Dallas Police & Military Intel in Dealey Plaza

[Pamela Ray]

Does anyone know of a complete list of Dallas Police and Military Intel officers present in Dealey Plaza Nov 22, 1963? Rank and duties would be helpful too.

Edited January 25, 2009 by Pamela Ray

[William Kelly]

Does anyone know of a complete list of Dallas Police and Military Intel officers present in Dealey Plaza Nov 22, 1963? Rank and duties would be helpful too.

– Deep Politics and the Death of JFK by PDS p. 276 The Plot and the Coverup

....two minutes earlier by Jack Alston Crichton, a right-wing Republican, oil operator, member of Army Intelligence Reserve (9 WH 106), and head of "a local Army Intelligence Unit" (WCD 386, SS 1058). Crichton knew Mamantov personally as a fellow petroleum geologist. He also knew him because Mamantov was a precinct chairman o the Republican party, for which Crichton became the 1964 candidate for governor of Texas.

It is not known how many Dallas policemen were also (as is apparently a widespread practice) members of the U.S. Army Reserve. One such reservist was Detective Adamik (7 WH 203), a member of the party which retrieved the rifle-blanket from the Paine garage and later reported what he overheard at Mamantov's interview of Marina about the rifle ("She said that it looked like her husband's rifle. She said that it was dark"; 24 WH291). Another member of Army Intelligence Reserve was Captain W. P. Gannaway, Revill's supervisor as head of the Dallas Police Special Service Bureau (WCD 1426.26; 19 WH 120); Gannaway's secretary was reported by an out-of-town police chief to be "closely connected" to Jack Ruby (WCD 86.151). This story was plausible, given the close connection between Ruby and the SSB, including men who participated in the search of the TSBD and the arrest of Oswald. Since the protection of visiting dignitaries was one of the SSB's responsibilities (5 WH48), Gannaway was involved in the meetings arranged by Secret Service advance man Winston Lawson for the Kennedy visit (5 WH39; 7 WH 580).

According to a news story in FBI files, in 1963 both Captain Gannaway and his subordinate Lieutenant Revill were assigned a special responsibility for "espionage and subversive activities" in Dallas. This was in conjunction with

Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, military intelligence teams from the army, navy, and air force, and other federal agencies with investigators operating from headquarters here…The job of [Revill's] intelligence section in Capt. Gannaway's bureau…requires the closest cooperation with these other governmental agencies gathering intelligence on subversive groups suspected of espionage…With membership in a national police intelligence organization known as LEIU (Law Enforcement Intelligence Units) the local officers are able to get information almost immediately on suspected subversives when they move into Dallas. This information is exchanged by police units as these persons move from city to city…Employes in [industrial] plants are carefully screened by security conscious personnel officers, and in key jobs are given strict government security clearances. Industry is taking great strides to upgrade security practices. One such group in this area is the American Society for Industrial Security. 10

The possibility that Oswald was an informant for this centralized security team would explain his visit to the Dallas American Civil Liberties Union, a liberal group being investigated by Revill's intelligence section, in the company of an extreme right-winger (Michael Paine). 11.

One can see how easily a false legend for Oswald could have been generated in the shared files of this coordinated security campaign, involving the Dallas SSB, FBI, military intelligence, and the American Society for Industrial Security. Such a centralized file system could be the source for the recurring (and unexplained) inversion of Oswald's name, as Harvey Lee Oswald, in the files of the Dallas police (e.g., 19 WH 438, 24 WH 259), FBI (e.g., 23 WH 207, 23 WH 373), Secret Service (16 WH 721, 748), army intelligence, and navy intelligence. 12.

The most intriguing "Harvey Lee Oswald" document is Jack Revill's list of employees at the Texas School Book Depository, compiled right after the assassination, before Oswald had been apprehended for the Tippit murder. For some unexplained reason, Oswald's inverted name ("Harvey Lee Oswald") was at the very head of that list, accompanied by an address, "605 Elsbeth," that slightly misrepresented the address (602 Elsbeth) where he had resided a year earlier (24 WH 259). 13 The Elsbeth address does suggest that Oswald's data had been parked for some time before the assassination in an intelligence file, not hitherto identified. One possibility would be the files of the LEIU, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, the intercity police-intelligence organization of which Revill as the lead local representative. LEIU's files, unlike ordinary police files, cannot be given to any civilian authorities and are treated as exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. As we shall see, it was also a frequent practice for the LEIU member intelligence units to collaborate with army intelligence. 14.

Another army reserve officer in Dealey plaza may have been Winston Lawson, the White House Secret Service agent responsible for the choice of the Kennedy motorcade route (4 WH 318). Lawson's first three reports of what happened on and before November 22 raise considerable questions about his performance. .....

http://leiu-homepage.org/about/historyPurpose.php

History, Purpose, and Operations

click here for the PDF version

HISTORY

In the mid 1950's, local and state law enforcement agencies in the United States recognized that no single agency or organization was responsible for receiving, collating, maintaining, and disseminating information on persons involved in organized crime. These law enforcement agencies surmised correctly that organized crime would exploit advancing technologies in transportation and communications, become more mobile, and increase their spheres of influence and criminal activities.

As a result, twenty-six (26) law enforcement agencies met in San Francisco, California on March 29, 1956 to discuss problems and possible solutions. The most important result of that meeting was the creation of the LEIU – The LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE UNIT and the development of an organizational purpose that survives to this day.

PURPOSE

The purpose of LEIU is to gather, record, and exchange confidential information not available through regular police channels, concerning organized crime and terrorism.

OPERATIONS

LEIU is an association of state and local police departments, similar in many respects to numerous other professional associations serving doctors, attorneys, journalists, and educators. LEIU has no employees and no capability as an entity to conduct any investigation or law enforcement activity of any kind. Each member agency is bound by, and acts pursuant to local law and their own agency regulations.

The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit is divided geographically into four (4) Zones, they are: Eastern, Central, Northwestern, and Southwestern. Each Zone elects a Chair and Vice Chair to serve as Zone Officers. Internationally, LEIU elects a General Chair, Vice General Chair, and designates a Secretary-Treasurer and a legal advisor who serve as International Officers. The International Officers, Zone Officers, past General Chair and two representatives from the Central Coordinating Agency make up the Executive Board. The Executive Board is the governing body of LEIU, and as such establishes policy and passes upon the admission of all members. The Executive Board is governed by a Constitution and Bylaws.

LEIU membership is limited to law enforcement agencies of general jurisdiction having an intelligence function. To become a member, an agency head makes written application. The applying agencies must be sponsored by an LEIU member. Each member agency head appoints an LEIU representative to be the contact for the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit. All LEIU member agencies are notified of an application for membership and have an opportunity to comment on the application. A background screening is conducted of the applying agency and the individual nominated to represent that agency. The application is voted on by the Executive Board. Termination of a member agency is provided for in the Constitution and Bylaws. Modern transportation allows an organized crime subject, gang member, or terrorist to travel from coast- to- coast in a matter of hours. Membership in LEIU provides a means of coping with the multi-jurisdictional investigation of organized crime/gang/terrorism information.

To submit a suspected criminal subject to the LEIU automated system, a member agency enters the subject information through a secure intranet, which is stored on the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) communications highway. The subject information includes, among other items, the subject’s identity, criminal activity, and criminal associates. All information submitted to the LEIU Automated File must meet LEIU File Guidelines and comply with 28 Code of Federal Regulations, part 23 (28CFR, part 23). The submitting agency must certify the subject meets established criteria, including criminal predicate. The Central Coordinating Agency (CCA) manages this automated file. CCA is housed within the California Department of Justice in Sacramento, California.

The membership of LEIU is comprised of law enforcement agencies in the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Due to the rapport established at the annual training seminars and through multi-agency investigations, representatives of member agencies have established a highly professional relationship of trust and respect. This facilitates the exchange of confidential criminal information between agencies. Although the LEIU Constitution and Bylaws restrict the dissemination of information to non-member law enforcement agencies, it is the policy of the LEIU that every member shall assist any law enforcement agency making a valid request concerning organized crime/gangs/terrorism. This exchange of criminal intelligence information is completed only after establishing a “right to know” and a “need to know”. This policy provides for the security of the information and protects the privacy of individuals.

In addition to gathering, recording, and exchanging confidential criminal information, the Central Coordinating Agency maintains an automated gaming index. The gaming index is a compilation of public information provided by member agencies that acts as a pointer system to assist in determining whether background information on individuals and companies applying for gaming licenses exist and whether the licenses for which the applicants have applied have been granted or denied.

The existence of organized criminal enterprises (traditional organized crime, gangs, or terrorists) in a free society requires alert law enforcement to proactively gather and analyze data. The traditional reactive approach to crime control is not effective when dealing with the scope and nature of organized criminal enterprises. The ability to retain data and review material is necessary to prevent crime or determine if criminal prosecution can be obtained. While accomplishing this, law enforcement agencies must abide by the rules and legal decisions that relate to the issues of security and privacy. LEIU members are guided in this area by the LEIU Constitution and Bylaws, the Representative’s Position Responsibilities, and LEIU File Guidelines. LEIU is a professional association that is recognized and discussed in books, periodicals, governmental documents and news media articles (site ref #1). LEIU representatives have voluntarily testified before Federal and State legislative committees (site ref #2) concerning the LEIU organization, its goals, and its role in combating organized criminal enterprises. The importance of gathering criminal intelligence information has been stressed by at least eight (8) National Commissions (site ref #3).

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has also recognized a need for the collection of criminal information. The IACP hosted a criminal intelligence sharing summit in March 2002, with the intent of enhancing the sharing of intelligence among various national, state and local agencies. LEIU was invited to participate in this summit and has been a leader in developing a National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan that will enhance public safety. This Plan recognizes and addresses the critical role that criminal intelligence performs in the implementation of effective Community Oriented Policing strategies within our communities.

No professional organization is without individuals who may abuse their regulations. LEIU recognizes that there have been errors made by some law enforcement intelligence units. But the answer to such errors is not the abolition of law enforcement intelligence files and criminal intelligence units. A solution lies, rather, in establishing well-defined standards governing the operations of criminal intelligence units. LEIU supports this concept and recognizes that there has to be a balance between protecting our constitutional liberties and protecting our society against those involved in criminal activity.

1 Examples of Publications - “Crime Confederation”, Ralph Salerno; “Theft of a Nation”, Dr. Donald Cressey; “Police Chief”, IACP; “Combating Organized Crime”, Report of Oyster Bay Conference, 1965; “Task Force Report: Organized Crime”, President’s commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967; Newsday; Los Angeles Times; San Diego Union.

2 Example: A Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, March 14, 1974.

3 National Commissions - President’s Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, November 29, 1963; President’s Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, July 1967; President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1967; National Commission on the Causes and Preventions of Violence, 1968; President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, 1970; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1971-1973; National Task Force on Organized Crime, 1976.

Edited January 26, 2009 by William Kelly

[John Dolva]

Pam, I think if you can find a comlete list, which I doubt, then (I think) you will find four previously unidentified persons, watching the assassination with the memory expert Harry D. Holmes cattywampus in relation to the headshot up by the, (as deduced by Ian), the fifth floor corner offices of the post office.(this is where the last section of the Bell film appears to be taken from, (and finishing with a lingering shot of the Jail) just about directly opposite the 'snipers nest' after briefly catching the long coated cop type (unidentified) and his companion whom he is leading or is naturaly walking with him to what may be Harry's office and just as he passes with a very brief appearance of his cap traversing right in close up on to Bells right, up close and personal.) He brushes the q re who these others were with the usual 'I can't remember'. Why, unless there was a reason to 'not remember'. (cross matching that to a list of the members of the DCC and their associations could be interesting)

[Brian Benson]

Does anyone know of a complete list of Dallas Police and Military Intel officers present in Dealey Plaza Nov 22, 1963? Rank and duties would be helpful too.

http://jfk.ci.dallas.tx.us/

Have you tried the documents online from the City of Dallas Archives? You can dig online through the Archive boxes. Example:

48. Memorandum, by Rio S. Pierce. Memorandum regarding changes in personnel assignments in order to cover traffic corner locations surrounding City Hall, (Photocopy), 11/23/63. 00003213 1 page 14 03 048 3213-001.gif

9. Report to Chief J. E. Curry, by Charles Batchelor. Lists assignments of DPD personnel for the visit of the President, (Photocopy), date unknown. 00003296 15 pages 14 04 009 3296-001.gif 3296-002.gif 3296-003.gif 3296-004.gif 3296-005.gif 3296-006.gif 3296-007.gif 3296-008.gif 3296-009.gif 3296-010.gif 3296-011.gif 3296-012.gif 3296-013.gif 3296-014.gif 3296-015.gif

3296-007.gif lists Main & Houston as BJ Fox, CE Lewis and WH Denham, lists Houston & Elm as WE Barnett, JM Smith and EL Smith and lists Triple Overpass as JW Foster and JC White, with JE Murphy at Stemmons Freeway Serv Rd.

[John Dolva]

Does anyone know of a complete list of Dallas Police and Military Intel officers present in Dealey Plaza Nov 22, 1963? Rank and duties would be helpful too.

http://jfk.ci.dallas.tx.us/

Have you tried the documents online from the City of Dallas Archives? You can dig online through the Archive boxes. Example:

48. Memorandum, by Rio S. Pierce. Memorandum regarding changes in personnel assignments in order to cover traffic corner locations surrounding City Hall, (Photocopy), 11/23/63. 00003213 1 page 14 03 048 3213-001.gif

9. Report to Chief J. E. Curry, by Charles Batchelor. Lists assignments of DPD personnel for the visit of the President, (Photocopy), date unknown. 00003296 15 pages 14 04 009 3296-001.gif 3296-002.gif 3296-003.gif 3296-004.gif 3296-005.gif 3296-006.gif 3296-007.gif 3296-008.gif 3296-009.gif 3296-010.gif 3296-011.gif 3296-012.gif 3296-013.gif 3296-014.gif 3296-015.gif

3296-007.gif lists Main & Houston as BJ Fox, CE Lewis and WH Denham, lists Houston & Elm as WE Barnett, JM Smith and EL Smith and lists Triple Overpass as JW Foster and JC White, with JE Murphy at Stemmons Freeway Serv Rd.

Good advice, I think. A consideration of post 1 of the 'Tips' topic may also help (unless they've fixed it, I didn't let on before, Except to a few and I have no idea what they did with it, but if you can crack the classification code you can find more than is indexed and/or linked to. Or you used to be able to anyway. Ther may be a more elaborate dictabelt transcript s and maps,copies of originals and copies of copies, and there are/were other unknown docs, one of which appears to be a drawing of the assassination site, a line of movement of the white van, and a name something brennan I think from memory, more of doodle as part of a conversation or some solitary doodling thinking. I don't know.

[Pamela Ray]

Does anyone know of a complete list of Dallas Police and Military Intel officers present in Dealey Plaza Nov 22, 1963? Rank and duties would be helpful too.

– Deep Politics and the Death of JFK by PDS p. 276 The Plot and the Coverup

....two minutes earlier by Jack Alston Crichton, a right-wing Republican, oil operator, member of Army Intelligence Reserve (9 WH 106), and head of "a local Army Intelligence Unit" (WCD 386, SS 1058). Crichton knew Mamantov personally as a fellow petroleum geologist. He also knew him because Mamantov was a precinct chairman o the Republican party, for which Crichton became the 1964 candidate for governor of Texas.

It is not known how many Dallas policemen were also (as is apparently a widespread practice) members of the U.S. Army Reserve. One such reservist was Detective Adamik (7 WH 203), a member of the party which retrieved the rifle-blanket from the Paine garage and later reported what he overheard at Mamantov's interview of Marina about the rifle ("She said that it looked like her husband's rifle. She said that it was dark"; 24 WH291). Another member of Army Intelligence Reserve was Captain W. P. Gannaway, Revill's supervisor as head of the Dallas Police Special Service Bureau (WCD 1426.26; 19 WH 120); Gannaway's secretary was reported by an out-of-town police chief to be "closely connected" to Jack Ruby (WCD 86.151). This story was plausible, given the close connection between Ruby and the SSB, including men who participated in the search of the TSBD and the arrest of Oswald. Since the protection of visiting dignitaries was one of the SSB's responsibilities (5 WH48), Gannaway was involved in the meetings arranged by Secret Service advance man Winston Lawson for the Kennedy visit (5 WH39; 7 WH 580).

According to a news story in FBI files, in 1963 both Captain Gannaway and his subordinate Lieutenant Revill were assigned a special responsibility for "espionage and subversive activities" in Dallas. This was in conjunction with

Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, military intelligence teams from the army, navy, and air force, and other federal agencies with investigators operating from headquarters here…The job of [Revill's] intelligence section in Capt. Gannaway's bureau…requires the closest cooperation with these other governmental agencies gathering intelligence on subversive groups suspected of espionage…With membership in a national police intelligence organization known as LEIU (Law Enforcement Intelligence Units) the local officers are able to get information almost immediately on suspected subversives when they move into Dallas. This information is exchanged by police units as these persons move from city to city…Employes in [industrial] plants are carefully screened by security conscious personnel officers, and in key jobs are given strict government security clearances. Industry is taking great strides to upgrade security practices. One such group in this area is the American Society for Industrial Security. 10

The possibility that Oswald was an informant for this centralized security team would explain his visit to the Dallas American Civil Liberties Union, a liberal group being investigated by Revill's intelligence section, in the company of an extreme right-winger (Michael Paine). 11.

One can see how easily a false legend for Oswald could have been generated in the shared files of this coordinated security campaign, involving the Dallas SSB, FBI, military intelligence, and the American Society for Industrial Security. Such a centralized file system could be the source for the recurring (and unexplained) inversion of Oswald's name, as Harvey Lee Oswald, in the files of the Dallas police (e.g., 19 WH 438, 24 WH 259), FBI (e.g., 23 WH 207, 23 WH 373), Secret Service (16 WH 721, 748), army intelligence, and navy intelligence. 12.

The most intriguing "Harvey Lee Oswald" document is Jack Revill's list of employees at the Texas School Book Depository, compiled right after the assassination, before Oswald had been apprehended for the Tippit murder. For some unexplained reason, Oswald's inverted name ("Harvey Lee Oswald") was at the very head of that list, accompanied by an address, "605 Elsbeth," that slightly misrepresented the address (602 Elsbeth) where he had resided a year earlier (24 WH 259). 13 The Elsbeth address does suggest that Oswald's data had been parked for some time before the assassination in an intelligence file, not hitherto identified. One possibility would be the files of the LEIU, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, the intercity police-intelligence organization of which Revill as the lead local representative. LEIU's files, unlike ordinary police files, cannot be given to any civilian authorities and are treated as exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. As we shall see, it was also a frequent practice for the LEIU member intelligence units to collaborate with army intelligence. 14.

Another army reserve officer in Dealey plaza may have been Winston Lawson, the White House Secret Service agent responsible for the choice of the Kennedy motorcade route (4 WH 318). Lawson's first three reports of what happened on and before November 22 raise considerable questions about his performance. .....

http://leiu-homepage.org/about/historyPurpose.php

History, Purpose, and Operations

click here for the PDF version

HISTORY

In the mid 1950's, local and state law enforcement agencies in the United States recognized that no single agency or organization was responsible for receiving, collating, maintaining, and disseminating information on persons involved in organized crime. These law enforcement agencies surmised correctly that organized crime would exploit advancing technologies in transportation and communications, become more mobile, and increase their spheres of influence and criminal activities.

As a result, twenty-six (26) law enforcement agencies met in San Francisco, California on March 29, 1956 to discuss problems and possible solutions. The most important result of that meeting was the creation of the LEIU – The LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE UNIT and the development of an organizational purpose that survives to this day.

PURPOSE

The purpose of LEIU is to gather, record, and exchange confidential information not available through regular police channels, concerning organized crime and terrorism.

OPERATIONS

LEIU is an association of state and local police departments, similar in many respects to numerous other professional associations serving doctors, attorneys, journalists, and educators. LEIU has no employees and no capability as an entity to conduct any investigation or law enforcement activity of any kind. Each member agency is bound by, and acts pursuant to local law and their own agency regulations.

The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit is divided geographically into four (4) Zones, they are: Eastern, Central, Northwestern, and Southwestern. Each Zone elects a Chair and Vice Chair to serve as Zone Officers. Internationally, LEIU elects a General Chair, Vice General Chair, and designates a Secretary-Treasurer and a legal advisor who serve as International Officers. The International Officers, Zone Officers, past General Chair and two representatives from the Central Coordinating Agency make up the Executive Board. The Executive Board is the governing body of LEIU, and as such establishes policy and passes upon the admission of all members. The Executive Board is governed by a Constitution and Bylaws.

LEIU membership is limited to law enforcement agencies of general jurisdiction having an intelligence function. To become a member, an agency head makes written application. The applying agencies must be sponsored by an LEIU member. Each member agency head appoints an LEIU representative to be the contact for the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit. All LEIU member agencies are notified of an application for membership and have an opportunity to comment on the application. A background screening is conducted of the applying agency and the individual nominated to represent that agency. The application is voted on by the Executive Board. Termination of a member agency is provided for in the Constitution and Bylaws. Modern transportation allows an organized crime subject, gang member, or terrorist to travel from coast- to- coast in a matter of hours. Membership in LEIU provides a means of coping with the multi-jurisdictional investigation of organized crime/gang/terrorism information.

To submit a suspected criminal subject to the LEIU automated system, a member agency enters the subject information through a secure intranet, which is stored on the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) communications highway. The subject information includes, among other items, the subject’s identity, criminal activity, and criminal associates. All information submitted to the LEIU Automated File must meet LEIU File Guidelines and comply with 28 Code of Federal Regulations, part 23 (28CFR, part 23). The submitting agency must certify the subject meets established criteria, including criminal predicate. The Central Coordinating Agency (CCA) manages this automated file. CCA is housed within the California Department of Justice in Sacramento, California.

The membership of LEIU is comprised of law enforcement agencies in the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Due to the rapport established at the annual training seminars and through multi-agency investigations, representatives of member agencies have established a highly professional relationship of trust and respect. This facilitates the exchange of confidential criminal information between agencies. Although the LEIU Constitution and Bylaws restrict the dissemination of information to non-member law enforcement agencies, it is the policy of the LEIU that every member shall assist any law enforcement agency making a valid request concerning organized crime/gangs/terrorism. This exchange of criminal intelligence information is completed only after establishing a “right to know” and a “need to know”. This policy provides for the security of the information and protects the privacy of individuals.

In addition to gathering, recording, and exchanging confidential criminal information, the Central Coordinating Agency maintains an automated gaming index. The gaming index is a compilation of public information provided by member agencies that acts as a pointer system to assist in determining whether background information on individuals and companies applying for gaming licenses exist and whether the licenses for which the applicants have applied have been granted or denied.

The existence of organized criminal enterprises (traditional organized crime, gangs, or terrorists) in a free society requires alert law enforcement to proactively gather and analyze data. The traditional reactive approach to crime control is not effective when dealing with the scope and nature of organized criminal enterprises. The ability to retain data and review material is necessary to prevent crime or determine if criminal prosecution can be obtained. While accomplishing this, law enforcement agencies must abide by the rules and legal decisions that relate to the issues of security and privacy. LEIU members are guided in this area by the LEIU Constitution and Bylaws, the Representative’s Position Responsibilities, and LEIU File Guidelines. LEIU is a professional association that is recognized and discussed in books, periodicals, governmental documents and news media articles (site ref #1). LEIU representatives have voluntarily testified before Federal and State legislative committees (site ref #2) concerning the LEIU organization, its goals, and its role in combating organized criminal enterprises. The importance of gathering criminal intelligence information has been stressed by at least eight (8) National Commissions (site ref #3).

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has also recognized a need for the collection of criminal information. The IACP hosted a criminal intelligence sharing summit in March 2002, with the intent of enhancing the sharing of intelligence among various national, state and local agencies. LEIU was invited to participate in this summit and has been a leader in developing a National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan that will enhance public safety. This Plan recognizes and addresses the critical role that criminal intelligence performs in the implementation of effective Community Oriented Policing strategies within our communities.

No professional organization is without individuals who may abuse their regulations. LEIU recognizes that there have been errors made by some law enforcement intelligence units. But the answer to such errors is not the abolition of law enforcement intelligence files and criminal intelligence units. A solution lies, rather, in establishing well-defined standards governing the operations of criminal intelligence units. LEIU supports this concept and recognizes that there has to be a balance between protecting our constitutional liberties and protecting our society against those involved in criminal activity.

1 Examples of Publications - “Crime Confederation”, Ralph Salerno; “Theft of a Nation”, Dr. Donald Cressey; “Police Chief”, IACP; “Combating Organized Crime”, Report of Oyster Bay Conference, 1965; “Task Force Report: Organized Crime”, President’s commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967; Newsday; Los Angeles Times; San Diego Union.

2 Example: A Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, March 14, 1974.

3 National Commissions - President’s Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, November 29, 1963; President’s Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, July 1967; President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1967; National Commission on the Causes and Preventions of Violence, 1968; President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, 1970; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1971-1973; National Task Force on Organized Crime, 1976.

Thank you for posting this. I don't have the book Deep Politics and when trying to access the information at

http://books.google.com/books?id=zWewDbarT...esult#PPA271,M1

the pages I really want to read are not available. Do you have the missing pages 272, 273, 275, 281 and will you please post them here?

I'm working on some new information and will post it soon.

Thanks again.

Edited January 27, 2009 by Pamela Ray

[Duke Lane]

Does anyone know of a complete list of Dallas Police and Military Intel officers present in Dealey Plaza Nov 22, 1963? Rank and duties would be helpful too.

Could there ever be such a thing?

There were DPD officers who simply went to DP without reporting at the time that they were going (e.g., #87 R.C. Nelson) as well as others assigned to foot patrol along the parade route who walked there without benefit of a radio. Not every officer filed an "after-action report" of his duties that afternoon, and not all filed those correctly (e.g., once again, R.C. Nelson, who claimed to have spent "the rest of the afternoon" in DP when he is clearly heard on the radio being assigned to - and responding to - a report of a vehicle with a rifle in the back seat out along Fort Worth Drive, and then going to Oak Cliff). Many more did not testify. Several did not use radios.

There is a separate transcript of DCSO radio transmissions (in CE1973, I believe) in which several sheriff's deputies responded, as well as something from the state police. There is no similar transcript or testimony of anyone assigned to a federal function, whether FBI, ONI or otherwise, thus no way of knowing if there was anyone there who either didn't say that they were there, or who were not referred to by others who were there. This includes only those who were there in some official capacity and had no compunction against anyone knowing they were there; if there was anyone who wasn't supposed to be there, or was there for nefarious purposes, they certainly didn't report being there.

I have compiled a list of DPD patrol officers who responded to the Signal 19 call or who were later assigned to DP, but that list excludes detectives and many higher-ups who didn't have regular assignments or "beats." There were something to the tune of 88-95 cops - not counting DCSO personnel - in DP within 15 minutes of the shooting.

Interestingly, over half of them - that we know of - responded to the second Signal 19 in Oak Cliff, again not counting over 20 DCSO officers and possibly constables as well. I think this information may be posted in a thread here within the past six months: you might try the keyword "definitive" or "definitive list" in a search to find it. If I run across it on my computer, I'll forward it to you or post it here. It includes only DPD patrol officers, though.

[William Kelly]

Does anyone know of a complete list of Dallas Police and Military Intel officers present in Dealey Plaza Nov 22, 1963? Rank and duties would be helpful too.

Could there ever be such a thing?

There were DPD officers who simply went to DP without reporting at the time that they were going (e.g., #87 R.C. Nelson) as well as others assigned to foot patrol along the parade route who walked there without benefit of a radio. Not every officer filed an "after-action report" of his duties that afternoon, and not all filed those correctly (e.g., once again, R.C. Nelson, who claimed to have spent "the rest of the afternoon" in DP when he is clearly heard on the radio being assigned to - and responding to - a report of a vehicle with a rifle in the back seat out along Fort Worth Drive, and then going to Oak Cliff). Many more did not testify. Several did not use radios.

There is a separate transcript of DCSO radio transmissions (in CE1973, I believe) in which several sheriff's deputies responded, as well as something from the state police. There is no similar transcript or testimony of anyone assigned to a federal function, whether FBI, ONI or otherwise, thus no way of knowing if there was anyone there who either didn't say that they were there, or who were not referred to by others who were there. This includes only those who were there in some official capacity and had no compunction against anyone knowing they were there; if there was anyone who wasn't supposed to be there, or was there for nefarious purposes, they certainly didn't report being there.

I have compiled a list of DPD patrol officers who responded to the Signal 19 call or who were later assigned to DP, but that list excludes detectives and many higher-ups who didn't have regular assignments or "beats." There were something to the tune of 88-95 cops - not counting DCSO personnel - in DP within 15 minutes of the shooting.

Interestingly, over half of them - that we know of - responded to the second Signal 19 in Oak Cliff, again not counting over 20 DCSO officers and possibly constables as well. I think this information may be posted in a thread here within the past six months: you might try the keyword "definitive" or "definitive list" in a search to find it. If I run across it on my computer, I'll forward it to you or post it here. It includes only DPD patrol officers, though.

Duke,

Of the Dallas Police at Dealey Plaza, do you know who were also in the US Army Reserves or in Gannaway's Intelligence Unit besides Revell?

Thanks,

BK

[Steve Thomas]

Bill,

Duke,

Of the Dallas Police at Dealey Plaza, do you know who were also in the US Army Reserves or in Gannaway's Intelligence Unit besides Revell?

Thanks,

BK

I think you can look at just about anybody who was in the Special Services Bureau, although some specialized in subversives, some in vice etc.

You can find a list of them here:

http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...p;relPageId=138

Around 11:00 PM on November 22nd, a cable was sent from The Commanding General U.S. Continental Army Command to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command in Fort Macdill, FL. This cable summarized a telephone call between a Captain Saxton in U.S. Strike Command and a Lieutenant Colonel Fons in the 4th Army Headquarters, Fort Sam Houston, TX. Part of the information in this phone call contained the following:

"Assistant Chief Don Stringfellow, Intelligence Section, Dallas Police Department, notified 112th Intelligene Group, this Headquarters that information had been obtained from Oswald revealed he had defected to Cuba in 1959 and is card carrying member of Communist Party."

(Stringfellow was a Detective, not an Assistant Chief)

Steve Thomas

[Thomas Graves]

Does anyone know of a complete list of Dallas Police and Military Intel officers present in Dealey Plaza Nov 22, 1963? Rank and duties would be helpful too.

– Deep Politics and the Death of JFK by PDS p. 276 The Plot and the Coverup

....two minutes earlier by Jack Alston Crichton, a right-wing Republican, oil operator, member of Army Intelligence Reserve (9 WH 106), and head of "a local Army Intelligence Unit" (WCD 386, SS 1058). Crichton knew Mamantov personally as a fellow petroleum geologist. He also knew him because Mamantov was a precinct chairman o the Republican party, for which Crichton became the 1964 candidate for governor of Texas.

It is not known how many Dallas policemen were also (as is apparently a widespread practice) members of the U.S. Army Reserve. One such reservist was Detective Adamik (7 WH 203), a member of the party which retrieved the rifle-blanket from the Paine garage and later reported what he overheard at Mamantov's interview of Marina about the rifle ("She said that it looked like her husband's rifle. She said that it was dark"; 24 WH291). Another member of Army Intelligence Reserve was Captain W. P. Gannaway, Revill's supervisor as head of the Dallas Police Special Service Bureau (WCD 1426.26; 19 WH 120); Gannaway's secretary was reported by an out-of-town police chief to be "closely connected" to Jack Ruby (WCD 86.151). This story was plausible, given the close connection between Ruby and the SSB, including men who participated in the search of the TSBD and the arrest of Oswald. Since the protection of visiting dignitaries was one of the SSB's responsibilities (5 WH48), Gannaway was involved in the meetings arranged by Secret Service advance man Winston Lawson for the Kennedy visit (5 WH39; 7 WH 580).

According to a news story in FBI files, in 1963 both Captain Gannaway and his subordinate Lieutenant Revill were assigned a special responsibility for "espionage and subversive activities" in Dallas. This was in conjunction with

Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, military intelligence teams from the army, navy, and air force, and other federal agencies with investigators operating from headquarters here. The job of [Revill's] intelligence section in Capt. Gannaway's bureau requires the closest cooperation with these other governmental agencies gathering intelligence on subversive groups suspected of espionage. With membership in a national police intelligence organization known as LEIU (Law Enforcement Intelligence Units) the local officers are able to get information almost immediately on suspected subversives when they move into Dallas. This information is exchanged by police units as these persons move from city to city. Employes in [industrial] plants are carefully screened by security-conscious personnel officers, and in key jobs are given strict government security clearances. Industry is taking great strides to upgrade security practices. One such group in this area is the American Society for Industrial Security. 10

The possibility that Oswald was an informant for this centralized security team would explain his visit to the Dallas American Civil Liberties Union, a liberal group being investigated by Revill's intelligence section, in the company of an extreme right-winger (Michael Paine). 11.

One can see how easily a false legend for Oswald could have been generated in the shared files of this coordinated security campaign, involving the Dallas SSB, FBI, military intelligence, and the American Society for Industrial Security. Such a centralized file system could be the source for the recurring (and unexplained) inversion of Oswald's name, as Harvey Lee Oswald, in the files of the Dallas police (e.g., 19 WH 438, 24 WH 259), FBI (e.g., 23 WH 207, 23 WH 373), Secret Service (16 WH 721, 748), army intelligence, and navy intelligence. 12.

The most intriguing "Harvey Lee Oswald" document is Jack Revill's list of employees at the Texas School Book Depository, compiled right after the assassination, before Oswald had been apprehended for the Tippit murder. For some unexplained reason, Oswald's inverted name ("Harvey Lee Oswald") was at the very head of that list, accompanied by an address, "605 Elsbeth," that slightly misrepresented the address (602 Elsbeth) where he had resided a year earlier (24 WH 259). 13 The Elsbeth address does suggest that Oswald's data had been parked for some time before the assassination in an intelligence file, not hitherto identified. One possibility would be the files of the LEIU, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, the intercity police-intelligence organization of which Revill as the lead local representative. LEIU's files, unlike ordinary police files, cannot be given to any civilian authorities and are treated as exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. As we shall see, it was also a frequent practice for the LEIU member intelligence units to collaborate with army intelligence. 14. Another army reserve officer in Dealey plaza may have been Winston Lawson, the White House Secret Service agent responsible for the choice of the Kennedy motorcade route (4 WH 318). Lawson's first three reports of what happened on and before November 22 raise considerable questions about his performance. .....

http://leiu-homepage.org/about/historyPurpose.php

History, Purpose, and Operations

click here for the PDF version

HISTORY

In the mid 1950's, local and state law enforcement agencies in the United States recognized that no single agency or organization was responsible for receiving, collating, maintaining, and disseminating information on persons involved in organized crime. These law enforcement agencies surmised correctly that organized crime would exploit advancing technologies in transportation and communications, become more mobile, and increase their spheres of influence and criminal activities.

As a result, twenty-six (26) law enforcement agencies met in San Francisco, California on March 29, 1956 to discuss problems and possible solutions. The most important result of that meeting was the creation of LEIU (The LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE UNIT) and the development of an organizational purpose that survives to this day.

PURPOSE

The purpose of LEIU is to gather, record, and exchange confidential information not available through regular police channels, concerning organized crime and terrorism.

OPERATIONS

LEIU is an association of state and local police departments, similar in many respects to numerous other professional associations serving doctors, attorneys, journalists, and educators. LEIU has no employees and no capability as an entity to conduct any investigation or law enforcement activity of any kind. Each member agency is bound by, and acts pursuant to local law and their own agency regulations.

The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit is divided geographically into four (4) Zones, they are: Eastern, Central, Northwestern, and Southwestern. Each Zone elects a Chair and Vice Chair to serve as Zone Officers. Internationally, LEIU elects a General Chair, Vice General Chair, and designates a Secretary-Treasurer and a legal advisor who serve as International Officers. The International Officers, Zone Officers, past General Chair and two representatives from the Central Coordinating Agency make up the Executive Board. The Executive Board is the governing body of LEIU, and as such establishes policy and passes upon the admission of all members. The Executive Board is governed by a Constitution and Bylaws.

LEIU membership is limited to law enforcement agencies of general jurisdiction having an intelligence function. To become a member, an agency head makes written application. The applying agencies must be sponsored by an LEIU member. Each member agency head appoints an LEIU representative to be the contact for the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit. All LEIU member agencies are notified of an application for membership and have an opportunity to comment on the application. A background screening is conducted of the applying agency and the individual nominated to represent that agency. The application is voted on by the Executive Board. Termination of a member agency is provided for in the Constitution and Bylaws. Modern transportation allows an organized crime subject, gang member, or terrorist to travel from coast- to- coast in a matter of hours. Membership in LEIU provides a means of coping with the multi-jurisdictional investigation of organized crime/gang/terrorism information.

To submit a suspected criminal subject to the LEIU automated system, a member agency enters the subject information through a secure intranet, which is stored on the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) communications highway. The subject information includes, among other items, the subject's identity, criminal activity, and criminal associates. All information submitted to the LEIU Automated File must meet LEIU File Guidelines and comply with 28 Code of Federal Regulations, part 23 (28CFR, part 23). The submitting agency must certify the subject meets established criteria, including criminal predicate. The Central Coordinating Agency (CCA) manages this automated file. CCA is housed within the California Department of Justice in Sacramento, California.

The membership of LEIU is comprised of law enforcement agencies in the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Due to the rapport established at the annual training seminars and through multi-agency investigations, representatives of member agencies have established a highly professional relationship of trust and respect. This facilitates the exchange of confidential criminal information between agencies. Although the LEIU Constitution and Bylaws restrict the dissemination of information to non-member law enforcement agencies, it is the policy of the LEIU that every member shall assist any law enforcement agency making a valid request concerning organized crime/gangs/terrorism. This exchange of criminal intelligence information is completed only after establishing a "right to know" and a "need to know". This policy provides for the security of the information and protects the privacy of individuals.

In addition to gathering, recording, and exchanging confidential criminal information, the Central Coordinating Agency maintains an automated gaming index. The gaming index is a compilation of public information provided by member agencies that acts as a pointer system to assist in determining whether background information on individuals and companies applying for gaming licenses exist and whether the licenses for which the applicants have applied have been granted or denied.

The existence of organized criminal enterprises (traditional organized crime, gangs, or terrorists) in a free society requires alert law enforcement to proactively gather and analyze data. The traditional reactive approach to crime control is not effective when dealing with the scope and nature of organized criminal enterprises. The ability to retain data and review material is necessary to prevent crime or determine if criminal prosecution can be obtained. While accomplishing this, law enforcement agencies must abide by the rules and legal decisions that relate to the issues of security and privacy. LEIU members are guided in this area by the LEIU Constitution and Bylaws, the Representative’s Position Responsibilities, and LEIU File Guidelines. LEIU is a professional association that is recognized and discussed in books, periodicals, governmental documents and news media articles (site ref #1). LEIU representatives have voluntarily testified before Federal and State legislative committees (site ref #2) concerning the LEIU organization, its goals, and its role in combating organized criminal enterprises. The importance of gathering criminal intelligence information has been stressed by at least eight (8) National Commissions (site ref #3).

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has also recognized a need for the collection of criminal information. The IACP hosted a criminal intelligence sharing summit in March 2002, with the intent of enhancing the sharing of intelligence among various national, state and local agencies. LEIU was invited to participate in this summit and has been a leader in developing a National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan that will enhance public safety. This Plan recognizes and addresses the critical role that criminal intelligence performs in the implementation of effective Community Oriented Policing strategies within our communities.

No professional organization is without individuals who may abuse their regulations. LEIU recognizes that there have been errors made by some law enforcement intelligence units. But the answer to such errors is not the abolition of law enforcement intelligence files and criminal intelligence units. A solution lies, rather, in establishing well-defined standards governing the operations of criminal intelligence units. LEIU supports this concept and recognizes that there has to be a balance between protecting our constitutional liberties and protecting our society against those involved in criminal activity.

1 Examples of Publications - "Crime Confederation", Ralph Salerno; "Theft of a Nation", Dr. Donald Cressey; "Police Chief", IACP; "Combating Organized Crime", Report of Oyster Bay Conference, 1965; "Task Force Report: Organized Crime", President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967; Newsday; Los Angeles Times; San Diego Union.

2 Example: A Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, March 14, 1974.

3 National Commissions - President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, November 29, 1963; President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, July 1967; President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1967; National Commission on the Causes and Preventions of Violence, 1968; President's Commission on Campus Unrest, 1970; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1971-1973; National Task Force on Organized Crime, 1976.

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--Tommy emphasis added

Edited February 2, 2012 by Thomas Graves