Is anyone interested in Apollo missions...

John Simkin · December 12, 2006

You can find the Jeane Kirkpatrick article, Dictatorships and Double Standards (November, 1979) on the Commentary website:

The failure of the Carter administration's foreign policy is now clear to everyone except its architects, and even they must entertain private doubts, from time to time, about a policy whose crowning achievement has been to lay the groundwork for a transfer of the Panama Canal from the United States to a swaggering Latin dictator of Castroite bent. In the thirty-odd months since the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President there has occurred a dramatic Soviet military buildup, matched by the stagnation of American armed forces, and a dramatic extension of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, and the Caribbean, matched by a declining American position in all these areas. The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third World.

As if this were not bad enough, in the current year the United States has suffered two other major blows - in Iran and Nicaragua - of large and strategic significance. In each country, the Carter administration not only failed to prevent the undesired outcome, it actively collaborated in the replacement of moderate autocrats friendly to American interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion. It is too soon to be certain about what kind of regime will ultimately emerge in either Iran or Nicaragua, but accumulating evidence suggests that things are as likely to get worse as to get better in both countries. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua appear to be as skillful in consolidating power as the Ayatollah Khomeini is inept, and leaders of both revolutions display an intolerance and arrogance that do not bode well for the peaceful sharing of power or the establishment of constitutional governments, especially since those leaders have made clear that they have no intention of seeking either.

It is at least possible that the SALT debate may stimulate new scrutiny of the nation's strategic position and defense policy, but there are no signs that anyone is giving serious attention to this nation's role in Iranian and Nicaraguan developments - despite clear warnings that the U.S. is confronted with similar situations and options in El Salvador, Guatemala, Morocco, Zaire, and elsewhere. Yet no problem of American foreign policy is more urgent than that of formulating a morally and strategically acceptable, and politically realistic, program for dealing with non-democratic governments who are threatened by Soviet-sponsored subversion. In the absence of such a policy, we can expect that the same reflexes that guided Washington in Iran and Nicaragua will be permitted to determine American actions from Korea to Mexico - with the same disastrous effects on the U.S. strategic position. (That the administration has not called its policies in Iran and Nicaragua a failure--and probably does not consider them such--complicates the problem without changing its nature.)

There were, of course, significant differences in the relations between the United States and each of these countries during the past two or three decades. Oil, size, and proximity to the Soviet Union gave Iran greater economic and strategic import than any Central American "republic," and closer relations were cultivated with the Shah, his counselors, and family than with President Somoza, his advisers, and family. Relations with the Shah were probably also enhanced by our approval of his manifest determination to modernize Iran regardless of the effects of modernization on traditional social and cultural patterns (including those which enhanced his own authority and legitimacy). And, of course, the Shah was much better looking and altogether more dashing than Somoza; his private life was much more romantic, more interesting to the media, popular and otherwise. Therefore, more Americans were more aware of the Shah than of the equally tenacious Somoza.

But even though Iran was rich, blessed with a product the U.S. and its allies needed badly, and led by a handsome king, while Nicaragua was poor and rocked along under a long-tenure president of less striking aspect, there were many similarities between the two countries and our relations with them. Both these small nations were led by men who had not been selected by free elections, who recognized no duty to submit them selves to searching tests of popular acceptability. Both did tolerate limited apposition, including opposition newspapers and political parties, but both were also confronted by radical, violent opponents bent on social and political revolution. Both rulers, therefore, sometimes invoked martial law to arrest, imprison, exile, and occasionally, it was alleged, torture their opponents. Both relied for public order on police forces whose personnel were said to be too harsh, too arbitrary, and too powerful. Each had what the American press termed "private armies," which is to say, armies pledging their allegiance to the ruler rather than the "constitution" or the "nation" or some other impersonal entity.

In short, both Somoza and the Shah were, in central ways, traditional rulers of semi-traditional societies. Although the Shah very badly wanted to create a technologically modern and powerful nation and Somoza tried hard to introduce mod- ern agricultural methods, neither sought to reform his society in the light of any abstract idea of social justice or political virtue. Neither attempted to alter significantly the distribution of goods, status, or power (though the democratization of education and skills that accompanied modernization in Iran did result in some redistribution of money and power there).

Both Somoza and the Shah enjoyed long tenure, large personal fortunes (much of which were no doubt appropriated from general revenues), and good relations with the United States. The Shah and Somoza were not only anti-Communist, they were positively friendly to the U.S., sending their sons and others to be educated in our universities, voting with us in the United Nations, and regularly supporting American interests and positions even when these entailed personal and political cost. The embassies of both governments were active in Washington social life, and were frequented by powerful Americans who occupied major roles in this nation's diplomatic, military, and political life. And the Shah and Somoza themselves were both welcome in Washington, and had many American friends...

No particular crisis conforms exactly with the sequence of events described above; there are always variations on the theme. In Iran, for example, the Carter administration - and the President himself - offered the ruler support for a longer time, though by December 1978 the President was acknowledging that he did not know if the Shah would survive, adding that the U.S. would not get "directly involved." Neither did the U.S. ever call publicly for the Shah's resignation. However, the President's special emissary, George Ball, "reportedly concluded that the Shah cannot hope to maintain total power and must now bargain with a moderate segment of the opposition . . ." and was "known to have discussed various alternatives that would effectively ease the Shah out of total power" (Washington Post, December 15, 1978). There is, furthermore, not much doubt that the U.S. assisted the Shah's departure and helped arrange the succession of Bakhtiar. In Iran, the Carter administration's commitment to nonintervention proved stronger than strategic considerations or national pride. What the rest of the world regarded as a stinging American defeat, the U.S. government saw as a matter to be settled by Iranians. "We personally prefer that the Shah maintain a major role in the government," the President acknowledged, "but that is a decision for the Iranian people to make."

Events in Nicaragua also departed from the scenario presented above both because the Cuban and Soviet roles were clearer and because U.S. officials were more intensely and publicly working against Somoza. After the Somoza regime had defeated the first wave of Sandinista violence, the U.S. ceased aid, imposed sanctions, and took other steps which undermined the status and the credibility of the government in domestic and foreign affairs. Between the murder of ABC correspondent Bill Stewart by a National Guardsman in early June and the Sandinista victory in late July, the U.S. State Department assigned a new ambassador who refused to submit his credentials to Somoza even though Somoza was still chief of state, and called for replacing the government with a "broadly based provisional government that would include representatives of Sandinista guerillas." Americans were assured by Assistant Secretary of State Viron Vaky that "Nicaraguans and our democratic friends in Latin America have no intention of seeing Nicaragua turned into a second Cuba," even though the State Department knew that the top Sandinista leaders had close personal ties and were in continuing contact with Havana, and, more specifically, that a Cuban secret-police official, Julian Lopez, was frequently present in the Sandinista headquarters and that Cuban military advisers were present in Sandinista ranks....

In a manner uncharacteristic of the Carter administration, which generally seems willing to negotiate anything with anyone anywhere, the U.S. government adopted an oddly uncompromising posture in dealing with Somoza. "No end to the crisis is possible," said Vaky, "that does not start with the departure of Somoza from power and the end of his regime. No negotiation, mediation, or compromise can be achieved any longer with a Somoza government. The solution can only begin with a sharp break from the past." Trying hard, we not only banned all American arms sales to the government of Nicaragua but pressured Israel, Guatemala, and others to do likewise--all in the name of insuring a "democratic" outcome. Finally, as the Sandinista leaders consolidated control over weapons and communications, banned opposition, and took off for Cuba, President Carter warned us against attributing this "evolutionary change" to "Cuban machinations" and assured the world that the U.S. desired only to "let the people of Nicaragua choose their own form of government."

Yet despite all the variations, the Carter administration brought to the crises in Iran and Nicaragua several common assumptions each of which played a major role in hastening the victory of even more repressive dictatorships than had been in place before. These were, first, the belief that there existed at the moment of crisis a democratic alternative to the incumbent government: second, the belief that the continuation of the status quo was not possible; third, the belief that any change, including the establishment of a government headed by self-styled Marxist revolutionaries, was preferable to the present government. Each of these beliefs was (and is) widely shared in the liberal community generally. Not one of them can withstand close scrutiny.

You can read the full article here:

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/...cle.aip?id=6189

John Simkin · December 12, 2006

Ironically, the article includes the following passage:

Although most governments in the world are, as they always have been, autocracies of one kind or another, no idea holds greater sway in the mind of educated Americans than the belief that it is possible to democratize governments, anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances. This notion is belied by an enormous body of evidence based on the experience of dozens of countries which have attempted with more or less (usually less) success to move from autocratic to democratic government. Many of the wisest political scientists of this and previous centuries agree that democratic institutions are especially difficult to establish and maintain-because they make heavy demands on all portions of a population and because they depend on complex social, cultural, and economic conditions.

Two or three decades ago, when Marxism enjoyed its greatest prestige among American intellectuals, it was the economic prerequisites of democracy that were emphasized by social scientists. Democracy, they argued, could function only in relatively rich societies with an advanced economy, a substantial middle class, and a literate population, but it could be expected to emerge more or less automatically whenever these conditions prevailed. Today, this picture seems grossly over-simplified. While it surely helps to have an economy strong enough to provide decent levels of well-being for all, and "open" enough to provide mobility and encourage achievement, a pluralistic society and the right kind of political culture - and time - are even more essential.

In his essay on Representative Government, John Stuart Mill identified three fundamental conditions which the Carter administration would do well to ponder. These are: "One, that the people should be willing to receive it [representative government]; two, that they should be willing and able to do what is necessary for its preservation; three, that they should be willing and able to fulfill the duties and discharge the functions which it imposes on them."

It is not surprising that Kirkpatrick had doubts about the wisdom of trying to impose democracy on Iraq.

Steven Phillips · December 13, 2006

Lez robertson says the building was designed to withstand the impact of a large airoplane so I dont see what difference it makes what speed it was going, 20 to 30 mph doesnt make that much difference and a lot of the energy was absorbed by the plane. How do you know how fast those planes were going? where is your evidence? Besides the second plane hit the building right on one side, it nearly missed, and in no way did it impact the central 47 column steel core; some of it exploded out the adjoining corner side. Ten minutes later people were waving and shouting at that hole, one person has been videod lying down and looking over the precipice.

The siezmic data shows explosions and buildings only come down in freefall when explosives are used.

Why did they not reconstruct and investigate, which is the usual practice in these disasters? Why did they seal off ground zero with high security clearance? Why did the dispose of the evidence ? What have they got to hide?

After a number of the alleged perpetrators that were displayed on tv let it be known that they were alive and well, why did the government not revise its theory, why did they keep quiet about it? Could it be that the pancake arab theory is bull shass.

Matthew Lewis · December 13, 2006

any and all stories of Hijackers still being alive came out soon after 911 before the FBI release their final and official list. After that the stories stopped. This points to the stories being mistaken identity with people with similar names. Another thing to think about is why would Saudi Arabia admit that 15 of the hijackers were their citizens if they were in fact alive?

http://www.911myths.com/html/still_alive.html

The seismic data only appears to show explosions when viewed in a highly compressed format. When looked at in a closer scale, seismic experts agree there is nothing suspicious.

http://www.911myths.com/html/seismic_record.html

If the towers fell at freefall speeds, then why is there debris falling off the towers that fall faster than the collapsing building and outpace the collapse?

http://www.911myths.com/html/freefall.html

http://911review.com/errors/wtc/times.html

Notice that second link is a CT site.

Edited December 13, 2006 by Matthew Lewis

Steven Phillips · December 13, 2006

any and all stories of Hijackers still being alive came out soon after 911 before the FBI release their final and official list. After that the stories stopped. This points to the stories being mistaken identity with people with similar names. Another thing to think about is why would Saudi Arabia admit that 15 of the hijackers were their citizens if they were in fact alive?

http://www.911myths.com/html/still_alive.html

This was not mistaken identity because some of these guys saw their pictures on the news.

The seismic data only appears to show explosions when viewed in a highly compressed format. When looked at in a closer scale, seismic experts agree there is nothing suspicious

Actually when the seismagraphs are lined up with footage of the buildings collapsing: they are very suspicious..

If the towers fell at freefall speeds, then why is there debris falling off the towers that fall faster than the collapsing building and outpace the collapse?

The buildings are falling at free-fall speed, they have been timed; the hight of the towers is known and the rate of speed an object falls at in air towards earth is known, so for instance a house brick would take 9. something seconds to hit the floor from the top of the tower, tower 2 fell in ten seconds.

The reason why some debris were falling faster than the free fall buildings is obvious and its the same reason why massive steel beams were impaled in builings across the street: because they were being propelled by a force, ie explosives.

Steven Phillips · December 13, 2006

No explosions at the world trade centre, whats this then scotch mist?................................................................................

.......

http://letsrollforums.com/phpwebsite/index...w&ANN_id=26

Steven Phillips · December 13, 2006

Sorry that last one was the wrong link..............................................................here`s the right one.....................................

http://letsroll911.org/phpwebsite/index.ph...&PAGE_id=63

John Simkin · December 13, 2006

In September 2000, the PNAC issued a 90-page report entitled Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, And Resources For A New Century, proceeding "from the belief that America should seek to preserve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the preeminence of U.S. military forces."
The report recommended the forward redeployment of US forces at new strategically placed permanent military bases in Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia. Permanent bases ease the strain on US forces, allowing readiness to be maintained and the carrier fleet to be reduced. Furthermore, PNAC advocates that the US-globalized military should be enlarged, equipped and restructured for the "constabulary" roles associated with shaping the security in critical regions of the world.

The report states that "while the unresolved conflict in Iraq provides the immediate justification (for US military presence), the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein" and "Over the long term, Iran may well prove as large a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf as Iraq has. And even should U.S.-Iranian relations improve, retaining forward-based forces in the region would still be an essential element in U.S. security strategy given the longstanding American interests in the region".

In Chapter V, entitled "Creating Tomorrow's Dominant Force" it states: "Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event — like a new Pearl Harbor." It is this quote that is used to suggest that the US government was complicit in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Many critics also claim the PNAC believed this "new Pearl Harbor" would justify war on Iraq.

The whole document can be found here:

http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:ruMnH...t=clnk&cd=1

Kevin M. West · December 13, 2006

What kind of explosives produce pools of molten metal?

Len Colby · December 13, 2006

Steve wrote:

“Lez robertson says the building was designed to withstand the impact of a large airoplane so I dont see what difference it makes what speed it was going, 20 to 30 mph doesnt make that much difference and a lot of the energy was absorbed by the plane. How do you know how fast those planes were going? where is your evidence?”

I agree 20 – 30 MPH wouldn’t make any difference but the planes were estimated to be flying at 470 (WTC1 – North Tower) and 590 MPH (WTC 2). The estimates were based on radar returns and video tapes. I’ve never seen any CT’s challenged the speed estimates. The impacts were of far greater force than Roberson’s study, which was based on a 180 mph crash, anticipated. Imagine someone made a study that found that the occupants of a certain model car should survive a crash at 18 mph and two crashes occurred involving that model one at 47 mph and the other at 59 and the occupants died, would that be suspicious? What if the coroner determined that they were killed by the resulting fires rather than the crashes themselves and the study hadn’t considered the potential of fires? Even if his study was for impacts of those speeds it would prove little, the Titanic was supposed to be unsinkable and that terminal at DeGaulle Airport wasn’t supposed to spontaneously collapse.

“Besides the second plane hit the building right on one side, it nearly missed, and in no way did it impact the central 47 column steel core”

Do you have any evidence to support your claim? I doubt you do because you’re wrong. I wrote the following for another forum.

-the south tower was hit a little bit more than 1/3 of the way over to one side or about 65 -80 feet from a corner just counting the 14 foot wide fuselage but IIRC Boeings like other planes carry most of their fuel in their wing tanks. 767 have124 foot wingspans.

And the core at the side flight 175 struck was 60 feet from the side thus at least part of the fuselage and one of the wings almost certainly hit the core.

3) According to the NIST study collapse initiated with the floor trusses not the core.

“…some of it exploded out the adjoining corner side. Ten minutes later people were waving and shouting at that hole, one person has been videod lying down and looking over the precipice.”

-Yes, and what does that have to do with whether or not the core was damaged?

-Citation for people being in the South Tower entrance hole 10 minutes after impact.

“The siezmic data shows explosions…”

Cite one seismic expert who backs that contention.

“…and buildings only come down in freefall when explosives are used.”

-Citation?

-Structural engineering professors from MIT (Kaussel) and Northwestern University (Barzant and Zhou) conducted studies showing that the towers could have collapsed due to structural failure in close to free fall time.

-Even according to some CT sources the towers took far longer than free fall time. You obviously didn’t look at Matthew’s links. Get back to us when you have.

“The buildings are falling at free-fall speed, they have been timed.”

Citation?

“The reason why some debris were falling faster than the free fall buildings is obvious and its the same reason why massive steel beams were impaled in builings across the street: because they were being propelled by a force, ie explosives.”

The debris certainly doesn’t appear to be propelled downwards, it shoots out a bit then slowly starts to fall.

“Why did they not reconstruct and investigate, which is the usual practice in these disasters?”

Cite one example of when a collapsed civil engineering structure (building, bridge, dam etc) that was reconstructed for forensic analysis, I don’t think it’s ever been done. That would have been a huge waste of time and money. They did investigate have you read the NIST report and the base reports, IIRC they total about 10,000 and included the input of hundreds of engineers most of whom were not government employees? There were a few other investigations as well.

“Why did they seal off ground zero with high security clearance?”

They didn’t. Access was unrestricted for the first few days after that people needed to explain their presence. This was none for safety and logistics reasons. Engineers investating the collapses and journalists and numerous volunteers were given more or less free access. Some friends of mine went, they didn’t have to pass security clearance they were only asked stuff like their names, addresses, emergency contact numbers, blood types etc.

“Why did the dispose of the evidence ?”

Not all the steel was recycled; some is still in a hanger at JFK. Experts differ over whether enough of the steel was preserved to accurately determine exactly what happened. Dr. Gene Corley, head of the American Society of Civil Engineers team that studied the collapses, said it wasn’t a problem http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full...ar06/corley.htm . None of the critics have suggested they believe that the steel was disposed of to further a cover up or that they doubt the towers collapsed as a result of being hit by jetliners.

“This was not mistaken identity because some of these guys saw their pictures on the news.”

Citation?

"No explosions at the world trade centre, whats this then scotch mist?.”

“Sorry that last one was the wrong link.....................................here`s the right one..

http://letsroll911.org/phpwebsite/index.ph...&PAGE_id=63 ”

Maybe I’m a bit slow, what exactly do you think that proves?

Kevin asked:

“What kind of explosives produce pools of molten metal?”

The evidence for pools of “molten metal” let alone molten steel is very weak.

Len

Len Colby · December 13, 2006