Greg Burnham

JFK made various statements to members of the media that appear to contradict the official policy that he had set in place. I believe you are quoting from his interview with Walter Cronkite, if I'm not mistaken. This was not the first or only time that JFK publicly positioned himself contrary to his actual policy. JFK appreciated the power of television and the danger of sound bytes long before the latter had been fully exploited (by today's standards) to pigeon-hole a politician. He knew that with the 1964 presidential election looming in the not too distant future that it would have been political suicide to allow his opposition to paint him as "soft on Communism." Whatever he said "on the record" to the media would potentially be used against him in the court of public opinion. So he operated through back channels often circumventing those whom he had placed in advisory positions. His having dictated the McNamara/Taylor Report--without the participation of McNamara or Taylor--speaks volumes as to his true intent, on the one hand, but also to the demands imposed by political resistance to his authority, on the other.

Agree 100%.

John F. Kennedy Speech Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy on Indochina before the Senate, Washington, D.C., April 6, 1954 Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be told the blunt truth about Indochina. I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in Geneva. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of the Congress which have been briefed – if not consulted – on this matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or an alarmist in my evaluation of the situation. But the speeches of President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and others have left too much unsaid, in my opinion – and what has been left unsaid is the heart of the problem that should concern every citizen. For if the American people are, for the fourth time in this century, to travel the long and tortuous road of war – particularly a war which we now realize would threaten the survival of civilization – then I believe we have a right – a right which we should have hitherto exercised – to inquire in detail into the nature of the struggle in which we may become engaged, and the alternative to such struggle. Without such clarification the general support and success of our policy is endangered. Inasmuch as Secretary Dulles has rejected, with finality, any suggestion of bargaining on Indochina in exchange for recognition of Red China, those discussions in Geneva which concern that war may center around two basic alternatives: The first is a negotiated peace, based either upon partition of the area between the forces of the Viet Minh and the French Union, possibly along the 16th parallel; or based upon a coalition government in which Ho Chi Minh is represented. Despite any wishful thinking to the contrary, it should be apparent that the popularity and prevalence of Ho Chi Minh and his following throughout Indochina would cause either partition or a coalition government to result in eventual domination by the Communists. The second alternative is for the United States to persuade the French to continue their valiant and costly struggle; an alternative which, considering the current state of opinion in France, will be adopted only if the United States pledges increasing support. Secretary Dulles’ statement that the “imposition in southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally…should be met by united action” indicates that it is our policy to give such support; that we will, as observed by the New York Times last Wednesday, “fight if necessary to keep southeast Asia out of their hands”; and that we hope to win the support of the free countries of Asia for united action against communism in Indochina, in spite of the fact that such nations have pursued since the war’s inception a policy of cold neutrality. I think it is important that the Senate and the American people demonstrate their endorsement of Mr. Dulles’ objectives, despite our difficulty in ascertaining the full significance of its key phrases. Certainly, I, for one, favor a policy of a “united action” by many nations whenever necessary to achieve a military and political victory for the free world in that area, realizing full well that it may eventually require some commitment of our manpower. Permit me to review briefly some of the statements concerning the progress of the war in that area, and it will be understood why I say that either we have not frankly and fully faced the seriousness of the military situation, or our intelligence estimates and those of the French have been woefully defective. But to pour money, materiel, and men into the jungles of Indochina without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of “united action” assumes that inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper basis for determining the extent of American participation. In February of 1951, for example, the late Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink, then head of the United States Military Advisory Group, in Indochina, told us of the favorable turn of events in that area as a result of new tactics designed by Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. In the fall of that same year, General De Lattre himself voiced optimism in his speech before the National Press Club here in Washington; and predicted victory, under certain conditions, in 18 months to 2 years, during his visit to France. In June of 1952, American and French officials issued a joint communique in Washington expressing the two countries’ joint determination to bring the battle to a successful end; and Secretary of State Acheson stated at his press conference that: “The military situation appears to be developing favorably. … Aggression has been checked and recent indications warrant the view that the tide is now moving in our favor. … We can anticipate continued favorable developments.” In March 1953, the French officials again came to Washington, again issued statements predicting victory in Indochina, and again joined with the United States in a communique planning military action and United States support which would achieve their new goal of decisive military victory in 2 years. In May of 1953, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles told the Congress that our mutual security program for France and Indochina would help “reduce this Communist pressure to manageable proportions.” In June an American military mission headed by General O’Daniel was sent to discuss with General Navarre in Indochina the manner in which United States aid “may best contribute to the advancement of the objective of defeating the Communist forces there”; and in the fall of last year General O’Daniel stated that he was “confident that the French-trained Vietnam Army when fully organized would prevail over the rebels.” In September of 1953, French and American officials again conferred, and, in announcing a new program of extensive American aid, again issued a joint communique restating the objective of “an early and victorious conclusion.” On December 2, 1953, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson told the Women’s National Republican Club in New York – in words almost identical with those of Secretary of State Acheson 18 months earlier – that “In Indochina…we believe the tide now is turning.” Later the same month Secretary of State Dulles state that military setbacks in the area had been exaggerated; and that he did not “believe that anything that has happened upsets appreciably the timetable of General Navarre’s plan,” which anticipated decisive military results by about March 1955. In February of this year, Defense Secretary Wilson said that a French victory was “both possible and probable” and that the war was going “fully as well as we expected it to at this stage. I see no reason to think Indochina would be another Korea.” Also in February of this year, Under Secretary of State Smith stated that: “The military situation in Indochina is favorable. … Contrary to some reports, the recent advances made by the Viet Minh are largely “real estate” operations. … Tactically, the French position is solid and the officers in the field seem confident of their ability to deal with the situation.” Less than 2 weeks ago, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, stated that “the French are going to win.” And finally, in a press conference some days prior to his speech to the Overseas Press Club in New York, Secretary of State Dulles stated that he did not “expect that there is going to be a Communist victory in Indochina”; that “in terms of Communist domination of Indochina, I do not accept that as a probability”; that “we have seen no reason to abandon the so-called Navarre plan,” which meant decisive results only 1 year hence; and that the United States would provide whatever additional equipment was needed for victory over the Viet Minh; with the upper hand probably to be gained “by the end of the next fighting season.” Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory, every Member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous amounts of economic and material aid from the United States, and despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu. It is, of course, for these reasons that many French are reluctant to continue the struggle without greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area is not to disparage their valor. If “united action” can achieve the necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the security and freedom of all southeast Asia, then such united action is clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions under which that pledge is made. I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, “an enemy of the people” which has the sympathy and covert support of the people. As succinctly stated by the report of the Judd Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in January of this year: “Until political independence has been achieved, an effective fighting force from the associated states cannot be expected. … The apathy of the local population to the menace of the Viet Minh communism disguised as nationalism is the most discouraging aspect of the situation. That can only be overcome through the grant of complete independence to each of the associated states. Only for such a cause as their own freedom will people make the heroic effort necessary to win this kind of struggle.” This is an analysis which is shared, if in some instances grudgingly, by most American observers. Moreover, without political independence for the associated states, the other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this as a war of colonialism; and the “united action” which is said to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention, without participation by the armed forces of the other nations of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the peoples of the associated states, with increasing reluctance and discouragement on the part of the French – and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground – such intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina. This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon my return from the Far East as follows: “In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam Government among the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms. The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure.” In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act which would have provided for the distribution of American aid, to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom and independence desired by the people of the Associated States. My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation; and that the new French Government could be expected to make “a decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment or resolution.” The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland] assured us that “We will all work, in conjunction with our great ally, France, toward the freedom of the people of those states.” It is true that only 2 days later on July 3 the French Government issued a statement agreeing that: “There is every reason to complete the independence of sovereignty of the Associated States of Indochina by insuring … the transfer of the powers … retained in the interests of the States themselves, because of the perilous circumstances resulting from the state of war.” In order to implement this agreement, Bao Dai arrived in Paris on August 27 calling for “complete independence for Vietnam.” I do not wish to weary the Senate with a long recital of the proceedings of the negotiations, except to say that as of today they have brought no important change in the treaty relationships between Vietnam and the French Republic. Today the talks appear to be at an impasse; and the return from Paris to Saigon of the Premier of Vietnam, Prince Buu Loc, is not a happy augury for their success. Thus the degree of control which the French retain in the area is approximately the same as I outlined last year: Politically, French control was and is extensive and paramount. There is no popular assembly in Vietnam which represents the will of the people that can ratify the treaty relationship between Vietnam and the French. Although the Associated States are said to be “independent within the French Union,” the French always have a permanent control in the high council and in the Assembly of the Union and the Government of France guides its actions. Under article 62 of the French Constitution, the French Government “coordinates” all of the resources of the members of the Union placed in common to guarantee its defense, under policies directed and prepared by the French Government. French Union subjects are given special legal exemptions, including the privilege of extraterritoriality. The French High Commissioner continues to exercise powers with respect to the internal security of the Associated States, and will have a similar mission even after the restoration of peace. When Vietnamese taxes affect French Union subjects, there must be consultation with the representatives of the countries concerned before they are imposed. The foreign policy of Vietnam must be coordinated with that of France, and the French must give consent to the sending of diplomatic missions to foreign countries. Inasmuch as the French did not develop experienced governmental administrators before World War II, they have guided to some degree actions within the local governments by requiring the Vietnamese Government to turn to them for foreign counselors and technicians. Militarily, French control is nearly complete. The United States has in the past dealt primarily with the French military authority, and these in turn deal with the Associated States. Our equipment and aid is turned over to the French who will then arrange for its distribution according to their decision. The French are granted for a period of time without limit facilities for bases and garrisons. Culturally, the French are directly in contact with the training of intellectual youths of Vietnam, inasmuch as France joined in the establishment of the university, installed a French rector, and provided that all instructions should be in French. Economically, French control of the country’s basic resources, transportation, trade, and economic life in general is extensive. In Vietnam, estimated French control is nearly 100 percent in the field of foreign commerce, international and coastal shipping, and rubber and other export products. The French control 66 percent of the rice export trade. Moreover, possession of property belonging to the French cannot be changed without permission of the French; and France shares the veto right under the PAU agreement on matters affecting France’s export and import trade. All of this flies in the face of repeated assurances to the American people by our own officials that complete independence has been or will be granted. In February of 1951, for example, the American Minister to the Associated States, Donald Heath, told us that the French colonial regime had ended and that “all Indochinese Government services were turned over to the Indochinese States.” This is untrue. In November of 1951, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk again assured us that: “The peoples of the Associated States are free to assume the extensive responsibility for their own affairs that has been accorded them by treaties with France.” Last year, the Department of States assured me that: “France had granted such a full measure of control to the 3 states over their own affairs that … these 3 countries became sovereign states.” In February of this year, Under Secretary of State Smith stated that the representatives of the Governments of Vietnam and of France would “meet in Paris to draw up the treaty which will complete Vietnamese independence.” As I have said, those conversations began in July, and broke off 10 days ago. And again Secretary Dulles stated last week that: “Their independence is not yet complete, but the French Government last July declared its intention to complete that independence, and negotiations to consummate that pledge are underway.” –They are underway 9 months after the pledge was originally given. I do not believe that the importance of the current breakdown of these negotiations has been made clear to the Senate or the people of the United States. Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second, that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed under steps “now” being undertaken; and, third, that military victory for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just around the corner, or lies 2 years off. But the stringent limitations upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain; and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of their reiteration, and they have caused this Nation to delay definitive action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may well be past. It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions of military victory and assurances of complete independence have given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first, that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable officer corps, a military victory, even with American support, in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and, second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union. Instead of approaching a solution to this problem, as Secretary Dulles indicated, French and Vietnamese officials appear to be receding from it. The Vietnamese, whose own representatives lack full popular support, because of a lack of popular assembly in that country, recognizing that French opinion favoring a military withdrawal would become overwhelming if all ties were entirely broken, have sought 2 treaties: one giving the Vietnamese complete and genuine independence, and the other maintaining a tie with the French Union on the basis of equality, as in the British Commonwealth. But 9 months of negotiations have failed thus far to provide a formula for both independence and union which is acceptable to the parties currently in the government of each nation. The French Assembly on March 9 – and I believe this action did not receive the attention it deserved – substantially lessened the chances of such a solution, through the adoption of a tremendously far-reaching rider which declared that France would consider her obligations toward Indochinese states ended if they should revoke the clauses in the French Constitution that bind them to the French Union. In other words, Mr. President, the French Parliament indicated that France would no longer have any obligations toward the Associated States if the present ties which bind them to the French Union – ties which assure, because of the constitutional arrangement of the French Union, that the French Republic and its Government are always the dominant power in the union – were broken. I realize that Secretary Dulles cannot force the French to adopt any course of action to which they are opposed; nor am I unaware of the likelihood of a French military withdrawal from Indochina, once its political and economic stake in that area is gone. But we must realize that the difficulties in the military situation which would result from a French withdrawal would not be greatly different from the difficulties which would prevail after the intervention of American troops without the support of the Indochinese or the other nations of Asia. The situation might be compared to what the situation would have been in Korea, if the Japanese had maintained possession of Korea, if a Communist group of Koreans were carrying on a war there with Japan – which had dominated that area for more than a century – and if we then went to the assistance of the Japanese, and put down the revolution of the native Koreans, even though they were Communists, and even though in taking that action we could not have the support of the non-Communist elements of country. That is the type of situation, whether we like it or not, which is presented today in connection with our support of the French in Indochina, without the support of the native peoples of Indochina. In Indochina, as in Korea, the battle against communism should be a battle, not for economic or political gain, but for the security of the free world, and for the values and institutions which are held dear in France and throughout the non-Communist world, as well as in the United States. It seems to me, therefore, that the dilemma which confronts us is not a hopeless one; that a victorious fight can be maintained by the French, with the support of this Nation and many other nations – and most important of all, the support of the Vietnamese and other peoples of the Associated States – once it is recognized that the defense of southeast Asia and the repelling of Communist aggression are the objectives of such a struggle, and not the maintenance of political relationships founded upon ancient colonialism. In such a struggle, the United States and other nations may properly be called upon to play their fullest part. If, however, this is not to be the nature of the war; if the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle. The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review, and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people, then, as Thomas Jefferson once said: “If we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion by education.” ===========END QUOTE=================================== Insomuch as the United States' continued failure by 1963 to enlist the earnest backing of the Native Peoples of Indochina in our struggle against so-called Communist aggression from the north, as evidenced by the Viet Cong in the south, it is no surprise that JFK's position to withdraw from that struggle had NOT changed from what it had long been since as early as the 1950's. Indeed, only if his objections to our involvement in Vietnam--that he delineated above--were no longer germane could we reasonably expect that he would have escalated US involvement had he lived to serve a second term. As he stated above, without the support of the Vietnamese people no amount of American intervention (money, personnel and/or materiel) could hope to be successful. By 1963 the situation had not changed in terms of garnering that support. Indeed, it had deteriorated even further. The government of Diem had failed to unite the population of the south in resistance against the North Vietnamese backed Viet Cong. Because JFK always opposed any US intervention without the support of the native population, if there was to be any chance of him escalating the war, Diem had to be done away with first. Theoretically, if the next Chief Executive of that country could unite the populace against the North, that would have allowed a case to be made to JFK for escalation. Two weeks following the death of Diem, a State Department Cable was sent out to those participating in the upcoming Honolulu Conference; a cable which confirmed that the agenda for discussions at the conference had NOT changed following the death of Diem due to the new political climate that resulted therefrom. Implementation of the JFK Withdrawal Policy remained the focus: “(2) MILITARY, INCLUDING REPORT ON PROGRESS IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF TASKS ASSIGNED AS A RESULT OF THE MCNAMARA, TAYLOR MISSION*, AND OUTLINING PLANS FOR CONTROL OF INFILTRATION AND SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DELTA CAMPAIGN.” [*Again note that the ONLY portion of the McNamara-Taylor (Mission) Report that was approved by JFK was the part recommending a complete withdrawal of the bulk of all US personnel by the end of 1965. There is no indication in this cable that he had changed his mind or that he was re-considering his earlier decision–not even in light of the changed political situation in South Vietnam.] The assassination of Diem was like a shot across JFK's bow. When it became unequivocally apparent that JFK was not going to allow escalation under almost any circumstances, he too, had to be done away with. While I don't believe Vietnam was the entire motivation for his assassination, it played a significant part.

I didn't intend to make you re-post something you've already covered. Perhaps you can instead post the link to the work?

I grew weary of waiting. I just found the answer to this question on my forum. Robert and I went back and forth on this question for many, many pages regarding the whereabouts of the bullet. After suggesting that he knew where it went, it was like pulling teeth to get him to finally just say it out loud. My apologies for not remembering exactly what Bob's answer to that question had been and for forgetting that he had, in fact, already answered it elsewhere.

LOL I love a good sport, Greg. I'm just running out to do a job but I'll respond to this later today. Bumped: Where did the bullet go, Robert? You have offered us characteristics of the bullet, such as, the tendency toward stability inherent to its length, the tendency toward turbulence in its wake resultant from the round shape of its nose and wide/flat bottom, etc. However, that is not an answer to the question you asked of us in your earlier post in this thread nor on my forum! This is a straight forward question. "Where did the bullet GO?" For the sake of this inquiry, based upon the implication you left that you know the answer to THAT question, please note that: I do not need to know "Why?" nor do I need to know "How?" the bullet ended up "where" it eventually came to rest. We can discuss that later. First, I only want to know where Robert Prudhomme thinks the bullet came to rest. Perhaps you think there was no bullet at all? Perhaps Humes inflicted the wound during autopsy? Perhaps there is some other explanation that you have yet to share? Inquiring minds want to know especially since you promised to answer the question you posed.

That's what you said on my forum, too. But you never did deliver.

Ok, I'll bite: Where did the bullet go, Robert?

You're assuming, of course, that the wound was made at a point on Elm that would be inconsistent with such a trajectory. However, we have no reliable source to cite for the exact location of the limo. You are assuming, of course, that the shot that caused this wound originated from the south east corner of the TSBD. We have no "admissible" evidence to indicate that a shot was fired from that location by Oswald or by anyone else. You are assuming, of course, that the wound was caused by a 6.5 mm Carcano round. This has not been proved. If we rely on the autopsy, in order to impeach itself, if not impeach the WCR, the autopsy evidence indicates, as you have alluded--not only to the incompetence of Humes--but if he is correct in his report on this issue of the size of the wound and if Sibert and O'Neil reported accurately what they witnessed, then we have evidence that the round that caused the back wound was NOT a 6.5 mm Carcano round at all! IMO: This is yet another example of how micro-analyzing the evidence leads nowhere except in circles. Again, I submit, this is not the fault of the researchers attempting to discover the truth. Rather it was and remains the intent of those who conspired to "keep us busy" seeking answers to questions that may not be knowable.

The following are worth the read, IMO. None to be taken as gospel truth, but rather as data sets worth evaluation. Dr. Mary's Monkey by Ed Haslam From an Office with a High Powered Rifle by Don Adams Survivor's Guilt by Vince Palomara Self-Portrait of a Scoundrel by Chauncey Holt

Sorry for going a bit down the rabbit hole, Robert. I hope that what I offered earlier had some merit.

Am I going to take the bait and challenge your claim that Vince was talking about the "clothing" evidence alone? Nope. Am I going to take the bait and ask you to provide a citation in support of your claim that Vince was talking about the "clothing" evidence alone? Nope. That's exactly what you want me to do. You think you can keep me busy for so much longer. Wrong. Which side of this case are you really on? Now I finally know.

Cliff, Although I agree with your location for the entrance wound, as you can see from DVP's above statement, it matters not. He refuses to admit that the SBT does not work even if the wound had, in fact, been located higher. IOW: The SBT is obsolete no matter if one chooses to locate the back wound at T-3 or uses the T-1 location. You are giving him a means to avoid that issue by setting up a rather irrelevant (for the sake of Bob's analysis) rebuttal. This is precisely why I gave my presentation in Washington last year. It is this constant micro-analyzing the evidence that leads to nowhere. Hell, you even quote Vince Salandria's sentiments to that effect in your signature! Yet, you pay them no heed.

There we go disagreeing again! I don't think it begs the question, I think it answers it!

Robert, Yours is what I call a double-whammy argument. You and I have often disagreed, but I support your methodology and argumentation in this instance. It is fairly easy to comprehend that flawed evidential interpretation, such as the misplaced location of the entrance wound, tends to produce flawed conclusions based upon those interpretations. However, your argument is stronger, not merely because of a different and perhaps superior interpretation of the evidence (T-3 as opposed to T-1), but because it stands on its own merit even when anchored to the opposing argument's (presumed flawed) premise (entrance at T-1). It allows the faulty argument to impeach itself. Well done.

From Carl Anthony online who discusses what JFK had planned for his second term as reported to him [Anthony] by Jacqueline Kennedy: Of all her later recollections about what President Kennedy intended to do, the most upsetting to her was what she curiously characterized as a “secret meeting,” with U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge. President Kennedy with the man he soon after appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, 1961. (AP) Her account suggests that he went into uncharacteristic detail with her about the reasons for this, briefing her fully on the current and unfolding situation. He would have had two strong reasons for doing this. First, he was meeting with the Ambassador not at the White House but at their private weekend home “Wexford,” thus intruding on what was supposed to be set aside as time alone with her and their children. Second, since the time they had first begun dating, while he was a freshman U.S. Senator and she was a newspaper columnist and photographer, he had known of her particular depth of knowledge and nuanced understanding of the delicate situation in Vietnam which, along with Laos and Cambodia, formed the former French colony of “Indochina.” She had begun studying the situation since 1949 while enrolled at the Sorbonne and she also translated French military policy reports for him on the matter in 1953. It is unclear why the account provided by Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis in 1990 contradicts the later publicly reported claim that the meeting was to take place at Camp David. The widowed Jacqueline Kennedy greets her friend Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, 1967. As the former First Lady specifically amplified my original manuscript account: “He [JFK] was searching for a way to relieve the ambassador of his duties and to gradually diminish the U.S. presence in Vietnam. JFK had scheduled a White House meeting on this subject for Monday morning, November 25.” This particular intention of JFK’s, “haunted for years” Jacqueline Kennedy (as her friend, the JFK-LBJ Defense Secretary Robert McNamara put it in our taped interview) because instead of beginning perhaps “to gradually diminish the U.S. presence in Vietnam” on Monday, November 25, 1963, the President was instead being buried at Arlington National Cemetery that day. ============= Again for emphasis, according to Jackie Kennedy: “He [JFK] was searching for a way to relieve the ambassador [Lodge] of his duties and to gradually diminish the U.S. presence in Vietnam. JFK had scheduled a White House meeting on this subject for Monday morning, November 25.”

This could be the most amazing statement ever posted on the forum. Just wanted to acknowledge it. I wholeheartedly agree Ron, I laughed for a whole 30 seconds reading DVP post. Common sense and the Single Bullet Fantasy. When you've stopped laughing, could you provide a viable alternative 'common sense' explanation? And there it is. One of the favorite lone nut apologist's fallacies being employed once again. It's colloquially called, "The Burden of Proof" fallacy. Let me first say that even IF the conclusion being asserted were true the argument given to support it would remain fallacious. However, in this case, the conclusion is false. The case has not been made. The argument does not persuade. The rules of logic apply to all rational argumentation, not just in a courtroom. So please don't duck out of this by exclaiming, "We aren't in a courtroom!" -- Where we are is irrelevant. Logic is logic. The SBT is a "claim" advanced by those who insist that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone, assassinated JFK. It is an assertion of alleged facts. Therefore, the Burden of Proof rests on those making that assertion. It does not rest on those disputing the assertion. A similar example of this type of fallacious argumentation takes the following form: Person A claims that: "During the middle of the night I heard a loud sound resembling a motor in my backyard, from around the edges of the curtains I saw a very bright light apparently descending in my yard and the next morning I noticed what appeared to be a perfectly round area of yellowed grass in my otherwise green lawn. That means a spacecraft landed in my backyard, but by the time I went out to check, it had already taken off..." Person B then disputes the claim, by telling Person A: "Your explanation of the evidence is much too farfetched ON ITS FACE to be true." (Just like the SBT is too farfetched on its face to be true). Person B then lists the items in the claim that are most unbelievable. Rather than adequately addressing the criticisms of the claim as raised by Person B, instead Person A says: "Common sense alone practically PROVES that a spaceship landed in my backyard last night." Person B says: "I can barely stop laughing at your illogical approach." Person A then commits the Burden of Proof fallacy by saying: "If it wasn't a spaceship that landed in my backyard last night, when you've stopped laughing, could you provide a viable alternative 'common sense' explanation?" ------- No. The BURDEN is on he who made the claim, not on he who disputes it! Of course, this sets up yet another fallacy, known as the "False Dichotomy" which implies, by an inappropriate inference, that if Person B cannot come up with an alternate theory to explain the evidence, then Person A's spaceship theory must be true. This is obviously fallacious. Paul, in all due respect, resorting to this type of sloppy (deliberate or not) reasoning is rather abusive. It is an assault on a thinking mind. Serious conspiracy researchers need not take the bait to become "conspiracy theorists." My job has never been to offer speculation about exactly how what happened occurred. I need not prove that any one of the hundreds of "possible theories" might be true. I only need to show that one single theory, the WCR, cannot possibly be true. Until the BURDEN of PROOF by those making the case for the SBT is met, my job is complete. I don't claim to have the resources to solve the case. I claim that those who had and/or have those resources (the WC and HSCA) got it wrong and they deliberately obstructed justice. Put another way, to show the absurdity in the argument advanced by Paul, since the BURDEN of PROOF--by Person A who is making the case for a spaceship landing in his backyard--has not been met, Person B's inability to explain the evidence (by substituting a different explanation than the "spaceship") does not give weight to the validity of Person A's claim.

Thank you, Kenneth. Your comments were not off course at all.

A Certain Arrogance by George Michael Evica

Mark, I think you've identified the problem. I like your math class analogy. It is a perfect symptom of the failure of our educational system. Back when we were grammar school students there were no calculators, Google, cell phones, etc., from which we could have cheated to get the answer. Yet they forced us to learn "long division" thoroughly, show our work, only to then teach us "short division" immediately thereafter. Learning long division was and is completely unnecessary. It added no value other than to teach us how not to solve division problems--as if we would have stumbled upon such a cumbersome method on our own! Imagine moving into a new house and one of your neighbors rings your doorbell to welcome you to the neighborhood. Say he invites you over for a beer. Not yet knowing which house he lives in, you ask him how to get there. He proceeds to give you these directions: "When you leave your house go to the sidewalk and turn right. Go to the first corner and turn right. Walk one bock to the next corner and turn right again. Walk one block and turn right again. Go to the very next corner and turn right again. Then walk down the street. My house is the one you come to just before you get back to your own." It's true. You can get there that way. But it's like long division. A waste of time. He could have just said: "I'm your next door neighbor on the left side as you face the street." Or, he could have given you directions: "Walk out of your house and go to the sidewalk. Turn left and I'm the first house you come to on the left side." That's like short division. Unlike when we were kids growing up, today I see a need for a student to prove his or her answer did not originate from the clandestine use of a calculator or other electronic method of cheating. However, there are methods of doing fairly complex mathematical calculations "within one's head" and without writing anything down. What to do with the student who possesses such gifts? What to do with these methods if they turn out not to be "gifts" but rather "better and more efficient" means to the same end and can be learned? Indeed, I would find any teacher incompetent who penalizes a student for "getting the correct answer" on the basis that the student employed an alternate method to the one being taught! In my view, so long as that method is reliable and, in some cases, may even be more efficient than the method being taught, the student's alternate method should be applauded rather than stifled. So this "model" of learning has not served us well. It has limited us to a paradigm that tends to exclude the underlying substance. It is more concerned with appearance than it is with function.

Cliff, You are still attempting to persuade the unpersuadable that there was a conspiracy by virtue of a proper interpretation of the physical evidence. Those who obstinately cling to the lone nut position have long had sufficient evidence, physical and otherwise, to become enlightened. Your endless quest to persuade others to appreciate what it is fails to address what it means. There are only fan blades spinning on the distant horizon, Don Quixote. What you're missing is the significance of the electricity they produce beneath the surface.

Greg, did you realize how many "respected" researchers put JFK's back wound at the back base of his neck -- in spite of the overwhelming evidence of a wound at T3? The physical evidence in the case -- the clothing evidence, which Salandria, Fonzi & Schotz have advocated to deaf ears -- is regarded with studied indifference at CTKA, outright hostility at ROKC, and goes over the head of Charles Drago. Yes, the JFK cover-up is alive and well and has the JFK Assassination Critical Research Community as an adjunct. Not to be redundant, but as I said previously [with emphasis now added]: I would appreciate it if the contributors to this thread would consider the thrust of my presentation before posting. In that presentation I submitted that we are playing into the hands of those who would obstruct justice when we, again, continue to rehash items of so-called "evidence," which more often than not is in conflict with other items of so-called "evidence." Researchers have, quite understandably, not given the same amount of weight to each item of so-called "evidence." Rather the value of each item is weighted according to the opinion of that researcher. And the opinion of each researcher is instructed, in part, by his or her education, critical thinking skills, personal bias and so forth. And so round and round we go...again. Until we choose to stop. Can we take a break from that exercise...just for now...just in this thread? If we do, perhaps we will discover that there are items of equal or greater value to discuss other than the mountain of conflicting evidence that has been the subject of our effort for over a half century, but has led us nowhere.

I think that we do ourselves a disservice when we treat this crime as a "simple" homicide instead of viewing it as a political assassination. If this were a "simple" homicide perpetrated by one man against another man the main loss suffered would have resided in the death of the individual victim, followed by the loss to his immediate family, then followed by the loss to his extended family and friends, and finally, followed by the loss to the community at large. Insomuch as the "average Joe" may have a relatively minor contribution to the community at large, the loss is barely felt or even noticed on that level. Not so in the case of John F. Kennedy. In this case the degree of loss suffered and its attendant tragic result is manifest most severely by its effect on the (global) community at large. It is not a case of one man killing another in order to steal his wallet. Nor was it a crime of passion. So micro-inspecting the elements of the crime, such as, motive, means and opportunity--as would be appropriate if this were a "simple" homicide--fail to address the most important clue of all: The outcome. I submit that the outcome is dynamic. It is ongoing. It is not over. It continues to evolve over time. The conspirators' successors are still operationally engaged to this day, managing the message, running the show. This is not a cover-up designed by RONCO, where you can: "Set it and forget it!" It is in need of constant maintenance. It takes an ever growing amount of energy to preserve itself. This thing is alive.

I would appreciate it if the contributors to this thread would consider the thrust of my presentation before posting. In that presentation I submitted that we are playing into the hands of those who would obstruct justice when we, again, continue to rehash items of so-called "evidence," which more often than not is in conflict with other items of so-called "evidence." Researchers have, quite understandably, not given the same amount of weight to each item of so-called "evidence." Rather the value of each item is weighted according to the opinion of that researcher. And the opinion of each researcher is instructed, in part, by his or her education, critical thinking skills, personal bias and so forth. And so round and round we go...again. Until we choose to stop. Can we take a break from that exercise...just for now...just in this thread? If we do, perhaps we will discover that there are items of equal or greater value to discuss other than the mountain of conflicting evidence that has been the subject of our effort for over a half century, but has led us nowhere.