Paul Rigby

The CIA’s abandonment of not merely Diem and family, but the entire concept of a political strong-man in Saigon, was formally announced – more accurately, retrospectively acknowledged - by none other than Edward Lansdale in the Foreign Affairs edition of October 1964. America’s repeated attempts at “engineering a great patriotic cause led by some universally loved Vietnamese of American selection,” a process in which no US official had been more central than Landsdale himself, were now dismissed as a “puerile romance” which “should not be attempted in real life.” The CIA terminated both Diem and the concept he represented for a very good reason: There was to be no future civilian-political figure in the South with whom the North could cut a peace deal. In Diem’s place, and that of a motley succession of older military men and discredited politicians, were to stand the Agency-formed “Young Turks,” who were eventually brought to power, in the face of considerable resistance from within the US foreign policy elite, in the years to follow. There is every reason to believe Lansdale had been guilty of a great deal more than mere advocacy of the “Young Turks” strategy during the Kennedy years. According to John Pilger, the creation and use of “Force X,” which “infiltrated” the Viet Cong and then undertook “atrocities that would then be blamed on the insurgency” was “pioneered by…Colonel Edward Lansdale.” (1) Bernard B. Fall, “The Second Indochina War,” International Affairs, January 1965, (Vol 41, No 1), p. 70. Fall comments of Lansdale’s condemnation “But this was precisely what was done.” (2) John Pilger, “Phoney war,” The Guardian, 19 October 1999, p. 18.

What was Hanoi's attitude to the prospect of a negotiated settlement? Ho Chi Minh’s strategy in the years preceding Diem’s overthrow was encapsulated in his “Descending Spiral Theory.” Ho believed that a resumption of guerilla warfare in the South would inevitably issue in a full-scale US invasion. He therefore did everything he could to avoid its recrudescence.(1) The public consistency of Ho’s position in favour of a negotiated settlement throughout 1962 was reflected in three interviews he gave in March, July, and December to, respectively, a British Daily Express journalist, Bernard Fall, and Jules Roy. As Fall wrote: “It was obvious to all three observers that the DRVN had backed off from outright conquest of South Viet Nam and was veering toward a negotiated solution embodying the existence of a neutral South Vietnamese state that would not be reunited with the North for a long time to come.”(3) (1)Wayne H. Nielsen, “The Second Indo-China War and the American Press,” The Minority of One, October 1964, p. 15. (2)Bernard Fall. The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p. 199. (3)Ibid. The resultant articles appeared in the Daily Express, 28 March 1962; The Saturday Evening Post, 24 November 1962; and L’Express, 10 January 1963. Fall’s interview with Ho appeared in “A Talk with Ho Chi Minh,” The New Republic, 12 October 1963, pp. 19-22. In The Making of a Quagmire, David Halberstam offers a paragraph on Fall’s Ho interview without once mentioning the minor fact that Ho was urging a peaceful settlement to the war. Instead, Halberstam confined himself to portraying Pham Van Dong as patronising Diem (Quagmire, p. 70).

Cliff, I readily concede that contemporaneous public references to Kennedy-instigated moves for a Laotian-style peace deal in Vietnam are hard to find, but they do exist. Here's two examples: And then there's a fleeting reference in a piece by Dick Starnes: And you're very right when you observed "Commies were bad for the heroin trade."

Funny that you say that because the "Baby Doc" administration tried using international law to justify invading Iraq (They were in violation of Security Council resolutions) I don’t know if “might makes right” is the answer by most accounts the invasion of Iraq has left “radical Islam” a lot stronger than before. The US has a lot bigger guns than Brazil, Sweden, the Netherlands, Costa Rica, South Africa, Japan etc yet with minor exception those and many other small gunned countries have free (or almost free) of terrorist attacks. The UK and Spain only became targets due to their support of the invasion. How many Afgans and Iraqis joined the “resistance” after having friend or loved ones killed/maimed/raped/tortured by “coalition forces”? Why do a majority of Iraqis of all ethnicities say they want the US out and that they were better off under Saddam? Might Israel suffer less if it treated the Arabs in and around it better? Perhaps part of the problem is that the US and its allies are too quick to use their ‘big guns’. Eagerness to send others to war or be tortured don't equal courage and reluctance to do doesn't equal cowardice. Hats off to Mr. C for an excellent post.

More on the Diem-Nhu negotiations with Hanoi in the months preceding the coup of 1 November. First up, veteran CIA water-carrier, Joe Alsop. Note the ever so subtle attempt to equate negotiating with Hanoi with insanity; and the recourse to an old Cold War stand by of the American foreign policy elite, “a secret French intrigue”: Next up, Madame Nhu, as filtered first through right-wing - of the Atlanticist, not Gaullist variety, I suspect - French journalist, Lucien Bodard, & published in the pages of Le Nouveau Candide; and then a figure described only as “Special to the New York Times”:

Feared as much.

Noel-Baker's view on who - or rather, what - was running US foreign policy in 1965 was hardly unique. Here's a similar point of view from the same year: And another observer, Senator Morse, on the same theme:

Cliff, OK, let's assume for the moment - I'm every bit as sceptical of the audio record of the period as I am of the film versions of the assassination, but I'll let that pass for the sake of discussion - that Harriman was in favour of the coup. Two objections arise immediately: Was Harriman intent on Diem's removal for the same reasons as the CIA? And, no, Kennedy doesn't characterise Harriman as "the power behind the coup." He's merely one name on a list. That list is very odd: It comprises all the key figures in favour of the proposed opening to China, a move long urged on Kennedy by the British political establishment in general, and the Labour Party in particular. How did the violent overthrow of Diem and his regime sit with that objective? It makes no sense at all, not least in the absence of any obvious figure of comparable stature to replace Diem, and thus to serve as a focus for stability and negotiation. A final question occurs - who finances the National Security Archive? Paul

John, First stab at an answer. Lodge appears to have shared JFK's conviction that no military solution, only a political one, was available or desirable in Vietnam. In his characteristically "diplomatic" memoir, The Storm Has Many Eyes (NY: WW Norton, 1973), Lodge wrote: Second, and relatedly, Lodge, like JFK, was a committed multilateralist: he left the Atlantic Institute, recall, to take the poison chalice that was the Saigon ambassadorship. Third, Kennedy's most pressing problem was the US press: Lodge was essentially being asked to reprise, only under much less favourable circumstances, the role of presidential shield he had undertaken for Eisenhower at the time of Khrushchev's visit. In both instances, Lodge was tasked with deflecting charges of insufficient presidential anti-communist zeal - the chief charge of Halberstam et al was, after all, that Diem wasn't prosecuting the war with anything like enough enthusiasm - while simultaneously not offending the the distinguished guest/host. Fourthly, Lodge, like Diem, spoke French. Sorry this is rushed, but tired and work beckons! Paul

Nat, I am interested in Wiener's portrayal: Fascinating to see just about every trick in the book thrown into this CIA-serving tripe. And, yes, I'm sure a) that this pabulum will influence far more people than anything I can offer by way of contrast; and that it is Dick Starnes being dismissed as a "journeyman reporter." Still, let's flip the argument on its head. What chance that in forty years time an Englishman previously unknown to Wiener will spend time and effort defending his journalism? Not a hope in hell! Your final question reminds me of something I think Charles Drago wrote, though in which thread I can't for the life of me remember. He characterised JFK's assassination as "a world-historical event," or something similarly Hegelian. He was right. The Agency understood this from the get-go, and prepared accordingly. The heirs of Dulles and Angleton continue to work from the same basic script. Weiner is manifestly in their service. Paul

Awful to hear, and my best wishes to her and her family. I disagree with the first half; couldn't agree more that "why" is hugely important. Agreed. Let's do our - inadequate, I know - level best to change that. Paul

And there's the view of Madame Nhu, as reported by one of the best journalists of the period. She was a source both well-placed and without obvious motivation to lie or guild the lily on the question of who destroyed her family:

Sorry, I don't invest in the drug trade. Here endeth research into the CIA!

"Today's World Report: Truce Moves Reported In Viet Nam," New York World-Telegram & Sun, (Friday), 25 October 1963, p.6: "LONDON - The government of South Vietnam and Communist North Viet Nam are apparently making exploratory contacts that could lead to a truce, diplomatic sources said. There was no official confirmation…Diplomatic sources said the current moves were believed to be aiming at some sort of truce arrangement with possible wider ramifications." Unconvinced, Cliff - you mean all those CIA guys masquerading as journos and cameramen at the storming of the Presidential palace were...Kennedy loyalists? I'm trying hard to convince myself, but, no, it just isn't working!

I recently rediscovered the following piece. It's tongue-in-cheek, deadly serious, and thought-provoking - not a bad combo. Enjoy! Fidel Castro - Supermole by Servando González http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagsg022.php

From the UK’s smuttiest tabloid, The Times, comes terrible news that British skies were blackened not by Starlings, but by Boris’ bomber squadrons: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/worl...icle2093759.ece While from the intellectual jewel in the Dirty Digger’s UK crown, The Sun, news of a very long spook briefing about a non-existent plot to kill the Robin Hood of modern London town, Boris Berezovksy: http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2-2007330145,00.html Time to buy shares in the arms industry. Pity we haven't yet privatized our heroic spooks. Shares in MI5, anyone?

Noel-Baker's view on who - or rather, what - was running US foreign policy in 1965 was hardly unique. Here's a similar point of view from the same year:

Richard Starnes’s first extended analysis of the State Dept White Paper referred to by Noel-Baker in his Times letter:

Here is the letter from PNB in question: Hard to imagine a letter of comparable literacy or courage emanating from a parliamentary drone of “New Labour.” Or Mockingbird Murdoch’s tabloid Times publishing it. *Eerily familiar. Iraq, Afghanistan anyone?

Unwitting dupe, quite probably due to premature senescence.

David J. Whittaker. Fighter for Peace: Philip Noel-Baker, 1889-1982 (York, England: William Sessions Ltd., 1989), pp.312-315: Noel-Baker “circled the globe in 1962, visiting Canada, the USA, Moscow and…Peking, Hong Kong, and Tokyo…By the summer of 1965…a letter to The Times…lamented the way in which the American President seemed influenced by military advisers and the CIA*…” *Philip Noel-Baker, “Letter to the Editor: An Authority Diminished – President Johnson’s Policies,” The Times, Monday, 19 July 1965, p.11. The CIA used a favoured creature of the period, Peter Bessell, to reply in The Times to Noel-Baker. Bessell’s letter appeared on 21 July 1965.

I can live with it, Sid. The most serious questions facing the Anglosphere today. And yet not a single politician of stature - at least, none that I'm aware - is asking any of them. It is a catastrophe; and will, if current trends are not reversed quickly and decisively, destroy our societies far more effectively than any external threats. Paul

Well, go on then, pick a relevant example and discuss "the evidence." And while you're at it, perhaps you'd deign to tell us who determines what is "evidence" and how it is presented. In cases of terrorism, could it be the intelligence services? And you trust them to give you the truth, the whole truth and nothing but? Why? Is your seeming trust in the spooks based on personal experience, the product of extensive examination, or an article of faith? If you did, it isn't obvious. Good grief! The pomposity is magnificent.

I admire your steadfast refusal to consider the rich history of agent provocateur and false flag ops. Er, why? Why the disposition to see it from the establishment's point of view? The great lesson history teaches us is that we should start from the assumption that the terrorist activity has state sponsorship - until proven otherwise. Relatedly, what the rubes think they are doing, and what their masters really intend, have a tendency to be poles apart. In the case of 9/11, for example, the FBI early went on record as believing that the hijackers in among the passengers thought they were taking part in an old fashioned skyjacking, not a suicide mission. And of the men in the cockpit, was Mohammad Atta, for example, really a devout Muslim, with a head full of virgins? Or just not in nightclubs when knocking back the vodka? A final thought: Given that every time a bomb explodes the spooks' budgets increase significantly, what countervailing incentives are there for them to do better? After all, whoever heard of a spook sacked or disciplined for failing to prevent a bombing?

Gosh, here's hoping I can ascend to such giddy heights of reason as... And miss the fact that the London bombers were NOT suicide bombers. [Hint: they scarpered before anything exploded...] Very impressive. So who is the fool, and what exactly is it you teach? Elementary logic? Rhetoric? Religio-racial stereotyping, perhaps?