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William Wallace

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  1. Here's an impromtu reply about "the final phase" by Jeff Nyquist from some questions posed by a member of another forum that some of you may find interesting: __ http://www.eoffshore.com/tfp.htm Historical examples of our current situation from The Final Phase forum I [JR Nyquist] have written a number of things on this forum to update readers on my current thinking. I will cut and paste as follows in case you missed it: We mustn't think that the Golitsyn methodology is always right. Clearly, reality is much too complex to be satisfactorily comprehended by Golitsyn, by Golitsyn's critics in the mainstream, or by five other theories all thrown together. People don't realize at all, that I come at the Golitsyn material from a skeptical point of view. I totally disbelieved the man at the outset, when I read his book in 1984. Then, in 1987 I was reading Jan Sejna's book and was suddenly struck by the similarities in the given descriptions of the Soviet long range strategy. This caused me to reread Golitsyn. I then went through the literature on strategic deception and disinformation carefuly. I read the history of Operation Trust under Lenin and Dzerzhinsky (an earlier "fake" collapse of communism known as the New Economic Policy or NEP) and I concluded that large-scale deceptions were workable. I then looked at U.S. defense intellectuals and began discussing Russian history with them. Their reactions were of interest. They simply dismissed the idea of Soviet strategic deception with prejudice, without a second thought. The Soviets never really deceive anyone, at least not any more. This was the red flag that got me going. How are the defense intellectuals of a country -- liberal and conservative -- conditioned to dismiss a possible line of deception when that line has, historically, been successful in the past? This brought me to what is called "the sociology of knowledge." That is, how social conditioning prevents the acknowledgement of certain facts. There are natural tendencies to blindness due to cultural peculiarities. If these are reinforced by enemy disinformation, propaganda, influence operations, etc., then you have a kind of "perceptions management" taking place. You read the whole history of the Stalin period and the mainstream press in the West didn't understand what was happening. Well, we now know that leading journalists tasked with covering the Soviet Union were Soviet agents -- like Walter Duranty. Meanwhile, inside the U.S. there were others, like I.F. Stone who covered for Moscow. Our perceptions of the Stalin Constitution, our alliance with "Uncle Joe" who "dissoved the Commintern" were shaped by an enemy playing the role of ally. When the Cold War began many were slow to accept reality. Anti-communism was "hysteria" and Joseph McCarthy was on a "witch hunt." And just as Uncle Joe's cover was blown by the Berlin crisis and the Korean War, Khrushchev emerged to take the wind out of the West's sails by admitting Stalin's evil and outlining a new, "kinder gentler" Soviet Union. The Russian leaders are always reinventing themselves. The pattern is clear. You can see this from any brief snapshot of Soviet history, taken from any decade; the East-West game has a character all its own. Just as a dog or a cat has a unique character, the Russian communists have a unique character. And once you get to know this character you know what to expect. You don't miss the forest for the trees. You look at Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin, etc. and after studying the many devils in the detail you realize that it is, indeed, a case of "New Lies for Old." They can call Golitsyn a clown because of the 6 percent he got wrong, but how does one account for the 94 percent he got right? So you take a general understanding of Soviet history, of Russian character and method, and you put it together with Golitysn's methodology and you look at what is happening in the War on Terror. You read books, magazines and newspapers. Pretty soon you are disturbed to find a number of striking linkages between al Qaeda and Russians like Victor Bout. You find linkages between al Qaeda's No. 2 man and China, Bulgaria, the Russian FSB; so you scratch your head and look back at Golitsyn's methology; then you look into the Chechen thing and find scholars cautiously noting Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev's GRU background (and his work as a Soviet paratrooper), and Chechen President Dudayev's work as a Soviet bomber commander who carpet-bombed Afghan Muslims prior to "getting religion" and leading the Chechen's to liberty then dying mysteriously (even though his death has not been publicly established). Even the scholars rub their eyes and admit the whole thing has the character of a classic KGB provocation. It really is a puzzle and you cannot figure it out. Then you stop cold upon reading Yossef Bodansky's claim that Osama bin Laden has Russian nukes purchased through Chechnya. You look back at Golitsyn once more. The old man has to be smiling now. How is one to explain so many bizarre linkages between the terrorists and the "former" communist bloc? It's just too many linkages, and its far too convenient that Russian nuclear warheads end up being used against the United States. (And THAT is precisely what all this information is readying us to accept). Everything fits together. And then I have the personal recollection of standing alone with a Russian GRU defector who tells me, years before the Twin Towers came crashing down, that if I ever hear that Arab terrorists have attacked America with nuclear weapons that I shouldn't believe it. The attack would be from Russia. None of this is proof, to be sure. But it is powerfully suggestive, and deserves much more attention than it has received to date. The most interesting item in all of this is the TOTAL lack of curiosity on the part of our leaders and intellectuals about this subject, about the terror-East Europen linkages and the fraudulent changes in Eastern Europe and Golitsyn's warnings and Sejna's warnings and Suvorov's warnings. It is not that our intellectuals and leaders don't know about the linkages I write of. They don't want to know. They don't want to consider. Their minds are shut, not to be confused by facts. And here is where I am left blinking in unbelief. The next question is: Did I miss something? At least this subject should be discussed. It should be argued. But there is no argument. There is only the poor "discredited" defector with his 94 percent predictive accuracy and the whole CIA/intelligence oligarchy standing around like grade schoolers with their fingers in their ears. I'm psychologist enough to know groupthink when I see it. I can recognize pathological denial within the blessed circle because I'm standing outside the circle. I'm not caught in the spell. I don't have a dog in this fight. And so I know when I'm seeing something significant, something BIG, something that gives the whole game away (and not the Russian game, but the American game -- the self-deception game). The rot in our society that I have previously described is not simply moral rot, or bureaucratic rot. It is also intellectual rot. To deny a decline in intellectual integrity in our day amounts to snoring. I happen to have Laurie Mylroie's new book in front of me, "Bush Vs. the Beltway." She writes something that I've heard from Washington insiders before. A Middle East expert told Mylroie, "Everyone must do what he must do for his career." According to Mylroie this signifies the fact that "behavior that was very self-serving became acceptable, irrespective of its possible implications for the country's security." Consider the logic of the careerist. If he is not paid well to occupy a post as advisor or analyst, then he is NOTHING. His intellectual work amounts to NOTHING. This logic ends by standing everything on its head because the "loser," by definition, is someone who doesn't have a good job with the CIA or DIA or some Ivy league university. I suppose these same individuals would have looked down on Einstein while he was a patent clerk. There is only one thing to say about such people and their attitude: Any intellectual who puts career ahead of truth, who judges propositions on the scales of money and status, is not a serious person but a clown whose ideas are of no account. They might draw a six figure salary and attend the most fashionable parties. But a well-paid, stylish clown is still a clown. Without morale courage, without intellectual integrity, the only constructive possibility for such a life is manual labor under someone else's direction, or proof-reading someone else's manuscript. Any other course is a train wreck with floppy shoes and spiked orange hair. The same can be said for journalists in the media, for academics and researchers. If they imagine there is a blessed circle of light and truth that one enters upon being employed by prestigious media organizations, then they have confused their own personal advancement with wisdom. With regard to this error, the resulting blindness is near-total when it comes to distinguishing the important from the trivial, the significant from the popular. And here we find the richest soil, the most wonderful insights, because a society's blind spots harbor the Great Secret of where that society is headed -- just as the blind spots of an individual help us to understand the fate of that individual. The mainstream pundits of our day cannot explain why Russia should continue to violate arms control agreements, align with China, send secret support to Saddam, give nuclear technology to Iran, criticize U.S. policy, encourage U.S. allies to an independent course, etc. The political algebra here is simple. It is basic. It is easy to read if one is familiar with history. I've been waiting for somebody to explain what is wrong with my algebra. So far, the explanation has not been forthcoming. Perhaps what reinforces me more than anything is the testimony of Poles, Russians, Czechs, Romanians and Hungarians on the very real conditions that obtain in the "former" communist countries. To be sure, our every paranoid imagining is not gospel. But there is something to this "final phase" business. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question for JR I located the article in question since you gave me the time frame. This does make it easier for me. Please understand, I have archives at Newsmax, WorldNetDaily, Financial Sense, Sierra Times and my own Web site. I have written about 400 internet articles and it takes me a half hour just to go through the WorldNetDaily archive. You may not understand what a person goes through when they write and carry on extensive correspondence. I receive 1000 emails every 3 to 4 days. I write 10 to 30 email replies a day. I post long replies like this one on the forum weekly, I've written 19 columns, a feature article for a Brazilian publication, approximately 900 email replies (some of them lengthy) and three essays for the seminar since I wrote "Waiting for the Big One." Add to this the mental burden of reading hundreds of emails, a dozen books and hundreds of articles since last September and you will understand how things might run together in my mind. For those with lighter mental loads, remembering is doubtless easier -- I don't think its an illness or any dishonesty or evasion on my part. So please excuse my slowness. Also, I am sometimes short on patience when baffling questions are asked and I cannot immediately remember what is referred to. I reread my article "Waiting for the Big One" and note, with care, that I did not say bin Laden has nukes, but that Yossef Bodansky alleges that bin Laden has nukes, and bin Laden also says this. My own skepticism follows from the following: a Russian defector said to me on Nov. 23, 1998, when we were standing outside a television station in Washington, D.C. "If you ever hear that Arab terrorists have attacked an American city with nuclear weapons, don't believe it." "Why not?" I asked. "Because it will be my people, Spetsnaz, Russia." It may be that bin Laden has nukes. It may be that my Russian friend has understood, much better than anyone in the West, what the Russian General Staff means by "diversionary operations." In the middle of THIS month Russia will be conducting a nuclear war exercise that simulates a mass nuclear strike against America. One might ask why Moscow would do this, especially as America is waiting for the "other" al Qaeda shoe to drop. Are the basic concepts of military strategy so arcane, so unthinkable, that Americans are incapable of lifting their heads from the shelves of their overstocked stores long enough to notice something dangerous in the combination before us? I will conclude my answer to you with a quote from Russian GRU defector Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun). "[Widespread terrorist and sabotage operations in advance of World War III] are known officially in the GRU as the 'preparatory period,' and unofficially as the 'overture.' The overture is a series of large and small operations the purpose of which is, before actual military operations begin, to weaken the enemy's morale, create an atmosphere of suspicion, fear and uncertainty, and divert the attention of the enemy's armies and police forces to a huge number of different targets, each of which may be the object of the next attack. "The overture is carried out by agents of the secret services of the Soviet satellite countries and by mercenaries recruited by intermediaries. The principal method employed at this stage is 'gray terror,' that is, a kind of terror which is not conducted in the name of the Soviet Union. The Soviet secret services do not at this stage leave their visiting cards, or leave other people's cards. The terror is carried out in the name of already existing extremist groups not connected in any way with the Soviet Union, or in the name of fictitious organizations."
  2. Here are some some other views on cynicism - few hold it to be a virtue: The cynic is one who never sees a good quality in a man, and never fails to see a bad one. He is the human owl, vigilant in darkness and blind to light, mousing for vermin, and never seeing noble game. - Henry Ward Beecher The cynic never grows up, but commits intellectual suicide. – Dean Charles R. Brown Cynicism is the humor of hatred. – Sir Herbert Beerbohm Cynicism is the intellectual cripple's substitute for intelligence. – Russell Lynes Cynicism is the only form in which base souls approach honesty – Evil Nietzche It takes a clever man to turn cynic and a wise man to be clever enough not to. – Fannie Hurst A cynic is a man who, when he smells flowers, looks around for a coffin. - H.L. Mencken The only deadly sin I know is cynicism. – Henry Lewis Stimson Cynicism is humor in ill health. H.G. Wells What is a cynic? A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. Oscar Wilde
  3. Robert, Thanks for the plug (although I didn't intend for this information it to be released to the general public prematurely, while it's still in development....now, alas, I will have to kill you): Special Edition on James Angleton at http://www.TheFinalPhase.com I am flattered that you should deem to be highly flattered. __ You know, when we think we know everything so much that it leads us to attempt to ridicule others because they are so unwashed in intellect and understanding, we become very wise fools indeed. In thinking of the thinking of the Tom Mangold's and others in this world who so smugly assume they hold the keys to truth in their intellect pockets, I've been formulating a fitting quote that might describe this mindset, although it, too, is not quite fully developed yet: Cynicism is the bastard offspring of distortion and dishonesty. It is intellectual bigotry. It absorbs the mind in black wherein light is smothered and dies. __ For those able to read without bias, I invite you to read these two pieces: "The Undead Again," by J.R. Nyquist: http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/g.../2005/1223.html "Drugs, Russia & Terrorism," by Dr. Joseph D. Douglass: http://www.thefinalphase.com/DouglassDrugs...a&Terrorism.htm p.s. I've done a spelt-check to ensure intellectual creditibility.
  4. John (or anyone), Has there been any FOIA submitted of late to try getting access to Cram's "History of the Counterintelligence Staff 1954-1974"? Is there any link avaliable to "Of Moles and Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Literature." Happy New Year to all! WW
  5. Robert, I'll get back to your response as time permits, but this is my brief reply for now: First of all, I am defending someone who I believe is being - and has been - sorely misunderstood and mischaracterized. Fairness and open-mindedness is my overriding point. The vast majority of this thread and the majority of writings in the public on this matter damn Angleton. From what I have read (the vast majority of it negative) on Angleton, and from my understanding of the dialectics of thought behind the Soviet Union's intelligence/deception operations, I have come to some interim conclusions about him that are instinctual in part, discernment in part, and also based on an understanding of human nature as manifested in legal proceedings wherein recountings from memory and impression - often affected by bias and perception - take place which can be so wrong, so far from the truth, even when the testimony given is honestly averred. So, in this sense and context of the thread, I am not "objective." I'm trying to provide counter possibilities to be put into the mix. However, even though I'm not "objective" in this meaning, I believe my actual approach to assessing J.A. in my own pursuit of the truth is objective. (You will notice how I assert things here; I'm not declaring points as absolute truth, which is a substantive difference than other posts here.) Everyone deserves a fair hearing; I don't think Angleton ever got one, yet the experts of the truth abound. WW
  6. 9 December 2005 Happy Birthday, James Angleton! If he could avail himself to civil procedure I wonder if he would file suit for libel. Probably something he would not do even if he could. Alas, dead men tell no tales (nor are they able to defend themselves). History has been written....but not by the infallible. Some things we're never know. These facts alone should guard against the "absolutes" of others and are essential elements behind the concept behind benefit of doubt. One thing history is certainly right about - since it didn't happen - Angleton never received due process. He was forced to retire for his "incompetence," so adjudges astute, wise men. WW
  7. p.s. "...although Epstein has attempted to distance himself from Angleton in recent years." In December 2004, Epstein wrote a piece on his website that would seem to indicate he has aligned himself with Angelton even more: "Was Angleton Right After All?" http://edjayepstein.blogspot.com/2004_12_0...in_archive.html and Moreover, his views are clarified further in a similarly titled Wall Street Journal piece: "Was Angleton Right?" http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/Angletonrightr.htm WW
  8. Objectivity is Key Although Winks did not mention it - as it is an obvious essential ingredient in any honest examination - objectivity must be the central standard. Since "Cram was told that the CIA wanted a study done of Angleton's reign from 1954 to 1974. 'Find out what in hell happened. What were these guys doing,'" the starting point appears to have begun with an end point in mind. John Hart, in his HSCA testimony, is representative of the official tack the CIA was using post-Angleton to describe how "screwed-up" Angleton and his "fundamentalists" were. Hart's testimony is revealed for the kind of history distortion it was by Pete Bagley in his executive session testimony later on in the HSCA hearings: VII. Testimony of the Deputy Chief, S.B. Division Before the HSCA, November 16, 1978 - Executive Session: Thursday, November 16, 1978 (linked here under "Oswald in the Soviet Union: An Investigation of Yuri Nosenko" http://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsc...12/contents.htm and linked here in pdf file: http://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsc...YuriNosenko.pdf Volumes of pages do not necessarily equate to accuracy or truth. Although the amount and material cited seems quite impressive, it is not the essence of what Winks was talking about nor described. I have not read what you referenced (in bold below), but I sense something about it which is not unique amongst Angleton's detractors: a reverse kind of McCarthyism whereby anyone who sides with Angleton or subscribes to his beliefs and concerns about Soviet deception and capabilities is somehow "rightwing," in a clearly pejoritive sense. "Rightwing" and "paranoid" are two of the favorite silencers used by Angleton detractors. (Of course, there is also the term "fundamentalist" which is interchangeably used against those (such as Bagley) who knew Angleton the best professionally, knew him the closest personally, and who can not recognize the monster as described by historical "researchers." This ties into the "Jesus" in J.A.'s name, which became a tool of ridicule to denote that the "fundamentalists" who supported him - his "disciples" - were somehow blind, unthinking, followers of the cult of Angleton. Mangold especially uses this method of smear and psychological intimidation throughout Cold Warrior - not a work of objectivity in the least.) Cram took the assignment and was given access to all CIA documents on covert operations. The study entitled History of the Counterintelligence Staff 1954-1974, took six years to complete. As David Wise points out in his book Molehunt (1992): "When Cram finally finished it in 1981... he had produced twelve legal-sized volumes, each three hundred to four hundred pages. Cram's approximately four-thousand-page study has never been declassified. It remains locked in the CIA's vaults." Cram continued to do research for the CIA on counterintelligence matters. In 1993 he completed a study carried out on behalf of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). Of Moles and Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Literature. This document was declassified in 2003. This document castigates those writers such as Joe Trento, Edward Epstein and Gus Russo who Angleton used to spread disinformation about the CIA. This included stories that the Soviets had a mole within the higher echelons of the CIA and that the KGB/Castro was behind the assassination of JFK. Angleton’s disinformation campaign has been eagerly grasped by right-wingers such as Tim Gratz (I am not describing Trento, Epstein and Russo as right-wingers for it is possible that they really believed Angleton’s stories at the time – although Epstein has attempted to distance himself from Angleton in recent years). Cram points out that David Martin (Wilderness of Mirrors), David Wise (Molehunt) and Tom Mangold (Cold War Warrior) got it right about Angleton. Casting aspersions on those who believe Angleton had many things right - no one can have everything right - is not healthful or helpful. "Angleton's disinformation campaign has been eagerly grasped by right-wingers such as Tim Gratz..." This is not the path to finding out the truth of a matter. The truth is this: none of us here posting commentary and none of the researchers who have done historical accounts of James Angelton, can assert with authority that they know the whole truth about Angleton. However, it would seem to me that those closest to the truth about the man would be those who were closest to him and those writers who actually interviewed him (such as Epstein) and who also considered and weighed information against him. How many hours of interview with Angleton did Cram conduct? Zero, I would guess. If so, why? Angleton was still alive then. If Angleton believed an honest recounting was underway at CIA by his replacement, Kalaris, I would think he would welcome the opportunity and make himself available. The fact that J.A. was still alive then, and that Cram's recounting of finding "out what in hell happened. What were these guys doing" did not include interviews of "the accused," indicates to me a strong possibility that the "recounting" very well may have been more of a "revision" instead. (Note, too, that Mangold waits until Angleton is dead to begin his book which commenced a short while afterward.) The more an historical account attempts to ascribe motive to a subject figure - without first having some sort of in-depth interview or conversation with that figure - the more likely it is mere conjecture and opinion of the writing/researcher along with all the human bias that humans are capable of. Although I am not able to discount Cram's research (as I haven't read it), based on its description, I would have to initially question its evidentiary value in weighing what the truth might be about James Angleton. A ton of one-sidedness is usually nothing more than lopsidedness and serving as counterfeit truth with little weight (if any). WW
  9. Tim, This is my first posted comment here. I was attracted to this forum for the coverage of Nosenko, Bagley, et. al. Your overall notion I believe is spot on. There is a majority of those who know the topic of Angleton who speak with such certainty about how "paranoid" J.A. was and, as can be found in such libelous "research" and writings by Tom Mangold in Cold Warrior, how "wrong" he was. The vast majority of material written about J.A. has been done by those who never interviewed the man, had no notion of the factual information surrounding various highlighted cases that "prove" J.A.'s errors, are slanted by the very same group-think mentality which branded J.A.'s form of understanding as "sick think." Here is something for anyone who wants to HONESTLY investigate an historical figure such as J.A.: (From The Literary Spy: The Ultimate Source for Quotations on Espionage & Intelligence, compiled and annotated by Charles E. Lathrop, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2004.) “The story of James Angleton as chief of Counter-Intelligence cannot be told now; at least not well, and perhaps never . . . . To tell the story the historian would need to have unfettered access to the archives of the British, French, Italian, Israeli, and Russian intelligence services, as well as the American and, quite probably, others. No such historian will ever exist. The scholar lacks access, assets, penetrations, sources, contacts – the entire array of resources by which a professional intelligence officer may, after much time, great expenditure of money, and with the support of his government, obtain an intelligence story. Angleton both tests and proves Sherman Kent’s dictum: while much can be learned that is presumed to be irretrievable, one cannot learn enough to tell in the end precisely how interesting, how significant, how true what one does know may be.” “Robin W. Winks on the intelligence historian’s dilemma in Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939 – 1961 (1978). Angleton was CIA’s CI chief from 1954 to 1974. Of intelligence history more generally, Winks says, ‘If the truth were known hundreds of books now on the shelves would be reclassified from history to fiction. But the truth is not known.’” (Page 280) WW
  10. Retired US Army, SFC (79-00). Currently using GI Bill as a student with American Military University (under the American Public University System). Enrolled in the BA program for Intel Studies (w/ concentration in Intel Analysis); am 51; live in Hawaii; and am especially interested in the Nosenko matter and that period of Intel history.
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