Greg Burnham

Are you kidding me? Do you think we all live in the city of Dallas? What right does anyone who lives outside the city, county, even the state of Texas have to call and complain about a city police matter? Are you out of your mind Robert? I hope you call the DPD over and over so you get arrested for harrasment In other news im glad Groden won, I have always been and always will be behind Groden and his work ROFLMFAO Dean!!!! Nice.

Bill, As you already know, we had many such "attacks" on JFKresearch Assassination Forum. None resulted in an "actual" or permanent shut down. The messages always turned out to be a hoax and were "hacker" driven. However, one hack was so destructive that we needed to reconstruct the entire "forum" portion of the site from archives. Some "last minute" entries (just prior to the hack) were lost, but very few. On more than one occasion, Rich changed servers to increase security. Sometimes more data is lost than at other times. It all depends. Hopefully, this will be a hoax, but ultimately not too destructive.

Duke, I haven't the time to argue these points beyond a few short lines. 1) The early implication that Fletcher Prouty was somehow "out-of-the-loop" in your first reply is absurd. He was the Chief of Special Operations which means he was all over it...perhaps even more so than many of the Generals! 2) The implication that his account was "second hand" knowledge is absurd. Prouty personally handed the leather bound "McNamara-Taylor Report" to the pilot and instructed that pilot as to how he was to brief McNamara & Taylor! 3) FYI: I spoke with Peter Dale Scott (and communicated through email) months ago when I sent my paper to him upon its completion. Other than a few minor items, he indicated that he essentially agreed with all I had written. Now, during my presentation, I acknowledge his good work. We may have differences, but we don't dismiss each other's conclusions at all. 4) A "National Security Action Memorandum" has 2 key concepts in it. The first is National Security, which TRUMPS all other considerations. The second is ACTION. It is not like "passing a note" in class. Not only might it delineate policy, it is a directive intended to implement that policy: ACTION. Finally, my intent was to get people thinking about these issues again because I believe they remain important. Thanks for thinking...

I'm directly posting the image you referenced for comparison purposes.

EXCELLENT Monk! David Thanks David!

Hi Duke, I only have time for an abbreviated answer this morning. I think you made a typo when you said the McNamara - Taylor Report was the basis of 273. It wasn't. 263 was based on that report. The McNamara - Taylor Report has NOTHING to do with the Honolulu Conference, per se. In other words, the McNamara-Taylor Report was delivered to Kennedy on October 2nd, 1963. The Honolulu Conference took place about 6 weeks later on November 20-21, 1963. According to the "official record" the report was ostensibly written on the airplane from Honolulu to Washington. However, Colonel L Fletcher Prouty was there in Washington working directly under Krulak's supervision during this time. Prouty's account is exactly what I was conveying in my presentation. I have no cause to disbelieve Prouty's account. The idea that this was done on the way home seems quite a stretch, but may have gone unnoticed if we didn't have Prouty's account. With his account, we scrutinize the official story and the illusion emerges for what it is. According to WIKI: ======================================= "Drafting the report After a one-day stopover in Honolulu to prepare their report, McNamara and Taylor arrived back in Washington on October 2. The report was written hurriedly on the plane trip back to Washington. Forrestal described the report as a 'mishmash of everything.' During the 27 hour flight, Bundy managed only to get two hours of sleep between his writing and later opined that 'neither their draftsmanship nor judgment is likely to be at its best under such working conditions.' They promptly met with the President and the National Security Council. Their report concluded that the 'military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress.' On the other hand, it warned that the serious political tensions in Saigon due to the Buddhist crisis and the increasing unpopularity of Diem and Nhu as a result of their anti-Buddhist activities could stoke the dissent of some ARVN officers and erode what they believed was favourable military progress. Taylor and Maxwell reported to having seen no evidence of a successful coup being prepared, and felt that American pressure would probably only further harden the Ngo family's attitudes. Nevertheless, 'unless such pressures are exerted, they [Diem-Nhu] are almost certain to continue past patterns of behavior.'" ======================================= Below find the entire McNamara-Taylor Report: 167. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President [1] Washington, October 2, 1963. SUBJECT Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam Your memorandum of 21 September 1963 [2] directed that General Taylor and Secretary McNamara proceed to South Vietnam to appraise the military and para-military effort to defeat the Viet Cong and to consider, in consultation with Ambassador Lodge, related political and social questions. You further directed that, if the prognosis in our judgment was not hopeful, we should present our views of what action must be taken by the South Vietnam Government and what steps our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese to that action. Accompanied by representatives of the State Department, CIA, and your Staff, we have conducted an intensive program of visits to key operational areas, supplemented by discussions with U.S. officials in all major U.S. Agencies as well as officials of the GVN and third countries. We have also discussed our findings in detail with Ambassador Lodge, and with General Harkins and Admiral Felt. The following report is concurred in by the Staff Members of the mission as individuals, subject to the exceptions noted. I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. Conclusions. 1. The military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress. 2. There are serious political tensions in Saigon (and perhaps elsewhere in South Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu government is becoming increasingly unpopular. 3. There is no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup, although assassination of Diem or Nhu is always a possibility. 4. Although some, and perhaps an increasing number, of GVN military officers are becoming hostile to the government, they are more hostile to the Viet Cong than to the government and at least for the near future they will continue to perform their military duties. 5. Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu could change the present favorable military trends. On the other hand, a return to more moderate methods of control and administration, unlikely though it may be, would substantially mitigate the political crisis. 6. It is not clear that pressures exerted by the U.S. will move Diem and Nhu toward moderation. Indeed, pressures may increase their obduracy. But unless such pressures are exerted, they are almost certain to continue past patterns of behavior. B. Recommendations. We recommend that: 1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as: a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps). b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended. c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value. d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength. e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta. f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced. 2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time. 3. In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort. 4. The following actions be taken to impress upon Diem our disapproval of his political program. a. Continue to withhold commitment of funds in the commodity import program, but avoid a formal announcement. The potential significance of the withholding of commitments for the 1964 military budget should be brought home to the top military officers in working level contacts between USOM and MACV and the Joint General Staff; up to now we have stated $95 million may be used by the Vietnamese as a planning level for the commodity import program for 1964. Henceforth we could make clear that this is uncertain both because of lack of final appropriation action by the Congress and because of executive policy. b. Suspend approval of the pending AID loans for the Saigon- Cholon Waterworks and Saigon Electric Power Project. We should state clearly that we are doing so as a matter of policy. c. Advise Diem that MAP and CIA support for designated units, now under Colonel Tung's control (mostly held in or near the Saigon area for political reasons) will be cut off unless these units are promptly assigned to the full authority of the Joint General Staff and transferred to the field. d. Maintain the present purely "correct" relations with the top GVN, and specifically between the Ambassador and Diem. Contact between General Harkins and Diem and Defense Secretary Thuan on military matters should not, however, be suspended, as this remains an important channel of advice. USOM and USIA should also seek to maintain contacts where these are needed to push forward programs in support of the effort in the field, while taking care not to cut across the basic picture of U.S. disapproval and uncertainty of U.S. aid intentions. We should work with the Diem government but not support it.[3] As we pursue these courses of action, the situation must be closely watched to see what steps Diem is taking to reduce repressive practices and to improve the effectiveness of the military effort. We should set no fixed criteria, but recognize that we would have to decide in 2-4 months whether to move to more drastic action or try to carry on with Diem even if he had not taken significant steps. 5. At this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage actively a change in government. Our policy should be to seek urgently to identify and build contacts with an alternative leadership if and when it appears. 6. The following statement be approved as current U.S. policy toward South Vietnam and constitute the substance of the government position to be presented both in Congressional testimony and in public statements. a. The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United States security. For this reason, we adhere to the overriding objective of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible. (By suppressing the insurgency we mean reducing it to proportions manageable by the national security forces of the GVN, unassisted by the presence of U.S. military forces.) We believe the U.S. part of the task can be completed by the end of 1965, the terminal date which we are taking as the time objective of our counterinsurgency programs. b. The military program in Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle. c. The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply serious. It has not yet significantly affected the military effort, but could do so at some time in the future. If the result is a GVN ineffective in the conduct of the war, the U.S. will review its attitude toward support for the government. Although we are deeply concerned by repressive practices, effective performance in the conduct of the war should be the determining factor in our relations with the GVN. d. The U.S. has expressed its disapproval of certain actions of the Diem-Nhu regime and will do so again if required. Our policy is to seek to bring about the abandonment of repression because of its effect on the popular will to resist. Our means consist of expressions of disapproval and the withholding of support from GVN activities that are not clearly contributing to the war effort. We will use these means as required to assure an effective military program. [Here follow Sections II, "Military Situation and Trends," III, "Economic Situation and Trends," IV, "Political Situation and Trends," and V, "Effect on Political Tension."] VI. OVERALL EVALUATION From the above analysis it is clear that the situation requires a constant effort by the U.S. to obtain a reduction of political tensions and improved performance by the Vietnamese Government. We cannot say with assurance whether the effort against the Viet Cong will ultimately fail in the absence of major political improvements. However, it does seem clear that after another period of repressive action progress may be reduced and indeed reversed. Although the present momentum might conceivably continue to carry the effort forward even if Diem remains in power and political tensions continue, any significant slowing in the rate of progress would surely have a serious effect on U.S. popular support for the U.S. effort. VII. U.S. LEVERAGES TO OBTAIN DESIRED CHANGES IN THE DIEM REGIME A. Conduct of U.S. Representatives. U.S. personnel in Saigon might adopt an attitude of coolness toward their Vietnamese counterparts, maintaining only those contacts and communications which are necessary for the actual conduct of operations in the field. To some extent this is the attitude already adopted by the Ambassador himself, but it could be extended to the civilian and military agencies located in Saigon. The effect of such action would be largely psychological. B. Economic Leverage. Together, USOM's Commodity Import Program (CIP) and the PL 480 program account for between 60 and 70 percent of imports into Vietnam. The commitment of funds under the CIP has already been suspended. CIP deliveries result in the generation of piastres, most of which go to the support of the defense budget. It is estimated that CIP pipelines will remain relatively large for some five or six months, and within this time period there would not be a serious material effect. Even within this period, however, the flow of piastres to support the defense budget will gradually begin to decline and the GVN will be forced to draw down its foreign exchange reserves or curtail its military expenditures. Within the domestic economy the existing large pipelines would mean that there would be no material reason for inflation to begin in the short term period. However, the psychological effect of growing realization that the CIP program has been suspended might be substantial in 2-4 months. Saigon has a large number of speculative traders, and although there is considerable police effort to control prices, this might not be able to contain a general trend of speculation and hoarding. Once inflation did develop, it could have a serious effect on the GVN budget and the conduct of the war. Apart from CIP, two major AID projects are up for final approval--the Saigon-Cholon Waterworks ($9 million) and the Saigon Electric Power Project ($4 million). Suspension of these projects would be a possible means of demonstrating to Congress and the world that we disapprove of GVN policies and are not providing additional aid not directly essential to the war effort. C. Paramilitary and Other Assistance. (1) USOM assistance to the Combat Police and USOM and USIS assistance to the Director General of Information and the ARVN PsyWar Program could be suspended. These projects involve a relatively small amount of local currency but their suspension, particularly in the case of USIS, might adversely affect programs which the U.S. wishes to see progress. (2) However, there would be merit in a gesture aimed at Colonel Tung, the Special Forces Commander, whose forces in or near Saigon played a conspicuous part in the pagoda affair and are a continuing support for Diem. Colonel Tung commands a mixed complex of forces, some of which are supported by MAP and others presently through CIA. All of those now in or near Saigon were trained either for combat missions or for special operations into North Vietnam and Laos. Purely on grounds of their not being used for their proper missions, the U.S. could inform Diem that we would cut off MAP and CIA support unless they were placed directly under Joint General Staff and were committed to field operations. The practical effect of the cut-off would probably be small. The equipment cannot be taken out of the hands of the units, and the pay provided to some units could be made up from the GVN budget. Psychologically, however, the significance of the gesture might be greater. At the least it would remove one target of press criticism of the U.S., and would probably also be welcomed by the high military officers in Vietnam, and certainly by the disaffected groups in Saigon. At the same time, support should continue, but through General Harkins rather than CIA, for border surveillance and other similar field operations that are contributing to the war effort. We have weighed this cut-off action carefully. It runs a risk that Colonel Tung would refuse to carry out external operations against the Lao corridor and North Vietnam. It might also limit CIA's access to the military. However, U.S. liaison with high military officers could probably be fully maintained through the U.S. military advisors. On balance, we conclude that these possible disadvantages are outweighed by the gains implicit in this action. (3) Consideration has been given both by USOM and the military (principally the JCS in Washington) to the possibility of redirecting economic and military assistance in such a fashion as to bypass the central government in Saigon. Military studies have shown the technical feasibility, though with great difficulty and cost, of supplying the war effort in the countryside over lines of communications which do not involve Saigon, and it is assumed that the same conclusions would apply to USOM deliveries to the filed under the rural strategic hamlet program. However, there is a consensus among U.S. agencies in Saigon that such an effort is not practical in the face of determined opposition by the GVN unless, of course, a situation had developed where the central government was no longer in control of some areas of the country. Nor is it at all clear that such diversion would operate to build up the position of the military or to cut down Nhu's position. D. Propaganda. Although the capability of USIS to support the United States campaign of pressure against the regime would be small, the Ambassador believes consideration must be given to the content and timing of the United States pronouncements outside the country. He has already suggested the use of the Voice of America in stimulating, in its broadcasts to Vietnamese, discussions of democratic political philosophies. This medium could be used to exploit a wide range of ascending political pressure. In addition, a phased program of United States official pronouncements could be developed for use in conjunction with the other leverages as they are applied. We must recognize the possibility that such actions may incite Diem to strong countermeasures. E. The Leverage of Conditioning Our Military Aid on Satisfactory Progress. Coupled with all the above there is the implicit leverage embodied in our constantly making it plain to Diem and other that the long term continuation of military aid is conditioned upon the Vietnamese Government demonstrating a satisfactory level of progress toward defeat of the insurgency. F. Conclusions. A program of limited pressures, such as the CIP suspension, will not have large material effects on the GVN or the war effort, at least for 2-4 months. The psychological effects could be greater, and there is some evidence that the suspension is already causing concern to Diem. However, the effect of pressures that can be carried out over an extended period without detriment to the war effort is probably limited with respect to the possibility of Diem making necessary changes. We have not analyzed with care what the effect might be of a far more intensive level of pressure such as cessation of MAP deliveries or long continued suspension of the commodity import program. If the Diem government should fail to make major improvements, serious consideration would have to be given to this possible course of action, but we believe its effect on the war effort would be so serious--in psychological if not in immediate material terms--that it should not be undertaken at the present time. VIII. COUP POSSIBILITIES A. Prospects of a Spontaneous Coup. The prospects of an early spontaneous replacement of the Diem Regime are not high. The two principal sources of such an attempt, the senior military officers and the students, have both been neutralized by a combination of their own inability and the regime's effective countermeasures of control. The student organizations have been emasculated. The students themselves have displayed more emotion than determination and they are apparently being handled with sufficient police sophistication to avoid an explosion. The generals appear to have little stomach for the difficult job of secretly arranging the necessary coalescence of force to upset the Regime. Diem/Nhu are keenly aware of the capability of the generals to take over the country, utilizing the tremendous power now vested in the military forces. They, therefore, concentrate their manipulative talent on the general officers, by transfers, and by controls over key units and their locations. They are aware that these actions may reduce efficiency, but they tolerate it rather than risk the prospect that they be overthrown and their social revolution frustrated. They have established a praetorian guard to guarantee considerable bloodshed if any attack is made. The generals have seen slim hope of surmounting these difficulties without prohibitive risk to themselves, the unity of the Army and the Establishment itself. Despite these unfavorable prospects for action in the short term, new factors could quickly arise, such as the death of Diem or an unpredictable and even irrational attack launched by a junior officer group, which would call urgently for U.S. support or counteraction. In such a case, the best alternative would appear to be the support of constitutional continuity in the person of the Vice President, behind whom arrangements could be developed for a more permanent replacement after a transitional period. B. Prospects for Improvement under an Alternative Government. The prospects that a replacement regime would be an improvement appear to be about 50-50.[4] Initially, only a strongly authoritarian regime would be able to pull the government together and maintain order. In view of the pre-eminent role of the military in Vietnam today, it is probable that this role would be filled by a military officer, perhaps taking power after the selective process of a junta dispute. Such an authoritarian military regime, perhaps after an initial period of euphoria at the departure of Diem/Nhu, would be apt to entail a resumption of the repression at least of Diem, the corruption of the Vietnamese Establishment before Diem, and an emphasis on conventional military rather than social, economic and political considerations, with at least an equivalent degree of xenophobic nationalism. These features must be weighed, however, against the possible results of growing dominance or succession by Nhu, which would continue and even magnify the present dissension, unhappiness and unrest. C. Possible U.S. Actions. Obviously, clear and explicit U.S. support could make a great difference to the chances of a coup. However, at the present time we lack a clear picture of what acceptable individuals might be brought to the point of action, or what kind of government might emerge. We therefore need an intensive clandestine effort, under the Ambassador's direction, to establish necessary contacts to allow the U.S. to continuously appraise coup prospects. If and when we have a better picture, the choice will still remain difficult whether we would prefer to take our chances on a spontaneous coup (assuming some action by Diem and Nhu would trigger it) or to risk U.S. prestige and having the U.S. hand show with a coup group which appeared likely to be a better alternative government. Any regime that was identified from the outset as a U.S. "puppet" would have disadvantages both within South Vietnam and in significant areas of the world, including other underdeveloped nations where the U.S. has a major role. In any case, whether or not it proves to be wise to promote a coup at a later time, we must be ready for the possibility of a spontaneous coup, and this too requires clandestine contacts on an intensive basis. IX. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES Broadly speaking, we believe there are three alternative policies the U.S. could pursue to achieve its political and military objectives: 1. Return to avowed support of the Diem regime and attempt to obtain the necessary improvements through persuasion from a posture of "reconciliation." This would not mean any expression of approval of the repressive actions of the regime, but simply that we would go back in practice to business as usual. 2. Follow a policy of selective pressures: "purely correct" relationships at the top official level, continuing to withhold further actions in the commodity import program, and making clear our disapproval of the regime. A further element in this policy is letting the present impression stand that the U.S. would not be averse to a change of Government--although we would not take any immediate actions to initiate a coup. 3. Start immediately to promote a coup by high ranking military officers. This policy might involve more extended suspensions of aid and sharp denunciations of the regime's actions so timed as to fit with coup prospects and planning. Our analysis of these alternatives is as follows: 1. Reconciliation. We believe that this course of action would be ineffective from the standpoint of events in South Vietnam alone, and would also greatly increase our difficulties in justifying the present U.S. support effort both to the Congress and generally to significant third nations. We are most unlikely, after recent events, to get Diem to make the necessary changes; on the contrary, he would almost certainly regard our reconciliation as an evidence that the U.S. would sit still for just about anything he did. The result would probably be not only a continuation of the destructive elements in the Regime's policies but a return to larger scale repressions as and when Diem and Nhu thought they were necessary. The result would probably be sharp deterioration in the military situation in a fairly short period. 2. Selective Pressures. We have examined numerous possibilities of applying pressures to Diem in order to incline him to the direction of our policies. The most powerful instrument at our disposal is the control of military and economic aid but any consideration of its use reveals the double-edged nature of its effects. Any long-term reduction of aid cannot but have an eventual adverse effect on the military campaign since both the military and the economic programs have been consciously designed and justified in terms of their contribution to the war effort. Hence, immediate reductions must be selected carefully and be left in effect only for short periods. We believe that the present level of pressures is causing, and will cause, Diem some concern, while at the same time not significantly impairing the military effort. We are not hopeful that this level (or indeed any level) of pressure will actually induce Diem to remove Nhu from the picture completely. However, there is a better chance that Diem will at least be deterred from resuming large scale oppressions. At the same time, there are various factors that set a time limit to pursuing this course of action in its present form. Within 2-4 months we have to make critical decisions with the GVN about its 1964 budget and our economic support level. In addition, there is a significant and growing possibility that even the present limited actions in the economic field--more for psychological than for economic reasons--would start a wave of speculation and inflation that would be difficult to control or bring back into proper shape. As to when we would reverse our present course, the resumption of the full program of economic and military aid should be tied to the actions of the Diem government. As a foundation for the development of our long-term economic and military aid programs, we believe it may be possible to develop specific military objectives to be achieved on an agreed schedule. The extent to which such objectives are met, in conjunction with an evaluation of the regime's political performance, would determine the level of aid for the following period. 3. Organizing a Coup. For the reasons stated earlier, we believe this course of action should not be undertaken at the present time. On balance we consider that the most promising course of action to adopt at this time is an application of selective short-term pressures, principally economic, and the conditioning of long-term aid on the satisfactory performance by the Diem government in meeting military and political objectives which in the aggregate equate to the requirements of final victory. The specific actions recommended in Section I of this report are consistent with this policy. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretary of Defense [5] _______ 1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous. Top Secret. Also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, pp. 554-573. 2. Document 142. 3. Mr. Colby believes that the official "correct" relationship should be supplemented by selected and restricted unofficial and personal relationships with individuals in the GVN, approved by the Ambassador, where persuasion could be fruitful without derogation of the official U.S. posture. [Footnote in the source text.] 4. Mr. Sullivan (State) believes that a replacement regime which does not suffer from the overriding danger of Nhu's ambition to establish a totalitarian state (the control of which he might easily lose to the Communists in the course of his flirtations) would be inevitably better than the current regime even if the former did have the deficiencies described. [Footnote in the source text.] 5. The source text bears no signatures.

great job, greg here's one from an old friend of yours you will recognize i know he would be very pleased...best b Thanks Beans. YOUR_MAIN monk

Thanks Dean.

...Like I said in my presentation, Robert, both Peter Scott and James Galbraith deserve recognition for some very fine work on the subject, IMO.

Thanks Kathy.

I'm glad you enjoyed it, Dave! Thanks--

Outstanding presentation, Greg. I know you are a terrific writer; you might be an even better speaker. The applause the audience gave you was well deserved. Thanks Mike. I feel honored to have been able to present something that still seems quite important. It's important to get honest feedback--good or bad. But such positive feedback feels great. Many thanks!

Greg Thank you for posting the video. Hope the Dukester gets his speakers fixed. Tip: When my speakers blew I just plugged in an inexpensive headset. Scholarly and very entertaining Greg, a rare combo. Like Duke, I too would love to see a transcript of this important presentation(ideally with citations). I appreciate it Raymond, thank you. As I said to Duke, the presentation was based on earlier writings found here: http://www.jfklancer.com/NSAM263.html and http://www.jfklancer.com/NSAM273.html

Where to find the writing? Speakers on this machine blew, have to wait to hear the speaking ...! Hi Duke, I used Power Point for the presentation. However, it was built on the following articles that I wrote earlier this year for LANCER: http://www.jfklancer.com/NSAM263.html http://www.jfklancer.com/NSAM273.html

Part One: http://vimeo.com/17699759 Part Two:

Dean, I'm pretty sure that you aren't a fan of John McAdams. I think this thread's focus was intended to be specific to "the deluded philosophy of John McAdams", as opposed to it being specific to "the application of the death penalty" to presumed guilty parties, in general. Perhaps we should all just settle for throwing McAdams' pontifications under the bus (where they belong) and discuss the philosophy of State Imposed Death penalty laws in a new thread? Just a suggestion...

There is another major consideration, besides the two primary ones. Namely, even if the morality of a State Imposed Death Penalty is not considered, and even if the "lack of deterrent" statistics are not considered, we still need to consider this: Islamic "terrorists" are more than willing to PLAN on death in their SUICIDE BOMB mission! They welcome death as long as it serves their purpose. Plus, many Islamic terrorists are convinced that dying for their cause is one--of only a few--SURE methods to secure their entry into heaven. Using the death penalty as a deterrent for members of such a culture is counter-intuitive.

David, Excellent post. I offer an additional comment to your statement; a statement with which I happen to agree, namely--you said: "The notion that the target of this whole operation --i.e., JFK's murder--was not just President Kennedy himself--i.e., JFK viewed as a mortal, who had to be killed--but ALSO his BODY, which had to be altered to support a false story of how he died (and create the false appearance that Oswald was the assassin) is the key to this murder case." While I don't disagree with you, I see it from a different perspective. The "target" was NOT even JFK, per se. It was the JFK Administration, JFK's policies, and JFK's inability to be "bought" and therefore his autonomy. In my view, the target was the Executive Branch of the US Government. By successfully removing JFK without being held accountable, the Power Elite, behind the Guns of Dallas, sent a very clear message to all future POTUS' who would one day become aware of their own vulnerability. The "balance of power" established in the US Constitution by our Founding Fathers, has been compromised ever since. So, the "target" was something else, IMO. However, the "targeted evidence" extended far beyond the man. For example, as I covered in Dallas last week at COPA, not only was the physical "body" evidence altered, so was the RECORD of Kennedy's intentions in Vietnam. Those records are demonstrably either self impeaching, altered, or obfuscated--seemingly with intent to create a Byzantine Accounting System--rendering them fraudulent, particularly from a historical perspective.

I happened to spend some good time with James Tague last week on the anniversary--on the grassy knoll. Yep. He hasn't changed his story. He got shot. He swears he was hit by a fragment (of concrete or bullet) from THE LAST shot fired.

There is a major difference between being narcissistic and having Narcissistic Personality Disorder .. The former usually indicates a self centered, egotistical person, while the latter is a serious mental condition that is akin to sociopathy. Kennedly never dispalyed the typical characteristics of having that mental disorder. The "disorder" formerly called Narcissism was REMOVED from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) last week. It is now judged to be a "personality trait" but NOT a "mental or emotional" disorder. Perhaps if there are co-morbid symptoms that exist a separate diagnosis might be appropriate. However, as of right now, the manual published by the American Psychiatric Association (the DSM) has removed it.

Good job, Jim.

You're welcome, Beans. As they say in Oz (instead of You're welcome): "Too easy." (pronounced "tweezy")

For Bernice: [bethesdaTimeLine;635-8pm;6/05;Rv2;12/6/10] p/o to pdf, 12/6/10 3:30 PM Rv 1= 6/10/05; revised, 8/15/05 Rv 2: Doc name changed, to spell out words, add the date etc. Also; additional minor edits, 12/6/10;p/o xxx The three documents are: the report of the Marine Security Detail (6:35 p.m. entry below); the FBI document generated by Sibert and O’Neill, after being interviewed in March, 1964, by WC attorney Specter (and which is corroborated by the Army document cited below (See 7:17 P.M. entry); and the report of the MDW Casket Team (See 8 P.M. entry below). “3 Entries of 2 caskets”--Time Line of Events at Bethesda on evening of 11/22, when two coffins arrived (and the second one entered twice) MAJOR POINT: This time line shows that, according to official documents, there are “3 entries of 2 caskets.” •6:35 p.m.; •7:17 p.m. •8:00 p.m. Entry of the shipping casket (per report of Marine Security Detail, headed by Sgt. Roger Boyajian; “MD-236” in ARRB collection. (first) entry of Dallas casket (per data supplied by FBI agents Sibert and O’Neill, when interviewed by Specter, March 64; also, from report of Army Provost Marshall Col. Phillpe Boas, who was with MDW General Wehle “and his aide” (who would be Lt. Lipsey); and who reports that autopsy began at “about” 7:14 pm. (See Best Evidence, Ch. 19).1 (second) entry of Dallas casket—per report of MDW Casket Team report, headed by Lt. Sam Bird. (See Ch. 25, B.E.. for further details) NOTE: This time line discussion—made into a separate document here—has been copied from [Mm;S&O,Reinterpreted;6|10|5], which is, quoting from that document, a re-interpretation (actually, a fine tuning) of the information in the Sibert and O’Neill FBI report.. The major accomplishment of that document is to focus on the distinction between what O’Connor witnessed (at 6:35 pm) and what the FBI reported (which must have been at 7:17). O’Connor said that the JFK was “naked” except for a sheet around the head, “a bloody sheet”; S & O report that the body was “covered” with a sheet, and there was a “second wrapping” on the head. Etc. This difference suggests that between 6:35 pm and 7:17 pm, JFK’s body was [fully covered] covered with a sheet, and returned to the Dallas casket (so that when S and O entered the morgue—after the delay they themselves noted in their report—they would see JFK’s body removed “from the casket in which it had been transported” (which is what they wrote) and which apparently refers to the Dallas casket (which, they believed, [had] contained the body). 1 See Footnote at bottom of page in Ch 19, B.E., which begins: “On December 6, 1979, I filed a FOIA request with the Military District of Washington . . “ This (new) focus on the difference in description between what O’Connor observed (at 6:35 p.m.) and what Sibert and O’Neill report states (which applies to a few minutes after 7:17 p.m.) is the answer to those (e.g. Weisberg) [bethesdaTimeLine;635-8pm;6/05;Rv2;12/6/10] 2 who have cited the S & O description as failing to support O’Connor’s observation that JFK’s body arrived in a body bag. The explanation is very simple: that particular fact is not in the S & O report because their observations took place somewhere in the vicinity of 7:35 p.m., whereas what O’Connor saw took place a few minutes after 6:35 p.m. (almost an hour earlier)—i.e., when the body first arrived in the shipping casket. So: O’Connor witnessed the body “naked. . .except for a sheet [around the head] a bloody sheet”, whereas Sibert and O’Neill report both a full-body sheet, (quoting their report: “the head area contained an additional wrapping which was saturated with blood.”2 plus a 2nd blood soaked wrapping, around the head 2 Sibert & O’Neill FBI report, p.3 (or, “CD 7, p. 283”) [bethesdaTimeLine;635-8pm;6/05;Rv2;12/6/10] 3 VERBAL DESCRIPTION OF TIME LINE: (which follows): Displays data showing 6:35 arrival of shipping casket (per report of Marine Security detail, headed by Sgt. Roger Boyajian); 6:55 arrival of Navy ambulance (per news accounts); 7:07 time when Adm Galloway drove off in ambulance with large casket (per Washington Post), and evaded the MDW casket team, who couldn’t find the casket for some 45 minutes; 7:17 when that casket was brought to the morgue (per FBI); 7:35, when Humes says autopsy began; and 8 pm when the casket team “found” the casket in an ambulance at the back of the hospital; and when the casket (which must have been brought back outside) was then brought back inside by the MDW casket team, who believed that marked the “beginning” of the autopsy (and so wrote in their report). Note: Difference in description re “sheet” (6:35 pm versus 7:17 pm—6:35 coming from O’Connor, 7:17 coming from FBI agents) is further evidence that what O’Connor witnessed when he opened the casket and then the body bag (and this happened just subsequent to its 6:35 p.m. arrival) ., when the Dallas casket was brought to the morgue; and then, after a small delay, they were permitted inside. was distinctly different from when FBI witnessed and what they understood to be “the coffin opening” just subsequent to 7:17 p.m [bethesdaTimeLine;635-8pm;6/05;Rv2;12/6/10] 4 TIME LINE 6:35 pm 6:55 7:07 7:17 7:35 8:00 --|-----------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------------|--------------!| 8 pm; Casket team 6:35 PM:: Body brought to morgue in shipping casket, by Marine Security detail (Report of Sgt. Boyajian. Head of detail, cites time); Dennis David & O’Connor confirms shipping casket; O’Connor says body in a body bag; naked except for a “bloody sheet” wrapped around the head.4 6:55pm Navy amb with bronze casket arrives at Bethesda5 7:07 PM Galloway drives off in ambulance; evades casket team, but not FBI6 7:17:PM: FBI agents help bring bronze casket to morgue; kept out of room for brief period.. When they enter, say body removed “from casket in which it had been transported”. Said it was wrapped in a sheet; with “additional wrapping on the head”.7 7:35pm Humes says autopsy begins8 3 MDW Casket Team Report (See Best Evidence, Ch. 16) 4My interview with PKO, Oct 1980; per Best Evidence Research Video 5 SS reports; wire service gives time as 6:53 pm 6 W Star gives time; W Post identifies Galloway; See Ch 16, Best Evidence, for detailed accounts of the “ambulance chase” which resulted in the casket team losing the Dallas casket. 7 Sibert and O’Neill FBI report (See Ch 12, Best Evidence) 8 Humes Warren Commission testimony brings in bronze Dallas casket3 (for 2nd time; was also brought in at 7:17)

For Bernice: Document name: [bethesdaTimeLine (graphic); “3entriesOf2caskets”;62098]* *DSL Note, 12/6/10;Doc name changed slightly, for clarify; minor edits & spell check (depicting three distinct events: i.e., three entries of two caskets)1 -------------->|-------------------------->|---------------------------------->|------------> #1 #2 #3 TIME LINE OF EVENTS AT BETHESDA 6:35 PM* 7:14/7:17 PM** 8 PM*** Shipping casket delivered 1st arrival of Dallas casket 2nd arrival to the morgue entrance; arrives in black hearse; escorted by plainclothes agents and men in morgue smocks. Inside casket, body is in a body bag.2 large (empty) ; escorted by two Secret Service agents (Kellerman and Greer); assisted by FBI agents Sibert and O'Neill. (the official entry now containing JFK's body. Escorted by Godfrey McHugh and MDW casket team.3. ) of the same Dallas casket; * Time as recorded in report of Marine Security Detail (Boyajian report, obtained by ARRB [and listed as “MD-236” in the Doug Horne compilation]). Description of event as recollected by Dennis David, Officer of the Day [see Ch 25 of BEST EVIDENCE], and Donald Rebentisch, who helped unload this casket.4 ** Time as recorded in FBI and Army documents.5 *** Time as recorded in official MDW Casket Team report.6 1 Based on detailed analysis and interviews from BEST EVIDENCE: Disguise and Deception in the Assassination of John F. Kennedy; first published in 1981 by Macmillan, later by Dell (1982); Carroll and Graf (1988) and New American Library (1993). See Chapters 16, 25-28, 31. Also based on various documents released since that time, or acquired by the Assassination Records and Review Board (ARRB). 2 For arrival of casket in black hearse, see account of Dennis David, as set forth in BEST EVIDENCE, Chapter 25. Also see filmed account in BEST EVIDENCE: The Research Video. For description of body being removed from body bag, see account of Paul O'Connor, Chapter 26, BEST EVIDENCE; for filmed account, see BEST EVIDENCE: The Research Video. 3 During the period between 7:12 and 8 PM, the MDW casket team "lost" the casket they were attempting to escort from the front to the back of the hospital. They were told by senior military officials that, for security purposes, more than one ambulance was being used, and that they had followed the "decoy ambulance" by mistake. 4 See BEST EVIDENCE, Chapter 25, for the detailed account of Dennis David. See 1982 Epilogue-- -included in all subsequent editions---for account of Donald Rebentisch, who came forward the week that BEST EVIDENCE was published (January, 1981), and was the subject of news stories. 5 See BEST EVIDENCE, Chapter 28, for description and citations to these documents. 6 See BEST EVIDENCE, Chapter 16 (describing the "ambulance chase") for all details and documents re the MDW casket team and the confusion caused by the "decoy ambulance."