Leslie Sharp

The Secret History of Israel's War Against Hitler's Scientists BY RONEN BERGMAN ON 04/12/18 AT 11:21 AM EDT (excerpt) . . . On March 25, 1963, Ben-Gurion summoned [Mossad chief Isser] Harel to his office; the Mossad chief had carried out some of his media operations without the prime minister's approval and now his boss was upset. The prime minister reminded Harel that he was supposed to implement government policy, not set it. Offended by the rebuke, Harel offered his resignation, confident the Old Man, as Ben-Gurion was known, couldn't manage without him and would beg him to stay. Ben-Gurion thought otherwise. He accepted the resignation on the spot. Harel's once brilliant career ended in a failed bluff and utter defeat. He was immediately replaced by Amit, the chief of AMAN. But it was too late for Ben-Gurion, too. Harel's campaign had played into the hands of Begin, among others. Less than two months after replacing Harel, Ben-Gurion resigned, convinced he'd lost the support of his own party. He was replaced by Levi Eshkol. 56 Burglaries and 30,000 Documents Amit, one of the IDF's brilliant young commanders, took over a Mossad in disarray. The agency was deeply demoralized. In the nine months since Egypt had announced its four missile tests, the Israelis had learned little about the program, and everything the Mossad and AMAN had tried had failed to even slow the project, let alone dismantle it. Pressuring Germany had made no difference. Amit set about rebuilding the organization, reinforcing it with the best personnel he knew from AMAN. As soon as he took over, he ordered a halt to any matters that he considered extraneous, and a drastic reduction of the resources being devoted to the hunt for Nazi criminals, explaining, "We have to produce information about the enemies of the state of Israel nowadays." Amit knew that he needed a tactical reset, and that the Mossad had to rethink its approach to the problem of Egyptian missiles. His first order, then, was for a shift away from targeted killing operations and for the vast majority of his resources to be focused instead on trying to understand what was going on inside the missile project. Secretly, however, with most of the top officials of the organization out of the loop, he prepared a targeted killing project of his own against the scientists. Operations personnel were trying to find ways to send parcel bombs from inside Egypt, significantly shortening the time between the sending and opening of the package. They tried out the method on a relatively easy target, the physician Eisele. On September 25, 1963, there was a blast in the post office in the upscale Cairo neighborhood of Maadi: A letter bomb that had been addressed to Dr. Carl Debouche, the false name Eisele was using, exploded and blinded a postal worker. The failure of this operation convinced Amit that targeted killings should be used only sparingly. Nevertheless, he ordered the Mossad to prepare plans to shoot, blow up or poison the scientists in case nonviolent means proved ineffective. Amit ordered the Mossad to step up break-ins at all the offices connected to the missile project in West Germany and Switzerland. These operations were enormously complex. The sites were well guarded—both by Egyptian intelligence and by the men under Vallentin, the German project's security chief—in the hearts of crowded European cities, in countries where the law was strictly enforced. Mossad operatives burglarized the Egyptian embassies, the Egyptian purchasing mission in Cologne and the Intra office in Munich. They broke into the EgyptAir office in Frankfurt no fewer than 56 times between August 1964 and December 1966. The information they obtained (operatives photographed some 30,000 documents up to the end of 1964 alone) was important, but far from sufficient. The Mossad had to recruit someone on the inside of the missile project. This critical task was assigned to a division called Junction, which was responsible for bringing in the bulk of the organization's human intelligence. Unlike in Hollywood movies, most of this information is not collected directly by Mossad employees darting about in the shadows. Rather, it is gleaned from foreign nationals in their home countries. The Mossad case officers responsible for recruiting and operating these sources are called "collection officers," and they are expert psychologists. They know how to persuade a person to betray everything and everyone he believes in: his friends and family, his organization, his nation. But none had been able to work on anyone close to the Egyptian program. Recruiting agents in Arab countries became a long-term priority, but in the short run, Junction would have to look elsewhere. 'A Favorite of the Führer' In April 1964, Amit sent Eitan to Paris, which served as the nerve center of Israeli intelligence, to run Junction's operations in Europe. Vallentin was becoming more of a problem, and Junction needed to take care of him. Avraham Ahituv, Junction's coordinator in Bonn, had an idea, and he presented it to Eitan in Paris in May 1964. He'd identified a dubious character who'd sold arms and intelligence to the Nasser regime and also was close to the German scientists. "There is just one small problem," Ahituv said. "The man's name is Otto Skorzeny, and he was a high-ranking Wehrmacht officer, Hitler's special operations commander, and a favorite of the Führer." "And you want to recruit this Otto?" Eitan asked sarcastically. "Wonderful." In 1960, Ahituv told Eitan, Harel had ordered Amal, the unit that handled the hunt for Nazi war criminals, to gather as much information as possible about Skorzeny, with the goal of bringing him to justice or killing him. His file said he was an enthusiastic member of the Austrian Nazi Party, had enlisted in 1935 in a secret SS unit in Austria and had taken part in Kristallnacht. He rose rapidly in rank in the Waffen-SS, becoming head of its special operations units. Skorzeny parachuted into Iran and trained local tribes to blow up oil pipelines serving the Allied armies, and he plotted to murder the Big Three—Winston Churchill, Josef Stalin and Franklin Roosevelt. He also had a plan for abducting and killing U.S. General Dwight Eisenhower. Skorzeny was even personally selected by Hitler to lead the Gran Sasso raid, which successfully extricated Benito Mussolini, the Führer's friend and ally, from the Alpine villa where he was being held prisoner by the Italian government. Allied intelligence called Skorzeny "the most dangerous man in Europe." He was not, however, convicted of war crimes. He was acquitted by one tribunal, and after he was re-arrested on other charges, he escaped with the help of his SS friends. He took refuge in Francisco Franco's Spain, where he established profitable commercial relations with fascist regimes from around the world. Skorzeny's acquaintance with the scientists in Egypt, and the fact that he'd been a superior officer to Vallentin during the war, was enough, in Eitan's view, to justify trying to recruit him, despite his Nazi past. Eitan felt that if it helped Israel, it was worth it. Through a number of intermediaries, the Mossad established contact with Countess Ilse von Finckenstein—Skorzeny's wife. She would serve as the Mossad's entrée. The agency's file on the countess says that she was "a member of the aristocracy. She is a cousin of the German [prewar] Finance Minister Hjalmar Schacht.… She is 45, a fairly attractive woman, brimming over with energy." "She was involved in everything," said Raphael "Raphi" Medan, the German-born Mossad operative who was assigned to the mission. "She sold titles of nobility, had ties with Vatican intelligence and sold arms as well." She and her husband also had liberal ideas about their relationship. "They didn't have children," Medan said, "and they maintained an open marriage. Ilse always looked stunning. Every two years she underwent hormonal treatment in Switzerland in order to preserve her youth." Medan "had had a reputation, because of his European good looks, for being able to influence women," according to the Mossad report on the affair. They set a meeting for late July 1964 in Dublin. Medan introduced himself as an Israeli Defense Ministry employee on leave, looking for an opening in international tourism. He might be interested in taking part in a Bahamas development project that the countess was involved in, he said. The countess liked Medan, and when their business talk was over, she invited him to a party at her farm. This was the start of a series of meetings, including some wild partying in Europe. According to a Mossad rumor that circulated for many years and was gently hinted at in the reports but not explicitly stated, Medan "sacrificed" himself for his country—and took advantage of the German couple's open marriage—by wooing the countess and eventually taking her to bed. Medan, however, simply said, "There are things that gentlemen do not speak about," and described their encounter, with a smile, as "good and even gratifying." Yellowcake: The story of the Argentine yellowcake sale to Israel has remained largely unknown in part because Israel has gone to great lengths to keep tight secrecy to this day about how and where it acquired raw materials for its nuclear program. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/israels-quest-for-yellowcake-the-secret-argentina-israel-connection-1963-1966

There seems to be a degree of controversy over when exactly Skorzeny agreed to cooperate with Mossad. Bergman insists it was not until July 1964 when Otto met with an Israeli conduit in Dublin. Other versions suggest he was recruited as early as summer of 1963; still others argue an even earlier association. I think there's little doubt that his concerns related to the possibility of his own extradition for war crimes were legitimate since Eichman's abduction, trial and execution. Suggesting he aligned philosophically with Jewish interests in the region is more than a stretch. I'm wondering why the Argentinian shipments of yellowcake to Israel in 1963 hasn't captured more interest than it has since the document drop in 2018. Argentina had its own political upheaval from the Navy revolt September 1962 - April 1963; Peron was still in exile in Madrid socializing with both Otto and Ilse. What might either have known about that yellowcake?

Was he active military in Southwest Asia when you knew him?

. . . as I have noted previously on this forum, numerous times. Did you know Askins while he worked at SwRi in San Antonio? Did you encounter Harlon B. Carter over the years?

I would ask why Otto Skorzeny's disputed history with Mossad, as controversial as it might be, isn't relevant to Jeff's article that includes a photo of the CI Chief and Meir Amit of Mossad who at one time solicited the help of the SS Commando . . . assuming the underlying purpose of this forum is to consider and debate facts related to the Kennedy assassination. I would also note that Angleton's associations from the early 1950s, including those he enjoyed during his involvement in MKULTRA (highlighted by Jeff), contribute to further understanding of the complex character that was JJA – who appears in the records of Pierre Lafitte.

Correction: An earlier version of this story stated that Angleton “launched” the notorious MKULTRA mind control program. It has been updated to read that Angleton “helped launch” the program. – Jefferson Morley The Security Research Staff (SRS), an Office of Security branch, directed by retired Brigadier General Paul F. Gaynor, was primarily responsible for detecting foreign attempts to penetrate the CIA, interrogating defectors and suspected spies, and operating several 'behavior modification' programs that were part of the CIA's top-secret BLUEBIRD and ARTICHOKE Projects which predated Project MKULTRA. – A Terrible Mistake by H. P. Albarelli Jr., pg. 88 From its inception, as readers shall learn in greater detail, the tightly compartmentalized project was Col. Sheffield Edwards' baby. Indeed, Edwards had selected the code-name "Bluebird" after an attendee at an early planning session made an offhand remark about creating a non-lethal arsenal for "making subjects sing like birds." – pg. 28 Detailed BLUEBIRD reports, such as the one above, were circulated only to carefully selected individuals. Those persons "who have been briefed on BLUEBIRD" included, by 1951: William King Harvey, J. H. Alberti, James Angleton, H. M. Chadwell, Cutler Clark, H. H. Cooper, Robert H. Cunningham, E. H. Cushing, James H. Drum, Allen Dulles, John Earman, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Helms, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Frank Wisner, Dr. William Webster. In October 1950, concurrently with implementation of BLUEBIRD, the CIA's chief of ultra-secret Staff D – which then included Richard Helms and James Angleton – requested that security director Edwards immediately contact former OSS officers who "experimented during 1945 and early 1946 with a drug known under the cryptonym SUGAR" . . . . Stanley Lovell urged the Agency to locate Geore Hunter White, a former OSS officer "with considerable experience with Project SUGAR." – pg. 212 The day before [Dr. Sidney] Gottlieb left New York, he and White met at the Narcotics Bureau office where White introduced Gottlieb to agents Arthur Giuliani and Vance Newman. Also present was "special employee" LaChapelle, who was known at FBN by his real name, Pierre Lafitte. As readers shall soon learn, Giuliani, Newman and Lafitte would, within a year, play prominent roles in the CIA's drug experiments at their Greenwich Village safe house in New York. . . . at the time, George White had already been vetted for Project BLUEBIRD by James Angleton. – pg. 223 By August 16, 1951, Sheffield Edwards notified H. Marshall Chadwell that pursuant to his expressed security concerns, the new name for BLUEBIRD would be ARTICHOKE. – pg. 221 In November 1952, Hunter White was summoned to share with Office of Scientific Intelligence the results of certain experiments that had a bearing on ARTICHOKE. Three weeks later, James Angleton and Gottlieb met with Hunter White in New York about the progress with search for a safe house and "they also discussed several projects for Lafitte" . . . . 'That evening White, Lafitte, Angleton and Gottlieb had dinner with Dr. Harold Abramson, and were joined by Robert Lashbrook, Col. Drum and Willis Gibbons, who had flown up from Washington. Over dinner, Gibbons explained that White and Lafitte would jointly run experiments with drugs . . . ' pg. 240 ' . . . At any rate, towards the end of 1950, almost three years before DCI Allen Dulles would approve the MKULTRA Program [1953], the CIA established an "informal agreement" with the SOD [Camp Detrick's Special Operations Division approved by Sec. James Forrestal, accelerated by the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical and Biological Warfare) to pursue projects the Agency requested.' – pg. 65 Eleven years later, CI Chief James Angleton and "special employee" Pierre Lafitte in league with infamous SS Commando Otto Skorzeny based in Madrid and Co. Kildare, Ireland would engage in Lancelot Project, the plot to assassinate President John Kennedy in Dallas on November 22, 1963. A thumbnail analysis of relevant entries found in the 1963 datebook maintained by Lafitte who along with his wife Rene had developed a personal friendship with Cicely and James Angleton as well as the Sheffield Edwards: James Angleton May 10 26 July 31 Aug 23 Oct 17 25 Nov 22 26 27 28 Dec 5 Sheffield Edwards July 9 Dec 23 Otto Skorzeny April 30 May 20 June 20 25 July 27 Aug 11 Sept 26 Oct 1 18 22 23 24 25 Nov 5 15 25 28 30 Dec 1

Isser Harel submitted a letter of resignation, and to his shock, Ben-Gurion accepted it. The new Mossad director, commander of military intelligence Gen. Meir Amit, moved the agency away from chasing or intimidating Nazis. Amit did activate Skorzeny at least once more, however. The spymaster wanted to explore the possibility of secret peace negotiations, so he asked Israel’s on-the-payroll Nazi to arrange a meeting with a senior Egyptian official. Nothing ever came of it. Skorzeny never explained his precise reasons for helping Israel. His autobiography does not contain the word “Israel,” or even “Jew.” It is true that he sought and got the life insurance. The Mossad did not assassinate him. . . https://www.motl.org/the-strange-case-of-a-nazi-who-became-an-israeli-hitman/ Meir Amit was studying at Columbia University 1959-1961 following a serious parachuting accident in 1958, so a trip cross country to visit the Angleton's in Cicely's home state of Arizona is reasonable. When the kibbutz movement split, Amit left his kibbutz and went into long-term service in the regular army. In 1953 he served as head of the Operations Division in the IDF General Headquarters. In 1955 and 1956 he was head of the Southern Command and again head of the Operations Division of the General Staff . He participated in planning the Sinai Campaign in 1956. In 1958 he was appointed head of the Central Command. At about the same time he was seriously injured in a parachuting accident and was hospitalized for more than a year. As part of his rehabilitation he studied business administration at Columbia University (1959-61). When he returned from the United States in the summer of 1961, Chief of Staff Tsvi Tsur asked him to accept command of military intelligence. He was appointed to the office in early 1962, the first time the post was filled by someone from the army and not from within intelligence. As head of military intelligence he strengthened the collection units. In 1963 Ben-Gurion appointed him head of the Mossad, a position he held until 1968. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/pdf/PDF_09_200_2.pdf

Heinz Krug: German rocket scientist, who had been a part of Von Braun's team at Peenemunde, and was to take a major part in Egypt's missile program, disappeared on September 11, 1962. There are two versions of his disappearance and death. In both versions, the Israeli Mossad orchestrated the deed. One version, put forward by Dr. Ronen Bergman in his book Rise and Kill First, says Krug was abducted by Israeli agents, taken to Israel, and interrogated and eventually killed there. The other version, put forward by Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman in their article "The Nazi Who Became A Mossad Hitman,” says he was lured to a forest outside Munich and murdered there by Skorzeny, on the orders of Skorzeny's Mossad handlers. These conflicting versions may underscore the difficulty of understanding Skorzeny's personality and motives. Was he an unrepentant Nazi, an opportunistic mercenary, or a madman? Or perhaps all three?—Ran Daniel, researcher, writer and research associate of author H. P. Albarelli Jr. – Notes: Chapter 1. WWII, Special Ops, and Assassinations. Coup in Dallas by H. P. Albarelli Jr. with Leslie Sharp and Alan Kent Interesting to watch as Otto Skorzeny seeps deeper into the collective psyche. (Perhaps eventually his role in the JFK assassination will be accepted by "the community.") https://www.timesofisrael.com/story-of-mossads-ties-with-high-ranking-nazi-to-become-tv-show/

The photo (without caption) was called to my attention in context of our investigation into Col. Charles Askins who appears in the 1963 datebook maintained by Pierre Lafitte. Athough there are physical similarities, the likelihood Askins would be photographed with Angleton was slim. There are several additional photos of Meir in Tucson with JJA. I (perhaps naively) asked an Israeli research colleague whether Amit was a Zionist: Of course he was. Every Israeli, except Arabs, extreme left and Ultraorthodox may be considered Zionist in some sense . An Army General like Amit would certainly be considered Zionist, which , in itself, doesn't imply any extremism . I thought you indicated he was moderate. I'm reviewing Permindex and trying to distinguish those who believed in a strong Israel vs. the slander hurled at "Zionists". For instance, as you know, Edgar Bronfman is referred to in the derogatory, A ZIONIST. Perhaps it's hard to explain. A person who lives in Israel and makes himself part of the nation-building effort of the country is perforce a Zionist, which doesn't in any way make him an extremist, although of course there are Zionist Exrtremists, such as Meir Kahane and some parts of the Likkud party. Not all Zionists are extremists, unless one regards Zionism itself as extremist, and Israel itself as an illegitimate entity. If Bronfman was affiliated with the "Stern Gang" or Etzel, out of which the Likkud developed, he would be more extreme than someone affiliated with the "Hagganah", which had its roots in the Labour party. But it's a matter of degree and different perspectives. Sorry about the longish lecture.

I found very little on the Browns and Newall. I'm interested in all things ARAMCO. Another significant Texas thread.

Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Red Sea?

LOLOLOL. I Know N.u.t.h.t.h.i.n.g!!

Newman has told others that his office was broken into and his Cobb file(s?) was stolen; apparently he had filed one particular document or group of documents in another area and planned to release them to the public at some point. To my knowledge that has yet to happen. Also, my understanding is that June handed over those files to John with the understanding they would be returned; for some reason she failed to make photocopies so the originals were invaluable. He never returned the originals to June. Why would anyone break into John's office and not steal additional research, or did they? Are we to understand the break-in was specific to June's files? If so, why wasn't Albarelli's place broken into as well?

C/PW Seymour Bolten/Trouchard? (actually, Trouchard may be Kent) (62-63) (64 - SAS/SO/SB) C/PW George Joannides/Newby (63-64) aka Henry Boysen Ops Officer - Deputy COS - August 61 Frederick Inghurst - deputy COS (re Joannides personnel file) - field contracting officer Shackley's chief of operations Raymond L. Pochron (?) was C/CI/JMWAVE during 1962 Winfred Jimerson (Sforza?) was C/CI/JMWAVE from late 1962 to mid-1963 CI officers Lewis Nicklas, George Watts, Here's the CIA flowchart for JMWAVE: COS and DCOS, w/secretaries and communicators Branches: Support, Ops Branch of FI and Special Ops, CA Branch, External Ops Branch, Reports Section, Technical Services Section C/Miami, chief of operations, Morales (Ult Sac, p. 57) Bill, do you read anything into his recruitment of Augustin Guitart in context of the Odio incident? Pure coincidence?

I've never seen evidence that he was. He was reposted to Cordoba Argentina in I believe late '64/ early '65. He passed away only recently. https://www.legacy.com/us/obituaries/readingeagle/name/carl-trettin-obituary?id=54013075