Winston Churchill and the death of Prince George, Duke of Kent

[Denis Pointing]

John, I don't question the logic. There are issues I'm ignorant of and have learnt about here that largely support my repeatedly, though nowhere as coherent, contention that things were as you write. At the same time 'history is not one dimensional' as someoone else (David?) said, and for me this means a consideration of the British working class as well. By the very early declaring a 'phony war' certain control mechanisms are put in place that essentially disarms the working class in a global political consciousness sense.

I share your views about the class aspects of this story. It is not well known but both Churchill and the royal family received hostile receptions when they toured working class areas during the Blitz. It was well-known that if the Germans had ever invaded, the ruling class would have been flown to Canada before they had to suffer the experience of occupation.

John, I'm rather surprised at that last statement! I thought a large part of your thesis revolved around the ruling classes supporting the Nazis, why would they need to flee the country?

Edited June 13, 2007 by Denis Pointing

[Sid Walker]

John can you provide citations for the above claims? Are ever going to get around to what Sid called “the punch line*”?

* i.e. your theory as to why Churchill would have bumped the Duke off

I have already provided the sources for the first ten points as they were a summary of previous postings. I have now edited the rest of the post in order that you can check page references.

This background information is all evidence to why Churchill needed to kill the Duke of Kent. What I would like readers to do is to question the logic of what I have posted so far.

I find the overall outline of your last post - concerning the probable negotiations between Hitler and Churchill - plausible. The coincidence between the arrival of Hess and the end of the Blitz is certainly interesting, as is Churchill's decision to throttle back on bombing Germany... for a while.

You wrote:

What we do know is that Churchill changed his mind completely about the wisdom of carpet bombing when the Soviet Union had successfully halted the German invasion. It was now Churchill who was urging the complete destruction of German cities, even those like Dresden that posed no threat to the British. Churchill realized that he could longer rely on Nazi Germany to destroy communism in Europe. In fact, the position had been reversed. The Red Army was now in a position to impose communism on Eastern Europe. The policy had to change. It was now vitally important that Allied forces arrived in mainland Europe in order to “liberate” German occupied countries in Western Europe.

I don't think this is quite right. Churchill's goal - and the people who put him into power - was always to destroy Germany (and Imperial Japan). However, they wanted the execution nicely choreographed, in order to have their enemy weaken the USSR as much as possible.

I think of the WW2 as three main blocks scheming against each other - the Anglophile Allies (1), the Axis (2) and the USSR (3). Leaving aside ideology, this is about power and control. The world is a big chessboard - even more like the board game 'Risk'. The object is to win.

To state the blooming obvious, this is a simplification…

The Anglophile Allies are the established elite. At war's start, this block is strongest and in the best position. Arguably, it could take on the rest of the world combined and beat it. But there are problems. First, their own people would not stand for it. An unprovoked attack on the rest of the world would not be a salable policy. Second, although the Anglophile Allies are a potential block, at the beginning of the war the largest single component of this block (the USA) is so anti-war that even its pro-war President can't whip up anything close to enough enthusiasm to join in.

However, one does not get to be no 1 power block without a certain guile. Why slug it out with 2 and 3 directly, when 2 & 3 can clobber each other?

Simplistically, the least costly option for Block 1 would be to foment war between 2 and 3 - and let them slug it out.

The obvious problem with that strategy (from a Block one perspective) is that conflict only between 2 and 3 may end with a new block (2 + 3) that becomes a greater threat to block 1.

Hence, it is necessary to have conflict between 2 and 3 - and for that to be the most costly part of the war. However, it's also important that Block 1 gets involved to take at least a share (the best share) of the spoils.

In a world with one established rather overfed established Block and two aspiring Blocks who'd like at minimum a bigger slice of the pie, the most logical alliance would be between blocks 2 and 3. That poses the most dangerous threat to 1.

Fortunately, (from a Block 1 perspective) there was deep ideological hatred and distrust between the two blocks. Could they overcome this?

It seemed possible, in August 1939. Disaster!

Within weeks of blocks 2 and 3 forging an economic and security alliance, World War Two began. It began when approximately half of Block 1 declared war on block 2 (sorry Poland - for the sake of this very limited analysis, you don't count - and that I suspect was the truth at the time, in elite pro-war circles in London, New York and Washington).

Now Block 1 was always in a weak position until the USA (its largest single component) joined in. That couldn't be done at the beginning, such was the depth of American anti-war sentiment. To fix this would need skillful maneuvering and take a couple of years to achieve.

The early part of the war was therefore the most dangerous from a Block 1 perspective. Indeed, it was a close shave. Germany performed with military and strategic brilliance in the opening rounds of the war.

It was crucial - for Block 1 - to keep open a promise of peace with Block 2, while working for the eventual desired alignment - a coalescence of the whole of Block 1 into a fighting unit and an alliance with Block 3 to avert and eventually crush an Axis that could have reached across the whole of the Eurasian landmass. (1 + 3) v 2 was the eventual alignment that brought about the total defeat of Block 2... at a very high price. But it wasn't in place until 1942.

In the early years of the war, the British leadership took a very high stake gamble and played the clever but cynical game of manipulating Block 2 into not pressing home its advantage on the western front at a time when its eastern front was not under serious threat.

In this endeavor, of course, the British leadership was greatly advantaged by the fact that it had Enigma.

In war, both Hitler's team and Churchill's team were more than willing to do the equivalent of 'cheating at cards', but the latter did it rather better.

So well, indeed, that the British were able to divert troops and resources from homeland defense to wage war in north Africa and the Middle East, at a time when almost everyone thought that Britain was really in peril and needed all the help it could get. Plus a quarter of a million British troops got to sail home unscathed at Dunkirk, to fight again. Sweet!

If Poland and Eastern Europe were collateral damage in the war, Japan was a deliberate very juicy co-victim. Sucked into joining Block 2 by economic blockade at a time when it seemed possible Block 2 might prevail, it also had a initial military advances but faced ultimate defeat. Germany & Japan, both swallowed up. Two for the price of one!

Perhaps some poker analogies help illustrate the war, from the point of view of the British pro-war elite.

In round one (1939) Britain and France did not take the bold and potentially war-winning strategy of attacking Germany at the outset from the west. This might have been a war-winning lunge – especially in alliance with Poland. But it could have got very messy in all sorts of ways... World War One revisited but with no chance of the USA joining in this time? Moreover, the British political leadership was divided.

In poker, that when you fold on a good reasonably hand, because you just can’t be certain of winning this time round... and you are about to deal with a deck of marked cards.

In round two, (mid-1940 –late 1941) Britain (now led by Churchill and without France), bluffed Hitler. It persuaded him not to attack and follow through his advantage when he had, potentially, a winning hand in the west. The promise of renewed peace between 1 & 2 was a crucial card in this play. In reality, there was no real possibility once Churchill was in power of a negotiated peace with Germany.

In poker, that’s a bluff. It helps if you can read the other guys cards. Then you can bluff him rather more effectively.

By round three (1942-5), Churchill's team had accumulated a few Aces and out they rolled, with devastating aplomb.

At war's end, only two blocks remained.

Block 1 effectively absorbed Japan and most of Germany. Eastern Europe was the consolation prize for Block 3.

It would take another generation to finish off the USSR and more fully re-open that part of the world to global commercial interests.

It goes without saying that the analysis is crass. It leaves out most of humanity (most notably China, India, Africa and South America). But I think it sets out a plausible, Anglo-centric war-winning strategy. It was roughly what was strategized, in my opinion - and it worked.

The Second World War - a war in which some 60 million people died - was not inevitable. Blocks 2 and 3 didn't want it, although they were, of course, not run by pacifists. Elements within Block 1 were the most powerful motive force behind the war - and through World War Two they achieved their broad goals, which were far too cynical to be for publication. Very devious. Very nasty.

The mainstream view of World War Two has, however, successfully been obscured by a set of myths that are really congealed, 60 year-old war propaganda, serving various over-lapping interests that emerged victorious from World War Two and have consolidated their power to a greater or lesser extent ever since.

Edited June 26, 2007 by Sid Walker

[John Simkin]

John, I'm rather surprised at that last statement! I thought a large part of your thesis revolved around the ruling classes supporting the Nazis, why would they need to flee the country?

They would have only been forced to flee the country if these negotiations were unsuccessful and Germany successfully invaded the UK. Hitler was willing to do deals with the British ruling class but if they resisted and lost, he would have been unwilling to share power with them.

[John Simkin]

John can you provide citations for the above claims? Are ever going to get around to what Sid called “the punch line*”?

* i.e. your theory as to why Churchill would have bumped the Duke off

I have already provided the sources for the first ten points as they were a summary of previous postings. I have now edited the rest of the post in order that you can check page references.

This background information is all evidence to why Churchill needed to kill the Duke of Kent. What I would like readers to do is to question the logic of what I have posted so far.

I find the overall outline of your last post - concerning the probable negotiations between Hitler and Churchill - plausible. The coincidence between the arrival of Hess and the end of the Blitz is certainly interesting, as is Churchill's decision to throttle back on bombing Germany... for a while.

You wrote:

What we do know is that Churchill changed his mind completely about the wisdom of carpet bombing when the Soviet Union had successfully halted the German invasion. It was now Churchill who was urging the complete destruction of German cities, even those like Dresden that posed no threat to the British. Churchill realized that he could longer rely on Nazi Germany to destroy communism in Europe. In fact, the position had been reversed. The Red Army was now in a position to impose communism on Eastern Europe. The policy had to change. It was now vitally important that Allied forces arrived in mainland Europe in order to “liberate” German occupied countries in Western Europe.

I don't think this is quite right. Churchill's goal - and the people who put him into power - was always to destroy Germany (and Imperial Japan). However, they wanted the execution nicely choreographed, in order to have their enemy weaken the USSR as much as possible.

I think of the WW2 as three main blocks scheming against each other - the Anglophile Allies (1), the Axis (2) and the USSR (3). Leaving asie ideology, this is about power and control. The world is like a big chessboard. Even more like the board Risk. The object is to win. But how?

I do not think it is possible to link the UK, France and the USA together as one block in 1939. It has to be remembered that USA pursued an isolationist foreign policy in the 1930s. There was no way Roosevelt could have involved the USA in a war without Pearl Harbour.

It is impossible to leave “ideology aside” in this analysis. It is of prime importance that Germany, UK and the USA were capitalist states. It was only natural that US capitalists like Prescott Bush would invest in Nazi Germany. It provided high returns. Foreign capitalists were not concerned about human rights in Germany. In fact, the Nazi control over labour made it a very attractive place to invest in.

The Soviet Union also had complete control over its labour force. However, it did not allow foreign capitalists to buy into this economy. That is why capitalism needed to destroy it. Especially, as the Soviet economy was growing in the 1930s while those countries in the west were experiencing a depression. The main fear was that the popularity of communism would spread (see for example membership figures for the Communist Party in the UK and the USA in the 1930s) and that workers in other countries would advocate the destruction of capitalism.

This is why fascism was an attractive proposition to the ruling classes in the Western World in the 1930s. Fascism had it successfully destroyed the power of the labour movements in Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. What is more, Germany appeared to be interested in destroying communism in the Soviet Union. It was a win-win situation until Hitler and Stalin signed the Soviet-Nazi Pact and the German Army began moving West. Even this was not a major problem to the USA. War in mainland Europe was good for the American economy. They could afford to wait a little bit longer for the destruction of communism in the Soviet Union.

[Sid Walker]

I agree that the ‘bloc’ analysis is a gross oversimplification. I also agree that Block 1, as I defined it, was neither homogeneous nor self-evident in 1939. It had to be built. France was in at the start. The dominions were a push-over. Getting the USA onside and at war, on the other hand, was hard work and would take time..

For the key players, consolidating wealth, power and control were crucial motivators. But ideology - in both general and specific ways – clearly played a crucial role. I agree. My last post was not intended to suggest to the contrary.

Block 1, in my analysis, had an ideology of “freedom and democracy”. It’s economic base was capitalist. However, it had been forced by circumstances to adopt some Keynesian measures – and to make some accommodation with the power of organized labour and the voting power of ordinary people.

Block 3 had an ideological base that was both socialist and universalistic. I understand that Trotsky had lost to Stalin. Nevertheless, the ideology of the USSR was that it was the forerunner of mankind’s future. The economy of the USSR was State socialist – very much a vanguardist, authoritarian version of socialism. Power was highly centralized. The Soviet Union was anathema to most foreign capitalists – although some external capitalist enterprises were able, in circumstances permitted by the regime, to operate profitably. It's ideology had some support base within block 1 - although much of this was rather lukewarm. Even so, the western left as a whole had considerable reserves of sympathy for the USSR. Within Block 2, by contrast, the formerly considerable influence of communist ideology had been decimated during the 1930s.

What was the ideology of Block 2?

The word usually used by the Nazis themselves was ‘Volkish’. I’m no German linguist, but I understand this could be translated into English as ‘populist’. Not greatly dissimilar, I’d argue, in general terms from the policies of Huey Long, Hugo Chavez or even (more arguably) Putin in Russia today.

Nazi Germany did not prohibit foreign capital – but did exercise control over it. In response to a boycott actually initiated by elements of the international Jewish lobby in the early 1930s, it put increasing controls on Jewish capital.

Some elements of the ruling elite in Britain and America were not unhappy with the Nazis and enthused about the prospect of a resurgent Germany curbing the USSR and the advance of communism worldwide.

However, other elements of the western elite were determined to knock Germany out of the game. For them, the threat from Nazi Germany was more immediate than from the USSR. That’s not only because their interests were increasingly excluded from a major and fast growing chunk of the world economy. They were also concerned that Nazi ideology and economic policy could spread – in local variants – within Block 1 as a whole. That was surely a more likely scenario – in the late 1930s – than popular communist revolutions in Britain and America.

Hence the tussle during the 1930s within the western elite, which the war camp eventually won in 1939, consolidating its victory and making it absolute in 1940.

Ideology was crucial – because it cut across the sectors. It could change the look of the overall board-game by sudden changes within blocks. Quick flips were possible.

Block 1 was especially vulnerable because it had a more open style of society and still ran fair elections with universal suffrage. It had gone through a very tough economic decade. There were high levels of popular dissatisfaction within these countries. There were also strong peace movements.

Block 2 ideology was the most threatening to the war camp. It was more likely to be contagious within their existing domains.

Block 2 ideology posed a challenge within the west, not because it was hideously unattractive to most people, but because it was potentially rather attractive to most (but not all) people. Here was a government with a strong development agenda and the determination to implement it, irrespective of the injunctions of the banking community. It did not only benefit capital. Broadly speaking, all boats rose on a rising economic tide. It’s true that the former free trade unions were abolished – but it’s also true they were replaced were new, co-operative workplace organizations. These were not utterly toothless and ineffective. In modern times, we might call it ‘industrial reform’. The German working class was not fleeced under Nazi rule in the 1930s. Compared with the previous decade, it prospered.

From the perspective of economic interests effectively excluded from Germany, there was an imperative to nail Germany before it could go too far establishing itself as an alternative center of power in the world – and an alternative model for capitalist society.

Nailing the USSR would have to wait. And it did.

Again, to state the obvious, this is over-simplified analysis. I accept that. Every point is open to debate.

Yes, it's impossible to avoid the subject of ideology, but to make it clear, I am not 'taking sides' in a hot war that was fought a long time ago. This is about understanding history. Ideological battles - when they turn into world wars - are fought by power blocks. There is interplay between ideology and material reality. By studying that interplay we approach a reasonably complete understanding of history.

Starting around 1940 and continuing to the present day, Block 1 propagandists sneakily managed to spin a version of history in which the contest was fought not between war leaders and powerful vested interests within Block 1 and authoritarian governments in Blocks 2 and 3, but between the great free world and beleaguered Russian people one the one hand - and Evil incarnated on the other.

To some extent the mass hallucination of the fake version of the 1930s and World War Two was perpetrated deliberately by vested interests who knew exactly what they were doing. But once the snowball was rolling, almost everyone in western society got involved. So, for that matter, did the Russians and the German and Japanese people themselves. We have all - almost all of us - become enforcers and promulgators of mass hallucinations, at least at some stage in our lives. One is reminded of the Salem witchcraft mass hysteria so ably dramatized by Arthur Miller in The Crucible.

After 1945, those in power in both East and West were able to collude in - and share the benefits of - the hallucinatory morality tale of modern times in which Hitler plays the role of The Devil. No-one was left to balance historical evaluation of that period from a Block 2 perspective. Those who tried were treated like latter day witches - and this continues to the present day.

Edited June 14, 2007 by Sid Walker

[Denis Pointing]

John, I'm rather surprised at that last statement! I thought a large part of your thesis revolved around the ruling classes supporting the Nazis, why would they need to flee the country?

They would have only been forced to flee the country if these negotiations were unsuccessful and Germany successfully invaded the UK. Hitler was willing to do deals with the British ruling class but if they resisted and lost, he would have been unwilling to share power with them.

Sorry John but I'm not convinced, the ruling classes would still be useful, if only as a puppet government. The fact that there were indeed secret plans for the aristocracy to flee ( I assume this information has only relatively recently been released) would surly imply that although at the beginning ,they may have had some sympathy with the Nazis, after the war started in earnest most of them were totally loyal, otherwise, why would they need a secreat escape plan ? I am in no way a royalist but I cant help but wonder if your not giving the royals a raw deal deal with this one. I know from my own late grandfather that many soldiers had a lot of sympathy with the Nazis polices, but that in no way implies that when push came to shove, every man Jack of them did their duty and put personal feelings aside.

[Sid Walker]

John, I'm rather surprised at that last statement! I thought a large part of your thesis revolved around the ruling classes supporting the Nazis, why would they need to flee the country?

They would have only been forced to flee the country if these negotiations were unsuccessful and Germany successfully invaded the UK. Hitler was willing to do deals with the British ruling class but if they resisted and lost, he would have been unwilling to share power with them.

Sorry John but I'm not convinced, the ruling classes would still be useful, if only as a puppet government. The fact that there were indeed secret plans for the aristocracy to flee ( I assume this information has only relatively recently been released) would surly imply that although at the beginning ,they may have had some sympathy with the Nazis, after the war started in earnest most of them were totally loyal, otherwise, why would they need a secreat escape plan ? I am in no way a royalist but I cant help but wonder if your not giving the royals a raw deal deal with this one. I know from my own late grandfather that many soldiers had a lot of sympathy with the Nazis polices, but that in no way implies that when push came to shove, every man Jack of them did their duty and put personal feelings aside.

I agree.

It wasn't just that sympathy for - and positive interest in - Nazi Germany plummeted once war broke out.

The British peace movement had also melted by 1939. From the hero days of the Peace Pledge Union to near zero in a couple of years.

This dramatic shift was caused by a turnaround in British public opinion about Hitler and Nazi Germany.

The expansionism of Germany from the mid 30s was portrayed as a malevolent, impatient quest for world domination at British expense. This line was pushed by elements of the ruling class and by a growing and eventually overwhelming majority on the left.

By the turn of the decade, the Hitler = Evil formula was a near universal belief in Britain.

Nationalism and common decency overlapped, for once. The way forward was as clear and inevitable as it was terrible... war.

A war clearly forced on Britain (not a war started by Britain). A regrettable necessity. A just war. A war that left and right could agree about. A unifying war.

That's a very effective propaganda snowball.

Edited June 14, 2007 by Sid Walker

[Sid Walker]

A note on motivating factors behind the consolidation of Block 1.

By August 1939, the seed had been firmly implanted in Roosevelt's mind that

(i) a new and unprecedented "weapon of mass destruction" might be possible in the near future: nuclear bombs

(ii) Nazi Germany was actually developing nuclear bombs with probable malicious intent.

See Einstein's letter of August 2nd 1939.

Edited June 14, 2007 by Sid Walker

[Len Colby]

John can you provide citations for the above claims? Are ever going to get around to what Sid called “the punch line*”?

* i.e. your theory as to why Churchill would have bumped the Duke off

I have already provided the sources for the first ten points as they were a summary of previous postings. I have now edited the rest of the post in order that you can check page references.

John I looked back at your earlier post and my recollection seems to have been correct, I couldn't find where you had cited sources for points 1 – 5 and 9.

“10 May marked the end of the London Blitz. It was the last time the Nazis would attempt a major raid on the capital. Foreign journalist based in London at the time wrote articles that highlighted this strange fact.”

A bit misleading since the focus of the Blitz had shifted to other cities before this and the Germans launched a major raid on Birmingham on May 16 and a smaller raid on Cardiff the next day (*, **, *6). The historically accepted explanation for the end of the Blitz was that resources were being shifted east to attack the Soviet Union (**, *4, *5, *6). You even quoted A.J.P Taylor as saying “16 May 1941 saw the last heavy German attack on Birmingham. Thereafter the Luftwaffe was busy preparing to cooperate with the army against Soviet Russia”***.

Another factor may have been improving British anti-aircraft technology:

“By the spring of 1941 British scientists had learned to "bend" or block the German radio beams and Royal Air Force night fighter defences were slowly improving. Whereas in December 1940 just 14 aircraft were shot down, 10 by ack-ack, four by night fighters, German losses in April totalled 75 bombers.”*4

Mid May also saw a ratcheting up of attacks by the German Navy on British civilian ships with the launching of the Bismarch and other battleships*. This better fits the theory that the Blitz was called off due to the upcoming attack on Russia than as a “good will gesture” because the Germans used their navy very little if at all against the USSR.

* http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:5yoPpu...au.com/may.html

** http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/timelin...ticleId=1057349

*** http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Jtaylor.htm

*4 http://www.legionmagazine.com/features/can...story/96-01.asp

* 5 http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/archive/timeli...&IsDetail=1 see June 9, 1941

* 6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz

“…at the same time as Hitler ordered the cessation of the Blitz, Churchill was instructing Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, to reduce bombing attacks on Germany. …[he said he] now believed “it is very disputable whether bombing by itself will be a decisive factor in the present war”.

Are you really taking Churchill to task for ordering a reduction in attacks on civilian targets? Humanitarian concerns aside might he have legitimately felt the attacks weren’t worth the risk and cost? A conclusion reached according to Wikipedia by John Kenneth Galbraith. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Kenneth_..._Administration

This background information is all evidence to why Churchill needed to kill the Duke of Kent. What I would like readers to do is to question the logic of what I have posted so far.

OK let's say you're right and Churchill was secretly negotiating with Hitler, why would that make him want to kill the Duke?

Edited June 15, 2007 by Len Colby

[Guest David Guyatt]

On the USA angle, I would again reference Tony Sutton’s book On Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler to provide a glimpse of what was to be.

Likewise, the still highly sensitive and impossible to get (I have only read fragments) CFR War & Peace Studies Project that commenced in September 1939 and which was the blueprint for a new world order in the post war world which America would dominate. Most of the major post WWII institutions, such as the United Nations, IMF and World Bank were conceived under this umbrella.

The key point here is that you don’t begin detailed planning for a post war world when the outcome is far from certain. The following extract is from Chomsky’s book “What Uncle Sam Really Wants”:

Quote:

The "Grand Area"

During World War II, study groups of the State Department and Council on Foreign Relations developed plans for the postwar world in terms of what they called the "Grand Area," which was to be subordinated to the needs of the American economy.

The Grand Area was to include the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, the Far East, the former British Empire (which was being dismantled), the incomparable energy resources of the Middle East (which were then passing into American hands as we pushed out our rivals France and Britain), the rest of the Third World and, if possible, the entire globe. These plans were implemented, as opportunities allowed.

Every part of the new world order was assigned a specific function. The industrial countries were to be guided by the "great workshops," Germany and Japan, who had demonstrated their prowess during the war (and now would be working under US supervision).

The Third World was to "fulfill its major function as a source of raw materials and a market" for the industrial capitalist societies, as a 1949 State Department memo put it. It was to be "exploited" (in Kennan's words) for the reconstruction of Europe and Japan. (The references are to Southeast Asia and Africa, but the points are general.)

Kennan even suggested that Europe might get a psychological lift from the project of "exploiting" Africa. Naturally, no one suggested that Africa should exploit Europe for its reconstruction, perhaps also improving its state of mind. These declassified documents are read only by scholars, who apparently find nothing odd or jarring in all this.

The Vietnam War emerged from the need to ensure this service role. Vietnamese nationalists didn't want to accept it, so they had to be smashed. The threat wasn't that they were going to conquer anyone, but that they might set a dangerous example of national independence that would inspire other nations in the region.

The US government had two major roles to play. The first was to secure the far-flung domains of the Grand Area. That required a very intimidating posture, to ensure that no one interferes with this task -- which is one reason why there's been such a drive for nuclear weapons.

The government's second role was to organize a public subsidy for high-technology industry. For various reasons, the method adopted has been military spending, in large part.

Free trade is fine for economics departments and newspaper editorials, but nobody in the corporate world or the government takes the doctrines seriously. The parts of the US economy that are able to compete internationally are primarily the state-subsidized ones: capital-intensive agriculture (agribusiness, as it's called), high-tech industry, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, etc.

The same is true of other industrial societies. The US government has the public pay for research and development and provides, largely through the military, a state-guaranteed market for waste production. If something is marketable, the private sector takes it over. That system of public subsidy and private profit is what is called free enterprise.

Unquote

Lastly, on the subject of the German atomic bomb capability, it is well worth reading Carter Hydrick’s book “Critical Mass - The Real Story of the Birth of the Atomic Bomb and the Nuclear Age” - in which he argues, fairly convincingly in my view, that the US would not have been successful with their bomb programme in the required time frame had it not been for the Nazis providing them with the essential uranium 235 just prior to war’s end (ditto the trigger for the plutonium bomb).

The world is not as it is presented but something far more unpleasant.

David

[Sid Walker]

Lastly, on the subject of the German atomic bomb capability, it is well worth reading Carter Hydrick’s book “Critical Mass - The Real Story of the Birth of the Atomic Bomb and the Nuclear Age” - in which he argues, fairly convincingly in my view, that the US would not have been successful with their bomb programme in the required time frame had it not been for the Nazis providing them with the essential uranium 235 just prior to war’s end (ditto the trigger for the plutonium bomb).

The world is not as it is presented but something far more unpleasant.

David

Can you expand on this David?

Edited June 15, 2007 by Sid Walker

[Len Colby]

By the turn of the decade, the Hitler = Evil formula was a near universal belief in Britain.

Oh and of course nothing could be further from the truth right Sid?

A note on motivating factors behind the consolidation of Block 1.

By August 1939, the seed had been firmly implanted in Roosevelt's mind that

(i) a new and unprecedented "weapon of mass destruction" might be possible in the near future: nuclear bombs

(ii) Nazi Germany was actually developing nuclear bombs with probable malicious intent.

See Einstein's letter of August 2nd 1939.

So you think Einstein conned FDR into getting the US involved in WW2? Can you show that anything in the letter was intentionally misleading?

[Guest David Guyatt]

Lastly, on the subject of the German atomic bomb capability, it is well worth reading Carter Hydrick’s book “Critical Mass - The Real Story of the Birth of the Atomic Bomb and the Nuclear Age” - in which he argues, fairly convincingly in my view, that the US would not have been successful with their bomb programme in the required time frame had it not been for the Nazis providing them with the essential uranium 235 just prior to war’s end (ditto the trigger for the plutonium bomb).

The world is not as it is presented but something far more unpleasant.

David

Can you expand on this David?

Certainly Sid.

The below is the introduction to Carter Hydrick's book, which to my mind is really very authorative -- especially when one reviews the evidence that Bormann did, in fact, escape and survive and died in Latin America, as outlined in Hugh Thomas's book "Doppleganger".

David

Critical Mass

The Real Story of the Birth of the Atomic Bomb=20

and the Nuclear Age

by Carter P. Hydrick

Copyright © 1998 by Carter P. Hydrick

- Introduction -

This micro-history is suggested as the result of newly

discovered, very significant events that occurred during the closing

weeks of World War Two. As the story of Critical Mass unfolds, it

questions the foundations of the traditional history of the making and

use of the first atomic bombs as well as our understanding of the

Nuclear Age. The facts reveal not only important new information about

the race to produce the bomb; but the new information helps us

understand how the sum of the history of man was combined in one brief

moment to create a critical mass in humanity that shattered the old

world forever and ushered in the Nuclear Age.

The previously secret (now declassified) unpublished military,

state, intelligence and Department of Energy documentation cited

throughout Critical Mass suggests that the atomic bomb was not fully

developed and built by American scientists and technicians, as the

traditional and long-standing history asserts. Instead, the evidence

shows that enriched uranium and other atomic bomb components developed

by Nazi Germany were surrendered to United States forces during the

final weeks of the war - probably according to prearranged surreptitious

agreements - and were a vital part of the materials used to create the

bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The evidence

indicates that without these materials the United States would have

fallen short of achieving its nuclear weapons objectives.

Interwoven into this story - in fact, integral to it - is

provocative evidence that connects Hitler's behind-the-scenes right-hand

man, Nazi Party Chief Martin Bormann, to Germany's very nearly

successful effort to create an atomic bomb; and to Germany's last-ditch

efforts to transfer that technology to Japan. Evidence also suggests

that Bormann, at the latest possible moment, turned against his Asian

ally and decided to hand the keys of world dominion - in the form of the

atomic bomb - to any Allied country that would treat with him. Thus

Bormann covertly negotiated a separate, and very secret, personal peace

with the United States that allowed him to disappear from the front page

of history and slide silently between the shadows of a murky past and a

phantasmal future.

The events that initiated this story have each lead to

astounding new revelations that had the net effect of continually, and,

seemingly unendingly, expanding the scope of this book. As a private

citizen who researched and wrote the book around the demands of a full-

time job and who, with the aid of generous friends and family, financed

the research and writing, generating unlimited resources to constantly

expand the book's scope was impossible. Despite desires to throw light

in every corner, proving the premises presented in Critical Mass has, of

necessity, been circumscribed to proving the following basic assertions:

1. That the Manhattan Project was not successful producing all of the

needed enriched uranium - isotope U235 - in time to fulfill its atomic

bomb requirements, nor was it successful creating a triggering device

for the plutonium bomb without the help of captured German components.

2. While not proving conclusively that uranium was enriched in Germany,

it would be demonstrated that there was potential in Germany, despite

the traditional history that states otherwise, for the Nazi program to

successfully enrich U235. Enrichment would have been in quantities

that could have supplied the bomb-grade uranium needed by the United

States to complete its atomic bomb project. Also, that Germany

successfully developed a triggering mechanism usable for the plutonium

bomb.

3. That U235 for the uranium bomb, and infrared fuses for the plutonium

bomb, were obtained by the U.S. from Germany and were transferred into

the possession of the Manhattan Project and ultimately used in the bombs

dropped on Japan.

As a matter of sufficiently authenticating the above assertions,

I have tried to obtain a minimum of two corroborating pieces of evidence

to validate the theories presented. In almost every case, as will be

seen, this has been accomplished. In many, three or more proofs are

given. In a few instances only one piece of evidence is extant; but

taken on the whole, the accumulated evidence is considerable if not

incontrovertible.

The question may be asked that, with the hundreds if not

thousands of books, articles and histories that have been written about

the making of the first atomic bombs, how can any new and unpublished

information be added to the chronicle. Remarkably, the answer, in part,

is that very few of the writers of those histories ever saw any of the

original records of the most seminal events that constituted the makings

of the bombs. As far as I can tell, I was the first to review the

actual uranium enrichment production records, the shipping and receiving

records of materials sent from Oak Ridge to Los Alamos, the

metallurgical fabrication records of the making of the bombs themselves,

and the records and testimony regarding failure to develop a viable

triggering device for the plutonium bomb. Of the 38 boxes of Oak Ridge

records held in the Southeast Regional Archives in Atlanta, Georgia I

had pulled for review, only four had been opened since their

declassification in 1967 and 1978. I was the first to open and cull

through many of these boxes, and within these containers I found many

critical documents. And there are boxes that remain, their

declassification seals yet unbroken.

Apparently, the authors described above have relied on personal accounts

and the administrative, strategic and general records harbored in the

National Archives in Washington for their research. The critical daily

production records of Oak Ridge and elsewhere have been all but ignored,

though they reveal important information not previously considered in

other histories, and although they tell a different story than that

presently believed. Even if those authors had read, assimilated and

interpreted the available records, the discrepancies may have been

considered anomalous and possibly would have been ignored when compared against the overpowering reputation of the traditional history. Most of that history can be traced in theme and content to Manhattan Project

Commanding General Leslie Groves' book on the subject, Now It Can Be

Told. =20

Now It Can Be Told presents the story of the making of the

atomic bomb that the United States government needed the world to hear

at the time. There was, undoubtedly, justification for this guarded

approach considering the exigencies of the era. The chronicle of

history should be corrected when opportunity allows, however - though it

all too often is not - for the understanding and benefit of generations

to come. And, frankly, for the recognition of all those who played a

part, as well as the enlightenment of those who simply desire to know

the truth. Democracies especially depend on an informed citizenry to

safeguard the proper use of power and appropriate oversight of important

military and political policy. Certainly not all information and

actions of a government at war or in conflict with another sovereignty

can be reviewed on an open basis contemporaneously with the critical

events. But as timely issues are resolved or neutralized by new events,

it is incumbent upon that democratic society to carefully review and

analyze the events and equitably judge the system and the people

involved. Through this course we ensure the nation's best interests

were preserved, and make whatever adjustments are necessary to provide a

guide for future like endeavors.

Other official and semi-official accounts of the Manhattan

Project and the programs that competed against it have been written, the

best among them being Richard Rhodes' exceptional Pulitzer Prize winning

book, The Making Of The Atomic Bomb. Critical Mass attempts in no way to

re-document the otherwise reliable historical elements of a very complex

and detailed subject, other than to provide a basic understanding useful

to the reader's analysis of the scenario forwarded within these pages.

Critical Mass simply suggests that the data recently found describe some

very different events than are recounted in the presently accepted

history.

As noted, many other authors' accounts are cited herein, but all

of them, ultimately, either directly or indirectly, by default or

design, have been molded by the man who presided over the project

itself, General Groves. During the very process of the making of the

atomic bombs, through compartmentalization and by mixing a high

percentage of genuine data with innuendo - as well as judicious use of

the occasional untruth - Groves was able to create a resilient and

coherent self-perpetuating myth of the birth of the atomic age.

Much of the information used to tell the story in Critical Mass

does come from the writings of Groves and other authors. David Irving,

Britain's controversial but documentation-dependant World War II

historian has recorded much of the German effort to create a bomb in his

book, The German Atomic Bomb. His account alone, though he seems not to

realize it, goes a long way toward impeaching the accepted history that,

because Germany failed to create plutonium, it therefore failed to build

an atomic bomb.=20

There are two ways to build an atomic bomb, one of plutonium, the other

of uranium. Irving brings to light ample information that, when

considered with other evidence newly discovered and revealed in Critical

Mass, suggests the Germans produced the material for and all but

assembled a uranium bomb.

In the traditional history of the bomb, Groves has positioned

the German plutonium effort as the only nuclear initiative Germany ever

pursued. And he has magnified this misinformation, couched in a cushion

of half-truths, to immense proportions - large enough to hide what

appears to be a huge German uranium enrichment project behind it - and

thus he has shielded the Nazi near-success from the view of the world.

His motivations for doing so will be discussed in detail later.

One of many other authors quoted in Critical Mass is former

World War Two intelligence officer Ladislas Farago, who documented

Martin Bormann's escape from Nazi Germany at the end of the war and his

ensuing life in semi-secret exile in South America in his book,

Aftermath. Farago was accused and supposedly proven, with the help of

the CIA, of having forged the documentation he used to verify his claims

about Bormann. Critical Mass reviews the subject of the CIA and its

predecessor the OSS, and their involvement in the negotiations with

Bormann and eventual surrender of German-made nuclear bomb materials

during the course of the war, later within the body text of this book.

Suffice it to say here that involvement by the CIA in a fair perusal of

Farago's findings must be suspect.

Critical Mass quotes other authors, as well, who have

independently discovered similar but different documentation to that Mr.

Farago cites, and whose findings exonerate and rehabilitate Ladislas

Farago's work. Among these authors are Paul Manning, former journalist

for the New York Times and author of Martin Bormann - Nazi In Exile.

Manning's credentials as a journalist particularly are impeccable, and

his reputation is unassailable. Although he did not accept an offer

immediately after the war to serve as the civilian deputy of the United

States' occupation zone of Germany, the offer itself attests to the high

regard in which he is held, as well as to the potential military

intelligence and other resources he had available when researching his

book.

Another author from whose writings I have drawn is William Stevenson,

author of the book A Man Called Intrepid, the approved biography of

another gentleman and friend of Stevenson's, a man by the same name, Sir

William Stephenson (unrelated, note spellings). Sir William is the man

who oversaw the combined intelligence efforts of the United States and

England during World War II, and who, incidentally, plays a minor role

in our story within the covers of Critical Mass. Author Stevenson's

book is titled The Bormann Brotherhood.

=20

Many other authors are quoted, as well, to highlight and

validate the conclusions presented in Critical Mass. But the definitive

body of evidence is the actual documents cited in this book that

dispassionately record the numbers and weights and dates and times and

places and people that constitute the real events that occurred.

The silent archives, in some cases long untouched, contain the

remaining few pieces of the picture that had been painted over with

duplicitous details and fraudulent facts. Exposing those lost data to

the light of day is much like the art curator who takes a blacklight to

a painting to ascertain its origin. Under scrutiny of light tuned only

to see the original, the primary picture is exposed underneath as well

as any revisions that may later have been made. So it is with the

certifieds cited in Critical Mass. The light of day, "always a great

disinfectant" as the saying goes, reveals through newly-disclosed

documentation the true story of the Manhattan Project during the birth

of its atomic offspring - with all its flaws, foibles and unholy

alliances as well as its ultimate, although somehow twisted, success.

And even with those flaws and foibles it is, at once, a story of

genius and perseverance as well as a lesson in man's own struggle to

grow morally and spiritually at the same pace that he has grown

intellectually and technologically. For, as social beings who must

share this earth, we are all interdependent upon one another. When one

such as Hitler rises to power, the only defense against the bully who

insists on blood, when all reason has failed, is to be more the

aggressor, or submit and perish. Such course devolves to a level of

behavior differentiated from the instigator's only by the moral

imperative of one's right to survive.=20

The sad fact is we can rise as a race only to the level of our

least enlightened. Until that time, the weight of our human frailties

and flaws will at irregular intervals compress to critical mass and

ignite a new explosion of pain and suffering until we learn once and for

all that our cumulative morality must meet or exceed our united

intellects

[John Simkin]

“10 May marked the end of the London Blitz. It was the last time the Nazis would attempt a major raid on the capital. Foreign journalist based in London at the time wrote articles that highlighted this strange fact.”

A bit misleading since the focus of the Blitz had shifted to other cities before this and the Germans launched a major raid on Birmingham on May 16 and a smaller raid on Cardiff the next day (*, **, *6). The historically accepted explanation for the end of the Blitz was that resources were being shifted east to attack the Soviet Union (**, *4, *5, *6). You even quoted A.J.P Taylor as saying “16 May 1941 saw the last heavy German attack on Birmingham. Thereafter the Luftwaffe was busy preparing to cooperate with the army against Soviet Russia”***.

I don't think my statement is anyway misleading. In fact, it is completely accurate. I said it was the last major German air raid on London. It was. Of course, Hitler continued to order air raids on other parts of the UK. In the same way that Churchill did not completely abandon the bombing of Germany. If Hitler and Churchill had done this it would be clear that peace negotiations were taking place. What we do know is that leading officials of both governments were amazed by these decisions made by Hitler and Churchill.

[Sid Walker]

By the turn of the decade, the Hitler = Evil formula was a near universal belief in Britain.

Oh and of course nothing could be further from the truth right Sid?

A note on motivating factors behind the consolidation of Block 1.

By August 1939, the seed had been firmly implanted in Roosevelt's mind that

(i) a new and unprecedented "weapon of mass destruction" might be possible in the near future: nuclear bombs

(ii) Nazi Germany was actually developing nuclear bombs with probable malicious intent.

See Einstein's letter of August 2nd 1939.

So you think Einstein conned FDR into getting the US involved in WW2? Can you show that anything in the letter was intentionally misleading?

Not suggesting that at all Len. But the possibility of this new weapon cast a shadow over other decisions, actions and events. It clearly needs incorporating in anything resembling a full analysis. And it was clearly a major factor for Roosevelt.

Roosevelt may have had enough reasons to seek war with Nazi Germany without the WMD scare... but it was in his mix of motivations.

David - thanks for the extra material you posted by Hydrick. A fascinating read.

Edited June 15, 2007 by Sid Walker