Tim Carroll

I was in Catholic school at the time of JFK's death, so everyone was pretty upset. But a few years later, when Bobby was killed, a friend's father shocked me by saying that it was a great thing for the country. Tim

What is the basis for the assertion that "in the film, the reporter (Warren Beatty) is framed for the assassination of a Senator at the Dallas Trade Mart (JFK's destination)"...? In the context of the movie plot line, that event occurs in Los Angeles, the same city in which the Parallax Corp. is located. There is no credit at the end showing that it was filmed at the Dallas Trade Mart. Tim

It looks like Oswald. Tim

The lack of basic editing/fact checking in bigtime publications always surprises me. In the case of Dominick Dunne's Vanity Fair article, I was surprised by the misstatement that Jack Ruby's Carousel Club was located in Houston. To his credit, Dunne didn't water down his take on Kilgallen's death. He wrote, "Kilgallen told people that she was going to break the case, so Ruby must have told her something that someone important didn't want her to print. At least that's my interpretation." Tim

On New Years Day, 1959, when Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba, the United States’ foreign policy establishment had a wide range of options available. So why was the choice made to alienate Castro, thereby driving him into the Soviet fold? Much of the answer can be found in the U.S.’ policy in support of multinational corporations. This single-minded mentality (the business of America is business) had little tolerance for social reforms that might cut into profits and control. The absolutism of American capitalism was a very real factor, as C. Wright Mills wrote, “in forcing the Government of Cuba to align itself politically with the Soviet bloc, as against assuming a genuinely neutralist and hence peaceful world orientation.” In his first speech as the leader of the new Cuba, Castro revealed an intended independence that would have been disconcerting to those that profited most from a subservient Cuba: "The Revolution begins now. . . . It will not be like 1898, when the North Americans came and made themselves masters of our country. . . . For the first time, the Republic will really be entirely free and the people will have what they deserve. . . . This war was won by the people!" The shaping of Castro’s image as communistic long before he would be forced to publicly adopt that guise was a form of self-prophesy. But initially, even the CIA’s own resident expert on Latin American communism concluded after a three hour interview with Castro, that “Castro is not only not a Communist; he is a strong anti-Communist fighter.” Castro also proved himself a crowd pleaser. During a 1960 trip to the United Nations for that year's General Assembly, after having a dispute with the management of the Shelboure Hotel in midtown, Castro’s entourage of bearded guerrillas who had recently assumed power moved to Harlem's Hotel Theresa. Thousands of Harlem residents crowded the streets to cheer them. There, Castro met with black leader Malcolm X, and met separately with then-Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Gamal Abdel Nassar of the United Arab Republic also paid his respects to Castro at the hotel, which has since been torn down. It was during this trip to New York that Castro asserted, “I have said in a clear and definitive fashion that we are not Communists. . . . The doors are open to private investments that contribute to the industrial development of Cuba. The Eisenhower administration was alarmed by Castro’s protestations about human rights and democracy at the same time that he was seizing control of the press, rigging elections, shutting down the casinos, and nationalizing industry. However, other than the issue of the casinos and the geographical and recreational immediacy to American interests, these practices had all been seen before in Latin American efforts to achieve social reform. But this was after McCarthyism had taken its toll on Western attitudes, and there was no room for shades of pink in that climate. It was the era of all or nothing in the fight against the Red Menace. Such extreme attitudes were reflected in a briefing given to CIA Director Dulles by Kenneth Crosby, a leading American businessman with interests in Havana. Crosby described Castro as “another Hitler” who had “tremendous influence over the people,” comparable to that of Rasputin. Clearer heads, however, have questioned such a totalistic perspective. Thomas Patterson disputes the notion that Castro was always a Communist and committed to a Marxist view of the world before taking power. He notes that “even the veteran foreign service officer appointed U.S. ambassador to Cuba shortly after Castro’s triumph acknowledged that Castro's Soviet alliance solidified only after the United States tried to overthrow the bearded leader.” More than simply placing the cart before the horse, U.S. policy actually created a Soviet beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. This constituted enemy-making of the first order. One school of thought argues that Castro’s objectives, combined with the dynamics of revolution, propelled Fidel into the Soviet orbit. On the other hand, there is the contention that, by its actions and non-actions, the United States drove Castro to seek out the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there was consensus that if Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had responded to Cuba as President Carter later did to Nicaragua, Castro more likely than not would have been stymied in his radical course. Even if it were true all along that Castro was a Communist, few countries subscribed to the blanket criterion of “anything but communism” (the “ABC” of U.S. Cold War foreign policy ) in determining regime legitimacy. Only a year after Castro came to power, secret official efforts had begun to depose him when Eisenhower’s National Security Council deliberated over ways to bring “another government to power in Cuba.” E. Howard Hunt, the man the Washington Post called the “Great Gatsby of the cloak and walkie-talkie set,” had been sent to Cuba to check things out for himself and upon returning submitted an itemized list of suggestions geared toward toppling Castro: 1. Assassinate Castro before or coincident with the invasion (a task for Cuban patriots); 2. Destroy the Cuban radio and television transmitters before or coincident with the invasion; 3. Destroy the island’s microwave relay system just before the invasion begins; 4. Discard any thought of a popular uprising against Castro until the issue has already been militarily decided. Before Hunt was to be appointed what James Reston described as “operational head of the CIA-Cuban Bay of Pigs disaster,” he was asked whether he was too conservative to handle the Cuban exiles. He responded that he was “a career officer” and that his “political views, whatever they may be, don’t enter into it.” In fact, the question would eventually prove to be well placed; given Hunt’s right wing attitudes, he would eventually require replacement over this very issue. But his extreme operational recommendations were well-received, initiating what is perhaps the shadiest period in U.S. foreign relations. At the time, however, it was old home week, with the veterans of the Guatemala overthrow reunited. Hunt recalled, “We greeted each other warmly and remarked that the old crowd was rallying to the new cause.” “The first discussion of killing Castro” according to Richard Bissell, the number two man at the CIA, occurred when “first on [Hunt’s] list was Castro’s murder.” A meeting of the National Security Council was held after which, on March 17, President Eisenhower approved a four-point plan military plan, laid out in a top secret policy paper, “A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime.” This program had already received approval from the 5412 Committee, “the most secret operating unit of government.” Leaving out any mention of Hunt’s internal CIA memo recommending that “thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro,” the document called for four steps: (1) creation of a responsible and unified Cuban government in exile; (2) a powerful propaganda offensive; (3) a covert intelligence and action organization in Cuba, to be responsive to the exile opposition; and (4) a paramilitary force outside of Cuba for future guerrilla action. Hunt was gratified to be informed that the project’s action officer at the White House was to be none other than the Vice President, Richard Nixon. He later noted his disappointment that when the time came that he needed him, Nixon “had been supplanted by a new administration.” Michael Beschloss has observed that all of this plotting and planning was conducted at a time when Castro “had yet to seize American property or establish diplomatic relations with Moscow.” Publicly, the official American policy was still friendliness toward the new Cuban government. The planned lodgment of a government-in-exile on a Cuban beachhead was never expected to actually topple Castro; the most hopeful prospect was that by presenting a military threat of unknown proportions, and fabricating rumors and propaganda of multiple landings, dissident Cubans might be encouraged to take up arms while borderline supporters would be frightened into quiescence. The idea was that, once established, the exiles would begin “broadcasting to the world as a government-in-arms. In other words, the best the constructed legitimacy of the exile beachhead government could have offered the Cuban people was civil war, a “bitter gift.” Of course, once the U.S. were to recognize the new government as the legitimate one, then requests for military support would have indigenous origins, giving the U.S. all the pretext needed and avoiding any appearance of imperialism. To add to the construction of legitimacy, Hunt was directed to draft a new Cuban constitution which should include “land reform clauses and the rest of it.” While some supposed that the exile force would be able to advance toward Havana, Bissell knew better: the isolation of the landing site intended to keep Castro out would just as readily keep the exiles in. Shortly after conducting a good will tour of America, Castro introduced an agrarian reform law to his Cabinet. The measure would authorize the Cuban government to take back much of the island’s land from its owners, many of them being American-based companies. Immediately, the American press began to portray Castro as a Communist. This change was not merely a reflection of ideological sentiment. There was a very real monetary incentive behind the opposition to the agrarian reform. Chief among the companies who vehemently opposed the expropriation of land was the conglomerate, some would say oligarchy, United Fruit, a company that had already been instrumental in the overthrow of the Guatemalan government in 1954. The Boston-based United Fruit Company had unique connections within the U.S. government. Both John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, and his brother Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, had been partners in the law firm that represented this com-pany. John M. Cabot, Eisenhower’s Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, was the company’s major stockholder. Sinclair Weeks, the Secretary of Commerce, had been director of United Fruit’s registrar bank. Although some of these officials had divested themselves of their interests in the company, the Washington-United Fruit network was a significant one. These were the days “when the United Fruit Company’s reputation for being able to call in the Marines or the CIA to its Central American banana fiefdom was a principal company asset.” Along with United Fruit, a major stakeholder in the control of Cuba was the American Mafia. When Castro ordered the casinos closed down he made himself a significant enemy of the Mafia. That U.S. foreign policy would represent the interests of United Fruit is not so surprising as that the government would readily climb in bed with the Mafia. In September of 1960, a high-ranking CIA official met with Chicago mob boss Sam Giancana, his West Coast associate Johnny Roselli, and Santos Trafficante, the Florida and Havana underworld chief who had been put in jail by Castro after the takeover of the casinos. The purpose of the meeting was the planning for the murder of the Cuban leader. The Deputy Director for Plans of the CIA, Richard Bissell, thought that hiring gangsters to kill Castro was the “ultimate cover,” because “there was very little chance that anything the Syndicate would try to do would be traced back” to the U.S. government. It seems reasonable, however, that this was not merely operationally expedient; it was also a reflection of a mutuality of interests between the American intelligence community and the Underworld. Nor was it the first time this partnership had been activated. The alliance had begun during World War II after a series of sabotage incidents on the East Coast culminated in the burning of an oceanliner, the Normandie. With Operation Underworld, Roosevelt made the Mafiosi all but official masters of the U.S. East Coast docks and gave implicit protection to their activities everywhere. With his instructions to Patton in 1943, he restored the Mafia to power in Sicily. When he sent Lansky to Batista in 1944, he paved the way for the spread of Syndicate influence throughout the Caribbean and Central America. The same month that the CIA and Mafia resumed their unholy partnership, this time planning for the assassination of a sovereign head of state, Castro publicly labeled the U.S. activities against his country as subversive and warlike. In a speech before the United Nations in September of 1960, he railed against the international criminality being practiced by the U.S.: "The government of the United States considers it has the right to promote and encourage subversion in our country. The government of the United States is promoting the organization of subversive movements against the revolutionary government of Cuba. . . . Does this mean, by chance, that the Cuban government has the right to promote subversion in the United States?" Castro seems to have been beset by the strange notion that what goes around comes around, turn about is fair play, and some kind of equitable treatment between nations is to be expected. His statements consistently reflect a resistance to the kind of one-sidedness presumed by the United States. Given that legitimacy in international relations involves certain standards and codes of conduct, Castro’s expectations may have been legitimate, but misplaced. It was Castro’s rejection of the U.S. military double standard in the hemisphere, which assumes Latin American weakness and North American strength, that encouraged him to form an army which could later beat off the Bay of Pigs invasion. That same summer, Soviet Premier Khrushchev announced that “the Monroe Doctrine has outlived its time, has outlived itself, has died, so to say, a natural death.” Reflecting Nietzsche’s views on the state of stale, obsolete constructions, the Russian continued, “Now the remains of this doctrine should best be buried as every dead body is so that it should not poison the air by its decay.” Khrushchev held nothing back in describing the people most served by continued invocation of the doctrine: ". . . the imperialists of the United States of America, the colonialists, who, like vultures, snatch the last crumb out of the mouths of the dying children and old folk just to wax fat and rich. And it is through the Monroe Doctrine that they want to assure themselves the right to go on with this robbery forever." The representation that Castro posed a Communist threat to the U.S. was demonstrably in place long before any supporting facts were to emerge. The New York Times’ reporter, Herbert L. Matthews, had come under attack for his sympathetic coverage long before Castro announced that he was a Communist who would be characterized as having “almost brought on a nuclear war.” The newspaper reported public demonstrations “protesting editorials on Cuba and editorial writings of Herbert L. Matthews in The Times, as well as information in the news columns that the protesters interpreted as favorable to Fidel Castro, and therefore to communism.” Tim

If what is being read into my comment is that I think John was provoking trouble with T.G., then that is not a misread. As for justifying threats to sue, I was sorry T.G. did that as a matter of style. It's bad form and pragmatically silly to make such threats. To paraphrase Nixon, T.G. handed his enemies a sword, and they used it. But regarding the discourse here about invocation of legal standards as a minimum reflection of social standards, I don't cotton to the demonization of the legal right to sue. Many have expressed dismay that Shanet apologized for asserting that T.G. was involved in the manipulation of Arthur Bremer. In that context, I believe T.G. was correct for asserting the argument that such an unfounded assertion, intended with malice, constitutes libel. I respect Shanet for recognizing that as well. It would be silly to argue that Shanet apologized out of fear of litigation. I believe that his own sense of honor was his guide. I am opposed to tort reform, as I clearly said (is Pat saying he supports it?), and don't believe that the mention of legal standards is such an abomination. I leave that argument to George Bush's crowd. I consider an arbitrary imposition of skewed discourse to be un-American. I certainly believe that misquoting, especially in a cut and paste format, is a suspect basis to ban oppositional thinking. Honor warranted a correction, not an overreactive censorship. And if this is being taken out of context by courageous people flocking to post on a thread about T.G. to which he can't respond, let it be noted that I am not alone in having recognized the history, and note Pat's own observation that there was a misquote, which was not, to my knowledge, corrected. For those who've forgotten, one member remarked on Simkin's "baiting." I thought Royce expressed himself well: Now I'm off for my midnight flight to Cozumel. Here's wishing everyone well. Tim

I've heard the story over the years that someone ran out into traffic on Turtle Creek, waving frantically and attempting to warn the president. Unfortunately, I can't search for the story on this forum as I have a midnight flight to Cozumel. But I seem to remember the issue being discussed in conjunction with the story of an SS agent having been killed that day. Tim

Like unacknowledged and uncorrected misquoting as a tactic for manufacturing a straw man dispute? Since the mention that language is actionably libelous is such an attrocity here, I wonder why Hemming was allowed to engage in that practice routinely. Given that calling others "liars" is forbidden (according to the forum "rules"), why was Piper allowed to take that behavior to such an extreme? As a political matter, in the U.S., so-called tort reform is high on the menu of desires of those who seek to limit forums for redress of rights for regular folks. The right to sue when someone demonstrates a disregard for the truth with a motive of damaging that person is an essential ingredient of freedom of speech and holding people to a civilized standard of social discourse. Tim

History has not sufficiently recognized the matrix of aggression that was Eisenhower's legacy, involving numerous circumstances requiring Kennedy's courageous resistence. Some of this is the result of Eisenhower's seeming passivity, in contrast to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's maniacal "Onward Christian Soldiers" approach to foreign policy. Fred Greenstein has characterized Eisenhower as a "hidden hand president" who preferred to utilize behind-the-scenes methods to avoid expending mass political support. "Covert action allowed Eisenhower to achieve foreign policy aims without alienating American or world opinion."[1] In John Foster Dulles' black and white world, neutrality was a form of evil, to be contested at every turn. As Dulles' employer, Ike clearly subscribed to the notion that the Cold War could not be waged according to accepted rules of international conduct. In 1955 he wrote, "I have come to the conclusion that some of our traditional ideas of international sportsmanship are scarcely applicable in the morass in which the world now founders."[2] This attitude was reinforced by the issuance of the Doolittle Report, which asserted that in fighting the Cold War, "hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of fair play must be reconsidered. We must ... learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy."[3] The most dangerous of Eisenhower's bequeathed policies was the mutual deception with Khrushchev to exaggerate Soviet nuclear strength in order to pretextualize massive military industrial expenditures by the U.S. Many felt that the U.S. had missed its opportunity for global dominance immediately after WWII, when it held a nuclear monopoly. Through the Fifties, under Eisenhower's stewardship, a build-up of a first strike capability was conducted. The plan reached fruition in August 1961, when the Corona satellite became operational. At that moment, all Soviet forces became immediately vulnerable to a first strike elimination. It was in resisting the entrenched forces eager to seize the moment and launch a Nazi-esque First Strike Final Solution that Kennedy most dramatically and importantly established his own greatness and stature as a world leader. Tim [1] Robert Smith Thompson, The Missiles Of October. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 130-131. [2] Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: The U-2 Affair. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986), p. 130. [3] Thompson, p. 64.

I know of no source or mention of RFK opposing the assassination of Diem, or that assassination was even discussed. Many have argued that a coup would obviously result in the assassination of Diem and that the Kennedys had to have known this, but that is not reflected in the notes, transcripts or oral histories of the time. Robert Kennedy himself described his and the president's positions about the Vietnam coup, not assassination, thusly: He would have liked to have gotten rid of Diem if he could get rid of him and get somebody proper to replace him. He was against getting rid of him until you knew what was going to come along, whether the government that was going to replace it had any stability, whether it would, in fact, be a successful coup. But he didn't know - I mean, other than the fact that there were rumors about coups all the time. He had no idea that this particular coup was going to take place, other than what I've described. This looked more serious, but he had sent out and asked for certain information before any coup should take place. Henry Cabot Lodge was going to come home during this period of time; and it was felt that he should delay his departure but still act as if he were going home, because otherwise, it would disturb everybody. We had the difficult problem that, in fact, people had been encouraged to have a coup and now to pull the rug out from under them meant their death. That complicated the problem. And then what really brought the coup on - I guess, from what I've read since then - is the fact that Diem planned a coup himself, a fake coup: He was going to pick up all these people and arrest them and say they were participating in a coup and then execute them. Bobby's words have relevance to the recent arguments advanced in the book, Ultimate Sacrifice, about plans for a Cuban coup just one month later, as well as to current U.S. foreign policy: "It's a bad policy to get into, for us to run a coup out there and replace somebody we don't like with somebody we do, because it would just make every other country nervous as can be that we were running coups in and out." Robert Kennedy, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, New York: Bantam Books, 1988, p. 40. Tim

The statements made by JFK about matters that required waiting until after a critical election were well-known, and a more down-to-earth interpretation of LBJ's supposed statement to the joint chiefs may well have been that it was of that variety: Certainly Kennedy and Johnson were both aware of the cruciality of timing in political life. T.C.

Thank you for this. I don't have a copy of Karnow's book at hand. Does he give his source for this comment?Karnow has what he calls "Notes on Sources" at the end of his book.... In reality, one would have to search various books to find which one had the quote in it. I don't like this procedure for sourcing material, and it leaves the reader to ask just how valid is his information in the chapter. While that line made for good theater in the movie, JFK, it seems an unlikely comment for LBJ to make "to the joint chiefs at a White House reception on Christmas Eve 1963." For one thing, what would the joint chiefs have to do with getting LBJ "elected?" For another, the image of the joint chiefs gathered together being addressed as a group at a White House reception seems like a dramatic contrivance. Also, the quote implies a quid pro quo arrangement, as if the joint chiefs would be rewarded for providing an election victory with a war. A more credible scenario would have LBJ expressing the need to prevail in the election before acquiescing to the joint chiefs' war plans. Similarly, JFK was known to have expressed the need to get reelected before he could do certain things. Tim

Some members have argued that it makes no sense that people with foreknowledge of the Dealey Plaza operation would expose themselves by attending and possibly being identified. An analogous counterpoint to that position has emerged. There's a new report out of Italy today that through the use of modern film analysis techniques, a KGB agent long thought to have been involved in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II, has now been definitively identified among the spectators during the shooting. "According to the report, there is also a photograph showing Sergei Antonov, a Bulgarian man acquitted of involvement in the assassination attempt, in St Peter’s Square when the pope was shot." Tim

Tim .... use a little sense. Bill, lose the condescending attitude; it's definitely not justified. So you are saying that Arnold moved to his left (camera right), behind the retaining wall, as part of his dive to the ground. But are you also meaning to say that Bob Groden agrees with you that BDM, seen in Willis and Betzer, was Gordon Arnold? And that Yarborough could see Arnold dive to the ground from his location at street level east on Elm St with the retaining wall in the way? And also that Arnold heard "several other shots" after hitting the dirt following a shot from Badge Man at Zf-315? BTW, these are simple, yes or no questions. Tim

If, according to Bill, Groden believes BDM was seen still standing in Moorman at Zf-315 in the purported Arnold/BDM location, and that he hadn't "moved," as Groden said to me, how can it have been Arnold "moving to his left after the kill shot" when he had supposedly "hit the dirt?" Which part is "consistent with the movement witnessed by Yarborough and reported by Arnold," the part when he "hit the dirt" or the part when he was "moving to his left"? Did he crawl to his left or to the camera's left? T.C.

The third possibility is that it isn't a person seen at the corner of the wall in Moorman. As for the above statement regarding Groden's position, it seems to imply that he believes BDM and Arnold to be one and the same. I'm not sure if Bill really intends to be making that claim. When I asked Groden what he thought happened to BDM between Willis and Moorman, he succinctly replied: "He moved." T.C.

Just to clarify, you have to press the QUOTE button first, to select the post (the QUOTE button will light up), before pressing REPLY. John is correct; you do not have to hit the "Quote" button at all. Just hit "Reply" and the post being addressed will already be there. As long as you don't remove the quote brackets, the quoted post will appear in its own box. The newly posted text must be typed outside of those brackets. Ron is of course correct that if you shorten the quoted segment to the germaine portion, the post will be more succinct and effective. T.C.

Regarding your post #32 in this thread, thanks for posting the graphic with the elevated-and-tilted perspective of the grassy knoll, wooden fence, concrete wall, and the assumed people, etc, so we can see how everything "fits together." It would be helpful to see a wider view of the Moorman Photo that includes the three men on the steps. Given Arnold's proposed location (Bill has him a foot or two north of where Jack has him), he and the men on the steps would be relatively equidistant to Moorman's location, meaning that their sizes should be roughly the same. Here's the field of view that would allow a comparison of Gordon Arnold's size relative to other human beings in the photo: T.C.

Are the simulation stand-ins proportional to scale with the Badge Man, Gordon Arnold and Hard Hat images? What is there to make of the study showing that Badge Man is much smaller than the humans known to be present in Moorman, such as Zapruder, Sitzman and Hudson? Is there an overlay which shows Badge Man's size compared with the known humans shown in Moorman. Something that would demonstrate what the following photo crudely attempts? How could Gary Mack participate in a study that concluded, without caveat, that for Badge Man to be proportional, he would have to be 40' behind the fence? T.C.

The relative scale to other people in the photo is anything but "immaterial." If, in comparison with an approximately 6' tall Emmett Hudson, Badge Man can be seen to be less than 3' tall, that would be material. Rather than compare hypothetical people to other hypothetical people, I've simply requested that the hypothetical people be shown in comparison with established human images in the photo, such as Zapruder, Sitzman or Hudson. Obviously, no one need respond who agrees with Jack's statement that "the relative scale to other people in the photo is immaterial." Note also that Turner's simulation shows the Gordon Arnold figure partially revealed to the left of the retaining wall, in contrast to the Moorman Photo. I have no use for undertaking a study of whether or not Zapruder, Sitzman, Hudson and the other two unidentified men on the steps are authentic humans. I am familiar with the film alterationists' argument. Jack himself has argued about why one would bother studying images in fake films and photographs. Apparently Jack doesn't apply that to Moorman's Badge Man, Hard Hat Man and Gordon Arnold, although a cavalier dismissal of the relevance of scale to other humans is considered appropriate. Go figure.... I don't deserve to be personally attacked because I don't keep track of Jack White's decades of petty squabbles. So as not to be remiss in the future, perhaps he could simply name the "gang of four." T.C.

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Let's put an end to the NONSENSE such as the Magic Bullet show. Look at the evidence and judge for yourself!I thought the gang of four would be all over this by now, showing their recreations behind the fence with 18-foot ladders forty feet behind the fence, as they claim. Show us your pictures, please. I'm not seeking to promote any "NONSENSE" here, don't know to whom the "gang of four" refers, and always "judge" for myself. Nevertheless, I find Jack's exhibit to be unresponsive in that it doesn't demonstrate the relative scale in relation to other humans seen in the Moorman Photo. A non-polemical response would involve posting an unretouched Moorman Photo with the figures of the humans outlined. Here's a crude example of the exercise I'm suggesting: T.C.

I just watched the Magic Bullet program on the Discovery Channel, again, and noticed the study of Badge Man which demonstrated that proportionally, he is either very small or located very far back into the parking lot. The program said that for Badge Man to have been right up against the fence, he would only have been 2.8' tall. For him to be a 6' man, he would have to have been 40' back in the parking lot and elevated to a height of 25' ("standing on a ladder" is how the program expressed it). How could Gary Mack have been a participant in that study and continue to believe that the photo image is of an actual shooter? T.C.

The question I found a bit tricky was: "From the time Kennedy was shot, America was effectively without a president for around how many hours?" The programs answer was two hours, obviously in consideration of the time of LBJ taking the oath of office. But a constitutional scholar, considering the word "effectively," would have answered that there is no interregnum. In the abstract, LBJ was president from the moment of JFK's death. Bobby Kennedy made this point himself when he informed Johnson that there was no need to hold up Air Force One in Dallas waiting for Judge Sarah Hughes. T.C.

I've always been troubled by Hawkins' role in the Bay of Pigs. It doesn't make sense. Here's a paragraph from something I wrote years ago: Kennedy never gave up on his prohibition of American military forces. The president was therefore strongly influenced by a telegram he received from Col. Jack Hawkins, who, after inspecting the Cuban exile force, wrote that they "do not expect help from the U.S. armed forces."[1] Ken O'Donnell, the president's Chief of Staff, recalled that the colonel's report "glowed with approval, and that Kennedy told him it was "this impressive message . . . that finally prompted him to give the go-ahead."[2] Interestingly, Hawkins himself recorded that after 35 years of silence, with the declassification of his information, he had quite a different story to tell. He claims that he and the Chief of the Cuba Project went to the CIA's Richard Bissell, "to attempt to dissuade him from continuing with the operation." He claims their motive was that they "did not want to be parties to the disaster [they] believed lay ahead." Hawkins' appraisal was that "it had become obvious that the military requirements for a successful operation and the President's insistence on plausible deniability were in irreconcilable conflict." Nowhere in his recent article does Col. Hawkins seek to address the discrepancy between the glowing telegram to the president and his warning to the Deputy Director for Plans of the CIA. The contradictory versions of people such as Hawkins, who were responsible for the information upon which Kennedy had to rely, are indicative of the kind of reality in which decisionmakers find themselves when trying to sift through the morass of constructions within constructions.[3] 1. Michael Beschloss, 1991, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 114. 2. O'Donnell, Powers & McCarthy, 1970, Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 272. 3. Jack Hawkins, "Classified Disaster: The Bay of Pigs Operation was Doomed by Presidential Indecisiveness and Lack of Commitment," National Review, (December 31, 1996, v48 n25), 36(3). T.C.