JFK Coup Documentary Records

William Kelly · September 17, 2006

JFK COUP D’ETAT - THE ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

By William E. Kelly – bkjfk3@yahoo.com

If the assassination of President John F. Kennedy was not the act of a lone, deranged gunman, then it was certainly the work of not only a conspiracy, but a more specifically defined covert operation, the purpose of which is to shield the actual perpetuators.

The Dealey Plaza operation was also connected to a number of other covert operations that if successful, would have been secret, but were blown and became known, each of which gives deeper background to those responsible for what happened at Dallas. The Bay of Pigs was the biggest of these, but Lee Harvey Oswald, the accused assassin, was also involved with the U2, and other tactical operations were conducted that led up to the assassination of the President, each of which should be thoroughly reviewed. Among these periphial tactical operations that became known were the theft of munitions by anti-Castro Cubans [schulmberger Wells/ See: Garrison], the revolt of the French generals over Algeria, the shooting of Gen. Walker, Oswald’s Clinton and Mexico City escapades, and the Bayo/Pawley and Rex Cuban raiding parties. .

Among the effects of Lee Harvey Oswald were found a New Orleans newspaper clipping about the raids, and Carlos Bringuier, in his book, mentions the significance of the anti-Castro Cuban boat raids, and the names of the men who died or were captured on some of these missions.

Documenting and detailing the official approval of these covert operations that are connected with what led to the change in government offers evidence and further proof that the assassination was not the work of a renegade CIA-Mafia-Cuban intelligence network, but a well planned, coordinated, integrated and official program. It was an inside job and coup d’etat implemented not by foreign communists, but by a domestic, anti-communist intelligence network that was active in the covert operations against Cuba. That the street level tactical operations in Dallas can be traced to their organizational and administrative origins clearly indicate they were controlled, not by some mob boss or renegade veterans, but from within the government itself.

As a coup and not just a conspiracy, there is extant documentation and records that reflect the policy, administration, payments, management, training and tasks necessary to successfully execute the Dealey Plaza operation. It can be documented by examining the direct relationships between the approval of specific anti-Castro Cuban covert policies and strategies and following them through to the actual tactical events as they unfolded at sea level. These three operations, directly related to what happened at Dealey Plaza, are the Bayo-Pawley raid (June 8, 1963), the Rex mission (Oct. 26-30) and to some extent the less know activities of Clare Booth Luce’s “boys,” – Julio Fernandez and the DRE network which operated in Louisiana and Florida throughout the summer of 1963.

There should be, and there can be demonstrated a direct relationship between those at the top who devised, approved and directed those three specific covert operations, and what happened on the streets of Dallas and Oak Cliff. In records released in batches unrelated to the JFK Act of 1992, documents from the National Security Council, Special Operations Group and Cuban Coordinating Committee – Covert Operations in Cuba all establish a paper trail, set a time-line of related events, list the names of those individuals who were in the Cuban Covert Action Coordinating loop at the administration level, and detail the types of operations planned and approved by the President. They also help us identify those who were responsible for carrying them out, and we can follow them to what we know happened at both sea level and the street level in Dallas.

While many hundreds of plans were hatched against Castro and Cuba by the anti-Castro Cuban exiles, CIA and Mafia, forget all the plots to kill Castro and all other operations other than the three naval operations that we can directly connect to the assassination – the Bayo-Pawley raid (which included John Martino, et al.), the Rex mission (which used Collins Radio as a cover) and the DRE naval group financially supported by Clare Booth Luce (who had Oswald records).

These three naval operations were not part of Mongoose, but were part of a specific and different covert action scheme devised and approved in the spring of 1963.

After being set into motion, they were supplemented by a second, back-channel diplomatic approach to a détente with Cuba, begun at the United Nations between the Cuban UN Ambassador Carlos Lechuga and American diplomat William Attwood.

The following records were published by Mark J. White in THE KENNEDYS AND CUBA (1999, Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, 1332 North Halsted Street, Chicago, Il. 60622). They are labeled by numbers White ascribed to them, though not all of them are relevant and begin with Document #4. Italics are White’s comments; [brackets are text notes], {BK Brackets are Kelly’s notes, and BOLD type are Kelly’s }.

As White points out in his introduction to Part 6 – 1963-Old Tactics, New Approaches, “John Kennedy, it can be argued, changed as a president during the final year of his life. The Cuban missile crisis appears to have sobered him, increasing his determination to make the cold war safer. Examples of this new resolve came in the summer of 1963, with his famous speech at American University, noteworthy for its conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet Union, and his signing of the Test Ban Treaty, which limited nuclear testing. A more progressive phase in his civil rights policies in 1963, with the introduction in Congress of a sweeping bill designed to end segregation, can be viewed as the domestic counterpart to this more accommodating thrust in his foreign policy.”

“The documents in this chapter can be examined to determine whether JFK’s Cuban policies support the notion that he became an increasingly mature leader. Not all of them do, by any means. In 1963 Cuba was no longer the central focus of Kennedy’s foreign policy. Vietnam came to assume a priority for U.S. policymakers that it retained over the course of the next decade. But when JFK and his advisors did turn their attention to Castro, their attitude was strikingly and troublingly reminiscent of their pre-missile crisis outlook: they remained determined to use covert means to undermine Castro’s position. In June 1963 JFK gave the go-ahead for a CIA plan to carry out sabotage and other hostile activities against Cuba. It was a sort of condensed version of Operation Mongoose. Some of the documents in this chapter demonstrate that Russian officials soon learned of the resumption of covert U.S. pressure on Cuba, making this issue a bone of contention between the superpowers in the fall of 1963.”

“In contrast to this continuing effort to harass Castro, however, the Kennedy administration pursued another clandestine strategy in the fall of 1963, this one aimed at generating a dialog with the Cuban leader. William Attwood, a U.S. official at the United Nations, was centrally involved in this enterprise, and he kept senior administration officials abreast of his efforts. Had Kennedy not been assassinated, this initiative may conceivably have brought about an accommodation with Castro.”

“Robert Kennedy, such a conspicuous figure on Cuban matters in 1961-62, was less prominent in 1963 in shaping administration policy toward Castro. But his role remained significant.”

4. Memorandum for the Record Drafted by Chairman of the JCS Taylor

Contingency planning for an attack on Cuba, an important feature of the Kennedy administration’s covert approach toward Castro before the missile crisis, continues in 1963, with JFK’s active involvement.

Washington, February 28, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs with the President on 28 February 1963

All the Chiefs were present at the above meeting which lasted from 5:30 p.m. to 6:45 p.m. The following subjects were principle topics of discussion.

a. The Cuban Invasion Plan.

(1) The Chiefs discussed the time-space factors in the implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 312 and 316. [1. These were U.S. contingency plans for an attack on Cuba, developed before the missile crisis.]…The President was shown why it would take approximately 18 days from decision to D-day from the present troop and ship dispositions. In order to reduce this time to something like 7 days, considerable prepositioning would be required in order to get Army/Marine units to the East Coast and to assemble the necessary cargo shipping. The Chiefs expressed the view that it was unlikely that a period of tension would not proceed a decision to invade Cuba which would allow ample time for preparatory measures; hence, it was undesirable to make permanent changes of station of Army and Marine units which would upset the present disposition of strategic reserve forces.

(2) The President expressed particular interest in the possibility of getting some troops quickly into Cuba in the event of a general uprising. He was told that only the airborne troops could arrive with little delay, that the first Marine elements would require about 7 days before landing. He asked the Chiefs to develop specific plans in anticipation of the need for this kind of quick reaction.[2. Maxwell Taylor drafted this memorandum on March 1, 1963.]…

5. President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy Memorandum from Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the

A variety of covert schemes to pressure Castro (and Soviet troops in Cuba) are devised.

Washington, April 3, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba Coordinating Committee – Covert Operations In Cuba { CCC-COC}

Attached is an agenda [1. The agenda (not included here) enumerates the six items mentioned in this memorandum.] which was discussed at a meeting of the Cottrell Committee [2. An interdepartmental committee, chaired by Sterling J. Cottrell, was set up in early 1963 to coordinate the administration’s covert and overt Cuban policies.] on April 1. {BK. What a joke.} The meeting was attended by Secretary Vance, Joe Califano, Dick Helms, Dez FitzGerald, and Bob Hurwitch.

1. Balloon Operations Over Havana {BOH} – The plan is well underway. Assuring the winds are right, CIA proposes to release balloons containing 300,000 to 500,000 leaflets on May Day [3. A holiday in honor of workers.] (before daylight). The balloons will not be visible by radar or by the naked eye. The leaflets will (1) attack Castro’s henchmen, and (2) contain cartoons illustrating sabotage techniques. The decision on the balloons is scheduled for another review during the week preceding May Day.

2. Training of CIA-Sponsored Cuban Exiles on Military Reservations – CIA and the Army are now working on this one to find appropriate installations.

3. The Russian Language Programs – The Committee decided in favor of instituting three programs (Radio Liberty, Radio Caribe, and an intrusion program)….In approving the three programs for Special Group considerations, the committee recognized that they will probably be of marginal value only; however, they will cost us very little, financial or otherwise.

4. Sabotage of Cuban Shipping (19 ships) – The Committee discussed three forms of sabotage – limpets, [4. Literally a limpet is a marine mollusk which adheres to rocks.], incendiaries in the cargos, and abrasives in the machinery. The Committee decided against limipets…Unfortunately, there is no certain way of controlling a limpet; it could sink a ship and the sinking could be billed as a U.S. submarine attack. Secretary Vance came down hard against skinkings.

The Committee will recommend to the Special Group the incendiaries which would be timed to go off in international waters and the abrasives in the machinery. While the propaganda boost might be nil, they are easier to effect than limpets and could rally hurt Castro.

The Committee gave the CIA the option of using either its own Cubans or of using DRE as a cut-out. {!!! Please note this reference to DRE – BK}

5. Redirection of Cuban Exile Group Operations – The Committee discussed this one briefly – i.e. what is an acceptable target? Dick Helms pointed out that although these groups may start out to get a non-Soviet target, ONCE YOU LET THEM GO, YOU CAN NEVER REALLY BE SURE WHAT THEY WILL DO. {Emphasis added – BK}. Bob Hurwitch seemed to favor the approach that attacks and sabotage should appear to come from inside rather than from outside Cuba.

The Committee came to no decision on this one. More thinking is needed. {Indeed. BK}

6. Propaganda Inside Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops – While Secretary Vance expressed some concern about the possibility that this would lead to a conflagration between the Cubans and the Soviets (what would we do), the Committee decided in favor of this course of action. While the results will probably not be startling for our side, the costs and risks are small. (I’m not sure a conflagration would be such a bad thing for us, even if it did occur. How much chance would these 5,000 combat troops have against the huge and well-equipped Cuban army? I don’t think the Russians would dare try to impose their will by force; they would have to grin and bear it).

Comment:

1. In considering specifics of a covert program, I think we should keep in the back of our minds the possibility that we may want to turn our policy around sometime in the future. This does not necessarily mean that we would rule out covert operations – rather, we would probably want to direct them towards splitting the Cuban/Soviet tie…..

2. Assuming we continue our present policy or consider a turnaround policy very far down the road, I like an active covert program. It seems to me that a good sabotage program is one of the few tools we can use to really hurt Castro economically. Our present policy of isolating Cuba from the Free World is not going to bust Castro….

6. Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to President Kennedy

Resuming their clandestine dialog, Robert Kennedy and Ambassador Dobrynin clash bitterly over Cuba.

Washington, April 3, 1963

Mr. Markov of the Russian Embassy [1. Peter J. Markov, attache at the Soviet Embassy] called this morning and said that Russian Ambassador [Dobrynin] wished to come by and see me. I arranged for him to come at 3:30 p.m.

We exchanged pleasantries. He told me that Norman Cousins had asked to see Khrushchev and he had arranged it. [2. Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, discussed the nuclear test-ban issue with Khrushchev on April 12]. What was Cousins’ elationship to the President?…..

….Another point that was made was a sharp and bitter criticism about the raids that had taken place against Russian ships. [3. On March 26 antic-Castro group L-66 sunk the Baku, a Russian vessel, at the Cuban harbor of Caibarien only a week after another Soviet ship had been attacked in a Cuban port.] These were piratical acts and the United States must take responsibility for them. It isn’t possible to believe that if we really wanted to stop these raids that we could not do so. They were glad to hear of the steps that are being taken lately but in the last analysis the specific acts, namely, the arrests that we made would be the criteria by which they would judge our sincerity. The Soviet Union questions whether in fact we wish to end these attacks for our criticism of them has been not that they were wrong but they were ineffective. The clear implication was that if the raid shad been effective they would have had our approval.

Further, our efforts to isolate Cuba, to build a virtual wall around it, was a barbaric act. Our actions to stifle Cuba’s commerce and to create economic difficulties and isolate her from her neighbors in Latin America were completely unwarranted. The support given to counter-revolutionaries and the statements to the barbaric mercenaries in Miami by the President were also bitterly criticized.

7. Memorandum from Secretary of the Army’s Special Assistant Joseph A. Califano to Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance

JFK decides which of the covert operations proposed to him (see Document 5) will be carried out.

Washington, April 9, 1963

SUBJECT

Presidential Action on Special Group Items Concerning Cuba

1. The President rejected the balloon item on the recommendations of Ed Murrow.

{BK Note: Former CBS News reporter E.R. Murrow, scotched this plan, after it was

“well underway.” After it was rejected, leaflets were instead distributed to the Cuban exile community that read: Cuba will be free “Only if an act of God puts a Texan in the White House.” David Attle Phillips ran not only the propaganda shop, but also was CIA control agent with the DRE }

2. The President approved the propaganda item (inciting Cubans to harass, attack and sabotage Soviet military personnel in Cuba) provided every precaution is taken to prevent attribution.

3. The President approved the sabotage of cargoes on Cuban ships and the crippling of ships (through sand in the gears, etc.)

4. With respect to Russian language broadcasts, the President (a) rejected such broadcasts by exile groups over Radio Caribe in the Dominican Republic, ( rejected black intrusion on Radio Moscow Russian language broadcasts, and © withheld a decision on the use of such broadcasts on Radio Liberty from North Carolina, pending consultation with Lleweellyn Thompson.

5. Persuant to Special Group approval of the use of DoD facilities to support training of CIA agents, General Rosson and I met with CIA representatives yesterday and agreed to provide certain weapons training on a military reservation under such circumstances that the trainees would not know they were on a military reservation. Such training will probably commence within the next several days. Parachute jump training under comparable circumstances will commence at a later date but within the next few weeks.

6. We have also agreed with CIA that we that we would spot about 20 inductees now in training at Fort Jackson whom we consider to have the necessary characteristics for CIA operations inside Cuba. These personnel, along with those given jump training under 5 above, would also be used in advance of the introduction of Special Forces, should there be a decision to invade Cuba.

10. Memorandum from Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Sterling J. Cottrell to the Special Group

Sterling Cottrell, installed in early 1963 as the coordinator of administration policy towards Cuba, reviews current covert actions against Castro and poses the question whether these actions should be intensified.

Washington, April 18, 1963.

SUBJECT

Proposed New Covert Policy and Program Towards Cuba

A. The following guidelines are being used in our present covert policy towards Cuba:

1. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to our basic policy objectives….

2. Intensifying cover collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime.

3. Supporting the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement [1. A reference to the original effort to spark a revolution in Cuba when Castro and his cohorts tried to seize the Moncada military barracks in 1953.] and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: a) case a split in the leadership of the regime…. create a political base of opposition..

4. The use of a variety of propaganda media to stimulate passive resistance…

5. The placing of incendiary devices and/or explosives with suitable time delay within the hull or cargo to disable or sink Cuban vessels and/or damage their cargos while on the high seas.

6. Introduce abrasives and other damaging material….

B. The questions now to be decided are:

1. Should the U.S. move beyond the above policy to a program of sabotage, harassment and resistance activities?

2. What kind of effective action can be taken?

3. What capabilities do we posses?

4. What repercussions can we expect……

2. Surface attacks by maritime assets firing on Cuban ships in Cuban wers. When the maritime asset cannot reach the target, shore based attacks on shipping in port or passing the offshore keys will be undertaken.

Considerations: Attack craft from the sea would be manned by Cubans. Shore based attacks by paramilitary trained Cubans firing on ships with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers or 20mm cannon. First sea attack in May and once monthly thereafter. First shore based attack in June. These operations would disrupt coastal commerce. US would probably be blamed. Cuban reprisal measures possible. Soviets likely allege US culpability….

3. Externally mounted hit and run attacks against land targets. Examples: molasses tanker, petroleum storage dumps, naval refueling base, refineries, power plants.

Considerations: Operations conducted by Cubans with paramilitary training. HIGH POSSIBILITIES OF COMPLEX OPERATIONS GOING AWRY. {Emphasis added – BK}First attack in April, with one per month thereafter. Effects would be increased exile morale, some economic disruption. Repercussions would include charges of U.S. sponsorship and increased Cuban security force activities….

4. Support of Internal Resistance Elements, providing material and personnel to permit them to undertake a variety of sabotage and harassment operations…..

Attachment

SUBJECT

A Covert Harassment/Sabotage Program against Cuba.

1. This paper presents a covert Harassment/Sabotage program targeted against Cuba; included are those sabotage plans which have previously been approved as well as new proposals….Losses in men and equipment with the attendant adverse publicity must be expected. Even without such loses, U.S. attribution would be claimed.

When the policy and guidelines of the overall sabotage program are established, it will be possible progressively to develop up to a limit additional covert assets and support capabilities. However, materially to increase the pace of operations, a period of four to six months is required. Ultimate limiting factors are weather, length of “dark of the moon” period each month and appropriate targets. A source of additional agent personnel is from Cuban personnel trained by the U.S. Military Forces under

the recent programs, but released to civilian status…….

11. Summary Record of a Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Robert Kennedy and other American officials look at ways to step up the pressure on Castro.

Washington, April 23, 1963, 5 p.m.

The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Bundy entitled “A Sketch of the Cuban Alternatives.” [Note: This memorandum by McGeorge Bundy has not been included].

{BK Note: SG of NSC – includes Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance, his deputy Joe Califano and Al Haig (See: GR – LBTS) }

12. Memorandum from President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JFK continues to press for the developing of contingency plans to attack Cuba.

Washington, April 29, 1963

Are we keeping our Cuban contingency invasion plans up to date? I notice that there have been a number of new judgments on the amount of equipment that the Cubans have. I thought last October the number of troops we planed to have available was rather limited and the success of the operation was dependent upon, in large measure, our two airborne divisions getting in and controlling the two airfields. It seems to be that we should strengthen our contingency plans on this operation.

13. Extract of a Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

In response to JFK’s message of April 11 (See Document 8), Khrushchev maintains that the number of Soviet troops still in Cuba is insignificant, and that U.S. reconnaissance flights over the island are unacceptable.

April 29, 1963. [Note: Bromley Smith produced this memorandum. – {BK notes: Bromley Smith is also the point man at the White House Situation Room directing radio messages to AF1 and the Cabinet Planes in the sky on November 22, 1963}]

Already for a protracted period, in the exchange of opinions between us no matter in what channels they took place, one and the same question has inevitably arisen – concerning the situation around Cuba….

14….……A revision of CINCLANT’s basic invasion plan for Cuba was reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 February 1963…..

2. The most significant change in the basic invasion plan since last October has resulted from our increasing capability to introduce larger numbers of troops and heavy equipment into the objective area early in the operation. This capability is being achieved by the reactivation of 11 LSTs…..and programmed acquisition of additional C-130 aircaft….

15. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the Standing Group of the National Security Council

The momentum that had been gathering in the Kennedy administration in the spring of 1963 in favor of greater covert pressure on Cuba culminates in this CIA plan of action.

Washington, June 8, 1963

{BK Note: On this same day an as yet unidentified CIA officer wrote this paper, the Flying Tiger II delivered the Eddie Bayo team to near Baracoa, Cuba, but when Pawley returned the next day to pick them up, they never showed. William Turner reorts (In “Rearview Mirror”, p. 194) that “In 1995 ex-Cuban security chief Gen. Fabian Escalante told me that Bayo’s boat was found swamped near Baracoa, but there were no signs of its occupants.”}

SUBJECT

Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba.

I. Introduction.

1. Submitted herewith is a covert program for Cuba within the CIA’s capabilities. Some parts of the program have already been approved and are being implemented. Being closely inter-related, the total cumulative impact of the courses of action set forth in this program is dependent upon the simultaneous coordinated execution of the individual course of action.

2. This program is based on the assumption that current U.S. policy does not contemplate outright military intervention in Cuba or a provocation which can be used as a pretext for an invasion of Cuba by United States military forces. It is further assumed that U.S. policy calls for the exertion of maximum pressure by all means available to the U.S. government, short of military intervention,….

II Discussion of Components of an Integrated Program….

A. Covert collection of intelligence

B. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance….

C. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military…

D. Economic denial actions

E. General sabotage and harassment….These operations will be conducted either by eternally held assets [Note: Presumably a reference to Cuban émigrés ] now available or by existing internal assets or those to be developed. Assets trained and controlled by the CIA will be used as well as selected autonomous exile groups. Initially, the emphasis will be on the use of externally held assets with a shift to internal assets as soon as operationally feasible….

F. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of action.

(1) It is the keystone of the autonomous operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals motivated by the conviction that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance.

(2)The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous operations can be effectively halted by the withdrawal of US support, but once halted, it cannot be resumed.

(3) All autonomous operations will be mounted from outside the territory of the United States.

(4) The United States Government must be prepared to deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of US complicity.

(5) The US presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum…..

(6) These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed item schedule….

16. Memorandum for the Record

JFK approves a new program of sabotage operations and other cover actions against Cuba – the CIA plan of June 8 (See preceding document)

Washington, June 19, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting at the White House concerning Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba

PRESENT

Higher Authority (JFK)

Secretary McNamara

Under Secretary Harriman

Mr. McCone

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Thomas Parrott

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald

Air Force Chief of Staff, General W. F. McKee,

1. The program as recommended by the Standing Group of the NSC [Note: See Document 15, including footnote 2] was presented briefly to Higher Authority who showed a particular interest in proposed external sabotage operations. He was show charts indicating typical targets for this program and a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages ensued. It as well recognized that there would be failures and a considerable noise level….Mr. Bundy described the integrated nature of the program presented and made the point that, having made the decision to go ahead, we be prepared to take the consequences of flaps and criticisms for a sufficient period to give the program a real chance. Mr. Harriman stated that the program would be ‘reviewed weekly’ by the Special Group [ Note: It was customary for the NSC Special Group to oversee covert operations ] (It is believed that an arrangement can be made with Mr. Bundy for less detailed control by the Special Group than was indicated by Mr. Harriman.)

2. Higher Authority asked how soon we could get into action with the external sabotage program and was told that we should be able to conduct our first operation in the dark-of-the-moon period in July although he was informed that we would prefer to start the program with some caution selecting softer targets to begin with. Higher Authority said this was a matter for our judgment. Although at one stage in the discussion Higher Authority said that we should move ahead with the program ‘this summer’ it is believed that Mr. Bundy will be able to convince him that this is not a sufficiently long trial period to demonstrate what the program can do. [Note: CIA official Desmond FitzGerald prepared this memorandum.].

{BK Note: There’s a huge gap in the official records here – from June 19 to Sept. 10, during which a lot happened – ie. On Sept. 9, the New Orleans Times Picayune published an article: “Castro Blasts Raids on Cuba” that Oswald clipped, and Issac Don Levine says was found among his effects. In it Castro is quoted as saying “We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. US leaders should think twice that if they are aiding terrorists plans to eleminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe.”}

17. Memorandum of Conversation

In a secret message to JFK, Khrushchev makes clear that he is aware of the recent resumption of sabotage by the United States against Cuba. He also warns Kennedy that the Soviet Union will respond if Cuba is attacked.

Washington, September 10, 1963.

SUBJECT

United States Actions in Cuba

18. Memorandum of Conversation Prepared by Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson.

Responding to Khrushchev’s September 10 message, JFK tries to change the subject from sabotage against Cuba to Cuban subversion in Latin America.

Attachment

ORAL STATEMENT

In keeping with the March 30, 1963 declaration by the Department of State and Justice concerning hit and run attacks by Cuban exile groups against targets in Cuba, the law enforcement agencies are taking vigorous measures to assure that the pertinent laws of the United States are observed….

{BK Note: On October 8, Radio Havana broadcast: “The U.S. has been extending the acts of infiltration of agents of the CIA” and accused Washington of staging jet raids and training counter-revolutionary Cubans for another invasion.” On October 22, RH charged that attacks on Cuban coastline and acts of sabotage and murder are carried out under the direction of the President, in this case Mr. Kennedy.” }

From: “Rearview Mirror” (Penmarin Books, CA, 2001, p. 185-186) by William Turner: “On the night of October 21, 1963, Pepe was a crew member of the disguised raider Rex when it launched a sabotage attack on a shore installation in Pinar del Rio Province. It was a CIA operation…The Rex was not listed in Jane’s Fighting Ships. It was a World War II subchaser pulled out of the mothball fleet at Green Cove Springs, Florida. Painted a classy dark blue, the 174-foot vessel could cut through the waves at twenty knots. It flew the blue-and-white flag of Nicaragua, whose strongman, General Luis Somoza, had hosted the Bay of Pigs invasion brigade. Registration papers showed that it was owned by the Belcher Oil Company of Miami, which fueled cruise ships. In turn, Belcher leased it to Collins Radio International, a major defense contractor, for ‘electronic and oceanographic research.’”

{BK Note: The phone records of David Ferrie reflect that he made a number of phone calls to Belcher Oil Co., and J.D. Tippit’s best friend, whose car was seen near where Tippit was murdered, worked at Collins Radio in Richardson, Texas, and personally worked on the radio communications equipment aboard the Vice President’s plane}

Turner: “There were oversized searchlights, elaborate electronic gear…and a large crain on the aft deck capable of raising and lowering twenty-foot speedboats….two 40-mm. Naval cannon, a 57-mm recoilless rifle, and two 20-mm cannon. According to Pepe, the forty seamen, all Cubans, were paid $300 a month by the CIA….When a mission was scheduled, they received a phone call, then a nondescript CIA van picked them up and took them to the West Palm Beach berth {BK Note: not far for the Kennedy family home and compound} where the Rex was tied up. The dockage fees were paid by a CIA front, Sea Key Shipping Company, which operated out of a post office box…Captain Alejandro Brooks, ….awaited the arrival of Gordon Campbell, the CIA’s director of Naval operations to arrive with orders for the night’s mission….The men belonged to the Commandos Mambises,…the CIA’s elite, the Green Berets of the Secret War. They were led by Major Manuel Villafana, a spit-and-polish officer who had commanded the Bay of Pigs Air Force. Villafana insisted his men be low paid because he wanted them driven by hate, not money.”

“The target on this mission was the giant Matahambre copper mine near Cape Corriente on the bootheel of Pinar del Rio Provence….when the Rex arrived at the landing zone, there was a sense of foreboding….it was a trap….'

Two days later…Fidel Castro appeared on Havana television to describe the Rex…and introduced two of the missing men, Rex quartermaster Luis Montera Carranzana, who had piloted a Moppie, and Dr. Clemente Inclan Werner, a Mambise…...White House press secretary Pierre Salinger: “We have nothing to say.” but Kennedy, visiting his Palm Beach home, not far from where the Rex was docked, was reportedly upset that the Cubans were launching attacks from the USA, against stated government policy.

On November 1, 1963, the New York Times published a photo of the Rex on the front page, with a story that blew the CIA cover of Collins Radio.

On November 4, The Dallas Morning News announced JFK’s visit to Dallas.

At the same time the Cuban raiders were attacking Cuba, President Kennedy had begun secret negotiations with Castro through his UN ambassador Carlos Lechuga and American diplomat William Attwood.

The two two operations would cross paths at Dealey Plaza, Dallas on November 22, 1963.

xxxx

Robert Howard · September 21, 2006