CHAPTER EIGHT
THE FLAWED 1974 DECISION OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ON LIDDY’S APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION
The assassination of President Kennedy in 1963 and the plot to destroy President Nixon in 1972 had common elements. These included some of the same CIA people being involved in both, a coalition of the CIA and Miliary Intelligence, and flawed investigations into what took place. Historian Peter Dale Scott in an interview in The Kennedy Beacon of January 23, 2024, declared, “The truth is, we’ve been living with “fake facts” ever since the Warren Report. The Warren Report is so phony that even some of the men who drafted it, and signed it, didn’t believe it! Some were quite vocal about it. They were signing a fake document. To believe the Warren Report you have to believe that one bullet was able to cause seven wounds in two different people, hit a bone, and then fall unscathed onto a stretcher. It’s all in the report. And if you believe that, you’re nuts.”
The same is true that we have been living with crucial “fake facts” in the Watergate case in the Appeals Court decision of November 1974, almost two years after the trial took place. The Court’s decision with its lies and misrepresentations about me is the primary exhibit of how the role of the CIA escaped being exposed during the multi-investigations into the Watergate case. By declaring that Hunt called me from the Watergate burglar’s lookout post in room 723 of the Howard John Moter Hotel after the five burglars were arrested, Prosecutor Silbert, Judge Sirica and the Court of Appeals foreclosed any possible inquiry that Hunt called someone else, which is what he did – CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston, one of the three principal conspirators.
It is ludicrous to believe that the CIA conspirators would have included me, an associate attorney in a labor law firm, as a conspirator in their conspiracy to destroy President Nixon. What they did was to move me around like a piece on a chessboard without me be aware of it to end up as I did to be the attorney Hunt called from his White House office at 3:05 a.m. to be counsel in the case.
Fortunately, the 1973 public hearings of the Senate Watergate Committee supplemented by evidence from other sources such as the Nixon Oval Office tapes reveal the gross deficiencies of the Appeals Court’s decision. Key witnesses that were never called to testify at the 1973 trial subsequently provided crucial testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee that filled in the shortcomings of the Appeals Court opinion.
Judge Sirica at the trial again became the prosecutor just as he did in the early days of the case.
The Appeals Court’s decision here is followed by my analysis and commentary. In reading the court opinion bear in mind that the intention of Henry Petersen, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division in the U.S. Department of Justice, and Prosecutor Silbert was to keep the investigation confined solely to the burglary of the DNC. They did not want it to extend further because it might implicate higher-ups in the White House or in CREEP. They never were aware that the CIA clandestinely was running the cover-up and that their actions meant that any investigation into the role of the CIA in Watergate was foreclosed. This strategy is explained in this Oval Office tape of October 20, 1972, the day after I testified before the grand jury.
The following is from a discussion between President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman:
Haldeman: Another thing I didn’t know that [John] Mitchell told me is that John Dean…went to [Henry] Petersen and laid out the whole scenario to him of what actually happened, who was involved and where it all fit. Now, on the basis of that, Petersen is working with that knowledge, directing the investigation along the channels that will not produce the kind of answers we don’t want produced. Petersen also feels that the fact that there were some lines in this case that ran to the White House is very beneficial because it has slowed them down in pursuing things, because all of them are of the view that they don’t want to indict the White House, they only want to indict the -- they want to tighten up that case on the criminal act and limit it to that to the degree that they can….
Here is the Appeals Court decision followed by my analysis and commentary.
United States of America v. George Gordon Liddy, A/k/a George F. Leonard, Appellant, 509 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 509 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1974) Argued June 14, 1974. Decided Nov. 8, 1974
Peter L. Maroulis, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., for appellant. Thomas A. Kennelly, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appellant.
Sidney M. Glazer, Asst. Sp. Prosecutor, for appellee. Leon Jaworski, Sp. Prosecutor, Philip A. Lacovara, Counsel for the Sp. Prosecutor, Richard D. Weinberg and Robert L. Palmer, Asst. Counsel to the Sp. Prosecutor, were on the brief for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT, McGOWAN, LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON, MacKINNON and WILKEY, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Liddy seeks reversal of his conviction on charges relating to the burglary and wiretapping of the offices of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate apartment-office building complex in the early morning hours of Saturday, June 17, 1972. Appellant was named in six counts of an eight count indictment returned against seven defendants1 on September 15, 1972. On January 8, 1973, jury selection began before then Chief Judge John J. Sirica of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Shortly after the trial commenced, five defendants changed their pleas to guilty.2 On January 30, 1973, the remaining defendants, appellant Liddy and James W. McCord, Jr., were found guilty by the jury. Appellant was convicted of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (count 1), burglary in violation of 22 D.C.Code § 1801(b) (counts 2 and 3), and unlawful endeavor to intercept oral and wire communications and interception of communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (a) (counts 4, 5, and 8). The sentences imposed by Judge Sirica on Liddy on March 23, 1973, are set forth in the margin.3
Appellant presents five grounds for reversal: (1) The trial judge erred in conducting voir dire by refusing to engage in individual questioning of each venireman who had been exposed to pretrial publicity. (2) The trial judge erred in reading to the jury the testimony of a government witness and related bench conferences taken outside of the jury's presence. (3) Instructions improperly allowed the jury to consider the time and circumstances under which appellant retained an attorney as bearing on his state of mind. (4) The trial judge erred in allowing testimony regarding defendant's statement that he lost his job for failure to cooperate with the FBI. (5) Appellant was denied his right to cross-examine a government witness by the trial judge's adherence to an order of this court prohibiting the introduction into evidence of the contents of illegally intercepted wire communications. We find no reversible error, and affirm.
During a three-week jury trial the Government introduced extensive evidence concerning the activities of defendants Hunt, Liddy, and McCord regarding their efforts to secure political intelligence from the headquarters of various Democratic presidential candidates and the offices of the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The presentation focused on the period of May and June, 1972, during which the conspiracy was alleged to have been formed and the acts of burglary and violations of the wiretapping laws took place.
We summarize the evidence pertaining to the involvement of appellant Liddy. In late 1971 Liddy was hired by the Committee for the Reelection of the President (CRP) to serve as general counsel. Later, in January 1972, he agreed to organize an intelligence gathering operation to protect the campaign from violence and disruptions. In March, 1972, he moved from CRP down a flight of stairs to become counsel for the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President, although he continued his prior intelligence gathering assignment.
The Government presented several lines of evidence connecting Liddy with the five defendants apprehended in the DNC offices on June 17, 1972--McCord, and four residents of the Miami area, Barker, Martinez, Gonzalez, and Sturgis. First, there was the testimony of Hugh Sloan, treasurer of the finance committee. In April 1972, Sloan consulted Liddy regarding possible problems in accepting four checks drawn on a foreign (Mexican) bank, payable to and endorsed by one Manuel Ogarrio. The two agreed that the best way to handle these checks was to convert them into cash, and Liddy undertook to do this with the aid of friends around the country. The Government established that these Mexican checks, and also a check payable to and endorsed by a member of the finance committee totaling $114,000, were deposited in a Miami bank account by defendants Barker and Martinez on April 20, 1972, and that the bulk of the funds were withdrawn within two weeks by Barker. Liddy later returned $111,500 in $100 bills to Sloan.
Sloan further testified that he turned over to Liddy a total of $199,000 in cash, primarily in $100 bills. Bills of that denomination were given by Liddy to McCord, who was in charge of security for CRP and the finance committee, and later were found, in sequence, on McCord and the four other defendants apprehended in the DNC offices on June 17. The hundred dollar bills found on those men and in their hotel rooms were traced to Barker's Miami bank account.
In addition to the use of the checks and the hundred dollar bills, the Government introduced telephone company and hotel records. The telephone slips showed calls from Liddy to Barker placed just prior to trips made by the four Miami residents to Washington in May and June, 1972. The guest records indicated that six of the defendants, using aliases, checked in together at a Washington hotel on May 22, 1972, and rented rooms together at the Watergate Hotel until May 29, 1972.
Thomas Gregory, a college student, gave evidence tying Liddy to Hunt and other defendants in connection with plans to enter the offices used by Senator McGovern in his campaign to secure the Democratic Presidential nomination. Gregory had been hired by Hunt in early 1972 to infiltrate Senator Muskie's headquarters and pass information to Hunt. In April, Hunt directed Gregory to switch to McGovern headquarters and continue his activities there. Gregory testified to meeting Liddy, along with Hunt, and driving around while Liddy questioned Gregory about the layout of the McGovern offices. They then proceeded to McGovern headquarters at approximately 2:00 a.m. where they found the back entrance locked and the front entrance too well lighted. Gregory met Liddy again on May 22, along with Hunt, McCord, Gonzalez, Sturgis, and two other men, at the hotel where six of the defendants had recently checked in. In Liddy's presence, Gonzalez, a locksmith, asked Gregory, McCord, and Hunt about the locks on the doors at the McGovern headquarters.
The operation for monitoring of the conversations on the intercepted DNC telephones was described by Alfred Baldwin, a former FBI agent who had been hired by McCord. McCord instructed Baldwin on the operation of the equipment he had assembled in room 419 of the Howard Johnson Motel located across the street from the DNC offices and requested that he monitor conversations which were political or personal in nature. McCord indicated that the unit was activated whenever the telephone of DNC's executive director, Spencer Oliver, was in use. In order to improve reception, the operation was moved to room 723 of the motel, which looked directly down into DNC headquarters. Through the first half of June, Baldwin estimated that he monitored 200 calls, including conversations of Oliver and his secretary Ida Mae Wells. He testified that on May 26, Hunt and Liddy came to room 419 and McCord then showed them the monitoring equipment. Later, Hunt, Liddy and McCord visited room 723 and used the balcony to survey the DNC offices.
The Arrests and Subsequent Events
When McCord, Barker, Martinez, Gonzalez, and Sturgis were apprehended in the DNC offices in the Watergate complex on June 17, at 2:00 a.m., they had in their possession walkie talkies, burglary tools, documents that had been taken from DNC files, telephone bugging devices, and equipment capable of transmitting voice conversations. Baldwin, who was acting as a lookout from the balcony of room 723, saw two men emerge from an alleyway near the Watergate building shortly after uniformed policemen arrived at the scene. He identified one of the men as Hunt and testified that the other was wearing a suit he recognized as Liddy's. At about 3 a.m. Hunt arrived at room 723 with a walkie talkie and used the telephone to call an attorney, Michael Douglas Caddy.
Caddy's testimony established that about a half hour after this phone call, Hunt visited Caddy's apartment. Caddy then made a series of telephone calls to retain an attorney with more experience in criminal law. Caddy stated that at about 5 a.m. Hunt called Liddy from Caddy's apartment and informed Liddy that an attorney experienced in criminal law matters had been retained. Caddy talked to Liddy and confirmed what Hunt had said. Then Hunt gave Caddy $8500 in cash, one $500 bill and the rest in $100 bills.
At 8:30 a.m., Caddy went to arraignment court where he met Joseph Rafferty, a lawyer with experience in criminal law. They checked with the clerk to see whether the arraignment sheet contained names of five individuals, names that were the aliases then being used by the five men arrested in the Watergate. Shortly thereafter the attorneys went to a police station to confer with the five men. Caddy had met Barker a year previous but had never met any of the others. Caddy had not been contacted by any of these men prior to his appearance at the police station. After the meeting at the police station, Caddy called Hunt at home. A few days later, Liddy directed Caddy by telephone to pay to Mr. Rafferty $2500 of the $8500 he had received.
Later in the morning of Saturday, June 17, Liddy went to the Finance Committee for the Re-election of the President. Hugh Sloan testified that he ran into Liddy in the hall outside his office, at which time--'He was obviously in a hurry. He indicated to me at that point he couldn't stop; he said to the best of my recollection: my boys got caught last night; I made a mistake; I used somebody from here which I said I'd never do. I'm afraid I am going to lose my job.' (Tr. 1452).
Later in the day, Liddy inquired about the Committee's largest shredding machine and was instructed in its operation. He was subsequently seen with a large stack of papers on the floor where the shredder was located. The Government introduced, as further evidence of Liddy's guilty knowledge, testimony of Hunt's employer, Robert Bennett, that on July 2 Liddy told him that he had lost his job at the Committee for failing to cooperate fully with the FBI.
The defense consisted primarily of an attack on the credibility of Gregory and Baldwin and challenges to their identifications of Liddy. Character witnesses and evidence that Liddy cooperated with the FBI in late July were presented. Liddy did not testify.
II. VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION ON PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
The purpose of voir dire examination is to safeguard the right to jury trial which 'guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors.'4 The requirement of impartiality demands that voir dire examination serve as a filter capable of screening out prospective jurors who are unable to lay aside any opinion as to guilt or innocence and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.5 The trial judge, acting under Rule 24(a), Fed. R. Crim. P., is accorded broad discretion to mold the manner and mode of voir dire examination, to fit the demands of the case at hand,6 and provides no basis for reversal unless he abuses his discretion, and there is substantial prejudice to the accused.7
In United States v. Bryant, this court endorsed the recommendation of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press § 3.4(a) (1968) as encapsulating the proper criteria for determining when individual voir dire examination regarding pretrial publicity is required.8 This standard requires individual examination '(w)henever there is believed to be a significant possibility that individual talesmen will be ineligible to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial material.' Whether such a 'significant possibility' exists in a given case depends on such circumstances as the amount and pervasiveness of the publicity, its tone or quality, its proximity to the date of trial, and the nature of the particular case. The totality of the circumstances controls whether the likelihood of prejudice is too great to permit the jurors' avowals of impartiality to be accepted.9 When such a likelihood exists, individual questioning is necessary to provide the trial judge with a basis for determining whether the juror will be able to lay aside any opinion as to guilt or innocence and render a verdict based on the evidence adduced at trial.
Appellant contends that, in light of the extensive pretrial publicity regarding the Watergate incident, such a significant possibility existed with regard to each prospective juror who admitted some prior knowledge of the case. He relies primarily on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Silverthorne v. United States, supra, which reversed a conviction because the trial judge failed to inquire into what each talesman knew about the case in order to assess the impact of the massive pretrial publicity. In that case the quantity, focus, and, most importantly, the inflammatory tone of the publicity created a substantial possibility that the prospective jurors' impartiality might have been undermined.10 All of the sixty-five veniremen in Silverthorne confessed knowledge of the case and thirty percent of those veniremen initially questioned had formed an opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused. 400 F.2d at 639. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, 'under the peculiar and difficult facts of this case' and 'in such an atmosphere,' the trial judge had abused his discretion by not employing individual questions to develop an objective basis for determining each juror's impartiality. 400 F.2d at 639--640. Like Silverthorne, the other cases which appellant relies upon to urge the inadequacy of general assurances of impartiality given by jurors in response to en masse questioning involved extreme circumstances created by pervasive, inflammatory publicity.11
In United States v. Bryant, supra, this court recently approved a voir dire examination procedure involving general question addressed to the veniremen en masse supplemented by individual questioning of those prospective jurors who had formed an opinion as to guilt or innocence or who recalled details of the case. 153 U.S.App.D.C. at 76--77, 471 F.2d at 1044--1045. In Bryant only some of the jurors admitted to having prior knowledge of the case, no juror indicated an opinion as to guilt or innocence, and a few confessed recollection of details. This court concluded that the trial judge's voir dire examination was 'generally in accord with' the ABA recommendation.12 Moreover, this court recognized the countervailing pressure, also present in the instant case, to shorten voir dire in order to reduce exposure of the veniremen, prior to empaneling and sequestration, to publicity generated by the commencement of the jury selection process.13
In the present case, the trial judge used voir dire examination procedures similar to those employed in Bryant--general questions addressed to the entire array, followed by individual questioning of those who responded affirmatively to any of the initial inquiries, and thus raised the possibility they might have formed an opinion on the case. Although the trial judge recognized that the Watergate matter had been publicized extensively,14 he did not abuse his discretion in declining the defendants' request that all the veniremen who had heard anything about the case be examined individually.
The trial judge, after determining that virtually all of the veniremen had some knowledge of the case,15 did grant defendants' request to the limited extent of conducting individual questioning of eight members of the array who had acknowledged exposure to some publicity. This individual questioning indicated that most knew little about the case, few remembered even a single detail, and none had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants.16 The results of the individual examinations thus served to verify prior responses to en masse questioning which indicated that few veniremen had formed an opinion regarding guilt or innocence.17 Under these circumstances, the trial judge acted within his broad discretion in abandoning individual questioning and continuing voir dire on an en masse basis. He complied with the ABA recommendation by examining individually all prospective jurors who indicated an opinion regarding guilt or innocence or who recalled details of the case, for only those veniremen, under the facts of this case, presented a significant possibility of ineligibility.
III. TRIAL JUDGE'S READING OF SLOAN'S TESTIMONY TO THE JURY
Immediately after Hugh Sloan testified that he did not understand the significance of Liddy's hurried statement--'my boys got caught last night'--at the time that it was made, the trial judge excused the jurors and announced that the rest of Sloan's testimony would be heard out of their presence. Following the prosecutor's completion of direct examination, the trial judge propounded 42 additional questions. (Tr. 1460--65). After the jury returned, the prosecutor asked Mr. Sloan when Liddy's June 17 remark came to have meaning to him. Defense counsel objected, and the prosecutor stopped his examination. Defense counsel put no questions on cross-examination and Sloan was excused.
Upon reviewing the record, the trial judge concluded that the jurors should have the benefit of the testimony taken in their absence. Three days after Sloan had completed his testimony, the trial judge informed counsel of his intention to read to the jury the transcript of Sloan's testimony beginning four pages before the jury was excused, continuing through the examination conducted out of the jurors' presence, and concluding with the final questioning of Sloan and a related bench conference which took place after the jury had returned. Prior to presenting the material to the jury, the trial judge read the entire section to counsel, indicating that several of his comments were to be excluded and allowing counsel to state objections to the procedure. The Government said it preferred that the evidence be developed by having the jury hear it from Sloan directly. The trial judge responded: 'No, Mr. Sloan might have a lapse of memory, I don't know. I would rather read it from the record.'18 The Government acquiesced. The trial judge advised both sides that he would permit Sloan to be recalled for further questioning or cross-examination.19
The Government also asked whether the judge intended to read the bench conferences. The judge indicated that he did not 'think they (were) harmful to either side' and explained that 'the jury ought to hear the testimony in sequence.'20 Appellant's counsel objected to the entire proposal on the grounds that it would cause the jurors to place undue emphasis on Sloan's testimony and would undermine his decision not to cross-examine Sloan. He did not object to the inclusion of the bench conferences, however, until after they had been presented to the jury.
After recalling the jurors, the trial judge explained his decision to read the aforementioned testimony and cautioned them not to draw any inferences regarding his views from the procedure.21 Subsequently, after Sloan's testimony was read to the jury, appellant raised objection to the disclosure of the material presented in the bench conferences. The trial judge then instructed the jurors that questions of counsel and arguments at the bench do not constitute evidence.22
Appellant asserts three claims of error with regard to the trial judge's action in reading Sloan's testimony to the jury: (1) The procedure prejudiced the appellant by lending undue emphasis to Sloan's testimony. (2) The disclosure of the bench conferences exposed the jury to inadmissible material prejudicial to appellant. (3) The procedure deprived appellant of his right to confrontation and cross-examination.
The precepts of fair trial and judicial objectivity do not require a judge to be inert. The trial judge is properly governed by the interest of justice and truth, and is not compelled to act as if he were merely presiding at a sporting match. He is not a 'mere moderator.'23 As Justice Frankfurter put it, '(f)ederal judges are not referees at prize-fights but functionaries of justice.' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54, 68 S. Ct. 391, 395, 92 L. Ed. 468 (1948) (dissenting in part). A federal trial judge has inherent authority not only to comment on the evidence adduced by counsel, but also--in appropriate instances--to call or recall and question witnesses.24 He may do this when he believes the additional testimony will be helpful to the jurors in ascertaining the truth and discharging their fact-finding function.25 What is required, however, are reins of restraint, that he not comport himself in such a way as to 'tilt' or oversteer the jury or control their deliberations.26
Applying these general principles to this particular case, we conclude that, although certain problems are presented by the action of the trial judge in reading to the jury from the testimony first taken from Sloan outside the jury's presence, his overall course was neither an abuse of his judicial function nor a denial of fair trial.
In this case we do not have the situation that commonly leads to a claim of judicial excess, wherein the trial judge either creates an appearance of partiality by continued intervention on the side of one of the parties27 or undermines the effective functioning of counsel through repeated interruption of the examination of witnesses.28 Here there was no interjection by the trial judge until he excused the jury at a time when the prosecutor had almost completed his examination. And there was no questioning by defense counsel.
The decision of the trial judge to proceed outside the presence of the jury was announced when Sloan gave testimony that the judge found hard to credit. (Sloan said he had not appreciated at the time the significance of Liddy's 'my boys got caught' statement.) The removal of the jury was a prelude to questioning by the trial judge. The prosecutor completed his direct examination, eliciting that when Sloan initially gave information to the FBI and the prosecutors he was concerned about his liability under the campaign financing law, but was informed that, although no promises could be made, 'common sense' made charges against him unlikely. Then the trial judge put his questions to the witness.
The majority of the questions put by the trial judge to Sloan were a retraverse of subjects covered on direct--the mechanics of the 'laundering' of the Mexican checks; the cash payments to Liddy; the relation between Sloan and the prosecutor. The trial judge went beyond the ground covered in the prosecutor's direct examination in one respect. The judge asked Sloan to testify why the cash payments were made to Liddy. While the prosecutor elicited from Sloan on direct that cash payments had been made to Liddy, he did not inquire as to the purpose of those payments. And so the record as it stood left the jury only with the testimony of a prior witness, Jeb Stuart Magruder, the deputy campaign director of CRP, that substantial sums had been paid to Liddy in cash for the intelligence gathering functions that Magruder had assigned to Liddy, and that he, Magruder, had not known of the plans for wiretapping and burglary. This left the jury with the prosecutor's approach that Liddy was the mastermind of both the intercept plan and the unlawful entry to implement it. The judge acted well within his discretion in seeking information of the accuracy of this approach from a witness who was likely to have such information. Magruder's testimony did not foreclose further inquiry. There were gaps in the record even assuming Magruder had been accurate. (a) Magruder only purported to testify that on being consulted by Sloan concerning a large sum drawn by Liddy, he assumed the funds related to Liddy's indication that 'he needed a considerable amount up front to get his intelligencegathering operation into being' (Tr. 1415). (b) Magruder testified as to a 'large sum' but not necessarily to all of the $199,000 Sloan paid out to Liddy. The questioning in some detail about the $199,000 in cash which Sloan had turned over to Liddy reflects the trial judge's evident skepticism that such a large sum would have been made available by Sloan without any explanation of the purpose for which it was to be used.
In response to the judge's questioning as to the purpose of the cash withdrawals by Liddy, Sloan could only say that he was not informed by Magruder, who gave the authorization, as to the purpose of the withdrawals. Magruder had established that the finance committee, although nominally a separate committee, had the function of making disbursements on the authorization of CRP. Sloan testified that he had verified Magruder's authority with former Secretary Stans, director of the finance committee, who in turn checked with former Attorney General Mitchell of CRP (Tr. 1443). Sloan also testified that eventually he made a full accounting to Stans of the cash he had disbursed (Tr. 1450). Although the judge's questions to Sloan went beyond Magruder's responses, the testimony given by Sloan was congruent with that previously given by Magruder.
We cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion either in the questioning of Sloan, or in submitting to the jury the information elicited in its absence.
Where a trial judge is concerned with a witness's reliability, he may insist on supplemental questioning--and the procedure for withdrawal of the jury in the first instance may serve to prevent irreparable prejudice to the trial. The judge is not confined by the fact that the questions he has in mind were not put by counsel.
The judge's latitude to insist on further questions to a witness must be judged prospectively. It is therefore not undercut by the fact that, with regard to Sloan, the supplemental questioning in court produced no evidence that significantly affected the testimony given on direct.
Liddy's contention of prejudice would have more force if it were predicated on questioning by the judge that had passed outside judicial discretion to an inquisitorial undertaking. While it is ironic that Judge Sirica, concerned as he was with perjury at the trial, did not question Magruder, whose perjury was later developed in the massive, historic inquiry by Congress, this development serves to underline that the judges's questioning of Sloan did not portray a wide-ranging probe of witnesses that transcended the judicial province. We are not here concerned with any indications the judge may have given before or after the trial as to the public need for a broader investigation. So far as the questioning of Sloan is concerned, this was apparently triggered by what seemed to be the improbability of his account as given. It may well be that all that was involved as to Sloan was naivete, and the willingness of an A.B. in history, not versed in law or economics, to follow the instructions of senior officials of the political committee, including a former cabinet member, and to make large disbursements of cash without further inquiry. But the matter must be judged prospectively; there was certainly basis for the trial judge's concern at the time that Sloan was holding back, and that supplemental questioning was needed to prevent pollution by perjury of the trial he was conducting.
Even though the supplemental questioning did not significantly affect the thrust of Sloan's direct testimony, the trial judge had discretion, on reviewing that testimony, to conclude that its presentation to the jury would help it discharge its responsibility. He might well have concluded that the evidence regarding Sloan's relationship with the prosecutors and the more detailed development of matters raised in previous testimony would better equip the jury to digest the substance of Sloan's testimony, to assess its bearing on Sloan's credibility, and to appraise the weight the evidence should be accorded.29
Separate problems are raised by the procedure used to present Sloan's testimony to the jury, as distinguished from the fact of its presentation. Sound and accepted doctrine teaches that the trial judge should avoid extensive questioning of the witness and should rely on counsel to develop testimony for the jury's consideration.30 Here the trial judge not only failed to seek an alternative to personal intervention, he declined the prosecutor's request to elicit the additional testimony by further questioning of Sloan in the jury's presence.31 A reopening of the record to enhance appraisal of credibility would ordinarily be furthered by presenting the witness, and his demeanor, if available. The problems are certainly not resolved by the trial judge's comment that Sloan 'might have a lapse of memory, I don't know.'
Nevertheless, we feel that the procedure did not infringe upon the requirement of fair trial. The impact of the extensive questioning by the trial judge was muted. He did not interrupt the direct examination with his inquiries. Reading a record already made tends to have less impact than question and answer by the witness. The judge's editing excised comments that might have been construed as an expression of an opinion regarding the credibility of the testimony given by Sloan.
The case would stand in a different posture if defense counsel had urged the trial judge to recall the witness for additional testimony. But here it was the prosecutor and not the defendant who asked that Sloan testify in person. Appellant's counsel clearly indicated that he did not want any further testimony from Sloan. In response to questioning at oral argument on appeal he stated:
Oh, let there be no misunderstanding about that your Honor. I did not intend to have my position understood as being that I wanted Sloan brought back. I don't believe that, however, my choices should be that I should join with the prosecutor in either having the matter read back or having the witness brought back. I don't think that covers the entire spectrum of choices. I think there is another choice, that it should be left alone.
As to appellant's claim that the entire procedure was invalid because undue emphasis was accorded Sloan's testimony concerning Liddy's statement of June 17 that 'my boys got caught last night,' we are convinced by the Government's response that 'no reasonable jury would have overlooked or forgotten such testimony.'32 Sloan's initial testimony about the June 17 remark given before the jury on direct examination and the Government's highlighting of the admission in summation and rebuttal rendered de minimis the effect of its inclusion at two points in the 22 pages of the record read to the jury. We also take note of the cautionary instruction given to the jury prior to the reading of the testimony.33
Although prejudicial information contained in bench conferences may serve as grounds for reversal if the remarks are overheard by the jury,34 the inclusion of two bench conferences in the portion of the record read to the jury also fails to support reversal in this case.
Colloquy like that heard in bench conferences is often spoken in open court. An examination of this record and these conferences validates the trial judge's determination that the conferences were not harmful to either side.35 Although the dry run of the trial judge included the bench conferences before they were read and the Government specifically asked whether bench conferences would be read, defense counsel did not object to their inclusion. As soon as the point was raised, the trial judge instructed the jury that statements made during bench conferences are not evidence to be considered by the jury.36
We turn to appellant's claim that the reading of Sloan's testimony deprived him of his right to cross-examination. The trial judge afforded appellant an opportunity to cross-examine Sloan and counsel steadfastly declined to exercise this right.37 He urges that the right to cross-examine includes the right to refuse to cross-examine, and that this right was undercut by the trial judge's action. This is the kind of point that establishes resourcefulness of counsel, but not legal error. Although defense counsel may exercise his discretion regarding cross-examination, he has no absolute right to prevent further testimony by a witness.
In sum, defense counsel has no right to preclude recall of a witness. A judge not only has power of recall, but latitude to use it to remove or dilute the pollution of a trial by testimony he believes to be perjurious or highly questionable. He may supplement the examination by counsel in order to draw out more information from a witness and to enhance the perspective for appraising his testimony.38 The public interest in safeguarding a record from taint is particularly keen when the case involves the integrity of the nation's political system--as can fairly be said when persons in the campaign of one major political party used clandestine contributions to penetrate the internal process of the other--and is consequently of moment in both the daily press and history. Judge Sirica's palpable search for truth in such a trial was not only permissible, it was in the highest tradition of his office as a federal judge. And although his execution of this objective presented problems, as must be acknowledged, they were not of a kind that deprived defendants of a fair trial. 'A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.' Lutwak v. United States,344 U.S. 604, 619, 73 S. Ct. 481, 490, 97 L. Ed. 593 (1953). The vitality of this precept is attested by e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231, 93 S. Ct. 1565, 36 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1973); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968). Assuming for discussion that the problems already noted reflect error by the trial judge, it must be ranked as harmless rather than prejudicial error.
IV. INSTRUCTION REGARDING RETAINING OF COUNSEL
On direct examination, attorney Michael Douglas Caddy testified as follows: At approximately 3:40 a.m. Saturday morning, June 17, 1972, Howard Hunt arrived at his apartment and arranged with him to secure counsel for the five men arrested in the Democratic National Committee's offices an hour and a half earlier. At about 4:45 a.m. Hunt called Liddy and both Hunt and Caddy explained to Liddy the steps that had been taken to retain an attorney for those men. During this conversation, Liddy indicated that he desired to have Caddy represent him in this matter.
Appellant assigns as error the trial judge's instruction that the jury could draw no adverse inferences from the fact that Liddy retained counsel but could 'consider the time and other surrounding circumstances at which Mr. Liddy retained Mr. Caddy with respect to the state of mind of Mr. Liddy only.'39 Appellant claims that allowing the jury to draw inferences of guilty knowledge from his efforts to obtain counsel imposes a penalty on the exercise of his Sixth Amendment rights.40 Liddy cites the Government's emphasis in closing argument on the unusual hour at which he retained counsel as evidence of the prejudicial nature of the alleged error.41
Appellant bases his Sixth Amendment claim on Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965). In that case the Court held that comment on the defendant's failure to testify was forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, because it was tantamount to a penalty for exercising a constitutional right. Id. at 614--615, 85 S. Ct. 1229. A number of courts, including this court, have extended the principle announced in Griffin to prohibit comment on the defendant's failure to make an exculpatory statement upon arrest.42
There is only scant law on the applicability of the penalty analysis employed in Griffin to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Some courts have found reversible error in circumstances in which the prosecutor has commented on the defendant's silence and request for counsel upon arrest.43 Those cases, though containing language referring generally to the right to counsel, appear to be bottomed on considerations involving the rights of an accused facing police interrogation--a context in which the right to counsel is intimately bound up with the privilege against self-incrimination. They are thus of marginal value in ascertaining the applicability of Griffin to the Sixth Amendment claim raised in the present case.
In the present case, the trial judge instructed the jury that no adverse inferences could be drawn from the fact that appellant Liddy exercised his constitutional right to counsel. The trial judge, however, drew a distinction between the fact of hiring counsel and the time and circumstances under which an attorney was retained by the defendant.
Although it is the latter action of the trial judge that is contested on this appeal, we may usefully begin our discussion by approval of his instruction prohibiting the drawing of an adverse inference from the mere fact of hiring an attorney, at least when the circumstances are such that admission of evidence of such a request provokes the possibility that it will be taken as self-in-criminatory. This prohibition of adverse inference from the fact of hiring an attorney seems to us to be a fair corollary to the Supreme Court's opinion in Griffin. We should, perhaps, refer to our opinion in Jones v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 276, 296 F.2d 398 (en banc 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 913, 82 S. Ct. 1260, 8 L. Ed. 406 (1962), although it was not cited by parties. Insofar as Jones, which rejects a Sixth Amendment claim, uses the broad principle that the expression of a desire to have a lawyer never impinges on the right to have one, we think it is superseded by the reasoning of Griffin.44
The trial judge erred, however, in limiting the application of the principle of Griffin with a ruling that apparently considered that it is generally proper to take into account the time and circumstances of retaining an attorney, and to draw whatever inferences as seem appropriate. Such a distinction generally raises problems that hobble the right to seek counsel. To the extent that an inference of criminality is operative, it invites probing of the very process of selection of counsel--who, why, when and where--and pressing the defendant to come forward with evidence concerning this process. The mischief of the approach is underlined by it semantic subtleties, which opens the door to maneuver and misunderstanding. It would be a rare case indeed where the prosecutor could not point out that the incriminating feature of the employment of counsel--in the absence of explanation--rests not in the employment as such but in the time and circumstances surrounding that event, and inferences therefrom that reflect adversely on the defendant.45
The Third Circuit recently examined the application of Griffin to a Sixth Amendment contention in United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855, 94 S. Ct. 154, 38 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1973). In that case the prosecutor in his summation to the jury commented upon the fact that the defendant called an attorney the morning after the alleged crime and argued that this action cast doubt on the defendant's claim that the shooting was an accident. Id. 476 F.2d at 614. Although the defendant neither objected to the comment nor requested an instruction, the court held that there was plain error that required a reversal of the conviction. The court read Griffin as an absolute prohibition against the imposition of any penalty for the exercise of a constitutional right in a criminal law context. Id. at 615--616.
We agree with the Third Circuit's analysis that the admission of a request for counsel raises Sixth Amendment problems under Griffin. We are not called upon in this case to determine whether the Third Circuit was correct in treating Griffin as a bar that is absolute--whether, for example, it would apply where the request for or retainer of counsel was part of the actions constituting the offense, sometimes called the res gestae, so that omission of the request or retainer would distort the underlying account of the witnesses or undercut the likelihood that it would be considered reasonable or natural.
In the present case, even if it be assumed that there was error in the admission of evidence, the prosecutor's summation, or the instruction, or all of these, the error would be 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'46 In Macon, where the Third Circuit found reversible error, the prosecutor's comment was directed at the credibility of the accused's story which was a central issue in the case. 476 F.2d at 616. Here, the time at which Liddy retained counsel was but one of a number of factors that linked him to Hunt and the five defendants apprehended a couple of hours earlier. Moreover, the effect of the error was mitigated by the fact that evidence of part of Liddy's 5:00 a.m. conversation with Caddy was clearly admissible to show Liddy's involvement in his action of retaining counsel for those arrested during the break-in. His assertion of a right to Sixth Amendment protection against any use of his statements to obtain counsel for himself certainly does not prohibit inquiry into portions of his conversation with Caddy relating to his action in obtaining counsel for others. This evidence of Liddy's efforts on behalf of the five defendants only a few hours after their arrest was probative of his involvement in their venture.47
The evidence against the appellant, summarized at the outset of the opinion, was so overwhelming that even if there were constitutional error in the comment of the prosecutor and the instruction of the trial judge there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction.48
V. ADMISSION OF STATEMENT REGARDING FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH THE FBI
Appellant's fourth claim of error is also based on Griffin v. California.49 He asserts that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated by testimony that Liddy had told Robert Bennett, Hunt's employer, that he was no longer with the re-election committee because he had failed to cooperate with the FBI. He argues that the use of that evidence by the prosecutor during summation constituted a comment on his silence in violation of Griffin.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits any Government coercion that impairs an accused's right of silence, and Griffin reproves even the prospective coercion of prosecutorial comment at trial. But the right of silence is alloyed by speech, even the speech that refers to the silence, at least where, as here, the statement is to a private party,50 and is made freely and voluntarily without any hint of coercion.51 The cases (footnotes 50 and 51) establish that in such circumstances Fifth Amendment values are not impaired. It was within the discretion of the trial judge to hold that the statement volunteered by appellant as an explanation for his action (of leaving the committee) was admissible to establish his consciousness of guilt.
VI. PROHIBITION OF EXAMINATION ON CONTENTS OF ILLEGALLY INTERCEPTED WIRE COMMUNICATIONS
Prior to trial, persons claiming to be parties to intercepted conversations moved to suppress the contents of the illegally wiretapped conversations and to prevent their disclosure by witnesses at trial. After a series of rulings by the district court and this court and an in camera hearing on proposed testimony regarding the conversations, this court held that proof of the contents of the intercepted communications was not required to prove the charges against the defendants and ordered that the contents not be offered as evidence. The order allowed evidence regarding the identity of the telephones which were tapped and the persons at the Democratic National Committee who used those telephones. United States v. Liddy and Allen, No. 73--1020 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1973). Appellant contends that the foreclosure of questioning on the substance of the intercepted material violated his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination.
The order prohibiting disclosure of the conversations restricted the range of proof available to both parties on the charge of actual interception of wire communications (count eight). As a result, the Government was limited to circumstantial evidence and to Baldwin's testimony that he overheard voices he recognized as those of Spencer Oliver and his secretary, Ida Mae Wells. Appellant was given ample opportunity to cross-examine Baldwin regarding the details of the wiretapping operation, his identifications of Liddy, and his ability to identify certain voices.52 Although questioning regarding the contents of the conversations which Baldwin allegedly overheard might have provided an additional area in which to test his credibility, such an examination was not required to afford appellant a fair opportunity to test the truth of the direct testimony.53 Under the circumstances of this case, the order prohibiting disclosure of the contents of the intercepted conversations vindicated the rights of the movants without undue interference with the rights of the accused.
Affirmed.
Analysis and commentary on the “Fake Facts” in the Appeals Court’s decision. The section of the court’s opinion being reviewed is in bold face print.
(1) Sidney M. Glazer, Asst. Sp. Prosecutor, for appellee. Leon Jaworski, Sp. Prosecutor, Philip A. Lacovara, Counsel for the Sp. Prosecutor, Richard D. Weinberg and Robert L. Palmer, Asst. Counsel to the Sp. Prosecutor, were on the brief for appellee.
I was questioned several times on tangential matters by the Office of the Special Prosecutor but was never contacted by the Senate Watergate Committee to provide testimony. It appears that the Office of Special Prosecutor and the Senate Watergate Committee merely accepted what had been provided them by the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia in its investigation of Watergate headed by Principal Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl Silbert and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Seymour Glanzer and Donald Campbell.
Glanzer’s prosecutorial role in the trial was supported by Judge Sirica. Here is an example:
At the trial Liddy’s attorney adamantly contended that Liddy’s Sixth Amendment constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was being violated by my being forced to testify. He argued:
“…If Mr. Liddy or any citizen of the United States or any person under the jurisdiction of the United States has a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel…it ought not to matter one whit whether he exercises that right at three in the morning or three in the afternoon and what Mr. Silbert is suggesting is that there should be some limitation as to the hours when one can consult with an attorney and have no adverse inference drawn there from. I submit that it would have a chilling effect on the right to effectiveness of counsel.”
Sirica openly sneered at this argument, declaring:
“How do I know Mr. Caddy in the context of the facts of this case is truly Mr. Liddy’s attorney? The simple fact that he says he is my attorney does not make him his attorney, does it? Then, if he wants to take the stand and go into detail when he consult him and how Mr. Caddy became his lawyer, what fee he paid him, and anything like that, I will listen to him, and then make a ruling. He hasn’t made any showing. Does your client want to take the stand? He will be cross-examined as to the relationship between Mr. Liddy and Mr. Caddy.”
Liddy’s attorney responded, “Is your honor requiring that the only method in which I can establish the attorney-client relationship is to put my client on the stand?”
Judge Sirica retorted, “I am not saying anything, but you have offered no evidence and your argument is not evidence to me. It is simply a statement by you.”
At this point the prosecution began to worry that Liddy’s attorney was building a good case for appeal. So, Silbert called upon his second in command, Glanzer, to pollute the record with a tantalizing smear of me. Glanzer told the judge:
“There are many cases even though there is a relationship of attorney-client, the court can lift the confidentiality where it is in furtherance of a criminal venture although we are not saying it here. I am just citing an example where lawyers are called to testify or testimony is admitted with respect to lawyers of defendants at trial. There are no Sixth Amendment claims raised in those cases. It is preposterous.”
Sirica, his bias barely concealed, jumped at Glanzer’s smear: “I think you are right.”
(2) When McCord, Barker, Martinez, Gonzalez, and Sturgis were apprehended in the DNC offices in the Watergate complex on June 17, at 2:00 a.m., they had in their possession walkie talkies, burglary tools, documents that had been taken from DNC files, telephone bugging devices, and equipment capable of transmitting voice conversations. Baldwin, who was acting as a lookout from the balcony of room 723, saw two men emerge from an alleyway near the Watergate building shortly after uniformed policemen arrived at the scene. He identified one of the men as Hunt and testified that the other was wearing a suit he recognized as Liddy's. At about 3 a.m. Hunt arrived at room 723 with a walkie talkie and used the telephone to call an attorney, Michael Douglas Caddy.”
This is a “fake fact.” Hunt made the phone call from room 723 around 2:30 a.m. to an unnamed attorney. However, he called me from his White House Office at 3:05 a.m. as I testified at the trial.
On September 25, 2014, Bob Woodward, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on Watergate, and his Washington Post colleague, Carl Bernstein, gave a lecture on the case in Houston at the Wortham Center. I was invited to the VIP Reception and had a friendly reunion with the two famous journalists. Both signed my copy their best-seller, All The President’s Men. At one point in our discussion, Bernstein declared, ‘Hunt called you from the Howard Johnson Motor Hotel.” Before I could reply, Woodward intervened, shaking his head negatively from side to side, saying, “No not him.” Bernstein looked stunned. I, too, was stunned to hear this truth spoken by the person who knows the most about what happened in Watergate. Woodward, always the skilled and honest reporter, then took the opportunity to ask me, “When did you first meet Howard Hunt?” and I replied, “at the Mullen Company.” Our discussion ended there as other people at the reception wanted to meet and talk to Woodward and Bernstein.
In December 2023, Ari Melber interviewed Woodward on his MSNBC show, The Beat. The interview was played two different times on MSNBC and I viewed it both times. In the second minute of the interview, Woodward declared that after 50 years new information has come forth about Nixon and Watergate. He then added that what he had written about Watergate was a first draft. I believe that his remarks were in reference to what I had written here in The First Hour of Watergate.
Alfred Baldwin in his testimony in 1973 before the Senate Watergate Committee testified Hunt called an unnamed lawyer from room 723 in the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge shortly after the burglars arrest.
Baldwin, in an earlier interview published in The New York Times of October 7, 1972, said:
“Moments later I was contacted on the walkie‐talkie again and told: “We're on the way up. Be there in a minute.” I said, “You'd better not park near this building, police are all over the place.”
He said, “Okay.”
Then I heard a voice from another unit whisper, “They've got us.” Then Mc Cord's voice came through: “What are you people? Are you metropolitan police or what?”
Another voice demanded: “What's that?” And then the unit went silent. I tried to renew the contact, but to no avail.
A few minutes later Hunt, wearing a windbreaker, rushed into the room. He was extremely nervous.
“What do you see?” he asked.
I told him I saw McCord and some other man being led away from the Watergate in handcuffs. He walked over, looked down at the scene and then said: “I've got to call a lawyer.”
Picking up the phone, he dialed a local number. “They've had it,” he told the party on the other end, adding: “Well, I've got $5,000 in cash with me we can use for bond money.”
Hunt, hanging up the phone, turned and asked if I knew where McCord lived. I said yes, I had been to his house in Rockville. He instructed me to pack all the equipment and take it to McCord's house and asked if I had a place to go.”
On December 24, 2005, historian John Simkin interviewed Baldwin on Spartacus-educational:
John Simkin: Is it true that when E. Howard Hunt arrived at your hotel room, he made a phone call to Douglas Caddy?
Alfred Baldwin: True Hunt on arriving at my room did make a call to someone who I realized was a lawyer due to the nature of the conversation coming from Hunt. No name was ever used so I cannot name that person.
The FBI report of July 19, 1972, states: “Michael Douglas Caddy, also known as Douglas Caddy, is an Attorney at Law having offices at 1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. and is associated with the law firm Gall, Lane, Powell and Kilcullen. Caddy gratuitously appeared at the Metropolitan Police Department where subjects were taken after being arrested and claimed to represent them. Prior to Caddy’s arrival, none of the subjects made any phone calls which might have precipitated his appearance. Investigation disclosed telephone calls were made during the early morning hours of June 17, 1972, from the telephone of Everette Howard Hunt at the Robert R. Mullen and Company to the Barker residence in Miami, Florida and from Barker’s residence to the residence of Caddy.
“Upon Caddy’s appearance before the Federal Grand Jury at Washington, D.C., he was held in contempt of court for failing to answer questions on the basis he had an attorney-client privilege relationship with Hunt. Contempt action was upheld at the U.S. Court of Appeals on July 19, 1982. Caddy subsequently testified he received a telephone call from Hunt at around 3:00 a.m. on June 17, 1972.”
“Around 12:00 a.m. to 12:30 a.m., June 17, 1972, McCord received a telephone call and told Baldwin that ‘We’re going across the Street’ pointing to the Democratic Headquarters. McCord told Baldwin to watch and if anything unusual occurred to contact McCord by walkie-talkie.
“Around 2:15 a.m., June 17, 1982, Baldwin noticed lights going on in the Watergate Apartments and subsequently police beginning to arrive. He attempted to utilize the walkie-talkie to alert McCord and received a response in a whisper. ‘We hear you; they have us.’ About this time Baldwin noticed two men leaving the alley on the east side of the Watergate and identified them as Hunt and Liddy. Hunt came to Room 723 and used the phone to call an attorney.”
Again, the attorney Hunt called was not named in the FBI report.
From: E. Howard Hunt, Undercover: Memoirs of an American Secret Agent (Berkley, 1974):
From there I drove to the White House Annex – the Old Executive Office Building, in bygone years the War Department and later the Department of State.
Carrying three heavy attaché cases, I entered the Pennsylvania Avenue door, showed my blue-and-white, White House pass to the uniformed guards, and took the elevator to the third floor. I unlocked the door of 338 and went in. I opened my two-drawer safe, took out my operational handbook, found a telephone number and dialed it.
The time was 2:13 in the morning of June 17, 1972, and five of my companions had been arrested and taken to the maximum-security block of the District of Columbia jail. I had recruited four of them and it was my responsibility to get them out. That was the sole focus of my thoughts as I began talking on the telephone.
But with those five arrests the Watergate affair had begun….
After several rings the call was answered, and I heard the sleepy voice of Douglas Caddy. ‘Yes?’
Doug? This is Howard and I hate to wake you up, but I’ve got a tough situation and I need to talk to you. Can I come over?
‘Sure. I’ll tell the desk clerk you’re expected.’
I’ll be there in about 20 minutes, I told him, and hung up.
From the safe I took a small money box and removed the $10,000 Liddy had given me for emergency use. I put $1,500 in my wallet and the remaining $8,500 in my coat pocket. The black attaché case containing McCord’s electronic equipment I placed in a safe drawer that held my operational notebook. Then I closed and locked the safe, turning the dial several times. The other two cases I left beside the safe, turned out the light and left my office, locking the door.
(3) Caddy's testimony established that about a half hour after this phone call [from Room 723 at the Howard Johnson Motor Hotel], Hunt visited Caddy's apartment. Caddy then made a series of telephone calls to retain an attorney with more experience in criminal law. Caddy stated that at about 5 a.m. Hunt called Liddy from Caddy's apartment and informed Liddy that an attorney experienced in criminal law matters had been retained. Caddy talked to Liddy and confirmed what Hunt had said. Then Hunt gave Caddy $8500 in cash, one $500 bill and the rest in $100 bills.
This is another “fake fact.” Hunt made the phone call from room 723 around 2:30 a.m. to an unnamed attorney. He called me from his White House Office at 3:05 a.m. as I testified at the trial. Hunt then came to my apartment about a mile from the White House arriving at 3:40 a.m.
Another court opinion of “fake fact” is that “Caddy then made a series of telephone calls to retain an attorney with more experience in criminal law.” I made only one phone call. I was an associate attorney in the six-man labor law firm that had three partners and three associate attorneys. I had no authority to accept a case for the law firm without first contacting a partner. The only partner available was Robert Scott. The managing partner, Jerome Powell, was at his vacation home on the Eastern Shore of Maryland and I did not have its phone number. The third partner, John Kilcullen, was on vacation with his wife in Italy. So, I called Robert Scott who knew Hunt.
Scott’s first reaction on the phone was “they must have been setup, they must have been setup.” He then said that he would telephone a criminal defense attorney who would assist me in representing the defendants and would call his nephew. He called back twenty minutes later and told me that defense attorney Joseph Raferty would assist me and where I would meet him a few hours later, and that he had also talked to his nephew. I did not learn until a few weeks later, on June 30, 1972, two days after I Had been served a subpoena to appear forthwith before the grand jury, that Scott’s nephew was an Assistant U.S. Attorney! Scott was a Democrat and the counsel to the United Mine Worker Union. He knew that Hunt was a client of the firm as he had attended the three meetings with Hunt at the firm when Hunt sought legal advice on personal matters before he was asked to join the Nixon White House staff as a consultant. It never occurred to me that Scott would betray Hunt, the law firm and me by throwing legal ethics aside to use the case to advance the Democratic Party’s interest in driving Nixon from office. So, while Hunt was in my apartment Scott had informed his nephew of Hunt’s visit to me and what happened at the DNC at Watergate. His nephew wasted no time contacting the U.S Attorney. In short, before Hunt left my apartment to go home at 5 a.m. the prosecutors knew the full story of what had happened at the DNC at Watergate based on the information provided by Scott to his nephew. Upon learning of Scott’s role as double agent, I and the two attorneys Jerome Powell had secured for me, Urban Lester and Joseph Contrucci, cut Scott out from any learning any more information about the case. To Scott I was merely collateral damage in his zealous quest to destroy Noxon. He continued to provide embroidered information to the prosecutors through his nephew even after being cut off. If you want to see a photo of Scott, go to the Senate Committee hearing at which Howard Hunt testified on September 24, 1973. In its opening three minutes you will hear the following, which appears in the Committee’s printed hearings, of questions posed by Samual Dash, chief counsel and staff director of the Committee:
Mr. Dash: Mr. Hunt, are you accompanied by counsel?
Mr. Hunt: I am.
Mr. Dash: Will counsel please identify yourself for the record?
Mr. Sachs: My name is Sidney S. Sachs. I am a lawyer, a member of the District of Columbia Bar and I am accompanied by my partner, Mr. Robert M. Scott, and by my law clerk who has been helping in the case, Mr. Henry Goldman
Soctt is sitting behind Mr. Sachs at the hearing.
In short, Scott betrayed Hunt, a client of the firm, on June 17, 1972, by providing client information to the prosecutors and to the Democratic Party about Watergate. This continued throughout the case culminating at the Senate Committee hearings.
The controversy about me at the beginning of the case stemmed in large part by the embroidered information Scott was providing to these entities. I, too, was a victim of Scott’s betrayal of his ethics as an attorney and member of the bar.
For Scott his role was a complete success. He achieved his goal of being a hidden person behind the scenes in driving President Nixon out of office. The personal payoff for him later was to be appointed Judge on the District of Columbia Superior Court.
The issue of timeline is all important here. Another “fake fact” in the Appeals Court opinion Is that the five burglars “were apprehended in the DNC offices in the Watergate complex on June 17, at 2 a.m.” However, here in the testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee in September 1973:
Fred D, Thompson, Committee Minority Counsel: Officer Shoffler, do you recall when you received the word from headquarters to answer this call at Watergate? Were you in the car with Sergeant Leeper?
Officer Shoffler: Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson: What time in the morning was this?
Officer Shoffler: Approximately 1:52 a.m.
Samuel Dash, Committee Chief Counsel and Staff Director: Where were you located when you received that call?
Sergeant Leeper: We were in the area of about K and 30th, Washington, D.C.
Mr. Dash: How close was it to the Watergate complex?
Sergeant Leeper: Approximately a minute and a half. 2 minutes away.
So, the police officers arrived at 1:54 a.m. There is no way they could have arrested the five burglars six minutes later at 2:00 a.m. after arriving, as the Appeals Court decision maintains. What happened next is described in the final report of the Senate Watergate Committee:
The plainclothes unit under the direction of Sergeant Paul Leeper entered the Office Building stairwell through the garage door and ascended to the eighth floor. The policemen worked their way down to the sixth-floor level and entered the floor through the stairway door which they found unlocked by the same masking tape technique employed on the garage.
Baldwin did not become alarmed until he noticed the lights go on in the building – first on the eighth floor and then on the sixth – and saw two individuals emerge on the sixth floor terrace of the DNC headquarters, one holding a pistol. He then radioed Hunt and Liddy and asked, “Are our people on the sixth floor in suits or are they dressed casually?” When the answer came back, “Our people are dressed in suits, why?” Baldwin replied, “You have some trouble because these are some individuals around here who are dressed casually and have their guns out.” Within minutes, Sergeant Leeper and his unit discovered the five burglars and arrested them. Hunt and Liddy escaped unnoticed from the Watergate Hotel. Baldwin was told to leave the Motor Lodge, which he promptly did.
Hunt, who pleaded guilty at the start of the trial and did not testify at the trial. in his book, American Spy, puts the arrests at 2:13 a.m.
The Appeals Court decision states, “At about 3 a.m. Hunt arrived at room 723 with a walkie talkie and used the telephone to call an attorney, Michael Douglas Caddy.” This is a “fake fact.”
Hunt in his Senate Committee testimony stated that he arrived at room 723 around 2:30 a.m. He and Liddy had fled their hotel room minutes after they heard over the walkie-talkie of the burglars’ arrest. Here is Hunt’s account from American Spy:
“The monitor came to life in Liddy’s hand. Barker was finally able to reply in a whisper, ‘They’ve got us!’
Baldwin again: ‘Now I see our people. They’ve got their hands up. Must be cops.’
That was all I needed to hear. I strode out onto the balcony to get a firsthand look. Lights were on across the top floors of the office building. I jumped back inside, where Liddy was receiving play-by-play action. ‘…..filing out with them now, guns drawn. Police wagon pulling up at the entrance below, also some marked police cars….’
I told him to keep talking. I threw the suitcases on the bed, spread them open, and began packing the operational litter from the room. McCord had left behind his electronics gear, which I now crammed back into his black attaché case.
Liddy was glued to the radio and looked at me with a bit of confusion. “Let’s go.” I told him. “The police will be here any moment.”
‘Why?’ he asked.
“Barker has our room key,” I answered bluntly. Liddy Looked alarmed.
Baldwin’s plaintive voice emanated from the radio. ‘What should I do?’
Liddy jumped into action and now had his hands full, so I picked up the radio. “Keep your lights out and stay out of sight,” I ordered. “I’ll come over as soon as I can. We’re signing off.”
The Appeals Court decision would have history to believe that Hunt and Liddy stayed in their hotel room atter the burglars arrest at the 2 a.m. time as determined by the court until as the court found, “At about 3 a.m. Hunt arrived at room 723 with a walkie talkie and used the telephone to call an attorney, Michael Douglas Caddy.”
Hunt was inside his White House office about 3 a.m., which is where he telephoned me at 3:05 a.m.
Timeline in Appeals Court Opinion:
2 a.m. Police Officers arrest five burglars inside DNC
3 a.m. Hunt arrived in Room 723 of the Howard Johnson where Baldwin is
3:40 a.m. Hunt arrived at my residence.
Actual Timeline of events
1:52 a.m. Police officers alerted to crime being committed at Watergate
1:54 a.m. Police arrived at Watergate
2:15 a.m. Police arrest the five burglars inside the DNC
2:20 a.m. Hunt and Liddy exited their room in Hotel Washington in the Watergate complex
2: 30 a.m. Hunt arrived in Room 723 in Howard Johnson Motor Lodge
2:40 a.m. Hunt called an unnamed lawyer
2:45 a.m. Hunt departed Howard Johnson Motor Lodge
3:00 a.m. Hunt arrived in his White House Office
3:05 a.m. Hunt called Caddy at his home
3:20 a.m. Hunt departed his White House Office
3: 25 a.m. Hunt arrived at the Mullen Company office one block away and called Mrs. Barker in Miami
3:40 Hunt arrived at my residence one mile from the Mullen Company and the White House
(4) On direct examination, attorney Michael Douglas Caddy testified as follows: At approximately 3:40 a.m. Saturday morning, June 17, 1972, Howard Hunt arrived at his apartment and arranged with him to secure counsel for the five men arrested in the Democratic National Committee's offices an hour and a half earlier. At about 4:45 a.m. Hunt called Liddy and both Hunt and Caddy explained to Liddy the steps that had been taken to retain an attorney for those men. During this conversation, Liddy indicated that he desired to have Caddy represent him in this matter.
This is a fact.
SUMMARY UP TO THIS POINT
The evidence is clear that Hunt called me from his White House Office at 3:05 a.m. on June 17, 1972. The statement in the Appeals Court opinion that Hunt called me from Room 723 at the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge at 3:00 a.m. on June 17, 1972, is just that, a statement without any supporting evidence. It is a “fake fact.”
Whoever Hunt called, based on what Baldwin testified that he overheard Hunt speaking on the phone. had knowledge of the conspiracy to burglarize the DNC.
At the trial of Liddy and McCord Prosecutor Silbert on direct examination asked me whether I possessed any prior knowledge of the break-in of the DNC. I responded, “No, I did not.” I was under oath when I testified. Had subsequently any of the investigations into Watergate following the exposure of the coverup produced evidence that I had lied at the trial, I would have been charged with perjury. I was never indicted, or named an unindicted co-conspirator, or disciplined by the bar or named in the DNC civil lawsuit.
I went from being a “principal” in the criminal conspiracy as charged by Chief Judge Sirica who held me in contempt of court and jailed me to later being a semi-non-person the case. Sirica acted as prosecutor, jury, and judge.
I testified six times before the grand jury starting June 28, 1972, until June 1, 1973. The prosecutors subpoenaed my bank account records.
At no time was any effort made by the original prosecutors, the Special Prosecutor, or the Senate Watergate Committee to determine who Hunt actually called from the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge on June 17, 1972, if it was not me.
The role of the CIA in Watergate was never exposed…until now, although Senator Howard Baker did his best to do that in his minority report in the Senate Watergate Committee Report.
I was “used” by various parties in the case.
By the CIA that took over my life without my knowing it in moving me like a piece of chess on a chessboard from early April to June 17, 1972.
By Robert M Scott, the partner who made the determination that the law firm would take on the case of defending the arrested five burglars and Hunt and Liddy. Scott put me on the front line in defending them while behind the scenes he worked with his nephew, the Assistant U.S. Attorney, to send the defendants to jail in his quest to destroy President Nixon.
By the three prosecutors – Silbert, Glanzer and Campbell – in calling me, the defense counsel, as the first witness in the case before the grand jury in trying to frame me, and then by covering up the coverup by limiting the case to solely the arrest of the seven burglars of the DNC at Watergate.
By John Dean, White House counsel and the Mastermind of the Coverup, who never told John Ehrlichman that I had refused to accept the “hush” money and by later ordering the prosecutors via Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, Henry Petersen, to prevent me from disclosing before the federal grand jury of my refusal to accept the “hush” money.
By Chief Judge John Sirica who tried to frame as being a “principal” in the crime.
There are more revelations to come in my book. Here is a sample:
From a posting on Facebook on December 6, 2016, by Lyn Colodny, founder of Watergate.com of his interview with H.R. Haldeman:
HALDEMAN: CONFIRMS "SECRET GOVERNMENT" THEORY
HALDEMAN/COLODNY INTERVIEW EXCERPT RE"SECRET GOVERNMENT" 3/23/1988
HALDEMAN: There is a whole bunch of people that had a, had a, had a
vested interest in Nixon's unsuccess and they all coalesced.
COLODNY: Well, what we say is -- we say that A Silent Coup is the
story of a President at war with his own government upon
assuming the Presidency in January. This is the frame we
built. "In '69, Nixon was a President with a radically new
view of the war of order but totally distrustful of the
established bureaucracy in Congress." I assume you don't disagree with that.
HALDEMAN: I don't disagree with that.
COLODNY: "He (Nixon) saw the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA as
obstacles to his plans, road blocks that had to be
circumvented if he would succeed in implementing his own
foreign policy. He appointed a weak Secretary of State as
well as a man he did not trust as Secretary of Defense, and
finally retained as his head of the CIA, Richard Helms, a
Kennedy appointee and another individual in which he had
little or no confidence." How about--, is that paragraph
close?
HALDEMAN: It's okay.
COLODNY: "Based on his years as Vice President, he knew the real
value of the National Security Council and it would be the
perfect vehicle to go around the Congress and the
Bureaucracy. Immediately with Kissinger and a very few
trusted aides and advisers, he took his government "Secret".
Over the next three and a half years, one by one he changed
American foreign policy. Detente with the Soviet Union,
with the Soviet's, a secret opening to China and, finally,
Salt I and the ABM Treaty and more. He wound" --, I'm I
going to quick?
HALDEMAN: No.
COLODNY: "He wound down the War in Vietnam instead of winning it, and
conducted secret peace talks with the North Vietnamese. All
this time the established bureaucracy was quietly reacting
to Nixon. Nixon had the power and the one thing he did
control was the White House. The Chairman of the Joint
Chief's set up an espionage operation inside the White House
to learn Nixon's secrets and undermine his policies and
weaken the President. The CIA infiltrated the White House,
using the Plumbers to run domestic CIA operations that would
later be blamed on the President and his men. In addition,
they also moved individuals into the Nixon re-election
committee for similar domestic cover. So, while, for the
first three years, Nixon appears to be totally in control of
the White House, but in reality that control already began
to crumble. Slowly piece by piece culminating after his
landslide re-election into a full fledged war against the
President and his policies. Is he aware that he is in a
war? Does he understand its dimensions? A war he is
surely in, and in the end, his enemies at State, the
Pentagon, the CIA using the press, the Congress and the
courts, will bring Richard Nixon down." That's the frame
that we've put around the book.
HALDEMAN: Well, you come pretty well in the line with Haldeman's
theory of the whole thing.
COLODNY: I thought I told you a long time ago, I thought you were on
the right tract.
HALDEMAN: [Laughs]
The common elements that the assassination of President Kendy in 1963 had with the conspiracy to drive President Nixon from office in 1972:
Karen Croft and David Talbot interviewed Peter Dale Scott in the January 23, 2024, issue of The Kennedy Beacon. Here is an excerpt:
The JFK Records Act leads us to another big question, because you’ve been doing research on the Kennedy assassination for so long. As another researcher once said, “Peter Dale Scott has forgotten more about the Kennedy assassination than we’ll ever know.” So, the big question is why was JFK killed?
We don’t live in a system like a monarchy. We live in a state of chaos — a kind of Hobbesian state of nature, with different, powerful oligarchs — and they’ve been battling each other in the U.S. ever since they met to draft the Articles of Confederation. And at least one of the states — South Carolina — was there to guarantee the protection of slavery, because in their state at least 60 percent of the people were black. So, this racist system was baked into America at the beginning. It was a kind of built-in conflict at the top level, which is what I think is now running this country, rather than a “deep state.” I was never happy about that term, even though I helped import it to the United States from Turkey and said so when I wrote about it. It sounds like it’s a “thing.” What we actually live in is a kind of Hobbesian condition of chaos, a new Gilded Age, with greater and greater accumulations of private power.
Yes, but you sidestepped the question – why was President Kennedy eliminated? What made him a target?
Well, he was threatening an end to the Cold War, which was the basis of the military economy that had made America prosperous since 1953. He was threatening to ease us off the war economy, and to deal with problems at home like poverty and racism.
The Cold Warriors who ran the country maintained a constant state of alarm, constant preparedness. The sociologist C. Wright Mills, author of The Power Elite, recognized how they created a national security emergency “without foreseeable end.” He called these men “crackpot realists…In the name of realism they have constructed a paranoid reality all their own.”
A “paranoid reality” that was – and still is – very profitable for the military-industrial complex.
People forget President Kennedy’s 1963 Atomic Test Ban Treaty, which ended all nuclear arms testing above ground. It sounds petty now, but it wasn’t petty then. There had been no treaty with the Soviet Union since 1955 when Washington and Moscow agreed by treaty to respect the neutrality of Austria.
During the debate about the atomic test ban, the Cold War lobby and the media were saying you cannot conclude a deal with the Russians because they are Communists — but JFK did it. And worse than that, Kennedy — rightly — didn’t trust his CIA. So, the president was privately talking to his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Bobby was privately talking to Georgi Bolshakov, the Soviet representative in Washington, as a back-channel to Khrushchev in the Kremlin. Well, the CIA and the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) knew about the back-channel. And a document that purports to be a DIA document — I think it’s authentic — comes out 12 years later, an analysis that Kennedy is doing something treasonous, illegal. That agency, the DIA, might have helped do him in. Ironically, the DIA was created by Kennedy, who distrusted naval intelligence and army intelligence.
Kennedy gave two important speeches, one day apart in June 1963. In the first one, the so-called Peace Speech, he said we should empathize with our enemy, the Russians. At the height of the Cold War, he said, “In the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.”
And the very next day, he gave his swiftly composed civil rights speech on national TV, responding to the turmoil in the South, including Governor George Wallace, how he stood in the doorway at the University of Alabama to try to prevent two black students from integrating the university. The president told the nation that racial justice was “a moral issue. It is as old as the scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution.”
I can see, and I believe I’m right in seeing, that there was a kind of retro Southern presence in the military. The Army slow-marched to the University of Mississippi in 1962 and to the University of Alabama the following year, after President Kennedy ordered Army troops to restore order on those campuses.
I could go on, but I won’t go on. There were probably five or six reasons Kennedy was killed —- it was a coalition that killed Kennedy. And it was a coalition that killed Kennedy in a way that they knew the media would have to come in and make it look like it had been a lone nut who had killed Kennedy.
So, was the media part of the coalition?
Not in the actual assassination, but to cover it up, absolutely. It was planned that they were to play that role.
And who was organizing the whole thing, in your mind?
I’ve always said I’m here to analyze what was happening, the forces behind it, not to have a point of view about who did it. David, I know that in your book (The Devil’s Chessboard), you wrote that essentially it was the CIA — Allen Dulles, who was fired as agency director by JFK, and the network around him. I do think they were in it. But I have a whole chapter in my book Deep Politics about military intelligence — more importantly, the Military Intelligence Reserve, which interfaces with oil corporations, and had a conspiratorial unit in Dallas exploring petroleum deposits in the Soviet Union. I believe they were at least as involved in the murder as the CIA.
But the JFK plot was a coalition. The anti-civil rights people in the South were also part of it. I refer people to the Joseph Milteer story I talk about in my book Dallas 1963. There’s a white Southern factor that helped to kill Kennedy.
To paraphrase Jim Douglass (author of JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why it Matters), why does the JFK assassination still haunt us?
I could go on and on and on about this, all this fuss now about truth and propaganda, about “fake facts” and so on. The truth is, we’ve been living with “fake facts” ever since the Warren Report. The Warren Report is so phony that even some of the men who drafted it, and signed it, didn’t believe it! Some were quite vocal about it. They were signing a fake document. To believe the Warren Report you have to believe that one bullet was able to cause seven wounds in two different people, hit a bone, and then fall unscathed onto a stretcher. It’s all in the report. And if you believe that, you’re nuts.
(Editorial note: The Warren Report’s “magic bullet theory” was finally “buried in concrete,” according to forensics expert Cyril Wecht, following former Secret Service agent Paul Landis’s recent account that he found the pristine bullet in the presidential limousine.)
What would America look like if it lost WWWIII? This what I have been thinking about, Read this. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-02-11/what-would-america-look-like-if-it-lost-world-war-iii?utm_source=website&utm_medium=share&utm_campaign=copy