluation of the units other than those already discussed?

A. On point we did, on the air data computers we did check the friction level of this and the friction level was down on the order of 2 feet. I think it was two feet on one and seven feet on the other one. We have checked the captain's altimeter for lead effect on the captain's, and he is coming out very close to what we consider nominal.

Q. And Mr. Angus, I can't find it right now, but in the report there is a reference to white flaking material in the static report of one of the central air data computers. Could you amplify that a little for me?

A. Angus: Yes. After we had resumed testing this equipment in Elmhurst, when we were running the monitor test, as I previously mentioned, we had to remove the altitude modules from the Central Air Data Computer so we could run a jumper cable. So it would be possible to interrupt the servo motor pilot. When we separated the module, I am not sure which one it is, that was the first officers unit. When we took the first officer's altitude module off the computer chassis. There was a white, flaky, material over the connecting port as used to connect the module into the plumbing with the central air data computer that goes to the connection tubes. There was a small deposit, probably two or three cubic millimeters, of very flaky material. We had noted back at United in San Francisco that one of the static lines had some water in it which looked to be like it might be water that had accumulated because of fire. The water wasn't clean.

Q. Was there any analysis of the white, flaky, material?

A. We, that white flaky material was placed in a sealed box and it is available to the Board if they want to spectrograph it. Now the general assumption on the flaky material is this is contained on a stainless steel pressure port which fits into an anodized aluminum. It was just felt his loose -- all the people called in with reasonable chemical background indicated it was more likely an aluminum oxide.

CHAIRMAN BURGESS: What?

THE WITNESS: An aluminum oxide.

MR. STREET: I have no questions.

MR. LAYNOR: I wasn't through.

CHAIRMAN BURGESS: I am sorry, Mr. Laynor is still continuing.

MR. STREET: I am sorry.

(Discussion off the record)

BY MR. LAYNOR

Q. Mr. Angus, I believe in your testimony you commented to the fact that to your knowledge of these systems are connected to two completely independent static systems. It is true then that both static systems will have to be effected in a similar manner to cause essentially the same error in the system?

A. It would appear that way due to the fact they have this more than tolerance difference in the particular outputs of the computers.

Q. Are the static systems, again to your knowledge, you could refer to exhibit 9-E, were the static systems which feed the central air data computer common in any way to the captain to the captain or first officers air speed indicators?

A. First of all, you are talking, "as received" correct?

Q. Yes, sir. First of all, as I understand it, the central air data computer themselves transmit no information to the air speed indicators in the cockpit. It this true?

A. This is correct.

Q. And the airspeed indicators?

A. The pitot input -- the panel requirements for pilot pressure come off separate pitot tubes according to this diagram. In other words, there is a pilot tube that supplies the captain's panel, a pilot supply for the first officer's panel, pilot for each air data computer independently.

Q. How about static systems, sir?

A. It would appear to be the same way for the static except in the case of static there, they cross over -- in other words, there is a right and a left pitot static tube tied together to provide what is called a balanced pitot static. I think in this case there were dual statics for each side, thus providing a line for the indicator separate.

Q. Okay. I realize that the static system installation is not in your area of responsibility, but can you discuss possible reasons why the static system errors -- although of a magnitude reflected in the sink row telepositions in the central or data computers, could have occurred? Can you offer any rational explanation as to why the central air data computers could have been reading in the direction they were?

A. I am afraid I will have to pass that at the moment.

THEORY OF CRASH OF UNITED FLIGHT 533 DECEMBER 8, 1972

By November 1972 HUNT was blackmailing the White House for $100,000. White House aide Fred LaRue gave Manuel Artime at least $21,000 to distribute to the families of the Watergate burglars.

HUNT could have implicated NIXON in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. But did HUNT have any evidence? Had HUNT entrusted it to his wife while he was in prison? NIXON may have believed DOROTHY HUNT possessed evidence that linked him to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

As stated, DOROTHY HUNT was killed in the airplane crash of United Airlines Flight 533 on December 8, 1972, at Chicago's Midway Airport. UAL 533 was on its way from Washington, D.C., to Omaha, Nebraska, with an intermediate stop at Midway Airport. There were 55 people aboard, including five children and two infants. After Charles Colson became a born-again Christian, he stated: "I don't say this to many people because they think I am nuts. I think they killed DOROTHY HUNT. I really do..." HOWARD HUNT: "When I see these repetitive allusions to my wife's death as having somehow been caused by the CIA, I think that is really enough...if my wife had been the only one killed that would have been one thing...but 40 people..."

ANALYSIS

A detailed analysis of the Aircraft Accident Report prepared by the National Transportation Safety Board on the crash indicated that the Boeing 737 crashed because of instrument sabotage that engendered pilot error. In its report, however, the NTSB attributed the cause of the crash only to pilot error. The report was unofficial. National Transportation Safety Board Chairman John Reed, "was not present and did not participate in the adoption of this report." The report went unsigned.

The National Transportation Safety Board Report blamed "the Captain's failure to exercise positive flight management during the execution of a non-precision approach, which culminated in a critical deterioration of airspeed in the stall regime..."

THE FINAL DESCENT

At 2:26 p.m. the Captain ordered the crew of United Airlines Flight 533 to do a final descent check. At 2:27 p.m., United Air Lines Flight 533 was issued a missed-approach clearance by Midway Airport control tower: "United Flight 533, execute a missed approach..." Just as the sound of word "execute" began, the sound of the stickshaker, which was a device that sent vibrations through the cockpit several seconds before an aircraft was about to go into a stall, was heard on the tapes recovered from the cockpit voice recorder. Captain Whitehouse, the pilot of United Air Lines 533, age 44, had been employed by United Airlines for almost 20 years. He had accumulated a total of 18,000 hours flying time, of which 2,435 were in a Boeing 737.

ANALYSIS

Every pilot was taught that when a stall occurs, he should point the aircraft's nose slightly downward by extending his flaps, then immediately accelerate the engines to increase thrust. HEMMING told this researcher: "When you get a stall you drop the nose. The last thing you do is add power because that will tend to raise your nose. Put you nose down first then add power, which lessens your rate of descent. Change the angle of attack of your wings which get more airflow going across the wings creating more lift. Then add power to kill the rate of descent. Your rate of descent has slackened off, but your nose is still pointing down." Most survivors reported that, just before the crash, contrary to being nose-down, the aircraft went into a very high angle of attack. HEMMING told this researcher: "Whitehouse realized he was going to crash and tried to drag his tail to cut down his speed." Some survivors believed that there was a rapid application of power before impact. An analysis of the cockpit voice recorder tapes found by the General Electric Research Corporation did not conclusively show this power increase.

The cockpit voice recorder revealed that when the stickshaker went off at what was thought to be 1000 feet because of altimeter readings, Captain Whitehouse ordered the Second Officer to release the flaps to point the airplane's nose downward and get out of the stall. The Second Officer acknowledged the Captain's last command by saying: "Flaps 15." The Second Officer then said "I'm sorry." The National Transportation Safety Board stated that when faced with a stall, the Captain had decided to reconfigure the aircraft by extending the flight flaps because, within two seconds of the onset of the stickshaker, he asked for "more flaps." The National Transportation Safety Board stated that following this order, there was a sound indicative of flap lever movement. The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that it was Captain Whitehouse's error - failing to realize the flaps were already extended to 30 degrees and ordering the additional 15-degree extension while making a non-precision landing - that caused the crash. The National Transportation Safety Board: "The 15 degrees was added to the 30 degrees of extension that was accidentally there, so the aircraft continued to stall."

Eight seconds after the Second Officer said: "I'm sorry," United Air Lines Flight 533 crashed into several houses located near Midway Airport. Forty passengers and three crew members were killed. Two persons on the ground received fatal injuries. The aircraft itself was largely destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. Ground damage "precluded any determination of the pre-impact integrity of the control system." If this was so, how did the National Transportation Safety Board arrive at it's figure of the 30 degrees of extension that was "accidentally" there.

HEMMING told this researcher: "For the pilot to say 'flaps' then '15 degrees' - they ain't supposed to be at 15 degrees that quickly. It's deadly for those flaps to come up in a hurry when you are executing a missed approach. You'll sink. You got a stickshaker and ask for more flaps - that's the last thing you do. You're gonna start milking them flaps up. You're at that altitude and you have a stall, you've got to execute a missed approach. Nose down, full power. He's telling you what it says on the instrument. You run that xxxxer to 15 degrees below 500 feet you're going to die. He said he was sorry."

ANALYSIS

There was confusion in the cockpit during crash. The cause of this confusion would have become apparent had the flight recorder functioned properly.

THE DISABLED FLIGHT RECORDER

Eighty-two minutes after takeoff (approximately 14 minutes before the accident), the Fairchild Flight Data Recorder stopped functioning: "Flight recorder examination showed that a mitre gear (part of the drive gear assembly) had slipped on its shaft, causing the recorder to stop functioning." The cockpit voice recorder, which was recovered from the wreckage, revealed that when the flight recorder went off, a light went on in the cockpit and Captain Whitehouse asked: "Recorder go off?" The second officer: "Yeah." Captain Whitehouse: "See what's wrong, will ya...sounds to me like a circuit breaker...yeah, I just meant, I thought you'd better check everything..." The cockpit voice recorder revealed the Second Officer activated the circuit breaker that fused the power going to the flight recorder and reported: "It tests...I think its okay. I think its working...it says 'Off' but the signal, the encode light comes on and it shows, indicating taping. Christ, I can't even find the circuit breaker for this (deleted) flight recorder...I don't know, I get a reaction when I pull the AC, no reaction when you pull the DC though, you want me to call maintenance?" Captain Whitehead ordered the Second Officer to immediately call it in. Double click here to see a photograph of the flight recorder. [FlightRecorder.JPEG] The recorder was installed on the day of the accident, and had last been overhauled on November 11, 1972, only two months before it malfunctioned. The Flight Recorder Group of the National Transportation Safety Board found: "No evidence of recorder malfunction in any of the parameters as determined by examining previous flights contained on this foil medium."

ANALYSIS

The mitre gear slipped because a saboteur had loosened its set screw. (The Kollsman Instrument Report asked: "if the questionable calibration arm set screws were loose...") HEMMING told this researcher: "That was very unusual. The thing is wired into the aircraft's electrical system and has its own backup battery. A power failure doesn't shut it down. I doubt if it was coincidental. How many wrecks do you have in the history of the NTSB where you could recover the flight recorder but it didn't work?"

THE TESTIMONY OF JAMES W. ANGUS BEFORE THE NTSB

Q. Will you state your full name.

A. James W. Angus.

Q. And what is your address?

A. 57 Westervelt Avenue, Baldwin, New York.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am staff engineer with Kollsman Instruments Company.

Q. Will you tell us how long you have been employed by Kollsman Instruments?

A. I have been employed with Kollsman since 1942 with the exception of a short period of a year and a half.

Q. Would you briefly describe your background and training and experience with Kollsman leading to your current position?

A. I have a bachelor of Mechanical Engineering Degree from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn. At Kollsman I have held assorted positions, starting as a tool inspector, becoming an experimental machinist and experimental technician, a designer, and finally an engineer.

Q. Would you describe your duties and responsibilities in your present position?

A. My primary duties are to develop pressure sensitive equipment. I also assist in giving technical assistance in areas where it is requested under special occasion.

SENIOR HEARING OFFICER HENDRICKS

Exhibit 9-G is identified as a report of an examination of altimeters and air data computers recovered from the Boeing 737, United Airlines Flight 553. Exhibit 9-C-1 is photographs altimeters and air data computers recovered from flight 553. Exhibit 9E, excerpts from Boeing 737 instruction manual regarding the pilot static system.

Q. Mr. Angus, I would like for you to start by describing the altimetry system that is install in Boeing 737, and you may use Exhibit 9E for referral. I would like you to point out those components furnished by Kollsman.

A. Our involvement with the 757 air data computer and the servo-automatic computers for this particular aircraft. The central air data computer is a device which accepts inputs of static pressure, total pressure, temperature and electrical power. We sense the pressure functions and by means of servo systems, compute associated outputs that are used in various positions around the airplane. The sensors, sender portion of the air data computer ,consist essentially of mechanisms somewhat similar to what is contained in altimeters and airspeed indicators. That is, capsules which are responsive to the particular air pressures being supplied. And this particular information is converted into angular motion which ultimately becomes part of a synchotel system and combined with a servo, it positions all of the necessary output devices in accordance with program established by the specification for the air data computer, the output devices are in the forms of syncros, potentiometers, decoders, and reliability signals.

Included with the air data computer is a monitor system for each loop. This monitor determines that the servo system is properly following up each of the sensed values. If, as in the case of the altimeter, the servo system were to get out of track by as much as 100 feet, it would automatically disconnect the system. The way it does this, it cuts off the reliability signals that are sent to each of the using devices. So that any device in the airplane receives not only data from the air data computer, but it receives a validity signal which indicates whether or not the information should be used. The functions that are sent out are sent to indicators on the panel, auto-pilot, the flight recorder, the cabin pressurization system, and the transponder for reporting altitude. The altimeters are what are sometimes referred to as servo pneumatic altimeters. These altimeters have two modes of operation which are selectable by the pilot. In the standby mode of operation, the instrument will operate as a normal pressure sensitive device in accordance with the requirements of FAA/T on C10 Beacon. If it is elected, the indicator my also operate as a servo-repeater from the altitude data transmitted by the central air data computer. In order to operate in this mode, the pilot must actuate a switch knob on the face of the altimeter, which puts it in corrected mode of operation. In this mode of operation, the overall accuracy is improved from approximately ½ a percent system to about 2/10 of a percent accuracy.

Q. The corrected mode would be the normal side of the operation?

A. I believe the way the airline uses the term, the corrected mode is the normal side of operation.

Q. And I am sorry if I missed it, but there are two such systems in the aircraft?

A. Yes, there are two completely different independent systems. There is a central air data computer for the captain's side with his own indicator, and there s a central air data computer for the first officers side that he has his own independent altimeter. As I understand it there are independent static systems supplying each of these units.

Q. Where does Kollsman interface with Boeing in this system?

A. In each case there is a Boeing specification which determines what the inputs are that you receive and what specification level these inputs would be provided to. In the case of pressure, they give us certain -- we have to provide certain cords on the devices that will tie up the lines in the aircraft, electrical connectors -- it is pretty much standardized, what pins are used for each function.

Q. I believed you mentioned the monitor tripout. Can you describe the monitor tripout as it effects the altimeter. Does this go into the standby mode when the CADAC trips out?

A. The air data computer will supply precise altitude information to the altimeter. If, for some reason, the altitude module in the air data computer determines that the information is unreliable, it will automatically cut off the reliability signal going to the altimeter.

Q. Is there any other protection in the event of a legitimate signal which is erroneous coming from the central air data computer?

A. The altimeter also contains its servo-monitor. There are two basic modes of servo detection in the altimeter. First would be if the servo system in the altimeter does not track that output of the air data computer. If there is a 50 foot disagreement between the altimeter and the air data computer, the altimeter will automatically revert to standby operation. That will be operating as a straight TSO altimeter. At the time this occurs, there is a flag on the dial which indicates it goes from the corrected mode to the standby mode.

Q. You said this occurs with a 50 foot --

A. Fifty foot separation, that is correct.

Now, in addition to this, we have what is known as a limiting device. People are always concerned and rightly so, for some reason that the servo might run away. If, for example, servo in the air data computer were to run away, we would provide a limited device in the altimeter and at certain pre-selected levels after the altimeter has responded to the corrected mode. It will then be limited in total correction capabilities at the point the monitor will cut the altimeter off, even though the air data computer might want to drive further.

Q. What kind of error would this generate maximum?

A. The error is a variable error with altitude, so that you can take care of increased tolerances at high altitude. At sea level this error would amount to approximately 350 feet.

Q. At what phase of the investigation into the accident of United 533 did your participation start?

A. We started when the instruments had been recovered and they were returned to United at San Francisco. We joined the committee at the United overhaul base and participated with them.

Q. You participated in the examination of both altimeters and the central air data computer, is that correct?

A. That is right, two data computers and two altimeters.

Q. And you prepared Exhibit 9-C to describe the extent of your participation and findings, is that correct.

A. That is correct.

Q. I would like you to refer to refer to Exhibit 9-C-1, answering the following, if you would please. Could you use the photographs and describe the general condition of the Captain's altimeter when it was first received by you?

A. I might mention before we go ahead that is all of these findings, the committee was present, and in general, I don't know of an area that doesn't exist, the committee in general agreed with the findings. These are not single person findings.

Q. Yes, sir.

A. The altimeter suffered primarily what appeared to be fire damage. There was some small indication of impact damage, but the primary source of the difficulty here was that the exterior of the case of the altimeter, which has an enamel paint which is baked on at the time of manufacture, this paint was actually burned off in many areas. With this burning off of the paint, all of the pressure seals in the instrument were no longer active.

The covered glass was cracked and it appeared to be intact, which gave us the impression that this was a thermostress problem, rather than breakage due to impact shock. The rear connector on the instrument was contaminated with a fire material which more than likely was the mating connector on the electrical harness supplied in the airplane. This material had to actually be dug out. It was quite solid. Then the electrical connector was cleaned off. We observed the instrument. We shook it lightly; it didn't have any particular noisiness inside which might indicate broken parts rolling around. We felt the instrument was capable of further testing.

Q. May I refer you to photograph 1-1 in your exhibit, please.

A. Yes, I am looking at that.

Q. The indicated dial is set 30.035 thereabout. Have you any reason to believe this setting had been changed since impact?

A. Yes. It is my understanding after the instruments had been recovered at the accident site, and as I understand it, notes were taken and photographs were taken of the instrument as mounted on the panel, that subsequently the barrel knob was rotated to see if the pointers were still operable and the particular setting that you see there is the setting that happened to be left on the instrument at the time that it was received in the United Shop.

Q. Could you briefly describe for me the functional test unit was subjected to?

A. This altimeter was placed in a ball jar. The reason for that was that we could not pipe pressure into the altimeter and maintain a reading due to the leakage from the various seals.

Without making any further adjustments to the altimeter, we connected this bell jar, which is a sealed chamber that you can look through and observe the altimeter inside of it, connected this chamber to a barometer and programmed pressure into the chamber, and each specific instance we brought the altimeter to an indicated value in 200 foot stops, going from 0 to 2000 feet.

At each time that we reached stabilization, we measured the pressure within the chamber by means of the barometer that was attached to it. We then computed, based upon the indicated values, pressure values, and the setting, we computed that the indicator had, in its present state, had an average error of approximately 150 feet in the minus direction.

Q. In which?

A. In the minus direction. We then took the same altimeter and just rotated the barrel knob to the 29-92 position, which is the standard position for performing tests on an instrument of this type, and then programmed corrected pressures into the instrument. And putting corrected pressures into the instrument, we then read the instrument error. Now, the instrument error in this case averages out to approximately minus 120 foot value. The reason for the disagreement in this particular case between the first test and the second test -- excuse me. Am I getting ahead? Do you want the reason now?

Q. Yes, go right ahead.

A. The reason we felt the disagreement existed was because due to the high temperature exposure of the unit, the operation of the fundamental mechanism was not as smooth as it would be in normal conditions. And operating somewhat erratically, you would not be perfectly sure exactly where the first level was when we were setting the pointer on the instrument. The second case, you program in a very specific pressure, vibrate the instrument, and then take a reading when it settled out. So using a control standard that is much more precise in the second case, the results tend to be more meaningful.

Q. And the error was still in the same direction?

A. Same direction, but much more repeatable all the way up. Used the same 2000 foot altitude test span and 200 foot increment.

Q. Okay, do you have any explanation as to how the low effect offset may have occurred?

A. Yes. The subsequent examination of the instrument after taking the case off revealed that the instrument internally, where the mechanism is located, had reached temperatures approaching 360 degrees Fahrenheit.

We have since taken an equivalent instrument of the servo pneumatic variety and subject that instrument to a basic calibration. The instrument was seasoned overnight in the normal operation that you season these instruments to, which is to expose it to plus 70 degrees. The next morning it was rechecked again and the instrument was a stable instrument. We had to ascertain this fact first.

Then we placed the instrument in an oven. Now I am saying in an oven because you are essentially placing it in air which is heated to a specific temperature level, but it is no a high circulation factor. It is something -- there is a gentle fan in there that just keeps the air moving at a slow pace. This particular instrument was placed there, kept there for one hour at 360 degrees -- excuse me, let me go back.

In the test condition, we did not expose it to 360 degrees because that happens to be coincident with the melting temperatures of the solders used in the instrument, so for the purpose of the second instrument, to keep the data valid, we operated this at 300 degrees Fahrenheit. No, under these conditions, after aligning the instrument to return to room temperature, we the retested it and we have an average minimum error of 85 to 90 feet. Now that does not appear in the report because we just finished the test Monday. I received the data by phone on Tuesday. We will give you a supplement on that.

Q. Do the results of the pressure testing this particular altimeter in this manner, reflect operation in the servo mode as well as the stand-by?

A. No. When we were finished testing the instrument as noted previously, using control pressure inputs, that was as far as we went on the testing in San Francisco. At that point we concentrated our testing on some of the central air data computer testing. We subsequently resumed testing on this back at Elmhurst in our plant with the team present.

After verifying our initial data, we took the instrument out of the case, we found that all of the electrical components had been exposed to very high temperatures, capacitors had exploded, solder had melted. But the basic pressure mechanism was intact. So we could not operate the instrument in servo mode. We tried in California but we just blew fuses. At that point we just stopped, we didn't want to damage it.

Q. Can you describe the condition of the first officer's altimeter one as described by you?

A. The first officers altimeter was in very poor condition as received. This instrument was subjected to extensive fire and impact damage. The fire damage present was at a level that actually melted the aluminum away, which means it was in the temperature band of 1100 degrees Fahrenheit. The base of the instrument was split open, and a goodly portion of it was missing. The rear mechanism in the instrument, which is the pressure sensing section, was also missing. The front end, the cover glass, and flange assembly, was missing. The display elements were still on the face of the instrument. Essentially all that we could say was present was a mechanism body with associated burned-out electrical components and the display portion of the instrument.

Q. Would you refer, please, to photograph 2-1 in Exhibit 9-C-1. Is this a photograph of the first officers altimeter?

A. Yes, that is a photograph taken at United as it was received.

Q. Can you explain the significance of the dial reading or apparent pointer positions and also the reading on the baro set on the altimeter as found?

A. The pointer positions are what are referred to in the trade as uncoordinated. The relative position of the pointers cannot exist based upon the normal reading that is present in the instrument. The baro set was approximately 30,685.

Q. Was there any indication on the dial of the instrument such as impact markings?

A. No.

Q. Anything to give you a clue as to what the altimeter may have been reading on impact.

A. No. We have very carefully examined the dial components under a binocular type microscope using lights and we could not find any signs that could be attributed to an impact mark.

Q. Would you briefly describe the significance of the photos that you have labeled 2-6, 2-7, and 2-8 in establishing the uncoordinated positions of the pointers?

A. Yes. While we were at United, United made available to the team a recently serviced altimeter in their possession of the same type. We very carefully measured reference points on each pointer of the first officers unit and then positioned the corresponding point on the sample altimeter to that value, and then photographed, the purpose being when you look at the photograph of the good instrument and the photograph of this instrument which had been damaged in the accident, it become readily apparent the pointers are discoordinated.

Q. The primary central air data computer, can you describe the coefficient of that component when you received it?

A. The air data computer received what we would consider a moderate amount of impact damage. By that I mean the cases were dented in several areas on each unit. The front face of the computer was also damaged rather significantly, and there was fire damage around various areas. Let me just check which ones -- the captain's, first the captains computer unit was not severely damaged, but the first officers unit was very badly burned to the point where even the knobs could not be rotated.

Q. Were the units, the internal portions, in operable condition?

A. Yes, they were operable.

Q. Could you describe for us, please, the tests to which these units were subjected?

A. Testing accomplished on the air data computers consisted, first, of isolating all of the output devices to obtain position data at the point of power cutoff to the computer. This was followed by a check of the altitude sensor by disconnecting it electrically from the computer, and running it strictly on a pressure function to determine the operability of the sensor, and again, there are means in there to determine the point at which power was cut off.

At this point we got both computers - we had the sensors and everything reconnected. We programmed standard pressures into the computer and measured the output of the --- find the sink rows. This was to determine if the signals going to the altimeter were within specification requirements.

In the case of the first officer's air data computer, it read approximately 3 ½ degrees low. This is roughly 45 to 50 feet. The captain's altimeter was well within spec, in general it was within approximately 7 feet. We then checked the correlation of the encoder, which is used by the transponder. This is checked by comparing the point at which you transition from one code value to the next as compared to the altitude data being transmitted to the indicator in the panel. This was in general less than one degree on both units, which is within 14 feet.

And individually we tried --- we worked the servo unit up to air data computer and ran them through the same range, 2,000 feet. The altimeter connected to the captain's air data computer generally responded to less than 10 feet. First officer's was between minus 30 feet and 50 feet. Following this, we ran what we call a coast test of the servo. This test was to determine if the computer was being driven as it would be in the case of a descent and power was cut off, would the computer continue to move, thereby destroying the validity of the original set of data we took off the output devices. This test was run at top rates of descent, 1,000 feet per minute and 2,500 feet per minute. In the case of the captain's altimeter, so-called coast effect was less than 7/10. The first officers altimeter approximately two feet. We considered this gave the original output devices reasonable values that we could accept.

Subsequent to this we performed a monitor check. This took special test equipment and this was done back in New York. What we did in this case was we isolated the modules for the air data computer and used jump cables, so that electrically they were connected even though they were set aside on some special test boxes. This allows us to, with the computer and the particular modules concerned, tied together, we can inactivate the servo, but still have power applied, and determine whether then monitors were still operating. The monitors on the both the first officer's and the captain's operated properly. This and some subsequent testing also verified not only did the monitors operate, but at the time that the monitor operates, the encoder output was cutoff automatically.

At one point in time the subject came up, were the sensors capable of performing when submitted to assorted acceleration factors, as you might have when the aircraft might pull some G's if you made a sharp pull up.

We made some special test pictures and adapted the altitude modules to a centrifuge. Units were tested individually for this. We subjected them from zero to one, back to zero; from zero to four G's, back to zero; then up to ten G's and back to zero. This was done at an altitude level of approximately 500 feet. The first officer's altitude module from the air data computer at 10 G's, the output varied 3 ½ degrees, which would be equivalent to 100 feet. The captain's module was within two degrees at 10 G's, which would put it at approximately 50 to 60 feet. There is no requirement for the 10 G's. The test was performed in any case. In further testing of the units, we became aware that when the overall air date computers were fired up for a short period of time, the reliability signal coming from the airspeed modules was in the unreliable state and then after approximately 30 seconds to a minute, reliability signal would come back on, indicating a valid state. This was an unusual condition so we decided to pull the airspeed sensor modules off and check them. This was the captain's incidentally, in case I didn't mention that. When we opened the airspeed sensor, we found there was a gear disengagement at the output stage on this particular sensor. The sensor has subsequently --- gear has been reengaged and everything operated normally.

We were concerned because when we looked at his particular sensor, the gearing is protected with stops, what we call stops in terms of functions, high and low; and also side stops so that the gears can't disengage by moving axis. All stops were in place. That particular sensor, we checked all the records, dates back to 1967.

We subsequently, as I mentioned, re-engaged the gears properly and then we took the sensor to our test laboratory and performed a shock test in the direction that was indicated as if this disengagement occurred due to shock. We felt that it would probably come in the fore and aft direction of the airplane so we checked it in that direction and levelwise what we did, we said we were not going to try to break it, the normal shock test for a unit of this type would be to expose it to 15 G's for approximately 11 millisecond pulse. In this case we first tested it at 20 G's, then we tested it at 25 G's. The instrument stayed in the sink and there was no disengagement. We stopped at this point because we felt that there may be further testing required for some other functions and it would not be conducive to break the instrument to prove one point.

The air data computers were made ready again and at the request of United, we ran what we called some computer step function tests. These tests consisted of programming pressure changes into the sensor and measuring the time that it would take the output of the air data computer to become stable at the secondary pressure. This was done for values of a thousand foot step function, 500 foot stop function, 200 feet and 100 feet. In the case of the captain's 1,000 foot function, the response of the overall system, -- this is, the air data computer, it was 5 seconds. When you get down to 100 feet, you are talking 3 or 2 ½ seconds. Subsequently we took the computers back up and in order to determine the operation of the monitors, we ran the air data computers at high velocity, and velocity chosen was that value at which point the servo would just indicate at the edge of the monitor trip. We're talking roughly 100 feet. The captain's air data computer would run at 21,400 feet per minute and the first officer's approximately 18,000 feet per minute. Now, that essentially completed the testing that was done on the air data computers.

Q. Thank you Mr. Angus. I may have misunderstood something, but I would like to refer you to page 10 in Exhibit 9-C. This test concerns the position evaluation of the sink rows with relation to the output of the central air data computer. I think I heard testimony, but you spoke of figures of 45 to 50 feet for the first officer's and 7 feet for the captain's primary unit. I would like clarification of what the 45 to 50 feet and the 7 feet are in reference to.

A. Those values don't appear on page 18. The values you are referring to come about on page 21, which is the programming correct pressure into the unit and measuring the output finding sink roll. The data on page 18 is the reading in the "as received" stats of each output module.

Q. Could you explain the page 18 figures for me again sir? I am specifically interested in trying to correlate the position of the sink rows in the "as received" condition to the known pressure altitude.

A. The sink rows that is used to drive the altimeter on the flight panel were read out, using an angle position indicator. Captain's read out, converted to feet, read out 652 feet; first officer's read out 558 feet. Now this difference here corresponds to 54 feet, but there would be some small difference depending upon the time sequence of power off, small differences in calibration, things of this nature.

Q. What barometric pressure would these figures refer to, sir?

A. These just refer to the "as received" state. They don't refer to any barometric pressure. They are measured against what we all call standard altitude. Standard altitude sometimes referred to by pilots at times as QNH altitude. This would be in the case of the altimeter, altimeter set for 29.92 power setting. If you wanted to convert these QNH values, it would be necessary to add the appropriate offset that would correspond to the local baro setting.

Q. How does the pilot produce the QNH baro set into the system?

A. He introduces it to the air data computer. He uses this in terms of his altimeter. When he program the baro setting into the altimeter it automatically puts the baro setting in whether he be using it in standby or servo mode of operation. It puts in an additive factor, adds so many feet to the display.

Q. So in order to correlate the "as received" position of the sink rows in the central air data computer to a given elevation on a given day, we would have to apply the QNH correction, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Have you done that for these figures?

A. The difference between the standard altitude and the pressure setting, as we were notified, 30.035 comes out to 120 feet. At 120 feet, each of these values, that would be the indicated value being presented to the crew at the time of power cut off.

Q. And knowing the elevation of the impact site is about 620 feet above mean sea level, that represents an error of about 150 feet, 100 feet. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Thank you. The encoders verified were correlated with the sink positions?

A. That is correct. The photo transmission point is always at the 50 feet point. The captain had a 652 foot value so that was into the next code bit, which was 700 feet.

Q. Now I would like to refer you to page 27 in this. Again it may be misunderstanding on my part, but I thought that I heard you say that the acceleration test showed an error of approximately 100 feet. And on page 27 I see a statement that all three positions maximum deviation of model sensored was one degree or 27 feet, for acceleration from zero to 10 G's.

A. When we do a test that is not a standard test for that particular equipment, we always try, particularly in the case of an accident, equipment, we always try to get an equivalent item. So in this particular case we took a sensor that was in stock and first ran the test through on the sensor. That particular sensor was within one degree on all the tests. The data for the two sensors involved is contained on the next page, and that data contains the difference values that I quoted previously.

Q. Were there any other significant findings in the evaluation of the units other than those already discussed?

A. On point we did, on the air data computers we did check the friction level of this and the friction level was down on the order of 2 feet. I think it was two feet on one and seven feet on the other one. We have checked the captain's altimeter for lead effect on the captain's, and he is coming out very close to what we consider nominal.

Q. And Mr. Angus, I can't find it right now, but in the report there is a reference to white flaking material in the static report of one of the central air data computers. Could you amplify that a little for me?

A. Angus: Yes. After we had resumed testing this equipment in Elmhurst, when we were running the monitor test, as I previously mentioned, we had to remove the altitude modules from the Central Air Data Computer so we could run a jumper cable. So it would be possible to interrupt the servo motor pilot. When we separated the module, I am not sure which one it is, that was the first officers unit. When we took the first officer's altitude module off the computer chassis. There was a white, flaky, material over the connecting port as used to connect the module into the plumbing with the central air data computer that goes to the connection tubes. There was a small deposit, probably two or three cubic millimeters, of very flaky material. We had noted back at United in San Francisco that one of the static lines had some water in it which looked to be like it might be water that had accumulated because of fire. The water wasn't clean.

Q. Was there any analysis of the white, flaky, material?

A. We, that white flaky material was placed in a sealed box and it is available to the Board if they want to spectrograph it. Now the general assumption on the flaky material is this is contained on a stainless steel pressure port which fits into an anodized aluminum. It was just felt his loose -- all the people called in with reasonable chemical background indicated it was more likely an aluminum oxide.

CHAIRMAN BURGESS: What?

THE WITNESS: An aluminum oxide.

MR. STREET: I have no questions.

MR. LAYNOR: I wasn't through.

CHAIRMAN BURGESS: I am sorry, Mr. Laynor is still continuing.

MR. STREET: I am sorry.

(Discussion off the record)

BY MR. LAYNOR

Q. Mr. Angus, I believe in your testimony you commented to the fact that to your knowledge of these systems are connected to two completely independent static systems. It is true then that both static systems will have to be effected in a similar manner to cause essentially the same error in the system?

A. It would appear that way due to the fact they have this more than tolerance difference in the particular outputs of the computers.

Q. Are the static systems, again to your knowledge, you could refer to exhibit 9-E, were the static systems which feed the central air data computer common in any way to the captain to the captain or first officers air speed indicators?

A. First of all, you are talking, "as received" correct?

Q. Yes, sir. First of all, as I understand it, the central air data computer themselves transmit no information to the air speed indicators in the cockpit. It this true?

A. This is correct.

Q. And the airspeed indicators?

A. The pitot input -- the panel requirements for pilot pressure come off separate pitot tubes according to this diagram. In other words, there is a pilot tube that supplies the captain's panel, a pilot supply for the first officer's panel, pilot for each air data computer independently.

Q. How about static systems, sir?

A. It would appear to be the same way for the static except in the case of static there, they cross over -- in other words, there is a right and a left pitot static tube tied together to provide what is called a balanced pitot static. I think in this case there were dual statics for each side, thus providing a line for the indicator separate.

Q. Okay. I realize that the static system installation is not in your area of responsibility, but can you discuss possible reasons why the static system errors -- although of a magnitude reflected in the sink row telepositions in the central or data computers, could have occurred? Can you offer any rational explanation as to why the central air data computers could have been reading in the direction they were?

A. I am afraid I will have to pass that at the moment.

This is a fascinating article. I think it is worth dividing into different sections and posting in the "Political Conspiracy" section.

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showforum=209

I will post this section on the current debate on Dorothy Hunt.

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=3856

Of all heart attacks, around 6 per cent occur during sexual intercourse. Of these, 90 per cent happen during extramarital sex.

Don't have sex, you'll live forever.

At least it'll seem like forever.

These are very misleading statistics. What it does not tell you is that you are much more likely to have a long life if you have regular sex. One study of over 60-year-olds in Wales showed the most healthy option is to have sex at least once a day. There is an evolutionary reason for this. When you stop having sex the message given to your body that you are no longer able to procreate and it begins to get ready for death. Regular sex is especially good for your immune system. It is also good for your heart as it needs to beat very fast at least three times a week. In fact, sex is just as good for your heart as a two mile run. If you do it right, it is even more fun than running.

Of all heart attacks, around 6 per cent occur during sexual intercourse. Of these, 90 per cent happen during extramarital sex.

I am not aware of any school teachers who use the Titanic as a history investigation. However, there is a good new book that lends itself to this approach: Nick Barratt's Lost Voices from the Titanic: The Definitive Oral History.

Starting from its original conception and design by the owners and naval architects at the White Star Line through construction at Harland and Wolff's shipyards in Belfast, Nick Barratt explores the pre-history of the Titanic. He examines the aspirations of the owners, the realities of construction and the anticipation of the first sea-tests, revealing that the seeds of disaster were sown by the failure to implement sealed bulkheads - for which the original plans are now available. Barratt then looks at what it was like to embark on the Titanic's maiden voyage in April 1912. The lives of various passengers are examined in more detail, from the first class aristocrats enjoying all the trappings of privilege, to the families in third-class and steerage who simply sought to leave Britain for a better life in America. Similarly, the stories of representatives from the White Star Line who were present, as well as members of the crew, are told in their own words to give a very different perspective of the voyage. Finally, the book examines the disaster itself, when Titanic struck the iceberg on 14 April and sunk hours later. Survivors from passengers and crew explain what happened, taking you back in time to the full horror of that freezing Atlantic night when up to 1,520 people perished. The tragedy is also examined from the official boards of inquiry, and its aftermath placed in a historic context - the damage to British prestige and pride, and the changes to maritime law to ensure such an event never took place again. The book concludes by looking at the impact on those who escaped, and what became of them in the ensuing years; and includes the words of the last living survivor, Millvina Dean.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Lost-Voices-Titani...3438&sr=1-2