FBI turning off the alarm (flash) on 10/9/1963

[Jean Ceulemans]

Couldn´t the impersonation just have been part of it, to provide deniability when needed?  Easy, fairly simple, and effective till this very day... Sometimes, it doesn´t have to be complicated.   

[Bill Simpich]

Silvia Duran was impersonated as well as Oswald on 9/28/63.   She has repearedly denied ever seeing Oswald after 9/27/63, despite the CIA transcript documenting that she and Duran were together at the Cuban consulate on 9/28 about noon time.   Did the American agencies provide a reaction to this impersonation?

Immediately after the Oswald-Duran impersonation, a strong thread of evidence emerges on 10/2/63 about the CIA's concern about the "danger that the FBI's field office in Mexico City had been penetrated".  See the cryptonym LAROB, and this in particular:

10/3/63 cable from HQ to Mexico City, DIR 73144 PBRAMPART:  "Urgent.  Private meeting (illegible)."  Next page:  "On October 2, a memo went out from CIA headquarters discussing the danger that the FBI's field office in Mexico City had been penetrated. "Re coordination of FBI (oper?)ations in MEXI, -__ in liaison with ODENVY (note: FBI) is still delicate matter which ___ AMDEAD at HDQS 0-- directives foresee that certain types of operations may be coordinated at HDQS rather than in the field. on the whole our relations with FBI on world-wide and PBPRIME and CE (note: US and counter-espionage) matters are extremely productive and still improving and we do not wish at present time to raise new issues in Mexico...FBI has agreed and has instructed its MEXI rep to discuss with you pertinent details of such Russian CE ops as LAROB case."

Here's my analysis of the LAROB evidence in Chapter 5:  

Keep in mind that right after the calls of Sept 28 and Oct 1, the station had immediately responded with a report to HQ admitting its fear that the local FBI field office had been penetrated.

On October 1, Bill Bright’s defection target Valentin Bakulin – who was handling the double agents LAROB and LINEB-1 for the Soviets, as seen in Chapter 3 - was seen talking to Yatskov outside the Soviet Embassy.[ 18 ] Yatskov was the consul assumed to be in close communication with Oswald, as seen in a contact sheet for Oswald. This referenced list of contacts makes it clear that the CIA was convinced by October 1st that “Y talked to O” on September 28.[ 19 ]

At this point, CIA complaints surface about the FBI’s operation. I believe the concern was that someone from the LAROB or the LINEB-1 operations might have obtained access to LIENVOY, and impersonated Oswald and Duran on the telephone (note:  after the Oswald figure spoke in person with Yatskov earlier that day)

Bakulin and LINEB-1 met on October 1. Bakulin told LINEB-1 he had no money for him that day. Things had heated up. After the meeting, Bakulin was put on continuous physical surveillance by the CIA’s Mexico City station unit known as LIEMBRACE.[ 20 ]

The next day, October 2, a memo went out from CIA headquarters discussing the danger that the FBI's field office in Mexico City had been penetrated, and that any coordination with that FBI office was "a delicate matter" that should be dealt with at the headquarters level rather than in the field.

The memo also said that the FBI leadership “instructed its Mexi rep to discuss with you pertinent details of such Russian CE ops (note: counter-espionage operations) as LAROB case”. LAROB was a double agent handled by both Soviet officer Valentin Bakulin and the FBI in Mexico City. Bill Bright had been tracking this story, as discussed in Chapter 3. Although there was a danger that the FBI's relationship with LAROB might have compromised its own security, HQ valued its relationship with the FBI and told the Mexico City station that "we do not wish at present time to raise new issues in Mexico."[ 21 ]

On October 5, the Mexico City station reported that “HQs was deferring discussion of the high level of penetration, but would take it up after hearing results of closer liaison between (the Mexico City station and the FBI) in Mexico City."[ 22 ]

On October 7, twenty sets of reports about double agent LAROB were sent from the FBI to the Mexico City station and Headquarters.[ 23 ] Why were they sent? Because both the Station and Headquarters were worried that LAROB was insecure. This double agent or his contacts could have impersonated Duran and Oswald on September 28 and October 1. LAROB and his contacts were logical suspects.

If the local FBI field office had been subjected to a high level of penetration, then the Mexico City station could have been penetrated as well. The station itself had to be treated as a suspect in the molehunt.