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Cryptology, Army Signal Corp and Field Operations Intelligence


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Forum members may be familiar with Dick Russell's mention of Field Operations Intelligence, in his classic book The Man Who Knew Too Much, especially in relation to Richard Case Nagell, and Charles Willoughby, acting subordinate to General Douglas MacArthur during the postwar occupation of Japan, and onwards.

After spending a great deal of personal time researching various subjects, ranging from the Office of Naval Intelligence from the period of its inception to Pearl Harbor, culminating in the period of the Kennedy Assassination, to other aspects of intelligence operations, such as Army Intelligence, particularly the 112th MIG and the 513th MIG; Also noteworthy is the Army Signal Corp, which, in the post World War II period became known as the Signal Intelligence Service......Names and places which will hopefully be contained in this thread in the future will illustrate, the intertwining relationships pertaining to cryptology and its oblique relationship to the assassination of President Kennedy, activities in Japan particularly with relation to Atsugi, Japan.

For a point of reference, as it were, the following information is from the files of the US Army Archives and goes into greater detail regarding Field Operations Intelligence, than anything I have personally had the opportunity to read.......This section posted is here is a segment, not a complete document.....

The information contained supplements a great deal of information regarding the old Military Intelligence Division and ONI and cryptography studies that are viewable online at the mary ferrell website under the Church Committee Documents.

Robert

PS For those wishing to view the footnotes cited, I did not include them for the sake of length, they are available at the URL contained at the bottom of this page.

In April 1954 the Department of Field Operations Intelligence was added to the existing training facility at Fort Holabird. As a result, collection personnel began to train side by side with CIC agents. This was just the beginning of a snowballing accretion of new activities that fell under the control of the CIC chief. In August 1954 he assumed command of the former G-2 Records Facility at Holabird, which contained the Army's counterintelligence files. At this point, the Counter Intelligence Corps Center was redesignated the Army Intelligence Center, and the chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, assumed a new title as the center's commanding general. In March 1955 an Army Photo Interpretation Center was established at Fort Holabird. Finally, during the same month, responsibility for conducting training in combat intelligence transferred from the Army General School at Fort Riley to the new U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Holabird.5 The arrangement centralized almost all intelligence training at one post. Only the G2's Strategic Intelligence School in Washington, D.C., and the Army Security Agency facility at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, remained outside the complex.

In practice, the original concept of an all-embracing Army Intelligence center was never quite realized. It seems to have been the intention of Maj. Gen. Arthur C. Trudeau, the assistant chief of staff, G-2, that Holabird would become the directing hub for Army Intelligence. Under the original plan, the chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, in his capacity as commanding general of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, would not only assume responsibility for training all Army Intelligence personnel, but would also take over responsibility for their administrative supervision. This arrangement would have extended the benefits of the CIC personnel structure to the rest of the Army Intelligence community. Although the concept was approved by the Army chief of staff, it was not completely implemented, and the center never achieved the position of importance originally envisioned for it. However, it did serve as a basis for more modest reforms and initiatives.

The year 1955 also witnessed the inception of an intelligence civilian career program within the Army. This step, first advocated by the second Hoover Commission on governmental reform, would augment nontactical Military Intelligence units with trained civilian specialists who would provide continuity to operations. Three hundred such positions were authorized originally. Actual implementation began in 1957, overseen by an Administrative Survey Detachment organized within the Army Intelligence Center. However, the Army soon began to have second thoughts about the program. Civilians were limited to working a forty-hour week and were not under court-martial jurisdiction. Moreover, Army leaders believed it was counterproductive to keep civilians on indefinite assignments in any one single geographic area. As a result, they limited the effort to employ more civilians.

Meanwhile, the Army Intelligence Center became involved in an attempt to remedy some of the perceived deficiencies in field intelligence programs. Initially, the commanding general, Army Intelligence Center, was responsible for training new field operations intelligence specialists, but had no authority over their assignments in the field. Some human intelligence collectors were in units under theater control, organized years before the field operations intelligence program, as such, had come into existence; others served in a detachment under direct ACSI control. The field operations intelligence program thus operated under a separate and less rigid personnel system than the Counter Intelligence Corps. Its military occupational specialty (MOS) could be awarded by ACSI and by theater commanders as well as by the Army Intelligence Center, and the Army could recruit individuals whose foreign connections would have barred them from enlisting in the Counter Intelligence Corps.

The differences between these two intelligence elements soon led to an unhealthy rivalry. As one report pointed out, "there is too much bickering and snideness at the [intelligence] Center regarding these two fields."6 The situation was made worse by the fact that intelligence officers on the Army Staff and in Europe considered field operations intelligence personnel better qualified to handle especially sensitive counterespionage operations than CIC agents. But Counter Intelligence Corps members saw any such transfer of functions as "an emasculation of CIC."7 Another problem area arose when field operations intelligence personnel, because of the nature of their mission requirements, lacked an adequate rotation base in the continental United States. Although a majority of CIC billets were in the United States, four-fifths of those billets in the field operations intelligence program were overseas.

Eventually, the ACSI decided that it would be more economical and efficient to merge all field operations intelligence assets with the Counter Intelligence Corps and cross-train personnel to serve both as counterintelligence agents and as human intelligence collectors. Accordingly, a consolidated Intelligence Corps, commanded by the former CIC chief and operating under tight centralized control, was created on I January 1961. The new organization incorporated slightly over 5,000 personnel, about 85 percent of whom came from CIC. Entrance requirements for the Intelligence Corps were less restrictive than they had been for the old Counter Intelligence Corps.

Attempts to bring the new organization even closer to the Army mainstream soon followed. During the 1950s the Counter Intelligence Corps had embodied the "best and the brightest." Ever since the Korean War, the draft had furnished it with a steady stream of college-trained applicants attracted to the idea of fulfilling their service obligation by working in civilian clothes in a glamorous and exotic field, and the CIC had been able to choose among them. Unfortunately, most of these individuals did not show any propensity for making intelligence work a career. The retention rate was abysmal- 7 percent for lieutenants and just 3 percent for enlisted personnel. Accordingly, the Army decided that "selection of applicants must be made with consideration for those offering the best career potential and not necessarily the bright college student."8 The Intelligence Corps would accept only applicants who volunteered for a three-year enlistment. At the same time, the age limit for enlisting in the corps was lowered and brought into line with the rest of the Army; eighteen-year-old personnel now became eligible for entry-level positions involving clerical rather than investigative duties. Finally, in 1965 the minimum Army General Test score for joining the Intelligence Corps was lowered from 110, the same requirement imposed on officer candidates Army-wide, to 100, which more closely approximated the Army average.

The Army Security Agency

If Fort Holabird was one pole of Army Intelligence in the 1950s, Arlington Hall Station was the other. Arlington Hall continued to serve as headquarters for the ASA, the largest single intelligence and security element in the Army, and it also came to house intelligence elements of five of the Army's technical services after the consolidation of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade in 1957 made office space available. During the Eisenhower administration, Arlington Hall's main Army tenant, the Army Security Agency, grew steadily. Personnel strength rose from 11,500 in 1952 to 18,300 by 1957; new field stations and tactical units appeared; and a substantial restructuring of the agency's mission took place.

By 1954 the Army Signal Corps was fielding a number of units to collect electronic intelligence and continued to be responsible for the conduct of electronic warfare. In April 1954 the Department of the Army analyzed the feasibility of combining all these capabilities into a single agency As a result of this study, the Army Security Agency took over responsibility for electronic intelligence and communications-related electronic countermeasures (ECM) from the Signal Corps in 1955, assuming control of a number of dispersed units and a battalion and four companies stationed at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. In return, the agency surrendered its responsibilities for Army cryptologistics and cryptomaintenance, along with associated personnel, to the Signal Corps.

In budgetary terms, the reorganization was significant: the Army was introducing a new generation of machine cipher devices to replace the venerable M209, and purchase of the new machines had consumed 60 percent of the Army Security Agency's fiscal year 1953 budget. However, the change had the important benefits of eliminating duplication of facilities and allowing for proper integration of signals intelligence with electronic intelligence. The term signals intelligence (SIGINT) was now redefined and used to refer to both of these functions. Actual implementation of this mission transfer was delayed for a short time until the Signal Corps personnel transferred to the Army Security Agency had their clearance levels upgraded.

The new arrangements meant that the Army Security Agency was no longer exclusively an intelligence organization. By acquiring responsibility for electronic warfare, the agency now managed a weapons system, even though the weapon was invisible. In recognition of this change, the Army Security Agency became a Department of the Army field operating agency on 23 June 1955.9 It now reported directly to the Army chief of staff, not to the assistant chief of staff, G-2. However, the agency continued to focus primarily on the cryptologic mission, and electronic warfare in practice did not receive much emphasis.

Having acquired responsibility for electronic intelligence and electronic warfare, the Army Security Agency made further attempts to enlarge the scope of its mission. In September 1955 the chief, Army Security Agency, recommended to the Army chief of staff that his organization be given the responsibility for dissemination and protection of sensitive compartmented information Army-wide, thus eliminating the special security officer system maintained by the assistant chief of staff, G-2, which had just been consolidated into a single element, Detachment M. The rationale for this proposal was economy. However, both the Army's intelligence staff and commanders in the field vigorously resisted it. Intelligence personnel claimed that the Army Security Agency was not qualified to produce the all-source intelligence which special security officers provided to their supported G-2s. Field commanders unanimously endorsed the existing arrangement, pointing out that ASA units were not conveniently located in or near the major Army headquarters and that eliminating the special security officers would deprive them of their secure "back-channel" communications. The Army chief of staff tabled the proposal, but the Army Security Agency refused to drop the issue. The bureaucratic struggle over the matter would go on for the next two decades, at times fought with considerable acrimony

The Army Security Agency pursued other initiatives with greater success. In 1956 the agency became aware for the first time of the possibility that emissions radiating from electronic data processing equipment might compromise security and initiated a program, nicknamed TEMPEST, to counter the threat. In 1957 the U.S. Army Security Agency Board was created to provide long-range planning,

and in 1960 its functions were expanded to include combat development. At the same time, the Army Intelligence Board at Fort Holabird acquired parallel responsibilities for overseeing combat developments in the field of human intelligence. Meanwhile, the ASA and its field stations underwent redesignation. As a result of an Army-wide change, the agency became the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) on 1 January 1957. Concurrently, its fixed field stations, which previously had been known as numbered Army administrative units in the 8600 series, acquired new designations as numbered USASA field stations. 10

The agency's tactical elements underwent a more significant restructuring during this period. During the Korean War, the Army Security Agency had operated with flexible battalion headquarters overseeing the operations of independent security and collection companies. In 1955 fixed battalions with organic companies combining both functions were created, and in 1956 all communication reconnaissance units were redesignated as Army Security Agency units. However, in 1957 the secretary of defense's decision to cut the Army's strength by a total of 50,000 threw the force structure of the agency into disarray. The decrement left the ASA without sufficient personnel to fill its existing tactical TOE units, which at the time accounted for about a quarter of its total strength. In response, the Army Security Agency inactivated all its TOE units and replaced them with mission-tailored units based on individual tables of distribution. The new TD units included the 507th and 508th U.S. Army Security Agency Groups, located respectively in Germany and Korea, and six U.S. Army Security Agency battalions numbered from 316 to 321. These units were given the designator U.S. Army Security Agency to distinguish them from Army Security Agency TOE units. The battalions retained the fixed structure of their TOE predecessors.

Originally, the Army intended this as a temporary measure, to remain in force only until new organizational tables could be drawn up. In practice, however, the ASA continued to operate exclusively with TD units until 1962, when tactical TOE units were formed in the continental United States to support the Army's new strategic reserve for contingency operations. Later, additional TOE elements were activated to serve in Vietnam. Some of the mission-tailored TD units soon acquired new and exotic designations as special operations units and special operations commands.

The U.S. Army Security Agency was the principal tenant at Arlington Hall after 1957, but not the only one. Intelligence elements of five technical services ultimately located there. Only the Corps of Engineers, the intelligence arm of which was concentrated in the Army Map Service, and the Quartermaster Corps held back, although the Ordnance Corps also maintained a separate missile intelligence center at Redstone Arsenal. Although most of these technical service intelligence units engaged in analysis and production, the Signal Corps continued to engage in some specialized collection activities even after it had surrendered its electronic intelligence and communications-related electronic warfare functions to the Army Security Agency

Military Intelligence in the Field

Until the late 1950s the tactical formations of the Army received their intelligence support from Military Intelligence specialist units put together on the cellular principle. Combat intelligence units were organically separate from counterintelligence units under this arrangement, and the G-2s of the supported units had to coordinate the efforts of the two diverse elements themselves.

At the end of 1957 the Army introduced a new category of intelligence units organized under a concept plan entitled the Military Intelligence Organization. Under this plan interrogators, photo interpreters, order of battle specialists, and other combat intelligence personnel were integrated into single units with counterintelligence and collection elements. These new units operated under a fixed table of organization and were designed to be administratively selfsufficient.

Under the Military Intelligence Organization concept, the basic building block was the Military Intelligence battalion supporting afield army. This unit had its own specialized organic companies: a headquarters and headquarters company containing photo interpreters, order of battle and technical intelligence specialists, and censorship personnel; and lettered linguist, security, and collection companies. In addition, the battalion furnished tactical units down to the division level with attached multidiscipline intelligence detachments.11 The creation of the Military Intelligence Organization was one of the first steps in bringing truly multidiscipline intelligence support to the field. Only ASA units remained outside the new organizational structure because of the Army Security Agency's vertical, or "stovepipe," command structure and its tight centralization and compartmentation.

In practice, implementation of the new force structure was limited. Under the Military Intelligence Organization concept, four Military Intelligence Battalions eventually were reorganized: the 319th and 519th in the continental United States; the 532d in Germany; and the 502d in Korea. However, only the headquarters and headquarters companies and linguist companies were initially activated in the two battalions in the United States.12 Meanwhile, the bulk of Army counterintelligence and field operations intelligence personnel continued to serve in singlediscipline cellular units supporting the theaters and the Zone of Interior armies until 1961, when consolidated intelligence Corps groups and detachments were formed.

Not all intelligence disciplines were well served by this new arrangement. In the continental United States, linguists had to be concentrated at battalion level, rather than spread among the detachments that were attached to divisions and other tactical units, as the Military Intelligence Organization concept dictated. Each detachment might be involved in several contingency plans, and each plan often required expertise in a different language. There was simply no way to assign the appropriate linguists to a Military Intelligence detachment until actual implementation of a specific plan or major field exercise began.

Photo interpreters also fit rather uneasily into the new structure. At the tactical level such personnel lacked access to the imagery that national-level reconnaissance elements began to generate in the late 1950s, and thus felt that their skills were not being adequately used. Units based in the United States had no operational mission, and photo interpreters found themselves all too often assigned to housekeeping and administrative positions unrelated to their specialty. Detailed to kitchen police and other "rock-painting" chores, many felt slighted and complained of "harassment." 13

To remedy the situation, in 1963 the Army Intelligence Center proposed that all photo interpreters in the United States be placed under centralized control in the same fashion as the Army's linguists. They could find more useful employment either at the Army Photo Interpretation Center or with the Army's lone specialized tactical photo unit in the United States. However, field commanders strongly resisted the proposal on the grounds that stripping Military Intelligence detachments of their photo interpreters would deprive G-2s of access to this intelligence field and would result in equipment maintenance problems. The status quo thus continued.

Finally, the Army continued to neglect tactical-level technical intelligence. There were no provisions for a technical intelligence company in the initial TOES for the Military intelligence battalion (field army), and it would take ten years for the Army to remedy this discrepancy. By that time, the Vietnam conflict would be in full swing, creating an insatiable demand for personnel resources, and only one field army-level battalion would ever receive its technical intelligence company.

At the tactical level, intelligence organization was also influenced by the Army's increasing reliance on aircraft. By 1960 there were 5,000 aircraft in the Army inventory. Many of them were helicopters, items that had first seen extensive use in medical evacuation during the Korean War. It soon became apparent that improved versions of rotary-wing aircraft could serve as useful reconnaissance assets. During the course of the 1950s the Korean-vintage L-19 that had served as the all-purpose workhorse within the division was phased out in favor of the helicopter, and aircraft within the division were concentrated in larger formations. Under the structure of the pentomic division fielded in 1957, Army aviation within the divisions was consolidated into company-size units. The ROAD division of 1962 included a complete aviation battalion, one company of which was equipped with scout helicopters. In addition, observation helicopters were assigned to divisional artillery, and a helicopter-borne aerial cavalry troop formed part of the divisional reconnaissance battalion.

Along with its helicopters, the Army also developed more sophisticated fixedwing aircraft for reconnaissance. In 1962 it acquired the AO-1 Mohawk. This twin-engine craft came in three configurations: one equipped with a high-performance camera; one with newly developed infrared night vision equipment; and the third with the equally new side-looking airborne radar device. Mohawks were employed both in divisional aerial surveillance and targeting platoons, as well as in aerial surveillance companies that operated at corps level. 15

In addition to developing its own aerial assets, the Army took steps to improve its interaction with Air Force tactical reconnaissance. To better exploit aerial photography produced by Air Force reconnaissance squadrons, the Army fielded the 1st Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion in 1959. The unit consisted of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, a signal air photo reproduction and delivery company, and a photo interpretation company. A similar unit, the 24th Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion, was activated in the Army Reserve the same year, thus becoming the first non-ASA intelligence battalion active in the reserve components since the Korean War. In 1961 the Army activated another Regular Army air reconnaissance support battalion to support the Seventh Army in Germany, and in 1962 these units were reorganized and redesignated as Military intelligence battalions (air reconnaissance support), or "Mibars." Two years later it devised a new TOE for this type of unit that provided for a headquarters and headquarters company and four lettered imagery interpretation detachments.16 The diverse nature of the products which photo interpreters now had to manage-infrared and radar imagery, as well as conventional photography-led to the Army's redesignating photographic intelligence as imagery intelligence in 1964.

There were also new developments in the Army's arrangements for ground reconnaissance. From 1957 on, each combat division had its own reconnaissance battalion. The successive restructurings of the division in 1957 and 1962

meant that reconnaissance assets previously held at the regimental level were moved down, first to battle group, and then to battalion. An armored cavalry platoon and a ground surveillance section equipped with mobile radar sets became part of the headquarters company of each infantry battalion.

Intelligence Support to the Theaters

By the late 1950s the deployment of the Army overseas had become fixed in a pattern that would remain largely unchanged for the duration of the Cold War.17 The completion of the European buildup, the drawdown of forces in Korea, and the signing of a peace treaty with Japan resulted in a force structure that gave the Army five divisions in Europe and two in Korea, commanded respectively by the Seventh and Eighth Armies. The diversity of the theaters, the disparate numbers of the supported forces in each one, and the differing nature of intelligence requirements in Europe and in the Pacific dictated that arrangements for intelligence support would not be uniform. Moreover, even if the positioning of troops on the ground remained relatively static, theater command relationships did not, and these shifts also impacted on the theater intelligence structure.

In Europe a continuing flood of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain provided American forces with ample opportunities for intelligence exploitation. From 1951 to 1962 collection of intelligence from border crossers was carried out by the Seventh Army's 532d Military Intelligence Battalion, a field-army type of unit organized under the Military Intelligence Organization concept and headquartered in Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Federal Republic of Germany During an average year, the battalion screened between 20,000 and 30,000 refugees.

At the theater level, counterintelligence support for U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), was provided by the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. This unit, with headquarters in Stuttgart, provided counterintelligence coverage through a network of regional and field offices that not only extended over West Germany but also reached occupied Berlin and the USAREUR Communications Zone in France. The 513th Military Intelligence Service Group, activated at Oberursel, Federal Republic of Germany, in 1953 to take over operations previously performed by the 7077th USAREUR Intelligence Center, soon was redesignated the 513th Military Intelligence Group and then expanded its scope of activities to include active collection. With the inception of an Army civilian intelligence career program in the 1950s, both units received large TD augmentations of civilian specialists.

In 1959 USAREUR experimented with organizing intelligence work on an area rather than on a functional basis. Consequently the 513th Military

Intelligence Group was given northern Germany as its area of responsibility, and the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group (later successively redesignated as the 66th Military Intelligence Group and the 66th intelligence Corps Group) was allotted the south, where the preponderance of American forces was stationed. This arrangement caused more problems than solutions and was later abandoned.

Meanwhile, opportunities for exploitation of sources began to diminish. In 1961 the construction of the Berlin Wall and the simultaneous imposition of tighter border controls by East Germany effectively shut off the refugee flow This development reduced the need to have three large intelligence units with partially overlapping responsibilities in Europe. As a result, in 1962 there was a major realignment of intelligence resources. The 513th Intelligence Corps Group, as it was now designated, assumed complete responsibility for active intelligence and certain sensitive counterespionage missions for USAREUR, while the 66th Intelligence Corps Group was reassigned to Seventh Army and assumed the mission of the inactivated 532d Military Intelligence Battalion. During this process, the group lost its regional form of organization and emerged as the command headquarters for various numbered Army Intelligence units, including the tactical intelligence elements attached to the Seventh Army's corps and divisions. 18

Cryptologic support in the theater was provided by an entirely separate organizational structure, in conformity with Army practice. The U.S. Army Security Agency maintained a theater headquarters in Frankfurt that exercised command and control over various field stations in Europe and over a group headquarters with three subordinate battalions and some other units operating in support of the Seventh Army.

In the Pacific, following the conclusion of the armistice in Korea, the Army broke up its elaborate intelligence and special operations organization, the 8240th Army Unit. Under conditions of relative peace, the Korean partisan forces it had mustered were transferred to the control of the South Korean government, the least productive of its operations terminated, and its mission restricted to intelligence collection. The unit's Korean-based element, the Army Collection Detachment, continued to report to a theater-level Army command reconnaissance activity until 1961, when a number of Army Intelligence assets in Korea combined to form the 502d Military Intelligence Battalion. The other elements used to form the battalion came from the 308th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and the Eighth Army's 528th Military Intelligence Company, which were concurrently inactivated.

At the theater level, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), served as the Army's principal headquarters element in the Pacific until 1957. It was supported

by an elaborate intelligence architecture directed by the USAFFE G-2 in Tokyo, Japan. The organization's principal human intelligence collection arm was the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Far East. The other major field elements were the 500th Military Intelligence Group, an interpreter unit, and the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Group. These three units reported to the U.S. Army Intelligence Support Center, Japan, under command of a brigadier general.

The Eisenhower-Kishii agreement of 1957 led to a drawdown of American troop strength from Japan and relocation of the Army's main Pacific headquarters from Tokyo to Hawaii. The discontinuance of USAFFE and the establishment of United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), led to a rapid decrement in Japan-based Military Intelligence assets. The 500th Military Intelligence Group was inactivated, the Intelligence Support Center discontinued, and the functions of both organizations absorbed by the successor of the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Far East, the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Pacific. Following the departure of most American troops from Japan in 1959, the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, as it was now known, was in turn inactivated. In 1961 the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Pacific, was discontinued and the 500th Military Intelligence Group once more reactivated to carry out all aspects of the human intelligence mission. This group redeployed to Hawaii in 1965, a move dictated by the U.S. government's attempts at that time to reduce the outflow of gold reserves overseas.

U.S. Army Security Agency operations in the Far East were under the direction of a regional headquarters located in Tokyo until 1958. This was consolidated briefly with ASA headquarters elements in Hawaii from 1958 to 1960 to become the U.S. Army Security Agency, Pacific. In 1960 it returned to Tokyo, where it remained until it again relocated to Hawaii in 1965. The withdrawal of the agency's Pacific headquarters back to American soil also came about because of the government's concern over the balance of payments.

After 1957 the Eighth Army in Korea received its cryptologic support from the 508th U.S. Army Security Group (a TD unit) and the 321st U.S. Army Security Agency Battalion, another TD unit. The battalion was discontinued in 1964-another casualty of the government's worries about the gold flow.

One unique feature of the Pacific theater was the existence of the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Pacific. Unlike other Army intelligence training facilities overseas, the Pacific intelligence school, set up on Okinawa in 1958, trained foreigners, not Americans. The students from seven different countries bordering the Pacific basin took courses in combat intelligence and counterintelligence techniques until the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty brought operations to a halt in 1975.19

The McNamara Revolution

The outcome of the presidential election of 1960 led to major changes in the structure of the Army and the Army's intelligence components. President John F Kennedy rejected the strategic assumptions of the previous administration, believing that any military challenge had to be met through graduated deterrence. This approach placed a new emphasis on the importance of the nation's conventional forces, including the Army Kennedy selected Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to implement the new strategy. In carrying out his assignment, McNamara, a former Ford Motors executive with a background in systems analysis, proved to be the very model of a rationalizing, centralizing bureaucrat. Making the most of the powers of his office, McNamara introduced a series of reforms that altered the way the American military machine was constructed and had a profound effect on the Army Intelligence community.20

Since 1958 there had been discussions at the national level concerning the advisability of setting up some kind of intelligence agency at the Department of Defense (DOD) level to better coordinate the intelligence elements of the armed services. In 1960 a Joint Study Group had criticized the existing arrangements within the Military Intelligence community. Three separate and uncoordinated service intelligence agencies, each with its own parochial bias, could not provide DOD with the integrated intelligence it needed to formulate a coherent national strategy. Air Force Intelligence in particular had embarrassed policy makers, since its estimates of alleged "bomber gaps" and "missile gaps" between the United States and the Soviet Union were widely disseminated and later demonstrated to be incorrect.21

Once in office, McNamara became a vigorous proponent of centralization, especially with respect to Military Intelligence operations under DOD. As a result, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) began operations on 1 October 1961. The new organization would impose the same kind of centralized direction and control on the general Military Intelligence program as NSA was already providing to signals intelligence. Its creation meant that Army Intelligence would become a distinctly subordinate element within a wider Military Intelligence structure and marked a further cutback in ACSI's powers and responsibilities. However, this did not happen immediately At its inception, DIA consisted of a cadre of twenty-five people housed in 2,000 square feet of borrowed office space in the Pentagon. The new agency pulled together rather slowly at first, initially taking on only the estimative, current intelligence, and requirements missions from the service intelligence agencies.

Meanwhile, McNamara was reorganizing the Army itself in ways that had a substantial effect on the Army's intelligence architecture. In 1962 the secretary of defense implemented Project 80, which involved the wholesale restructuring of the Army into functional, centralized commands. In the process, ACSI lost control over intelligence training, research and development, and doctrinal matters. Five of the Army's technical services were abolished, with only the Corps of Engineers and the Office of the Surgeon General remaining in place, and their intelligence personnel were split up among a number of different elements.22

A few order of battle specialists from the dissolved technical services joined the ACSI staff. A larger group engaged in scientific and technical intelligence became part of a new Foreign Science and Technology Center or stayed in place at the Army Missile Intelligence Agency which the Ordnance Department maintained at Redstone Arsenal. Both of these centers were assigned to the Army Materiel Command, which McNamara had just created. The largest group, consisting of 700 persons engaged in area analysis, was absorbed into the Area Analysis Intelligence Agency established at the direction of the chief of Engineers.

The Area Analysis Intelligence Agency was intended to be only a temporary holding area. When DIA assumed production responsibilities in 1963, the organization was discontinued, and its personnel, together with part of the OACSI staff, transferred to DIA. All in all, the Army contributed 1,000 spaces and its ACSI-MATIC computer system to the new DIA Production Center. In the process, OACSI lost 235 spaces, one-third of its strength, to the new agency. The centerpiece of OACSI had been its Directorate of Foreign Intelligence, the intelligence production unit. This was reduced to a shell, retaining only a residual responsibility for analyzing and interpreting national agency production in support of the Army and in maintaining liaison with DIA. As a result of this devolution of responsibilities, the center of gravity of Army intelligence would move from the staff in Washington, D.C., to the units in the field.

However, even after the reorganization of 1963 DIA did not hold a complete monopoly over the production of intelligence for the Army Subordinate elements within the Army continued to conduct production activities. These included the Army Materiel Command, with its two scientific and technical intelligence centers; the Office of the Chief of Engineers, which administered the Army Map Service; and the Office of the Surgeon General, which still had the responsibility of meeting some of the Army's medical intelligence requirements. In addition, a new production element was formed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to support the mobile reserve forces assigned to the Continental Army Command (CONARC).

Other intelligence-related functions previously performed by the Army were also centralized. In 1963 the Army's Strategic Intelligence School was merged with its Navy counterpart to form a new Defense Intelligence School, which began to provide training for attaches from all the military services. The process was carried through to its logical conclusion in 1965, when DIA assumed control over the military attache system that had served as an Army information source since 1889. All service attaches were integrated into the new Defense Attache System. Meanwhile, the Defense Language Institute had replaced the separate language schools previously maintained by the services.

Although DIA acquired production and collection assets from Army Intelligence, another new McNamara creation (the Defense Supply Agency) asserted itself on the counterintelligence front. In March 1965 this agency took over the whole field of industrial security, absorbing all the related spaces from ACSI's Industrial and Personnel Security Group. Ever since World War II, the function had rebounded between G-2 and the Provost Marshal General's Office. The new arrangement seemed to mark a definitive end to this particular jurisdictional dispute within the Army.

OACSI responded to these institutional challenges in much the same way as ASA had met the threat of the Armed Forces Security Agency: it found a new role in devoting itself to Armyspecific needs. Shorn of many of its operational functions, OACSI reoriented itself and began providing intensified staff supervision to intelligence areas of growing interest to the Army. In the summer of 1963 the Directorate of Surveillance and Reconnaissance was added to the Army's Intelligence staff to develop the doctrine and hardware that would allow the Army to glean information from the battlefield through innovative technologies. Additional new Directorates of Security and Combat Intelligence were formed in 1964 to supervise functional areas of primary interest to the Army The Combat Intelligence Directorate included a section responsible for overseeing developments in the fields of special warfare and foreign assistance. Finally, OACSI found ways to edge back into fields of activity theoretically preempted by DIA. In 1963 it set up a Special Research Detachment as a liaison element at NSA, soon expanding it into an all-source production element. The same year the Special Security Detachment formed an Intelligence Support Branch to provide the Army Staff with current intelligence.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Command and the U.S. Army Security Agency

The McNamara-directed reorganization of the Army had significant consequences for the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The center, commanded by the chief of the Intelligence Corps, had functioned as a field operating agency under direct ACSI control. Two of its main assets were the Army Intelligence School and the Army Intelligence Board, charged with framing doctrine and developing specialized equipment. The McNamara restructuring intruded on both of these arrangements. The Intelligence School was resubordinated to CONARC and the functions of the Intelligence Board split between the Army Materiel Command and another McNamara creation, the Combat Developments Command.

As a result, ACSI created a new administrative entity, the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Activity, which took over the remnant of the former Intelligence Center's assets and residual functions. The organization served as a vehicle through which the chief of the Intelligence Corps could exercise control over those elements the McNamara restructuring had left under ACSI jurisdiction. These consisted of the Army's counterintelligence records facility, a new Intelligence Corps Supply Activity, the Strategic Intelligence School (until its transfer to DIA), the Army Photo Interpretation Center, and the Administrative Survey Detachment that supported the Intelligence Civilian Career Program which ACSI had started in the 1950s. However, the establishment of the Army Intelligence Corps Activity did nothing to alleviate the confusion in the intelligence command chain resulting from the reorganizations. Since the chief of the Intelligence Corps continued to act as commandant of the Army Intelligence School and commander of Fort Holabird, he now reported simultaneously to three different superiors. As commanding general of the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Activity and chief of the intelligence Corps he was responsible to ACSI, but he was under the jurisdiction of CONARC in his capacity as school commandant and subordinate to the U.S. Second Army in his role of post commander. This Rube Goldberg-like arrangement offered no promise of stability

These changes represented only the beginning of the restructuring of Army counterintelligence organization. In 1963 and 1964 the Army undertook a major study of its personnel security system, an effort spurred by the discovery that an Army sergeant in a sensitive position at the National Security Agency had been passing information to the Soviets for years without being detected.23 The study, Project SECURITY SHIELD, found serious weaknesses both in the traditional decentralized approach to counterintelligence operations and in the coordination that existed between Army counterintelligence and the criminal investigators of the Provost Marshal General's Office. SECURITY SHIELD led to yet another wholesale reorganization of Army counterintelligence.

On 1 January 1965, the Army created the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command as a Department of the Army major field command. Operating under a new design concept, the command took over centralized direction over all counterintelligence operations in the continental United States. The Intelligence Corps Command assumed authority over the seven Intelligence Corps groups that had previously operated under six armies and the Military District of Washington. (The large CIC detachments in the United States had been redesignated as "groups" between 1956 and 1959.) At the same time, the Army ordered the field offices of the Intelligence Corps Command and the provost marshal's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to be brought together wherever possible, and the records of the CID repository removed from Fort Gordon, Georgia, and collocated with the counterintelligence records at Fort Holabird.

The creation of the Intelligence Corps Command gave its commander, the chief of the Intelligence Corps, operational responsibilities for the first time in the history of Army counterintelligence. At the same time, he lost certain assets. Not all the elements of the former Army Intelligence Corps Activity were transferred to the new command. Since the Intelligence Corps Command was intended to be purely a counterintelligence organization, the Army Imagery Interpretation Center, as the Photo Interpretation Center had been redesignated, reverted back to the direct control of the ACSI.

There were still certain anomalies in the new pattern of organization. Despite its title, the Intelligence Corps Command controlled only about half of all Intelligence Corps personnel in the continental United States. The rest were on school or organizational staffs, with the TOE organizations supporting tactical elements in the field, or in the "pipeline." Intelligence Corps personnel deployed outside the continental United States were not a part of the new command. The Intelligence Corps Command's commander, in his other capacity as chief of the intelligence Corps, thus had substantial administrative responsibilities extending beyond his own command; and the intelligence Corps he headed was engaged in active intelligence collection as well as in counterintelligence. The creation of the new headquarters also had left the chain of command more tangled than ever. Its commander now wore four hats. As head of a major field command, he now reported directly to the Army chief of staff, in addition to reporting to ACSI, the commander of CONARC, and the commander of the U.S. Second Army in his other various roles.24

In one sense, this arrangement conformed to the civilian theories of matrix management popular in the 1960s. Matrix management held that someone marketing refrigerators to Latin America should report to a vice president for marketing, a vice president for refrigerators, and a vice president for Latin America. But the scheme did not accord with normal Army command procedures and was in practice unworkable. Not surprisingly, reorganization plans were begun as soon as the new command had been assembled. The U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command lasted just six months.

There seemed to be only two possible solutions to the organizational tangle created by the existence of the Intelligence Corps Command. One duplicated

the Army Security Agency's centralized, vertical command structure, creating a self-sufficient organization. However, because of its mission, that agency was a special case, and its organization had no parallel in the rest of the Army The other solution, the one adopted, decentralized the structure of the Intelligence Corps Command.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) was created on 1 July 1965 to conduct counterintelligence operations within the continental United States.25 The combined headquarters organization of the former Intelligence Corps Command was broken up, and the Army Intelligence School and Fort Holabird placed under separate commanders. Functions previously performed by the Intelligence Corps Command that were unrelated to counterintelligence administering the intelligence civilian career program and procuring intelligencerelated supply items-reverted to ACSI, resulting in the establishment of the Administrative Survey Detachment and the Intelligence Materiel Development Support Office as separate field operating activities. Finally, the Intelligence Corps itself was discontinued in March 1966, and its personnel functions shifted to the Department of Army level. This ended the Army's attempts to integrate human intelligence and counterintelligence personnel under a single organizational structure. Discontinuance of the Intelligence Corps also resulted in the redesignation of all Intelligence Corps units as Military Intelligence units.26

The creation of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command meant that the Army counterintelligence organization had been turned inside out. The old Counter Intelligence Corps had selected, trained, and administered Army counterintelligence personnel, but counterintelligence operations themselves had been decentralized under the control of local Army commanders. The new major Army field command was a centralized operational organization without any personnel or training functions. The demise of the Intelligence Corps ended a special tradition that went back to the Corps of Intelligence Police in World War I, but the new arrangements meant that Army counterintelligence was now aligned with the rest of the Army.

If McNamara's organizational innovations destroyed the Intelligence Corps, they left the Army Security Agency substantially untouched. Because of its specialized mission and compartmented operations, the agency escaped the loss of its training and research and development functions. Instead, it expanded physically, geographically, and functionally An ASA element, with the in-country designation of the 3d Radio Research Unit, deployed to Vietnam to support the ongoing advisory effort as early as 1961.27 The agency also acquired an important new acoustical intelligence mission in 1962, following the abolition of the Signal Corps as an Army technical service. A year later, the Army Security Agency achieved a monopoly of Army electronic warfare functions when it took over control of the noncommunications jamming function and associated units from the Signal Corps. In 1964 it set up its third field station in the continental United States at Homestead, Florida, to better meet new mission requirements which had evolved in the early 1960s. Finally, the agency's independence and unique position within the Army was ratified on 14 April 1964, when it achieved the status of a major Army field command.28

The Army Intelligence and Security Branch

The changes within the Army Intelligence community during the 1960s were not confined to shifts in function and in command relationships. Army Intelligence took a giant step in the direction of full professionalism in 1962, when the Army Intelligence and Security Branch was set up as a basic branch of the Regular Army. This development was long overdue. Since World War II, intelligence professionals had argued that the very existence of intelligence units created the need for a separate intelligence branch. The logic of this argument was increasingly reinforced by practical necessities. The pool of reserve officers capable of filling intelligence slots was becoming exhausted. Without a reform in the Army personnel system, analysts projected that half the Army's intelligence officer positions would be without qualified occupants by 1965. The incumbent ACSI, Maj. Gen. Alva R. Fitch, pushed vigorously for the creation of a new branch to remedy the situation. Yet even the Army Intelligence community was divided on the issue. The ASA chief protested that the proposed integration of signals intelligence officers with other intelligence personnel would be like putting infantry and artillery into one branch. But Fitch won his case. The new branch came into existence formally on 1 July 1962.29

The Army Intelligence and Security Branch embraced about 5 percent of officers in the active Army The initial group joining the branch consisted of 283 Regular Army and 3,652 reserve officers who had a background in intelligence or were assigned to intelligence positions. A quarter of the group consisted of cryptologic specialists; the remainder broke down about evenly into combat intelligence personnel and members of the Intelligence Corps. The formation of the new branch significantly enhanced the Army's capacity to promote and retain qualified intelligence officers.

However, the new branch had problems initially It contained only a small number of Regular Army officers, and many of the reserve officers brought into the Army Intelligence and Security Branch lacked higher education or prospects for career advancement. The branch was designated as one that performed a combat service support function, not the most prestigious role in the Army. Finally, it was the only branch in the Army without a common basic course. Although most Intelligence officers attended Fort Holabird for training, Army Security Agency officers still trained separately at the U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School (USASATC&S) at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Nevertheless, within the space of four years, much of Army Intelligence had been reconfigured. The new structure would meet its first test in the foreign and domestic challenges during the war in Vietnam.

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Forum members may be familiar with Dick Russell's mention of Field Operations Intelligence, in his classic book The Man Who Knew Too Much, especially in relation to Richard Case Nagell, and Charles Willoughby, acting subordinate to General Douglas MacArthur during the postwar occupation of Japan, and onwards.

After spending a great deal of personal time researching various subjects, ranging from the Office of Naval Intelligence from the period of its inception to Pearl Harbor, culminating in the period of the Kennedy Assassination, to other aspects of intelligence operations, such as Army Intelligence, particularly the 112th MIG and the 513th MIG; Also noteworthy is the Army Signal Corp, which, in the post World War II period became known as the Signal Intelligence Service......Names and places which will hopefully be contained in this thread in the future will illustrate, the intertwining relationships pertaining to cryptology and its oblique relationship to the assassination of President Kennedy, activities in Japan particularly with relation to Atsugi, Japan.

For a point of reference, as it were, the following information is from the files of the US Army Archives and goes into greater detail regarding Field Operations Intelligence, than anything I have personally had the opportunity to read.......This section posted is here is a segment, not a complete document.....

The information contained supplements a great deal of information regarding the old Military Intelligence Division and ONI and cryptography studies that are viewable online at the mary ferrell website under the Church Committee Documents.

Robert

PS For those wishing to view the footnotes cited, I did not include them for the sake of length, they are available at the URL contained at the bottom of this page.

In April 1954 the Department of Field Operations Intelligence was added to the existing training facility at Fort Holabird. As a result, collection personnel began to train side by side with CIC agents. This was just the beginning of a snowballing accretion of new activities that fell under the control of the CIC chief. In August 1954 he assumed command of the former G-2 Records Facility at Holabird, which contained the Army's counterintelligence files. At this point, the Counter Intelligence Corps Center was redesignated the Army Intelligence Center, and the chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, assumed a new title as the center's commanding general. In March 1955 an Army Photo Interpretation Center was established at Fort Holabird. Finally, during the same month, responsibility for conducting training in combat intelligence transferred from the Army General School at Fort Riley to the new U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Holabird.5 The arrangement centralized almost all intelligence training at one post. Only the G2's Strategic Intelligence School in Washington, D.C., and the Army Security Agency facility at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, remained outside the complex.

In practice, the original concept of an all-embracing Army Intelligence center was never quite realized. It seems to have been the intention of Maj. Gen. Arthur C. Trudeau, the assistant chief of staff, G-2, that Holabird would become the directing hub for Army Intelligence. Under the original plan, the chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, in his capacity as commanding general of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, would not only assume responsibility for training all Army Intelligence personnel, but would also take over responsibility for their administrative supervision. This arrangement would have extended the benefits of the CIC personnel structure to the rest of the Army Intelligence community. Although the concept was approved by the Army chief of staff, it was not completely implemented, and the center never achieved the position of importance originally envisioned for it. However, it did serve as a basis for more modest reforms and initiatives.

The year 1955 also witnessed the inception of an intelligence civilian career program within the Army. This step, first advocated by the second Hoover Commission on governmental reform, would augment nontactical Military Intelligence units with trained civilian specialists who would provide continuity to operations. Three hundred such positions were authorized originally. Actual implementation began in 1957, overseen by an Administrative Survey Detachment organized within the Army Intelligence Center. However, the Army soon began to have second thoughts about the program. Civilians were limited to working a forty-hour week and were not under court-martial jurisdiction. Moreover, Army leaders believed it was counterproductive to keep civilians on indefinite assignments in any one single geographic area. As a result, they limited the effort to employ more civilians.

Meanwhile, the Army Intelligence Center became involved in an attempt to remedy some of the perceived deficiencies in field intelligence programs. Initially, the commanding general, Army Intelligence Center, was responsible for training new field operations intelligence specialists, but had no authority over their assignments in the field. Some human intelligence collectors were in units under theater control, organized years before the field operations intelligence program, as such, had come into existence; others served in a detachment under direct ACSI control. The field operations intelligence program thus operated under a separate and less rigid personnel system than the Counter Intelligence Corps. Its military occupational specialty (MOS) could be awarded by ACSI and by theater commanders as well as by the Army Intelligence Center, and the Army could recruit individuals whose foreign connections would have barred them from enlisting in the Counter Intelligence Corps.

The differences between these two intelligence elements soon led to an unhealthy rivalry. As one report pointed out, "there is too much bickering and snideness at the [intelligence] Center regarding these two fields."6 The situation was made worse by the fact that intelligence officers on the Army Staff and in Europe considered field operations intelligence personnel better qualified to handle especially sensitive counterespionage operations than CIC agents. But Counter Intelligence Corps members saw any such transfer of functions as "an emasculation of CIC."7 Another problem area arose when field operations intelligence personnel, because of the nature of their mission requirements, lacked an adequate rotation base in the continental United States. Although a majority of CIC billets were in the United States, four-fifths of those billets in the field operations intelligence program were overseas.

Eventually, the ACSI decided that it would be more economical and efficient to merge all field operations intelligence assets with the Counter Intelligence Corps and cross-train personnel to serve both as counterintelligence agents and as human intelligence collectors. Accordingly, a consolidated Intelligence Corps, commanded by the former CIC chief and operating under tight centralized control, was created on I January 1961. The new organization incorporated slightly over 5,000 personnel, about 85 percent of whom came from CIC. Entrance requirements for the Intelligence Corps were less restrictive than they had been for the old Counter Intelligence Corps.

Attempts to bring the new organization even closer to the Army mainstream soon followed. During the 1950s the Counter Intelligence Corps had embodied the "best and the brightest." Ever since the Korean War, the draft had furnished it with a steady stream of college-trained applicants attracted to the idea of fulfilling their service obligation by working in civilian clothes in a glamorous and exotic field, and the CIC had been able to choose among them. Unfortunately, most of these individuals did not show any propensity for making intelligence work a career. The retention rate was abysmal- 7 percent for lieutenants and just 3 percent for enlisted personnel. Accordingly, the Army decided that "selection of applicants must be made with consideration for those offering the best career potential and not necessarily the bright college student."8 The Intelligence Corps would accept only applicants who volunteered for a three-year enlistment. At the same time, the age limit for enlisting in the corps was lowered and brought into line with the rest of the Army; eighteen-year-old personnel now became eligible for entry-level positions involving clerical rather than investigative duties. Finally, in 1965 the minimum Army General Test score for joining the Intelligence Corps was lowered from 110, the same requirement imposed on officer candidates Army-wide, to 100, which more closely approximated the Army average.

The Army Security Agency

If Fort Holabird was one pole of Army Intelligence in the 1950s, Arlington Hall Station was the other. Arlington Hall continued to serve as headquarters for the ASA, the largest single intelligence and security element in the Army, and it also came to house intelligence elements of five of the Army's technical services after the consolidation of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade in 1957 made office space available. During the Eisenhower administration, Arlington Hall's main Army tenant, the Army Security Agency, grew steadily. Personnel strength rose from 11,500 in 1952 to 18,300 by 1957; new field stations and tactical units appeared; and a substantial restructuring of the agency's mission took place.

By 1954 the Army Signal Corps was fielding a number of units to collect electronic intelligence and continued to be responsible for the conduct of electronic warfare. In April 1954 the Department of the Army analyzed the feasibility of combining all these capabilities into a single agency As a result of this study, the Army Security Agency took over responsibility for electronic intelligence and communications-related electronic countermeasures (ECM) from the Signal Corps in 1955, assuming control of a number of dispersed units and a battalion and four companies stationed at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. In return, the agency surrendered its responsibilities for Army cryptologistics and cryptomaintenance, along with associated personnel, to the Signal Corps.

In budgetary terms, the reorganization was significant: the Army was introducing a new generation of machine cipher devices to replace the venerable M209, and purchase of the new machines had consumed 60 percent of the Army Security Agency's fiscal year 1953 budget. However, the change had the important benefits of eliminating duplication of facilities and allowing for proper integration of signals intelligence with electronic intelligence. The term signals intelligence (SIGINT) was now redefined and used to refer to both of these functions. Actual implementation of this mission transfer was delayed for a short time until the Signal Corps personnel transferred to the Army Security Agency had their clearance levels upgraded.

The new arrangements meant that the Army Security Agency was no longer exclusively an intelligence organization. By acquiring responsibility for electronic warfare, the agency now managed a weapons system, even though the weapon was invisible. In recognition of this change, the Army Security Agency became a Department of the Army field operating agency on 23 June 1955.9 It now reported directly to the Army chief of staff, not to the assistant chief of staff, G-2. However, the agency continued to focus primarily on the cryptologic mission, and electronic warfare in practice did not receive much emphasis.

Having acquired responsibility for electronic intelligence and electronic warfare, the Army Security Agency made further attempts to enlarge the scope of its mission. In September 1955 the chief, Army Security Agency, recommended to the Army chief of staff that his organization be given the responsibility for dissemination and protection of sensitive compartmented information Army-wide, thus eliminating the special security officer system maintained by the assistant chief of staff, G-2, which had just been consolidated into a single element, Detachment M. The rationale for this proposal was economy. However, both the Army's intelligence staff and commanders in the field vigorously resisted it. Intelligence personnel claimed that the Army Security Agency was not qualified to produce the all-source intelligence which special security officers provided to their supported G-2s. Field commanders unanimously endorsed the existing arrangement, pointing out that ASA units were not conveniently located in or near the major Army headquarters and that eliminating the special security officers would deprive them of their secure "back-channel" communications. The Army chief of staff tabled the proposal, but the Army Security Agency refused to drop the issue. The bureaucratic struggle over the matter would go on for the next two decades, at times fought with considerable acrimony

The Army Security Agency pursued other initiatives with greater success. In 1956 the agency became aware for the first time of the possibility that emissions radiating from electronic data processing equipment might compromise security and initiated a program, nicknamed TEMPEST, to counter the threat. In 1957 the U.S. Army Security Agency Board was created to provide long-range planning,

and in 1960 its functions were expanded to include combat development. At the same time, the Army Intelligence Board at Fort Holabird acquired parallel responsibilities for overseeing combat developments in the field of human intelligence. Meanwhile, the ASA and its field stations underwent redesignation. As a result of an Army-wide change, the agency became the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) on 1 January 1957. Concurrently, its fixed field stations, which previously had been known as numbered Army administrative units in the 8600 series, acquired new designations as numbered USASA field stations. 10

The agency's tactical elements underwent a more significant restructuring during this period. During the Korean War, the Army Security Agency had operated with flexible battalion headquarters overseeing the operations of independent security and collection companies. In 1955 fixed battalions with organic companies combining both functions were created, and in 1956 all communication reconnaissance units were redesignated as Army Security Agency units. However, in 1957 the secretary of defense's decision to cut the Army's strength by a total of 50,000 threw the force structure of the agency into disarray. The decrement left the ASA without sufficient personnel to fill its existing tactical TOE units, which at the time accounted for about a quarter of its total strength. In response, the Army Security Agency inactivated all its TOE units and replaced them with mission-tailored units based on individual tables of distribution. The new TD units included the 507th and 508th U.S. Army Security Agency Groups, located respectively in Germany and Korea, and six U.S. Army Security Agency battalions numbered from 316 to 321. These units were given the designator U.S. Army Security Agency to distinguish them from Army Security Agency TOE units. The battalions retained the fixed structure of their TOE predecessors.

Originally, the Army intended this as a temporary measure, to remain in force only until new organizational tables could be drawn up. In practice, however, the ASA continued to operate exclusively with TD units until 1962, when tactical TOE units were formed in the continental United States to support the Army's new strategic reserve for contingency operations. Later, additional TOE elements were activated to serve in Vietnam. Some of the mission-tailored TD units soon acquired new and exotic designations as special operations units and special operations commands.

The U.S. Army Security Agency was the principal tenant at Arlington Hall after 1957, but not the only one. Intelligence elements of five technical services ultimately located there. Only the Corps of Engineers, the intelligence arm of which was concentrated in the Army Map Service, and the Quartermaster Corps held back, although the Ordnance Corps also maintained a separate missile intelligence center at Redstone Arsenal. Although most of these technical service intelligence units engaged in analysis and production, the Signal Corps continued to engage in some specialized collection activities even after it had surrendered its electronic intelligence and communications-related electronic warfare functions to the Army Security Agency

Military Intelligence in the Field

Until the late 1950s the tactical formations of the Army received their intelligence support from Military Intelligence specialist units put together on the cellular principle. Combat intelligence units were organically separate from counterintelligence units under this arrangement, and the G-2s of the supported units had to coordinate the efforts of the two diverse elements themselves.

At the end of 1957 the Army introduced a new category of intelligence units organized under a concept plan entitled the Military Intelligence Organization. Under this plan interrogators, photo interpreters, order of battle specialists, and other combat intelligence personnel were integrated into single units with counterintelligence and collection elements. These new units operated under a fixed table of organization and were designed to be administratively selfsufficient.

Under the Military Intelligence Organization concept, the basic building block was the Military Intelligence battalion supporting afield army. This unit had its own specialized organic companies: a headquarters and headquarters company containing photo interpreters, order of battle and technical intelligence specialists, and censorship personnel; and lettered linguist, security, and collection companies. In addition, the battalion furnished tactical units down to the division level with attached multidiscipline intelligence detachments.11 The creation of the Military Intelligence Organization was one of the first steps in bringing truly multidiscipline intelligence support to the field. Only ASA units remained outside the new organizational structure because of the Army Security Agency's vertical, or "stovepipe," command structure and its tight centralization and compartmentation.

In practice, implementation of the new force structure was limited. Under the Military Intelligence Organization concept, four Military Intelligence Battalions eventually were reorganized: the 319th and 519th in the continental United States; the 532d in Germany; and the 502d in Korea. However, only the headquarters and headquarters companies and linguist companies were initially activated in the two battalions in the United States.12 Meanwhile, the bulk of Army counterintelligence and field operations intelligence personnel continued to serve in singlediscipline cellular units supporting the theaters and the Zone of Interior armies until 1961, when consolidated intelligence Corps groups and detachments were formed.

Not all intelligence disciplines were well served by this new arrangement. In the continental United States, linguists had to be concentrated at battalion level, rather than spread among the detachments that were attached to divisions and other tactical units, as the Military Intelligence Organization concept dictated. Each detachment might be involved in several contingency plans, and each plan often required expertise in a different language. There was simply no way to assign the appropriate linguists to a Military Intelligence detachment until actual implementation of a specific plan or major field exercise began.

Photo interpreters also fit rather uneasily into the new structure. At the tactical level such personnel lacked access to the imagery that national-level reconnaissance elements began to generate in the late 1950s, and thus felt that their skills were not being adequately used. Units based in the United States had no operational mission, and photo interpreters found themselves all too often assigned to housekeeping and administrative positions unrelated to their specialty. Detailed to kitchen police and other "rock-painting" chores, many felt slighted and complained of "harassment." 13

To remedy the situation, in 1963 the Army Intelligence Center proposed that all photo interpreters in the United States be placed under centralized control in the same fashion as the Army's linguists. They could find more useful employment either at the Army Photo Interpretation Center or with the Army's lone specialized tactical photo unit in the United States. However, field commanders strongly resisted the proposal on the grounds that stripping Military Intelligence detachments of their photo interpreters would deprive G-2s of access to this intelligence field and would result in equipment maintenance problems. The status quo thus continued.

Finally, the Army continued to neglect tactical-level technical intelligence. There were no provisions for a technical intelligence company in the initial TOES for the Military intelligence battalion (field army), and it would take ten years for the Army to remedy this discrepancy. By that time, the Vietnam conflict would be in full swing, creating an insatiable demand for personnel resources, and only one field army-level battalion would ever receive its technical intelligence company.

At the tactical level, intelligence organization was also influenced by the Army's increasing reliance on aircraft. By 1960 there were 5,000 aircraft in the Army inventory. Many of them were helicopters, items that had first seen extensive use in medical evacuation during the Korean War. It soon became apparent that improved versions of rotary-wing aircraft could serve as useful reconnaissance assets. During the course of the 1950s the Korean-vintage L-19 that had served as the all-purpose workhorse within the division was phased out in favor of the helicopter, and aircraft within the division were concentrated in larger formations. Under the structure of the pentomic division fielded in 1957, Army aviation within the divisions was consolidated into company-size units. The ROAD division of 1962 included a complete aviation battalion, one company of which was equipped with scout helicopters. In addition, observation helicopters were assigned to divisional artillery, and a helicopter-borne aerial cavalry troop formed part of the divisional reconnaissance battalion.

Along with its helicopters, the Army also developed more sophisticated fixedwing aircraft for reconnaissance. In 1962 it acquired the AO-1 Mohawk. This twin-engine craft came in three configurations: one equipped with a high-performance camera; one with newly developed infrared night vision equipment; and the third with the equally new side-looking airborne radar device. Mohawks were employed both in divisional aerial surveillance and targeting platoons, as well as in aerial surveillance companies that operated at corps level. 15

In addition to developing its own aerial assets, the Army took steps to improve its interaction with Air Force tactical reconnaissance. To better exploit aerial photography produced by Air Force reconnaissance squadrons, the Army fielded the 1st Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion in 1959. The unit consisted of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, a signal air photo reproduction and delivery company, and a photo interpretation company. A similar unit, the 24th Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion, was activated in the Army Reserve the same year, thus becoming the first non-ASA intelligence battalion active in the reserve components since the Korean War. In 1961 the Army activated another Regular Army air reconnaissance support battalion to support the Seventh Army in Germany, and in 1962 these units were reorganized and redesignated as Military intelligence battalions (air reconnaissance support), or "Mibars." Two years later it devised a new TOE for this type of unit that provided for a headquarters and headquarters company and four lettered imagery interpretation detachments.16 The diverse nature of the products which photo interpreters now had to manage-infrared and radar imagery, as well as conventional photography-led to the Army's redesignating photographic intelligence as imagery intelligence in 1964.

There were also new developments in the Army's arrangements for ground reconnaissance. From 1957 on, each combat division had its own reconnaissance battalion. The successive restructurings of the division in 1957 and 1962

meant that reconnaissance assets previously held at the regimental level were moved down, first to battle group, and then to battalion. An armored cavalry platoon and a ground surveillance section equipped with mobile radar sets became part of the headquarters company of each infantry battalion.

Intelligence Support to the Theaters

By the late 1950s the deployment of the Army overseas had become fixed in a pattern that would remain largely unchanged for the duration of the Cold War.17 The completion of the European buildup, the drawdown of forces in Korea, and the signing of a peace treaty with Japan resulted in a force structure that gave the Army five divisions in Europe and two in Korea, commanded respectively by the Seventh and Eighth Armies. The diversity of the theaters, the disparate numbers of the supported forces in each one, and the differing nature of intelligence requirements in Europe and in the Pacific dictated that arrangements for intelligence support would not be uniform. Moreover, even if the positioning of troops on the ground remained relatively static, theater command relationships did not, and these shifts also impacted on the theater intelligence structure.

In Europe a continuing flood of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain provided American forces with ample opportunities for intelligence exploitation. From 1951 to 1962 collection of intelligence from border crossers was carried out by the Seventh Army's 532d Military Intelligence Battalion, a field-army type of unit organized under the Military Intelligence Organization concept and headquartered in Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Federal Republic of Germany During an average year, the battalion screened between 20,000 and 30,000 refugees.

At the theater level, counterintelligence support for U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), was provided by the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. This unit, with headquarters in Stuttgart, provided counterintelligence coverage through a network of regional and field offices that not only extended over West Germany but also reached occupied Berlin and the USAREUR Communications Zone in France. The 513th Military Intelligence Service Group, activated at Oberursel, Federal Republic of Germany, in 1953 to take over operations previously performed by the 7077th USAREUR Intelligence Center, soon was redesignated the 513th Military Intelligence Group and then expanded its scope of activities to include active collection. With the inception of an Army civilian intelligence career program in the 1950s, both units received large TD augmentations of civilian specialists.

In 1959 USAREUR experimented with organizing intelligence work on an area rather than on a functional basis. Consequently the 513th Military

Intelligence Group was given northern Germany as its area of responsibility, and the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group (later successively redesignated as the 66th Military Intelligence Group and the 66th intelligence Corps Group) was allotted the south, where the preponderance of American forces was stationed. This arrangement caused more problems than solutions and was later abandoned.

Meanwhile, opportunities for exploitation of sources began to diminish. In 1961 the construction of the Berlin Wall and the simultaneous imposition of tighter border controls by East Germany effectively shut off the refugee flow This development reduced the need to have three large intelligence units with partially overlapping responsibilities in Europe. As a result, in 1962 there was a major realignment of intelligence resources. The 513th Intelligence Corps Group, as it was now designated, assumed complete responsibility for active intelligence and certain sensitive counterespionage missions for USAREUR, while the 66th Intelligence Corps Group was reassigned to Seventh Army and assumed the mission of the inactivated 532d Military Intelligence Battalion. During this process, the group lost its regional form of organization and emerged as the command headquarters for various numbered Army Intelligence units, including the tactical intelligence elements attached to the Seventh Army's corps and divisions. 18

Cryptologic support in the theater was provided by an entirely separate organizational structure, in conformity with Army practice. The U.S. Army Security Agency maintained a theater headquarters in Frankfurt that exercised command and control over various field stations in Europe and over a group headquarters with three subordinate battalions and some other units operating in support of the Seventh Army.

In the Pacific, following the conclusion of the armistice in Korea, the Army broke up its elaborate intelligence and special operations organization, the 8240th Army Unit. Under conditions of relative peace, the Korean partisan forces it had mustered were transferred to the control of the South Korean government, the least productive of its operations terminated, and its mission restricted to intelligence collection. The unit's Korean-based element, the Army Collection Detachment, continued to report to a theater-level Army command reconnaissance activity until 1961, when a number of Army Intelligence assets in Korea combined to form the 502d Military Intelligence Battalion. The other elements used to form the battalion came from the 308th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and the Eighth Army's 528th Military Intelligence Company, which were concurrently inactivated.

At the theater level, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), served as the Army's principal headquarters element in the Pacific until 1957. It was supported

by an elaborate intelligence architecture directed by the USAFFE G-2 in Tokyo, Japan. The organization's principal human intelligence collection arm was the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Far East. The other major field elements were the 500th Military Intelligence Group, an interpreter unit, and the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Group. These three units reported to the U.S. Army Intelligence Support Center, Japan, under command of a brigadier general.

The Eisenhower-Kishii agreement of 1957 led to a drawdown of American troop strength from Japan and relocation of the Army's main Pacific headquarters from Tokyo to Hawaii. The discontinuance of USAFFE and the establishment of United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), led to a rapid decrement in Japan-based Military Intelligence assets. The 500th Military Intelligence Group was inactivated, the Intelligence Support Center discontinued, and the functions of both organizations absorbed by the successor of the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Far East, the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Pacific. Following the departure of most American troops from Japan in 1959, the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, as it was now known, was in turn inactivated. In 1961 the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Pacific, was discontinued and the 500th Military Intelligence Group once more reactivated to carry out all aspects of the human intelligence mission. This group redeployed to Hawaii in 1965, a move dictated by the U.S. government's attempts at that time to reduce the outflow of gold reserves overseas.

U.S. Army Security Agency operations in the Far East were under the direction of a regional headquarters located in Tokyo until 1958. This was consolidated briefly with ASA headquarters elements in Hawaii from 1958 to 1960 to become the U.S. Army Security Agency, Pacific. In 1960 it returned to Tokyo, where it remained until it again relocated to Hawaii in 1965. The withdrawal of the agency's Pacific headquarters back to American soil also came about because of the government's concern over the balance of payments.

After 1957 the Eighth Army in Korea received its cryptologic support from the 508th U.S. Army Security Group (a TD unit) and the 321st U.S. Army Security Agency Battalion, another TD unit. The battalion was discontinued in 1964-another casualty of the government's worries about the gold flow.

One unique feature of the Pacific theater was the existence of the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Pacific. Unlike other Army intelligence training facilities overseas, the Pacific intelligence school, set up on Okinawa in 1958, trained foreigners, not Americans. The students from seven different countries bordering the Pacific basin took courses in combat intelligence and counterintelligence techniques until the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty brought operations to a halt in 1975.19

The McNamara Revolution

The outcome of the presidential election of 1960 led to major changes in the structure of the Army and the Army's intelligence components. President John F Kennedy rejected the strategic assumptions of the previous administration, believing that any military challenge had to be met through graduated deterrence. This approach placed a new emphasis on the importance of the nation's conventional forces, including the Army Kennedy selected Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to implement the new strategy. In carrying out his assignment, McNamara, a former Ford Motors executive with a background in systems analysis, proved to be the very model of a rationalizing, centralizing bureaucrat. Making the most of the powers of his office, McNamara introduced a series of reforms that altered the way the American military machine was constructed and had a profound effect on the Army Intelligence community.20

Since 1958 there had been discussions at the national level concerning the advisability of setting up some kind of intelligence agency at the Department of Defense (DOD) level to better coordinate the intelligence elements of the armed services. In 1960 a Joint Study Group had criticized the existing arrangements within the Military Intelligence community. Three separate and uncoordinated service intelligence agencies, each with its own parochial bias, could not provide DOD with the integrated intelligence it needed to formulate a coherent national strategy. Air Force Intelligence in particular had embarrassed policy makers, since its estimates of alleged "bomber gaps" and "missile gaps" between the United States and the Soviet Union were widely disseminated and later demonstrated to be incorrect.21

Once in office, McNamara became a vigorous proponent of centralization, especially with respect to Military Intelligence operations under DOD. As a result, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) began operations on 1 October 1961. The new organization would impose the same kind of centralized direction and control on the general Military Intelligence program as NSA was already providing to signals intelligence. Its creation meant that Army Intelligence would become a distinctly subordinate element within a wider Military Intelligence structure and marked a further cutback in ACSI's powers and responsibilities. However, this did not happen immediately At its inception, DIA consisted of a cadre of twenty-five people housed in 2,000 square feet of borrowed office space in the Pentagon. The new agency pulled together rather slowly at first, initially taking on only the estimative, current intelligence, and requirements missions from the service intelligence agencies.

Meanwhile, McNamara was reorganizing the Army itself in ways that had a substantial effect on the Army's intelligence architecture. In 1962 the secretary of defense implemented Project 80, which involved the wholesale restructuring of the Army into functional, centralized commands. In the process, ACSI lost control over intelligence training, research and development, and doctrinal matters. Five of the Army's technical services were abolished, with only the Corps of Engineers and the Office of the Surgeon General remaining in place, and their intelligence personnel were split up among a number of different elements.22

A few order of battle specialists from the dissolved technical services joined the ACSI staff. A larger group engaged in scientific and technical intelligence became part of a new Foreign Science and Technology Center or stayed in place at the Army Missile Intelligence Agency which the Ordnance Department maintained at Redstone Arsenal. Both of these centers were assigned to the Army Materiel Command, which McNamara had just created. The largest group, consisting of 700 persons engaged in area analysis, was absorbed into the Area Analysis Intelligence Agency established at the direction of the chief of Engineers.

The Area Analysis Intelligence Agency was intended to be only a temporary holding area. When DIA assumed production responsibilities in 1963, the organization was discontinued, and its personnel, together with part of the OACSI staff, transferred to DIA. All in all, the Army contributed 1,000 spaces and its ACSI-MATIC computer system to the new DIA Production Center. In the process, OACSI lost 235 spaces, one-third of its strength, to the new agency. The centerpiece of OACSI had been its Directorate of Foreign Intelligence, the intelligence production unit. This was reduced to a shell, retaining only a residual responsibility for analyzing and interpreting national agency production in support of the Army and in maintaining liaison with DIA. As a result of this devolution of responsibilities, the center of gravity of Army intelligence would move from the staff in Washington, D.C., to the units in the field.

However, even after the reorganization of 1963 DIA did not hold a complete monopoly over the production of intelligence for the Army Subordinate elements within the Army continued to conduct production activities. These included the Army Materiel Command, with its two scientific and technical intelligence centers; the Office of the Chief of Engineers, which administered the Army Map Service; and the Office of the Surgeon General, which still had the responsibility of meeting some of the Army's medical intelligence requirements. In addition, a new production element was formed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to support the mobile reserve forces assigned to the Continental Army Command (CONARC).

Other intelligence-related functions previously performed by the Army were also centralized. In 1963 the Army's Strategic Intelligence School was merged with its Navy counterpart to form a new Defense Intelligence School, which began to provide training for attaches from all the military services. The process was carried through to its logical conclusion in 1965, when DIA assumed control over the military attache system that had served as an Army information source since 1889. All service attaches were integrated into the new Defense Attache System. Meanwhile, the Defense Language Institute had replaced the separate language schools previously maintained by the services.

Although DIA acquired production and collection assets from Army Intelligence, another new McNamara creation (the Defense Supply Agency) asserted itself on the counterintelligence front. In March 1965 this agency took over the whole field of industrial security, absorbing all the related spaces from ACSI's Industrial and Personnel Security Group. Ever since World War II, the function had rebounded between G-2 and the Provost Marshal General's Office. The new arrangement seemed to mark a definitive end to this particular jurisdictional dispute within the Army.

OACSI responded to these institutional challenges in much the same way as ASA had met the threat of the Armed Forces Security Agency: it found a new role in devoting itself to Armyspecific needs. Shorn of many of its operational functions, OACSI reoriented itself and began providing intensified staff supervision to intelligence areas of growing interest to the Army. In the summer of 1963 the Directorate of Surveillance and Reconnaissance was added to the Army's Intelligence staff to develop the doctrine and hardware that would allow the Army to glean information from the battlefield through innovative technologies. Additional new Directorates of Security and Combat Intelligence were formed in 1964 to supervise functional areas of primary interest to the Army The Combat Intelligence Directorate included a section responsible for overseeing developments in the fields of special warfare and foreign assistance. Finally, OACSI found ways to edge back into fields of activity theoretically preempted by DIA. In 1963 it set up a Special Research Detachment as a liaison element at NSA, soon expanding it into an all-source production element. The same year the Special Security Detachment formed an Intelligence Support Branch to provide the Army Staff with current intelligence.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Command and the U.S. Army Security Agency

The McNamara-directed reorganization of the Army had significant consequences for the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The center, commanded by the chief of the Intelligence Corps, had functioned as a field operating agency under direct ACSI control. Two of its main assets were the Army Intelligence School and the Army Intelligence Board, charged with framing doctrine and developing specialized equipment. The McNamara restructuring intruded on both of these arrangements. The Intelligence School was resubordinated to CONARC and the functions of the Intelligence Board split between the Army Materiel Command and another McNamara creation, the Combat Developments Command.

As a result, ACSI created a new administrative entity, the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Activity, which took over the remnant of the former Intelligence Center's assets and residual functions. The organization served as a vehicle through which the chief of the Intelligence Corps could exercise control over those elements the McNamara restructuring had left under ACSI jurisdiction. These consisted of the Army's counterintelligence records facility, a new Intelligence Corps Supply Activity, the Strategic Intelligence School (until its transfer to DIA), the Army Photo Interpretation Center, and the Administrative Survey Detachment that supported the Intelligence Civilian Career Program which ACSI had started in the 1950s. However, the establishment of the Army Intelligence Corps Activity did nothing to alleviate the confusion in the intelligence command chain resulting from the reorganizations. Since the chief of the Intelligence Corps continued to act as commandant of the Army Intelligence School and commander of Fort Holabird, he now reported simultaneously to three different superiors. As commanding general of the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Activity and chief of the intelligence Corps he was responsible to ACSI, but he was under the jurisdiction of CONARC in his capacity as school commandant and subordinate to the U.S. Second Army in his role of post commander. This Rube Goldberg-like arrangement offered no promise of stability

These changes represented only the beginning of the restructuring of Army counterintelligence organization. In 1963 and 1964 the Army undertook a major study of its personnel security system, an effort spurred by the discovery that an Army sergeant in a sensitive position at the National Security Agency had been passing information to the Soviets for years without being detected.23 The study, Project SECURITY SHIELD, found serious weaknesses both in the traditional decentralized approach to counterintelligence operations and in the coordination that existed between Army counterintelligence and the criminal investigators of the Provost Marshal General's Office. SECURITY SHIELD led to yet another wholesale reorganization of Army counterintelligence.

On 1 January 1965, the Army created the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command as a Department of the Army major field command. Operating under a new design concept, the command took over centralized direction over all counterintelligence operations in the continental United States. The Intelligence Corps Command assumed authority over the seven Intelligence Corps groups that had previously operated under six armies and the Military District of Washington. (The large CIC detachments in the United States had been redesignated as "groups" between 1956 and 1959.) At the same time, the Army ordered the field offices of the Intelligence Corps Command and the provost marshal's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to be brought together wherever possible, and the records of the CID repository removed from Fort Gordon, Georgia, and collocated with the counterintelligence records at Fort Holabird.

The creation of the Intelligence Corps Command gave its commander, the chief of the Intelligence Corps, operational responsibilities for the first time in the history of Army counterintelligence. At the same time, he lost certain assets. Not all the elements of the former Army Intelligence Corps Activity were transferred to the new command. Since the Intelligence Corps Command was intended to be purely a counterintelligence organization, the Army Imagery Interpretation Center, as the Photo Interpretation Center had been redesignated, reverted back to the direct control of the ACSI.

There were still certain anomalies in the new pattern of organization. Despite its title, the Intelligence Corps Command controlled only about half of all Intelligence Corps personnel in the continental United States. The rest were on school or organizational staffs, with the TOE organizations supporting tactical elements in the field, or in the "pipeline." Intelligence Corps personnel deployed outside the continental United States were not a part of the new command. The Intelligence Corps Command's commander, in his other capacity as chief of the intelligence Corps, thus had substantial administrative responsibilities extending beyond his own command; and the intelligence Corps he headed was engaged in active intelligence collection as well as in counterintelligence. The creation of the new headquarters also had left the chain of command more tangled than ever. Its commander now wore four hats. As head of a major field command, he now reported directly to the Army chief of staff, in addition to reporting to ACSI, the commander of CONARC, and the commander of the U.S. Second Army in his other various roles.24

In one sense, this arrangement conformed to the civilian theories of matrix management popular in the 1960s. Matrix management held that someone marketing refrigerators to Latin America should report to a vice president for marketing, a vice president for refrigerators, and a vice president for Latin America. But the scheme did not accord with normal Army command procedures and was in practice unworkable. Not surprisingly, reorganization plans were begun as soon as the new command had been assembled. The U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command lasted just six months.

There seemed to be only two possible solutions to the organizational tangle created by the existence of the Intelligence Corps Command. One duplicated

the Army Security Agency's centralized, vertical command structure, creating a self-sufficient organization. However, because of its mission, that agency was a special case, and its organization had no parallel in the rest of the Army The other solution, the one adopted, decentralized the structure of the Intelligence Corps Command.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) was created on 1 July 1965 to conduct counterintelligence operations within the continental United States.25 The combined headquarters organization of the former Intelligence Corps Command was broken up, and the Army Intelligence School and Fort Holabird placed under separate commanders. Functions previously performed by the Intelligence Corps Command that were unrelated to counterintelligence administering the intelligence civilian career program and procuring intelligencerelated supply items-reverted to ACSI, resulting in the establishment of the Administrative Survey Detachment and the Intelligence Materiel Development Support Office as separate field operating activities. Finally, the Intelligence Corps itself was discontinued in March 1966, and its personnel functions shifted to the Department of Army level. This ended the Army's attempts to integrate human intelligence and counterintelligence personnel under a single organizational structure. Discontinuance of the Intelligence Corps also resulted in the redesignation of all Intelligence Corps units as Military Intelligence units.26

The creation of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command meant that the Army counterintelligence organization had been turned inside out. The old Counter Intelligence Corps had selected, trained, and administered Army counterintelligence personnel, but counterintelligence operations themselves had been decentralized under the control of local Army commanders. The new major Army field command was a centralized operational organization without any personnel or training functions. The demise of the Intelligence Corps ended a special tradition that went back to the Corps of Intelligence Police in World War I, but the new arrangements meant that Army counterintelligence was now aligned with the rest of the Army.

If McNamara's organizational innovations destroyed the Intelligence Corps, they left the Army Security Agency substantially untouched. Because of its specialized mission and compartmented operations, the agency escaped the loss of its training and research and development functions. Instead, it expanded physically, geographically, and functionally An ASA element, with the in-country designation of the 3d Radio Research Unit, deployed to Vietnam to support the ongoing advisory effort as early as 1961.27 The agency also acquired an important new acoustical intelligence mission in 1962, following the abolition of the Signal Corps as an Army technical service. A year later, the Army Security Agency achieved a monopoly of Army electronic warfare functions when it took over control of the noncommunications jamming function and associated units from the Signal Corps. In 1964 it set up its third field station in the continental United States at Homestead, Florida, to better meet new mission requirements which had evolved in the early 1960s. Finally, the agency's independence and unique position within the Army was ratified on 14 April 1964, when it achieved the status of a major Army field command.28

The Army Intelligence and Security Branch

The changes within the Army Intelligence community during the 1960s were not confined to shifts in function and in command relationships. Army Intelligence took a giant step in the direction of full professionalism in 1962, when the Army Intelligence and Security Branch was set up as a basic branch of the Regular Army. This development was long overdue. Since World War II, intelligence professionals had argued that the very existence of intelligence units created the need for a separate intelligence branch. The logic of this argument was increasingly reinforced by practical necessities. The pool of reserve officers capable of filling intelligence slots was becoming exhausted. Without a reform in the Army personnel system, analysts projected that half the Army's intelligence officer positions would be without qualified occupants by 1965. The incumbent ACSI, Maj. Gen. Alva R. Fitch, pushed vigorously for the creation of a new branch to remedy the situation. Yet even the Army Intelligence community was divided on the issue. The ASA chief protested that the proposed integration of signals intelligence officers with other intelligence personnel would be like putting infantry and artillery into one branch. But Fitch won his case. The new branch came into existence formally on 1 July 1962.29

The Army Intelligence and Security Branch embraced about 5 percent of officers in the active Army The initial group joining the branch consisted of 283 Regular Army and 3,652 reserve officers who had a background in intelligence or were assigned to intelligence positions. A quarter of the group consisted of cryptologic specialists; the remainder broke down about evenly into combat intelligence personnel and members of the Intelligence Corps. The formation of the new branch significantly enhanced the Army's capacity to promote and retain qualified intelligence officers.

However, the new branch had problems initially It contained only a small number of Regular Army officers, and many of the reserve officers brought into the Army Intelligence and Security Branch lacked higher education or prospects for career advancement. The branch was designated as one that performed a combat service support function, not the most prestigious role in the Army. Finally, it was the only branch in the Army without a common basic course. Although most Intelligence officers attended Fort Holabird for training, Army Security Agency officers still trained separately at the U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School (USASATC&S) at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Nevertheless, within the space of four years, much of Army Intelligence had been reconfigured. The new structure would meet its first test in the foreign and domestic challenges during the war in Vietnam.

From

http://www.history.a...eage/mi/Ch8.htm

I post the following to show that the strange universe between Richard Case Nagell, Lee Harvey Oswald and Dr. Chikao Fujisawa, is even more convoluted than one could possibly imagine, and that the "Bishops" whom Peter Levenda rightly associated with the Process Church of the Final Judgement, is not exactly a dead alley, by any means.

As evidenced below"

"An orthodox Shinto believer, a Japanese scholar and a professor of Kyushu Imperial University, Dr. Chikao Fujisawa, believed that the three holy objects of Japan originated from the three holy objects of ancient Israel. And there are not a few Shinto scholars who think the same. Some suggest a parallelism between the mirror and the tablets, the bead and the manna, the sword and the rod.

Some point out that mirrors were also used in the temple of King Solomon (1 Kings 7:28). Others point out that the shape of the Japanese bead is the same as a Hebrew letter yod which is also the first letter of the holy name Yahweh."

http://www5.ocn.ne.j...i9/isracam3.htm

Of course Dr Chikao Fujisawa, according to Dick Russell, died in 1963. What is interesting is that circumstanially, there is, another familiar name to JFK researchers Revilio P. Oliver, who entered the frey. In his book The Yellow Peril, Oliver, in his atypical ethno-racist slant wrote of missionary N. McLeod, (who arrived in Japan in 1867, and theorized that the Japanese Jews were actually part of the twelve tribes of Israel), "I gather that the hariolations of Professors Fujisawa and Anasaki inspired the foundation of a Holiness Church, of which the Bishop, Juju Nakada, proclaims that "it is God's will that these two nations [the Ten Tribes who hit the road for Japan in 722 B.C. and the Two Tribes who have been vampires on the goyim in the rest of the world] be united after 3,000 years."

Last time I looked, which has been some time, Revilio P Oliver was still spewing his racial hatred for all to behold. With any luck, perhaps he can find a place, if he is still with us, in the ultimate example of fear-based politics and regression, the Tea Party.

Edited by Robert Howard
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Thanks to Flickr, there is available a photograph of John B Hurt at the following URL.

http://www.flickr.com/photos/brewbooks/with/3297663777/

Additionally, and thanks to Tom Scully, we now know that John B Hurt's obituary was published in the New York Times.

See

John B. Hurt, Retired Aide Of National Security Unit

August 9, 1966, Tuesday

Page 37, John B. Hurt, retired dean of the linguistics staff of the National Security Agency, died Monday morning of a heart attack. He was 62 years old

and lived at 330 Third Avenue. Mr. Hurt worked for the Government agency when it was the Signal Intelligence Service of the War Department from

1930 to 1963. He was the agency's expert on Oriental languages. Mr. Hurt is survived by his widow, Mrs. Ana Drittle Hurt, a Russian-born cellist; his

mother, Mrs. Anna Hurt of Wytheville, VA; two sisters and three brothers.

Also, thanks to Tom Scully, for providing the obituary for Colonel Harrod Miller.

Northwest Arkansas Times Saturday Sept., 24, 1966

Col. Harrod G. Miller, 65, U.S. Army,

retired, of Fayetteville, died this morning in the Huntsville rest home. He was born Dec. 5, 1900 in Kahoka, Mo. and

was a member of the Masonic Lodge, the Consistory and the Angelical Church. Survivors are the widow, Mrs. Jean Miller of the home;

one daughter, Mrs. Rovene M. Conner of Irving, Tex.; one sister, Mrs. Paul C. Witt of Kahoka and three grandchildren.

Funeral and burial will be in Kahoka, Mo. with local arrangements by Moore's Chapel.

It is interesting that my research into Col. Miller, revealed that after the close of World War II, he was made a member of the

Order of The British Empire. It seems odd that, to the best of my knowledge, there is no military or cryptologic website, that

lists his death. Please inform me, if I am mistaken.

Edited by Robert Howard
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Thanks to Flickr, there is available a photograph of John B Hurt at the following URL.

http://www.flickr.co...ith/3297663777/

Additionally, and thanks to Tom Scully, we now know that John B Hurt's obituary was published in the New York Times.

See

John B. Hurt, Retired Aide Of National Security Unit

August 9, 1966, Tuesday

Page 37, John B. Hurt, retired dean of the linguistics staff of the National Security Agency, died Monday morning of a heart attack. He was 62 years old

and lived at 330 Third Avenue. Mr. Hurt worked for the Government agency when it was the Signal Intelligence Service of the War Department from

1930 to 1963. He was the agency's expert on Oriental languages. Mr. Hurt is survived by his widow, Mrs. Ana Drittle Hurt, a Russian-born cellist; his

mother, Mrs. Anna Hurt of Wytheville, VA; two sisters and three brothers.

Also, thanks to Tom Scully, for providing the obituary for Colonel Harrod Miller.

Northwest Arkansas Times Saturday Sept., 24, 1966

Col. Harrod G. Miller, 65, U.S. Army,

retired, of Fayetteville, died this morning in the Huntsville rest home. He was born Dec. 5, 1900 in Kahoka, Mo. and

was a member of the Masonic Lodge, the Consistory and the Angelical Church. Survivors are the widow, Mrs. Jean Miller of the home;

one daughter, Mrs. Rovene M. Conner of Irving, Tex.; one sister, Mrs. Paul C. Witt of Kahoka and three grandchildren.

Funeral and burial will be in Kahoka, Mo. with local arrangements by Moore's Chapel.

It is interesting that my research into Col. Miller, revealed that after the close of World War II, he was made a member of the

Order of The British Empire. It seems odd that, to the best of my knowledge, there is no military or cryptologic website, that

lists his death. Please inform me, if I am mistaken.

Robert,

Many thanks for this.

That obit is something else.

Is his wife's maiden name really "Drittle" - and not like Oswald spelled it on the applicaiton form for the pistol - "Drittal"?

And she plays the cello? Just like the female sniper assassin that 007 goes after in the short story in The Spy Who Loved Me?

BK

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  • 2 weeks later...

Thanks to Flickr, there is available a photograph of John B Hurt at the following URL.

http://www.flickr.co...ith/3297663777/

Additionally, and thanks to Tom Scully, we now know that John B Hurt's obituary was published in the New York Times.

See

John B. Hurt, Retired Aide Of National Security Unit

August 9, 1966, Tuesday

Page 37, John B. Hurt, retired dean of the linguistics staff of the National Security Agency, died Monday morning of a heart attack. He was 62 years old

and lived at 330 Third Avenue. Mr. Hurt worked for the Government agency when it was the Signal Intelligence Service of the War Department from

1930 to 1963. He was the agency's expert on Oriental languages. Mr. Hurt is survived by his widow, Mrs. Ana Drittle Hurt, a Russian-born cellist; his

mother, Mrs. Anna Hurt of Wytheville, VA; two sisters and three brothers.

Also, thanks to Tom Scully, for providing the obituary for Colonel Harrod Miller.

Northwest Arkansas Times Saturday Sept., 24, 1966

Col. Harrod G. Miller, 65, U.S. Army,

retired, of Fayetteville, died this morning in the Huntsville rest home. He was born Dec. 5, 1900 in Kahoka, Mo. and

was a member of the Masonic Lodge, the Consistory and the Angelical Church. Survivors are the widow, Mrs. Jean Miller of the home;

one daughter, Mrs. Rovene M. Conner of Irving, Tex.; one sister, Mrs. Paul C. Witt of Kahoka and three grandchildren.

Funeral and burial will be in Kahoka, Mo. with local arrangements by Moore's Chapel.

It is interesting that my research into Col. Miller, revealed that after the close of World War II, he was made a member of the

Order of The British Empire. It seems odd that, to the best of my knowledge, there is no military or cryptologic website, that

lists his death. Please inform me, if I am mistaken.

Robert,

Many thanks for this.

That obit is something else.

Is his wife's maiden name really "Drittle" - and not like Oswald spelled it on the applicaiton form for the pistol - "Drittal"?

And she plays the cello? Just like the female sniper assassin that 007 goes after in the short story in The Spy Who Loved Me?

BK

I guess so, there isn't much correlating material, so I guess that is kind of where things stand......

Since you're the only person to respond, here is a little something for you, although it is off-topic.

Remember Admiral Ellis Zacharias's book? Here is the link, although usually there are pages missing....Better than the alternative....

Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer By Ellis M. Zacharias

http://books.google.com/books?id=Uge_rPrb7NYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=#v=onepage&q&f=false

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Thanks to Flickr, there is available a photograph of John B Hurt at the following URL.

http://www.flickr.co...ith/3297663777/

Additionally, and thanks to Tom Scully, we now know that John B Hurt's obituary was published in the New York Times.

See

John B. Hurt, Retired Aide Of National Security Unit

August 9, 1966, Tuesday

Page 37, John B. Hurt, retired dean of the linguistics staff of the National Security Agency, died Monday morning of a heart attack. He was 62 years old

and lived at 330 Third Avenue. Mr. Hurt worked for the Government agency when it was the Signal Intelligence Service of the War Department from

1930 to 1963. He was the agency's expert on Oriental languages. Mr. Hurt is survived by his widow, Mrs. Ana Drittle Hurt, a Russian-born cellist; his

mother, Mrs. Anna Hurt of Wytheville, VA; two sisters and three brothers.

Also, thanks to Tom Scully, for providing the obituary for Colonel Harrod Miller.

Northwest Arkansas Times Saturday Sept., 24, 1966

Col. Harrod G. Miller, 65, U.S. Army,

retired, of Fayetteville, died this morning in the Huntsville rest home. He was born Dec. 5, 1900 in Kahoka, Mo. and

was a member of the Masonic Lodge, the Consistory and the Angelical Church. Survivors are the widow, Mrs. Jean Miller of the home;

one daughter, Mrs. Rovene M. Conner of Irving, Tex.; one sister, Mrs. Paul C. Witt of Kahoka and three grandchildren.

Funeral and burial will be in Kahoka, Mo. with local arrangements by Moore's Chapel.

It is interesting that my research into Col. Miller, revealed that after the close of World War II, he was made a member of the

Order of The British Empire. It seems odd that, to the best of my knowledge, there is no military or cryptologic website, that

lists his death. Please inform me, if I am mistaken.

Robert,

Many thanks for this.

That obit is something else.

Is his wife's maiden name really "Drittle" - and not like Oswald spelled it on the applicaiton form for the pistol - "Drittal"?

And she plays the cello? Just like the female sniper assassin that 007 goes after in the short story in The Spy Who Loved Me?

BK

I guess so, there isn't much correlating material, so I guess that is kind of where things stand......

Since you're the only person to respond, here is a little something for you, although it is off-topic.

Remember Admiral Ellis Zacharias's book? Here is the link, although usually there are pages missing....Better than the alternative....

Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer By Ellis M. Zacharias

http://books.google....epage&q&f=false

John B. Hurt

Friedman, known as the father of cryptography, had an ability to choose people with special talents to attack the problems faced during World War II. One of those people was John B. Hurt from Viginia. He was the nephew of a congressman, which might have played a role in the decision to hire hime, but he had an amazing mind, perfrectly suited to the job.

On one occasion, Solomon Kullback, Frank Rowlett, and Abraham Sinkov (true greats in American cryptology) were pondering over an SIS (Signal Intelligence Service) message from a prisoner in Columbus, Ohio. It had been written in invented symbols and they were looking a letter frequencies. As Hurt passed by, he looked over their shoulders and started reading the message almost immediately. His uncanny ability to recognize linguistic patterns also led to a major cryptanalytic breakthrough in solving the Japanese diplomatic cipher system known as PURPLE.

He taught himself Japanese without going to school or having any formal training. He had a Japanese neighbor and some Japanese roomates at the University of Virginia and managed to absorb his knowledge of the language from them.

Friedman decided to take a risk with Hurt. Originally, he was looking for a person who knew Japanese and mathematics, but Hurt had no penchant for mathematics. He disliked formal analytical procedures, finding them tedious, but had a knack for just throwing himself into a cipher problem and recognizing patterns of words.

Frank Rowlett says:

Sinkov, Kullback, and I were hired because we had all studied math and foreign languages-Sinkov had taken French; Kullback, Spanish; and I, German.

Friedman's efforts to round out the team with a combination mathematician and Japanese linguist had so far failed: the Civil Service Commission, Military

Intelligence, and the State Department had all been unable to produce anyone with that rather unusual combination of talents. Soon, however, through the

good offices of Congressman Schaeffer of Virginia, Friedman learned of a young man named John Hurt, the congressman's nephew, who, though lacking an

extensive math background, was unusually fluent in Japanese. The Army major who interviewed him told Friedman that he had never met an American so proficient in that difficult language.

www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_spectrum/frank

Who was John B. Hurt's uncle who was a Congressman?

BK

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Who was John B. Hurt's uncle who was a Congressman?

BK

Then, Congressman Joseph "Joe" Crockett Shaffer of the Ninth District of West Virginia.

See

page 39-40; The American Codebreakers The U.S. Role In Ultra by Thomas Parrish

more. . . . . .

Birth: Jan. 19, 1880

Death: Oct. 19, 1958

US Congressman. Elected to represent Virginia's 9th District in the United States House of Representatives, serving from 1929 to 1931.

http://www.findagrav...gr&GRid=7786101

Is it a coincidence that there are Cabell family members buried at that same cemetery?

See

http://www.findagrav...7&GRid=6078936

Col Derosey Carroll "Bud" Cabell, III

Aug. 30, 1919

San Antonio

Bexar County

Texas, USA

Death: May 30, 1998

Aurora

Adams County

Colorado, USA

Colonel, Air Defense Artillery, US Army. Aviator. Nickname was "Bud".

The son of a West Point officer whose mother was the daughter of a West Point officer, it was only natural that he would go to West Point, graduating in the Class of 1944. During the last months of World War II, he served as an artillery battery commander on Okinawa. He would later learn to fly, learning both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. He served tours of duty in Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and Iran. He was in Vietnam before it became an official war (1963-64), and again during the Vietnam War. He retired from the Army in 1974.

Later, he became a private pilot for wealthy clients, flying them around the country. His family was extremely important to him, and he always tried to maintain close family ties despite his Army assignments.

Also See

http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/cabana-cadwalader.html#CABELL

Edited by Robert Howard
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  • 1 month later...

Most indispensable URL ever for Dallas graveyards. Judge for yourself.

http://www.findagrav...FScityid=139737

A long time ago in a Senate Chamber far away............

Topic: If Mr Pash had planned an assassination.

Yea, and if I were to plan it, it would be limited to such a thing - - well without sort of jeopardizing my position on assassination, supposing I was

supposed to - - say I was told to plan an assassination, and I agreed to plan it, my plan would consist of, we want to assassinate A, the conditions for this are

that it should be limited to those involved. Who was to be aware of it? How was it to take place, and so forth, the planning, and whom to send in, what to use

and how to do it, and all of that, that would not come under me.......That would be given to the operational division. There was an operational division, you see,

a man by the name of Lindsay was in charge.

http://www.maryferre...c.do?docId=1430

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Guest Tom Scully

Robert, I hope you'll give the details and relationships described in this post, some thought.:

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=16540&st=0&p=205079entry205079

Consider too, that McCloy was the head of the Amherst board of trustees, he appointed George Plimpton's uncle as Amherst president, Plimpton's father appeared to be the "bait" to bring an entourage to this meeting;

http://books.google.com/books?um=1&lr=&q=%22que+pasaba+en+el+pa%C3%ADs+en+el+que+ten%C3%ADan*%22&btnG=Search+Books

Una revolución itinerante? - Page 199

Arturo Valdés Palacio - Peru - 1989 - 403 pages

do amigo José María Quimper que, con Oscar Faura y Jaime Cáce

e- ran funcionarios de las Naciones Unidas y Directores del Club "Perú" de

Nueva York.

José María nos llevó a almorzar a un acogedor hotel italiano, donde estuvimos

tranquilos conversando hasta que salimos corriendo a las 4 y media de la tarde

para recojer a un intérprete, que ya nos esperaba en el Hotel,

pues teníamos una recepción nada menos que en honor de Ruiz Eldredge y mía,

que nos daba la Asociación de Abogados de la ciudad de Nueva York.

Creímos que era una reunión únicamente de abogados. No era así.

Estaba por supuesto el Dr. John N. lrwing, abogado de Nueva York y

el Dr. Francis TP Plimpton, Presidente de la Asociación, que equivale a

a Decano de nuestro Colegio de Abogados de Lima,

y un buen grupo de representantes de diversos estudios jurídicos, incluyendo un Juez en los criminal y otro de la Suprema Corte, así como un catedrático universitario, pero además se encontraban presentes Franck W. Archibald, Vicepresidente de la American Smelting & Refining Co., quien a los dos días de la revolución se contactó con el General Montagne, interesándose en Cuajone, lo que ya conté; JonhH.Andren, Vice-Presidente Ejecutivo y James R. Grene,

Vice-Presidente también, ambos del Manufactures Hannover Trust Compañy; Charles Goldman,

de la lnternational Telephone and Telegraph Corp,la popular lTT,

contra quien tanto tuvo que pelear el general Aníbal Meza Cuadra; Jerry W.

Johnston, Vice-Presidente del Chase Manhattan Banck, en aquel entonces dueños del Banco Continental que pasó depués a ser Banco Asociado; Jhon C. Duncan, Vice-Presidente Ejecutivo de WR Grace & Co., cuya hacienda Cartavio fué expropiada por la Reforma Agraria, un mes y medio después de esta reunión, lo mismo que Paramonga y el saldo de

sus empresas las adquirimos dentro de lo que se llamó el Convenio Greene. George B. Munroe,

Presidente de Phelpes Dodge Corporation y Robert P., Koening, Presidente de la Cerro Corporation, que también adqurimos por el Convenio Greene. Como se puede apreciar era gente que tenía intereses

directos en el Perú y por tanto especial necesidad de conocer que pasaba en el país en el que tenían ubicado alguna parte de su capital.

do amigo José María Quimper which, with Oscar Faura and Jaime Caceres

e-ran United Nations officials and Directors of the Club "Peru"

New York.

Jose Maria took us to lunch at a cozy Italian hotel where we were

quiet talking until we ran out at 4 ½ o'clock to pick up an interpreter,

already waiting for us at the hotel, for we had nothing less than a reception in honor of Ruiz Eldredge and myself,

which gave us the Law Society of New York City. We thought it was a unique gathering of lawyers. Not so.

He was of course the Dr. John N. lrwing, New York lawyer and

Dr. Francis TP Plimpton, President of the Association, which equals

to Dean of our College of Lawyers of Lima,

and a good group of representatives from various law firms, including a judge in criminal and other Supreme Court and a university professor, but also were present Franck W. Archibald, vice president of the American Smelting & Refining Co., who after two days of the revolution he contacted the General Montagne, interested in Cuajone, which already counted; JonhH.Andren, Executive Vice President and James R. Grene,

Vice-President also, both of Manufactures Hanover Trust Company, Charles Goldman,

the Intemational Telephone and Telegraph Corp., the popular LTT,

against whom both had to fight General Anibal Meza Cuadra, Jerry W.

Johnston, Vice-President of Chase Manhattan Banck, then-owners of the Continental Bank happened to be depues Associated Bank, John C. Duncan, Executive Vice President of WR Grace & Co., whose property was expropriated by Cartavio Agrarian Reform, a month and a half after this meeting, as did Paramonga and the balance of

their businesses we acquired in what was called the Convention Greene. George B. Munroe,

Phelp Dodge Corporation President and Robert P., Koenig, President of the Cerro Corporation, which also Greene adqurimos by the Convention. As you can see were people who had interests

direct in Peru and therefore in particular need to know that happened in the country where they were located somewhere in their capital....

Francis Plimpton's law partner was Eli Whitney Debevoise, HICOG John McCloy's counsel and deputy High Governor...

Another Amherst grad provided the Dorothe Matlock intelligence, to the point that he was investigated to the degree it was found that his aunt had worked for the CIA as a clerk.:

http://books.google.com/books?id=00kXAAAAIAAJ&pg=RA2-PA561&lpg=RA2-PA561&dq=cogswell,+james+amherst+minerales+estrella&source=bl&ots=HB6OtF18ix&sig=mXyiz4_pcZ82G4hwC2Kx3-sDS_A&hl=en&ei=jyqyTLnkDsOAlAeuk-zbBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=cogswell%2C%20james%20amherst%20minerales%20estrella&f=false

Amherst College biographical record, 1963; biographical record of ... - Google Books Result

Amherst College - 1963 - 1109 pages

COGSWELL. James Kelsey III. s James Kelsey Jr and Francesca Pickering ... now v-pres Minerales Estrella de Mayori Habana Cuba. USNR 1943-46 Lt (Jg). club:...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Cogswell

...Captain Cogswell died at Puget Sound Naval Hospital, Bremerton, Washington on 22 September, 1939.

He married Grace Phillips (born 1887) of New York City. She worked for the US Foreign Service and later for the Central Intelligence Agency until her retirement in 1954. They had no children....

So, McCloy is closely tied to Amherst, to Francis Plimpton's brother, and to Francis's law partner, Debevoise. The law partnership hired the brother of the Lindsey twins, both ushers at Nancy Bush's wedding where Wm. B. Macomber Jr. was best man. George Plimpton was the Paris review partner of John Train. Train leads us to the interaction of his partner. Thomas Devine, with Greene, Clemard Charles, and DeMohrenchildt. So does James Cogswell. McCloy also served as a trustee at the Amherst Shakespeare Library in the DC, a favorite research library of Friedman's wife.

How did McCloy even find the time....?

More on John Hurt and his uncle.:

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,732570,00.html

RACES: De Priest Sequelac

Monday, Jul. 01, 1929

Congressman Oscar De Priest of Illinois continued last week to be the most conspicuous Negro in the U. S. The race issue raised by Mrs. De Priest's acceptance of a perfunctory invitation to tea at the White House (TIME, June 24) where, according to her husband she made "some fine contacts," was politically prodded from all sides, kept alive...

...Undismayed, last week at the failure (because of a visual defect) of his Candidate Charles E. Weir to pass the physical examination for the U. S. Naval Academy, Congressman De Priest said he would continue to appoint Negroes to fill his district's vacancies in the service schools....

....Arrayed against Congressman De Priest was many a southern politician. Virginia's Republican Representative Joseph C. Shaffer, refusing the De Priest musicale invitation, warned the Negro congressman: "You are now embarking on a perilous course which will, if you continue, disturb relations which have long been amicably settled in the South."...

http://www.roanoke.com/news/nrv%5C31494.html

Sunday, September 04, 2005

Wytheville linguist's World War II role is finally revealed

Researchers from Virginia and Japan have documented John Hurt's contributions to breaking Japanese coded messages.

...It was in languages that Hurt's expertise stood out. His mother's brother, former U.S. Rep. Joseph Crockett Shaffer, who served as 9th District congressman for one term, got Hurt an interview in 1930 with the Signal Intelligence Service, a predecessor to the National Security Agency.

The congressman, who was the father of Edwin Shaffer, a former Wythe County commonwealth's attorney who still lives in Wytheville, had learned that the agency was looking for someone fluent in Japanese.

"But after that, he was on his own," Hoch said. "He proved himself very, very well."

Frank Rowlett was one of a handful of cryptanalysts hired by William Friedman, who was the sole professional assigned to code and cipher work for the U.S. War Department. They worked in New York under Military Intelligence, also known as G-2.

In his book, "The Story of Magic: Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer," Rowlett recalled the report from the officer who interviewed Hurt.

"I've never met an American who is as proficient in Japanese as that young man," the officer said. "It is unbelievable. If you don't employ him, you will be making a great mistake. He is remarkably fluent in conversational Japanese, he can read both forms of written Japanese, and his vocabulary is fabulous. He knows Japanese much better than I or, for that matter, anyone else in G-2."

Hurt had mastered that language, among others, without ever having visited Japan. He also spoke French and did not visit France -- although he did marry a French concert cellist named Ana.

"He'd had so many close friends in college who were Japanese," Hoch said....

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Robert, I hope you'll give the details and relationships described in this post, some thought.:

http://educationforu...79

Consider too, that McCloy was the head of the Amherst board of trustees, he appointed George Plimpton's uncle as Amherst president, Plimpton's father appeared to be the "bait" to bring an entourage to this meeting;

http://books.google....nG=Search+Books

Una revolución itinerante? - Page 199

Arturo Valdés Palacio - Peru - 1989 - 403 pages

do amigo José María Quimper que, con Oscar Faura y Jaime Cáce

e- ran funcionarios de las Naciones Unidas y Directores del Club "Perú" de

Nueva York.

José María nos llevó a almorzar a un acogedor hotel italiano, donde estuvimos

tranquilos conversando hasta que salimos corriendo a las 4 y media de la tarde

para recojer a un intérprete, que ya nos esperaba en el Hotel,

pues teníamos una recepción nada menos que en honor de Ruiz Eldredge y mía,

que nos daba la Asociación de Abogados de la ciudad de Nueva York.

Creímos que era una reunión únicamente de abogados. No era así.

Estaba por supuesto el Dr. John N. lrwing, abogado de Nueva York y

el Dr. Francis TP Plimpton, Presidente de la Asociación, que equivale a

a Decano de nuestro Colegio de Abogados de Lima,

y un buen grupo de representantes de diversos estudios jurídicos, incluyendo un Juez en los criminal y otro de la Suprema Corte, así como un catedrático universitario, pero además se encontraban presentes Franck W. Archibald, Vicepresidente de la American Smelting & Refining Co., quien a los dos días de la revolución se contactó con el General Montagne, interesándose en Cuajone, lo que ya conté; JonhH.Andren, Vice-Presidente Ejecutivo y James R. Grene,

Vice-Presidente también, ambos del Manufactures Hannover Trust Compañy; Charles Goldman,

de la lnternational Telephone and Telegraph Corp,la popular lTT,

contra quien tanto tuvo que pelear el general Aníbal Meza Cuadra; Jerry W.

Johnston, Vice-Presidente del Chase Manhattan Banck, en aquel entonces dueños del Banco Continental que pasó depués a ser Banco Asociado; Jhon C. Duncan, Vice-Presidente Ejecutivo de WR Grace & Co., cuya hacienda Cartavio fué expropiada por la Reforma Agraria, un mes y medio después de esta reunión, lo mismo que Paramonga y el saldo de

sus empresas las adquirimos dentro de lo que se llamó el Convenio Greene. George B. Munroe,

Presidente de Phelpes Dodge Corporation y Robert P., Koening, Presidente de la Cerro Corporation, que también adqurimos por el Convenio Greene. Como se puede apreciar era gente que tenía intereses

directos en el Perú y por tanto especial necesidad de conocer que pasaba en el país en el que tenían ubicado alguna parte de su capital.

do amigo José María Quimper which, with Oscar Faura and Jaime Caceres

e-ran United Nations officials and Directors of the Club "Peru"

New York.

Jose Maria took us to lunch at a cozy Italian hotel where we were

quiet talking until we ran out at 4 ½ o'clock to pick up an interpreter,

already waiting for us at the hotel, for we had nothing less than a reception in honor of Ruiz Eldredge and myself,

which gave us the Law Society of New York City. We thought it was a unique gathering of lawyers. Not so.

He was of course the Dr. John N. lrwing, New York lawyer and

Dr. Francis TP Plimpton, President of the Association, which equals

to Dean of our College of Lawyers of Lima,

and a good group of representatives from various law firms, including a judge in criminal and other Supreme Court and a university professor, but also were present Franck W. Archibald, vice president of the American Smelting & Refining Co., who after two days of the revolution he contacted the General Montagne, interested in Cuajone, which already counted; JonhH.Andren, Executive Vice President and James R. Grene,

Vice-President also, both of Manufactures Hanover Trust Company, Charles Goldman,

the Intemational Telephone and Telegraph Corp., the popular LTT,

against whom both had to fight General Anibal Meza Cuadra, Jerry W.

Johnston, Vice-President of Chase Manhattan Banck, then-owners of the Continental Bank happened to be depues Associated Bank, John C. Duncan, Executive Vice President of WR Grace & Co., whose property was expropriated by Cartavio Agrarian Reform, a month and a half after this meeting, as did Paramonga and the balance of

their businesses we acquired in what was called the Convention Greene. George B. Munroe,

Phelp Dodge Corporation President and Robert P., Koenig, President of the Cerro Corporation, which also Greene adqurimos by the Convention. As you can see were people who had interests

direct in Peru and therefore in particular need to know that happened in the country where they were located somewhere in their capital....

Francis Plimpton's law partner was Eli Whitney Debevoise, HICOG John McCloy's counsel and deputy High Governor...

Another Amherst grad provided the Dorothe Matlock intelligence, to the point that he was investigated to the degree it was found that his aunt had worked for the CIA as a clerk.:

http://books.google....strella&f=false

Amherst College biographical record, 1963; biographical record of ... - Google Books Result

Amherst College - 1963 - 1109 pages

COGSWELL. James Kelsey III. s James Kelsey Jr and Francesca Pickering ... now v-pres Minerales Estrella de Mayori Habana Cuba. USNR 1943-46 Lt (Jg). club:...

http://en.wikipedia....rancis_Cogswell

...Captain Cogswell died at Puget Sound Naval Hospital, Bremerton, Washington on 22 September, 1939.

He married Grace Phillips (born 1887) of New York City. She worked for the US Foreign Service and later for the Central Intelligence Agency until her retirement in 1954. They had no children....

So, McCloy is closely tied to Amherst, to Francis Plimpton's brother, and to Francis's law partner, Debevoise. The law partnership hired the brother of the Lindsey twins, both ushers at Nancy Bush's wedding where Wm. B. Macomber Jr. was best man. George Plimpton was the Paris review partner of John Train. Train leads us to the interaction of his partner. Thomas Devine, with Greene, Clemard Charles, and DeMohrenchildt. So does James Cogswell. McCloy also served as a trustee at the Amherst Shakespeare Library in the DC, a favorite research library of Friedman's wife.

How did McCloy even find the time....?

More on John Hurt and his uncle.:

http://www.time.com/...,732570,00.html

RACES: De Priest Sequelac

Monday, Jul. 01, 1929

Congressman Oscar De Priest of Illinois continued last week to be the most conspicuous Negro in the U. S. The race issue raised by Mrs. De Priest's acceptance of a perfunctory invitation to tea at the White House (TIME, June 24) where, according to her husband she made "some fine contacts," was politically prodded from all sides, kept alive...

...Undismayed, last week at the failure (because of a visual defect) of his Candidate Charles E. Weir to pass the physical examination for the U. S. Naval Academy, Congressman De Priest said he would continue to appoint Negroes to fill his district's vacancies in the service schools....

....Arrayed against Congressman De Priest was many a southern politician. Virginia's Republican Representative Joseph C. Shaffer, refusing the De Priest musicale invitation, warned the Negro congressman: "You are now embarking on a perilous course which will, if you continue, disturb relations which have long been amicably settled in the South."...

http://www.roanoke.c...rv%5C31494.html

Sunday, September 04, 2005

Wytheville linguist's World War II role is finally revealed

Researchers from Virginia and Japan have documented John Hurt's contributions to breaking Japanese coded messages.

...It was in languages that Hurt's expertise stood out. His mother's brother, former U.S. Rep. Joseph Crockett Shaffer, who served as 9th District congressman for one term, got Hurt an interview in 1930 with the Signal Intelligence Service, a predecessor to the National Security Agency.

The congressman, who was the father of Edwin Shaffer, a former Wythe County commonwealth's attorney who still lives in Wytheville, had learned that the agency was looking for someone fluent in Japanese.

"But after that, he was on his own," Hoch said. "He proved himself very, very well."

Frank Rowlett was one of a handful of cryptanalysts hired by William Friedman, who was the sole professional assigned to code and cipher work for the U.S. War Department. They worked in New York under Military Intelligence, also known as G-2.

In his book, "The Story of Magic: Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer," Rowlett recalled the report from the officer who interviewed Hurt.

"I've never met an American who is as proficient in Japanese as that young man," the officer said. "It is unbelievable. If you don't employ him, you will be making a great mistake. He is remarkably fluent in conversational Japanese, he can read both forms of written Japanese, and his vocabulary is fabulous. He knows Japanese much better than I or, for that matter, anyone else in G-2."

Hurt had mastered that language, among others, without ever having visited Japan. He also spoke French and did not visit France -- although he did marry a French concert cellist named Ana.

"He'd had so many close friends in college who were Japanese," Hoch said....

I really appreciate the information; anything that pertains to names, associations, relationships et cetera, is saved and duly noted. We know so much more now than

in the early years [1960's] about intelligence agencies relationships with the academic world, referring to Amherst. I am attempting to make this thread a repository of all the pertinent information I have discovered, even though it seems to be a pretty ignored thread, with the exception of postings by yourself and Bill Kelly.

Speaking of Amherst, here is another interesting tidbit, this one concerns George DeMohrenschildt's attorney.

J. Henry Doscher, Jr. class of '42

Henry Doscher, known as Hank to his friends at Amherst, died in Abilene, Texas, on October 3, 2008, after a long illness. He was born Jan. 5, 1921, in Houston and grew up in Sweetwater, Texas, before coming to Amherst in 1938.

At Amherst, he was a member of Phi Gam; on the Hurricane Hop Committee; on the prom committee sophomore, junior, and senior years; and on the planning committee all four years. He also participated in freshman soccer.

Immediately after graduation, he joined the U.S. Navy and was commissioned as ensign in November 1942. After further training at the Subchaser Training Center in Miami, he served extensively on ships in the Pacific, beginning at Guadalcanal in April '43 and ending as part of the occupation force in Japan in late '45 and early '46. He was released from active duty in April 1946 but remained in the U.S. Naval Reserve, retiring as a captain in 1970.

In June of '46, Henry entered the Texas Univ. law school, receiving a doctor of jurisprudence degree in August 1948. He then served as briefing attorney to the chief justice of the Texas Supreme Court for more than a year before practicing law in Abilene, Texas, for 35 years.

After retiring from the active practice of the law, Henry taught legal subjects at McMurry Univ. until 1997. Over the years, he also somehow found time for numerous business and civic activities, serving as a director of several businesses and as a trustee of several Abilene cultural activities. In addition, he obtained a M.A. degree in history from Hardin-Simmons Univ. in 1973. Henry was a long-time member of the Texas Bar Association, the American Bar Association and the Abilene Bar Association, of which he was president from 1970-1971.

Henry's main hobbies were traveling and bridge. He became a Life Master in bridge in 1970 and played in national and regional tournaments in the U.S. and Mexico. After retiring from his law practice, he also indulged an interest in writing. Harking back to his days in the Pacific during World War II, he wrote two books, Subchaser in the South Pacific and Little Wolf at Leyte.

One of Henry's former law partners described him as precise, cautious and "client sensitive," while an associate from McMurry Univ. said, "He was a consummate gentleman . . . one of the finest individuals I have known." Henry, who never married, made Amherst his principal beneficiary, establishing an irrevocable trust in 1995 to benefit the College and including Amherst in his will. He was also a Johnson Chapel Associate and a Pooled Income Fund donor.

From the did you know Department

District Attorney Henry Wade and John Connally were roommates at the University of Texas. See Henry Wade WC Testimony.

There are several things I can think of which make me indifferent to the interest level of other Forum members to the whole cryptology, Field Operations Intelligence

and Army Signal Corp angle and its relation to the assassination, and Lee Harvey Oswald.

Primarily, the strongest indication of the relevance of, at least the Army Signal Corp, aka Signal Intelligence Service to the assassination lay in the area of secured communications inter-related to Air Force One and Two, the WHCA and the Command Center, all central to still unknown information due to the still-classified

documents.....

A quote by William Manchester below, referring to the telephone impasse in Washington on November 22nd reveals the importance of the ASC in these

matters; although one must bear in mind that he wrote this in 1967

"Emergency planners have yet to learn the lessons of November 22. A study of that afternoon suggests that in any disaster on a workday, commercial telephones

would become highly unreliable. The public could be reached by television and radio, but the homes of all vital officials should be knitted into a government system

similar to the White House Communications Agency. The Signal Corps has the expertise and equipment to do this; it lacks only a green light."

And, although the following will be met by a somnolent response, it provides a behind the scenes look at what inter-relationships existed in the technological world

largely disregarded as relevant to the assassination in any way, yet it does, in an indirect manner.

The influence of the IAS project in the early years of U.S. computer technology

was therefore extensive, even before its completion in 1951. As the published

design circulated widely, joint projects with other research institutions on

subsystems for the Princeton computer were undertaken..... Other collaborating

institutions built copies of the basic design.

These copies included those built at the five laboratories, officially designated

in the funding contract for the IAS system —

the ILLIAC 1 built for the Army at the University of Illinois,

ORDVAC at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland,

MANIAC 1 at Los Alamos,

the AVIDAC at Argonne,

the Oak Ridge ORACLE

and the JOHNNIAC at Rand.

The JOHNNIAC was named in honor of John Von Neumann

The National Bureau of Standards

NBS also assisted the Army Security Agency in designing and constructing

ABNER, a cryptological computer.

Also See Samuel S. Snyder, 96 Broke Codes and Designed Computers

Snyder signed off more than a few important docs in his lifetime...

I also try to bear in mind that the elusive material may not reside in a government document, or that elusive information may have been in a government

document that was destroyed. For instance Secret Service Records pertaining to the Miami leg of President Kennedy's trip there, before Dallas are

very incomplete, yet, the Miami Police have, or had a large number of documents pertaining to individuals under suspicion et cetera

As a reinforcement to that issue consider the following:

I have seen a lot of interesting documents in my years but the following would have to be up there, I will point out that this document is not from

maryferrell.org, history-matters or any other government documents website, but I suppose the question you have to ask yourself

is does paperless archives have anything to offer?

Let the reader draw their own conclusions.

The areas which contain ......... did not say redacted, they were simply scribbled out, so I used the periods in order to indicate the portions were

in effect, redacted without using the word redacted. I do know that John Kester was involved with areas that would fall within

the discussion area cited below....

If the document is valid, it is interesting that, if I am interpreting it correctly, Sgt. Stevensen is Blakey's friend, and I would like to hammer home a point

about Messr. Blakey, but will save it for comments afterwards.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT 8 November Meeting with Mr. Blakey

1. On 8 November, ............ visited Mr. Robert G Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director for the House Select Committee on Assassinations,

to receive questions concerning ........... allegation that he had ......... information linking an assassination plot against President Kennedy

with a figure in organized crime. Mr. Blakey had been referred to NSA (GC Dan Silver) by Mrs. Judy Miller, Special Assistant to John Kester, OCD

2. Mr Blakey indicated that .......... had communicated with a friend of his

named Sgt. Michael B. Stevensen at "Corry" Field, Florida

3. At that time, ........ Sometime before November, 1963 in his work as ........

referred in paragraph 1. Mr. Blakey stated that he did not know who the crime figure is. [redacted] supervisor Sgt. Praeter (actually "Prater")

4. Mr. Blakey stated that NSA had already acknowledged the existence of such a facility during this period, but he didn't indicate

to whom such a statement had been made.

5. Mr Blakey posed the following comments for NSA.

(a) What is NSA's cabability for retrieving communications from this time and place?

How quickly can we make this retrieval?

(His committee complete its work in December. If NSA can easily provide the answers to a number

of questions, he will do some preliminary investigation before formally requesting the information, but if we indicate

that much time will be required, he will task us now).

What additional information does NSA need from Mr. Blakey to speed the retrieval process?

(d) Is the data still available for retrieval?

http://www.paperless..._nsa_files.html

I have been looking for this at maryferrell.org, as it is obviously from paperless archives, so far I have not been successful, but it is interesting nonetheless!

Cheers

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  • 2 weeks later...

The chronology of cryptographic history is practically a dead file for the year 1963, other than the story

regarding the death of Army Sergeant Jack Dunlap.

Jack E. Dunlap, was an United States Army sergeant stationed at the National Security Agency, who later became a spy for the Soviet Union in the early 1960's.

In order to continue his access to classified information, Sgt. Dunlap applied for civilian employment at NSA. At the time, background investigations were more strict for civilan employees than members of the military. When the NSA began Sgt. Dunlap's background investigation, indications of Dunlap's "high lifestyle" began to emerge. Dunlap's security clearance was revoked on May 23, 1963, and NSA transferred Dunlap to a menial job.

Dunlap committed suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning on July 23, 1963. After the suicide, Dunlap's wife discovered packages of secret materials -- only then did the scope of the breach become evident. Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap was a NSA courier who allegedly sold secrets to the Soviet Union for three years; he killed himself while under investigation in 1963. Scott Shane, "Some at NSA Betrayed Country," from Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, "No Such Agency," Baltimore Sun, reprint of six-part series, 3-15 December 1995. Jack E. Dunlap, an employee of the NSA 1958, was found dead of carbon monoxide poisoning - an apparent suicide (see photo below).

He also was a Soviet penetration agent, who had concealed in the attic his house a treasure trove of sealed packets of classified NSA documents bearing on its most secret deciphering and interception operation.

There were many reasons why it would have been inconvenient to arrest and Jack Dunlap. For one thing, he was a liaison with "Staff D" in the CIA, and could expose areas of CIA-NSA cooperation in domestic interceptions that might be deemed illegal. For another, he had been the personal driver, and aide, to Major General Garrison Coverdale the chief of staff of the NSA. General Coverdale, and after Coverdale left in August 1959, Dunlap to the new NSA Chief of Staff, General Watlington. As such, he had top-secret clearance and a "no inspection" status, which meant he could drive off the base with documents hidden in the car and then return without anyone knowing that the material had been removed from the base. Moreover, Dunlap had other high-level connections in the NSA. According to the Carroll Report, which investigated the Dunlap breach, he had helped a ring of officers at NSA pilfer some government property. Dunlap was under interrogation just before he died. His apparent suicide ended the investigation. Some of it is hearsay, some heresy from un-named sources.

Jack Dunlap was a Boy Scout in New Orleans in his youth. Enlisted and became an Airborne Ranger in the Infantry. Served in the Korean War and received the Combat Infantry Badge (CIB).

The circumstances of his joining the ASA is not known, but is assigned to Det 4 in 57/58 with an unknown MOS. It might have been as a MP. During the 57-58 period there were no known MP's assigned to Sinop. The security for the base was performed by the Turk conscript unit billeted outside the post. It is believed that the name of the blond-haired Hungarian was Alex Klopstock.

Jack Dunlap frequented the beach area at Samsun and enjoyed the Russian females there. After gaining access to operations Dunlap was especially interested in the telemetry signals, etc and on several occasions was seen going into the restricted COMCEN area, but because he was a Senior NCO, no one challenged him and it will NEVER be known if he secreted or photographed anything therein.

Also, many thought it unusual that Jack Dunlap went TDY to Hq's USASAEUR with the CO at Det 4 in 1958 because he was not knowlegable of the mission as was Sergeant Van Pelt. Sergeant Dunlap shot a wild boar and all the Sinop dogs (except Gimp) with his .45. Perhaps we will find the name of the Major who commanded Det 4 in 1958.

Jack Dunlap was transferred to Vint Hill Farms from Fort Meade after he took a polygraph at NSA. He probably knew that he had flunked and was now in a dilemma. He was seen driving a white Cadillac at VHFS and would be gone for days before his death in Maryland. At least one person swears that the autopsy of Jack Dunlap would show that he was 'beaten to a pulp' and that a 'snake in the woodpile' was responsible for placing the hose in his car which caused his death. Jack E. Dunlap he described as a drunken Army sergeant who was recruited strictly for money. Once a chauffeur-courier for the National Security Agency, Dunlap provided NSA documents to the GRU. For his work Dunlap received lavish payments that permitted him a lifestyle of powerboats, fast cars and an expensive mistress.

Dunlap committed suicide when it appeared federal officers were about to arrest him. Espionage, since it is based on human vulnerability, can penetrate even the most heavily guarded repositories of national secrets.

Soviet intelligence demonstrated this in the 1950's when it recruited no fewer than five different American sources in the ultra-secret National Security Agency (NSA), the unit that supplies the codes and ciphers used by the American government.

One of these KGB spies, Jack E. Dunlap, the chauffeur for the NSA's Chief of Staff, organized a number of staff officers into a larceny scheme, which allowed him access to the highest level cryptography, the "keys to the kingdom," as one military investigator put it. He delivered this material to his Soviet case officer in the Chief of Staff's limousine (the only car which could leave headquarters without being searched). This human spying made it possible for the Soviet Union to decipher the American data that had been gathered by its technical collection, and also to ascertain many of the targets of American technical collection.

JE Dunlap PHOTO

DUNLAP, JACK E

SFC US ARMY

DATE OF BIRTH: 11/14/1927

DATE OF DEATH: 07/23/1963

BURIED AT: SECTION 43 SITE 976

ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY Posted: 7 May 2006

And although what is contained below is still years before the Kennedy Assassination, it is nonetheless

an important part of the cryptographic links regarding the assassination of President Kennedy

One of the major NSA success stories since its establishment on

October 24, 1952, was the rigging of the encryption machines of the

Swiss company Crypto AG in a secret deal cut between NSA's William

Friedman and Boris Hagelin, the developer of the Hagelin cipher

machine used by the Allies in World War II. In 1958, Hagelin, who

founded Crypto AG in 1950, agreed to the deal with NSA. It was the

height of the Cold War.

For U.S. intelligence, the Hagelin-NSA deal was an intelligence coup

on the level of the U.S. breaking of Germany's Enigma code and Japan's

Purple code in World War II. Neutral nations trusted a Swiss company

to sell encryption machines as highly reliable as Swiss watches and as

trusted as Swiss bank accounts. Non-aligned nations like Egypt,

Indonesia, Algeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Mexico, Yemen, Venezuela,

Yugoslavia, and Argentina became contented Crypto AG users. Upon

independence, Britain's Commonwealth Office offered the British

Empire's newly-independent states a sweetheart deal. They could

protect their sensitive diplomatic communications with free surplus

Hagelin cryptographic machines like the C-52 cipher machine once used

by Britain. Nations like India, Pakistan, Ghana, Burma, Ceylon,

Nigeria, Kenya, Kuwait, and Jordan enthusiastically accepted the offer

along with mechanical modifications to handle non-Latin alphabets like

Arabic, Burmese, Thai, and Farsi. The users were unaware that all

their coded traffic was an open book to NSA and Britain's Government

Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), NSA's British signals intelligence

partner in a secret intelligence-sharing pact known as the UK-USA

Agreement. French-speaking Crypto AG salesmen had tremendous success

in francophone former French and Belgian African colonies to use their

ciphering machines after independence. Soon, governments in the

Central African Republic, Morocco, Tunisia, Gabon, Upper Volta,

Dahomey, Cameroon, Togo, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa),

Senegal, Malagasy Republic, and Chad were encrypting their

communications not aware that everything was being decoded and read by

NSA.

Source Wayne Madsen Report

Edited by Robert Howard
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The chronology of cryptographic history is practically a dead file for the year 1963, other than the story

regarding the death of Army Sergeant Jack Dunlap.

Jack E. Dunlap, was an United States Army sergeant stationed at the National Security Agency, who later became a spy for the Soviet Union in the early 1960's.

In order to continue his access to classified information, Sgt. Dunlap applied for civilian employment at NSA. At the time, background investigations were more strict for civilan employees than members of the military. When the NSA began Sgt. Dunlap's background investigation, indications of Dunlap's "high lifestyle" began to emerge. Dunlap's security clearance was revoked on May 23, 1963, and NSA transferred Dunlap to a menial job.

Dunlap committed suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning on July 23, 1963. After the suicide, Dunlap's wife discovered packages of secret materials -- only then did the scope of the breach become evident. Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap was a NSA courier who allegedly sold secrets to the Soviet Union for three years; he killed himself while under investigation in 1963. Scott Shane, "Some at NSA Betrayed Country," from Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, "No Such Agency," Baltimore Sun, reprint of six-part series, 3-15 December 1995. Jack E. Dunlap, an employee of the NSA 1958, was found dead of carbon monoxide poisoning - an apparent suicide (see photo below).

He also was a Soviet penetration agent, who had concealed in the attic his house a treasure trove of sealed packets of classified NSA documents bearing on its most secret deciphering and interception operation.

There were many reasons why it would have been inconvenient to arrest and Jack Dunlap. For one thing, he was a liaison with "Staff D" in the CIA, and could expose areas of CIA-NSA cooperation in domestic interceptions that might be deemed illegal. For another, he had been the personal driver, and aide, to Major General Garrison Coverdale the chief of staff of the NSA. General Coverdale, and after Coverdale left in August 1959, Dunlap to the new NSA Chief of Staff, General Watlington. As such, he had top-secret clearance and a "no inspection" status, which meant he could drive off the base with documents hidden in the car and then return without anyone knowing that the material had been removed from the base. Moreover, Dunlap had other high-level connections in the NSA. According to the Carroll Report, which investigated the Dunlap breach, he had helped a ring of officers at NSA pilfer some government property. Dunlap was under interrogation just before he died. His apparent suicide ended the investigation. Some of it is hearsay, some heresy from un-named sources.

Jack Dunlap was a Boy Scout in New Orleans in his youth. Enlisted and became an Airborne Ranger in the Infantry. Served in the Korean War and received the Combat Infantry Badge (CIB).

The circumstances of his joining the ASA is not known, but is assigned to Det 4 in 57/58 with an unknown MOS. It might have been as a MP. During the 57-58 period there were no known MP's assigned to Sinop. The security for the base was performed by the Turk conscript unit billeted outside the post. It is believed that the name of the blond-haired Hungarian was Alex Klopstock.

Jack Dunlap frequented the beach area at Samsun and enjoyed the Russian females there. After gaining access to operations Dunlap was especially interested in the telemetry signals, etc and on several occasions was seen going into the restricted COMCEN area, but because he was a Senior NCO, no one challenged him and it will NEVER be known if he secreted or photographed anything therein.

Also, many thought it unusual that Jack Dunlap went TDY to Hq's USASAEUR with the CO at Det 4 in 1958 because he was not knowlegable of the mission as was Sergeant Van Pelt. Sergeant Dunlap shot a wild boar and all the Sinop dogs (except Gimp) with his .45. Perhaps we will find the name of the Major who commanded Det 4 in 1958.

Jack Dunlap was transferred to Vint Hill Farms from Fort Meade after he took a polygraph at NSA. He probably knew that he had flunked and was now in a dilemma. He was seen driving a white Cadillac at VHFS and would be gone for days before his death in Maryland. At least one person swears that the autopsy of Jack Dunlap would show that he was 'beaten to a pulp' and that a 'snake in the woodpile' was responsible for placing the hose in his car which caused his death. Jack E. Dunlap he described as a drunken Army sergeant who was recruited strictly for money. Once a chauffeur-courier for the National Security Agency, Dunlap provided NSA documents to the GRU. For his work Dunlap received lavish payments that permitted him a lifestyle of powerboats, fast cars and an expensive mistress.

Dunlap committed suicide when it appeared federal officers were about to arrest him. Espionage, since it is based on human vulnerability, can penetrate even the most heavily guarded repositories of national secrets.

Soviet intelligence demonstrated this in the 1950's when it recruited no fewer than five different American sources in the ultra-secret National Security Agency (NSA), the unit that supplies the codes and ciphers used by the American government.

One of these KGB spies, Jack E. Dunlap, the chauffeur for the NSA's Chief of Staff, organized a number of staff officers into a larceny scheme, which allowed him access to the highest level cryptography, the "keys to the kingdom," as one military investigator put it. He delivered this material to his Soviet case officer in the Chief of Staff's limousine (the only car which could leave headquarters without being searched). This human spying made it possible for the Soviet Union to decipher the American data that had been gathered by its technical collection, and also to ascertain many of the targets of American technical collection.

JE Dunlap PHOTO

DUNLAP, JACK E

SFC US ARMY

DATE OF BIRTH: 11/14/1927

DATE OF DEATH: 07/23/1963

BURIED AT: SECTION 43 SITE 976

ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY Posted: 7 May 2006

And although what is contained below is still years before the Kennedy Assassination, it is nonetheless

an important part of the cryptographic links regarding the assassination of President Kennedy

One of the major NSA success stories since its establishment on

October 24, 1952, was the rigging of the encryption machines of the

Swiss company Crypto AG in a secret deal cut between NSA's William

Friedman and Boris Hagelin, the developer of the Hagelin cipher

machine used by the Allies in World War II. In 1958, Hagelin, who

founded Crypto AG in 1950, agreed to the deal with NSA. It was the

height of the Cold War.

For U.S. intelligence, the Hagelin-NSA deal was an intelligence coup

on the level of the U.S. breaking of Germany's Enigma code and Japan's

Purple code in World War II. Neutral nations trusted a Swiss company

to sell encryption machines as highly reliable as Swiss watches and as

trusted as Swiss bank accounts. Non-aligned nations like Egypt,

Indonesia, Algeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Mexico, Yemen, Venezuela,

Yugoslavia, and Argentina became contented Crypto AG users. Upon

independence, Britain's Commonwealth Office offered the British

Empire's newly-independent states a sweetheart deal. They could

protect their sensitive diplomatic communications with free surplus

Hagelin cryptographic machines like the C-52 cipher machine once used

by Britain. Nations like India, Pakistan, Ghana, Burma, Ceylon,

Nigeria, Kenya, Kuwait, and Jordan enthusiastically accepted the offer

along with mechanical modifications to handle non-Latin alphabets like

Arabic, Burmese, Thai, and Farsi. The users were unaware that all

their coded traffic was an open book to NSA and Britain's Government

Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), NSA's British signals intelligence

partner in a secret intelligence-sharing pact known as the UK-USA

Agreement. French-speaking Crypto AG salesmen had tremendous success

in francophone former French and Belgian African colonies to use their

ciphering machines after independence. Soon, governments in the

Central African Republic, Morocco, Tunisia, Gabon, Upper Volta,

Dahomey, Cameroon, Togo, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa),

Senegal, Malagasy Republic, and Chad were encrypting their

communications not aware that everything was being decoded and read by

NSA.

Source Wayne Madsen Report

Highlights of Testimony of Boris Pash

http://www.maryferre...c.do?docId=1430

page 10, the same type of coolness that I found among my scientists who were assigned to my unit after World War II,

after it became known in '54 that I appeared at the Oppenheimer hearings, some of them wouldn't speak to me

page 14, Mr Pash: It was not an assassination unit. In the first place I would like to say I was never an employee of the agency.

I was detailed from the Army for a normal tour of duty to the Agency.

Mr Kirbow: How many years did that entail off and on?

Mr Pash: I stayed with the agency, I don't have my records with me. They're in California, but about I would say,

either the very end of 1948 or the very early part of '49, somewhere right in there, and I reverted back to the Army.

completed the tour with the agency at the end of 1951, and then I was assigned and left for Austria in 1952, where

I was assigned as Special Forces Officer or Unconventional Warfare Planning Officer.

In 1954 and 1955 and early '56, I was stationed in the presidio of San Francisco as a Deputy G-2 in charge of Security

Matters. So certainly after '51, I had no direct contact with the Agency. While in the Agency, for the first maybe a year - -

page 15, and again I'm not sure, but for about I think less of my - - less than half of my time in the Agency, or maybe about half

the time, I was in charge of a planning group, and this was a part of what I think when the Agency was formed in those

days, they had Plans and Policy Division, and if I am not mistaken, a man by the name of Frank, Mr. Frank was in

charge of that.

Mr. Kirbow: This wasn't Frank Wisner?

Oh no. Mine was Planning Branch No. 7, and that in general was individual type operations and all other such activities

which the other six branches didn't specifically have. And I forgot what the other branches were. One was propaganda.

That, I remember. The other was - - well, I dont even - -

Mr. Kirbow: Probably an intelligence collection outfit?

Mr. Pash: No. These were operational plannning

Mr. Baron: Political, economic?

Mr. Pash: Yes.

......

page 16, Mr. Pash: Also, if I am not mistaken, I was the first intelligence [OSS] officer reserve. I was a reserve officer.

I was teaching in Southern California I was called in in June of 1940, and I was the only counterintelligence officer called in and

assigned to the 1st 9th Corps Area on the Pacific Coast

page 20, we had a project to try to spirit Cardianl Menzenti sic [Mindszenty] out of Hungary

page 21, Mr. Pash: Yes, he wanted to talk to Senator Tower

His mother sent him the copy of the newspaper from Dallas, and said is this the Colonel Pash we know? And so he told me about it

page 23, Mr. Baron: Let me ask you a particular question that was brought to our attention by Artie Lazarus when we spoke to him two days ago

He said that when he first joined you in PB7 you asked him to read the charter of PB7

page 27, Mr. Baron: ....he said that in the summer of 1949, the chief of the political section, which he thought was probably PB1, but he wasn't sure, but he was

sure it was the chief of the political section came to him shortly after a meeting at the State Department, some sort of a regular planning meeting

and said we've just had a meeting in which it was decided that Chiang Kai Shek must be sent to meet his ancestors and used just that kind of language

and it was clear this was a request to PB7 to assassinate Chiang Kai Shek, and Artie Lazarus said that he was the Acting Chief at that point

page 28 because he believes youre in Japan, and he said that this same man who was the liason with the State Department told him there was

higher authority for this request, and Artie Lazarus said he doesent remember now whether he cited, - - wait, I'm sorry, I may be misspeaking myself.

...and Artie Lazarus says that he then hand-carried the suggestion to Frank Wisner's attention, and the response he got was from Tom Betts, who

replied that this had gone right to the top and the answer was no.....Having refreshed your recollection with this story, do you now recall this incident?

Mr. Pash: No, I never knew about that, and as I say, just a year ago, Artie told me about it and he says I never told you because you were away and it was

washed up and nothing happened.

page 32

Mr. Baron: Although your saying that if assassination had been considered as something the CIA wanted to be able to carry out, a capability they wanted

to develop, you might have been asked to develop some sort of general plans.

Mr. Pash: Yea, and if I were to plan it, it would be limited to such a thing - - well without sort of jeopardizing my position on assassination, supposing I was

supposed to - - say I was told to plan an assassination, and I agreed to plan it, my plan would consist of, we want to assassinate A, the conditions for this are

that it should be limited to those involved. Who was to be aware of it? How was it to take place, and so forth, the planning, and whom to send in, what to use

and how to do it, and all of that, that would not come under me.

Mr. Baron: That would be given to a case officer?

Mr. Pash: That would be given to the operational division. There was an operational division, you see, a man by the name of Lindsay was in charge.

Mr. Baron: Were you ever asked to develop a capability for assassinations if it were necessary.

Mr. Pash: No.

page 35, Mr Pash.....upon leaving the CIA, I served in headquarters US Forces, Austria from January 1952 to October 1953

at which time I was transferred to the Headquarters, Sixth Army, where I served from October 1953 to May 1956. after Pash reads his prepared statement

he says, "I notice that in typing it I made a mistake which I will correct here - - the years when I was assigned to USFA - -and I will make that correction."

page 39, Mr Pash - The other was the - - well, it was the operational group, and that was, if I'm not mistaken the group headed by Mr. Lindsay, Frank

Lindsay I think his name was, was in charge of,.....

Mr. Baron: Do you remember a man by the name of Douglas Blaufarb who I think was on the Albanian desk, at that point?

Mr. Baron: Is this newspaper account correct that you retired from the Army in November '67?

Mr. Pash Yes, but I resent the way......and I have a back injury a heart attack and exposure to radiation

page 45, Mr Pash:.......We had a code name for it [the Oppenheimer case]

Mr Baron: What was that code name?

Mr Pash: DSM Project

Mr Baron: For the record we are talking about an article that appeared in the Dallas Times Herald by Thomas Ross copyrighted 1975 Chicago Sun Times

and it appeared on December 30, 1975.

Mr Pash: In the Dallas newspaper?

Mr Baron: Right

And we should enter this as Exhibit No. 2 in our record

(The document referred to was

page 47, marked as Pash Exhibit No 2 for identification.)

Mr Baron: While were on the subject, is there anything else you would like to say about the account in this article that is headlined

"Hunt Says Boris Pash Oppenheimer Accuser"*

Mr Pash: Well, I was never the security officer, or a security officer in the Manhattan Project. I conducted security operations for the Manhattan

Project but I was doing that as an Army Intelligence Officer assigned to the Fourth Army for Western Defense Command

Mr Pash: To put it straight [Peer] de Silva was a Lieutenant who came into my office in'42, shortly after graduating from West Point, and he was

put on - - I was then Chief of CounterrIntelligence for the Fourth Army in Western Defense Command, and he was working at the Communist desk

and I had him reviewing some of the reports and asked him to prepare a memorandum. His memorandum was a very well prepared memorandum.

The material was very well analyzed.......

I put a covering letter on it and sent it to the War Department so that de Silva would get credit for his work, rather than I getting credit for

the work that de Silva did.

page 52, Mr Pash: So when I found defeciencies in the CIA, I didn't hesitate to make it known. As a matter of fact when I returned from Europe in 1951,

General Fry, who was then Chief of Personnel, told me informally that the Agency didn't particularly want me assigned to Wahington.....

... I gave a mission to the OSS to get an scientist out of Rome before Rome fell because my mission was to get ahold of Drs. Amakli, Giordani and Weck

to see if they knew anything about the German atomic bomb development. That was my mission in World War II in Europe, and the OSS told me they

dropped a radio man into Rome, and they made contact with Dr. Amaldi and that he's ready to come out, but the OSS doesen't have the capability to

getting him out because they need a submarine. In London I got a quick message to get down to Italy becasue Rome waas about to fall.

I entered Rome with the advance elements that were attacking Rome, and I went right to Amaldi's place and I picked him up........

And that evening when I already had Dr. Armaldi and had him secure, he came to me because I told him not to leave Rome without my permission......

Armaldi said, well there's an officer downstairs who told me I had to go. And I said no you don't have to go

I'll go down and talk to the officer. And this officer a big, husky fellow in a captains's uniform starts telling me I was interfering with a very

important mission directed by the President himself, and I said what's happened. And he said

I have to take Dr. Amaldi and take him to Naples. And I said why are you taking him to Naples.

He said I have to turn him over to the Alsace Mission, I tell you because you're interfering.

And I says you're looking at the Alcase Mission.

page 58, Mr Baron: I had just one detail question.

Do you know a man named Colonel Milton Buffington?**

Mr Pash:

Mr Baron: In the Emergency Planning Office of the CIA

* Another article/version re the same subject "Hunt says CIA Had Assassin Unit," New York Times 12/26/75, page 9, column 1. 72.

** See Google Books - Getting Ready for "The Day"

http://www.history.a...occ-gy/ch11.htm

From The US Army in the Occupation of Germany

http://www.history.a...ex.htm#contents

http://www.history.a...ect/usaww2.html

Also The Old Boys - Boris Pash pages 153, 211, 227

Note Frank Sturgis was associated with Albania in the early-mid 1950's see cryptography

Also In 1968 Boris Pash released a book entitled The Alsos Mission

DMN September 14, 1945 Colonel Gerald R Tyler commanded the Los Alamos Atomic Bomb Project Laboratory.

A special engineering department of the Army was set up into which the Ph.d's and those holding masters degrees

were transferred from other Army units.

See Texas Tourists Are Numerous in New Mexico

Captain Peer de Silva was the only West Point Graduate resident at Los Alamos during the period

according to Kai Bird

See page 230, American Promotheus: the triumph and tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer

By Kai Bird, Martin J. Sherwin

The ALSOS team was led by Lt. Colonel Boris T. Pash, an Army intelligence officer who had earlier taken part in the security investigation of Robert Oppenheimer. Because the members of the ALSOS team would at times be going into "no man's land" -- or even behind enemy lines -- in search of information, they were not told any details of the Manhattan Project. This way, if they were captured, they could reveal nothing of use to the Germans. The mission began in Italy and followed closely behind the Allied armies as they pushed deeper into Europe and, ultimately, into Germany itself. Although proving a negative is always difficult, after months of investigation the ALSOS team found no indications of massive German nuclear production facilities of the sort that had been built at Hanford or Oak Ridge. In late November 1944, ALSOS representatives uncovered strong evidence at the University of Strasbourg that the German program had not gotten beyond the research and development stage, but it was not until April 1945, only weeks before the final German surrender, that the bulk of the German uranium was captured and any final fears of a Nazi bomb were alleviated. After the war, ten of the top German atomic researchers were internedFarm Hall in a British intelligence "safe house" in Farm Hall, Great Britain (right), for six months. All of their conversations were secretly recorded. The significance of what they said to each other is still a matter of debate, but the transcripts of their discussions do make it clear just how far away from a useable weapon the German atomic program remained at war's end.

With the surrender of Germany, only Japan remained as a possible atomic threat. Japanese physicists had noted the discovery of fission before the war, and they did inform the Japanese Army of the danger. Some research was conducted at a Tokyo laboratory into various methods of uranium enrichment, but comparatively little progress was made. In early 1943, a group of Japanese experts concluded that, while it was true that the United States was probably trying to build an atomic bomb, it might take Japan ten years or more to build one. Accordingly, little further research into nuclear energy was conducted in Japan beyond the construction of one cyclotron in Kyoto.

http://www.cfo.doe.g...ttan/rivals.htm

http://www.cfo.doe.g...ttan/people.htm

San Francisco Chronicle (CA) - May 13, 1995

Deceased Name: Colonel Boris T. Pash

A funeral will be held Monday for retired Army Colonel Boris T. Pash.

Colonel Pash, who died Thursday in Greenbrae at age 94, was director of security in the American atomic bomb project during World War II. He was also the lead officer in the Alsos Mission, which scoured Europe searching for German nuclear scientists.

He was born in San Francisco, and was called to active duty in the Army in 1938, assigned to Ninth Corps headquarters at the Presidio as chief of counterintelligence.

With the outbreak of World War II, Colonel Pash investigated security breaches at the University of California at Berkeley Radiation Laboratory involving personnel for the Manhattan Engineer District project, which produced the first nuclear bomb.

His findings on J. Robert Oppenheimer and other members of the Rad Lab staff have recently been discussed anew by historians.

In September 1943, he was sent to Washington for new orders. In cooperation with General Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, he organized the Alsos Mission, charged with finding out how much progress the Nazi regime had made in developing atomic and bacteriological weapons.

The mission landed in Italy and proceeded to Rome in the vanguard of Allied troops, located several physicists, and then went via England to France after D-Day in June 1944, again accompanying forward units.

The main Allied forces had been held back to allow French troops to liberate Paris, but Colonel Pash and his group rushed into the city where they were the first American troops to arrive. They liberated the world-famous Curie Institute of physical research and seized 18 tons of uranium ore amassed by the Nazis in France. They also took over a primitive reactor that had been built in Germany.

Colonel Pash summarized the mission's history in a published book, ''The Alsos Mission.''

After the war he served as chief of the foreign service section in General Douglas MacArthur's Japanese occupation headquarters, then worked under the Secretary of Defense in Washington.

He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, among other decorations, and was inducted into the Army's Military Intelligence Hall of Fame in 1988.

He is survived by his wife, Gladys, and son Edgar, of Madera. A funeral will be held Monday at 11 a.m. at Keaton's Mortuary in San Rafael, with interment at the Serbian Cemetery in Colma.

Contributions are requested for the American Cancer Society.

More information on this era can be found in the book

Harnessing the Genie:Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force 1944-1986 - Michael H. Gorn

Hint: The 1965 Woods Hole Summer Study was not the first such military/scientific meeting of the minds.

The first such scientific grouping was working in the fall of 1944.....with General Hap Arnold and Theodore Von Karman were

the main figures.

The following is courtesy of James Bamford, it has been posted before, but it was on a inactive thread that is approximately four years old.

I am still surprised that with the interest in Boris Pash, I would post fairly large portions of his deposition, previously on this thread and no-one even bothered to respond, that is disappointing. but it is certainly not my loss....

At any rate.

The most cogent analysis of NSA activity on November 22nd was provided by James Bamford in his seminal work Body of Secrets, concerning NSA activity and it's monitoring of intercepts around the world, on the day of President Kennedy's assassination. The following passages are from Body of Secrets.

"That Friday, November 22, 1963 was much like any other day at NSA. In the early morning hours, Cuban intercepts from the ferret ship USNS Muller had richocheted off the moon and down to NSA. The backlogged Cuban analysts and cryptologists of B Group were only now putting out translations of messages intercepted weeks earlier. One of those was a report by a Cuban official on the country's internal problems with rebels. "I believe that the approaching Presidential elections in the United States will strengthen reactionary forces from within and without" said the worried official "Therefore, there is a need for a strong gorilla [sic] collar around Cuba." That Friday was slow in the NSA Sigint Command Center. The duty officer logged some messages in; Sergeant Holtz arrived at ten o'clock to pick up a few tapes; at 1:30 P.M. a Strategic Air Command surveillance mission codenamed Brass Knob sent a preflight message. Five minutes later, couriers assigned to secretly collect cables from Western Union and other communications companies over the weekend were briefed.

Then at 1:36, a bulletin flashed over the radio. Don Gardiner of the ABC radio network cut into a local program to report that President Kennedy had been shot in Dallas. NSA Director Gordon Blake was sitting at his desk in his third-floor office when he heard the news. At the White House, crowded around a large circular table in the West Basement's staff mess, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was deep in debate following a late lunch. Across the Potomac, General Maxwell Taylor and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were meeting in the Pentagon's Gold Room with the commanders of the West German Bundeswehr. Down the hall in his E-ring office, Secretary of Defense Robert S.McNamara was discussing the $50 billion budget with a half-dozen aides..........

At fourteen minutes past two, General Blake sent out a message alerting all NSA stations and listening posts. Twenty-two minutes later he sent out another message over NSA's restricted communications links "President Kennedy is dead." At the eavesdropping base at Kamiseya in Japan, the operations center suddenly went quiet..........

As the world mourned, NSA continued to eavesdrop. Immediately after the assassination, NSA instituted a large-scale manual and and computer review of all available signals intelligence information, including all traffic between the United States and Cuba. At the same time, NSA was intercepting about 1,000 messages a day worldwide. Suspected assassin Lee Harvey Oswald' name was entered into the computer search. A short time later, additional names provided by the FBI from Oswald's address book were added. At the same time between twenty-five and fifty analysts manually reviewed all traffic between Cuba and New Orleans and Cuba and Dallas, and some traffic between Cuba and Russia.

Fifteen hundred miles to the south, Navy intercept operators, monitoring both Cuban and "Soviet Forces Cuba" communications, listened in as Cuban military forces were placed on high alert. "A state of alert is ordered for all personnel," said the intercepted message. "Be ready to repel aggression." A message intercepted from the Polish embassy in Havana indicated that "military units are being relocated" and a new military draft, was called. Intercepts flooded in from other listening posts. Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia suddenly went on alert. One foreign ambassador in Havana cabled home a report of a large movement of troops, adding a note about Castro: "I got the immediate impression that on this occasion he was frightened, if not terrified."

From early intercepts of Cuban diplomatic communications, it was clear that, far from being involved, Castro's people were as mystified by the assassination as the rest of the world. "The assassination of Kennedy" said one message from Havana to its embassy in Mexico City "was a provocation against world peace, perfectly, thoroughly planned by the most reactionary sectors in the United States." An intercept of a message from Brazil's ambassador to Cuba back to his Foreign Office indicated that Cuban officials "were unanimous in believing that any other president would be "even worse" than Kennedy...............In the hours and day's following the assassination, a wide variety of intercepts poured into NSA.................Egyptian diplomats speculated that Kennedy was assassinated as a result of his stand on racial equality............

A diplomat in Leopoldville, in Congo, reported: "Certain ill-intentioned persons are rejoicing over the death of the President of the United States of America, considering that grievous event a sign of victory for them." The Argentine ambassador to Budapest reported that the Hungarian people "were deeply touched" and that the government attributed the killing to "fascist elements inspired by racial hatred."

In the aftermath of the assassination, Meredith K. Gardner, one of NSA's top Soviet codebreakers, was assigned to examine a number of items taken from assassin Lee Harvey Oswald and suspected to contain codes or ciphers. The Warren Commission, charged with investigating the assassination, was particularly intrigued by a Russian novel Glaza Kotorye Sprashivayut ["Questioning Eyes"] Oswald had apparently cut eight letters out of page 152. But this was too little to go on. "The manner of perforating only a few known letters, wrote Gardner "does not conform to any known system. . . . . .We believe, nevertheless, that it is most likely that the letters were cut out for some purpose related to Oswald's photographic experiments."

Edited by Robert Howard
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With the declassification of documents that pertain to the Government Code and Cypher School, ie Bletchley Park, NSA and works by David Kahn and the Alan Turing website, the relationships between the world of cryptology and the JFK era, are becoming more apparent.

Take Ian Fleming for example, the following is from the Alan Turing website.....

The documents quoted here are taken from an Admiralty file (ADM 223/463). They illustrate the situation in October 1940 when Turing was unable to make effective use of his methods for deciphering naval Enigma. These methods required (i) enough familiarity with the traffic for cribs to be guessed and (ii) some knowledge of the bigram table used for the indicator system. In 1940 neither of these conditions were fulfilled. They were desperate for a 'pinch' of material.

When this file was released in 1996, it attracted particular attention because a plan for capturing Enigma material from a German naval rescue boat was devised by Ian Fleming, in 1952 the creator of 'James Bond'. Indeed Fleming hoped to execute the plan himself. This plan ('Operation Ruthless') was approved but never put into effect. Enigma material was indeed 'pinched' from the Krebs off Norway in February 1941 and Turing's methods then made a successful start.

For more on the context of these documents, go to this page of the Alan Turing Internet Scrapbook.

The first document quoted is a memorandum dated 20 October 1940 from Frank Birch, head of the naval interpretation section at Bletchley Park, to the Admiralty.

Turing and Twinn came to me like undertakers cheated of a nice corpse two days ago, all in a stew about the cancellation of Operation Ruthless. The burden of their song was the importance of a pinch. Did the authorities realise that, since the Germans did the dirt on their machine on June 1st, there was very little hope, if any, of their deciphering current, or even approximately current, enigma for months and months and months - if ever? Contrariwise, if they got a pinch - even enough to give a clue to one day's material, they could be pretty sure, after an initial delay, of keeping going from day to day from then on; nearly up-to-date if not quite, because the level of traffic now is so much higher and because the machinery has been so much improved. The 'initial delay' would be in proportion to the pinch. If the whole bag of tricks was pinched, there'd be no delay at all. They asked me to add - what is self-evident - that they couldn't guarantee that at some future date, near or remote, the Germans mightn't muck their machine about again and necessitate another pinch. There are alternative operations possible. I put up one suggestion myself, and there are probably lots better. is there anything in the wind? I feel there ought to be.

The second document is the plan for 'Operation Ruthless' as proposed by Fleming to the Director of Naval Intelligence on 12 September 1940.

I suggest we obtain the loot by the following means:

1. Obtain from Air Ministry an air-worthy German bomber.

2. Pick a tough crew of five, including a piot, W/T opeartor and word-perfect German speaker. Dress them in German Air Force uniform, add blood and bandages to suit.

3. Crash plane in the Channel after making S.O.S. to rescue service in P/L.

4. Once aboard rescue boat, shoot German crew, dump overboard, bring rescue boat back to English port.

In order to increase the chances of capturing an R. or M. with its richer booty, the crash might be staged in mid-Channel. The Germans would presumably employ one of this type for the longer and more hazardous journey.

Ian Fleming later added other details to the plan:

... N.B. Since attackers will be wearing enemy uniform, they will be liable to be shot as franc-tireurs if captured, and incident might be fruitful field for propaganda. Attackers' story will therefore be "that it was done for a lark by a group of young hot-heads who thought the war was too tame and wanted to have a go at the Germans. They had stolen plane and equipment and had expected to get into trouble when they got back". This will prevent suspicions that party was after more valuable booty than a rescue boat.

http://www.turing.or...s/ruthless.html

Robert: Some postings recently have delved into the area of disinformation, somewhat recently another slur against assassinated President John F. Kennedy has him being privy to advance knowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack, a

charge that is so utterly political, that unless new authentic documents are produced, it will simply fall into the category of another attack against a deceased person, who cannot defend himself.

It may well behoove those prone to take Pearl Harbor "revelations," with a healthy grain of salt.

For instance, consider the statement of former OSS Chief of Special Operations in London, William J. Casey, "The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east towards Hawaii"

The esteemed Victor Cavendish-Bentwick, who was the head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, also stated.

We knew that they [Japanese fleet] changed course. I remember presiding over a J.I.C. meeting and being told that a Japanese fleet was sailing in the direction of Hawaii, asking 'Have we informed our transatlantic brethren?' and receiving an affirmative reply.....

Author Richard Aldrich wrote in response.

How plausible are these remarkable passages? Uncorroborated by other sources, they have passed

almost unnoticed over the years. Moreover, at first glance they appear to be contradicted by the recently released JIC minutes for the fateful week of Pearl Harbor. These reveal that the JIC did not even meet on 5 December. It met on 3 and 9 December and did not mention Pearl Harbor

at either meeting.

See page 87, Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service - Richard Aldrich

Edited by Robert Howard
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Thanks for that stuff Robert,

At least somebody wants to get back to research.

BK

With the declassification of documents that pertain to the Government Code and Cypher School, ie Bletchley Park, NSA and works by David Kahn and the Alan Turing website, the relationships between the world of cryptology and the JFK era, are becoming more apparent.

Take Ian Fleming for example, the following is from the Alan Turing website.....

The documents quoted here are taken from an Admiralty file (ADM 223/463). They illustrate the situation in October 1940 when Turing was unable to make effective use of his methods for deciphering naval Enigma. These methods required (i) enough familiarity with the traffic for cribs to be guessed and (ii) some knowledge of the bigram table used for the indicator system. In 1940 neither of these conditions were fulfilled. They were desperate for a 'pinch' of material.

When this file was released in 1996, it attracted particular attention because a plan for capturing Enigma material from a German naval rescue boat was devised by Ian Fleming, in 1952 the creator of 'James Bond'. Indeed Fleming hoped to execute the plan himself. This plan ('Operation Ruthless') was approved but never put into effect. Enigma material was indeed 'pinched' from the Krebs off Norway in February 1941 and Turing's methods then made a successful start.

For more on the context of these documents, go to this page of the Alan Turing Internet Scrapbook.

The first document quoted is a memorandum dated 20 October 1940 from Frank Birch, head of the naval interpretation section at Bletchley Park, to the Admiralty.

Turing and Twinn came to me like undertakers cheated of a nice corpse two days ago, all in a stew about the cancellation of Operation Ruthless. The burden of their song was the importance of a pinch. Did the authorities realise that, since the Germans did the dirt on their machine on June 1st, there was very little hope, if any, of their deciphering current, or even approximately current, enigma for months and months and months - if ever? Contrariwise, if they got a pinch - even enough to give a clue to one day's material, they could be pretty sure, after an initial delay, of keeping going from day to day from then on; nearly up-to-date if not quite, because the level of traffic now is so much higher and because the machinery has been so much improved. The 'initial delay' would be in proportion to the pinch. If the whole bag of tricks was pinched, there'd be no delay at all. They asked me to add - what is self-evident - that they couldn't guarantee that at some future date, near or remote, the Germans mightn't muck their machine about again and necessitate another pinch. There are alternative operations possible. I put up one suggestion myself, and there are probably lots better. is there anything in the wind? I feel there ought to be.

The second document is the plan for 'Operation Ruthless' as proposed by Fleming to the Director of Naval Intelligence on 12 September 1940.

I suggest we obtain the loot by the following means:

1. Obtain from Air Ministry an air-worthy German bomber.

2. Pick a tough crew of five, including a piot, W/T opeartor and word-perfect German speaker. Dress them in German Air Force uniform, add blood and bandages to suit.

3. Crash plane in the Channel after making S.O.S. to rescue service in P/L.

4. Once aboard rescue boat, shoot German crew, dump overboard, bring rescue boat back to English port.

In order to increase the chances of capturing an R. or M. with its richer booty, the crash might be staged in mid-Channel. The Germans would presumably employ one of this type for the longer and more hazardous journey.

Ian Fleming later added other details to the plan:

... N.B. Since attackers will be wearing enemy uniform, they will be liable to be shot as franc-tireurs if captured, and incident might be fruitful field for propaganda. Attackers' story will therefore be "that it was done for a lark by a group of young hot-heads who thought the war was too tame and wanted to have a go at the Germans. They had stolen plane and equipment and had expected to get into trouble when they got back". This will prevent suspicions that party was after more valuable booty than a rescue boat.

http://www.turing.or...s/ruthless.html

Robert: Some postings recently have delved into the area of disinformation, somewhat recently another slur against assassinated President John F. Kennedy has him being privy to advance knowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack, a

charge that is so utterly political, that unless new authentic documents are produced, it will simply fall into the category of another attack against a deceased person, who cannot defend himself.

It may well behoove those prone to take Pearl Harbor "revelations," with a healthy grain of salt.

For instance, consider the statement of former OSS Chief of Special Operations in London, William J. Casey, "The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east towards Hawaii"

The esteemed Victor Cavendish-Bentwick, who was the head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, also stated.

We knew that they [Japanese fleet] changed course. I remember presiding over a J.I.C. meeting and being told that a Japanese fleet was sailing in the direction of Hawaii, asking 'Have we informed our transatlantic brethren?' and receiving an affirmative reply.....

Author Richard Aldrich wrote in response.

How plausible are these remarkable passages? Uncorroborated by other sources, they have passed

almost unnoticed over the years. Moreover, at first glance they appear to be contradicted by the recently released JIC minutes for the fateful week of Pearl Harbor. These reveal that the JIC did not even meet on 5 December. It met on 3 and 9 December and did not mention Pearl Harbor

at either meeting.

See page 87, Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service - Richard Aldrich

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